Search Results: "nore"

27 October 2025

Dirk Eddelbuettel: #054: Faster r-ci Continuous Integration via r2u Container

Welcome to post 54 in the R4 series. The topic of continuous integration has been a recurrent theme here at the R4 series. Post #32 introducess r-ci, while post #41 brings r2u to r-ci, but does not show a matrix deployment. Post #45 describes the updated r-ci setup that is now the default and contains a macOS and Ubuntu matrix, where the latter relies on r2u to keep things fast, easy, reliable . Last but not least more recent post #52 shares a trick for ensuring coverage reports. Following #45, use of r-ci at for example GitHub Actions has seen steady use and very reliable performance. With the standard setup, a vanilla Ubuntu setup is changed into one supported by r2u. This requires downloading and installating a few Ubuntu packages, and has generally been fairly quick on the order of around fourty seconds. Now, the general variability of run-times for identical tasks in GitHub Actions is well documented by the results of the setup described in post #39 which still runs weekly. It runs the identical SQL query against a remote backend using two different package families. And lo and behold, the intra-method variability on unchanged code or setup and therefore due solely to system variability is about as large as the inter-method variability. In short, GitHub Actions performance varies randomly with significant variability. See the repo README.md for chart that updates weekly (and see #39 for background). Of late, this variability became more noticeable during standard GitHub Actions runs where it would regularly take more than two minutes of setup time before actual continuous integration work was done. Some caching seems to be in effect, so subsequent runs in the same repo seem faster and often came back to one minute or less. For lightweight and small packages, loosing two minutes to setup when the actual test time is a minute or less gets old fast. Looking around, we noticed that container use can be combined with matrix use. So we have now been deploying the following setup (not always over all the matrix elements though)
jobs:
  ci:
    strategy:
      matrix:
        include:
          -   name: container, os: ubuntu-latest, container: rocker/r2u4ci  
          -   name: macos,     os: macos-latest   
          -   name: ubuntu,    os: ubuntu-latest  

    runs-on: $  matrix.os  
    container: $  matrix.container  
GitHub Actions is smart enough to provide NULL for container in the two other cases, so container: $ matrix.container is ignored there. But when container is set as here for the ci-enhanced version of r2u (which adds a few binaries commonly needed such as git, curl, wget etc needed for CI) then the CI jobs runs inside the container. And thereby skips most of the setup time as the container is already prepared. This also required some small adjustments in the underlying shell script doing the work. To not disrupt standard deployment, we placed these into a release candidate / development version one can op into via an new variable dev_version
      - name: Setup
        uses: eddelbuettel/github-actions/r-ci@master
        with:
          dev_version: 'TRUE'
Everything else remains the same and works as before. But faster as much less time is spent on setup. You can see the actual full yaml file and actions in my repositories for rcpparmadillo and rcppmlpack-examples. Additional testing would be welcome, so feel free to deploy this in your actions now. Otherwise I will likely carry this over and make it the defaul in a few weeks time. It will still work as before but when the added container: line is used will run much faster thanks to rocker/r2u4ci being already set up for CI.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can now sponsor me at GitHub.

19 October 2025

Otto Kek l inen: Could the XZ backdoor have been detected with better Git and Debian packaging practices?

Featured image of post Could the XZ backdoor have been detected with better Git and Debian packaging practices?The discovery of a backdoor in XZ Utils in the spring of 2024 shocked the open source community, raising critical questions about software supply chain security. This post explores whether better Debian packaging practices could have detected this threat, offering a guide to auditing packages and suggesting future improvements. The XZ backdoor in versions 5.6.0/5.6.1 made its way briefly into many major Linux distributions such as Debian and Fedora, but luckily didn t reach that many actual users, as the backdoored releases were quickly removed thanks to the heroic diligence of Andres Freund. We are all extremely lucky that he detected a half a second performance regression in SSH, cared enough to trace it down, discovered malicious code in the XZ library loaded by SSH, and reported promtly to various security teams for quick coordinated actions. This episode makes software engineers pondering the following questions: As a Debian Developer, I decided to audit the xz package in Debian, share my methodology and findings in this post, and also suggest some improvements on how the software supply-chain security could be tightened in Debian specifically. Note that the scope here is only to inspect how Debian imports software from its upstreams, and how they are distributed to Debian s users. This excludes the whole story of how to assess if an upstream project is following software development security best practices. This post doesn t discuss how to operate an individual computer running Debian to ensure it remains untampered as there are plenty of guides on that already.

Downloading Debian and upstream source packages Let s start by working backwards from what the Debian package repositories offer for download. As auditing binaries is extremely complicated, we skip that, and assume the Debian build hosts are trustworthy and reliably building binaries from the source packages, and the focus should be on auditing the source code packages. As with everything in Debian, there are multiple tools and ways to do the same thing, but in this post only one (and hopefully the best) way to do something is presented for brevity. The first step is to download the latest version and some past versions of the package from the Debian archive, which is easiest done with debsnap. The following command will download all Debian source packages of xz-utils from Debian release 5.2.4-1 onwards:
$ debsnap --verbose --first 5.2.4-1 xz-utils
Getting json https://snapshot.debian.org/mr/package/xz-utils/
...
Getting dsc file xz-utils_5.2.4-1.dsc: https://snapshot.debian.org/file/a98271e4291bed8df795ce04d9dc8e4ce959462d
Getting file xz-utils_5.2.4.orig.tar.xz.asc: https://snapshot.debian.org/file/59ccbfb2405abe510999afef4b374cad30c09275
Getting file xz-utils_5.2.4-1.debian.tar.xz: https://snapshot.debian.org/file/667c14fd9409ca54c397b07d2d70140d6297393f
source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.2.4-1.dsc:
Good signature found
validating xz-utils_5.2.4.orig.tar.xz
validating xz-utils_5.2.4.orig.tar.xz.asc
validating xz-utils_5.2.4-1.debian.tar.xz
All files validated successfully.
Once debsnap completes there will be a subfolder source-<package name> with the following types of files:
  • *.orig.tar.xz: source code from upstream
  • *.orig.tar.xz.asc: detached signature (if upstream signs their releases)
  • *.debian.tar.xz: Debian packaging source, i.e. the debian/ subdirectory contents
  • *.dsc: Debian source control file, including signature by Debian Developer/Maintainer
Example:
$ ls -1 source-xz-utils/
...
xz-utils_5.6.4.orig.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.6.4.orig.tar.xz.asc
xz-utils_5.6.4-1.debian.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.6.4-1.dsc
xz-utils_5.8.0.orig.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.0.orig.tar.xz.asc
xz-utils_5.8.0-1.debian.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.0-1.dsc
xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc
xz-utils_5.8.1-1.1.debian.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.1-1.1.dsc
xz-utils_5.8.1-1.debian.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.1-1.dsc
xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.1-2.dsc

Verifying authenticity of upstream and Debian sources using OpenPGP signatures As seen in the output of debsnap, it already automatically verifies that the downloaded files match the OpenPGP signatures. To have full clarity on what files were authenticated with what keys, we should verify the Debian packagers signature with:
$ gpg --verify --auto-key-retrieve --keyserver hkps://keyring.debian.org xz-utils_5.8.1-2.dsc
gpg: Signature made Fri Oct 3 22:04:44 2025 UTC
gpg: using RSA key 57892E705233051337F6FDD105641F175712FA5B
gpg: requesting key 05641F175712FA5B from hkps://keyring.debian.org
gpg: key 7B96E8162A8CF5D1: public key "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
gpg: Good signature from "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" [unknown]
gpg: aka "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>" [unknown]
gpg: aka "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 6425 4695 FFF0 AA44 66CC 19E6 7B96 E816 2A8C F5D1
Subkey fingerprint: 5789 2E70 5233 0513 37F6 FDD1 0564 1F17 5712 FA5B
The upstream tarball signature (if available) can be verified with:
$ gpg --verify --auto-key-retrieve xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc
gpg: assuming signed data in 'xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz'
gpg: Signature made Thu Apr 3 11:38:23 2025 UTC
gpg: using RSA key 3690C240CE51B4670D30AD1C38EE757D69184620
gpg: key 38EE757D69184620: public key "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
gpg: Good signature from "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 3690 C240 CE51 B467 0D30 AD1C 38EE 757D 6918 4620
Note that this only proves that there is a key that created a valid signature for this content. The authenticity of the keys themselves need to be validated separately before trusting they in fact are the keys of these people. That can be done by checking e.g. the upstream website for what key fingerprints they published, or the Debian keyring for Debian Developers and Maintainers, or by relying on the OpenPGP web-of-trust .

Verifying authenticity of upstream sources by comparing checksums In case the upstream in question does not publish release signatures, the second best way to verify the authenticity of the sources used in Debian is to download the sources directly from upstream and compare that the sha256 checksums match. This should be done using the debian/watch file inside the Debian packaging, which defines where the upstream source is downloaded from. Continuing on the example situation above, we can unpack the latest Debian sources, enter and then run uscan to download:
$ tar xvf xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
...
debian/rules
debian/source/format
debian/source.lintian-overrides
debian/symbols
debian/tests/control
debian/tests/testsuite
debian/upstream/signing-key.asc
debian/watch
...
$ uscan --download-current-version --destdir /tmp
Newest version of xz-utils on remote site is 5.8.1, specified download version is 5.8.1
gpgv: Signature made Thu Apr 3 11:38:23 2025 UTC
gpgv: using RSA key 3690C240CE51B4670D30AD1C38EE757D69184620
gpgv: Good signature from "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>"
Successfully symlinked /tmp/xz-5.8.1.tar.xz to /tmp/xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.
The original files downloaded from upstream are now in /tmp along with the files renamed to follow Debian conventions. Using everything downloaded so far the sha256 checksums can be compared across the files and also to what the .dsc file advertised:
$ ls -1 /tmp/
xz-5.8.1.tar.xz
xz-5.8.1.tar.xz.sig
xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc
$ sha256sum xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz /tmp/xz-5.8.1.tar.xz
0b54f79df85912504de0b14aec7971e3f964491af1812d83447005807513cd9e xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz
0b54f79df85912504de0b14aec7971e3f964491af1812d83447005807513cd9e /tmp/xz-5.8.1.tar.xz
$ grep -A 3 Sha256 xz-utils_5.8.1-2.dsc
Checksums-Sha256:
0b54f79df85912504de0b14aec7971e3f964491af1812d83447005807513cd9e 1461872 xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz
4138f4ceca1aa7fd2085fb15a23f6d495d27bca6d3c49c429a8520ea622c27ae 833 xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc
3ed458da17e4023ec45b2c398480ed4fe6a7bfc1d108675ec837b5ca9a4b5ccb 24648 xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
In the example above the checksum 0b54f79df85... is the same across the files, so it is a match.

Repackaged upstream sources can t be verified as easily Note that uscan may in rare cases repackage some upstream sources, for example to exclude files that don t adhere to Debian s copyright and licensing requirements. Those files and paths would be listed under the Files-Excluded section in the debian/copyright file. There are also other situations where the file that represents the upstream sources in Debian isn t bit-by-bit the same as what upstream published. If checksums don t match, an experienced Debian Developer should review all package settings (e.g. debian/source/options) to see if there was a valid and intentional reason for divergence.

Reviewing changes between two source packages using diffoscope Diffoscope is an incredibly capable and handy tool to compare arbitrary files. For example, to view a report in HTML format of the differences between two XZ releases, run:
diffoscope --html-dir xz-utils-5.6.4_vs_5.8.0 xz-utils_5.6.4.orig.tar.xz xz-utils_5.8.0.orig.tar.xz
browse xz-utils-5.6.4_vs_5.8.0/index.html
Inspecting diffoscope output of differences between two XZ Utils releases If the changes are extensive, and you want to use a LLM to help spot potential security issues, generate the report of both the upstream and Debian packaging differences in Markdown with:
diffoscope --markdown diffoscope-debian.md xz-utils_5.6.4-1.debian.tar.xz xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
diffoscope --markdown diffoscope.md xz-utils_5.6.4.orig.tar.xz xz-utils_5.8.0.orig.tar.xz
The Markdown files created above can then be passed to your favorite LLM, along with a prompt such as:
Based on the attached diffoscope output for a new Debian package version compared with the previous one, list all suspicious changes that might have introduced a backdoor, followed by other potential security issues. If there are none, list a short summary of changes as the conclusion.

Reviewing Debian source packages in version control As of today only 93% of all Debian source packages are tracked in git on Debian s GitLab instance at salsa.debian.org. Some key packages such as Coreutils and Bash are not using version control at all, as their maintainers apparently don t see value in using git for Debian packaging, and the Debian Policy does not require it. Thus, the only reliable and consistent way to audit changes in Debian packages is to compare the full versions from the archive as shown above. However, for packages that are hosted on Salsa, one can view the git history to gain additional insight into what exactly changed, when and why. For packages that are using version control, their location can be found in the Git-Vcs header in the debian/control file. For xz-utils the location is salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils. Note that the Debian policy does not state anything about how Salsa should be used, or what git repository layout or development practices to follow. In practice most packages follow the DEP-14 proposal, and use git-buildpackage as the tool for managing changes and pushing and pulling them between upstream and salsa.debian.org. To get the XZ Utils source, run:
$ gbp clone https://salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils.git
gbp:info: Cloning from 'https://salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils.git'
At the time of writing this post the git history shows:
$ git log --graph --oneline
* bb787585 (HEAD -> debian/unstable, origin/debian/unstable, origin/HEAD) Prepare 5.8.1-2
* 4b769547 d: Remove the symlinks from -dev package.
* a39f3428 Correct the nocheck build profile
* 1b806b8d Import Debian changes 5.8.1-1.1
* b1cad34b Prepare 5.8.1-1
* a8646015 Import 5.8.1
* 2808ec2d Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/5.8.1'
 \
  * fa1e8796 (origin/upstream/v5.8, upstream/v5.8) New upstream version 5.8.1
  * a522a226 Bump version and soname for 5.8.1
  * 1c462c2a Add NEWS for 5.8.1
  * 513cabcf Tests: Call lzma_code() in smaller chunks in fuzz_common.h
  * 48440e24 Tests: Add a fuzzing target for the multithreaded .xz decoder
  * 0c80045a liblzma: mt dec: Fix lack of parallelization in single-shot decoding
  * 81880488 liblzma: mt dec: Don't modify thr->in_size in the worker thread
  * d5a2ffe4 liblzma: mt dec: Don't free the input buffer too early (CVE-2025-31115)
  * c0c83596 liblzma: mt dec: Simplify by removing the THR_STOP state
  * 831b55b9 liblzma: mt dec: Fix a comment
  * b9d168ee liblzma: Add assertions to lzma_bufcpy()
  * c8e0a489 DOS: Update Makefile to fix the build
  * 307c02ed sysdefs.h: Avoid <stdalign.h> even with C11 compilers
  * 7ce38b31 Update THANKS
  * 688e51bd Translations: Update the Croatian translation
*   a6b54dde Prepare 5.8.0-1.
*   77d9470f Add 5.8 symbols.
*   9268eb66 Import 5.8.0
*   6f85ef4f Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/5.8.0'
 \ \
  *   afba662b New upstream version 5.8.0
   /
  * 173fb5c6 doc/SHA256SUMS: Add 5.8.0
  * db9258e8 Bump version and soname for 5.8.0
  * bfb752a3 Add NEWS for 5.8.0
  * 6ccbb904 Translations: Run "make -C po update-po"
  * 891a5f05 Translations: Run po4a/update-po
  * 4f52e738 Translations: Partially fix overtranslation in Serbian man pages
  * ff5d9447 liblzma: Count the extra bytes in LZMA/LZMA2 decoder memory usage
  * 943b012d liblzma: Use SSE2 intrinsics instead of memcpy() in dict_repeat()
This shows both the changes on the debian/unstable branch as well as the intermediate upstream import branch, and the actual real upstream development branch. See my Debian source packages in git explainer for details of what these branches are used for. To only view changes on the Debian branch, run git log --graph --oneline --first-parent or git log --graph --oneline -- debian. The Debian branch should only have changes inside the debian/ subdirectory, which is easy to check with:
$ git diff --stat upstream/v5.8
debian/README.source   16 +++
debian/autogen.sh   32 +++++
debian/changelog   949 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
...
debian/upstream/signing-key.asc   52 +++++++++
debian/watch   4 +
debian/xz-utils.README.Debian   47 ++++++++
debian/xz-utils.docs   6 +
debian/xz-utils.install   28 +++++
debian/xz-utils.postinst   19 +++
debian/xz-utils.prerm   10 ++
debian/xzdec.docs   6 +
debian/xzdec.install   4 +
33 files changed, 2014 insertions(+)
All the files outside the debian/ directory originate from upstream, and for example running git blame on them should show only upstream commits:
$ git blame CMakeLists.txt
22af94128 (Lasse Collin 2024-02-12 17:09:10 +0200 1) # SPDX-License-Identifier: 0BSD
22af94128 (Lasse Collin 2024-02-12 17:09:10 +0200 2)
7e3493d40 (Lasse Collin 2020-02-24 23:38:16 +0200 3) ###############
7e3493d40 (Lasse Collin 2020-02-24 23:38:16 +0200 4) #
426bdc709 (Lasse Collin 2024-02-17 21:45:07 +0200 5) # CMake support for building XZ Utils
If the upstream in question signs commits or tags, they can be verified with e.g.:
$ git verify-tag v5.6.2
gpg: Signature made Wed 29 May 2024 09:39:42 AM PDT
gpg: using RSA key 3690C240CE51B4670D30AD1C38EE757D69184620
gpg: issuer "lasse.collin@tukaani.org"
gpg: Good signature from "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>" [expired]
gpg: Note: This key has expired!
The main benefit of reviewing changes in git is the ability to see detailed information about each individual change, instead of just staring at a massive list of changes without any explanations. In this example, to view all the upstream commits since the previous import to Debian, one would view the commit range from afba662b New upstream version 5.8.0 to fa1e8796 New upstream version 5.8.1 with git log --reverse -p afba662b...fa1e8796. However, a far superior way to review changes would be to browse this range using a visual git history viewer, such as gitk. Either way, looking at one code change at a time and reading the git commit message makes the review much easier. Browsing git history in gitk --all

Comparing Debian source packages to git contents As stated in the beginning of the previous section, and worth repeating, there is no guarantee that the contents in the Debian packaging git repository matches what was actually uploaded to Debian. While the tag2upload project in Debian is getting more and more popular, Debian is still far from having any system to enforce that the git repository would be in sync with the Debian archive contents. To detect such differences we can run diff across the Debian source packages downloaded with debsnap earlier (path source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian) and the git repository cloned in the previous section (path xz-utils):
diff
$ diff -u source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian/ xz-utils/debian/
diff -u source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian/changelog xz-utils/debian/changelog
--- debsnap/source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian/changelog 2025-10-03 09:32:16.000000000 -0700
+++ xz-utils/debian/changelog 2025-10-12 12:18:04.623054758 -0700
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 * Remove the symlinks from -dev, pointing to the lib package.
 (Closes: #1109354)

- -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Fri, 03 Oct 2025 18:32:16 +0200
+ -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Fri, 03 Oct 2025 18:36:59 +0200
In the case above diff revealed that the timestamp in the changelog in the version uploaded to Debian is different from what was committed to git. This is not malicious, just a mistake by the maintainer who probably didn t run gbp tag immediately after upload, but instead some dch command and ended up with having a different timestamps in the git compared to what was actually uploaded to Debian.

