A lot has been written about the Internet in Cuba over the years. I have read a few articles, from New York Times' happy support for Google's invasion of Cuba to RSF's dramatic and fairly outdated report about censorship in Cuba. Having written before about Internet censorship in Tunisia, I was curious to see if I could get a feel of what it is like over there, now that a new Castro is in power and the Obama administration has started restoring diplomatic ties with Cuba. With those political changes coming signifying the end of an embargo that has been called genocidal by the Cuban government, it is surprisingly difficult to get fresh information about the current state of affairs. This article aims to fill that gap in clarifying how the internet works in Cuba, what kind of censorship mechanisms are in place and how to work around them. It also digs more technically into the network architecture and performance. It is published in the hope of providing both Cubans and the rest of the world with a better understanding of their network and, if possible, Cubans ways to access the internet more cheaply or without censorship.

"Censorship" and workarounds Unfortunately, I have been connected to the internet only through the the Varadero airport and the WiFi of a "full included" resort near Jibacoa. I have to come to assume that this network is likely to be on a segregated, uncensored internet while the rest of the country suffers the wrath of the Internet censorship in Cuba I have seen documented elsewhere. Through my research, I couldn't find any sort of direct censorship. The Netalyzr tool couldn't find anything significantly wrong with the connection, other than the obvious performance problems related both to the overloaded uplinks of the Cuban internet. I ran an incomplete OONI probe as well, and it seems there was no obvious censorship detected there as well, at least according to folks in the helpful #ooni IRC channel. Tor also works fine, and could be a great way to avoid the global surveillance system described later in this article. Nevertheless, it still remains to be seen how the internet is censored in the "real" Cuban internet, outside of the tourist designated areas - hopefully future visitors or locals can expand on this using the tools mentioned above, using the regular internet. Usual care should be taken when using any workaround tools, mentioned in this post or not, as different regimes over the world have accused, detained, tortured and killed sometimes for the mere fact of using or distributing circumvention tools. For example, a Russian developer was arrested and detained in 2001 by United States' FBI for exposing vulnerabilities in the Adobe e-books copy protection mechanisms. Similarly, people distributing Tor and other tools have been arrested during the period prior to the revolution in Tunisia.

The Cuban captive portal There is, however, a more pernicious and yet very obvious censorship mechanism at work in Cuba: to get access to the internet, you have to go through what seems to be a state-wide captive portal, which I have seen both at the hotel and the airport. It is presumably deployed at all levels of the internet access points. To get credentials through that portal, you need a username and password which you get by buying a Nauta card. Those cards cost 2$CUC and get you an hour of basically unlimited internet access. That may not seem like a lot for a rich northern hotel party-goer, but for Cubans, it's a lot of money, given that the average monthly salary is around 20$CUC. The system is also pretty annoying to use, because it means you do not get continuous network access: every hour, you need to input a new card, which will obviously make streaming movies and other online activities annoying. It also makes hosting servers basically impossible. So while Cuba does not have, like China or Iran, a "great firewall", there is definitely a big restriction to going online in Cuba. Indeed, it seems to be how the government ensures that Cubans do not foment too much dissent online: keep the internet slow and inaccessible, and you won't get too many Arab spring / blogger revolutions.

Bypassing the Cuban captive portal The good news is that it is perfectly possible for Cubans (or at least for a tourist like me with resources outside of the country) to bypass the captive portal. Like many poorly implemented portals, the portal allows DNS traffic to go through, which makes it possible to access the global network for free by using a tool like iodine which tunnels IP traffic over DNS requests. Of course, the bandwidth and reliability of the connection you get through such a portal is pretty bad. I have regularly seen 80% packet loss and over two minutes of latency:

--- 10.0.0.1 ping statistics ---
163 packets transmitted, 31 received, 80% packet loss, time 162391ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 133.700/2669.535/64188.027/11257.336 ms, pipe 65

Still, it allowed me to login to my home server through SSH using Mosh to workaround the reliability issues. Every once in a while, mosh would get stuck and keep on trying to send packets to probe the server, which would clog the connection even more. So I regularly had to restart the whole stack using these commands:

killall iodine # stop DNS tunnel
nmcli n off # turn off wifi to change MAC address
macchanger -A wlan0 # change MAC address
nmcli n on # turn wifi back on
sleep 3 # wait for wifi to settle
iodine-client-start # restart DNS tunnel

The Koumbit Wiki has good instructions on how to setup a DNS tunnel. I am wondering if such a public service could be of use for Cubans, although I am not sure how it could be deployed only for Cubans, and what kind of traffic it could support... The fact is that iodine does require a server to operate, and that server must be run on the outside of the censored perimeter, something that Cubans may not be able to afford in the first place. Another possible way to save money with the captive portal would be to write something that automates connecting and disconnecting from the portal. You would feed that program a list of credentials and it would connect to the portal only on demand, and disconnect as soon as no traffic goes through. There are details on the implementation of the captive portal below that may help future endeavours in that field.

