Search Results: "robert"

24 July 2020

Mike Gabriel: Ayatana Indicators / IDO - Menu Rendering Fixed with vanilla GTK-3+

At DebConf 17 in Montreal, I gave a talk about Ayatana Indicators [1] and the project's goal to continue the by then already dropped out of maintenance Ubuntu Indicators in a separate upstream project, detached from Ubuntu and its Ubuntu'isms. Stalling The whole Ayatana Indicators project received a bit of a show stopper by the fact that the IDO (Indicator Display Object) rendering was not working in vanilla GTK-3 without a certain patch [2] that only Ubuntu has in their GTK-3 package. Addressing GTK developers upstream some years back (after GTK 3.22 had already gone into long term maintenance mode) and asking for a late patch acceptance did not work out (as already assumed). Ayatana Indicators stalled at a level of 90% actually working fine, but those nice and shiny special widgets, like the calendar widget, the audio volume slider widgets, switch widgets, etc. could not be rendered appropriately in GTK based desktop environments (e.g. via MATE Indicator Applet) on other distros than Ubuntu. I never really had the guts to sit down without a defined ending and find a patch / solution to this nasty problem. Ayatana Indicators stalled as a whole. I kept it alive and defended its code base against various GLib and what-not deprecations and kept it in Debian, but the software was actually partially broken / dysfunctional. Taking the Dog for a Walk and then It Became all Light+Love Several days back, I received a mail from Robert Tari [3]. I was outside on a hike with our dog and thought, ah well, let's check emails... I couldn't believe what I read then, 15 seconds later. I could in fact, hardly breathe... I have known Robert from earlier email exchanges. Robert maintains various "little" upstream projects, like e.g. Caja Rename, Odio, Unity Mail, etc. that I have looked into earlier regarding Debian packaging. Robert is also a Manjaro contributor and he has been working on bringing Ayatana Indicators to Manjaro MATE. In the early days, without knowing Robert, I even forked one of his projects (indicator-notification) and turned it into an Ayatana Indicator. Robert and I also exchanged some emails about Ayatana Indicators already a couple of weeks ago. I got the sense of him maybe being up to something already then. Oh, yeah!!! It turned out that Robert and I share the same "love" for the Ubuntu Indicators concept [4]. From his email, it became clear that Robert had spent the last 1-2 weeks drowned in the Ayatana IDO and libayatana-indicator code and worked him self through the bowels of it in order to understand the code concept of Indicators to its very depth. When emerging back from his journey, he presented me (or rather: the world) a patch [5] against libayatana-indicator that makes it possible to render IDO objects even if a vanilla GTK-3 is installed on the system. This patch is a game changer for Indicator lovers. When Robert sent me his mail pointing me to this patch, I think, over the past five years, I have never felt more excited (except from the exact moment of getting married to my wife two-to-three years ago) than during that moment when my brain tried to process his email. "Like a kid on Christmas Eve...", Robert wrote in one of his later mails to me. Indeed, like a "kid on Christmas Eve", Robert. Try It Out As a proof of all this to the Debian people, I have just done the first release of ayatana-indicator-datetime and uploaded it to Debian's NEW queue. Robert is doing the same for Manjaro. The Ayatana Indicator Sound will follow after my vacation. For fancy widget rendering in Ayatana Indicator's system indicators, make sure you have libayatana-indicator 0.7.0 or newer installed on your system. Credits One of the biggest thanks ever I send herewith to Robert Tari! Robert is now co-maintainer of Ayatana Indicators. Welcome! Now, there is finally a team of active contributors. This is so delightful!!! References P.S. Expect more Ayatana Indicators to appear in your favourite distro soon...

23 July 2020

Raphaël Hertzog: Freexian s report about Debian Long Term Support, June 2020

A Debian LTS logo Like each month, here comes a report about the work of paid contributors to Debian LTS. Individual reports In June, 202.00 work hours have been dispatched among 12 paid contributors. Their reports are available: Evolution of the situation June was the last month of Jessie LTS which ended on 2020-06-20. If you still need to run Jessie somewhere, please read the post about keeping Debian 8 Jessie alive for longer than 5 years.
So, as (Jessie) LTS is dead, long live the new LTS, Stretch LTS! Stretch has received its last point release, so regular LTS operations can now continue.
Accompanying this, for the first time, we have prepared a small survey about our users and contributors, who they are and why they are using LTS. Filling out the survey should take less than 10 minutes. We would really appreciate if you could participate in the survey online! On July 27th 2020 we will close the survey, so please don t hesitate and participate now! After that, there will be a followup with the results. The security tracker for Stretch LTS currently lists 29 packages with a known CVE and the dla-needed.txt file has 44 packages needing an update in Stretch LTS. Thanks to our sponsors New sponsors are in bold. We welcome CoreFiling this month!

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24 June 2020

Raphaël Hertzog: Freexian s report about Debian Long Term Support, May 2020

A Debian LTS logo Like each month, here comes a report about the work of paid contributors to Debian LTS. Individual reports In May, 198 work hours have been dispatched among 14 paid contributors. Their reports are available: Evolution of the situation In May 2020 we had our second (virtual) contributors meeting on IRC, Logs and minutes are available online. Then we also moved our ToDo from the Debian wiki to the issue tracker on salsa.debian.org.
Sadly three contributors went inactive in May: Adrian Bunk, Anton Gladky and Dylan A ssi. And while there are currently still enough active contributors to shoulder the existing work, we like to use this opportunity that we are always looking for new contributors. Please mail Holger if you are interested.
Finally, we like to remind you for a last time, that the end of Jessie LTS is coming in less than a month!
In case you missed it (or missed to act), please read this post about keeping Debian 8 Jessie alive for longer than 5 years. If you expect to have Debian 8 servers/devices running after June 30th 2020, and would like to have security updates for them, please get in touch with Freexian. The security tracker currently lists 6 packages with a known CVE and the dla-needed.txt file has 30 packages needing an update. Thanks to our sponsors New sponsors are in bold. With the upcoming start of Jessie ELTS, we are welcoming a few new sponsors and others should join soon.

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23 May 2020

Raphaël Hertzog: Freexian s report about Debian Long Term Support, April 2020

A Debian LTS logo Like each month, here comes a report about the work of paid contributors to Debian LTS. Individual reports In April, 284.5 work hours have been dispatched among 14 paid contributors. Their reports are available: Evolution of the situation In April we dispatched more hours than ever and another was new too, we had our first (virtual) contributors meeting on IRC! Logs and minutes are available and we plan to continue doing IRC meetings every other month.
Sadly one contributor decided to go inactive in April, Hugo Lefeuvre.
Finally, we like to remind you, that the end of Jessie LTS is coming in less than two months!
In case you missed it (or missed to act), please read this post about keeping Debian 8 Jessie alive for longer than 5 years. If you expect to have Debian 8 servers/devices running after June 30th 2020, and would like to have security updates for them, please get in touch with Freexian. The security tracker currently lists 4 packages with a known CVE and the dla-needed.txt file has 25 packages needing an update. Thanks to our sponsors New sponsors are in bold.