Creating syntetic Debian packaging git repositories If no Debian packaging git repository exists, or if it is lagging behind what was uploaded to Debian s archive, one can use git-buildpackage s import-dscs feature to create synthetic git commits based on the files downloaded by debsnap, ensuring the git contents fully matches what was uploaded to the archive. To import a single version there is gbp import-dsc (no s at the end), of which an example invocation would be:
$ gbp import-dsc --verbose ../source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.dsc
Version '5.8.1-2' imported under '/home/otto/debian/xz-utils-2025-09-29'
Example commit history from a repository with commits added with gbp import-dsc:
$ git log --graph --oneline
* 86aed07b (HEAD -> debian/unstable, tag: debian/5.8.1-2, origin/debian/unstable) Import Debian changes 5.8.1-2
* f111d93b (tag: debian/5.8.1-1.1) Import Debian changes 5.8.1-1.1
* 1106e19b (tag: debian/5.8.1-1) Import Debian changes 5.8.1-1
 \
  * 08edbe38 (tag: upstream/5.8.1, origin/upstream/v5.8, upstream/v5.8) Import Upstream version 5.8.1
   \
    * a522a226 (tag: v5.8.1) Bump version and soname for 5.8.1
    * 1c462c2a Add NEWS for 5.8.1
    * 513cabcf Tests: Call lzma_code() in smaller chunks in fuzz_common.h
An online example repository with only a few missing uploads added using gbp import-dsc can be viewed at salsa.debian.org/otto/xz-utils-2025-09-29/-/network/debian%2Funstable An example repository that was fully crafted using gbp import-dscs can be viewed at salsa.debian.org/otto/xz-utils-gbp-import-dscs-debsnap-generated/-/network/debian%2Flatest. There exists also dgit, which in a similar way creates a synthetic git history to allow viewing the Debian archive contents via git tools. However, its focus is on producing new package versions, so fetching a package with dgit that has not had the history recorded in dgit earlier will only show the latest versions:
$ dgit clone xz-utils
canonical suite name for unstable is sid
starting new git history
last upload to archive: NO git hash
downloading http://ftp.debian.org/debian//pool/main/x/xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz...
downloading http://ftp.debian.org/debian//pool/main/x/xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc...
downloading http://ftp.debian.org/debian//pool/main/x/xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz...
dpkg-source: info: extracting xz-utils in unpacked
dpkg-source: info: unpacking xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz
dpkg-source: info: unpacking xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
synthesised git commit from .dsc 5.8.1-2
HEAD is now at f9bcaf7 xz-utils (5.8.1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
dgit ok: ready for work in xz-utils
$ dgit/sid   git log --graph --oneline
* f9bcaf7 xz-utils (5.8.1-2) unstable; urgency=medium 9 days ago (HEAD -> dgit/sid, dgit/dgit/sid)
 \
  * 11d3a62 Import xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz 9 days ago
* 15dcd95 Import xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz 6 months ago
Unlike git-buildpackage managed git repositories, the dgit managed repositories cannot incorporate the upstream git history and are thus less useful for auditing the full software supply-chain in git.

Comparing upstream source packages to git contents Equally important to the note in the beginning of the previous section, one must also keep in mind that the upstream release source packages, often called release tarballs, are not guaranteed to have the exact same contents as the upstream git repository. Projects might strip out test data or extra development files from their release tarballs to avoid shipping unnecessary files to users, or projects might add documentation files or versioning information into the tarball that isn t stored in git. While a small minority, there are also upstreams that don t use git at all, so the plain files in a release tarball is still the lowest common denominator for all open source software projects, and exporting and importing source code needs to interface with it. In the case of XZ, the release tarball has additional version info and also a sizeable amount of pregenerated compiler configuration files. Detecting and comparing differences between git contents and tarballs can of course be done manually by running diff across an unpacked tarball and a checked out git repository. If using git-buildpackage, the difference between the git contents and tarball contents can be made visible directly in the import commit. In this XZ example, consider this git history:
* b1cad34b Prepare 5.8.1-1
* a8646015 Import 5.8.1
* 2808ec2d Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/5.8.1'
 \
  * fa1e8796 (debian/upstream/v5.8, upstream/v5.8) New upstream version 5.8.1
  * a522a226 (tag: v5.8.1) Bump version and soname for 5.8.1
  * 1c462c2a Add NEWS for 5.8.1
The commit a522a226 was the upstream release commit, which upstream also tagged v5.8.1. The merge commit 2808ec2d applied the new upstream import branch contents on the Debian branch. Between these is the special commit fa1e8796 New upstream version 5.8.1 tagged upstream/v5.8. This commit and tag exists only in the Debian packaging repository, and they show what is the contents imported into Debian. This is generated automatically by git-buildpackage when running git import-orig --uscan for Debian packages with the correct settings in debian/gbp.conf. By viewing this commit one can see exactly how the upstream release tarball differs from the upstream git contents (if at all). In the case of XZ, the difference is substantial, and shown below in full as it is very interesting:
$ git show --stat fa1e8796
commit fa1e8796dabd91a0f667b9e90f9841825225413a
(debian/upstream/v5.8, upstream/v5.8)
Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Date: Thu Apr 3 22:58:39 2025 +0200
New upstream version 5.8.1
.codespellrc   30 -
.gitattributes   8 -
.github/workflows/ci.yml   163 -
.github/workflows/freebsd.yml   32 -
.github/workflows/netbsd.yml   32 -
.github/workflows/openbsd.yml   35 -
.github/workflows/solaris.yml   32 -
.github/workflows/windows-ci.yml   124 -
.gitignore   113 -
ABOUT-NLS   1 +
ChangeLog   17392 +++++++++++++++++++++
Makefile.in   1097 +++++++
aclocal.m4   1353 ++++++++
build-aux/ci_build.bash   286 --
build-aux/compile   351 ++
build-aux/config.guess   1815 ++++++++++
build-aux/config.rpath   751 +++++
build-aux/config.sub   2354 +++++++++++++
build-aux/depcomp   792 +++++
build-aux/install-sh   541 +++
build-aux/ltmain.sh   11524 ++++++++++++++++++++++
build-aux/missing   236 ++
build-aux/test-driver   160 +
config.h.in   634 ++++
configure   26434 ++++++++++++++++++++++
debug/Makefile.in   756 +++++
doc/SHA256SUMS   236 --
doc/man/txt/lzmainfo.txt   36 +
doc/man/txt/xz.txt   1708 ++++++++++
doc/man/txt/xzdec.txt   76 +
doc/man/txt/xzdiff.txt   39 +
doc/man/txt/xzgrep.txt   70 +
doc/man/txt/xzless.txt   36 +
doc/man/txt/xzmore.txt   31 +
lib/Makefile.in   623 ++++
m4/.gitignore   40 -
m4/build-to-host.m4   274 ++
m4/gettext.m4   392 +++
m4/host-cpu-c-abi.m4   529 +++
m4/iconv.m4   324 ++
m4/intlmacosx.m4   71 +
m4/lib-ld.m4   170 +
m4/lib-link.m4   815 +++++
m4/lib-prefix.m4   334 ++
m4/libtool.m4   8488 +++++++++++++++++++++
m4/ltoptions.m4   467 +++
m4/ltsugar.m4   124 +
m4/ltversion.m4   24 +
m4/lt~obsolete.m4   99 +
m4/nls.m4   33 +
m4/po.m4   456 +++
m4/progtest.m4   92 +
po/.gitignore   31 -
po/Makefile.in.in   517 +++
po/Rules-quot   66 +
po/boldquot.sed   21 +
po/ca.gmo   Bin 0 -> 15587 bytes
po/cs.gmo   Bin 0 -> 7983 bytes
po/da.gmo   Bin 0 -> 9040 bytes
po/de.gmo   Bin 0 -> 29882 bytes
po/en@boldquot.header   35 +
po/en@quot.header   32 +
po/eo.gmo   Bin 0 -> 15060 bytes
po/es.gmo   Bin 0 -> 29228 bytes
po/fi.gmo   Bin 0 -> 28225 bytes
po/fr.gmo   Bin 0 -> 10232 bytes
To be able to easily inspect exactly what changed in the release tarball compared to git release tag contents, the best tool for the job is Meld, invoked via git difftool --dir-diff fa1e8796^..fa1e8796. Meld invoked by git difftool --dir-diff afba662b..fa1e8796 to show differences between git release tag and release tarball contents To compare changes across the new and old upstream tarball, one would need to compare commits afba662b New upstream version 5.8.0 and fa1e8796 New upstream version 5.8.1 by running git difftool --dir-diff afba662b..fa1e8796. Meld invoked by git difftool --dir-diff afba662b..fa1e8796 to show differences between to upstream release tarball contents With all the above tips you can now go and try to audit your own favorite package in Debian and see if it is identical with upstream, and if not, how it differs.

Should the XZ backdoor have been detected using these tools? The famous XZ Utils backdoor (CVE-2024-3094) consisted of two parts: the actual backdoor inside two binary blobs masqueraded as a test files (tests/files/bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz, tests/files/good-large_compressed.lzma), and a small modification in the build scripts (m4/build-to-host.m4) to extract the backdoor and plant it into the built binary. The build script was not tracked in version control, but generated with GNU Autotools at release time and only shipped as additional files in the release tarball. The entire reason for me to write this post was to ponder if a diligent engineer using git-buildpackage best practices could have reasonably spotted this while importing the new upstream release into Debian. The short answer is no . The malicious actor here clearly anticipated all the typical ways anyone might inspect both git commits, and release tarball contents, and masqueraded the changes very well and over a long timespan. First of all, XZ has for legitimate reasons for several carefully crafted .xz files as test data to help catch regressions in the decompression code path. The test files are shipped in the release so users can run the test suite and validate that the binary is built correctly and xz works properly. Debian famously runs massive amounts of testing in its CI and autopkgtest system across tens of thousands of packages to uphold high quality despite frequent upgrades of the build toolchain and while supporting more CPU architectures than any other distro. Test data is useful and should stay. When git-buildpackage is used correctly, the upstream commits are visible in the Debian packaging for easy review, but the commit cf44e4b that introduced the test files does not deviate enough from regular sloppy coding practices to really stand out. It is unfortunately very common for git commit to lack a message body explaining why the change was done, and to not be properly atomic with test code and test data together in the same commit, and for commits to be pushed directly to mainline without using code reviews (the commit was not part of any PR in this case). Only another upstream developer could have spotted that this change is not on par to what the project expects, and that the test code was never added, only test data, and thus that this commit was not just a sloppy one but potentially malicious. Secondly, the fact that a new Autotools file appeared (m4/build-to-host.m4) in the XZ Utils 5.6.0 is not suspicious. This is perfectly normal for Autotools. In fact, starting from XZ Utils version 5.8.1 it is now shipping a m4/build-to-host.m4 file that it actually uses now. Spotting that there is anything fishy is practically impossible by simply reading the code, as Autotools files are full custom m4 syntax interwoven with shell script, and there are plenty of backticks ( ) that spawn subshells and evals that execute variable contents further, which is just normal for Autotools. Russ Cox s XZ post explains how exactly the Autotools code fetched the actual backdoor from the test files and injected it into the build. Inspecting the m4/build-to-host.m4 changes in Meld launched via git difftool There is only one tiny thing that maybe a very experienced Autotools user could potentially have noticed: the serial 30 in the version header is way too high. In theory one could also have noticed this Autotools file deviates from what other packages in Debian ship with the same filename, such as e.g. the serial 3, serial 5a or 5b versions. That would however require and an insane amount extra checking work, and is not something we should plan to start doing. A much simpler solution would be to simply strongly recommend all open source projects to stop using Autotools to eventually get rid of it entirely.

Not detectable with reasonable effort While planting backdoors is evil, it is hard not to feel some respect to the level of skill and dedication of the people behind this. I ve been involved in a bunch of security breach investigations during my IT career, and never have I seen anything this well executed. If it hadn t slowed down SSH by ~500 milliseconds and been discovered due to that, it would most likely have stayed undetected for months or years. Hiding backdoors in closed source software is relatively trivial, but hiding backdoors in plain sight in a popular open source project requires some unusual amount of expertise and creativity as shown above.

Is the software supply-chain in Debian easy to audit? While maintaining a Debian package source using git-buildpackage can make the package history a lot easier to inspect, most packages have incomplete configurations in their debian/gbp.conf, and thus their package development histories are not always correctly constructed or uniform and easy to compare. The Debian Policy does not mandate git usage at all, and there are many important packages that are not using git at all. Additionally the Debian Policy also allows for non-maintainers to upload new versions to Debian without committing anything in git even for packages where the original maintainer wanted to use git. Uploads that bypass git unfortunately happen surpisingly often. Because of the situation, I am afraid that we could have multiple similar backdoors lurking that simply haven t been detected yet. More audits, that hopefully also get published openly, would be welcome! More people auditing the contents of the Debian archives would probably also help surface what tools and policies Debian might be missing to make the work easier, and thus help improve the security of Debian s users, and improve trust in Debian.

Is Debian currently missing some software that could help detect similar things? To my knowledge there is currently no system in place as part of Debian s QA or security infrastructure to verify that the upstream source packages in Debian are actually from upstream. I ve come across a lot of packages where the debian/watch or other configs are incorrect and even cases where maintainers have manually created upstream tarballs as it was easier than configuring automation to work. It is obvious that for those packages the source tarball now in Debian is not at all the same as upstream. I am not aware of any malicious cases though (if I was, I would report them of course). I am also aware of packages in the Debian repository that are misconfigured to be of type 1.0 (native) packages, mixing the upstream files and debian/ contents and having patches applied, while they actually should be configured as 3.0 (quilt), and not hide what is the true upstream sources. Debian should extend the QA tools to scan for such things. If I find a sponsor, I might build it myself as my next major contribution to Debian. In addition to better tooling for finding mismatches in the source code, Debian could also have better tooling for tracking in built binaries what their source files were, but solutions like Fraunhofer-AISEC s supply-graph or Sony s ESSTRA are not practical yet. Julien Malka s post about NixOS discusses the role of reproducible builds, which may help in some cases across all distros.

Or, is Debian missing some policies or practices to mitigate this? Perhaps more importantly than more security scanning, the Debian Developer community should switch the general mindset from anyone is free to do anything to valuing having more shared workflows. The ability to audit anything is severely hampered by the fact that there are so many ways to do the same thing, and distinguishing what is a normal deviation from a malicious deviation is too hard, as the normal can basically be almost anything. Also, as there is no documented and recommended default workflow, both those who are old and new to Debian packaging might never learn any one optimal workflow, and end up doing many steps in the packaging process in a way that kind of works, but is actually wrong or unnecessary, causing process deviations that look malicious, but turn out to just be a result of not fully understanding what would have been the right way to do something. In the long run, once individual developers workflows are more aligned, doing code reviews will become a lot easier and smoother as the excess noise of workflow differences diminishes and reviews will feel much more productive to all participants. Debian fostering a culture of code reviews would allow us to slowly move from the current practice of mainly solo packaging work towards true collaboration forming around those code reviews. I have been promoting increased use of Merge Requests in Debian already for some time, for example by proposing DEP-18: Encourage Continuous Integration and Merge Request based Collaboration for Debian packages. If you are involved in Debian development, please give a thumbs up in dep-team/deps!21 if you want me to continue promoting it.

Can we trust open source software? Yes and I would argue that we can only trust open source software. There is no way to audit closed source software, and anyone using e.g. Windows or MacOS just have to trust the vendor s word when they say they have no intentional or accidental backdoors in their software. Or, when the news gets out that the systems of a closed source vendor was compromised, like Crowdstrike some weeks ago, we can t audit anything, and time after time we simply need to take their word when they say they have properly cleaned up their code base. In theory, a vendor could give some kind of contractual or financial guarantee to its customer that there are no preventable security issues, but in practice that never happens. I am not aware of a single case of e.g. Microsoft or Oracle would have paid damages to their customers after a security flaw was found in their software. In theory you could also pay a vendor more to have them focus more effort in security, but since there is no way to verify what they did, or to get compensation when they didn t, any increased fees are likely just pocketed as increased profit. Open source is clearly better overall. You can, if you are an individual with the time and skills, audit every step in the supply-chain, or you could as an organization make investments in open source security improvements and actually verify what changes were made and how security improved. If your organisation is using Debian (or derivatives, such as Ubuntu) and you are interested in sponsoring my work to improve Debian, please reach out.

9 October 2025

Thorsten Alteholz: My Debian Activities in September 2025

Debian LTS This was my hundred-thirty-fifth month that I did some work for the Debian LTS initiative, started by Raphael Hertzog at Freexian. During my allocated time I uploaded or worked on: An upload of spim was not needed, as the corresponding CVE could be marked as ignored. I also started to work on an open-vm-tools and attended the monthly LTS/ELTS meeting. Debian ELTS This month was the eighty-sixth ELTS month. During my allocated time I uploaded or worked on: The CVEs for open-vm-tools could be marked as not-affeceted as the corresponding plugin was not yet available. I also attended the monthly LTS/ELTS meeting. Debian Printing This month I uploaded a new upstream version or a bugfix version of: This work is generously funded by Freexian! Debian Astro This month I uploaded a new upstream version or a bugfix version of: Debian IoT This month I uploaded a new upstream version or a bugfix version of: Debian Mobcom This month I uploaded a new upstream version or a bugfix version of: misc The main topic of this month has been gcc15 and cmake4, so my upload rate was extra high. This month I uploaded a new upstream version or a bugfix version of: I wonder what MBF will happen next, I guess the /var/lock-issue will be a good candidate. On my fight against outdated RFPs, I closed 30 of them in September. Meanwhile only 3397 are still open, so don t hesitate to help closing one or another. FTP master This month I accepted 294 and rejected 28 packages. The overall number of packages that got accepted was 294.