Private information revealed to the captive portal It should be mentioned, however, that the captive portal has a significant amount of information on clients, which is a direct threat to the online privacy of Cuban internet users. Of course the unique identifiers issued with the Nauta cards can be correlated with your identity, right from the start. For example, I had to give my room number to get a Nauta card issued. Then the central portal also knows which access point you are connected to. For example, the central portal I was connected to Wifi_Memories_Jibacoa which, for anyone that cares to research, will give them a location of about 20 square meters where I was located when connected (there is only one access point in the whole hotel). Finally, the central portal also knows my MAC address, a unique identifier for the computer I am using which also reveals which brand of computer I am using (Mac, Lenovo, etc). While this address can be changed, very few people know that, let alone how. This led me to question whether I would be allowed back in Cuba (or even allowed out!) after publishing this blog post, as it is obvious that I can be easily identified based on the time this article was published, my name and other details. Hopefully the Cuban government will either not notice or not care, but this can be a tricky situation, obviously. I have heard that Cuban prisons are not the best hangout place in Cuba, to say the least...

Network configuration assessment This section is more technical and delves more deeply in the Cuban internet to analyze the quality and topology of the network, along with hints as to which hardware and providers are being used to support the Cuban government.

Line quality The internet is actually not so bad in the hotel. Again, this may be because of the very fact that I am in that hotel, and I get a privileged access to the new fiber line to Venezuela, the ALBA-1 link. The line speed I get is around 1mbps, according to speedtest, which selected a server from LIME in George Town, Cayman Islands:

[1034]anarcat@angela:cuba$ speedtest
Retrieving speedtest.net configuration...
Retrieving speedtest.net server list...
Testing from Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba (152.206.92.146)...
Selecting best server based on latency...
Hosted by LIME (George Town) [391.78 km]: 317.546 ms
Testing download speed........................................
Download: 1.01 Mbits/s
Testing upload speed..................................................
Upload: 1.00 Mbits/s

Latency to the rest of the world is of couse slow:

--- koumbit.org ping statistics ---
122 packets transmitted, 120 received, 1,64% packet loss, time 18731,6ms
rtt min/avg/max/sdev = 127,457/156,097/725,211/94,688 ms
--- google.com ping statistics ---
122 packets transmitted, 121 received, 0,82% packet loss, time 19371,4ms
rtt min/avg/max/sdev = 132,517/160,095/724,971/93,273 ms
--- redcta.org.ar ping statistics ---
122 packets transmitted, 120 received, 1,64% packet loss, time 40748,6ms
rtt min/avg/max/sdev = 303,035/339,572/965,092/97,503 ms
--- ccc.de ping statistics ---
122 packets transmitted, 72 received, 40,98% packet loss, time 19560,2ms
rtt min/avg/max/sdev = 244,266/271,670/594,104/61,933 ms

Interestingly, Koumbit is actually the closest host in the above test. It could be that Canadian hosts are less affected by bandwidth problems compared to US hosts because of the embargo.

Network topology The various traceroutes show a fairly odd network topology, but that is typical of what I would described as "colonized internet users", which have layers and layers of NAT and obscure routing that keep them from the real internet. Just like large corporations are implementing NAT in a large scale, Cuba seems to have layers and layers of private RFC 1918 IPv4 space. A typical traceroute starts with:

traceroute to koumbit.net (199.58.80.33), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
 1  10.156.41.1 (10.156.41.1)  9.724 ms  9.472 ms  9.405 ms
 2  192.168.134.137 (192.168.134.137)  16.089 ms  15.612 ms  15.509 ms
 3  172.31.252.113 (172.31.252.113)  15.350 ms  15.805 ms  15.358 ms
 4  pos6-0-0-agu-cr-1.mpls.enet.cu (172.31.253.197)  15.286 ms  14.832 ms  14.405 ms
 5  172.31.252.29 (172.31.252.29)  13.734 ms  13.685 ms  14.485 ms
 6  200.0.16.130 (200.0.16.130)  14.428 ms  11.393 ms  10.977 ms
 7  200.0.16.74 (200.0.16.74)  10.738 ms  10.019 ms  10.326 ms
 8  ix-11-3-1-0.tcore1.TNK-Toronto.as6453.net (64.86.33.45)  108.577 ms  108.449 ms