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19 April 2020

Dirk Eddelbuettel: prrd 0.0.3: More improvements

Back in early 2018, the prrd package was introduced as release 0.0.1, uploaded to CRAN, and updated once as release 0.0.2. I have used it extensively for every CRAN release of Rcpp, RcppArmadillo, RcppEigen, BH, and possibly others. The idea of prrd is simple, and described in some more detail on its webpage and its GitHub repo. Reverse dependency checks are an important part of package development and is easily done in a (serial) loop. But these checks are also generally embarassingly parallel as there is no or little interdependency between them (besides maybe shared build depedencies). See the following (dated) screenshot (running six parallel workers, arranged in split byobu session). Since the two early releases, I made a few changes to e.g. the analysis of package checks and their summaries (but never pushed these) as well as a few usability enhancements. This release regroups these. The release is summarised in the NEWS entry:

Changes in prrd version 0.0.3 (2020-04-19)
  • Extended functionality summarise() with optional use of package foghorn (Dirk)
  • New scripts enqueueDepends, dequeueDepends and summmariseJobs (Dirk)
  • Added tweaks and enhancements throughout (Dirk)
  • The default queue location can now be set via options (Dirk)
  • Meta-data on package, version and date is now stored, and shown on dequeue startup (Dirk)
  • The README.md was clarified and improved (Dirk, Avraham Adler in #8, Robert Nuske in #10)

CRANberries provides the usual summary of changes to the previous version. See the aforementioned webpage and its repo for details. For more questions or comments use the issue tracker off the GitHub repo. If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can now sponsor me at GitHub. For the first year, GitHub will match your contributions.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.

16 April 2020

Raphaël Hertzog: Freexian s report about Debian Long Term Support, March 2020

A Debian LTS logo Like each month, here comes a report about the work of paid contributors to Debian LTS. Individual reports In March, 252 work hours have been dispatched among 14 paid contributors. Their reports are available: Evolution of the situation March was a strange month for many people all over the globe. Here we ll just express our hopes that you are and will be well! LTS gained a new contributor in March, Anton Gladky, however he then decided to become active later this year. Similarly Hugo Lefeuvre notified us that he ll be inactive in April. In case you missed it (or missed to act), please read this post about keeping Debian 8 Jessie alive for longer than 5 years. If you expect to have Debian 8 servers/devices running after June 30th 2020, and would like to have security updates for them, please get in touch with Freexian. Hurry up: the end of Jessie LTS is coming in less than three months! The security tracker currently lists 25 packages with a known CVE and the dla-needed.txt file has 23 packages needing an update. Thanks to our sponsors New sponsors are in bold.

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25 March 2020

Raphaël Hertzog: Freexian s report about Debian Long Term Support, February 2020

A Debian LTS logo Like each month, here comes a report about the work of paid contributors to Debian LTS. Individual reports In February, 226 work hours have been dispatched among 14 paid contributors. Their reports are available: Evolution of the situation February began as rather calm month and the fact that more contributors have given back unused hours is an indicator of this calmness and also an indicator that contributing to LTS has become more of a routine now, which is good. In the second half of February Holger Levsen (from LTS) and Salvatore Bonaccorso (from the Debian Security Team) met at SnowCamp in Italy and discussed tensions and possible improvements from and for Debian LTS. The security tracker currently lists 25 packages with a known CVE and the dla-needed.txt file has 21 packages needing an update. Thanks to our sponsors New sponsors are in bold.

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23 November 2017

Russ Allbery: Holiday haul

Catching up on accumulated book purchases. I'm going to get another burst of reading time over the holidays (and am really looking forward to it). Alfred Bester The Stars My Destination (sff)
James Blish A Case of Conscience (sff)
Leigh Brackett The Long Tomorrow (sff)
Algis Budrys Who? (sff)
Frances Hardinge Fly By Night (sff)
Robert A. Heinlein Double Star (sff)
N.K. Jemisin The Obelisk Gate (sff)
N.K. Jemisin The Stone Sky (sff)
T. Kingfisher Clockwork Boys (sff)
Ursula K. Le Guin City of Illusions (sff)
Ursula K. Le Guin The Complete Orsinia (historical)
Ursula K. Le Guin The Dispossessed (sff)
Ursula K. Le Guin Five Ways to Forgiveness (sff)
Ursula K. Le Guin The Left Hand of Darkness (sff)
Ursula K. Le Guin Planet of Exile (sff)
Ursula K. Le Guin Rocannon's World (sff)
Ursula K. Le Guin The Telling (sff)
Ursula K. Le Guin The World for Word Is Forest (sff)
Fritz Leiber The Big Time (sff)
Melina Marchetta Saving Francesca (mainstream)
Richard Matheson The Shrinking Man (sff)
Foz Meadows An Accident of Stars (sff)
Dexter Palmer Version Control (sff)
Frederick Pohl & C.M. Kornbluth The Space Merchants (sff)
Adam Rex True Meaning of Smekday (sff)
John Scalzi The Dispatcher (sff)
Julia Spencer-Fleming In the Bleak Midwinter (mystery)
R.E. Stearns Barbary Station (sff)
Theodore Sturgeon More Than Human (sff)
I'm listing the individual components except for the Orsinia collection, but the Le Guin are from the Library of America Hainish Novels & Stories two-volume set. I had several of these already, but I have a hard time resisting a high-quality Library of America collection for an author I really like. Now I can donate a bunch of old paperbacks. Similarly, a whole bunch of the older SF novels are from the Library of America American Science Fiction two-volume set, which I finally bought since I was ordering Library of America sets anyway. The rest is a pretty random collection of stuff, although several of them are recommendations from Light. I was reading through her old reviews and getting inspired to read (and review) more.

17 November 2017

Raphaël Hertzog: Freexian s report about Debian Long Term Support, October 2017

A Debian LTS logoLike each month, here comes a report about the work of paid contributors to Debian LTS. Individual reports In October, about 197 work hours have been dispatched among 13 paid contributors. Their reports are available: Evolution of the situation The number of sponsored hours increased slightly to 183 hours per month. With the increasing number of security issues to deal with, and with the number of open issues not really going down, I decided to bump the funding target to what amounts to 1.5 full-time position. The security tracker currently lists 50 packages with a known CVE and the dla-needed.txt file 36 (we re a bit behind in CVE triaging apparently). Thanks to our sponsors New sponsors are in bold.

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24 October 2017

Reproducible builds folks: Reproducible Builds: Weekly report #130

Here's what happened in the Reproducible Builds effort between Sunday October 15 and Saturday October 21 2017: Past events Upcoming events New York University sessions A three week session will be held at New York University to work on reproducibilty issues in conjunction with the reproducible builds community. Students from the Application Security course will be working for two weeks to work on the reproducible builds effort. Packages reviewed and fixed, and bugs filed The following reproducible builds-related NMUs were accepted: Patches sent upstream: Reviews of unreproducible packages 41 package reviews have been added, 119 have been updated and 54 have been removed in this week, adding to our knowledge about identified issues. 2 issue types were removed as they were fixed: Weekly QA work During our reproducibility testing, FTBFS bugs have been detected and reported by: diffoscope development strip-nondeterminism development Version 0.039-1 was uploaded to unstable by Chris Lamb. It included contributions already covered by posts of the previous weeks, including: reprotest development tests.reproducible-builds.org Website updates Misc. This week's edition was written by Bernhard M. Wiedemann, Chris Lamb, Holger Levsen, Santiago Torres & reviewed by a bunch of Reproducible Builds folks on IRC & the mailing lists.

