A couple of weeks ago there was an article on the Freexian blog about Using
JavaScript in Debusine without depending on
JavaScript. It
describes how JavaScript is used in the Debusine Django app, namely for
progressive enhancement rather than core functionality .
This is an approach I also follow when implementing web interfaces and I think
developments in web technologies and standardization in recent years have made
this a lot easier.
One of the examples described in the post, the Bootstrap toast messages, was
something that I implemented myself recently, in a similar but slightly
different way.
In the main app I develop for my day job we also use the Bootstrap
framework. I have also used it for different
personal projects (for example the GSOC project I did for Debian in 2018, was
also a Django app that used
Bootstrap).
Bootstrap is still primarily a CSS framework, but it also comes with a
JavaScript library for some functionality. Previous versions of Bootstrap
depended on jQuery, but since version 5 of Bootstrap, you don t need jQuery
anymore. In my experience, two of the more commonly used JavaScript utilities
of Bootstrap are modals
(also called lightbox or popup, they are elements that are displayed above
the main content of a website) and
toasts (also called
alerts, they are little notification windows that often disappear after a
timeout). The thing is, Bootstrap 5 was released in 2021 and a lot has happened
since then regarding web technologies. I believe that both these UI components
can nowadays be implemented using standard HTML5 elements.
An eye opening talk I watched was Stop using JS for
that from last years JSConf(!).
In this talk the speaker argues that the Rule of least
power is one of the core
principles of web development, which means we should use HTML over CSS and CSS
over JavaScript. And the speaker also presents some CSS rules and HTML elements
that added recently and that help to make that happen, one of them being the
dialog
element:
The <dialog> HTML element represents a modal or non-modal dialog box or other
interactive component, such as a dismissible alert, inspector, or subwindow.
The Dialog element at MDN
The baseline for this element is widely available :
This feature is well established and works across many devices and browser
versions. It s been available across browsers since March 2022.
The Dialog element at MDN
This means there is an HTML element that does what a modal Bootstrap does!
Once I had watched that talk I removed all my Bootstrap modals and replaced
them with HTML <dialog> elements (JavaScript is still needed to .show() and
.close() the elements, though, but those are two methods instead of a full
library). This meant not only that I replaced code that depended on an external
library, I m now also a lot more flexible regarding the styling of the
elements.
When I started implementing notifications for our app, my first approach was to
use Bootstrap toasts, similar to how it is implemented in Debusine. But looking
at the amount of HTML code I had to write for a simple toast message, I thought
that it might be possible to also implement toasts with the <dialog> element.
I mean, basically it is the same, only the styling is a bit different. So what
I did was that I added a #snackbar area to the DOM of the app. This would be
the container for the toast messages. All the toast messages are simply
<dialog> elements with the open attribute, which means that they are
visible right away when the page loads.
<divid="snackbar">
% for message in messages %
<dialogclass="mytoast alert alert- message.tags "role="alert"open>
message
</dialog>
% endfor %
</div>
This looks a lot simpler than the Bootstrap toasts would have.
To make the <dialog> elements a little bit more fancy, I added some CSS to make
them fade in and out:
(If one would want to use the same HTML code for both script and noscript users,
then the CSS should probably adapted: it fades away and if there is no
JavaScript to close the element, it stays visible after the animation is over.
A solution would for example be to use a close button and for noscript users
simply let it stay visible - this is also what happens with the noscript
messages in Debusine).
So there are many new elements in HTML and a lot of new features of CSS. It
makes sense to sometimes ask ourselves if instead of the solutions we know (or
what a web search / some AI shows us as the most common solution) there might
be some newer solution that was not there when the first choice was
created. Using standardized solutions instead of custom libraries makes the
software more maintainable. In web development I also prefer standardized
elements over a third party library because they have usually better
accessibility and UX.
In How Functional Programming Shaped (and Twisted) Frontend
Development
the author writes:
Consider the humble modal dialog. The web has <dialog>, a native element with
built-in functionality: it manages focus trapping, handles Escape key
dismissal, provides a backdrop, controls scroll-locking on the body, and
integrates with the accessibility tree. It exists in the DOM but remains
hidden until opened. No JavaScript mounting required.
[ ]
you ve trained developers to not even look for native solutions. The platform
becomes invisible. When someone asks how do I build a modal? , the answer is
install a library or here s my custom hook, never use <dialog>.
Ahmad Alfy
The discovery of a backdoor in XZ Utils in the spring of 2024 shocked the open source community, raising critical questions about software supply chain security. This post explores whether better Debian packaging practices could have detected this threat, offering a guide to auditing packages and suggesting future improvements.
The XZ backdoor in versions 5.6.0/5.6.1 made its way briefly into many major Linux distributions such as Debian and Fedora, but luckily didn t reach that many actual users, as the backdoored releases were quickly removed thanks to the heroic diligence of Andres Freund. We are all extremely lucky that he detected a half a second performance regression in SSH, cared enough to trace it down, discovered malicious code in the XZ library loaded by SSH, and reported promtly to various security teams for quick coordinated actions.
This episode makes software engineers pondering the following questions:
Why didn t any Linux distro packagers notice anything odd when importing the new XZ version 5.6.0/5.6.1 from upstream?
Is the current software supply-chain in the most popular Linux distros easy to audit?