3 October 2025

Dirk Eddelbuettel: #053: Adding llvm Snapshots for R Package Testing

Welcome to post 53 in the R4 series. Continuing with posts #51 from Tuesday and #52 from Wednesday and their stated intent of posting some more here is another quick one. Earlier today I helped another package developer who came to the r-package-devel list asking for help with a build error on the Fedora machine at CRAN running recent / development clang. In such situations, the best first step is often to replicate the issue. As I pointed out on the list, the LLVM team behind clang maintains an apt repo at apt.llvm.org/ making it a good resource to add to Debian-based container such as Rocker r-base or the offical r-base (the two are in fact interchangeable, and I take care of both). A small pothole, however, is that the documentation at the top of apt.llvm.org site is a bit stale and behind two aspects that changed on current Debian systems (i.e. unstable/testing as used for r-base). First, apt now prefers files ending in .sources (in a nicer format) and second, it now really requires a key (which is good practice). As it took me a few minutes to regather how to meet both requirements, I reckoned I might as well script this. Et voil the following script does that:
#!/bin/sh

## Update does not hurt but is not strictly needed
#apt update --quiet --quiet
#apt upgrade --yes

## wget -qO- https://apt.llvm.org/llvm-snapshot.gpg.key   sudo tee /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/apt.llvm.org.asc
## or as we are root in container
wget -qO- https://apt.llvm.org/llvm-snapshot.gpg.key > /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/apt.llvm.org.asc

cat <<EOF >/etc/apt/sources.list.d/llvm-dev.sources
Types: deb
URIs: http://apt.llvm.org/unstable/
# for clang-21 
#   Suites: llvm-toolchain-21
# for current clang
Suites: llvm-toolchain
Components: main
Signed-By: /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/apt.llvm.org.asc
EOF

test -d ~/.R   mkdir ~/.R
cat <<EOF >~/.R/Makevars
CLANGVER=-22
# CLANGLIB=-stdlib=libc++
CXX=clang++\$(CLANGVER) \$(CLANGLIB)
CXX11=clang++\$(CLANGVER) \$(CLANGLIB)
CXX14=clang++\$(CLANGVER) \$(CLANGLIB)
CXX17=clang++\$(CLANGVER) \$(CLANGLIB)
CXX20=clang++\$(CLANGVER) \$(CLANGLIB)
CC=clang\$(CLANGVER)
SHLIB_CXXLD=clang++\$(CLANGVER) \$(CLANGLIB)
EOF

apt update
apt install --yes clang-22
Once the script is run, one can test a package (or set of packages) against clang-22 and clang++-22. This may help R package developers. The script is also generic enough for other development communities who can ignore (or comment-out / delete) the bit about ~/.R/Makevars and deploy the compiler differently. Updating the softlink as apt-preferences does is one way and done in many GitHub Actions recipes. As we only need wget here a basic Debian container should work, possibly with the addition of wget. For R users r-base hits a decent sweet spot.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can now sponsor me at GitHub.

28 September 2025

Russ Allbery: Review: Echoes of the Imperium

Review: Echoes of the Imperium, by Nicholas & Olivia Atwater
Series: Tales of the Iron Rose #1
Publisher: Starwatch Press
Copyright: 2024
ISBN: 1-998257-04-5
Format: Kindle
Pages: 547
Echoes of the Imperium is a steampunk fantasy adventure novel, the first of a projected series. There is another novella in the series, A Matter of Execution, that takes place chronologically before this novel, but which I am told that you should read afterwards. (I have not yet read it.) If Olivia Atwater's name sounds familiar, it's probably for the romantic fantasy Half a Soul. Nicholas Atwater is her husband. William Blair, a goblin, was a child sailor on the airship HMS Caliban during the final battle that ended the Imperium, and an eyewitness to the destruction of the capital. Like every imperial solider, that loss made him an Oathbreaker; the fae Oath that he swore to defend the Imperium did not care that nothing a twelve-year-old boy could have done would have changed the result of the battle. He failed to kill himself with most of the rest of the crew, and thus was taken captive by the Coalition. Twenty years later, William Blair is the goblin captain of the airship Iron Rose. It's an independent transport ship that takes various somewhat-dodgy contracts and has to avoid or fight through pirates. The crew comes from both sides of the war and has built their own working truce. Blair himself is a somewhat manic but earnest captain who doesn't entirely believe he deserves that role, one who tends more towards wildly risky plans and improvisation than considered and sober decisions. The rest of the crew are the sort of wild mix of larger-than-life personality quirks that populate swashbuckling adventure books but leave me dubious that stuffing that many high-maintenance people into one ship would go as well as it does. I did appreciate the gunnery knitting circle, though. Echoes of the Imperium is told in the first person from Blair's perspective in two timelines. One follows Blair in the immediate aftermath of the war, tracing his path to becoming an airship captain and meeting some of the people who will later be part of his crew. The other is the current timeline, in which Blair gets deeper and deeper into danger by accepting a risky contract with unexpected complications. Neither of these timelines are in any great hurry to arrive at some destination, and that's the largest problem with this book. Echoes of the Imperium is long, sprawling, and unwilling to get anywhere near any sort of a point until the reader is deeply familiar with the horrific aftermath of the war, the mountains guilt and trauma many of the characters carry around, and Blair's impostor syndrome and feelings of inadequacy. For the first half of this book, I was so bored. I almost bailed out; only a few flashes of interesting character interactions and hints of world-building helped me drag myself through all of the tedious setup. What saves this book is that the world-building is a delight. Once the characters finally started engaging with it in earnest, I could not put it down. Present-time Blair is no longer an Oathbreaker because he was forgiven by a fairy; this will become important later. The sites of great battles are haunted by ghostly echoes of the last moments of the lives of those who died (hence the title); this will become very important later. Blair has a policy of asking no questions about people's pasts if they're willing to commit to working with the rest of the crew; this, also, will become important later. All of these tidbits the authors drop into the story and then ignore for hundreds of pages do have a payoff if you're willing to wait for it. As the reader (too) slowly discovers, the Atwaters' world is set in a war of containment by light fae against dark fae. Instead of being inscrutable and separate, the fae use humans and human empires as tools in that war. The fallen Imperium was a bastion of fae defense, and the war that led to the fall of that Imperium was triggered by the price its citizens paid for that defense, one that the fae could not possibly care less about. The creatures may be out of epic fantasy and the technology from the imagined future of Victorian steampunk, but the politics are that of the Cold War and containment strategies. This book has a lot to say about colonialism and empire, but it says those things subtly and from a fantasy slant, in a world with magical Oaths and direct contact with powers that are both far beyond the capabilities of the main characters and woefully deficient in in humanity and empathy. It has a bit of the feel of Greek mythology if the gods believed in an icy realpolitik rather than embodying the excesses of human emotion. The second half of this book was fantastic. The found-family vibe among a crew of high-maintenance misfits that completely failed to cohere for me in the first half of the book, while Blair was wallowing in his feelings and none of the events seemed to matter, came together brilliantly as soon as the crew had a real problem and some meaty world-building and plot to sink their teeth into. There is a delightfully competent teenager, some satisfying competence porn that Blair finally stops undermining, and a sharp political conflict that felt emotionally satisfying, if perhaps not that intellectually profound. In short, it turns into the fun, adventurous romp of larger-than-life characters that the setting promises. Even the somewhat predictable mid-book reveal worked for me, in part because the emotions of the characters around that reveal sold its impact. If you're going to write a book with a bad half and a good half, it's always better to put the good half second. I came away with very positive feelings about Echoes of the Imperium and a tentative willingness to watch for the sequel. (It reaches a fairly satisfying conclusion, but there are a lot of unresolved plot hooks.) I'm a bit hesitant to recommend it, though, because the first half was not very fun. I want to say that about 75% of the first half of the book could have been cut and the book would have been stronger for it. I'm not completely sure I'm right, since the Atwaters were laying the groundwork for a lot of payoff, but I wish that groundwork hadn't been as much of a slog. Tentatively recommended, particularly if you're in the mood for steampunk fae mythology, but know that this book requires some investment. Technically, A Matter of Execution comes first, but I plan to read it as a sequel. Rating: 8 out of 10

11 September 2025

Freexian Collaborators: Debian Contributions: Preparing for setup.py install deprecation, Salsa CI, Debian 13 "trixie" release and more! (by Anupa Ann Joseph)

Debian Contributions: 2025-08 Contributing to Debian is part of Freexian s mission. This article covers the latest achievements of Freexian and their collaborators. All of this is made possible by organizations subscribing to our Long Term Support contracts and consulting services.

Preparing for setup.py install deprecation, by Colin Watson setuptools upstream will be removing the setup.py install command on 31 October. While this may not trickle down immediately into Debian, it does mean that in the near future nearly all Python packages will have to use pybuild-plugin-pyproject (though they don t necessarily have to use pyproject.toml; this is just a question of how the packaging runs the build system). Some of the Python team talked about this a bit at DebConf, and Colin volunteered to write up some notes on cases where this isn t straightforward. This page will likely grow as the team works on this problem.

Salsa CI, by Santiago Ruano Rinc n Santiago fixed some pending issues in the MR that moves the pipeline to sbuild+unshare, and after several months, Santiago was able to mark the MR as ready. Part of the recent fixes include handling external repositories, honoring the RELEASE autodetection from d/changelog (thanks to Ahmed Siam for spotting the main reason of the issue), and fixing a regression about the apt resolver for *-backports releases. Santiago is currently waiting for a final review and approval from other members of the Salsa CI team, and being able to merge it. Thanks to all the folks who have helped testing the changes or provided feedback so far. If you want to test the current MR, you need to include the following pipeline definition in your project s CI config file:
---
include:
  - https://salsa.debian.org/santiago/pipeline/raw/sbuild-unshare-02-salsa-ci/salsa-ci.yml
  - https://salsa.debian.org/santiago/pipeline/raw/sbuild-unshare-02-salsa-ci/pipeline-jobs.yml
As a reminder, this MR will make the Salsa CI pipeline build the packages more similar to how it s built by the Debian official builders. This will also save some resources, since the default pipeline will have one stage less (the provisioning) stage, and will make it possible for more projects to be built on salsa.debian.org (including large projects and those from the OCaml ecosystem), etc. See the different issues being fixed in the MR description.

Debian 13 trixie release, by Emilio Pozuelo Monfort On August 9th, Debian 13 trixie was released, building on two years worth of updates and bug fixes from hundreds of developers. Emilio helped coordinate the release, communicating with several teams involved in the process.

DebConf 26 Site Visit, by Stefano Rivera Stefano visited Santa Fe, Argentina, the site for DebConf 26 next year. The aim of the visit was to help build a local team and see the conference venue first-hand. Stefano and Nattie represented the DebConf Committee. The local team organized Debian meetups in Buenos Aires and Santa Fe, where Stefano presented a talk on Debian and DebConf. Venues were scouted and the team met with the university management and local authorities.

Miscellaneous contributions
  • Rapha l updated tracker.debian.org after the trixie release to add the new forky release in the set of monitored distributions. He also reviewed and deployed the work of Scott Talbert showing open merge requests from salsa in the action needed panel.
  • Rapha l reviewed some DEP-3 changes to modernize the embedded examples in light of the broad git adoption.
  • Rapha l configured new workflows on debusine.debian.net to upload to trixie and trixie-security, and officially announced the service on debian-devel-announce, inviting Debian developers to try the service for their next upload to unstable.
  • Carles created a merge request for django-compressor upstream to fix an error when concurrent node processing happened. This will allow removing a workaround added in openstack-dashboard and avoid the same bug in other projects that use django-compressor.
  • Carles prepared a system to detect packages that Recommends packages which don t exist in unstable. Processed (either reported or ignored due to mis-detected problems or temporary problems) 16% of the reports. Will continue next month.
  • Carles got familiar and gave feedback for the freedict-wikdict package. Planned contributions with the maintainer to improve the package.
  • Helmut responded to queries related to /usr-move.
  • Helmut adapted crossqa.d.n to the release of trixie .
  • Helmut diagnosed sufficient failures in rebootstrap to make it work with gcc-15.
  • Helmut fixed the CI pipeline of debvm.
  • Helmut sent patches for 19 cross build problems.
  • Faidon discovered that the Multi-Arch hinter would emit confusing hints about :any annotations. Helmut identified the root cause to be the handling of virtual packages and fixed it.
  • Enrico took some dust off python-debiancontributors and prototyped a receiving end for salsa webpings, to start followup work to contributors.debian.org discussions at DebConf25.
  • Colin upgraded about 70 Python packages to new upstream versions, which is around 10% of the backlog; this included a complicated Pydantic upgrade in collaboration with the Rust team.
  • Colin fixed a bug in debbugs that caused incoming emails to bugs.debian.org with certain header contents to go missing.
  • Thorsten uploaded sane-airscan, which was already in experimental, to unstable.
  • Thorsten created a script to automate the upload of new upstream versions of foomatic-db. The database contains information about printers and regularly gets an update. Now it is possible to keep the package more up to date in Debian.
  • Stefano prepared updates to almost all of his packages that had new versions waiting to upload to unstable. (beautifulsoup4, hatch-vcs, mkdocs-macros-plugin, pypy3, python-authlib, python-cffi, python-mitogen, python-pip, python-pipx, python-progress, python-truststore, python-virtualenv, re2, snowball, soupsieve).
  • Stefano uploaded two new python3.13 point releases to unstable.
  • Stefano updated distro-info-data in stable releases, to document the trixie release and expected EoL dates.
  • Stefano did some debian.social sysadmin work (keeping up quotas with growing databases and filesystems).
  • Stefano supported the Debian treasurers in processing some of the DebConf 25 reimbursements.
  • Lucas uploaded ruby3.4 to experimental. It was already approved by FTP masters.
  • Lucas uploaded ruby-defaults to experimental to add support for ruby3.4. It will allow us to start triggering test rebuilds and catch any FTBFS with ruby3.4.
  • Lucas did some administrative work for Google Summer of Code (GSoC) and replied to some queries from mentors and students.
  • Anupa helped to organize release parties for Debian 13 and Debian Day events.
  • Anupa did the live coverage for the Debian 13 release and prepared the Bits post for the release announcement and 32nd Debian Day as part of the Debian Publicity team.
  • Anupa attended a Debian Day event organized by FOSS club SSET as a speaker.

6 September 2025

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in August 2025

Welcome to the August 2025 report from the Reproducible Builds project! Welcome to the latest report from the Reproducible Builds project for August 2025. These monthly reports outline what we ve been up to over the past month, and highlight items of news from elsewhere in the increasingly-important area of software supply-chain security. If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please see the Contribute page on our website. In this report:

  1. Reproducible Builds Summit 2025
  2. Reproducible Builds and live-bootstrap at WHY2025
  3. DALEQ Explainable Equivalence for Java Bytecode
  4. Reproducibility regression identifies issue with AppArmor security policies
  5. Rust toolchain fixes
  6. Distribution work
  7. diffoscope
  8. Website updates
  9. Reproducibility testing framework
  10. Upstream patches

Reproducible Builds Summit 2025 Please join us at the upcoming Reproducible Builds Summit, set to take place from October 28th 30th 2025 in Vienna, Austria!** We are thrilled to host the eighth edition of this exciting event, following the success of previous summits in various iconic locations around the world, including Venice, Marrakesh, Paris, Berlin, Hamburg and Athens. Our summits are a unique gathering that brings together attendees from diverse projects, united by a shared vision of advancing the Reproducible Builds effort. During this enriching event, participants will have the opportunity to engage in discussions, establish connections and exchange ideas to drive progress in this vital field. Our aim is to create an inclusive space that fosters collaboration, innovation and problem-solving. If you re interesting in joining us this year, please make sure to read the event page which has more details about the event and location. Registration is open until 20th September 2025, and we are very much looking forward to seeing many readers of these reports there!

Reproducible Builds and live-bootstrap at WHY2025 WHY2025 (What Hackers Yearn) is a nonprofit outdoors hacker camp that takes place in Geestmerambacht in the Netherlands (approximately 40km north of Amsterdam). The event is organised for and by volunteers from the worldwide hacker community, and knowledge sharing, technological advancement, experimentation, connecting with your hacker peers, forging friendships and hacking are at the core of this event . At this year s event, Frans Faase gave a talk on live-bootstrap, an attempt to provide a reproducible, automatic, complete end-to-end bootstrap from a minimal number of binary seeds to a supported fully functioning operating system . Frans talk is available to watch on video and his slides are available as well.

DALEQ Explainable Equivalence for Java Bytecode Jens Dietrich of the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand and Behnaz Hassanshahi of Oracle Labs, Australia published an article this month entitled DALEQ Explainable Equivalence for Java Bytecode which explores the options and difficulties when Java binaries are not identical despite being from the same sources, and what avenues are available for proving equivalence despite the lack of bitwise correlation:
[Java] binaries are often not bitwise identical; however, in most cases, the differences can be attributed to variations in the build environment, and the binaries can still be considered equivalent. Establishing such equivalence, however, is a labor-intensive and error-prone process.
Jens and Behnaz therefore propose a tool called DALEQ, which:
disassembles Java byte code into a relational database, and can normalise this database by applying Datalog rules. Those databases can then be used to infer equivalence between two classes. Notably, equivalence statements are accompanied with Datalog proofs recording the normalisation process. We demonstrate the impact of DALEQ in an industrial context through a large-scale evaluation involving 2,714 pairs of jars, comprising 265,690 class pairs. In this evaluation, DALEQ is compared to two existing bytecode transformation tools. Our findings reveal a significant reduction in the manual effort required to assess non-bitwise equivalent artifacts, which would otherwise demand intensive human inspection. Furthermore, the results show that DALEQ outperforms existing tools by identifying more artifacts rebuilt from the same code as equivalent, even when no behavioral differences are present.
Jens also posted this news to our mailing list.

Reproducibility regression identifies issue with AppArmor security policies Tails developer intrigeri has tracked and followed a reproducibility regression in the generation of AppArmor policy caches, and has identified an issue with the 4.1.0 version of AppArmor. Although initially tracked on the Tails issue tracker, intrigeri filed an issue on the upstream bug tracker. AppArmor developer John Johansen replied, confirming that they can reproduce the issue and went to work on a draft patch. Through this, John revealed that it was caused by an actual underlying security bug in AppArmor that is to say, it resulted in permissions not (always) matching what the policy intends and, crucially, not merely a cache reproducibility issue. Work on the fix is ongoing at time of writing.

Rust toolchain fixes Rust Clippy is a linting tool for the Rust programming language. It provides a collection of lints (rules) designed to identify common mistakes, stylistic issues, potential performance problems and unidiomatic code patterns in Rust projects. This month, however, Sosth ne Gu don filed a new issue in the GitHub requesting a new check that would lint against non deterministic operations in proc-macros, such as iterating over a HashMap .

