Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in March 2026
Welcome to the March 2026 report from the Reproducible Builds project!
These reports outline what we ve been up to over the past month, highlighting items of news from elsewhere in the increasingly-important area of software supply-chain security. As ever, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please see the Contribute page on our website.
- Linux kernel hash-based integrity checking proposed
- Distribution work
- Tool development
- Upstream patches
- Documentation updates
- Two new academic papers
- Misc news
Linux kernel hash-based integrity checking proposed
Eric Biggers posted to the Linux Kernel Mailing List in response to a patch series posted by Thomas Wei schuh to introduce a calculated hash-based system of integrity checking to complement the existing signature-based approach. Thomas original post mentions:
The current signature-based module integrity checking has some drawbacks in combination with reproducible builds. Either the module signing key is generated at build time, which makes the build unreproducible, or a static signing key is used, which precludes rebuilds by third parties and makes the whole build and packaging process much more complicated.
However, Eric s followup message goes further:
I think this actually undersells the feature. It s also much simpler than the signature-based module authentication. The latter relies on PKCS#7, X.509, ASN.1, OID registry, crypto_sig API, etc in addition to the implementations of the actual signature algorithm (RSA / ECDSA / ML-DSA) and at least one hash algorithm.
Distribution work
In Debian this month,
-
Lucas Nussbaum announced Debaudit, a new service to verify the reproducibility of Debian source packages :
debaudit complements the work of the Reproducible Builds project. While reproduce.debian.net focuses on ensuring that binary packages can be bit-for-bit reproduced from their source packages, debaudit focuses on the preceding step: ensuring that the source package itself is a faithful and reproducible representation of its upstream source or Vcs-Git repository.
-
kpcyrd filed a bug against the
librust-const-random-dev package reporting that the compile-time-rng feature of the ahash crate uses the const-random crate in turn, which uses a macro to read/generate a random number generator during the build. This issue was also filed upstream.
-
60 reviews of Debian packages were added, 4 were updated and 16 were removed this month adding to our knowledge about identified issues. One new issue types was added,
pkgjs_lock_json_file_issue.
Lastly, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted another openSUSE monthly update for their work there.
Tool development
diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can locate and diagnose reproducibility issues. This month, Chris Lamb made a number of changes, including preparing and uploading versions, 314 and 315 to Debian.
-
Chris Lamb:
- Don t run
test_code_is_black_clean test in the autopkgtests. (#1130402). [ ]
- Add some debugging info for PyPI debugging. [ ]
-
Jelle van der Waa:
- Fix compatibility with LLVM version 22. [ ]
- Adjust the PGP file detection regular expression. [ ]
-
Michael R. Crusoe:
- Reformat the source code using Black version 26.1.0 [ ][ ]
In addition, Vagrant Cascadian updated diffoscope in GNU Guix to version 315.
rebuilderd, our server designed monitor the official package repositories of Linux distributions and attempt to reproduce the observed results there; it powers, amongst other things, reproduce.debian.net.
A new version, 0.26.0, was released this month, with the following improvements:
- Much smoother onboarding/installation.
- Complete database redesign with many improvements.
- New REST HTTP API.
- It s now possible to artificially delay the first reproduce attempt. This gives archive infrastructure more time to catch up.
- And many, many other changes.
Upstream patches
The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:
-
Bernhard M. Wiedemann:
minify (rust random HashMap) / (alternative by kpcyrd)
rpm-config-SUSE (toolchain)
-
Chris Lamb:
- #1129544 filed against
python-nxtomomill.
- #1130622 filed against
dh-fortran.
- #1130623 filed against
python-discovery.
- #1130666 filed against
kanboard.
- #1131168 filed against
moltemplate.
- #1131384 filed against
stacer.
- #1131385 filed against
libcupsfilters.
- #1131395 filed against
django-ninja.
- #1131403 filed against
python-agate.
- #1132074 filed against
aetos.
- #1132508 filed against
python-bayespy.