Could we have similar backdoors lurking that haven t been detected yet?
As a Debian Developer, I decided to audit the xz package in Debian, share my methodology and findings in this post, and also suggest some improvements on how the software supply-chain security could be tightened in Debian specifically.
Note that the scope here is only to inspect how Debian imports software from its upstreams, and how they are distributed to Debian s users. This excludes the whole story of how to assess if an upstream project is following software development security best practices. This post doesn t discuss how to operate an individual computer running Debian to ensure it remains untampered as there are plenty of guides on that already.
Downloading Debian and upstream source packages
Let s start by working backwards from what the Debian package repositories offer for download. As auditing binaries is extremely complicated, we skip that, and assume the Debian build hosts are trustworthy and reliably building binaries from the source packages, and the focus should be on auditing the source code packages.
As with everything in Debian, there are multiple tools and ways to do the same thing, but in this post only one (and hopefully the best) way to do something is presented for brevity.
The first step is to download the latest version and some past versions of the package from the Debian archive, which is easiest done with debsnap. The following command will download all Debian source packages of xz-utils from Debian release 5.2.4-1 onwards:
Verifying authenticity of upstream and Debian sources using OpenPGP signatures
As seen in the output of debsnap, it already automatically verifies that the downloaded files match the OpenPGP signatures. To have full clarity on what files were authenticated with what keys, we should verify the Debian packagers signature with:
$ gpg --verify --auto-key-retrieve --keyserver hkps://keyring.debian.org xz-utils_5.8.1-2.dsc
gpg: Signature made Fri Oct 3 22:04:44 2025 UTC
gpg: using RSA key 57892E705233051337F6FDD105641F175712FA5B
gpg: requesting key 05641F175712FA5B from hkps://keyring.debian.org
gpg: key 7B96E8162A8CF5D1: public key "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
gpg: Good signature from "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" [unknown]
gpg: aka "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>" [unknown]
gpg: aka "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 6425 4695 FFF0 AA44 66CC 19E6 7B96 E816 2A8C F5D1
Subkey fingerprint: 5789 2E70 5233 0513 37F6 FDD1 0564 1F17 5712 FA5B
$ gpg --verify --auto-key-retrieve --keyserver hkps://keyring.debian.org xz-utils_5.8.1-2.dsc
gpg: Signature made Fri Oct 3 22:04:44 2025 UTC
gpg: using RSA key 57892E705233051337F6FDD105641F175712FA5B
gpg: requesting key 05641F175712FA5B from hkps://keyring.debian.org
gpg: key 7B96E8162A8CF5D1: public key "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
gpg: Good signature from "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" [unknown]
gpg: aka "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>" [unknown]
gpg: aka "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 6425 4695 FFF0 AA44 66CC 19E6 7B96 E816 2A8C F5D1
Subkey fingerprint: 5789 2E70 5233 0513 37F6 FDD1 0564 1F17 5712 FA5B
The upstream tarball signature (if available) can be verified with:
$ gpg --verify --auto-key-retrieve xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc
gpg: assuming signed data in 'xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz'
gpg: Signature made Thu Apr 3 11:38:23 2025 UTC
gpg: using RSA key 3690C240CE51B4670D30AD1C38EE757D69184620
gpg: key 38EE757D69184620: public key "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
gpg: Good signature from "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 3690 C240 CE51 B467 0D30 AD1C 38EE 757D 6918 4620
$ gpg --verify --auto-key-retrieve xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc
gpg: assuming signed data in 'xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz'
gpg: Signature made Thu Apr 3 11:38:23 2025 UTC
gpg: using RSA key 3690C240CE51B4670D30AD1C38EE757D69184620
gpg: key 38EE757D69184620: public key "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
gpg: Good signature from "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 3690 C240 CE51 B467 0D30 AD1C 38EE 757D 6918 4620
Note that this only proves that there is a key that created a valid signature for this content. The authenticity of the keys themselves need to be validated separately before trusting they in fact are the keys of these people. That can be done by checking e.g. the upstream website for what key fingerprints they published, or the Debian keyring for Debian Developers and Maintainers, or by relying on the OpenPGP web-of-trust .
Verifying authenticity of upstream sources by comparing checksums
In case the upstream in question does not publish release signatures, the second best way to verify the authenticity of the sources used in Debian is to download the sources directly from upstream and compare that the sha256 checksums match.
This should be done using the debian/watch file inside the Debian packaging, which defines where the upstream source is downloaded from. Continuing on the example situation above, we can unpack the latest Debian sources, enter and then run uscan to download:
$ tar xvf xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
...
debian/rules
debian/source/format
debian/source.lintian-overrides
debian/symbols
debian/tests/control
debian/tests/testsuite
debian/upstream/signing-key.asc
debian/watch
...
$ uscan --download-current-version --destdir /tmp
Newest version of xz-utils on remote site is 5.8.1, specified download version is 5.8.1
gpgv: Signature made Thu Apr 3 11:38:23 2025 UTC
gpgv: using RSA key 3690C240CE51B4670D30AD1C38EE757D69184620
gpgv: Good signature from "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>"
Successfully symlinked /tmp/xz-5.8.1.tar.xz to /tmp/xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.