20 October 2017

Raphaël Hertzog: Freexian s report about Debian Long Term Support, September 2017

A Debian LTS logoLike each month, here comes a report about the work of paid contributors to Debian LTS. Individual reports In August, about 170 work hours have been dispatched among 13 paid contributors. Their reports are available: Evolution of the situation The number of sponsored hours is the same as last month. But we have a new sponsor in the pipe. The security tracker currently lists 52 packages with a known CVE and the dla-needed.txt file 49. The number of packages with open issues decreased slightly compared to last month but we re not yet back to the usual situation. Thanks to our sponsors New sponsors are in bold.

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17 October 2017

Russ Allbery: Bundle haul

Confession time: I started making these posts (eons ago) because a close friend did as well, and I enjoyed reading them. But the main reason why I continue is because the primary way I have to keep track of the books I've bought and avoid duplicates is, well, grep on these posts. I should come up with a non-bullshit way of doing this, but time to do more elegant things is in short supply, and, well, it's my blog. So I'm boring all of you who read this in various places with my internal bookkeeping. I do try to at least add a bit of commentary. This one will be more tedious than most since it includes five separate Humble Bundles, which increases the volume a lot. (I just realized I'd forgotten to record those purchases from the past several months.) First, the individual books I bought directly: Ilona Andrews Sweep in Peace (sff)
Ilona Andrews One Fell Sweep (sff)
Steven Brust Vallista (sff)
Nicky Drayden The Prey of Gods (sff)
Meg Elison The Book of the Unnamed Midwife (sff)
Pat Green Night Moves (nonfiction)
Ann Leckie Provenance (sff)
Seanan McGuire Once Broken Faith (sff)
Seanan McGuire The Brightest Fell (sff)
K. Arsenault Rivera The Tiger's Daughter (sff)
Matthew Walker Why We Sleep (nonfiction)
Some new books by favorite authors, a few new releases I heard good things about, and two (Night Moves and Why We Sleep) from references in on-line articles that impressed me. The books from security bundles (this is mostly work reading, assuming I'll get to any of it), including a blockchain bundle: Wil Allsop Unauthorised Access (nonfiction)
Ross Anderson Security Engineering (nonfiction)
Chris Anley, et al. The Shellcoder's Handbook (nonfiction)
Conrad Barsky & Chris Wilmer Bitcoin for the Befuddled (nonfiction)
Imran Bashir Mastering Blockchain (nonfiction)
Richard Bejtlich The Practice of Network Security (nonfiction)
Kariappa Bheemaiah The Blockchain Alternative (nonfiction)
Violet Blue Smart Girl's Guide to Privacy (nonfiction)
Richard Caetano Learning Bitcoin (nonfiction)
Nick Cano Game Hacking (nonfiction)
Bruce Dang, et al. Practical Reverse Engineering (nonfiction)
Chris Dannen Introducing Ethereum and Solidity (nonfiction)
Daniel Drescher Blockchain Basics (nonfiction)
Chris Eagle The IDA Pro Book, 2nd Edition (nonfiction)
Nikolay Elenkov Android Security Internals (nonfiction)
Jon Erickson Hacking, 2nd Edition (nonfiction)
Pedro Franco Understanding Bitcoin (nonfiction)
Christopher Hadnagy Social Engineering (nonfiction)
Peter N.M. Hansteen The Book of PF (nonfiction)
Brian Kelly The Bitcoin Big Bang (nonfiction)
David Kennedy, et al. Metasploit (nonfiction)
Manul Laphroaig (ed.) PoC GTFO (nonfiction)
Michael Hale Ligh, et al. The Art of Memory Forensics (nonfiction)
Michael Hale Ligh, et al. Malware Analyst's Cookbook (nonfiction)
Michael W. Lucas Absolute OpenBSD, 2nd Edition (nonfiction)
Bruce Nikkel Practical Forensic Imaging (nonfiction)
Sean-Philip Oriyano CEHv9 (nonfiction)
Kevin D. Mitnick The Art of Deception (nonfiction)
Narayan Prusty Building Blockchain Projects (nonfiction)
Prypto Bitcoin for Dummies (nonfiction)
Chris Sanders Practical Packet Analysis, 3rd Edition (nonfiction)
Bruce Schneier Applied Cryptography (nonfiction)
Adam Shostack Threat Modeling (nonfiction)
Craig Smith The Car Hacker's Handbook (nonfiction)
Dafydd Stuttard & Marcus Pinto The Web Application Hacker's Handbook (nonfiction)
Albert Szmigielski Bitcoin Essentials (nonfiction)
David Thiel iOS Application Security (nonfiction)
Georgia Weidman Penetration Testing (nonfiction)
Finally, the two SF bundles: Buzz Aldrin & John Barnes Encounter with Tiber (sff)
Poul Anderson Orion Shall Rise (sff)
Greg Bear The Forge of God (sff)
Octavia E. Butler Dawn (sff)
William C. Dietz Steelheart (sff)
J.L. Doty A Choice of Treasons (sff)
Harlan Ellison The City on the Edge of Forever (sff)
Toh Enjoe Self-Reference ENGINE (sff)
David Feintuch Midshipman's Hope (sff)
Alan Dean Foster Icerigger (sff)
Alan Dean Foster Mission to Moulokin (sff)
Alan Dean Foster The Deluge Drivers (sff)
Taiyo Fujii Orbital Cloud (sff)
Hideo Furukawa Belka, Why Don't You Bark? (sff)
Haikasoru (ed.) Saiensu Fikushon 2016 (sff anthology)
Joe Haldeman All My Sins Remembered (sff)
Jyouji Hayashi The Ouroboros Wave (sff)
Sergei Lukyanenko The Genome (sff)
Chohei Kambayashi Good Luck, Yukikaze (sff)
Chohei Kambayashi Yukikaze (sff)
Sakyo Komatsu Virus (sff)
Miyuki Miyabe The Book of Heroes (sff)
Kazuki Sakuraba Red Girls (sff)
Robert Silverberg Across a Billion Years (sff)
Allen Steele Orbital Decay (sff)
Bruce Sterling Schismatrix Plus (sff)
Michael Swanwick Vacuum Flowers (sff)
Yoshiki Tanaka Legend of the Galactic Heroes, Volume 1: Dawn (sff)
Yoshiki Tanaka Legend of the Galactic Heroes, Volume 2: Ambition (sff)
Yoshiki Tanaka Legend of the Galactic Heroes, Volume 3: Endurance (sff)
Tow Ubukata Mardock Scramble (sff)
Sayuri Ueda The Cage of Zeus (sff)
Sean Williams & Shane Dix Echoes of Earth (sff)
Hiroshi Yamamoto MM9 (sff)
Timothy Zahn Blackcollar (sff)
Phew. Okay, all caught up, and hopefully won't have to dump something like this again in the near future. Also, more books than I have any actual time to read, but what else is new.

16 October 2017

Gustavo Noronha Silva: Who knew we still had low-hanging fruits?