-
kpcyrd:
Documentation updates
Once again, there were a number of improvements made to our website this month including:
-
kpcyrd:
- Add a new page about Rust specifics. [ ][ ][ ]
-
Robin Candau:
- Add link to the
diffoci Arch Linux package on the Tools page. [ ]
-
Timo Pohl:
- Add new From Constrictor to Serpent: Investigating the Threat of Cache Poisoning in the Python Ecosystem paper to the Academic publications page. [ ]
- Add GitLab registration confirmation to How to join the Salsa group page. [ ]
Two new academic papers
Marc Ohm, Timo Pohl, Ben Swierzy and Michael Meier published a paper on the threat of cache poisoning in the Python ecosystem:
Attacks on software supply chains are on the rise, and attackers are becoming increasingly creative in how they inject malicious code into software components.
This paper is the first to investigate Python cache poisoning, which manipulates bytecode cache files to execute malicious code without altering the human-readable source code.
We demonstrate a proof of concept, showing that an attacker can inject malicious bytecode into a cache file without failing the Python interpreter s integrity checks.
In a large-scale analysis of the Python Package Index, we find that about 12,500 packages are distributed with cache files.
Through manual investigation of cache files that cannot be reproduced automatically from the corresponding source files, we identify classes of reasons for irreproducibility to locate malicious cache files.
While we did not identify any malware leveraging this attack vector, we demonstrate that several widespread package managers are vulnerable to such attacks.
A PDF of the paper is available online.
Mario Lins of the University of Linz, Austria, has published their PhD doctoral thesis on the topic of Software supply chain transparency:
We begin by examining threats to the software distribution stage the point at which artifacts (e.g., mobile apps) are delivered to end users with an emphasis on mobile ecosystems [and] we next focus on the operating system on mobile devices, with an emphasis on mitigating bootloader-targeted attacks. We demonstrate how to compensate lost security guarantees on devices with an unlocked bootloader. This allows users to flash custom operating systems on devices that no longer receive security updates from the original manufacturer without compromising security. We then move to the source code stage. [Also,] we introduce a new architecture to ensure strong source-to-binary correspondence by leveraging the security guarantees of Confidential Computing technology. Finally, we present The Supply Chain Game, an organizational security approach that enhances standard risk-management methods. We demonstrate how game-theoretic techniques, combined with common risk management practices, can derive new criteria to better support decision makers.
A PDF of the paper is available online.
Misc news
On our mailing list this month:
-
Holger Levsen announced that this year s Reproducible Builds summit will almost certainly be held in Gothenburg, Sweden, from September 22 until 24, followed by two days of hacking. However, these dates are preliminary and not 100% final an official announcement is forthcoming.
-
Mark Wielaard posted to our list asking a question on the difference between
debugedit and relative debug paths based on a comment on the Build path page: Have people tried more modern versions of debugedit to get deterministic (absolute) DWARF paths and found issues with it?
Finally, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:
-
IRC:
#reproducible-builds on irc.oftc.net.
-
Mastodon: @reproducible_builds@fosstodon.org
-
Mailing list:
rb-general@lists.reproducible-builds.org
crypto_sig API, etc in addition to the implementations of the actual signature algorithm (RSA / ECDSA / ML-DSA) and at least one hash algorithm.
In Debian this month,
-
Lucas Nussbaum announced Debaudit, a new service to verify the reproducibility of Debian source packages :
debaudit complements the work of the Reproducible Builds project. While reproduce.debian.net focuses on ensuring that binary packages can be bit-for-bit reproduced from their source packages, debaudit focuses on the preceding step: ensuring that the source package itself is a faithful and reproducible representation of its upstream source or
Vcs-Gitrepository. -
kpcyrd filed a bug against the
librust-const-random-devpackage reporting that thecompile-time-rngfeature of theahashcrate uses theconst-randomcrate in turn, which uses a macro to read/generate a random number generator during the build. This issue was also filed upstream. -
60 reviews of Debian packages were added, 4 were updated and 16 were removed this month adding to our knowledge about identified issues. One new issue types was added,
pkgjs_lock_json_file_issue.
Lastly, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted another openSUSE monthly update for their work there.