$ tar xvf xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
...
debian/rules
debian/source/format
debian/source.lintian-overrides
debian/symbols
debian/tests/control
debian/tests/testsuite
debian/upstream/signing-key.asc
debian/watch
...
$ uscan --download-current-version --destdir /tmp
Newest version of xz-utils on remote site is 5.8.1, specified download version is 5.8.1
gpgv: Signature made Thu Apr 3 11:38:23 2025 UTC
gpgv: using RSA key 3690C240CE51B4670D30AD1C38EE757D69184620
gpgv: Good signature from "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>"
Successfully symlinked /tmp/xz-5.8.1.tar.xz to /tmp/xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.
The original files downloaded from upstream are now in /tmp along with the files renamed to follow Debian conventions. Using everything downloaded so far the sha256 checksums can be compared across the files and also to what the .dsc file advertised:
In the example above the checksum 0b54f79df85... is the same across the files, so it is a match.
Repackaged upstream sources can t be verified as easily
Note that uscan may in rare cases repackage some upstream sources, for example to exclude files that don t adhere to Debian s copyright and licensing requirements. Those files and paths would be listed under the Files-Excluded section in the debian/copyright file. There are also other situations where the file that represents the upstream sources in Debian isn t bit-by-bit the same as what upstream published. If checksums don t match, an experienced Debian Developer should review all package settings (e.g. debian/source/options) to see if there was a valid and intentional reason for divergence.
Reviewing changes between two source packages using diffoscope
Diffoscope is an incredibly capable and handy tool to compare arbitrary files. For example, to view a report in HTML format of the differences between two XZ releases, run:
If the changes are extensive, and you want to use a LLM to help spot potential security issues, generate the report of both the upstream and Debian packaging differences in Markdown with:
The Markdown files created above can then be passed to your favorite LLM, along with a prompt such as:
Based on the attached diffoscope output for a new Debian package version compared with the previous one, list all suspicious changes that might have introduced a backdoor, followed by other potential security issues. If there are none, list a short summary of changes as the conclusion.
Reviewing Debian source packages in version control
As of today only 93% of all Debian source packages are tracked in git on Debian s GitLab instance at salsa.debian.org. Some key packages such as Coreutils and Bash are not using version control at all, as their maintainers apparently don t see value in using git for Debian packaging, and the Debian Policy does not require it. Thus, the only reliable and consistent way to audit changes in Debian packages is to compare the full versions from the archive as shown above.
However, for packages that are hosted on Salsa, one can view the git history to gain additional insight into what exactly changed, when and why. For packages that are using version control, their location can be found in the Git-Vcs header in the debian/control file. For xz-utils the location is salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils.
Note that the Debian policy does not state anything about how Salsa should be used, or what git repository layout or development practices to follow. In practice most packages follow the DEP-14 proposal, and use git-buildpackage as the tool for managing changes and pushing and pulling them between upstream and salsa.debian.org.
To get the XZ Utils source, run:
$ gbp clone https://salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils.git
gbp:info: Cloning from 'https://salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils.git'
$ gbp clone https://salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils.git
gbp:info: Cloning from 'https://salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils.git'
At the time of writing this post the git history shows:
$ git log --graph --oneline
* bb787585 (HEAD -> debian/unstable, origin/debian/unstable, origin/HEAD) Prepare 5.8.1-2
* 4b769547 d: Remove the symlinks from -dev package.
* a39f3428 Correct the nocheck build profile
* 1b806b8d Import Debian changes 5.8.1-1.1
* b1cad34b Prepare 5.8.1-1
* a8646015 Import 5.8.1
* 2808ec2d Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/5.8.1'
\
* fa1e8796 (origin/upstream/v5.8, upstream/v5.8) New upstream version 5.8.1
* a522a226 Bump version and soname for 5.8.1
* 1c462c2a Add NEWS for 5.8.1
* 513cabcf Tests: Call lzma_code() in smaller chunks in fuzz_common.h
* 48440e24 Tests: Add a fuzzing target for the multithreaded .xz decoder
* 0c80045a liblzma: mt dec: Fix lack of parallelization in single-shot decoding
* 81880488 liblzma: mt dec: Don't modify thr->in_size in the worker thread
* d5a2ffe4 liblzma: mt dec: Don't free the input buffer too early (CVE-2025-31115)
* c0c83596 liblzma: mt dec: Simplify by removing the THR_STOP state
* 831b55b9 liblzma: mt dec: Fix a comment
* b9d168ee liblzma: Add assertions to lzma_bufcpy()
* c8e0a489 DOS: Update Makefile to fix the build
* 307c02ed sysdefs.h: Avoid <stdalign.h> even with C11 compilers
* 7ce38b31 Update THANKS
* 688e51bd Translations: Update the Croatian translation
* a6b54dde Prepare 5.8.0-1.
* 77d9470f Add 5.8 symbols.
* 9268eb66 Import 5.8.0
* 6f85ef4f Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/5.8.0'
\ \
* afba662b New upstream version 5.8.0
/
* 173fb5c6 doc/SHA256SUMS: Add 5.8.0
* db9258e8 Bump version and soname for 5.8.0
* bfb752a3 Add NEWS for 5.8.0
* 6ccbb904 Translations: Run "make -C po update-po"
* 891a5f05 Translations: Run po4a/update-po
* 4f52e738 Translations: Partially fix overtranslation in Serbian man pages
* ff5d9447 liblzma: Count the extra bytes in LZMA/LZMA2 decoder memory usage
* 943b012d liblzma: Use SSE2 intrinsics instead of memcpy() in dict_repeat()
$ git log --graph --oneline
* bb787585 (HEAD -> debian/unstable, origin/debian/unstable, origin/HEAD) Prepare 5.8.1-2
* 4b769547 d: Remove the symlinks from -dev package.