Earlier this month I had the pleasure of attending the Web Engines Hackfest, hosted by Igalia at their offices in A Coru a, and also sponsored by my employer, Collabora, Google and Mozilla. It has grown a lot and we had many new people this year. Fun fact: I am one of the 3 or 4 people who have attended all of the editions of the hackfest since its inception in 2009, when it was called WebKitGTK+ hackfest \o/ 20171002_204405 It was a great get together where I met many friends and made some new ones. Had plenty of discussions, mainly with Antonio Gomes and Google s Robert Kroeger, about the way forward for Chromium on Wayland. We had the opportunity of explaining how we at Collabora cooperated with igalians to implemented and optimise a Wayland nested compositor for WebKit2 to share buffers between processes in an efficient way even on broken drivers. Most of the discussions and some of the work that led to this was done in previous hackfests, by the way! 20171002_193518 The idea seems to have been mostly welcomed, the only concern being that Wayland s interfaces would need to be tested for security (fuzzed). So we may end up going that same route with Chromium for allowing process separation between the UI and GPU (being renamed Viz, currently) processes. On another note, and going back to the title of the post, at Collabora we have recently adopted Mattermost to replace our internal IRC server. Many Collaborans have decided to use Mattermost through an Epiphany Web Application or through a simple Python application that just shows a GTK+ window wrapping a WebKitGTK+ WebView. 20171002_101952 Some people noticed that when the connection was lost Mattermost would take a very long time to notice and reconnect its web sockets were taking a long, long time to timeout, according to our colleague Andrew Shadura. I did some quick searching on the codebase and noticed WebCore has a NetworkStateNotifier interface that it uses to get notified when connection changes. That was not implemented for WebKitGTK+, so it was likely what caused stuff to linger when a connection hiccup happened. Given we have GNetworkMonitor, implementation of the missing interfaces required only 3 lines of actual code (plus the necessary boilerplate)! screenshot-from-2017-10-16-11-13-39 I was surprised to still find such as low hanging fruit in WebKitGTK+, so I decided to look for more. Turns out WebCore also has a notifier for low power situations, which was implemented only by the iOS port, and causes the engine to throttle some timers and avoid some expensive checks it would do in normal situations. This required a few more lines to implement using upower-glib, but not that many either! That was the fun I had during the hackfest in terms of coding. Mostly I had fun just lurking in break out sessions discussing the past, present and future of tech such as WebRTC, Servo, Rust, WebKit, Chromium, WebVR, and more. I also beat a few challengers in Street Fighter 2, as usual. I d like to say thanks to Collabora, Igalia, Google, and Mozilla for sponsoring and attending the hackfest. Thanks to Igalia for hosting and to Collabora for sponsoring my attendance along with two other Collaborans. It was a great hackfest and I m looking forward to the next one! See you in 2018 =)

2 October 2017

Antoine Beaupr : Strategies for offline PGP key storage

While the adoption of OpenPGP by the general population is marginal at best, it is a critical component for the security community and particularly for Linux distributions. For example, every package uploaded into Debian is verified by the central repository using the maintainer's OpenPGP keys and the repository itself is, in turn, signed using a separate key. If upstream packages also use such signatures, this creates a complete trust path from the original upstream developer to users. Beyond that, pull requests for the Linux kernel are verified using signatures as well. Therefore, the stakes are high: a compromise of the release key, or even of a single maintainer's key, could enable devastating attacks against many machines. That has led the Debian community to develop a good grasp of best practices for cryptographic signatures (which are typically handled using GNU Privacy Guard, also known as GnuPG or GPG). For example, weak (less than 2048 bits) and vulnerable PGPv3 keys were removed from the keyring in 2015, and there is a strong culture of cross-signing keys between Debian members at in-person meetings. Yet even Debian developers (DDs) do not seem to have established practices on how to actually store critical private key material, as we can see in this discussion on the debian-project mailing list. That email boiled down to a simple request: can I have a "key dongles for dummies" tutorial? Key dongles, or keycards as we'll call them here, are small devices that allow users to store keys on an offline device and provide one possible solution for protecting private key material. In this article, I hope to use my experience in this domain to clarify the issue of how to store those precious private keys that, if compromised, could enable arbitrary code execution on millions of machines all over the world.

Why store keys offline? Before we go into details about storing keys offline, it may be useful to do a small reminder of how the OpenPGP standard works. OpenPGP keys are made of a main public/private key pair, the certification key, used to sign user identifiers and subkeys. My public key, shown below, has the usual main certification/signature key (marked SC) but also an encryption subkey (marked E), a separate signature key (S), and two authentication keys (marked A) which I use as RSA keys to log into servers using SSH, thanks to the Monkeysphere project.
    pub   rsa4096/792152527B75921E 2009-05-29 [SC] [expires: 2018-04-19]
      8DC901CE64146C048AD50FBB792152527B75921E
    uid                 [ultimate] Antoine Beaupr  <anarcat@anarc.at>
    uid                 [ultimate] Antoine Beaupr  <anarcat@koumbit.org>
    uid                 [ultimate] Antoine Beaupr  <anarcat@orangeseeds.org>
    uid                 [ultimate] Antoine Beaupr  <anarcat@debian.org>
    sub   rsa2048/B7F648FED2DF2587 2012-07-18 [A]
    sub   rsa2048/604E4B3EEE02855A 2012-07-20 [A]
    sub   rsa4096/A51D5B109C5A5581 2009-05-29 [E]
    sub   rsa2048/3EA1DDDDB261D97B 2017-08-23 [S]
All the subkeys (sub) and identities (uid) are bound by the main certification key using cryptographic self-signatures. So while an attacker stealing a private subkey can spoof signatures in my name or authenticate to other servers, that key can always be revoked by the main certification key. But if the certification key gets stolen, all bets are off: the attacker can create or revoke identities or subkeys as they wish. In a catastrophic scenario, an attacker could even steal the key and remove your copies, taking complete control of the key, without any possibility of recovery. Incidentally, this is why it is so important to generate a revocation certificate and store it offline. So by moving the certification key offline, we reduce the attack surface on the OpenPGP trust chain: day-to-day keys (e.g. email encryption or signature) can stay online but if they get stolen, the certification key can revoke those keys without having to revoke the main certification key as well. Note that a stolen encryption key is a different problem: even if we revoke the encryption subkey, this will only affect future encrypted messages. Previous messages will be readable by the attacker with the stolen subkey even if that subkey gets revoked, so the benefits of revoking encryption certificates are more limited.