Tool development
diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can locate and diagnose reproducibility issues. This month, Chris Lamb made a number of changes, including preparing and uploading versions, 314 and 315 to Debian.
-
Chris Lamb:
- Don t run
test_code_is_black_clean test in the autopkgtests. (#1130402). [ ]
- Add some debugging info for PyPI debugging. [ ]
-
Jelle van der Waa:
- Fix compatibility with LLVM version 22. [ ]
- Adjust the PGP file detection regular expression. [ ]
-
Michael R. Crusoe:
- Reformat the source code using Black version 26.1.0 [ ][ ]
In addition, Vagrant Cascadian updated diffoscope in GNU Guix to version 315.
rebuilderd, our server designed monitor the official package repositories of Linux distributions and attempt to reproduce the observed results there; it powers, amongst other things, reproduce.debian.net.
A new version, 0.26.0, was released this month, with the following improvements:
- Much smoother onboarding/installation.
- Complete database redesign with many improvements.
- New REST HTTP API.
- It s now possible to artificially delay the first reproduce attempt. This gives archive infrastructure more time to catch up.
- And many, many other changes.
Upstream patches
The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:
-
Bernhard M. Wiedemann:
minify (rust random HashMap) / (alternative by kpcyrd)
rpm-config-SUSE (toolchain)
-
Chris Lamb:
- #1129544 filed against
python-nxtomomill.
- #1130622 filed against
dh-fortran.
- #1130623 filed against
python-discovery.
- #1130666 filed against
kanboard.
- #1131168 filed against
moltemplate.
- #1131384 filed against
stacer.
- #1131385 filed against
libcupsfilters.
- #1131395 filed against
django-ninja.
- #1131403 filed against
python-agate.
- #1132074 filed against
aetos.
- #1132508 filed against
python-bayespy.
-
kpcyrd:
Documentation updates
Once again, there were a number of improvements made to our website this month including:
-
kpcyrd:
- Add a new page about Rust specifics. [ ][ ][ ]
-
Robin Candau:
- Add link to the
diffoci Arch Linux package on the Tools page. [ ]
-
Timo Pohl:
- Add new From Constrictor to Serpent: Investigating the Threat of Cache Poisoning in the Python Ecosystem paper to the Academic publications page. [ ]
- Add GitLab registration confirmation to How to join the Salsa group page. [ ]
Two new academic papers
Marc Ohm, Timo Pohl, Ben Swierzy and Michael Meier published a paper on the threat of cache poisoning in the Python ecosystem:
Attacks on software supply chains are on the rise, and attackers are becoming increasingly creative in how they inject malicious code into software components.
This paper is the first to investigate Python cache poisoning, which manipulates bytecode cache files to execute malicious code without altering the human-readable source code.
We demonstrate a proof of concept, showing that an attacker can inject malicious bytecode into a cache file without failing the Python interpreter s integrity checks.
In a large-scale analysis of the Python Package Index, we find that about 12,500 packages are distributed with cache files.
Through manual investigation of cache files that cannot be reproduced automatically from the corresponding source files, we identify classes of reasons for irreproducibility to locate malicious cache files.
While we did not identify any malware leveraging this attack vector, we demonstrate that several widespread package managers are vulnerable to such attacks.
A PDF of the paper is available online.
Mario Lins of the University of Linz, Austria, has published their PhD doctoral thesis on the topic of Software supply chain transparency:
We begin by examining threats to the software distribution stage the point at which artifacts (e.g., mobile apps) are delivered to end users with an emphasis on mobile ecosystems [and] we next focus on the operating system on mobile devices, with an emphasis on mitigating bootloader-targeted attacks. We demonstrate how to compensate lost security guarantees on devices with an unlocked bootloader. This allows users to flash custom operating systems on devices that no longer receive security updates from the original manufacturer without compromising security. We then move to the source code stage. [Also,] we introduce a new architecture to ensure strong source-to-binary correspondence by leveraging the security guarantees of Confidential Computing technology. Finally, we present The Supply Chain Game, an organizational security approach that enhances standard risk-management methods. We demonstrate how game-theoretic techniques, combined with common risk management practices, can derive new criteria to better support decision makers.