Let's take this apart line by line:

 1  10.156.41.1 (10.156.41.1)  9.724 ms  9.472 ms  9.405 ms

This is my local gateway, probably the hotel's wifi router.

 2  192.168.134.137 (192.168.134.137)  16.089 ms  15.612 ms  15.509 ms

This is likely not very far from the local gateway, probably still in Cuba. It in one bit away from the captive portal IP address (see below) so it is very likely related to the captive portal implementation.

 3  172.31.252.113 (172.31.252.113)  15.350 ms  15.805 ms  15.358 ms
 4  pos6-0-0-agu-cr-1.mpls.enet.cu (172.31.253.197)  15.286 ms  14.832 ms  14.405 ms
 5  172.31.252.29 (172.31.252.29)  13.734 ms  13.685 ms  14.485 ms

All those are withing RFC 1918 space. Interestingly, the Cuban DNS servers resolve one of those private IPs as within Cuban space, on line #4. That line is interesting because it reveals the potential use of MPLS.

 6  200.0.16.130 (200.0.16.130)  14.428 ms  11.393 ms  10.977 ms
 7  200.0.16.74 (200.0.16.74)  10.738 ms  10.019 ms  10.326 ms

Those two lines are the only ones that actually reveal that the route belongs in Cuba at all. Both IPs are in a tiny (/24, or 256 IP addresses) network allocated to ETECSA, the state telco in Cuba:

inetnum:     200.0.16/24
status:      allocated
aut-num:     N/A
owner:       EMPRESA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES DE CUBA S.A. (IXP CUBA)
ownerid:     CU-CUBA-LACNIC
responsible: Rafael L pez Guerra
address:     Ave. Independencia y 19 Mayo, s/n,
address:     10600 - La Habana - CH
country:     CU
phone:       +53 7 574242 []
owner-c:     JOQ
tech-c:      JOQ
abuse-c:     JEM52
inetrev:     200.0.16/24
nserver:     NS1.NAP.ETECSA.NET
nsstat:      20160123 AA
nslastaa:    20160123
nserver:     NS2.NAP.ETECSA.NET
nsstat:      20160123 AA
nslastaa:    20160123
created:     20030512
changed:     20140610

Then the last hop:

 8  ix-11-3-1-0.tcore1.TNK-Toronto.as6453.net (64.86.33.45)  108.577 ms  108.449 ms  108.257 ms

...interestingly, lands directly in Toronto, in this case going later to Koumbit but that is the first hop that varies according to the destination, hops 1-7 being a common trunk to all external communications. It's also interesting that this shoves a good 90 milliseconds extra in latency, showing that a significant distance and number of equipment crossed. Yet a single hop is crossed, not showing the intermediate step of the Venezuelan link or any other links for that matter. Something obscure is going on there... Also interesting to note is the traceroute to the redirection host, which is only one hop away:

traceroute to 192.168.134.138 (192.168.134.138), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
 1  192.168.134.138 (192.168.134.138)  6.027 ms  5.698 ms  5.596 ms

Even though it is not the gateway:

$ ip route
default via 10.156.41.1 dev wlan0  proto static  metric 1024
10.156.41.0/24 dev wlan0  proto kernel  scope link  src 10.156.41.4
169.254.0.0/16 dev wlan0  scope link  metric 1000

This means a very close coordination between the different access points and the captive portal system. Finally, note that there seems to be only three peers to the Cuban internet: Teleglobe, formerly Canadian, now owned by the Indian [[!wiki Tata group]], and Telef nica, the Spanish Telco that colonized most of Latin America's internet, all the way down to Argentina. This is confirmed by my traceroutes, which show traffic to Koumbit going through Tata and Google's going through Telef nica.