Common strategies for offline key storage Considering the security tradeoffs, some propose storing those critical keys offline to reduce those threats. But where exactly? In an attempt to answer that question, Jonathan McDowell, a member of the Debian keyring maintenance team, said that there are three options: use an external LUKS-encrypted volume, an air-gapped system, or a keycard. Full-disk encryption like LUKS adds an extra layer of security by hiding the content of the key from an attacker. Even though private keyrings are usually protected by a passphrase, they are easily identifiable as a keyring. But when a volume is fully encrypted, it's not immediately obvious to an attacker there is private key material on the device. According to Sean Whitton, another advantage of LUKS over plain GnuPG keyring encryption is that you can pass the --iter-time argument when creating a LUKS partition to increase key-derivation delay, which makes brute-forcing much harder. Indeed, GnuPG 2.x doesn't have a run-time option to configure the key-derivation algorithm, although a patch was introduced recently to make the delay configurable at compile time in gpg-agent, which is now responsible for all secret key operations. The downside of external volumes is complexity: GnuPG makes it difficult to extract secrets out of its keyring, which makes the first setup tricky and error-prone. This is easier in the 2.x series thanks to the new storage system and the associated keygrip files, but it still requires arcane knowledge of GPG internals. It is also inconvenient to use secret keys stored outside your main keyring when you actually do need to use them, as GPG doesn't know where to find those keys anymore. Another option is to set up a separate air-gapped system to perform certification operations. An example is the PGP clean room project, which is a live system based on Debian and designed by DD Daniel Pocock to operate an OpenPGP and X.509 certificate authority using commodity hardware. The basic principle is to store the secrets on a different machine that is never connected to the network and, therefore, not exposed to attacks, at least in theory. I have personally discarded that approach because I feel air-gapped systems provide a false sense of security: data eventually does need to come in and out of the system, somehow, even if only to propagate signatures out of the system, which exposes the system to attacks. System updates are similarly problematic: to keep the system secure, timely security updates need to be deployed to the air-gapped system. A common use pattern is to share data through USB keys, which introduce a vulnerability where attacks like BadUSB can infect the air-gapped system. From there, there is a multitude of exotic ways of exfiltrating the data using LEDs, infrared cameras, or the good old TEMPEST attack. I therefore concluded the complexity tradeoffs of an air-gapped system are not worth it. Furthermore, the workflow for air-gapped systems is complex: even though PGP clean room went a long way, it's still lacking even simple scripts that allow signing or transferring keys, which is a problem shared by the external LUKS storage approach.

Keycard advantages The approach I have chosen is to use a cryptographic keycard: an external device, usually connected through the USB port, that stores the private key material and performs critical cryptographic operations on the behalf of the host. For example, the FST-01 keycard can perform RSA and ECC public-key decryption without ever exposing the private key material to the host. In effect, a keycard is a miniature computer that performs restricted computations for another host. Keycards usually support multiple "slots" to store subkeys. The OpenPGP standard specifies there are three subkeys available by default: for signature, authentication, and encryption. Finally, keycards can have an actual physical keypad to enter passwords so a potential keylogger cannot capture them, although the keycards I have access to do not feature such a keypad. We could easily draw a parallel between keycards and an air-gapped system; in effect, a keycard is a miniaturized air-gapped computer and suffers from similar problems. An attacker can intercept data on the host system and attack the device in the same way, if not more easily, because a keycard is actually "online" (i.e. clearly not air-gapped) when connected. The advantage over a fully-fledged air-gapped computer, however, is that the keycard implements only a restricted set of operations. So it is easier to create an open hardware and software design that is audited and verified, which is much harder to accomplish for a general-purpose computer. Like air-gapped systems, keycards address the scenario where an attacker wants to get the private key material. While an attacker could fool the keycard into signing or decrypting some data, this is possible only while the key is physically connected, and the keycard software will prompt the user for a password before doing the operation, though the keycard can cache the password for some time. In effect, it thwarts offline attacks: to brute-force the key's password, the attacker needs to be on the target system and try to guess the keycard's password, which will lock itself after a limited number of tries. It also provides for a clean and standard interface to store keys offline: a single GnuPG command moves private key material to a keycard (the keytocard command in the --edit-key interface), whereas moving private key material to a LUKS-encrypted device or air-gapped computer is more complex. Keycards are also useful if you operate on multiple computers. A common problem when using GnuPG on multiple machines is how to safely copy and synchronize private key material among different devices, which introduces new security problems. Indeed, a "good rule of thumb in a forensics lab", according to Robert J. Hansen on the GnuPG mailing list, is to "store the minimum personal data possible on your systems". Keycards provide the best of both worlds here: you can use your private key on multiple computers without actually storing it in multiple places. In fact, Mike Gerwitz went as far as saying:
For users that need their GPG key on multiple boxes, I consider a smartcard to be essential. Otherwise, the user is just furthering her risk of compromise.

Keycard tradeoffs As Gerwitz hinted, there are multiple downsides to using a keycard, however. Another DD, Wouter Verhelst clearly expressed the tradeoffs:
Smartcards are useful. They ensure that the private half of your key is never on any hard disk or other general storage device, and therefore that it cannot possibly be stolen (because there's only one possible copy of it). Smartcards are a pain in the ass. They ensure that the private half of your key is never on any hard disk or other general storage device but instead sits in your wallet, so whenever you need to access it, you need to grab your wallet to be able to do so, which takes more effort than just firing up GnuPG. If your laptop doesn't have a builtin cardreader, you also need to fish the reader from your backpack or wherever, etc.
"Smartcards" here refer to older OpenPGP cards that relied on the IEC 7816 smartcard connectors and therefore needed a specially-built smartcard reader. Newer keycards simply use a standard USB connector. In any case, it's true that having an external device introduces new issues: attackers can steal your keycard, you can simply lose it, or wash it with your dirty laundry. A laptop or a computer can also be lost, of course, but it is much easier to lose a small USB keycard than a full laptop and I have yet to hear of someone shoving a full laptop into a washing machine. When you lose your keycard, unless a separate revocation certificate is available somewhere, you lose complete control of the key, which is catastrophic. But, even if you revoke the lost key, you need to create a new one, which involves rebuilding the web of trust for the key a rather expensive operation as it usually requires meeting other OpenPGP users in person to exchange fingerprints. You should therefore think about how to back up the certification key, which is a problem that already exists for online keys; of course, everyone has a revocation certificates and backups of their OpenPGP keys... right? In the keycard scenario, backups may be multiple keycards distributed geographically. Note that, contrary to an air-gapped system, a key generated on a keycard cannot be backed up, by design. For subkeys, this is not a problem as they do not need to be backed up (except encryption keys). But, for a certification key, this means users need to generate the key on the host and transfer it to the keycard, which means the host is expected to have enough entropy to generate cryptographic-strength random numbers, for example. Also consider the possibility of combining different approaches: you could, for example, use a keycard for day-to-day operation, but keep a backup of the certification key on a LUKS-encrypted offline volume. Keycards introduce a new element into the trust chain: you need to trust the keycard manufacturer to not have any hostile code in the key's firmware or hardware. In addition, you need to trust that the implementation is correct. Keycards are harder to update: the firmware may be deliberately inaccessible to the host for security reasons or may require special software to manipulate. Keycards may be slower than the CPU in performing certain operations because they are small embedded microcontrollers with limited computing power. Finally, keycards may encourage users to trust multiple machines with their secrets, which works against the "minimum personal data" principle. A completely different approach called the trusted physical console (TPC) does the opposite: instead of trying to get private key material onto all of those machines, just have them on a single machine that is used for everything. Unlike a keycard, the TPC is an actual computer, say a laptop, which has the advantage of needing no special procedure to manage keys. The downside is, of course, that you actually need to carry that laptop everywhere you go, which may be problematic, especially in some corporate environments that restrict bringing your own devices.