A PDF of the paper is available online.
Misc news
On our mailing list this month:
-
Holger Levsen announced that this year s Reproducible Builds summit will almost certainly be held in Gothenburg, Sweden, from September 22 until 24, followed by two days of hacking. However, these dates are preliminary and not 100% final an official announcement is forthcoming.
-
Mark Wielaard posted to our list asking a question on the difference between
debugedit and relative debug paths based on a comment on the Build path page: Have people tried more modern versions of debugedit to get deterministic (absolute) DWARF paths and found issues with it?
Finally, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:
-
IRC:
#reproducible-builds on irc.oftc.net.
-
Mastodon: @reproducible_builds@fosstodon.org
-
Mailing list:
rb-general@lists.reproducible-builds.org
- Don t run
test_code_is_black_cleantest in the autopkgtests. (#1130402). [ ] - Add some debugging info for PyPI debugging. [ ]
- Fix compatibility with LLVM version 22. [ ]
- Adjust the PGP file detection regular expression. [ ]
- Reformat the source code using Black version 26.1.0 [ ][ ]
-
Bernhard M. Wiedemann:
minify(rust random HashMap) / (alternative by kpcyrd)rpm-config-SUSE(toolchain)
-
Chris Lamb:
- #1129544 filed against
python-nxtomomill. - #1130622 filed against
dh-fortran. - #1130623 filed against
python-discovery. - #1130666 filed against
kanboard. - #1131168 filed against
moltemplate. - #1131384 filed against
stacer. - #1131385 filed against
libcupsfilters. - #1131395 filed against
django-ninja. - #1131403 filed against
python-agate. - #1132074 filed against
aetos. - #1132508 filed against
python-bayespy.
- #1129544 filed against
- kpcyrd:
Documentation updates
Once again, there were a number of improvements made to our website this month including:
-
kpcyrd:
- Add a new page about Rust specifics. [ ][ ][ ]
-
Robin Candau:
- Add link to the
diffoci Arch Linux package on the Tools page. [ ]
-
Timo Pohl:
- Add new From Constrictor to Serpent: Investigating the Threat of Cache Poisoning in the Python Ecosystem paper to the Academic publications page. [ ]
- Add GitLab registration confirmation to How to join the Salsa group page. [ ]
Two new academic papers
Marc Ohm, Timo Pohl, Ben Swierzy and Michael Meier published a paper on the threat of cache poisoning in the Python ecosystem:
Attacks on software supply chains are on the rise, and attackers are becoming increasingly creative in how they inject malicious code into software components.
This paper is the first to investigate Python cache poisoning, which manipulates bytecode cache files to execute malicious code without altering the human-readable source code.
We demonstrate a proof of concept, showing that an attacker can inject malicious bytecode into a cache file without failing the Python interpreter s integrity checks.
In a large-scale analysis of the Python Package Index, we find that about 12,500 packages are distributed with cache files.
Through manual investigation of cache files that cannot be reproduced automatically from the corresponding source files, we identify classes of reasons for irreproducibility to locate malicious cache files.
While we did not identify any malware leveraging this attack vector, we demonstrate that several widespread package managers are vulnerable to such attacks.
A PDF of the paper is available online.
Mario Lins of the University of Linz, Austria, has published their PhD doctoral thesis on the topic of Software supply chain transparency:
We begin by examining threats to the software distribution stage the point at which artifacts (e.g., mobile apps) are delivered to end users with an emphasis on mobile ecosystems [and] we next focus on the operating system on mobile devices, with an emphasis on mitigating bootloader-targeted attacks. We demonstrate how to compensate lost security guarantees on devices with an unlocked bootloader. This allows users to flash custom operating systems on devices that no longer receive security updates from the original manufacturer without compromising security. We then move to the source code stage. [Also,] we introduce a new architecture to ensure strong source-to-binary correspondence by leveraging the security guarantees of Confidential Computing technology. Finally, we present The Supply Chain Game, an organizational security approach that enhances standard risk-management methods. We demonstrate how game-theoretic techniques, combined with common risk management practices, can derive new criteria to better support decision makers.