* a39f3428 Correct the nocheck build profile
* 1b806b8d Import Debian changes 5.8.1-1.1
* b1cad34b Prepare 5.8.1-1
* a8646015 Import 5.8.1
* 2808ec2d Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/5.8.1'
\
* fa1e8796 (origin/upstream/v5.8, upstream/v5.8) New upstream version 5.8.1
* a522a226 Bump version and soname for 5.8.1
* 1c462c2a Add NEWS for 5.8.1
* 513cabcf Tests: Call lzma_code() in smaller chunks in fuzz_common.h
* 48440e24 Tests: Add a fuzzing target for the multithreaded .xz decoder
* 0c80045a liblzma: mt dec: Fix lack of parallelization in single-shot decoding
* 81880488 liblzma: mt dec: Don't modify thr->in_size in the worker thread
* d5a2ffe4 liblzma: mt dec: Don't free the input buffer too early (CVE-2025-31115)
* c0c83596 liblzma: mt dec: Simplify by removing the THR_STOP state
* 831b55b9 liblzma: mt dec: Fix a comment
* b9d168ee liblzma: Add assertions to lzma_bufcpy()
* c8e0a489 DOS: Update Makefile to fix the build
* 307c02ed sysdefs.h: Avoid <stdalign.h> even with C11 compilers
* 7ce38b31 Update THANKS
* 688e51bd Translations: Update the Croatian translation
* a6b54dde Prepare 5.8.0-1.
* 77d9470f Add 5.8 symbols.
* 9268eb66 Import 5.8.0
* 6f85ef4f Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/5.8.0'
\ \
* afba662b New upstream version 5.8.0
/
* 173fb5c6 doc/SHA256SUMS: Add 5.8.0
* db9258e8 Bump version and soname for 5.8.0
* bfb752a3 Add NEWS for 5.8.0
* 6ccbb904 Translations: Run "make -C po update-po"
* 891a5f05 Translations: Run po4a/update-po
* 4f52e738 Translations: Partially fix overtranslation in Serbian man pages
* ff5d9447 liblzma: Count the extra bytes in LZMA/LZMA2 decoder memory usage
* 943b012d liblzma: Use SSE2 intrinsics instead of memcpy() in dict_repeat()
This shows both the changes on the debian/unstable branch as well as the intermediate upstream import branch, and the actual real upstream development branch. See my Debian source packages in git explainer for details of what these branches are used for.
To only view changes on the Debian branch, run git log --graph --oneline --first-parent or git log --graph --oneline -- debian.
The Debian branch should only have changes inside the debian/ subdirectory, which is easy to check with:
If the upstream in question signs commits or tags, they can be verified with e.g.:
$ git verify-tag v5.6.2
gpg: Signature made Wed 29 May 2024 09:39:42 AM PDT
gpg: using RSA key 3690C240CE51B4670D30AD1C38EE757D69184620
gpg: issuer "lasse.collin@tukaani.org"
gpg: Good signature from "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>" [expired]
gpg: Note: This key has expired!
$ git verify-tag v5.6.2
gpg: Signature made Wed 29 May 2024 09:39:42 AM PDT
gpg: using RSA key 3690C240CE51B4670D30AD1C38EE757D69184620
gpg: issuer "lasse.collin@tukaani.org"
gpg: Good signature from "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>" [expired]
gpg: Note: This key has expired!
The main benefit of reviewing changes in git is the ability to see detailed information about each individual change, instead of just staring at a massive list of changes without any explanations. In this example, to view all the upstream commits since the previous import to Debian, one would view the commit range from afba662b New upstream version 5.8.0 to fa1e8796 New upstream version 5.8.1 with git log --reverse -p afba662b...fa1e8796. However, a far superior way to review changes would be to browse this range using a visual git history viewer, such as gitk. Either way, looking at one code change at a time and reading the git commit message makes the review much easier.
Comparing Debian source packages to git contents
As stated in the beginning of the previous section, and worth repeating, there is no guarantee that the contents in the Debian packaging git repository matches what was actually uploaded to Debian. While the tag2upload project in Debian is getting more and more popular, Debian is still far from having any system to enforce that the git repository would be in sync with the Debian archive contents.
To detect such differences we can run diff across the Debian source packages downloaded with debsnap earlier (path source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian) and the git repository cloned in the previous section (path xz-utils):
diff$ diff -u source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian/ xz-utils/debian/
diff -u source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian/changelog xz-utils/debian/changelog
--- debsnap/source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian/changelog 2025-10-03 09:32:16.000000000 -0700
+++ xz-utils/debian/changelog 2025-10-12 12:18:04.623054758 -0700
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
* Remove the symlinks from -dev, pointing to the lib package.