Quick keycard "howto" Getting keys onto a keycard is easy enough:
  1. Start with a temporary key to test the procedure:
        export GNUPGHOME=$(mktemp -d)
        gpg --generate-key
    
  2. Edit the key using its user ID (UID):
        gpg --edit-key UID
    
  3. Use the key command to select the first subkey, then copy it to the keycard (you can also use the addcardkey command to just generate a new subkey directly on the keycard):
        gpg> key 1
        gpg> keytocard
    
  4. If you want to move the subkey, use the save command, which will remove the local copy of the private key, so the keycard will be the only copy of the secret key. Otherwise use the quit command to save the key on the keycard, but keep the secret key in your normal keyring; answer "n" to "save changes?" and "y" to "quit without saving?" . This way the keycard is a backup of your secret key.
  5. Once you are satisfied with the results, repeat steps 1 through 4 with your normal keyring (unset $GNUPGHOME)
When a key is moved to a keycard, --list-secret-keys will show it as sec> (or ssb> for subkeys) instead of the usual sec keyword. If the key is completely missing (for example, if you moved it to a LUKS container), the # sign is used instead. If you need to use a key from a keycard backup, you simply do gpg --card-edit with the key plugged in, then type the fetch command at the prompt to fetch the public key that corresponds to the private key on the keycard (which stays on the keycard). This is the same procedure as the one to use the secret key on another computer.

Conclusion There are already informal OpenPGP best-practices guides out there and some recommend storing keys offline, but they rarely explain what exactly that means. Storing your primary secret key offline is important in dealing with possible compromises and we examined the main ways of doing so: either with an air-gapped system, LUKS-encrypted keyring, or by using keycards. Each approach has its own tradeoffs, but I recommend getting familiar with keycards if you use multiple computers and want a standardized interface with minimal configuration trouble. And of course, those approaches can be combined. This tutorial, for example, uses a keycard on an air-gapped computer, which neatly resolves the question of how to transmit signatures between the air-gapped system and the world. It is definitely not for the faint of heart, however. Once one has decided to use a keycard, the next order of business is to choose a specific device. That choice will be addressed in a followup article, where I will look at performance, physical design, and other considerations.
This article first appeared in the Linux Weekly News.

Antoine Beaupr : Strategies for offline PGP key storage

While the adoption of OpenPGP by the general population is marginal at best, it is a critical component for the security community and particularly for Linux distributions. For example, every package uploaded into Debian is verified by the central repository using the maintainer's OpenPGP keys and the repository itself is, in turn, signed using a separate key. If upstream packages also use such signatures, this creates a complete trust path from the original upstream developer to users. Beyond that, pull requests for the Linux kernel are verified using signatures as well. Therefore, the stakes are high: a compromise of the release key, or even of a single maintainer's key, could enable devastating attacks against many machines. That has led the Debian community to develop a good grasp of best practices for cryptographic signatures (which are typically handled using GNU Privacy Guard, also known as GnuPG or GPG). For example, weak (less than 2048 bits) and vulnerable PGPv3 keys were removed from the keyring in 2015, and there is a strong culture of cross-signing keys between Debian members at in-person meetings. Yet even Debian developers (DDs) do not seem to have established practices on how to actually store critical private key material, as we can see in this discussion on the debian-project mailing list. That email boiled down to a simple request: can I have a "key dongles for dummies" tutorial? Key dongles, or keycards as we'll call them here, are small devices that allow users to store keys on an offline device and provide one possible solution for protecting private key material. In this article, I hope to use my experience in this domain to clarify the issue of how to store those precious private keys that, if compromised, could enable arbitrary code execution on millions of machines all over the world.

Why store keys offline? Before we go into details about storing keys offline, it may be useful to do a small reminder of how the OpenPGP standard works. OpenPGP keys are made of a main public/private key pair, the certification key, used to sign user identifiers and subkeys. My public key, shown below, has the usual main certification/signature key (marked SC) but also an encryption subkey (marked E), a separate signature key (S), and two authentication keys (marked A) which I use as RSA keys to log into servers using SSH, thanks to the Monkeysphere project.
    pub   rsa4096/792152527B75921E 2009-05-29 [SC] [expires: 2018-04-19]
      8DC901CE64146C048AD50FBB792152527B75921E
    uid                 [ultimate] Antoine Beaupr  <anarcat@anarc.at>
    uid                 [ultimate] Antoine Beaupr  <anarcat@koumbit.org>
    uid                 [ultimate] Antoine Beaupr  <anarcat@orangeseeds.org>
    uid                 [ultimate] Antoine Beaupr  <anarcat@debian.org>
    sub   rsa2048/B7F648FED2DF2587 2012-07-18 [A]
    sub   rsa2048/604E4B3EEE02855A 2012-07-20 [A]
    sub   rsa4096/A51D5B109C5A5581 2009-05-29 [E]
    sub   rsa2048/3EA1DDDDB261D97B 2017-08-23 [S]
All the subkeys (sub) and identities (uid) are bound by the main certification key using cryptographic self-signatures. So while an attacker stealing a private subkey can spoof signatures in my name or authenticate to other servers, that key can always be revoked by the main certification key. But if the certification key gets stolen, all bets are off: the attacker can create or revoke identities or subkeys as they wish. In a catastrophic scenario, an attacker could even steal the key and remove your copies, taking complete control of the key, without any possibility of recovery. Incidentally, this is why it is so important to generate a revocation certificate and store it offline. So by moving the certification key offline, we reduce the attack surface on the OpenPGP trust chain: day-to-day keys (e.g. email encryption or signature) can stay online but if they get stolen, the certification key can revoke those keys without having to revoke the main certification key as well. Note that a stolen encryption key is a different problem: even if we revoke the encryption subkey, this will only affect future encrypted messages. Previous messages will be readable by the attacker with the stolen subkey even if that subkey gets revoked, so the benefits of revoking encryption certificates are more limited.

Common strategies for offline key storage Considering the security tradeoffs, some propose storing those critical keys offline to reduce those threats. But where exactly? In an attempt to answer that question, Jonathan McDowell, a member of the Debian keyring maintenance team, said that there are three options: use an external LUKS-encrypted volume, an air-gapped system, or a keycard. Full-disk encryption like LUKS adds an extra layer of security by hiding the content of the key from an attacker. Even though private keyrings are usually protected by a passphrase, they are easily identifiable as a keyring. But when a volume is fully encrypted, it's not immediately obvious to an attacker there is private key material on the device. According to Sean Whitton, another advantage of LUKS over plain GnuPG keyring encryption is that you can pass the --iter-time argument when creating a LUKS partition to increase key-derivation delay, which makes brute-forcing much harder. Indeed, GnuPG 2.x doesn't have a run-time option to configure the key-derivation algorithm, although a patch was introduced recently to make the delay configurable at compile time in gpg-agent, which is now responsible for all secret key operations. The downside of external volumes is complexity: GnuPG makes it difficult to extract secrets out of its keyring, which makes the first setup tricky and error-prone. This is easier in the 2.x series thanks to the new storage system and the associated keygrip files, but it still requires arcane knowledge of GPG internals. It is also inconvenient to use secret keys stored outside your main keyring when you actually do need to use them, as GPG doesn't know where to find those keys anymore. Another option is to set up a separate air-gapped system to perform certification operations. An example is the PGP clean room project, which is a live system based on Debian and designed by DD Daniel Pocock to operate an OpenPGP and X.509 certificate authority using commodity hardware. The basic principle is to store the secrets on a different machine that is never connected to the network and, therefore, not exposed to attacks, at least in theory. I have personally discarded that approach because I feel air-gapped systems provide a false sense of security: data eventually does need to come in and out of the system, somehow, even if only to propagate signatures out of the system, which exposes the system to attacks. System updates are similarly problematic: to keep the system secure, timely security updates need to be deployed to the air-gapped system. A common use pattern is to share data through USB keys, which introduce a vulnerability where attacks like BadUSB can infect the air-gapped system. From there, there is a multitude of exotic ways of exfiltrating the data using LEDs, infrared cameras, or the good old TEMPEST attack. I therefore concluded the complexity tradeoffs of an air-gapped system are not worth it. Furthermore, the workflow for air-gapped systems is complex: even though PGP clean room went a long way, it's still lacking even simple scripts that allow signing or transferring keys, which is a problem shared by the external LUKS storage approach.