A PDF of the paper is available online.
Misc news
On our mailing list this month:
-
Holger Levsen announced that this year s Reproducible Builds summit will almost certainly be held in Gothenburg, Sweden, from September 22 until 24, followed by two days of hacking. However, these dates are preliminary and not 100% final an official announcement is forthcoming.
-
Mark Wielaard posted to our list asking a question on the difference between
debugedit and relative debug paths based on a comment on the Build path page: Have people tried more modern versions of debugedit to get deterministic (absolute) DWARF paths and found issues with it?
Finally, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:
-
IRC:
#reproducible-builds on irc.oftc.net.
-
Mastodon: @reproducible_builds@fosstodon.org
-
Mailing list:
rb-general@lists.reproducible-builds.org
- Add a new page about Rust specifics. [ ][ ][ ]
- Add link to the
diffociArch Linux package on the Tools page. [ ]
- Add new From Constrictor to Serpent: Investigating the Threat of Cache Poisoning in the Python Ecosystem paper to the Academic publications page. [ ]
- Add GitLab registration confirmation to How to join the Salsa group page. [ ]
Marc Ohm, Timo Pohl, Ben Swierzy and Michael Meier published a paper on the threat of cache poisoning in the Python ecosystem:
Attacks on software supply chains are on the rise, and attackers are becoming increasingly creative in how they inject malicious code into software components.
This paper is the first to investigate Python cache poisoning, which manipulates bytecode cache files to execute malicious code without altering the human-readable source code.
We demonstrate a proof of concept, showing that an attacker can inject malicious bytecode into a cache file without failing the Python interpreter s integrity checks.
In a large-scale analysis of the Python Package Index, we find that about 12,500 packages are distributed with cache files.
Through manual investigation of cache files that cannot be reproduced automatically from the corresponding source files, we identify classes of reasons for irreproducibility to locate malicious cache files.
While we did not identify any malware leveraging this attack vector, we demonstrate that several widespread package managers are vulnerable to such attacks.
A PDF of the paper is available online.
Mario Lins of the University of Linz, Austria, has published their PhD doctoral thesis on the topic of Software supply chain transparency:
We begin by examining threats to the software distribution stage the point at which artifacts (e.g., mobile apps) are delivered to end users with an emphasis on mobile ecosystems [and] we next focus on the operating system on mobile devices, with an emphasis on mitigating bootloader-targeted attacks. We demonstrate how to compensate lost security guarantees on devices with an unlocked bootloader. This allows users to flash custom operating systems on devices that no longer receive security updates from the original manufacturer without compromising security. We then move to the source code stage. [Also,] we introduce a new architecture to ensure strong source-to-binary correspondence by leveraging the security guarantees of Confidential Computing technology. Finally, we present The Supply Chain Game, an organizational security approach that enhances standard risk-management methods. We demonstrate how game-theoretic techniques, combined with common risk management practices, can derive new criteria to better support decision makers.
A PDF of the paper is available online.
Misc news
On our mailing list this month:
-
Holger Levsen announced that this year s Reproducible Builds summit will almost certainly be held in Gothenburg, Sweden, from September 22 until 24, followed by two days of hacking. However, these dates are preliminary and not 100% final an official announcement is forthcoming.
-
Mark Wielaard posted to our list asking a question on the difference between
debugedit and relative debug paths based on a comment on the Build path page: Have people tried more modern versions of debugedit to get deterministic (absolute) DWARF paths and found issues with it?
Finally, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:
-
IRC:
#reproducible-builds on irc.oftc.net.
-
Mastodon: @reproducible_builds@fosstodon.org
-
Mailing list:
rb-general@lists.reproducible-builds.org
debugedit and relative debug paths based on a comment on the Build path page: Have people tried more modern versions of debugedit to get deterministic (absolute) DWARF paths and found issues with it?