(Closes: #1109354)
- -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Fri, 03 Oct 2025 18:32:16 +0200
+ -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Fri, 03 Oct 2025 18:36:59 +0200
$ diff -u source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian/ xz-utils/debian/
diff -u source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian/changelog xz-utils/debian/changelog
--- debsnap/source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian/changelog 2025-10-03 09:32:16.000000000 -0700
+++ xz-utils/debian/changelog 2025-10-12 12:18:04.623054758 -0700
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
* Remove the symlinks from -dev, pointing to the lib package.
(Closes: #1109354)
- -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Fri, 03 Oct 2025 18:32:16 +0200
+ -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Fri, 03 Oct 2025 18:36:59 +0200
In the case above diff revealed that the timestamp in the changelog in the version uploaded to Debian is different from what was committed to git. This is not malicious, just a mistake by the maintainer who probably didn t run gbp tag immediately after upload, but instead some dch command and ended up with having a different timestamps in the git compared to what was actually uploaded to Debian.
Creating syntetic Debian packaging git repositories
If no Debian packaging git repository exists, or if it is lagging behind what was uploaded to Debian s archive, one can use git-buildpackage s import-dscs feature to create synthetic git commits based on the files downloaded by debsnap, ensuring the git contents fully matches what was uploaded to the archive. To import a single version there is gbp import-dsc (no s at the end), of which an example invocation would be:
$ gbp import-dsc --verbose ../source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.dsc
Version '5.8.1-2' imported under '/home/otto/debian/xz-utils-2025-09-29'
$ gbp import-dsc --verbose ../source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.dsc
Version '5.8.1-2' imported under '/home/otto/debian/xz-utils-2025-09-29'
Example commit history from a repository with commits added with gbp import-dsc:
An online example repository with only a few missing uploads added using gbp import-dsc can be viewed at salsa.debian.org/otto/xz-utils-2025-09-29/-/network/debian%2Funstable
An example repository that was fully crafted using gbp import-dscs can be viewed at salsa.debian.org/otto/xz-utils-gbp-import-dscs-debsnap-generated/-/network/debian%2Flatest.
There exists also dgit, which in a similar way creates a synthetic git history to allow viewing the Debian archive contents via git tools. However, its focus is on producing new package versions, so fetching a package with dgit that has not had the history recorded in dgit earlier will only show the latest versions:
$ dgit clone xz-utils
canonical suite name for unstable is sid
starting new git history
last upload to archive: NO git hash
downloading http://ftp.debian.org/debian//pool/main/x/xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz...
downloading http://ftp.debian.org/debian//pool/main/x/xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc...
downloading http://ftp.debian.org/debian//pool/main/x/xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz...
dpkg-source: info: extracting xz-utils in unpacked
dpkg-source: info: unpacking xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz
dpkg-source: info: unpacking xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
synthesised git commit from .dsc 5.8.1-2
HEAD is now at f9bcaf7 xz-utils (5.8.1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
dgit ok: ready for work in xz-utils
$ dgit/sid git log --graph --oneline
* f9bcaf7 xz-utils (5.8.1-2) unstable; urgency=medium 9 days ago (HEAD -> dgit/sid, dgit/dgit/sid)
\
* 11d3a62 Import xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz 9 days ago
* 15dcd95 Import xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz 6 months ago
$ dgit clone xz-utils
canonical suite name for unstable is sid
starting new git history
last upload to archive: NO git hash
downloading http://ftp.debian.org/debian//pool/main/x/xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz...
downloading http://ftp.debian.org/debian//pool/main/x/xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc...
downloading http://ftp.debian.org/debian//pool/main/x/xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz...
dpkg-source: info: extracting xz-utils in unpacked
dpkg-source: info: unpacking xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz
dpkg-source: info: unpacking xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
synthesised git commit from .dsc 5.8.1-2
HEAD is now at f9bcaf7 xz-utils (5.8.1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
dgit ok: ready for work in xz-utils
$ dgit/sid git log --graph --oneline
* f9bcaf7 xz-utils (5.8.1-2) unstable; urgency=medium 9 days ago (HEAD -> dgit/sid, dgit/dgit/sid)
\
* 11d3a62 Import xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz 9 days ago
* 15dcd95 Import xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz 6 months ago
Unlike git-buildpackage managed git repositories, the dgit managed repositories cannot incorporate the upstream git history and are thus less useful for auditing the full software supply-chain in git.
Comparing upstream source packages to git contents
Equally important to the note in the beginning of the previous section, one must also keep in mind that the upstream release source packages, often called release tarballs, are not guaranteed to have the exact same contents as the upstream git repository. Projects might strip out test data or extra development files from their release tarballs to avoid shipping unnecessary files to users, or projects might add documentation files or versioning information into the tarball that isn t stored in git. While a small minority, there are also upstreams that don t use git at all, so the plain files in a release tarball is still the lowest common denominator for all open source software projects, and exporting and importing source code needs to interface with it.
In the case of XZ, the release tarball has additional version info and also a sizeable amount of pregenerated compiler configuration files. Detecting and comparing differences between git contents and tarballs can of course be done manually by running diff across an unpacked tarball and a checked out git repository. If using git-buildpackage, the difference between the git contents and tarball contents can be made visible directly in the import commit.