Keycard advantages The approach I have chosen is to use a cryptographic keycard: an external device, usually connected through the USB port, that stores the private key material and performs critical cryptographic operations on the behalf of the host. For example, the FST-01 keycard can perform RSA and ECC public-key decryption without ever exposing the private key material to the host. In effect, a keycard is a miniature computer that performs restricted computations for another host. Keycards usually support multiple "slots" to store subkeys. The OpenPGP standard specifies there are three subkeys available by default: for signature, authentication, and encryption. Finally, keycards can have an actual physical keypad to enter passwords so a potential keylogger cannot capture them, although the keycards I have access to do not feature such a keypad. We could easily draw a parallel between keycards and an air-gapped system; in effect, a keycard is a miniaturized air-gapped computer and suffers from similar problems. An attacker can intercept data on the host system and attack the device in the same way, if not more easily, because a keycard is actually "online" (i.e. clearly not air-gapped) when connected. The advantage over a fully-fledged air-gapped computer, however, is that the keycard implements only a restricted set of operations. So it is easier to create an open hardware and software design that is audited and verified, which is much harder to accomplish for a general-purpose computer. Like air-gapped systems, keycards address the scenario where an attacker wants to get the private key material. While an attacker could fool the keycard into signing or decrypting some data, this is possible only while the key is physically connected, and the keycard software will prompt the user for a password before doing the operation, though the keycard can cache the password for some time. In effect, it thwarts offline attacks: to brute-force the key's password, the attacker needs to be on the target system and try to guess the keycard's password, which will lock itself after a limited number of tries. It also provides for a clean and standard interface to store keys offline: a single GnuPG command moves private key material to a keycard (the keytocard command in the --edit-key interface), whereas moving private key material to a LUKS-encrypted device or air-gapped computer is more complex. Keycards are also useful if you operate on multiple computers. A common problem when using GnuPG on multiple machines is how to safely copy and synchronize private key material among different devices, which introduces new security problems. Indeed, a "good rule of thumb in a forensics lab", according to Robert J. Hansen on the GnuPG mailing list, is to "store the minimum personal data possible on your systems". Keycards provide the best of both worlds here: you can use your private key on multiple computers without actually storing it in multiple places. In fact, Mike Gerwitz went as far as saying:
For users that need their GPG key on multiple boxes, I consider a smartcard to be essential. Otherwise, the user is just furthering her risk of compromise.

Keycard tradeoffs As Gerwitz hinted, there are multiple downsides to using a keycard, however. Another DD, Wouter Verhelst clearly expressed the tradeoffs:
Smartcards are useful. They ensure that the private half of your key is never on any hard disk or other general storage device, and therefore that it cannot possibly be stolen (because there's only one possible copy of it). Smartcards are a pain in the ass. They ensure that the private half of your key is never on any hard disk or other general storage device but instead sits in your wallet, so whenever you need to access it, you need to grab your wallet to be able to do so, which takes more effort than just firing up GnuPG. If your laptop doesn't have a builtin cardreader, you also need to fish the reader from your backpack or wherever, etc.
"Smartcards" here refer to older OpenPGP cards that relied on the IEC 7816 smartcard connectors and therefore needed a specially-built smartcard reader. Newer keycards simply use a standard USB connector. In any case, it's true that having an external device introduces new issues: attackers can steal your keycard, you can simply lose it, or wash it with your dirty laundry. A laptop or a computer can also be lost, of course, but it is much easier to lose a small USB keycard than a full laptop and I have yet to hear of someone shoving a full laptop into a washing machine. When you lose your keycard, unless a separate revocation certificate is available somewhere, you lose complete control of the key, which is catastrophic. But, even if you revoke the lost key, you need to create a new one, which involves rebuilding the web of trust for the key a rather expensive operation as it usually requires meeting other OpenPGP users in person to exchange fingerprints. You should therefore think about how to back up the certification key, which is a problem that already exists for online keys; of course, everyone has a revocation certificates and backups of their OpenPGP keys... right? In the keycard scenario, backups may be multiple keycards distributed geographically. Note that, contrary to an air-gapped system, a key generated on a keycard cannot be backed up, by design. For subkeys, this is not a problem as they do not need to be backed up (except encryption keys). But, for a certification key, this means users need to generate the key on the host and transfer it to the keycard, which means the host is expected to have enough entropy to generate cryptographic-strength random numbers, for example. Also consider the possibility of combining different approaches: you could, for example, use a keycard for day-to-day operation, but keep a backup of the certification key on a LUKS-encrypted offline volume. Keycards introduce a new element into the trust chain: you need to trust the keycard manufacturer to not have any hostile code in the key's firmware or hardware. In addition, you need to trust that the implementation is correct. Keycards are harder to update: the firmware may be deliberately inaccessible to the host for security reasons or may require special software to manipulate. Keycards may be slower than the CPU in performing certain operations because they are small embedded microcontrollers with limited computing power. Finally, keycards may encourage users to trust multiple machines with their secrets, which works against the "minimum personal data" principle. A completely different approach called the trusted physical console (TPC) does the opposite: instead of trying to get private key material onto all of those machines, just have them on a single machine that is used for everything. Unlike a keycard, the TPC is an actual computer, say a laptop, which has the advantage of needing no special procedure to manage keys. The downside is, of course, that you actually need to carry that laptop everywhere you go, which may be problematic, especially in some corporate environments that restrict bringing your own devices.

Quick keycard "howto" Getting keys onto a keycard is easy enough:
  1. Start with a temporary key to test the procedure:
        export GNUPGHOME=$(mktemp -d)
        gpg --generate-key
    
  2. Edit the key using its user ID (UID):
        gpg --edit-key UID
    
  3. Use the key command to select the first subkey, then copy it to the keycard (you can also use the addcardkey command to just generate a new subkey directly on the keycard):
        gpg> key 1
        gpg> keytocard
    
  4. If you want to move the subkey, use the save command, which will remove the local copy of the private key, so the keycard will be the only copy of the secret key. Otherwise use the quit command to save the key on the keycard, but keep the secret key in your normal keyring; answer "n" to "save changes?" and "y" to "quit without saving?" . This way the keycard is a backup of your secret key.
  5. Once you are satisfied with the results, repeat steps 1 through 4 with your normal keyring (unset $GNUPGHOME)
When a key is moved to a keycard, --list-secret-keys will show it as sec> (or ssb> for subkeys) instead of the usual sec keyword. If the key is completely missing (for example, if you moved it to a LUKS container), the # sign is used instead. If you need to use a key from a keycard backup, you simply do gpg --card-edit with the key plugged in, then type the fetch command at the prompt to fetch the public key that corresponds to the private key on the keycard (which stays on the keycard). This is the same procedure as the one to use the secret key on another computer.