Captive portal implementation The captive portal is https://www.portal-wifi-temas.nauta.cu/ (not accessible outside of Cuba) and uses a self-signed certificate. The domain name resolves to 190.6.81.230 in the hotel. Accessing http://1.1.1.1/ gives you a status page which allows you to disconnect from the portal. It actually redirects you to https://192.168.134.138/logout.user. That is also a self-signed, but different certificate. That certificate actually reveals the implication of Gemtek which is a "world-leading provider of Wireless Broadband solutions, offering a wide range of solutions from residential to business". It is somewhat unclear if the implication of Gemtek here is deliberate or a misconfiguration on the part of Cuban officials, especially since the certificate is self-signed and was issued in 2002. It could be, however, a trace of the supposed involvement of China in the development of Cuba's networking systems, although Gemtek is based in Taiwan, and not in the China mainland. That IP, in turn, redirects you to the same portal but in a page that shows you the statistics:

https://www.portal-wifi-temas.nauta.cu/?mac=0024D1717D18&script=logout.user&remain_time=00%3A55%3A52&session_time=00%3A04%3A08&username=151003576287&clientip=10.156.41.21&nasid=Wifi_Memories_Jibacoa&r=ac%2Fpopup

Notice how you see the MAC address of the machine in the URL (randomized, this is not my MAC address), along with the remaining time, session time, client IP and the Wifi access point ESSID. There may be some potential in defrauding the session time there, I haven't tested it directly. Hitting Actualizar redirects you back to the IP address, which redirects you to the right URL on the portal. The "real" logout is at:

http://192.168.134.138/logout.user?cmd=logout

The login is performed against https://www.portal-wifi-temas.nauta.cu/index.php?r=ac/login with a referer of:

https://www.portal-wifi-temas.nauta.cu/?&nasid=Wifi_Memories_Jibacoa&nasip=192.168.134.138&clientip=10.156.41.21&mac=EC:55:F9:C5:F2:55&ourl=http%3a%2f%2fgoogle.ca%2f&sslport=443&lang=en-US%2cen%3bq%3d0.8&lanip=10.156.41.1

Again, notice the information revealed to the central portal.

Equipment and providers I ran Nmap probes against both the captive portal and the redirection host, in the hope of finding out how they were built and if they could reveal the source of the equipment used. The complete nmap probes are available in nmap, but it seems that the captive portal is running some embedded device. It is confusing because the probe for the captive portal responds as if it was the gateway, which blurs even more the distinction between the hotel's gateway and the captive portal. This raises the distinct possibility that all access points are actually captive portal that authenticate to another central server. The nmap traces do show three distinct hosts however:

• the captive portal (www.portal-wifi-temas.nauta.cu, 190.6.81.230)
• some redirection host (192.168.134.138)
• the hotel's gateway (10.156.41.1)

They do have distinct signatures so the above may be just me misinterpreting traceroute and nmap results. Your comments may help in clarifying the above. Still, the three devices show up as running Linux, in the two last cases versions between 2.4.21 and 2.4.31. Now, to find out which version of Linux it is running is way more challenging, and it is possible it is just some custom Linux distribution. Indeed, the webserver shows up as G4200.GSI.2.22.0155 and the SSH server is running OpenSSH 3.0.2p1, which is basically prehistoric (2002!) which corroborates the idea that this is some Gemtek embedded device. The fact that those devices are running 14 years old software should be a concern to the people responsible for those networks. There is, for example, a remote root vulnerability that affects that specific version of OpenSSH, among many other vulnerabilities.

A note on Nauta card's security Finally, one can note that it is probably trivial to guess card UIDs. All cards i have here start with the prefix 15100, the following digits being 3576 or 4595, presumably depending on the "batch" that was sent to different hotels, which seems to be batches of 1000 cards. You can also correlate the UID with the date at which the card was issued. For example, 15100357XXX cards are all valid until 19/03/2017, and 151004595XXX cards are all valid until 23/03/2017. Here's the list of UIDs I have seen:

151004595313
151004595974
151003576287
151003576105
151003576097

The passwords, on the other hand, do seem fairly random (although my sample size is small). Interestingly, those passwords are also 12 digits long, which is about as strong as a seven-letter password (mixed uppercase and lowercase). If there are no rate-limiting provisions on that captive portal, it could be possible to guess those passwords, since you have free rein on accessing those routers. Depending on the performance of the routers, you could be lucky and find a working password for free...