#reproducible-builds on irc.oftc.net.
rb-general@lists.reproducible-builds.org
A lot of the youtube channels I follow tend to involve somebody making
things, so of course one of the videos my SO and I watched a few days
ago was about
And then, 10 minutes after we had left, realizing that I had written
down the password for the train website, since it was no longer saved on
the phone, but i had forgotten the bit of paper at home. We could have
gone back to take it, but decided not to bother, as we could also
hopefully buy paper-ish tickets at the train station (we could).
Later on, I also realized I had also forgotten my GPS tracker, so I have
no record of where we went exactly (but it s not hard to recognize it on
a map) nor on what the temperature was. It s a shame, but by that point
it was way too late to go back.
Anyway, that probably was when Murphy felt we had paid our respects, and
from then on everything went lovingly well!
Routing had been done on the
And indeed, after a short while the paved road ended, but the path
continued on a wide and flat track, and was a welcome detour through
what looked like water works to prevent flood damage from a stream.
In a warmer season, with longer grass and ticks maybe the fact that I
was wearing a long skirt may have been an issue, but in winter it was
just fine.
And soon afterwards, we were in Porto Ceresio. I think I have been there
as a child, but I had no memory of it. On the other hand, it was about
as I expected: a tiny town with a lakeside street full of houses built
in the early 1900s when the area was an important tourism destination,
with older buildings a bit higher up on the hills (because streams
in this area will flood). And of course, getting there by foot rather
than by train we also saw the parts where real people live (but not
work: that s cross-border commuters country).
Soon after arriving in Porto Ceresio we stopped to eat our lunch on a
bench at the lakeside; up to then we had been pretty comfortable in the
clothing we had decided to wear: there was plenty of frost on the
ground, in the shade, but the sun was warm and the temperatures were
cleanly above freezing. Removing the gloves to eat, however, resulted in
quite cold hands, and we didn t want to stay still for longer than
strictly necessary.
So we spent another hour and a bit walking around Porto Ceresio like
proper tourists and taking pictures. There was an exhibition of nativity
scenes all around the streets, but to get a map one had to go to either
facebook or instagram, or wait for the opening hours of an office that
were later than the train we planned to get to go back home, so we only
saw maybe half of them, as we walked around: some were quite nice, some
were nativity scenes, and some showed that the school children must have
had some fun making them.
Another Christmas decoration were groups of creatures made of evergreen
branches that dotted the sidewalks around the lake: I took pictures of
the first couple of groups, and then after seeing a few more something
clicked in my brain, and I noticed that they were wrapped in green LED
strings, like chains, and they had a red ball that was supposed to be
the nose, but could just be around the mouth area, and suddenly I felt
the need to play
Another thing that we noticed were some benches in the shape of books,
with book quotations on them; most were on reading-related topics, but
the one with the Constitution felt worth taking a picture of, especially
these days.
And then, our train was waiting at the station, and we had to go back
home for the afternoon; it was a nice outing, if a bit brief, and we
agreed to do it again, possibly with a bit of a detour to make the walk
a bit longer. And then maybe one day we ll train to do the whole 5-6
hour thing through the hills.
Almost all of my Debian contributions this month were
In Mexico, we have the great luck to live among vestiges of long-gone
cultures, some that were conquered and in some way got adapted and
survived into our modern, mostly-West-Europan-derived society, and
some that thrived but disappeared many more centuries ago. And
although not everybody feels the same way, in my family we have always
enjoyed visiting archaeological sites when I was a child and today.
Some of the regulars that follow this blog (or its syndicators) will
remember Xochicalco, as it was the destination we chose for the
daytrip back in the day, in DebConf6 (May 2006).


So, in 2002 I attended my first
The fun tidbit was how stable they found the OCaml tool-chain. In
three years, they had just one bug related to this (the tool-chain), a
segfault due to wrong formatting code in the handling path of a
seldom-triggered Python exception, which led to a
Overall I have found interesting parallels between their experience
and my own with Haskell; from is this language/tool-chain stable
enough for use to concerns about using FP for a significant project
(but of course, orders of magnitude difference between their case and
mine).
Super-compilation
There were two papers on this topic;
Interestingly, the