Distribution work In Debian this month: Lastly, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted another openSUSE monthly update for their work there.

diffoscope diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can locate and diagnose reproducibility issues. This month, Chris Lamb made the following changes, including preparing and uploading versions, 303, 304 and 305 to Debian:
  • Improvements:
    • Use sed(1) backreferences when generating debian/tests/control to avoid duplicating ourselves. [ ]
    • Move from a mono-utils dependency to versioned mono-devel mono-utils dependency, taking care to maintain the [!riscv64] architecture restriction. [ ]
    • Use sed over awk to avoid mangling dependency lines containing = (equals) symbols such as version restrictions. [ ]
  • Bug fixes:
    • Fix a test after the upload of systemd-ukify version 258~rc3. [ ]
    • Ensure that Java class files are named .class on the filesystem before passing them to javap(1). [ ]
    • Do not run jsondiff on files over 100KiB as the algorithm runs in O(n^2) time. [ ]
    • Don t check for PyPDF version 3 specifically; check for >= 3. [ ]
  • Misc:
    • Update copyright years. [ ][ ]
In addition, Martin Joerg fixed an issue with the HTML presenter to avoid crash when page limit is None [ ] and Zbigniew J drzejewski-Szmek fixed compatibility with RPM 6 [ ]. Lastly, John Sirois fixed a missing requests dependency in the trydiffoscope tool. [ ]

Website updates Once again, there were a number of improvements made to our website this month including:

Reproducibility testing framework The Reproducible Builds project operates a comprehensive testing framework running primarily at tests.reproducible-builds.org in order to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. In August, however, a number of changes were made by Holger Levsen, including:
  • reproduce.debian.net-related:
    • Run 4 workers on the o4 node again in order to speed up testing. [ ][ ][ ][ ]
    • Also test trixie-proposed-updates and trixie-updates etc. [ ][ ]
    • Gather seperate statistics for each tested release. [ ]
    • Support sources from all Debian suites. [ ]
    • Run new code from the prototype database rework branch for the amd64-pull184 pseudo-architecture. [ ][ ]
    • Add a number of helpful links. [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ]
    • Temporarily call debrebuild without the --cache argument to experiment with a new version of devscripts. [ ][ ][ ]
    • Update public TODO. [ ]
  • Installation tests:
    • Add comments to explain structure. [ ]
    • Mark more old jobs as old or dead . [ ][ ][ ]
    • Turn the maintenance job into a no-op. [ ]
  • Jenkins node maintenance:
    • Increase penalties if the osuosl5 or ionos7 nodes are down. [ ]
    • Stop trying to fix network automatically. [ ]
    • Correctly mark ppc64el architecture nodes when down. [ ]
    • Upgrade the remaining arm64 nodes to Debian trixie in anticipation of the release. [ ][ ]
    • Allow higher SSD temperatures on the riscv64 architecture. [ ]
  • Debian-related:
    • Drop the armhf architecture; many thanks to Vagrant for physically hosting the nodes for ten years. [ ][ ]
    • Add Debian forky, and archive bullseye. [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ]
    • Document the filesystem space savings from dropping the armhf architecture. [ ]
    • Exclude i386 and armhfr from JSON results. [ ]
    • Update TODOs for when Debian trixie and forky have been released. [ ][ ]
  • tests.reproducible-builds.org-related:
  • Misc:
    • Detect errors with openQA erroring out. [ ]
    • Drop the long-disabled openwrt_rebuilder jobs. [ ]
    • Use qa-jenkins-dev@alioth-lists.debian.net as the contact for jenkins.debian.net. [ ]
    • Redirect reproducible-builds.org/vienna25 to reproducible-builds.org/vienna2025. [ ]
    • Disable all OpenWrt reproducible CI jobs, in coordination with the OpenWrt community. [ ][ ]
    • Make reproduce.debian.net accessable via IPv6. [ ]
    • Ignore that the megacli RAID controller requires packages from Debian bookworm. [ ]
In addition,
  • James Addison migrated away from deprecated toplevel deb822 Python module in favour of debian.deb822 in the bin/reproducible_scheduler.py script [ ] and removed a note on reproduce.debian.net note after the release of Debian trixie [ ].
  • Jochen Sprickerhof made a huge number of improvements to the reproduce.debian.net statistics calculation [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] as well as to the reproduce.debian.net service more generally [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ].
  • Mattia Rizzolo performed a lot of work migrating scripts to SQLAlchemy version 2.0 [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] in addition to making some changes to the way openSUSE reproducibility tests are handled internally. [ ]
  • Lastly, Roland Clobus updated the Debian Live packages after the release of Debian trixie. [ ][ ]

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

Finally, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

1 September 2025

Guido G nther: Free Software Activities August 2025

Another short status update of what happened on my side last month. Released Phosh 0.49.0 and added some more QoL improvements to Phosh Mobile stack (e.g. around Cell broadcasts). Also pulled my SHIFT6mq out of the drawer (where it was sitting in a drawwer far too long) and got it to show a picture after a small driver fix. Thanks to the work the sdm845-mainlining folks are doing that was all that was needed. If I can get touch to work better that would be another nice device for demoing Phosh. See below for details on the above and more: phosh phoc phosh-mobile-settings stevia (formerly phosh-osk-stub) xdg-desktop-portal-phosh pfs feedbackd feedbackd-device-themes libcmatrix Chatty Debian Cellbroadcastd ModemManager gnome-clocks git-buildpackage mobian-recipies Linux Reviews This is not code by me but reviews on other peoples code. The list is (as usual) slightly incomplete. Thanks for the contributions! Help Development If you want to support my work see donations. Comments? Join the Fediverse thread

18 August 2025

Otto Kek l inen: Best Practices for Submitting and Reviewing Merge Requests in Debian

Featured image of post Best Practices for Submitting and Reviewing Merge Requests in DebianHistorically the primary way to contribute to Debian has been to email the Debian bug tracker with a code patch. Now that 92% of all Debian source packages are hosted at salsa.debian.org the GitLab instance of Debian more and more developers are using Merge Requests, but not necessarily in the optimal way. In this post I share what I ve found the best practice to be, presented in the natural workflow from forking to merging.

Why use Merge Requests? Compared to sending patches back and forth in email, using a git forge to review code contributions brings several benefits:
  • Contributors can see the latest version of the code immediately when the maintainer pushes it to git, without having to wait for an upload to Debian archives.
  • Contributors can fork the development version and easily base their patches on the correct version and help test that the software continues to function correctly at that specific version.
  • Both maintainer and other contributors can easily see what was already submitted and avoid doing duplicate work.
  • It is easy for anyone to comment on a Merge Request and participate in the review.
  • Integrating CI testing is easy in Merge Requests by activating Salsa CI.
  • Tracking the state of a Merge Request is much easier than browsing Debian bug reports tagged patch , and the cycle of submit review re-submit re-review is much easier to manage in the dedicated Merge Request view compared to participants setting up their own email plugins for code reviews.
  • Merge Requests can have extra metadata, such as Approved , and the metadata often updates automatically, such as a Merge Request being closed automatically when the Git commit ID from it is pushed to the target branch.
Keeping these benefits in mind will help ensure that the best practices make sense and are aligned with maximizing these benefits.

Finding the Debian packaging source repository and preparing to make a contribution Before sinking any effort into a package, start by checking its overall status at the excellent Debian Package Tracker. This provides a clear overview of the package s general health in Debian, when it was last uploaded and by whom, and if there is anything special affecting the package right now. This page also has quick links to the Debian bug tracker of the package, the build status overview and more. Most importantly, in the General section, the VCS row links to the version control repository the package advertises. Before opening that page, note the version most recently uploaded to Debian. This is relevant because nothing in Debian currently enforces that the package in version control is actually the same as the latest uploaded to Debian. Packaging source code repository links at tracker.debian.org Following the Browse link opens the Debian package source repository, which is usually a project page on Salsa. To contribute, start by clicking the Fork button, select your own personal namespace and, under Branches to include, pick Only the default branch to avoid including unnecessary temporary development branches. View after pressing Fork Once forking is complete, clone it with git-buildpackage. For this example repository, the exact command would be gbp clone --verbose git@salsa.debian.org:otto/glow.git. Next, add the original repository as a new remote and pull from it to make sure you have all relevant branches. Using the same fork as an example, the commands would be:
git remote add go-team https://salsa.debian.org/go-team/packages/glow.git
gbp pull --verbose --track-missing go-team
The gbp pull command can be repeated whenever you want to make sure the main branches are in sync with the original repository. Finally, run gitk --all & to visually browse the Git history and note the various branches and their states in the two remotes. Note the style in comments and repository structure the project has and make sure your contributions follow the same conventions to maximize the chances of the maintainer accepting your contribution. It may also be good to build the source package to establish a baseline of the current state and what kind of binaries and .deb packages it produces. If using Debcraft, one can simply run debcraft build in the Git repository.

Submitting a Merge Request for a Debian packaging improvement Always start by making a development branch by running git checkout -b <branch name> to clearly separate your work from the main branch. When making changes, remember to follow the conventions you already see in the package. It is also important to be aware of general guidelines on how to make good Git commits. If you are not able to immediately finish coding, it may be useful to publish the Merge Request as a draft so that the maintainer and others can see that you started working on something and what general direction your change is heading in. If you don t finish the Merge Request in one sitting and return to it another day, you should remember to pull the Debian branch from the original Debian repository in case it has received new commits. This can be done easily with these commands (assuming the same remote and branch names as in the example above):
git fetch go-team
git rebase -i go-team/debian/latest
Frequent rebasing is a great habit to help keep the Git history linear, and restructuring and rewording your commits will make the Git history easier to follow and understand why the changes were made. When pushing improved versions of your branch, use git push --force. While GitLab does allow squashing, I recommend against it. It is better that the submitter makes sure the final version is a neat and clean set of commits that the receiver can easily merge without having to do any rebasing or squashing themselves. When ready, remove the draft status of the Merge Request and wait patiently for review. If the maintainer does not respond in several days, try sending an email to <source package name>@packages.debian.org, which is the official way to contact maintainers. You could also post a comment on the MR and tag the last few committers in the same repository so that a notification email is triggered. As a last resort, submit a bug report to the Debian bug tracker to announce that a Merge Request is pending review. This leaves a permanent record for posterity (or the Debian QA team) of your contribution. However, most of the time simply posting the Merge Request in Salsa is enough; excessive communication might be perceived as spammy, and someone needs to remember to check that the bug report is closed.

Respect the review feedback, respond quickly and avoid Merge Requests getting stale Once you get feedback, try to respond as quickly as possible. When people participating have everything fresh in their minds, it is much easier for the submitter to rework it and for the reviewer to re-review. If the Merge Request becomes stale, it can be challenging to revive it. Also, if it looks like the MR is only waiting for re-review but nothing happens, re-read the previous feedback and make sure you actually address everything. After that, post a friendly comment where you explicitly say you have addressed all feedback and are only waiting for re-review.

Reviewing Merge Requests This section about reviewing is not exclusive to Debian package maintainers anyone can contribute to Debian by reviewing open Merge Requests. Typically, the larger an open source project gets, the more help is needed in reviewing and testing changes to avoid regressions, and all diligently done work is welcome. As the famous Linus quote goes, given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow . On salsa.debian.org, you can browse open Merge Requests per project or for a whole group, just like on any GitLab instance. Reviewing Merge Requests is, however, most fun when they are fresh and the submitter is active. Thus, the best strategy is to ensure you have subscribed to email notifications in the repositories you care about so you get an email for any new Merge Request (or Issue) immediately when posted. Change notification settings from Global to Watch to get an email on new Merge Requests When you see a new Merge Request, try to review it within a couple of days. If you cannot review in a reasonable time, posting a small note that you intend to review it later will feel better to the submitter compared to not getting any response. Personally, I have a habit of assigning myself as a reviewer so that I can keep track of my whole review queue at https://salsa.debian.org/dashboard/merge_requests?reviewer_username=otto, and I recommend the same to others. Seeing the review assignment happen is also a good way to signal to the submitter that their submission was noted.

Reviewing commit-by-commit in the web interface Reviewing using the web interface works well in general, but I find that the way GitLab designed it is not ideal. In my ideal review workflow, I first read the Git commit message to understand what the submitter tried to do and why; only then do I look at the code changes in the commit. In GitLab, to do this one must first open the Commits tab and then click on the last commit in the list, as it is sorted in reverse chronological order with the first commit at the bottom. Only after that do I see the commit message and contents. Getting to the next commit is easy by simply clicking Next. Example review to demonstrate location of buttons and functionality When adding the first comment, I choose Start review and for the following remarks Add to review. Finally, I click Finish review and Submit review, which will trigger one single email to the submitter with all my feedback. I try to avoid using the Add comment now option, as each such comment triggers a separate notification email to the submitter.

Reviewing and testing on your own computer locally For the most thorough review, I pull the code to my laptop for local review with git pull <remote url> <branch name>. There is no need to run git remote add as pulling using a URL directly works too and saves from needing to clean up old remotes later. Pulling the Merge Request contents locally allows me to build, run and inspect the code deeply and review the commits with full metadata in gitk or equivalent.

Investing enough time in writing feedback, but not too much See my other post for more in-depth advice on how to structure your code review feedback. In Debian, I would emphasize patience, to allow the submitter time to rework their submission. Debian packaging is notoriously complex, and even experienced developers often need more feedback and time to get everything right. Avoid the temptation to rush the fix in yourself. In open source, Git credits are often the only salary the submitter gets. If you take the idea from the submission and implement it yourself, you rob the submitter of the opportunity to get feedback, try to improve and finally feel accomplished. Sure, it takes extra effort to give feedback, but the contributor is likely to feel ownership of their work and later return to further improve it. If a submission looks hopelessly low quality and you feel that giving feedback is a waste of time, you can simply respond with something along the lines of: Thanks for your contribution and interest in helping Debian. Unfortunately, looking at the commits, I see several shortcomings, and it is unlikely a normal review process is enough to help you finalize this. Please reach out to Debian Mentors to get a mentor who can give you more personalized feedback. There might also be contributors who just dump the code , ignore your feedback and never return to finalize their submission. If a contributor does not return to finalize their submission in 3-6 months, I will in my own projects simply finalize it myself and thank the contributor in the commit message (but not mark them as the author). Despite best practices, you will occasionally still end up doing some things in vain, but that is how volunteer collaboration works. We all just need to accept that some communication will inevitably feel like wasted effort, but it should be viewed as a necessary investment in order to get the benefits from the times when the communication led to real and valuable collaboration. Please just do not treat all contributors as if they are unlikely to ever contribute again; otherwise, your behavior will cause them not to contribute again. If you want to grow a tree, you need to plant several seeds.

Approving and merging Assuming review goes well and you are ready to approve, and if you are the only maintainer, you can proceed to merge right away. If there are multiple maintainers, or if you otherwise think that someone else might want to chime in before it is merged, use the Approve button to show that you approve the change but leave it unmerged. The person who approved does not necessarily have to be the person who merges. The point of the Merge Request review is not separation of duties in committing and merging the main purpose of a code review is to have a different set of eyeballs looking at the change before it is committed into the main development branch for all eternity. In some packages, the submitter might actually merge themselves once they see another developer has approved. In some rare Debian projects, there might even be separate people taking the roles of submitting, approving and merging, but most of the time these three roles are filled by two people either as submitter and approver+merger or submitter+merger and approver. If you are not a maintainer at all and do not have permissions to click Approve, simply post a comment summarizing your review and that you approve it and support merging it. This can help the maintainers review and merge faster.

Making a Merge Request for a new upstream version import Unlike many other Linux distributions, in Debian each source package has its own version control repository. The Debian sources consist of the upstream sources with an additional debian/ subdirectory that contains the actual Debian packaging. For the same reason, a typical Debian packaging Git repository has a debian/latest branch that has changes only in the debian/ subdirectory while the surrounding upstream files are the actual upstream files and have the actual upstream Git history. For details, see my post explaining Debian source packages in Git. Because of this Git branch structure, importing a new upstream version will typically modify three branches: debian/latest, upstream/latest and pristine-tar. When doing a Merge Request for a new upstream import, only submit one Merge Request for one branch: which means merging your new changes to the debian/latest branch. There is no need to submit the upstream/latest branch or the pristine-tar branch. Their contents are fixed and mechanically imported into Debian. There are no changes that the reviewer in Debian can request the submitter to do on these branches, so asking for feedback and comments on them is useless. All review, comments and re-reviews concern the content of the debian/latest branch only. It is not even necessary to use the debian/latest branch for a new upstream version. Personally, I always execute the new version import (with gbp import-orig --verbose --uscan) and prepare and test everything on debian/latest, but when it is time to submit it for review, I run git checkout -b import/$(dpkg-parsechangelog -SVersion) to get a branch named e.g. import/1.0.1 and then push that for review.

Reviewing a Merge Request for a new upstream version import Reviewing and testing a new upstream version import is a bit tricky currently, but possible. The key is to use gbp pull to automate fetching all branches from the submitter s fork. Assume you are reviewing a submission targeting the Glow package repository and there is a Merge Request from user otto s fork. As the maintainer, you would run the commands:
git remote add otto https://salsa.debian.org/otto/glow.git
gbp pull --verbose otto
If there was feedback in the first round and you later need to pull a new version for re-review, running gbp pull --force will not suffice, and this trick of manually fetching each branch and resetting them to the submitter s version is needed:
for BRANCH in pristine-tar upstream debian/latest
do
git checkout $BRANCH
git reset --hard origin/$BRANCH
git pull --force https://salsa.debian.org/otto/glow.git $BRANCH
done
Once review is done, either click Approve and let the submitter push everything, or alternatively, push all the branches you pulled locally yourself. In GitLab and other forges, the Merge Request will automatically be marked as Merged once the commit ID that was the head of the Merge Request is pushed to the target branch.

Please allow enough time for everyone to participate When working on Debian, keep in mind that it is a community of volunteers. It is common for people to do Debian stuff only on weekends, so you should patiently wait for at least a week so that enough workdays and weekend days have passed for the people you interact with to have had time to respond on their own Debian time. Having to wait may feel annoying and disruptive, but try to look at the upside: you do not need to do extra work simply while waiting for others. In some cases, that waiting can be useful thanks to the sleep on it phenomenon: when you yourself look at your own submission some days later with fresh eyes, you might notice something you overlooked earlier and improve your code change even without other people s feedback!

Contribute reviews! The last but not least suggestion is to make a habit of contributing reviews to packages you do not maintain. As we already see in large open source projects, such as the Linux kernel, they have far more code submissions than they can handle. The bottleneck for progress and maintaining quality becomes the reviews themselves. For Debian, as an organization and as a community, to be able to renew and grow new contributors, we need more of the senior contributors to shift focus from merely maintaining their packages and writing code to also intentionally interact with new contributors and guide them through the process of creating great open source software. Reviewing code is an effective way to both get tangible progress on individual development items and to transfer culture to a new generation of developers.

Why aren t 100% of all Debian source packages hosted on Salsa? As seen at trends.debian.net, more and more packages are using Salsa. Debian does not, however, have any policy about it. In fact, the Debian Policy Manual does not even mention the word Salsa anywhere. Adoption of Salsa has so far been purely organic, as in Debian each package maintainer has full freedom to choose whatever preferences they have regarding version control. I hope the trend to use Salsa will continue and more shared workflows emerge so that collaboration gets easier. To drive the culture of using Merge Requests and more, I drafted the Debian proposal DEP-18: Encourage Continuous Integration and Merge Request based Collaboration for Debian packages. If you are active in Debian and you think DEP-18 is beneficial for Debian, please give a thumbs up at dep-team/deps!21.

15 August 2025

Freexian Collaborators: Monthly report about Debian Long Term Support, July 2025 (by Roberto C. S nchez)

Like each month, have a look at the work funded by Freexian s Debian LTS offering.