Conclusion Clearly, Internet access in Cuba needs to be modernized. We can clearly see that Cuba years behind the rest of the Americas, if only through the percentage of the population with internet access, or download speeds. The existence of a centralized captive portal also enables a huge surveillance potential that should be a concern for any Cuban, or for that matter, anyone wishing to live in a free society. The answer, however, lies not in the liberalization of commerce and opening the doors to the US companies and their own systems of surveillance. It should be possible, and even desirable for Cubans to establish their own neutral network, a proposal I have made in the past even for here in Qu bec. This network could be used and improved by Cubans themselves, prioritizing local communities that would establish their own infrastructure according to their own needs. I have been impressed by this article about the El Paquete system - it shows great innovation and initiative from Cubans which are known for engaging in technology in a creative way. This should be leveraged by letting Cubans do what they want with their networks, not telling them what to do. The best the Googles of this world can do to help Cuba is not to colonize Cuba's technological landscape but to cleanup their own and make their own tools more easily accessible and shareable offline. It is something companies can do right now, something I detailed in a previous article.

The Debian Python Modules Team is discussing which DVCS to switch to from SVN. Ondrej Certik asked how to generate a list of commiters to the team s repository, so I looked at it and got this:
emilio@saturno:~/deb/python-modules$ svn log egrep "^r[0-9]+ cut -f2 -d sed s/-guest// sort uniq -c sort -n -r
865 piotr
609 morph
598 kov
532 bzed
388 pox
302 arnau
253 certik
216 shlomme
212 malex
175 hertzog
140 nslater
130 kobold
123 nijel
121 kitterma
106 bernat
99 kibi
87 varun
83 stratus
81 nobse
81 netzwurm
78 azatoth
76 mca
73 dottedmag
70 jluebbe
68 zack
68 cgalisteo
61 speijnik
61 odd_bloke
60 rganesan
55 kumanna
52 werner
50 haas
48 mejo
45 ucko
43 pabs
42 stew
42 luciano
41 mithrandi
40 wardi
36 gudjon
35 jandd
34 smcv
34 brettp
32 jenner
31 davidvilla
31 aurel32
30 rousseau
30 mtaylor
28 thomasbl
26 lool
25 gaspa
25 ffm
24 adn
22 jmalonzo
21 santiago
21 appaji
18 goedson
17 toadstool
17 sto
17 awen
16 mlizaur
16 akumar
15 nacho
14 smr
14 hanska
13 tviehmann
13 norsetto
13 mbaldessari
12 stone
12 sharky
11 rainct
11 fabrizio
10 lash
9 rodrigogc
9 pcc
9 miriam
9 madduck
9 ftlerror
8 pere
8 crschmidt
7 ncommander
7 myon
7 abuss
6 jwilk
6 bdrung
6 atehwa
5 kcoyner
5 catlee
5 andyp
4 vt
4 ross
4 osrevolution
4 lamby
4 baby
3 sez
3 joss
3 geole
2 rustybear
2 edmonds
2 astraw
2 ana
1 twerner
1 tincho
1 pochu
1 danderson
As it s likely that the Python Applications Packaging Team will switch too to the same DVCS at the same time, here are the numbers for its repo:

emilio@saturno:~/deb/python-apps$ svn log egrep "^r[0-9]+ cut -f2 -d sed s/-guest// sort uniq -c sort -n -r
401 nijel
288 piotr
235 gothicx
159 pochu
76 nslater
69 kumanna
68 rainct
66 gilir
63 certik
52 vdanjean
52 bzed
46 dottedmag
41 stani
39 varun
37 kitterma
36 morph
35 odd_bloke
29 pcc
29 gudjon
28 appaji
25 thomasbl
24 arnau
20 sc
20 andyp
18 jalet
15 gerardo
14 eike
14 ana
13 dfiloni
11 tklauser
10 ryanakca
10 nxvl
10 akumar
8 sez
8 baby
6 catlee
4 osrevolution
4 cody-somerville
2 mithrandi
2 cjsmo
1 nenolod
1 ffm
Here I m the 4th most committer And while I was on it, I thought I could do the same for the GNOME and GStreamer teams:
emilio@saturno:~/deb/pkg-gnome$ svn log egrep "^r[0-9]+ cut -f2 -d sed s/-guest// sort uniq -c sort -n -r
5357 lool
2701 joss
1633 slomo
1164 kov
825 seb128
622 jordi
621 jdassen
574 manphiz
335 sjoerd
298 mlang
296 netsnipe
291 grm
255 ross
236 ari
203 pochu
198 ondrej
190 he
180 kilian
176 alanbach
170 ftlerror
148 nobse
112 marco
87 jak
84 samm
78 rfrancoise
75 oysteigi
73 jsogo
65 svena
65 otavio
55 duck
54 jcurbo
53 zorglub
53 rtp
49 wasabi
49 giskard
42 tagoh
42 kartikm
40 gpastore
34 brad
32 robtaylor
31 xaiki
30 stratus
30 daf
26 johannes
24 sander-m
21 kk
19 bubulle
16 arnau
15 dodji
12 mbanck
11 ruoso
11 fpeters
11 dedu
11 christine
10 cpm
7 ember
7 drew
7 debotux
6 tico
6 emil
6 bradsmith
5 robster
5 carlosliu
4 rotty
4 diegoe
3 biebl
2 thibaut
2 ejad
1 naoliv
1 huats
1 gilir