In this XZ example, consider this git history:
* b1cad34b Prepare 5.8.1-1
* a8646015 Import 5.8.1
* 2808ec2d Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/5.8.1'
\
* fa1e8796 (debian/upstream/v5.8, upstream/v5.8) New upstream version 5.8.1
* a522a226 (tag: v5.8.1) Bump version and soname for 5.8.1
* 1c462c2a Add NEWS for 5.8.1
* b1cad34b Prepare 5.8.1-1
* a8646015 Import 5.8.1
* 2808ec2d Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/5.8.1'
\
* fa1e8796 (debian/upstream/v5.8, upstream/v5.8) New upstream version 5.8.1
* a522a226 (tag: v5.8.1) Bump version and soname for 5.8.1
* 1c462c2a Add NEWS for 5.8.1
The commit a522a226 was the upstream release commit, which upstream also tagged v5.8.1. The merge commit 2808ec2d applied the new upstream import branch contents on the Debian branch. Between these is the special commit fa1e8796 New upstream version 5.8.1 tagged upstream/v5.8. This commit and tag exists only in the Debian packaging repository, and they show what is the contents imported into Debian. This is generated automatically by git-buildpackage when running git import-orig --uscan for Debian packages with the correct settings in debian/gbp.conf. By viewing this commit one can see exactly how the upstream release tarball differs from the upstream git contents (if at all).
In the case of XZ, the difference is substantial, and shown below in full as it is very interesting:
To be able to easily inspect exactly what changed in the release tarball compared to git release tag contents, the best tool for the job is Meld, invoked via git difftool --dir-diff fa1e8796^..fa1e8796.
To compare changes across the new and old upstream tarball, one would need to compare commits afba662b New upstream version 5.8.0 and fa1e8796 New upstream version 5.8.1 by running git difftool --dir-diff afba662b..fa1e8796.
With all the above tips you can now go and try to audit your own favorite package in Debian and see if it is identical with upstream, and if not, how it differs.
Should the XZ backdoor have been detected using these tools?
The famous XZ Utils backdoor (CVE-2024-3094) consisted of two parts: the actual backdoor inside two binary blobs masqueraded as a test files (tests/files/bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz, tests/files/good-large_compressed.lzma), and a small modification in the build scripts (m4/build-to-host.m4) to extract the backdoor and plant it into the built binary. The build script was not tracked in version control, but generated with GNU Autotools at release time and only shipped as additional files in the release tarball.
The entire reason for me to write this post was to ponder if a diligent engineer using git-buildpackage best practices could have reasonably spotted this while importing the new upstream release into Debian. The short answer is no . The malicious actor here clearly anticipated all the typical ways anyone might inspect both git commits, and release tarball contents, and masqueraded the changes very well and over a long timespan.
First of all, XZ has for legitimate reasons for several carefully crafted .xz files as test data to help catch regressions in the decompression code path. The test files are shipped in the release so users can run the test suite and validate that the binary is built correctly and xz works properly. Debian famously runs massive amounts of testing in its CI and autopkgtest system across tens of thousands of packages to uphold high quality despite frequent upgrades of the build toolchain and while supporting more CPU architectures than any other distro. Test data is useful and should stay.
When git-buildpackage is used correctly, the upstream commits are visible in the Debian packaging for easy review, but the commit cf44e4b that introduced the test files does not deviate enough from regular sloppy coding practices to really stand out. It is unfortunately very common for git commit to lack a message body explaining why the change was done, and to not be properly atomic with test code and test data together in the same commit, and for commits to be pushed directly to mainline without using code reviews (the commit was not part of any PR in this case). Only another upstream developer could have spotted that this change is not on par to what the project expects, and that the test code was never added, only test data, and thus that this commit was not just a sloppy one but potentially malicious.
Secondly, the fact that a new Autotools file appeared (m4/build-to-host.m4) in the XZ Utils 5.6.0 is not suspicious. This is perfectly normal for Autotools. In fact, starting from XZ Utils version 5.8.1 it is now shipping a m4/build-to-host.m4 file that it actually uses now.
Spotting that there is anything fishy is practically impossible by simply reading the code, as Autotools files are full custom m4 syntax interwoven with shell script, and there are plenty of backticks () that spawn subshells and evals that execute variable contents further, which is just normal for Autotools. Russ Cox s XZ post explains how exactly the Autotools code fetched the actual backdoor from the test files and injected it into the build.
There is only one tiny thing that maybe a very experienced Autotools user could potentially have noticed: the serial 30 in the version header is way too high. In theory one could also have noticed this Autotools file deviates from what other packages in Debian ship with the same filename, such as e.g. the serial 3, serial 5a or 5b versions. That would however require and an insane amount extra checking work, and is not something we should plan to start doing. A much simpler solution would be to simply strongly recommend all open source projects to stop using Autotools to eventually get rid of it entirely.
Not detectable with reasonable effort
While planting backdoors is evil, it is hard not to feel some respect to the level of skill and dedication of the people behind this. I ve been involved in a bunch of security breach investigations during my IT career, and never have I seen anything this well executed.
If it hadn t slowed down SSH by ~500 milliseconds and been discovered due to that, it would most likely have stayed undetected for months or years. Hiding backdoors in closed source software is relatively trivial, but hiding backdoors in plain sight in a popular open source project requires some unusual amount of expertise and creativity as shown above.
Is the software supply-chain in Debian easy to audit?