Conclusion There are already informal OpenPGP best-practices guides out there and some recommend storing keys offline, but they rarely explain what exactly that means. Storing your primary secret key offline is important in dealing with possible compromises and we examined the main ways of doing so: either with an air-gapped system, LUKS-encrypted keyring, or by using keycards. Each approach has its own tradeoffs, but I recommend getting familiar with keycards if you use multiple computers and want a standardized interface with minimal configuration trouble. And of course, those approaches can be combined. This tutorial, for example, uses a keycard on an air-gapped computer, which neatly resolves the question of how to transmit signatures between the air-gapped system and the world. It is definitely not for the faint of heart, however. Once one has decided to use a keycard, the next order of business is to choose a specific device. That choice will be addressed in a followup article, where I will look at performance, physical design, and other considerations.
This article first appeared in the Linux Weekly News.

17 September 2017

Rapha&#235;l Hertzog: Freexian s report about Debian Long Term Support, August 2017

A Debian LTS logoLike each month, here comes a report about the work of paid contributors to Debian LTS. Individual reports In August, about 189 work hours have been dispatched among 12 paid contributors. Their reports are available: Evolution of the situation The number of sponsored hours is the same as last month. The security tracker currently lists 59 packages with a known CVE and the dla-needed.txt file 60. The number of packages with open issues decreased slightly compared to last month but we re not yet back to the usual situation. The number of CVE to fix per package tends to increase due to the increased usage of fuzzers. Thanks to our sponsors New sponsors are in bold.

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18 August 2017

Rapha&#235;l Hertzog: Freexian s report about Debian Long Term Support, July 2017

A Debian LTS logoLike each month, here comes a report about the work of paid contributors to Debian LTS. Individual reports In July, about 181 work hours have been dispatched among 11 paid contributors. Their reports are available: Evolution of the situation The number of sponsored hours increased slightly with two new sponsors: Leibniz Rechenzentrum (silver sponsor) and Catalyst IT Ltd (bronze sponsor). The security tracker currently lists 74 packages with a known CVE and the dla-needed.txt file 64. The number of packages with open issues increased of almost 50% compared to last month. Hopefully this backlog will get cleared up when the unused hours will actually be done. In any case, this evolution is worth watching. Thanks to our sponsors New sponsors are in bold.

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29 July 2017

Robert McQueen: Welcome, Flathub!

Alex Larsson talks about Flathub at GUADEC 2017At the Gtk+ hackfest in London earlier this year, we stole an afternoon from the toolkit folks (sorry!) to talk about Flatpak, and how we could establish a critical mass behind the Flatpak format. Bringing Linux container and sandboxing technology together with ostree, we ve got a technology which solves real world distribution, technical and security problems which have arguably held back the Linux desktop space and frustrated ISVs and app developers for nearly 20 years. The problem we need to solve, like any ecosystem, is one of users and developers without stuff you can easily get in Flatpak format, there won t be many users, and without many users, we won t have a strong or compelling incentive for developers to take their precious time to understand a new format and a new technology. As Alex Larsson said in his GUADEC talk yesterday: Decentralisation is good. Flatpak is a tool that is totally agnostic of who is publishing the software and where it comes from. For software freedom, that s an important thing because we want technology to empower users, rather than tell them what they can or can t do. Unfortunately, decentralisation makes for a terrible user experience. At present, the Flatpak webpage has a manually curated list of links to 10s of places where you can find different Flatpaks and add them to your system. You can t easily search and browse to find apps to try out so it s clear that if the current situation remains we re not going to be able to get a critical mass of users and developers around Flatpak. Enter Flathub. The idea is that by creating an obvious center of gravity for the Flatpak community to contribute and build their apps, users will have one place to go and find the best that the Linux app ecosystem has to offer. We can take care of the boring stuff like running a build service and empower Linux application developers to choose how and when their app gets out to their users. After the London hackfest we sketched out a minimum viable system Github, Buildbot and a few workers and got it going over the past few months, culminating in a mini-fundraiser to pay for the hosting of a production-ready setup. Thanks to the 20 individuals who supported our fundraiser, to Mythic Beasts who provided a server along with management, monitoring and heaps of bandwidth, and to Codethink and Scaleway who provide our ARM and Intel workers respectively. We inherit our core principles from the Flatpak project we want the Flatpak technology to succeed at alleviating the issues faced by app developers in targeting a diverse set of Linux platforms. None of this stops you from building and hosting your own Flatpak repos and we look forward to this being a wide and open playing field. We care about the success of the Linux desktop as a platform, so we are open to proprietary applications through Flatpak s extra data feature where the client machine downloads 3rd party binaries. They are correctly labeled as such in the AppStream, so will only be shown if you or your OS has configured GNOME Software to show you apps with proprietary licenses, respecting the user s preference. The new infrastructure is up and running and I put it into production on Thursday. We rebuilt the whole repository on the new system over the course of the week, signing everything with our new 4096-bit key stored on a Yubikey smartcard USB key. We have 66 apps at the moment, although Alex is working on bringing in the GNOME apps at present we hope those will be joined soon by the KDE apps, and Endless is planning to move over as many of our 3rd party Flatpaks as possible over the coming months. So, thanks again to Alex and the whole Flatpak community, and the individuals and the companies who supported making this a reality. You can add the repository and get downloading right away. Welcome to Flathub! Go forth and flatten  Flathub logo

Robert McQueen: Hello again!

Like all good blog posts, this one starts with an apology about not blogging for ages in my case it looks like it s been about 7 years which is definitely a new personal best (perhaps the equally or more remarkable thing is that I have diligently kept WordPress running in the meantime). In that time, as you might expect, a few things have happened, like I met a wonderful woman and fell in love and we have two wonderful children. I also decided to part ways with my first baby and leave my role as CTO & co-founder of Collabora. This was obviously a very tough decision it s a fantastic team where I met and made many life-long friends, and they are still going strong and doing awesome things with Open Source. However, shortly after that, in February last year, I was lucky enough to land what is basically a dream job working at Endless Computers as the VP of Deployment. As I m sure most readers know, Endless is building an OS to bring personal computing to millions of new users across the world. It s based on Free Software like GNOME, Debian, ostree and Flatpak, and the more successful Endless is, the more people who get access to education, technology and opportunity and the more FOSS users and developers there will be in the world. But in my role, I get to help define the product, understand our users and how technology might help them, take Open Source out to new people, solve commercial problems to get Endless OS out into the world, manage a fantastic team and work with bright people, learn from great managers and mentors, and still find time to squash bugs, review and write more code than I used to. Like any startup, we have a lot to do and not enough time to do it, so although there aren t quite enough days in the week, I m really happy! In any case, the main point of this blog post is that I m at GUADEC in Manchester right now, and I d like to blog about Flathub, but I thought it would be weird to just show up and say that after 7 years of silence without saying hello again.

24 July 2017

Jonathan Carter: Plans for DebCamp17

In a few days, I ll be attending DebCamp17 in Montr al, Canada. Here are a few things I plan to pay attention to:

Next.