Debian LTS contributors In July, 17 contributors have been paid to work on Debian LTS, their reports are available:
  • Adrian Bunk did 19.0h (out of 19.0h assigned).
  • Andrej Shadura did 5.0h (out of 0.0h assigned and 8.0h from previous period), thus carrying over 3.0h to the next month.
  • Bastien Roucari s did 18.5h (out of 18.75h assigned), thus carrying over 0.25h to the next month.
  • Ben Hutchings did 12.5h (out of 3.25h assigned and 15.5h from previous period), thus carrying over 6.25h to the next month.
  • Carlos Henrique Lima Melara did 10.0h (out of 10.0h assigned).
  • Chris Lamb did 18.0h (out of 18.0h assigned).
  • Daniel Leidert did 18.75h (out of 17.25h assigned and 1.5h from previous period).
  • Emilio Pozuelo Monfort did 18.75h (out of 18.75h assigned).
  • Guilhem Moulin did 15.0h (out of 14.0h assigned and 1.0h from previous period).
  • Jochen Sprickerhof did 2.0h (out of 16.5h assigned and 2.25h from previous period), thus carrying over 16.75h to the next month.
  • Lee Garrett did 7.0h (out of 0.0h assigned and 23.25h from previous period), thus carrying over 16.25h to the next month.
  • Markus Koschany did 9.0h (out of 18.75h assigned), thus carrying over 9.75h to the next month.
  • Roberto C. S nchez did 10.25h (out of 18.5h assigned and 2.75h from previous period), thus carrying over 11.0h to the next month.
  • Santiago Ruano Rinc n did 7.25h (out of 12.75h assigned and 2.25h from previous period), thus carrying over 7.75h to the next month.
  • Sylvain Beucler did 18.75h (out of 18.75h assigned).
  • Thorsten Alteholz did 15.0h (out of 15.0h assigned).
  • Utkarsh Gupta did 15.0h (out of 1.0h assigned and 14.0h from previous period).

Evolution of the situation In July, we released 24 DLAs.
  • Notable security updates:
    • angular.js, prepared by Bastien Roucari s, fixes multiple vulnerabilities including input sanitization and potential regular expression denial of service (ReDoS)
    • tomcat9, prepared by Markus Koschany, fixes an assortment of vulnerabilities
    • mediawiki, prepared by Guilhem Moulin, fixes several information disclosure and privilege escalation vulnerabilities
    • php7.4, prepared by Guilhem Moulin, fixes several server side request forgery and denial of service vulnerabilities
This month s contributions from outside the regular team include an update to thunderbird, prepared by Christoph Goehre (the package maintainer). LTS Team members also contributed updates of the following packages:
  • commons-beanutils (to stable and unstable), prepared by Adrian Bunk
  • djvulibre (to oldstable, stable, and unstable), prepared by Adrian Bunk
  • git (to stable), prepared by Adrian Bunk
  • redis (to oldstable), prepared by Chris Lamb
  • libxml2 (to oldstable), prepared by Guilhem Moulin
  • commons-vfs (to oldstable), prepared by Daniel Leidert
Additionally, LTS Team member Santiago Ruano Rinc n proposed and implemented an improvement to the debian-security-support package. This package is available so that interested users can quickly determine if any installed packages are subject to limited security support or are excluded entirely from security support. However, there was not previously a way to identify explicitly supported packages, which has become necessary to note exceptions to broad exclusion policies (e.g., those which apply to substantial package groups, like modules belonging to the Go and Rust language ecosystems). Santiago s work has enabled the notation of exceptions to these exclusions, thus ensuring that users of debian-security-support have accurate status information concerning installed packages.

DebCamp 25 Security Tracker Sprint The previously announced security tracker sprint took place at DebCamp from 7-13 July. Participants included 8 members of the standing LTS Team, 2 active Debian Developers with an interest in LTS, 3 community members, and 1 member of the Debian Security Team (who provided guidance and reviews on proposed changes to the security tracker); participation was a mix of in person at the venue in Brest, France and remote. During the days of the sprint, the team tackled a wide range of bugs and improvements, mostly targeting the security tracker. The sprint participants worked on the following items: As can be seen from the above list, only a small number of changes were brought to completion during the sprint week itself. Given the very compressed timeframe involved, the broad scope of tasks which were under consideration, and the highly sensitive data managed by the security tracker, this is not entirely unexpected and in no way diminishes the great work done by the sprint participants. The LTS Team would especially like to thank Salvatore Bonaccorso of the Debian Security Team for making himself available throughout the sprint to answer questions, for providing guidance on the work, and for helping the work by reviewing and merging the MRs which were able to merged during the sprint itself. In the weeks that follow the sprint, the team will continue working towards completing the in progress items.

Thanks to our sponsors Sponsors that joined recently are in bold.

6 August 2025

David Bremner: Using git-annex for email and notmuch metadata

Introducing git-remote-notmuch Based on an idea and ruby implementation by Felipe Contreras, I have been developing a git remote helper for notmuch. I will soon post an updated version of the patchset to the notmuch mailing list (I wanted to refer to this post in my email). In this blog post I'll outline my experiments with using that tool, along with git-annex to store (and sync) a moderate sized email store along with its notmuch metadata.

WARNING The rest of this post describes some relatively complex operations using (at best) alpha level software (namely git-remote-notmuch). git-annex is good at not losing your files, but git-remote-notmuch can (and did several times during debugging) wipe out your notmuch database. If you have a backup (e.g. made with notmuch-dump), this is much less annoying, and in particular you can decide to walk away from this whole experiment and restore your database.

Why git-annex? I currently have about 31GiB of email, spread across more than 830,000 files. I want to maintain the ability to search and read my email offline, so I need to maintain a copy on several workstations and at least one server (which is backed up explicitly). I am somewhat commited to maintaining synchronization of tags to git since that is how the notmuch bug tracker works. Commiting the email files to git seems a bit wasteful: by design notmuch does not modify email files, and even with compression, the extra copy adds a fair amount of overhead (in my case, 17G of git objects, about 57% overhead). It is also notoriously difficult to completely delete files from a git repository. git-annex offers potential mitigation for these two issues, at the cost of a somewhat more complex mental model. The main idea is that instead of committing every version of a file to the git repository, git-annex tracks the filename and metadata, with the file content being stored in a key-value store outside git. Conceptually this is similar to git-lfs. From our current point, the important point is that instead of a second (compressed) copy of the file, we store one copy, along with a symlink and a couple of directory entries.

What to annex For sufficiently small files, the overhead of a symlink and couple of directory entries is greater than the cost of a compressed second copy. When this happens depends on several variables, and will probably depend on the file content in a particular collection of email. I did a few trials of different settings for annex.largefiles to come to a threshold of largerthan=32k 1. For the curious, my experimental results are below. One potentially surprising aspect is that annexing even a small fraction of the (largest) files yields a big drop in storage overhead.
Threshold fraction annexed overhead
0 100% 30%
8k 29% 13%
16k 12% 9.4%
32k 7% 8.9%
48k 6% 8.9%
100k 3% 9.1%
256k 2% 11%
(git) 0 % 57%
In the end I chose to err on the side of annexing more files (for the flexibility of deletion) rather than potentially faster operations with fewer annexed files at the same level of overhead. Summarizing the configuration settings for git-annex (some of these are actually defaults, but not in my environment).
$ git config annex.largefiles largerthan=32k
$ git config annex.dotfiles true
$ git config annex.synccontent true

Delivering mail To get new mail, I do something like
# compute a date based folder under $HOME/Maildir
$ dest = $(folder)
# deliver mail to $ dest  (somehow).
$ notmuch new
$ git -C $HOME/Maildir add $ folder 
$ git -C $HOME/Maildir diff-index --quiet HEAD $ folder    git -C $HOME/Maildir commit -m 'mail delivery'
The call to diff-index is just an optimization for the case when nothing was delivered. The default configuration of git-annex will automagically annex any files larger than my threshold. At this point the git-annex repo knows nothing about tags. There is some git configuration that can speed up the "git add" above, namely
$ git config core.untrackedCache true
$ git config core.fsmonitor true
See git-status(1) under "UNTRACKED FILES AND PERFORMANCE" Defining notmuch as a git remote Assuming git-remote-notmuch is somewhere in your path, you can define a remote to connect to the default notmuch database.
$ git remote add database notmuch::
$ git fetch database
$ git merge --allow-unrelated database
The --allow-unrelated should be needed only the first time. In my case the many small files used to represent the tags (one per message), use a noticeable amount of disk space (in my case about the same amount of space as the xapian database). Once you start merging from the database to the git repo, you will likely have some conflicts, and most conflict resolution tools leave junk lying around. I added the following .gitignore file to the top level of the repo
*.orig
*~
This prevents our cavalier use of git add from adding these files to our git history (and prevents pushing random junk to the notmuch database. To push the tags from git to notmuch, you can run
$ git push database master
You might need to run notmuch new first, so that the database knows about all of the messages (currently git-remote-notmuch can't index files, only update metadata). git annex sync should work with the new remote, but pushing back will be very slow 2. I disable automatic pushing as follows
$ git config remote.database.annex-push false
Unsticking the database remote If you are debugging git-remote-notmuch, or just unlucky, you may end up in a sitation where git thinks the database is ahead of your git remote. You can delete the database remote (and associated stuff) and re-create it. Although I cannot promise this will never cause problems (because, computers), it will not modify your local copy of the tags in the git repo, nor modify your notmuch database.
$ git remote rm database
$ git update-rf -d notmuch/master
$ rm -r .git/notmuch
Fine tuning notmuch config
  • In order to avoid dealing with file renames, I have
      notmuch config maildir.synchronize_flags false
    
  • I have added the following to new.ignore:
       .git;_notmuch_metadata;.gitignore
    

  1. I also had to set annex.dotfiles to true, as many of my maildirs follow the qmail style convention of starting with a .
  2. I'm not totally clear on why it so slow, but certainly git-annex tries to push several more branches, and these are ignored by git-remote-annex.

5 August 2025

Matthew Garrett: Cordoomceps - replacing an Amiga's brain with Doom

There's a lovely device called a pistorm, an adapter board that glues a Raspberry Pi GPIO bus to a Motorola 68000 bus. The intended use case is that you plug it into a 68000 device and then run an emulator that reads instructions from hardware (ROM or RAM) and emulates them. You're still limited by the ~7MHz bus that the hardware is running at, but you can run the instructions as fast as you want.

These days you're supposed to run a custom built OS on the Pi that just does 68000 emulation, but initially it ran Linux on the Pi and a userland 68000 emulator process. And, well, that got me thinking. The emulator takes 68000 instructions, emulates them, and then talks to the hardware to implement the effects of those instructions. What if we, well, just don't? What if we just run all of our code in Linux on an ARM core and then talk to the Amiga hardware?

We're going to ignore x86 here, because it's weird - but most hardware that wants software to be able to communicate with it maps itself into the same address space that RAM is in. You can write to a byte of RAM, or you can write to a piece of hardware that's effectively pretending to be RAM[1]. The Amiga wasn't unusual in this respect in the 80s, and to talk to the graphics hardware you speak to a special address range that gets sent to that hardware instead of to RAM. The CPU knows nothing about this. It just indicates it wants to write to an address, and then sends the data.

So, if we are the CPU, we can just indicate that we want to write to an address, and provide the data. And those addresses can correspond to the hardware. So, we can write to the RAM that belongs to the Amiga, and we can write to the hardware that isn't RAM but pretends to be. And that means we can run whatever we want on the Pi and then access Amiga hardware.

And, obviously, the thing we want to run is Doom, because that's what everyone runs in fucked up hardware situations.

Doom was Amiga kryptonite. Its entire graphical model was based on memory directly representing the contents of your display, and being able to modify that by just moving pixels around. This worked because at the time VGA displays supported having a memory layout where each pixel on your screen was represented by a byte in memory containing an 8 bit value that corresponded to a lookup table containing the RGB value for that pixel.

The Amiga was, well, not good at this. Back in the 80s, when the Amiga hardware was developed, memory was expensive. Dedicating that much RAM to the video hardware was unthinkable - the Amiga 1000 initially shipped with only 256K of RAM, and you could fill all of that with a sufficiently colourful picture. So instead of having the idea of each pixel being associated with a specific area of memory, the Amiga used bitmaps. A bitmap is an area of memory that represents the screen, but only represents one bit of the colour depth. If you have a black and white display, you only need one bitmap. If you want to display four colours, you need two. More colours, more bitmaps. And each bitmap is stored in an independent area of RAM. You never use more memory than you need to display the number of colours you want to.

But that means that each bitplane contains packed information - every byte of data in a bitplane contains the bit value for 8 different pixels, because each bitplane contains one bit of information per pixel. To update one pixel on screen, you need to read from every bitmap, update one bit, and write it back, and that's a lot of additional memory accesses. Doom, but on the Amiga, was slow not just because the CPU was slow, but because there was a lot of manipulation of data to turn it into the format the Amiga wanted and then push that over a fairly slow memory bus to have it displayed.

The CDTV was an aesthetically pleasing piece of hardware that absolutely sucked. It was an Amiga 500 in a hi-fi box with a caddy-loading CD drive, and it ran software that was just awful. There's no path to remediation here. No compelling apps were ever released. It's a terrible device. I love it. I bought one in 1996 because a local computer store had one and I pointed out that the company selling it had gone bankrupt some years earlier and literally nobody in my farming town was ever going to have any interest in buying a CD player that made a whirring noise when you turned it on because it had a fan and eventually they just sold it to me for not much money, and ever since then I wanted to have a CD player that ran Linux and well spoiler 30 years later I'm nearly there. That CDTV is going to be our test subject. We're going to try to get Doom running on it without executing any 68000 instructions.

We're facing two main problems here. The first is that all Amigas have a firmware ROM called Kickstart that runs at powerup. No matter how little you care about using any OS functionality, you can't start running your code until Kickstart has run. This means even documentation describing bare metal Amiga programming assumes that the hardware is already in the state that Kickstart left it in. This will become important later. The second is that we're going to need to actually write the code to use the Amiga hardware.

First, let's talk about Amiga graphics. We've already covered bitmaps, but for anyone used to modern hardware that's not the weirdest thing about what we're dealing with here. The CDTV's chipset supports a maximum of 64 colours in a mode called "Extra Half-Brite", or EHB, where you have 32 colours arbitrarily chosen from a palette and then 32 more colours that are identical but with half the intensity. For 64 colours we need 6 bitplanes, each of which can be located arbitrarily in the region of RAM accessible to the chipset ("chip RAM", distinguished from "fast ram" that's only accessible to the CPU). We tell the chipset where our bitplanes are and it displays them. Or, well, it does for a frame - after that the registers that pointed at our bitplanes no longer do, because when the hardware was DMAing through the bitplanes to display them it was incrementing those registers to point at the next address to DMA from. Which means that every frame we need to set those registers back.

Making sure you have code that's called every frame just to make your graphics work sounds intensely irritating, so Commodore gave us a way to avoid doing that. The chipset includes a coprocessor called "copper". Copper doesn't have a large set of features - in fact, it only has three. The first is that it can program chipset registers. The second is that it can wait for a specific point in screen scanout. The third (which we don't care about here) is that it can optionally skip an instruction if a certain point in screen scanout has already been reached. We can write a program (a "copper list") for the copper that tells it to program the chipset registers with the locations of our bitplanes and then wait until the end of the frame, at which point it will repeat the process. Now our bitplane pointers are always valid at the start of a frame.

Ok! We know how to display stuff. Now we just need to deal with not having 256 colours, and the whole "Doom expects pixels" thing. For the first of these, I stole code from ADoom, the only Amiga doom port I could easily find source for. This looks at the 256 colour palette loaded by Doom and calculates the closest approximation it can within the constraints of EHB. ADoom also includes a bunch of CPU-specific assembly optimisation for converting the "chunky" Doom graphic buffer into the "planar" Amiga bitplanes, none of which I used because (a) it's all for 68000 series CPUs and we're running on ARM, and (b) I have a quad core CPU running at 1.4GHz and I'm going to be pushing all the graphics over a 7.14MHz bus, the graphics mode conversion is not going to be the bottleneck here. Instead I just wrote a series of nested for loops that iterate through each pixel and update each bitplane and called it a day. The set of bitplanes I'm operating on here is allocated on the Linux side so I can read and write to them without being restricted by the speed of the Amiga bus (remember, each byte in each bitplane is going to be updated 8 times per frame, because it holds bits associated with 8 pixels), and then copied over to the Amiga's RAM once the frame is complete.

And, kind of astonishingly, this works! Once I'd figured out where I was going wrong with RGB ordering and which order the bitplanes go in, I had a recognisable copy of Doom running. Unfortunately there were weird graphical glitches - sometimes blocks would be entirely the wrong colour. It took me a while to figure out what was going on and then I felt stupid. Recording the screen and watching in slow motion revealed that the glitches often showed parts of two frames displaying at once. The Amiga hardware is taking responsibility for scanning out the frames, and the code on the Linux side isn't synchronised with it at all. That means I could update the bitplanes while the Amiga was scanning them out, resulting in a mashup of planes from two different Doom frames being used as one Amiga frame. One approach to avoid this would be to tie the Doom event loop to the Amiga, blocking my writes until the end of scanout. The other is to use double-buffering - have two sets of bitplanes, one being displayed and the other being written to. This consumes more RAM but since I'm not using the Amiga RAM for anything else that's not a problem. With this approach I have two copper lists, one for each set of bitplanes, and switch between them on each frame. This improved things a lot but not entirely, and there's still glitches when the palette is being updated (because there's only one set of colour registers), something Doom does rather a lot, so I'm going to need to implement proper synchronisation.

Except. This was only working if I ran a 68K emulator first in order to run Kickstart. If I tried accessing the hardware without doing that, things were in a weird state. I could update the colour registers, but accessing RAM didn't work - I could read stuff out, but anything I wrote vanished. Some more digging cleared that up. When you turn on a CPU it needs to start executing code from somewhere. On modern x86 systems it starts from a hardcoded address of 0xFFFFFFF0, which was traditionally a long way any RAM. The 68000 family instead reads its start address from address 0x00000004, which overlaps with where the Amiga chip RAM is. We can't write anything to RAM until we're executing code, and we can't execute code until we tell the CPU where the code is, which seems like a problem. This is solved on the Amiga by powering up in a state where the Kickstart ROM is "overlayed" onto address 0. The CPU reads the start address from the ROM, which causes it to jump into the ROM and start executing code there. Early on, the code tells the hardware to stop overlaying the ROM onto the low addresses, and now the RAM is available. This is poorly documented because it's not something you need to care if you execute Kickstart which every actual Amiga does and I'm only in this position because I've made poor life choices, but ok that explained things. To turn off the overlay you write to a register in one of the Complex Interface Adaptor (CIA) chips, and things start working like you'd expect.

Except, they don't. Writing to that register did nothing for me. I assumed that there was some other register I needed to write to first, and went to the extent of tracing every register access that occurred when running the emulator and replaying those in my code. Nope, still broken. What I finally discovered is that you need to pulse the reset line on the board before some of the hardware starts working - powering it up doesn't put you in a well defined state, but resetting it does.

So, I now have a slightly graphically glitchy copy of Doom running without any sound, displaying on an Amiga whose brain has been replaced with a parasitic Linux. Further updates will likely make things even worse. Code is, of course, available.