While maintaining a Debian package source using git-buildpackage can make the package history a lot easier to inspect, most packages have incomplete configurations in their debian/gbp.conf, and thus their package development histories are not always correctly constructed or uniform and easy to compare. The Debian Policy does not mandate git usage at all, and there are many important packages that are not using git at all. Additionally the Debian Policy also allows for non-maintainers to upload new versions to Debian without committing anything in git even for packages where the original maintainer wanted to use git. Uploads that bypass git unfortunately happen surpisingly often.
Because of the situation, I am afraid that we could have multiple similar backdoors lurking that simply haven t been detected yet. More audits, that hopefully also get published openly, would be welcome! More people auditing the contents of the Debian archives would probably also help surface what tools and policies Debian might be missing to make the work easier, and thus help improve the security of Debian s users, and improve trust in Debian.
Is Debian currently missing some software that could help detect similar things?
To my knowledge there is currently no system in place as part of Debian s QA or security infrastructure to verify that the upstream source packages in Debian are actually from upstream. I ve come across a lot of packages where the debian/watch or other configs are incorrect and even cases where maintainers have manually created upstream tarballs as it was easier than configuring automation to work. It is obvious that for those packages the source tarball now in Debian is not at all the same as upstream. I am not aware of any malicious cases though (if I was, I would report them of course).
I am also aware of packages in the Debian repository that are misconfigured to be of type 1.0 (native) packages, mixing the upstream files and debian/ contents and having patches applied, while they actually should be configured as 3.0 (quilt), and not hide what is the true upstream sources. Debian should extend the QA tools to scan for such things. If I find a sponsor, I might build it myself as my next major contribution to Debian.
In addition to better tooling for finding mismatches in the source code, Debian could also have better tooling for tracking in built binaries what their source files were, but solutions like Fraunhofer-AISEC s supply-graph or Sony s ESSTRA are not practical yet. Julien Malka s post about NixOS discusses the role of reproducible builds, which may help in some cases across all distros.
Or, is Debian missing some policies or practices to mitigate this?
Perhaps more importantly than more security scanning, the Debian Developer community should switch the general mindset from anyone is free to do anything to valuing having more shared workflows. The ability to audit anything is severely hampered by the fact that there are so many ways to do the same thing, and distinguishing what is a normal deviation from a malicious deviation is too hard, as the normal can basically be almost anything.
Also, as there is no documented and recommended default workflow, both those who are old and new to Debian packaging might never learn any one optimal workflow, and end up doing many steps in the packaging process in a way that kind of works, but is actually wrong or unnecessary, causing process deviations that look malicious, but turn out to just be a result of not fully understanding what would have been the right way to do something.
In the long run, once individual developers workflows are more aligned, doing code reviews will become a lot easier and smoother as the excess noise of workflow differences diminishes and reviews will feel much more productive to all participants. Debian fostering a culture of code reviews would allow us to slowly move from the current practice of mainly solo packaging work towards true collaboration forming around those code reviews.
I have been promoting increased use of Merge Requests in Debian already for some time, for example by proposing DEP-18: Encourage Continuous Integration and Merge Request based Collaboration for Debian packages. If you are involved in Debian development, please give a thumbs up in dep-team/deps!21 if you want me to continue promoting it.
Can we trust open source software?
Yes and I would argue that we can only trust open source software. There is no way to audit closed source software, and anyone using e.g. Windows or MacOS just have to trust the vendor s word when they say they have no intentional or accidental backdoors in their software. Or, when the news gets out that the systems of a closed source vendor was compromised, like Crowdstrike some weeks ago, we can t audit anything, and time after time we simply need to take their word when they say they have properly cleaned up their code base.
In theory, a vendor could give some kind of contractual or financial guarantee to its customer that there are no preventable security issues, but in practice that never happens. I am not aware of a single case of e.g. Microsoft or Oracle would have paid damages to their customers after a security flaw was found in their software. In theory you could also pay a vendor more to have them focus more effort in security, but since there is no way to verify what they did, or to get compensation when they didn t, any increased fees are likely just pocketed as increased profit.
Open source is clearly better overall. You can, if you are an individual with the time and skills, audit every step in the supply-chain, or you could as an organization make investments in open source security improvements and actually verify what changes were made and how security improved.
If your organisation is using Debian (or derivatives, such as Ubuntu) and you are interested in sponsoring my work to improve Debian, please reach out.
Debian LTS
This was my hundred-thirty-fifth month that I did some work for the Debian LTS initiative, started by Raphael Hertzog at Freexian. During my allocated time I uploaded or worked on:
[DLA 4168-2] openafs regression update to fix an incomplete patch in the previous upload.
[DSA 5998-1] cups security update to fix two CVEs related to a authentication bypass and a denial of service.
[DLA 4298-1] cups security update to fix two CVEs related to a authentication bypass and a denial of service.
[DLA 4304-1] cjson security update to fix one CVE related to an out-of-bounds memory access.
[DLA 4307-1] jq security update to fix one CVE related to a heap buffer overflow.
[DLA 4308-1] corosync security update to fix one CVE related to a stack-based buffer overflow.
An upload of spim was not needed, as the corresponding CVE could be marked as ignored.
I also started to work on an open-vm-tools and attended the monthly LTS/ELTS meeting.