emilio@saturno:~/deb/pkg-gstreamer$ svn log egrep "^r[0-9]+ cut -f2 -d sed s/-guest// sort uniq -c sort -n -r
891 lool
840 slomo
99 pnormand
69 sjoerd
27 seb128
21 manphiz
8 he
7 aquette
4 elmarco
1 fabian
Conclusions:
- Why do I have the full python-modules and pkg-gstreamer trees, if I have just one commit to DPMT, and don t even have commit access to the GStreamer team?
- If you don t want to seem like you have done less commits than you have actually done, don t change your alioth name when you become a DD (hint: pox-guest and piotr in python-modules are the same person)
- If the switch to a new VCS was based on a vote where you have one vote per commit, the top 3 commiters in pkg-gnome could win the vote if they chosed the same! For python-apps it s the 4 top commiters, and the 7 ones for python-modules. pkg-gstreamer is a bit special

Would you like to hack on open source for a living? Interested in cutting edge desktop/mobile technologies? We’re hiring! If you’d like to just chat about this or anything else relating to Codethink, I’m reachable on IRC (GIMPnet and Freenode with nick robtaylor) and on XMPP and plain old email at rob.taylor@codethink.co.uk.

For my own benefit (I have a terrible memory) I’ve decided to microblog GUADEC this year - assuming that there’s some working network (Yeah, its a big assumption..). So I’ve got myself an account on identi.ca. Enjoy!

As those of you who’ve been a bit more observant may have noticed, I now have a new company - Codethink Ltd. It’s really just starting up, but so far we’ve been doing work on HAL, OHM and Tinymail and it’s been good fun. However I don’t want to go the normal contracting house route of taking on employees to supply demand. This inevitably leads to static power structures and static role assignments which generally seems to lead to inefficiency, conflict and boredom as a company grows. Where I want to take Codethink: In business, I believe the future lies in loosely connected individual contractors, dynamically coming together to attack a project or idea, much as was described a few years ago in the seminal article ‘The Dawn of the E-lance Economy’ by Malone and Laubacher (Though I have to admit I hate the term ‘E-lance’..). Back then a few businesses were started up to try to facilitate this, like guru.com and elance.com, but I think these fail fundamentally as they don’t represent the knowledge of the network - that requires real people who actually know each other. Of course here in open source we implicitly understand the importance of knowing each other’s strengths, the importance of introducing new people to our community and building new expertise. This can only happen in loosely-bound structures, where cost of entry is negligible - quite the opposite of the standard large-corporation model. So with Codethink I propose to act as an agent of change. I plan to provide support and help to groups and individuals who want to strike out on their own. I will use my knowledge of the management, architectural and coding expertise of these individuals to provide the service of assembling teams to attack projects for clients. There needs to be another side to the equation. For this to scale, I also need to invest in bringing new people into our open source world and training them as experts able to strike out on their own. So that means taking on employees of a kind - but with the covenant that I will be expecting each employee to be looking at becoming her own boss in time. So my cards are on the table now - for this plan to work it needs to be transparent by default. It may turn out to be a crazy idea that’ll never work in practice, but lets see. If anyone wants to chat with me about these plans, you can find me at rob.taylor@codethink.co.uk on email and XMPP and I’m always around as robtaylor on Freenode and GIMPNet.