[1] This is why we had trouble with late era 32 bit systems and 4GB of RAM - a bunch of your hardware wanted to be in the same address space and so you couldn't put RAM there so you ended up with less than 4GB of RAM

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2 August 2025

Raju Devidas: Use phone/tablets/other laptops as external monitor with your laptop

This method is for wayland based systems. There are better ways to do this on GNOME or KDE desktops, but the method we are going to use is independent of DE/WM that you are using. I am doing this on sway window manager, but you can try this on any other Wayland based WM or DE. I have not tried this on Xorg based systems, there are several other guides for Xorg based systems online. When we connect a physical monitor to our laptops, it creates a second display output in our display settings that we can then re-arrange in layout, set resolution, set scale etc. Since we are not connecting via a physical interface like HDMI, DP, VGA etc. We need to create a virtual display within our system and set the display properties manually.
Get a list of current display outputs. You can also just check it in display settings of your DE/WM with wdisplays
rajudev@sanganak ~> swaymsg -t get_outputs
Output LVDS-1 &aposSeiko Epson Corporation 0x3047 Unknown&apos (focused)
  Current mode: 1366x768 @ 60.002 Hz
  Power: on
  Position: 0,0
  Scale factor: 1.000000
  Scale filter: nearest
  Subpixel hinting: rgb
  Transform: normal
  Workspace: 2
  Max render time: off
  Adaptive sync: disabled
  Allow tearing: no
  Available modes:
    1366x768 @ 60.002 Hz
altSingle physical display of the laptop
Currently we are seeing only one display output. Our goal is to create a second virtual display that we will then share on the tablet/phone. To do this there are various tools available. We are using sway-vdctl . It is currently not available within Debian packages, so we need to install it manually.
$ git clone https://github.com/odincat/sway-vdctl.git
$ cd sway-vdctl
$ cargo build --release
This will generate the binary with the name main under target/release . We can then copy this binary to our bin folder.
$ sudo cp target/release/main /usr/local/bin/vdctl
Now we have the vdctl command available.
$ vdctl --help
Usage: vdctl [OPTIONS] <ACTION> [VALUE]
Arguments:
  <ACTION>
          Possible values:
          - create:      Create new output based on a preset
          - kill:        Terminate / unplug an active preset
          - list:        List out active presets
          - next-number: Manually set the next output number, in case something breaks
          - sync-number: Sync the next output number using &aposswaymsg -t get_outputs&apos
  [VALUE]
          Preset name to apply, alternatively a value
          
          [default: ]
Options:
      --novnc
          do not launch a vnc server, just create the output
  -h, --help
          Print help (see a summary with &apos-h&apos)
Before creating the virtual display, we need to set it&aposs properties at .config/vdctl/config.json . I am using Xiaomi Pad 6 tablet as my external display. You can adjust the properties according to the device you want to use as a second display. $ (text-editor) .config/vdctl/config.json
 
    "host": "0.0.0.0",
    "presets": [
         
            "name": "pad6",
            "scale_factor": 2,
            "port": 9901,
            "resolution":  
                "width": 2800,
                "height": 1800
             
       
    ]
 
In the JSON, you can set the display resolution according to your external device and other configurations. If you want to configure multiple displays, you can add another entry into the presets in the json file. You can refer to example json file into the git repository. Now we need to actually create the virtual monitor.
$ vdctl create pad6
Created output, presumably &aposHEADLESS-1&apos
Set resolution of &aposHEADLESS-1&apos to 2800x1800
Set scale factor of &aposHEADLESS-1&apos to 2
Preset &apospad6&apos (&aposHEADLESS-1&apos: 2800x1800) is now active on port 9901
Now if you will check the display outputs in your display settings or from command line, you will see two different displays.
$ swaymsg -t get_outputs
Output LVDS-1 &aposSeiko Epson Corporation 0x3047 Unknown&apos
  Current mode: 1366x768 @ 60.002 Hz
  Power: on
  Position: 0,0
  Scale factor: 1.000000
  Scale filter: nearest
  Subpixel hinting: rgb
  Transform: normal
  Workspace: 2
  Max render time: off
  Adaptive sync: disabled
  Allow tearing: no
  Available modes:
    1366x768 @ 60.002 Hz
Output HEADLESS-1 &aposUnknown Unknown Unknown&apos (focused)
  Current mode: 2800x1800 @ 0.000 Hz
  Power: on
  Position: 1366,0
  Scale factor: 2.000000
  Scale filter: nearest
  Subpixel hinting: unknown
  Transform: normal
  Workspace: 3
  Max render time: off
  Adaptive sync: disabled
  Allow tearing: no
Also in the display settings.
altDisplay settings on Wayland with physical and virtual monitor output
Now we need to make this virtual display available over VNC which we will access with a VNC client on the tablet. To accomplish this I am using wayvnc but you can use any VNC server package. Install wayvnc
$ sudo apt install wayvnc
Now we will serve our virtual display HEADLESS-1 with wayvnc.
$ wayvnc -o HEADLESS-1 0.0.0.0 5900
You can adjust the port number as per your need. The process from laptop side is done. Now install any VNC software on your tablet. I am using AVNC, which is available on F-Droid. In the VNC software interface, add a new connection with the IP address of your laptop and the port started by wayvnc. Remember, both your laptop and phone need to be on the same Wi-Fi network.
altAVNC interface with the connection details to connect to the virtual monitor.
Save and connect. Now you will be able to see a extended display on your tablet. Enjoy working with multiple screens in a portable setup. Till next time.. Have a great time.

22 July 2025

Iustin Pop: Watching website scanning bots

Ever since I put up http://demo.corydalis.io, and setup logcheck, I m inadvertently keeping up with recent exploits in common CMS frameworks, or maybe even normal web frameworks issues, by seeing what 404s I get from the logs. Now, I didn t indent to do this per se, I just wanted to make sure I don t have any 500s, and at one point, I did actually catch a bug by seeing seemingly valid URLs, with referrer my own pages, leading to 404s. But besides that, it s mainly a couple times per week, a bot finds the site, and then it tries in fast succession something like this (real log entries, with the source IP address removed):
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:09 +0200] "GET /pms?module=logging&file_name=../../../../../../~/.aws/credentials&number_of_lines=10000 HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:11 +0200] "GET /admin/config?cmd=cat+/root/.aws/credentials HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:11 +0200] "GET /.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:13 +0200] "GET /.env.local HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:13 +0200] "GET /.env.production HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:16 +0200] "GET /.env.dev HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:17 +0200] "GET /.env.development HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:19 +0200] "GET /.env.prod HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:19 +0200] "GET /.env.stage HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:22 +0200] "GET /.env.test HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:23 +0200] "GET /.env.example HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:25 +0200] "GET /.env.bak HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:26 +0200] "GET /.env.old HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:28 +0200] "GET /.envs/.production/.django HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:28 +0200] "GET /blog.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:31 +0200] "GET /wp-content/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:32 +0200] "GET /application/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:34 +0200] "GET /app/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:35 +0200] "GET /apps/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:37 +0200] "GET /config/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:38 +0200] "GET /config/config.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:40 +0200] "GET /config/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:41 +0200] "GET /api/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:43 +0200] "GET /vendor/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:44 +0200] "GET /backend/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:46 +0200] "GET /server/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:46 +0200] "GET /home/user/.aws/credentials HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:49 +0200] "GET /aws/credentials HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:50 +0200] "GET /.aws/credentials HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:52 +0200] "GET /.aws/config HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:52 +0200] "GET /config/aws.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:55 +0200] "GET /config/aws.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:55 +0200] "GET /.env.production HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:58 +0200] "GET /config.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:59 +0200] "GET /config/config.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:01 +0200] "GET /config/settings.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:02 +0200] "GET /config/secrets.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:04 +0200] "GET /config.yaml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:04 +0200] "GET /config.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:07 +0200] "GET /config.py HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:08 +0200] "GET /secrets.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:10 +0200] "GET /secrets.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:11 +0200] "GET /credentials.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:13 +0200] "GET /.git-credentials HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:14 +0200] "GET /.git/config HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:16 +0200] "GET /.gitignore HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:18 +0200] "GET /.gitlab-ci.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:19 +0200] "GET /.github/workflows HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:22 +0200] "GET /.idea/workspace.xml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:22 +0200] "GET /.vscode/settings.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:25 +0200] "GET /docker-compose.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:25 +0200] "GET /docker-compose.override.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:28 +0200] "GET /docker-compose.prod.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:28 +0200] "GET /docker-compose.dev.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:32 +0200] "GET /phpinfo HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:32 +0200] "GET /_profiler/phpinfo HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:34 +0200] "GET /phpinfo.php HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:34 +0200] "GET /info.php HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:37 +0200] "GET /storage/logs/laravel.log HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:37 +0200] "GET /storage/logs/error.log HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:40 +0200] "GET /logs/debug.log HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:40 +0200] "GET /logs/app.log HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:49 +0200] "GET /debug.log HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:51 +0200] "GET /error.log HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:53 +0200] "GET /.DS_Store HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:55 +0200] "GET /backup.zip HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:58 +0200] "GET /.backup HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:29:00 +0200] "GET /db.sql HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:29:03 +0200] "GET /dump.sql HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:29:06 +0200] "GET /database.sql HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:29:09 +0200] "GET /backup.tar.gz HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
Now, this example is actually trying to catch a bit more things, but many times it s focused on some specific thing, or two things. Here we have docker, MacOS .DS_Store (I m not sure how that s useful - to find more filenames?), VSCode settings, various secrets, GitHub workflows, log output, database dumps, AWS credentials, and still I guess from the wp filename WordPress settings. The first few years were full of WordPress scanners, now it seems it has quieted down, I haven t seen a bot scanning 200 WP potential filenames in ages. And this bot even bothers to put in Mozilla/5.0 as browser identification . Side-note: I don t think the filename path in the first log entry, i.e. ../../../../../../~/, ever properly resolves to the home directory of any user. So I m not that particular scanner ever works, but who knows? Maybe some framework does bad tilde expansion, but at least bash will not expand ~ inside a path, it seems that path is passed as-is to an invoked command (strace confirms it). What s surprising here is that these are usually plain dumb scanners, from the same IP address, no concern on throttling, no attempt to hide, just 2 minutes of brute-forcing a random list of known treasures , then moving on. For this to be worth, it means there are still victims found using this method, sadly. Well, sometimes I get a single, one-off "GET /wp-login.php HTTP/1.1, which is strange enough it might not be a bot even, who knows. But in general, periods of activity of this type are coming and going, probably aligned with new CVEs. And another surprising thing is that for this type of scanning to work (and I ve seen many over the years), the website framework/configuration must allow random file download. Corydalis itself is written in Haskell, using Yesod, and it has a hardcoded (built at compile time) list of static resources it will serve. I haven t made the switch to fully embedding in the binary, but at that point, it won t need to read from the filesystem at all. Right now it will serve a few CSS and JS files, plus fonts, but that s it, no arbitrary filesystem traversal. Strange that some frameworks allow it. This is not productively spent time, but it is fun, especially seeing how this changes over time. And probably the most use anyone gets out of http://demo.corydalis.io .

20 July 2025

Michael Prokop: What to expect from Debian/trixie #newintrixie

Trixie Banner, Copyright 2024 Elise Couper Update on 2025-07-28: added note about Debian 13/trixie support for OpenVox (thanks, Ben Ford!) Debian v13 with codename trixie is scheduled to be published as new stable release on 9th of August 2025. I was the driving force at several of my customers to be well prepared for the upcoming stable release (my efforts for trixie started in August 2024). On the one hand, to make sure packages we care about are available and actually make it into the release. On the other hand, to ensure there are no severe issues that make it into the release and to get proper and working upgrades. So far everything is looking pretty well and working fine, the efforts seemed to have payed off. :) As usual with major upgrades, there are some things to be aware of, and hereby I m starting my public notes on trixie that might be worth for other folks. My focus is primarily on server systems and looking at things from a sysadmin perspective. Further readings As usual start at the official Debian release notes, make sure to especially go through What s new in Debian 13 + issues to be aware of for trixie (strongly recommended read!). Package versions As a starting point, let s look at some selected packages and their versions in bookworm vs. trixie as of 2025-07-20 (mainly having amd64 in mind):
Package bookworm/v12 trixie/v13
ansible 2.14.3 2.19.0
apache 2.4.62 2.4.64
apt 2.6.1 3.0.3
bash 5.2.15 5.2.37
ceph 16.2.11 18.2.7
docker 20.10.24 26.1.5
dovecot 2.3.19 2.4.1
dpkg 1.21.22 1.22.21
emacs 28.2 30.1
gcc 12.2.0 14.2.0
git 2.39.5 2.47.2
golang 1.19 1.24
libc 2.36 2.41
linux kernel 6.1 6.12
llvm 14.0 19.0
lxc 5.0.2 6.0.4
mariadb 10.11 11.8
nginx 1.22.1 1.26.3
nodejs 18.13 20.19
openjdk 17.0 21.0
openssh 9.2p1 10.0p1
openssl 3.0 3.5
perl 5.36.0 5.40.1
php 8.2+93 8.4+96
podman 4.3.1 5.4.2
postfix 3.7.11 3.10.3
postgres 15 17
puppet 7.23.0 8.10.0
python3 3.11.2 3.13.5
qemu/kvm 7.2 10.0
rsync 3.2.7 3.4.1
ruby 3.1 3.3
rust 1.63.0 1.85.0
samba 4.17.12 4.22.3
systemd 252.36 257.7-1
unattended-upgrades 2.9.1 2.12
util-linux 2.38.1 2.41
vagrant 2.3.4 2.3.7
vim 9.0.1378 9.1.1230
zsh 5.9 5.9
Misc unsorted apt The new apt version 3.0 brings several new features, including: systemd systemd got upgraded from v252.36-1~deb12u1 to 257.7-1 and there are lots of changes. Be aware that systemd v257 has a new net.naming_scheme, v257 being PCI slot number is now read from firmware_node/sun sysfs file. The naming scheme based on devicetree aliases was extended to support aliases for individual interfaces of controllers with multiple ports. This might affect you, see e.g. #1092176 and #1107187, the Debian Wiki provides further useful information. There are new systemd tools available: The tools provided by systemd gained several new options: Debian s systemd ships new binary packages: Linux Kernel The trixie release ships a Linux kernel based on latest longterm version 6.12. As usual there are lots of changes in the kernel area, including better hardware support, and this might warrant a separate blog entry. To highlight some changes with Debian trixie: See Kernelnewbies.org for further changes between kernel versions. Configuration management For puppet users, Debian provides the puppet-agent (v8.10.0), puppetserver (v8.7.0) and puppetdb (v8.4.1) packages. Puppet s upstream does not provide packages for trixie, yet. Given how long it took them for Debian bookworm, and with their recent Plans for Open Source Puppet in 2025, it s unclear when (and whether at all) we might get something. As a result of upstream behavior, also the OpenVox project evolved, and they already provide Debian 13/trixie support (https://apt.voxpupuli.org/openvox8-release-debian13.deb). FYI: the AIO puppet-agent package for bookworm (v7.34.0-1bookworm) so far works fine for me on Debian/trixie. Be aware that due to the apt-key removal you need a recent version of the puppetlabs-apt for usage with trixie. The puppetlabs-ntp module isn t yet ready for trixie (regarding ntp/ntpsec), if you should depend on that. ansible is available and made it with version 2.19 into trixie. Prometheus stack Prometheus server was updated from v2.42.0 to v2.53, and all the exporters that got shipped with bookworm are still around (in more recent versions of course). Trixie gained some new exporters: Virtualization docker (v26.1.5), ganeti (v3.1.0), libvirt (v11.3.0, be aware of significant changes to libvirt packaging), lxc (v6.0.4), podman (v5.4.2), openstack (see openstack-team on Salsa), qemu/kvm (v10.0.2), xen (v4.20.0) are all still around. Proxmox already announced their PVE 9.0 BETA, being based on trixie and providing 6.14.8-1 kernel, QEMU 10.0.2, LXC 6.0.4, OpenZFS 2.3.3. Vagrant is available in version 2.3.7, but Vagrant upstream does not provide packages for trixie yet. Given that HashiCorp adopted the BSL, the future of vagrant in Debian is unclear. If you re relying on VirtualBox, be aware that upstream doesn t provide packages for trixie, yet. VirtualBox is available from Debian/unstable (version 7.1.12-dfsg-1 as of 2025-07-20), but not shipped with stable release since quite some time (due to lack of cooperation from upstream on security support for older releases, see #794466). Be aware that starting with Linux kernel 6.12, KVM initializes virtualization on module loading by default. This prevents VirtualBox VMs from starting. In order to avoid this, either add kvm.enable_virt_at_load=0 parameter into kernel command line or unload the corresponding kvm_intel / kvm_amd module. If you want to use Vagrant with VirtualBox on trixie, be aware that Debian s vagrant package as present in trixie doesn t support the VirtualBox package version 7.1 as present in Debian/unstable (manually patching vagrant s meta.rb and rebuilding the package without Breaks: virtualbox (>= 7.1) is known to be working). util-linux The are plenty of new options available in the tools provided by util-linux: Now no longer present in util-linux as of trixie: The following binaries got moved from util-linux to the util-linux-extra package: And the util-linux-extra package also provides new tools: OpenSSH OpenSSH was updated from v9.2p1 to 10.0p1-5, so if you re interested in all the changes, check out the release notes between those versions (9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9 + 10.0). Let s highlight some notable behavior changes in Debian: There are some notable new features: Thanks to everyone involved in the release, looking forward to trixie + and happy upgrading!
Let s continue with working towards Debian/forky. :)

17 July 2025

Arnaud Rebillout: Acquire-By-Hash for APT packages repositories, and the lack of it in Kali Linux

This is a lenghty blog post. It features a long introduction that explains how apt update acquires various files from a package repository, what is Acquire-By-Hash, and how it all works for Kali Linux: a Debian-based distro that doesn't support Acquire-By-Hash, and which is distributed via a network of mirrors and a redirector. In a second part, I explore some "Hash Sum Mismatch" errors that we can hit with Kali Linux, errors that would not happen if only Acquire-By-Hash was supported. If anything, this blog post supports the case for adding Acquire-By-Hash support in reprepro, as requested at https://bugs.debian.org/820660. All of this could have just remained some personal notes for myself, but I got carried away and turned it into a blog post, dunno why... Hopefully others will find it interesting, but you really need to like troubleshooting stories, packed with details, and poorly written at that. You've been warned! Introducing Acquire-By-Hash Acquire-By-Hash is a feature of APT package repositories, that might or might not be supported by your favorite Debian-based distribution. A repository that supports it says so, in the Release file, by setting the field Acquire-By-Hash: yes. It's easy to check. Debian and Ubuntu both support it:
$ wget -qO- http://deb.debian.org/debian/dists/sid/Release   grep -i ^Acquire-By-Hash:
Acquire-By-Hash: yes
$ wget -qO- http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/dists/devel/Release   grep -i ^Acquire-By-Hash:
Acquire-By-Hash: yes
What about other Debian derivatives?
$ wget -qO- http://http.kali.org/kali/dists/kali-rolling/Release   grep -i ^Acquire-By-Hash:   echo not supported
not supported
$ wget -qO- https://archive.raspberrypi.com/debian/dists/trixie/Release   grep -i ^Acquire-By-Hash:   echo not supported
not supported
$ wget -qO- http://packages.linuxmint.com/dists/faye/Release   grep -i ^Acquire-By-Hash:   echo not supported
not supported
$ wget -qO- https://apt.pop-os.org/release/dists/noble/Release   grep -i ^Acquire-By-Hash:   echo not supported
not supported
Huhu, Acquire-By-Hash is not ubiquitous. But wait, what is Acquire-By-Hash to start with? To answer that, we have to take a step back and cover some basics first. The HTTP requests performed by 'apt update' What happens when one runs apt update? APT first requests the Release file from the repository(ies) configured in the APT sources. This file is a starting point, it contains a list of other files (sometimes called "Index files") that are available in the repository, along with their hashes. After fetching the Release file, APT proceeds to request those Index files. To give you an idea, there are many kinds of Index files, among which: There's an excellent Wiki page that details the structure of a Debian package repository, it's there: https://wiki.debian.org/DebianRepository/Format. Note that APT doesn't necessarily download ALL of those Index files. For simplicity, we'll limit ourselves to the minimal scenario, where apt update downloads only the Packages files. Let's try to make it more visual: here's a representation of a apt update transaction, assuming that all the components of the repository are enabled:
apt update -> Release -> Packages (main/amd64)
                      -> Packages (contrib/amd64)
                      -> Packages (non-free/amd64)
                      -> Packages (non-free-firmware/amd64)
Meaning that, in a first step, APT downloads the Release file, reads its content, and then in a second step it downloads the Index files in parallel. You can actually see that happen with a command such as apt -q -o Debug::Acquire::http=true update 2>&1 grep ^GET. For Kali Linux you'll see something pretty similar to what I described above. Try it!
$ podman run --rm kali-rolling apt -q -o Debug::Acquire::http=true update 2>&1   grep ^GET
GET /kali/dists/kali-rolling/InRelease HTTP/1.1    # <- returns a redirect, that is why the file is requested twice
GET /kali/dists/kali-rolling/InRelease HTTP/1.1
GET /kali/dists/kali-rolling/non-free/binary-amd64/Packages.gz HTTP/1.1
GET /kali/dists/kali-rolling/main/binary-amd64/Packages.gz HTTP/1.1
GET /kali/dists/kali-rolling/non-free-firmware/binary-amd64/Packages.gz HTTP/1.1
GET /kali/dists/kali-rolling/contrib/binary-amd64/Packages.gz HTTP/1.1
However, and it's now becoming interesting, for Debian or Ubuntu you won't see the same kind of URLs:
$ podman run --rm debian:sid apt -q -o Debug::Acquire::http=true update 2>&1   grep ^GET
GET /debian/dists/sid/InRelease HTTP/1.1
GET /debian/dists/sid/main/binary-amd64/by-hash/SHA256/22709f0ce67e5e0a33a6e6e64d96a83805903a3376e042c83d64886bb555a9c3 HTTP/1.1
APT doesn't download a file named Packages, instead it fetches a file named after a hash. Why? This is due to the field Acquire-By-Hash: yes that is present in the Debian's Release file. What does Acquire-By-Hash mean for 'apt update' The idea with Acquire-By-Hash is that the Index files are named after their hash on the repository, so if the MD5 sum of main/binary-amd64/Packages is 77b2c1539f816832e2d762adb20a2bb1, then the file will be stored at main/binary-amd64/by-hash/MD5Sum/77b2c1539f816832e2d762adb20a2bb1. The path main/binary-amd64/Packages still exists (it's the "Canonical Location" of this particular Index file), but APT won't use it, instead it downloads the file located in the by-hash/ directory. Why does it matter? This has to do with repository updates, and allowing the package repository to be updated atomically, without interruption of service, and without risk of failure client-side. It's important to understand that the Release file and the Index files are part of a whole, a set of files that go altogether, given that Index files are validated by their hash (as listed in the Release file) after download by APT. If those files are simply named "Release" and "Packages", it means they are not immutable: when the repository is updated, all of those files are updated "in place". And it causes problems. A typical failure mode for the client, during a repository update, is that: 1) APT requests the Release file, then 2) the repository is updated and finally 3) APT requests the Packages files, but their checksum don't match, causing apt update to fail. There are variations of this error, but you get the idea: updating a set of files "in place" is problematic. The Acquire-By-Hash mechanism was introduced exactly to solve this problem: now the Index files have a unique, immutable name. When the repository is updated, at first new Index files are added in the by-hash/ directory, and only after the Release file is updated. Old Index files in by-hash/ are retained for a while, so there's a grace period during which both the old and the new Release files are valid and working: the Index files that they refer to are available in the repo. As a result: no interruption of service, no failure client-side during repository updates. This is explained in more details at https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~cjwatson/blog/no-more-hash-sum-mismatch-errors.html, which is the blog post from Colin Watson that came out at the time Acquire-By-Hash was introduced in... 2016. This is still an excellent read in 2025. So you might be wondering why I'm rambling about a problem that's been solved 10 years ago, but then as I've shown in the introduction, the problem is not solved for everyone. Support for Acquire-By-Hash server side is not for granted, and unfortunately it never landed in reprepro, as one can see at https://bugs.debian.org/820660. reprepro is a popular tool for creating APT package repositories. In particular, at Kali Linux we use reprepro, and that's why there's no Acquire-By-Hash: yes in the Kali Release file. As one can guess, it leads to subtle issues during those moments when the repository is updated. However... we're not ready to talk about that yet! There's still another topic that we need to cover: this window of time during which a repository is being updated, and during which apt update might fail. The window for Hash Sum Mismatches, and the APT trick that saves the day Pay attention! In this section, we're now talking about packages repositories that do NOT support Acquire-By-Hash, such as the Kali Linux repository. As I've said above, it's only when the repository is being updated that there is a "Hash Sum Mismatch Window", ie. a moment when apt update might fail for some unlucky clients, due to invalid Index files. Surely, it's a very very short window of time, right? I mean, it can't take that long to update files on a server, especially when you know that a repository is usually updated via rsync, and rsync goes to great length to update files the most atomically as it can (with the option --delay=updates). So if apt update fails for me, I've been very unlucky, but I can just retry in a few seconds and it should be fixed, isn't it? The answer is: it's not that simple. So far I pictured the "package repository" as a single server, for simplicity. But it's not always what it is. For Kali Linux, by default users have http.kali.org configured in their APT sources, and it is a redirector, ie. a web server that redirects requests to mirrors that are nearby the client. Some context that matters for what comes next: the Kali repository is synced with ~70 mirrors all around the world, 4 times a day. What happens if your apt update requests are redirected to 2 mirrors close-by, and one was just synced, while the other is still syncing (or even worse, failed to sync entirely)? You'll get a mix of old and new Index files. Hash Sum Mismatch! As you can see, with this setup the "Hash Sum Mismatch Window" becomes much longer than a few seconds: as long as nearby mirrors are syncing the window is opened. You could have a fast and a slow mirror next to you, and they can be out of sync with each other for several minutes every time the repository is updated, for example. For Kali Linux in particular, there's a "detail" in our network of mirrors that, as a side-effect, almost guarantees that this window lasts several minutes at least. This is because the pool of mirrors includes kali.download which is in fact the Cloudflare CDN, and from the redirector point of view, it's seen as a "super mirror" that is present in every country. So when APT fires a bunch of requests against http.kali.org, it's likely that some of them will be redirected to the Kali CDN, and others will be redirected to a mirror nearby you. So far so good, but there's another point of detail to be aware of: the Kali CDN is synced first, before the other mirrors. Another thing: usually the mirrors that are the farthest from the Tier-0 mirror are the longest to sync. Packing all of that together: if you live somewhere in Asia, it's not uncommon for your "Hash Sum Mismatch Window" to be as long as 30 minutes, between the moment the Kali CDN is synced, and the moment your nearby mirrors catch up and are finally in sync as well. Having said all of that, and assuming you're still reading (anyone here?), you might be wondering... Does that mean that apt update is broken 4 times a day, for around 30 minutes, for every Kali user out there? How can they bear with that? Answer is: no, of course not, it's not broken like that. It works despite all of that, and this is thanks to yet another detail that we didn't go into yet. This detail lies in APT itself. APT is in fact "redirector aware", in a sense. When it fetches a Release file, and if ever the request is redirected, it then fires the subsequent requests against the server where it was initially redirected. So you are guaranteed that the Release file and the Index files are retrieved from the same mirror! Which brings back our "Hash Sum Mismatch Window" to the window for a single server, ie. something like a few seconds at worst, hopefully. And that's what makes it work for Kali, literally. Without this trick, everything would fall apart. For reference, this feature was implemented in APT back in... 2016! A busy year it seems! Here's the link to the commit: use the same redirection mirror for all index files. To finish, a dump from the console. You can see this behaviour play out easily, again with APT debugging turned on. Below we can see that only the first request hits the Kali redirector:
$ podman run --rm kali-rolling apt -q -o Debug::Acquire::http=true update 2>&1   grep -e ^Answer -e ^HTTP
Answer for: http://http.kali.org/kali/dists/kali-rolling/InRelease
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Answer for: http://mirror.freedif.org/kali/dists/kali-rolling/InRelease
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Answer for: http://mirror.freedif.org/kali/dists/kali-rolling/non-free-firmware/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Answer for: http://mirror.freedif.org/kali/dists/kali-rolling/contrib/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Answer for: http://mirror.freedif.org/kali/dists/kali-rolling/main/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Answer for: http://mirror.freedif.org/kali/dists/kali-rolling/non-free/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Interlude Believe it or not, we're done with the introduction! At this point, we have a good understanding of what apt update does (in terms of HTTP requests), we know that Release files and Index files are part of a whole, and we know that a repository can be updated atomically thanks to the Acquire-By-Hash feature, so that users don't experience interruption of service or failures of any sort, even with a rolling repository that is updated several times a day, like Debian sid. We've also learnt that, despite the fact that Acquire-By-Hash landed almost 10 years ago, some distributions like Kali Linux are still doing without it... and yet it works! But the reason why it works is more complicated to grasp, especially when you add a network of mirrors and a redirector to the picture. Moreover, it doesn't work as flawlessly as with the Acquire-By-Hash feature: we still expect some short (seconds at worst) "Hash Sum Mismatch Windows" for those unlucky users that run apt update at the wrong moment. This was a long intro, but that really sets the stage for what comes next: the edge cases. Some situations in which we can hit some Hash Sum Mismatch errors with Kali. Error cases that I've collected and investigated over the time... If anything, it supports the case that Acquire-By-Hash is really something that should be implemented in reprepro. More on that in the conclusion, but for now, let's look at those edge cases. Edge Case 1: the caching proxy If you put a caching proxy (such as approx, my APT caching proxy of choice) between yourself and the actual packages repository, then obviously it's the caching proxy that performs the HTTP requests, and therefore APT will never know about the redirections returned by the server, if any. So the APT trick of downloading all the Index files from the same server in case of redirect doesn't work anymore. It was rather easy to confirm that by building a Kali package during a mirror sync, and watch if fail at the "Update chroot" step:
$ sudo rm /var/cache/approx/kali/dists/ -fr
$ gbp buildpackage --git-builder=sbuild
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  Update chroot                                Wed, 11 Jun 2025 10:33:32 +0000  
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Get:1 http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev InRelease [41.4 kB]
Get:2 http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev/contrib Sources [81.6 kB]
Get:3 http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev/main Sources [17.3 MB]
Get:4 http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev/non-free Sources [122 kB]
Get:5 http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev/non-free-firmware Sources [8297 B]
Get:6 http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev/non-free amd64 Packages [197 kB]
Get:7 http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev/non-free-firmware amd64 Packages [10.6 kB]
Get:8 http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev/contrib amd64 Packages [120 kB]
Get:9 http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev/main amd64 Packages [21.0 MB]
Err:9 http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev/main amd64 Packages
  File has unexpected size (20984689 != 20984861). Mirror sync in progress? [IP: ::1 9999]
  Hashes of expected file:
   - Filesize:20984861 [weak]
   - SHA256:6cbbee5838849ffb24a800bdcd1477e2f4adf5838a844f3838b8b66b7493879e
   - SHA1:a5c7e557a506013bd0cf938ab575fc084ed57dba [weak]
   - MD5Sum:1433ce57419414ffb348fca14ca1b00f [weak]
  Release file created at: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 07:15:10 +0000
Fetched 17.9 MB in 9s (1893 kB/s)
Reading package lists...
E: Failed to fetch http://http.kali.org/kali/dists/kali-dev/main/binary-amd64/Packages.gz  File has unexpected size (20984689 != 20984861). Mirror sync in progress? [IP: ::1 9999]
   Hashes of expected file:
    - Filesize:20984861 [weak]
    - SHA256:6cbbee5838849ffb24a800bdcd1477e2f4adf5838a844f3838b8b66b7493879e
    - SHA1:a5c7e557a506013bd0cf938ab575fc084ed57dba [weak]
    - MD5Sum:1433ce57419414ffb348fca14ca1b00f [weak]
   Release file created at: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 07:15:10 +0000
E: Some index files failed to download. They have been ignored, or old ones used instead.
E: apt-get update failed
The obvious workaround is to NOT use the redirector in the approx configuration. Either use a mirror close by, or the Kali CDN:
$ grep kali /etc/approx/approx.conf 
#kali http://http.kali.org/kali <- do not use the redirector!
kali  http://kali.download/kali
Edge Case 2: debootstrap struggles What if one tries to debootstrap Kali while mirrors are being synced? It can give you some ugly logs, but it might not be fatal:
$ sudo debootstrap kali-dev kali-dev http://http.kali.org/kali
[...]
I: Target architecture can be executed
I: Retrieving InRelease 
I: Checking Release signature
I: Valid Release signature (key id 827C8569F2518CC677FECA1AED65462EC8D5E4C5)
I: Retrieving Packages 
I: Validating Packages 
W: Retrying failed download of http://http.kali.org/kali/dists/kali-dev/main/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
I: Retrieving Packages 
I: Validating Packages 
W: Retrying failed download of http://http.kali.org/kali/dists/kali-dev/main/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
I: Retrieving Packages 
I: Validating Packages 
W: Retrying failed download of http://http.kali.org/kali/dists/kali-dev/main/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
I: Retrieving Packages 
I: Validating Packages 
W: Retrying failed download of http://http.kali.org/kali/dists/kali-dev/main/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
I: Retrieving Packages 
I: Validating Packages 
I: Resolving dependencies of required packages...
I: Resolving dependencies of base packages...
I: Checking component main on http://http.kali.org/kali...
I: Retrieving adduser 3.152
[...]
To understand this one, we have to go and look at the debootstrap source code. How does debootstrap fetch the Release file and the Index files? It uses wget, and it retries up to 10 times in case of failure. It's not as sophisticated as APT: it doesn't detect when the Release file is served via a redirect. As a consequence, what happens above can be explained as such:
  1. debootstrap requests the Release file, gets redirected to a mirror, and retrieves it from there
  2. then it requests the Packages file, gets redirected to another mirror that is not in sync with the first one, and retrieves it from there
  3. validation fails, since the checksum is not as expected
  4. try again and again
Since debootstrap retries up to 10 times, at some point it's lucky enough to get redirected to the same mirror as the one from where it got its Release file from, and this time it gets the right Packages file, with the expected checksum. So ultimately it succeeds. Edge Case 3: post-debootstrap failure I like this one, because it gets us to yet another detail that we didn't talk about yet. So, what happens after we successfully debootstraped Kali? We have only the main component enabled, and only the Index file for this component have been retrieved. It looks like that:
$ sudo debootstrap kali-dev kali-dev http://http.kali.org/kali
[...]
I: Base system installed successfully.
$ cat kali-dev/etc/apt/sources.list
deb http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev main
$ ls -l kali-dev/var/lib/apt/lists/
total 80468
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root    41445 Jun 19 07:02 http.kali.org_kali_dists_kali-dev_InRelease
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 82299122 Jun 19 07:01 http.kali.org_kali_dists_kali-dev_main_binary-amd64_Packages
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root    40562 Jun 19 11:54 http.kali.org_kali_dists_kali-dev_Release
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root      833 Jun 19 11:54 http.kali.org_kali_dists_kali-dev_Release.gpg
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root     4096 Jun 19 11:54 partial
So far so good. Next step would be to complete the sources.list with other components, then run apt update: APT will download the missing Index files. But if you're unlucky, that might fail:
$ sudo sed -i 's/main$/main contrib non-free non-free-firmware/' kali-dev/etc/apt/sources.list
$ cat kali-dev/etc/apt/sources.list
deb http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev main contrib non-free non-free-firmware
$ sudo chroot kali-dev apt update
Hit:1 http://http.kali.org/kali kali-dev InRelease
Get:2 http://kali.download/kali kali-dev/contrib amd64 Packages [121 kB]
Get:4 http://mirror.sg.gs/kali kali-dev/non-free-firmware amd64 Packages [10.6 kB]
Get:3 http://mirror.freedif.org/kali kali-dev/non-free amd64 Packages [198 kB]
Err:3 http://mirror.freedif.org/kali kali-dev/non-free amd64 Packages
  File has unexpected size (10442 != 10584). Mirror sync in progress? [IP: 66.96.199.63 80]
  Hashes of expected file:
   - Filesize:10584 [weak]
   - SHA256:71a83d895f3488d8ebf63ccd3216923a7196f06f088461f8770cee3645376abb
   - SHA1:c4ff126b151f5150d6a8464bc6ed3c768627a197 [weak]
   - MD5Sum:a49f46a85febb275346c51ba0aa8c110 [weak]
  Release file created at: Fri, 23 May 2025 06:48:41 +0000
Fetched 336 kB in 4s (77.5 kB/s)  
Reading package lists... Done
E: Failed to fetch http://mirror.freedif.org/kali/dists/kali-dev/non-free/binary-amd64/Packages.gz  File has unexpected size (10442 != 10584). Mirror sync in progress? [IP: 66.96.199.63 80]
   Hashes of expected file:
    - Filesize:10584 [weak]
    - SHA256:71a83d895f3488d8ebf63ccd3216923a7196f06f088461f8770cee3645376abb
    - SHA1:c4ff126b151f5150d6a8464bc6ed3c768627a197 [weak]
    - MD5Sum:a49f46a85febb275346c51ba0aa8c110 [weak]
   Release file created at: Fri, 23 May 2025 06:48:41 +0000
E: Some index files failed to download. They have been ignored, or old ones used instead.
What happened here? Again, we need APT debugging options to have a hint:
$ sudo chroot kali-dev apt -q -o Debug::Acquire::http=true update 2>&1   grep -e ^Answer -e ^HTTP
Answer for: http://http.kali.org/kali/dists/kali-dev/InRelease
HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified
Answer for: http://http.kali.org/kali/dists/kali-dev/contrib/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Answer for: http://http.kali.org/kali/dists/kali-dev/non-free/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Answer for: http://http.kali.org/kali/dists/kali-dev/non-free-firmware/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Answer for: http://kali.download/kali/dists/kali-dev/contrib/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Answer for: http://mirror.sg.gs/kali/dists/kali-dev/non-free-firmware/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Answer for: http://mirror.freedif.org/kali/dists/kali-dev/non-free/binary-amd64/Packages.gz
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
As we can see above, for the Release file we get a 304 (aka. "Not Modified") from the redirector. Why is that? This is due to If-Modified-Since also known as RFC-7232. APT supports this feature when it retrieves the Release file, it basically says to the server "Give me the Release file, but only if it's newer than what I already have". If the file on the server is not newer than that, it answers with a 304, which basically says to the client "You have the latest version already". So APT doesn't get a new Release file, it uses the Release file that is already present locally in /var/lib/apt/lists/, and then it proceeeds to download the missing Index files. And as we can see above: it then hits the redirector for each requests, and might be redirected to different mirrors for each Index file. So the important bit here is: the APT "trick" of downloading all the Index files from the same mirror only works if the Release file is served via a redirect. If it's not, like in this case, then APT hits the redirector for each files it needs to download, and it's subject to the "Hash Sum Mismatch" error again. In practice, for the casual user running apt update every now and then, it's not an issue. If they have the latest Release file, no extra requests are done, because they also have the latest Index files, from a previous apt update transaction. So APT doesn't re-download those Index files. The only reason why they'd have the latest Release file, and would miss some Index files, would be that they added new components to their APT sources, like we just did above. Not so common, and then they'd need to run apt update at a unlucky moment. I don't think many users are affected in practice. Note that this issue is rather new for Kali Linux. The redirector running on http.kali.org is mirrorbits, and support for If-Modified-Since just landed in the latest release, version 0.6. This feature was added by no one else than me, a great example of the expression "shooting oneself in the foot". An obvious workaround here is to empty /var/lib/apt/lists/ in the chroot after debootstrap completed. Or we could disable support for If-Modified-Since entirely for Kali's instance of mirrorbits. Summary and Conclusion The Hash Sum Mismatch failures above are caused by a combination of things: At the same time: All in all, it seems that all those issues would go away if only Acquire-By-Hash was supported in the Kali packages repository. Now is not a bad moment to try to land this feature in reprepro. After development halted in 2019, there's now a new upstream, and patches are being merged again. But it won't be easy: reprepro is a C codebase of around 50k lines of code, and it will take time and effort for the newcomer to get acquainted with the codebase, to the point of being able to implement a significant feature like this one. As an alternative, aptly is another popular tool to manage APT package repositories. And it seems to support Acquire-By-Hash already. Another alternative: I was told that debusine has (experimental) support for package repositories, and that Acquire-By-Hash is supported as well. Options are on the table, and I hope that Kali will eventually get support for Acquire-By-Hash, one way or another. To finish, due credits: this blog post exists thanks to my employer OffSec. Thanks for reading!

16 July 2025

Sven Hoexter: Google Cloud Oddities Summer 2025 Edition

Latest oddities I ran into with Google Cloud products before I start to forget about them again. e2 Compute Instances vs CloudNAT Years ago I already had a surprising encounter with the Google Cloud e2 instances. Back then we observed CPU steal time from 20-60%, which made the instances unusable for anything remotely latency sensitive. Now someone started to run a workload which creates many outbound connections to the same destination IP:Port. To connect to the internet we utilize the Google Cloud product "CloudNAT" which implements a NAT solution somewhere in the network layer. Starting the workload let after a few seconds to all sort of connection issues, and of course logs from CloudNAT that it dropped connections. The simplest reproducer I could find was while true; do curl http://sven.stormbind.net; done which already let to connection drops on CloudNAT. We starred a bit at output of gcloud compute routers get-nat-mapping-info our-default-natgw, but allocating additional ports still worked fine in general. Further investigation let to two differences between a project which was fine and those that failed:
  1. c2d or n2d machine types instead of e2 and
  2. usage of gVNIC.
Moving away from the e2 instances instantly fixed our issue. Only some connection drops could be observed on CloudNAT if we set the min_ports_per_vm value too low and it could not allocate new ports in time. Thus we did some additional optimizations: See also upstream documentation regarding timeouts. To complete the setup alignment we also enabled gVNIC on all GKE pools. Noteworthy detail a colleague figured out: If you use terraform to provision GKE pools make sure to use at least google provider v6.33.0 to avoid a re-creation of your node pool. GKE LoadBalancer Force allPorts: true on Forwarding Rule Technically it's possible to configure a forwarding rule to listen on some or all ports. That gets more complicated if you do not configure the forwarding rule via terraform or gcloud cli, but use a GKE resource kind: Service with spec.type: LoadBalancer. The logic documented by Google Cloud is that the forwarding rule will have per port configuration if it's five or less, and above that it will open for all ports. Sadly that does not work e.g. in cases where you've an internal load balancer and a serviceAttachment attached to the forwarding rule. In my experience reconfiguring was also unreliable in cases without a serviceAttachment and required a manual deletion of the service load balancer to have the operator reconcile it and create it correctly. Given that we wanted to have all ports open to allow us to dynamically add more ports on a specific load balancer, but there is no annotation for that, I worked around with this beauty:
      ports:
        - name: dummy-0
          port: 2342
          protocol: TCP
          targetPort: 2342
        - name: dummy-1
          port: 2343
          protocol: TCP
          targetPort: 2343
        - name: dummy-2
          port: 2344
          protocol: TCP
          targetPort: 2344
        - name: dummy-3
          port: 2345
          protocol: TCP
          targetPort: 2345
        - name: service-1
          port: 4242
          protocol: TCP
          targetPort: 4242
        - name: service-2
          port: 4343
          protocol: TCP
          targetPort: 4343
If something in that area did not work out there's basically two things to check:
  1. Is the port open on the forwarding rule / is the forwarding rule configured with allPorts: true?
  2. Got the VPC firewall rule created by the service operator in GKE updated to open all required ports?
Rate Limiting with Cloud Armor on Global TCP Proxy Load Balancer According to the Google Cloud support rate limiting on a TCP proxy is a preview feature. That seems to be the excuse why it's all very inconsistent right now, but it works. Terraform Sample Snippet
  rule  
    description = "L3-L4 Rate Limit"
    action      = "rate_based_ban"
    priority    = "2342"
    match  
      versioned_expr = "SRC_IPS_V1"
      config  
        src_ip_ranges = ["*"]
       
     
    rate_limit_options  
      enforce_on_key = "IP"
      # exceed_action only supports deny() with a response code
      exceed_action = "deny(429)"
      rate_limit_threshold  
        count        = 320
        interval_sec = 60
       
      ban_duration_sec = 240
      ban_threshold  
        count        = 320
        interval_sec = 60
       
      conform_action = "allow"
     
   
Config-Connector Sample Snippet
  - action: rate_based_ban
    description: L3-L4 Rate Limit
    match:
      config:
        srcIpRanges:
          - "*"
      versionedExpr: SRC_IPS_V1
    preview: false
    priority: 2342
    rateLimitOptions:
      banDurationSec: 240
      banThreshold:
        count: 320
        intervalSec: 60
      conformAction: allow
      enforceOnKey: IP
      exceedAction: deny
      rateLimitThreshold:
         count: 320
         intervalSec: 60

12 July 2025

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in June 2025

Welcome to the 6th report from the Reproducible Builds project in 2025. Our monthly reports outline what we ve been up to over the past month, and highlight items of news from elsewhere in the increasingly-important area of software supply-chain security. If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please see the Contribute page on our website. In this report:
  1. Reproducible Builds at FOSSY 2025
  2. Distribution work
  3. diffoscope
  4. OSS Rebuild updates
  5. Website updates
  6. Upstream patches
  7. Reproducibility testing framework

Reproducible Builds at FOSSY 2025 On Saturday 2nd August, Vagrant Cascadian and Chris Lamb will be presenting at this year s FOSSY 2025. Their talk, titled Never Mind the Checkboxes, Here s Reproducible Builds!, is being introduced as follows:
There are numerous policy compliance and regulatory processes being developed that target software development but do they solve actual problems? Does it improve the quality of software? Do Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs) actually give you the information necessary to verify how a given software artifact was built? What is the goal of all these compliance checklists anyways or more importantly, what should the goals be? If a software object is signed, who should be trusted to sign it, and can they be trusted forever?
The talk will introduce the audience to Reproducible Builds as a set of best practices which allow users and developers to verify that software artifacts were built from the source code, but also allows auditing for license compliance, providing security benefits, and removes the need to trust arbitrary software vendors. Hosted by the Software Freedom Conservancy and taking place in Portland, Oregon, USA, FOSSY aims to be a community-focused event: Whether you are a long time contributing member of a free software project, a recent graduate of a coding bootcamp or university, or just have an interest in the possibilities that free and open source software bring, FOSSY will have something for you . More information on the event is available on the FOSSY 2025 website, including the full programme schedule. Vagrant and Chris will also be staffing a table this year, where they will be available to answer any questions about Reproducible Builds and discuss collaborations with other projects.

Distribution work In Debian this month:
  • Holger Levsen has discovered that it is now possible to bootstrap a minimal Debian trixie using 100% reproducible packages. This result can itself be reproduced, using the debian-repro-status tool and mmdebstrap s support for hooks:
      $ mmdebstrap --variant=apt --include=debian-repro-status \
           --chrooted-customize-hook=debian-repro-status \
           trixie /dev/null 2>&1   grep "Your system has"
       INFO  debian-repro-status > Your system has 100.00% been reproduced.
    
  • On our mailing list this month, Helmut Grohne wrote an extensive message raising an issue related to Uploads with conflicting buildinfo filenames:
    Having several .buildinfo files for the same architecture is something that we plausibly want to have eventually. Imagine running two sets of buildds and assembling a single upload containing buildinfo files from both buildds in the same upload. In a similar vein, as a developer I may want to supply several .buildinfo files with my source upload (e.g. for multiple architectures). Doing any of this is incompatible with current incoming processing and with reprepro.
  • 5 reviews of Debian packages were added, 4 were updated and 8 were removed this month adding to our ever-growing knowledge about identified issues.

In GNU Guix, Timothee Mathieu reported that a long-standing issue with reproducibility of shell containers across different host operating systems has been solved. In their message, Timothee mentions:
I discovered that pytorch (and maybe other dependencies) has a reproducibility problem of order 1e-5 when on AVX512 compared to AVX2. I first tried to solve the problem by disabling AVX512 at the level of pytorch, but it did not work. The dev of pytorch said that it may be because some components dispatch computation to MKL-DNN, I tried to disable AVX512 on MKL, and still the results were not reproducible, I also tried to deactivate in openmpi without success. I finally concluded that there was a problem with AVX512 somewhere in the dependencies graph but I gave up identifying where, as this seems very complicated.

The IzzyOnDroid Android APK repository made more progress in June. Not only have they just passed 48% reproducibility coverage, Ben started making their reproducible builds more visible, by offering rbtlog shields, a kind of badge that has been quickly picked up by many developers who are proud to present their applications reproducibility status.
Lastly, in openSUSE news, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted another monthly update for their work there.

diffoscope diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can locate and diagnose reproducibility issues. This month, Chris Lamb made the following changes, including preparing and uploading versions 298, 299 and 300 to Debian:
  • Add python3-defusedxml to the Build-Depends in order to include it in the Docker image. [ ]
  • Handle the RPM format s HEADERSIGNATURES and HEADERIMMUTABLE as a special-case to avoid unnecessarily large diffs. Thanks to Daniel Duan for the report and suggestion. [ ][ ]
  • Update copyright years. [ ]
In addition, @puer-robustus fixed a regression introduced in an earlier commit which resulted in some differences being lost. [ ][ ] Lastly, Vagrant Cascadian updated diffoscope in GNU Guix to version 299 [ ][ ] and 300 [ ][ ].

OSS Rebuild updates OSS Rebuild has added a new network analyzer that provides transparent HTTP(S) interception during builds, capturing all network traffic to monitor external dependencies and identify suspicious behavior, even in unmodified maintainer-controlled build processes. The text-based user interface now features automated failure clustering that can group similar rebuild failures and provides natural language failure summaries, making it easier to identify and understand patterns across large numbers of build failures. OSS Rebuild has also improved the local development experience with a unified interface for build execution strategies, allowing for more extensible environment setup for build execution. The team also designed a new website and logo.

Website updates Once again, there were a number of improvements made to our website this month including:
  • Arnaud Brousseau added Stage , a new Linux distribution, to our Tools page.
  • Chris Lamb improved the docker instructions on the diffoscope website. [ ]


Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

Reproducibility testing framework The Reproducible Builds project operates a comprehensive testing framework running primarily at tests.reproducible-builds.org in order to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. In June, however, a number of changes were made by Holger Levsen, including:
  • reproduce.debian.net-related:
    • Installed and deployed rebuilderd version 0.24 from Debian unstable in order to make use of the new compression feature added by Jarl Gullberg for the database. This resulted in massive decrease of the SQLite databases:
      • 79G 2.8G (all)
      • 84G 3.2G (amd64)
      • 75G 2.9G (arm64)
      • 45G 2.1G (armel)
      • 48G 2.2G (armhf)
      • 73G 2.8G (i386)
      • 72G 2.7G (ppc64el)
      • 45G 2.1G (riscv64)
      for a combined saving from 521G 20.8G. This naturally reduces the requirements to run an independent rebuilderd instance and will permit us to add more Debian suites as well.
    • During migration to the latest version of rebuilderd, make sure several services are not started. [ ]
    • Actually run rebuilderd from /usr/bin. [ ]
    • Raise temperatures for NVME devices on some riscv64 nodes that should be ignored. [ ][ ]
    • Use a 64KB kernel page size on the ppc64el architecture (see #1106757). [ ]
    • Improve ordering of some failed to reproduce statistics. [ ]
    • Detect a number of potential causes of build failures within the statistics. [ ][ ]
    • Add support for manually scheduling for the any architecture. [ ]
  • Misc:
    • Update the Codethink nodes as there are now many kernels installed. [ ][ ]
    • Install linux-sysctl-defaults on Debian trixie systems as we need ping functionality. [ ]
    • Limit the fs.nr_open kernel turnable. [ ]
    • Stop submitting results to deprecated buildinfo.debian.net service. [ ][ ]
In addition, Jochen Sprickerhof greatly improved the statistics and the logging functionality, including adopting to the new database format of rebuilderd version 0.24.0 [ ] and temporarily increasing maximum log size in order to debug a nettlesome build [ ]. Jochen also dropped the CPUSchedulingPolicy=idle systemd flag on the workers. [ ]

Finally, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

11 July 2025

Jamie McClelland: Avoiding Apache Max Request Workers Errors

Wow, I hate this error:
AH00484: server reached MaxRequestWorkers setting, consider raising the MaxRequestWorkers setting
For starters, it means I have to relearn how MaxRequestWorkers functions in Apache:
For threaded and hybrid servers (e.g. event or worker), MaxRequestWorkers restricts the total number of threads that will be available to serve clients. For hybrid MPMs, the default value is 16 (ServerLimit) multiplied by the value of 25 (ThreadsPerChild). Therefore, to increase MaxRequestWorkers to a value that requires more than 16 processes, you must also raise ServerLimit.
Ok remind me what ServerLimit refers to?
For the prefork MPM, this directive sets the maximum configured value for MaxRequestWorkers for the lifetime of the Apache httpd process. For the worker and event MPMs, this directive in combination with ThreadLimit sets the maximum configured value for MaxRequestWorkers for the lifetime of the Apache httpd process. For the event MPM, this directive also defines how many old server processes may keep running and finish processing open connections. Any attempts to change this directive during a restart will be ignored, but MaxRequestWorkers can be modified during a restart. Special care must be taken when using this directive. If ServerLimit is set to a value much higher than necessary, extra, unused shared memory will be allocated. If both ServerLimit and MaxRequestWorkers are set to values higher than the system can handle, Apache httpd may not start or the system may become unstable. With the prefork MPM, use this directive only if you need to set MaxRequestWorkers higher than 256 (default). Do not set the value of this directive any higher than what you might want to set MaxRequestWorkers to. With worker, use this directive only if your MaxRequestWorkers and ThreadsPerChild settings require more than 16 server processes (default). Do not set the value of this directive any higher than the number of server processes required by what you may want for MaxRequestWorkers and ThreadsPerChild. With event, increase this directive if the process number defined by your MaxRequestWorkers and ThreadsPerChild settings, plus the number of gracefully shutting down processes, is more than 16 server processes (default).
Got it? In other words, you can consider raising the MaxRequestWorkers setting all you want, but you can t just change that setting, you have to read about several other compliated settings, do some math, and spend a lot of time wondering if you are going to remember what you just did and how to undo it if you blow up your server. On the plus side, typically, nobody should increase this limit - because if the server runs out of connections, it usually means something else is wrong. In our case, on a shared web server running Apache2 and PHP-FPM, it s usually because a single web site has gone out of control. But wait! How can that happen, we are using PHP-FPM s max_children setting to prevent a single PHP web site from taking down the server? After years of struggling with this problem I have finally made some headway. Our PHP pool configuration typically looks like this:
user = site342999writer
group = site342999writer
listen = /run/php/8.1-site342999.sock
listen.owner = www-data
listen.group = www-data
pm = ondemand
pm.max_children = 12
pm.max_requests = 500
php_admin_value[memory_limit] = 256M
And we invoke PHP-FPM via this apache snippet:
<FilesMatch \.php$>
        SetHandler "proxy:unix:/var/run/php/8.1-site342999.sock fcgi://localhost"
</FilesMatch>
With these settings in place, what happens when we use up all 12 max_children? According to the docs:
By default, mod_proxy will allow and retain the maximum number of connections that could be used simultaneously by that web server child process. Use the max parameter to reduce the number from the default. The pool of connections is maintained per web server child process, and max and other settings are not coordinated among all child processes, except when only one child process is allowed by configuration or MPM design.
The max parameter seems to default to the ThreadsPerChild, so it seems that the default here is to allow any web site to consume ThreadsPerChild (25) x ServerLimit (16), which is also the max number of over all connections. Not great. To make matter worse, there is another setting available which is mysteriously called acquire:
If set, this will be the maximum time to wait for a free connection in the connection pool, in milliseconds. If there are no free connections in the pool, the Apache httpd will return SERVER_BUSY status to the client.
By default this is not set which seems to suggest Apache will just hang on to connections forever until a free PHP process becomes available (or some other time out happens). So, let s try something different:
 <Proxy "fcgi://localhost">
    ProxySet acquire=1 max=12
  </proxy>
This snippet is the way you can configure the proxy configuration we setup in the SetHandler statement above. It s documented on the Apache mod_proxy page. Now we limit the maximum pool size per process to half of what is available for the entire server and we tell Apache to immediately throw a 503 error if we have exceeded our maximum number of connecitons. Now, if a site is overwhelmed with traffic, instead of maxing out the available Apache connections while leaving user with constantly spinning browsers, the users will get 503 ed and the server will be able to server other sites.

3 July 2025

Sergio Cipriano: Disable sleep on lid close

Disable sleep on lid close I am using an old laptop in my homelab, but I want to do everything from my personal computer, with ssh. The default behavior in Debian is to suspend when the laptop lid is closed, but it's easy to change that, just edit
/etc/systemd/logind.conf
and change the line
#HandleLidSwitch=suspend
to
HandleLidSwitch=ignore
then
$ sudo systemctl restart systemd-logind
That's it.

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