Debian ELTS
This month was the eighty-sixth ELTS month. During my allocated time I uploaded or worked on:
[ELA-1512-1] cups security update to fix two CVEs in Buster and Stretch, related to a authentication bypass and a denial of service.
[ELA-1520-1] jq security update to fix one CVE in Buster and Stretch, related to a heap buffer overflow.
[ELA-1524-1] corosync security update to fix one CVE in Buster and Stretch, related to a stack-based buffer overflow.
[ELA-1527-1] mplayer security update to fix ten CVEs in Stretch, distributed all over the code.
The CVEs for open-vm-tools could be marked as not-affeceted as the corresponding plugin was not yet available. I also attended the monthly LTS/ELTS meeting.
Debian Printing
This month I uploaded a new upstream version or a bugfix version of:
misc
The main topic of this month has been gcc15 and cmake4, so my upload rate was extra high. This month I uploaded a new upstream version or a bugfix version of:
I wonder what MBF will happen next, I guess the /var/lock-issue will be a good candidate.
On my fight against outdated RFPs, I closed 30 of them in September. Meanwhile only 3397 are still open, so don t hesitate to help closing one or another.
FTP master
This month I accepted 294 and rejected 28 packages. The overall number of packages that got accepted was 294.
About 90% of my Debian contributions this month were
sponsored by Freexian.
You can also support my work directly via
Liberapay or GitHub
Sponsors.
Some months I feel like I m pedalling furiously just to keep everything in a
roughly working state. This was one of those months.
Python team
I upgraded these packages to new upstream versions:
I had to spend a fair bit of time this month chasing down build/test
regressions in various packages due to some other upgrades, particularly to
pydantic, python-pytest-asyncio, and rust-pyo3:
I updated dh-python to suppress generated dependencies that would be
satisfied by python3 >=
3.11.
pkg_resources is
deprecated. In most cases
replacing it is a relatively simple matter of porting to
importlib.resources,
but packages that used its old namespace package support need more
complicated work to port them to implicit namespace
packages. We had quite a few bugs about
this on zope.* packages, but fortunately upstream did the hard part of
this recently. I went
round and cleaned up most of the remaining loose ends, with some help from
Alexandre Detiste. Some of these aren t completely done yet as they re
awaiting new upstream releases:
I fixed
jupyter-client
so that its autopkgtests would work in Debusine.
I fixed waitress to build with the
nocheck profile.
I fixed several other build/test failures:
rebuilderd v0.25.0 was recently released, this version has improved in-toto support for cryptographic attestations that this blog post briefly outlines.
As a quick recap, rebuilderd is an automatic build scheduler that emerged in 2019/2020 from the Reproducible Builds project doing the following:
Track binary packages available in a Linux distribution
Attempt to compile the official binary packages from their (alleged) source code
Check if the package we compiled is bit-for-bit identical
If so, mark it GOOD, issue an attestation
In every other case, mark it BAD, generate a diffoscope
The binary packages in question are explicitly the packages users would also fetch and install.
This project has caught the attention of Arch Linux, Debian and Fedora.
Before this version
The original in-toto integration was added 4 years ago by Joy Liu during GSoC 2021, with help from Santiago Torres and Aditya Sirish (shoutout to the real ones!). Each rebuilderd-worker had its own cryptographic key and included a signed attestation along with the build result that could then be fetched from /api/v0/builds/ id /attestation.
Since these workers are potentially ephemeral, and the list of worker public keys wasn t publicly known, it was difficult to make use of those signatures.
Since this version
This version introduces the following:
The rebuilderd daemon itself generates a long-term signing key
All attestations signed by a trusted worker also get signed by the rebuilderd daemon
The rebuilderd daemon gets a new endpoint that can be used to query the public-key this instance identifies with: /api/v0/public-keys
An example of this new endpoint can be found here:
https://reproducible.archlinux.org/api/v0/public-keys
The response looks something like this (this is the real long-term signing key used by reproducible.archlinux.org):
"current":["-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\r\nMCwwBwYDK2VwBQADIQBLNcEcgErQ1rZz9oIkUnzc3fPuqJEALr22rNbrBK7iqQ==\r\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\r\n"]
It s a list so keys can potentially be rolled over time, and in future versions it should also list the public keys the instance has used in the past.
I haven t develop any integrations for this yet (partially also to allow deployments to catch up with the new release), but I m planning to do so using the in-toto crate.
Closing words
To give credit where credit is due (and because people pointed out I tend to end my blog posts too abruptly), rebuilderd is only the scheduler software, the actual build in the correct build-environment is outsourced to external tooling like archlinux-repro and debrebuild.
For further reading on applied reproducible builds, see also my previous blogpost Disagreeing rebuilders and what that means.
Also, there are currently efforts by the European Commission to outlaw unregulated end-to-end encrypted chat, so this may be a good time to prepare for (potential) impact and check what tools you have available to reduce unchecked trust in (open source) software authorities, to keep them operating honest and accountable.
Never lose the plot~
Sincerely yours
If you're still using Vagrant (I am) and try to boot a box that uses UEFI (like boxen/debian-13),
a simple vagrant init boxen/debian-13 and vagrant up will entertain you with a nice traceback:
% vagrantup
Bringing machine 'default' up with 'libvirt' provider...==> default: Checking if box 'boxen/debian-13' version '2025.08.20.12' is up to date...==> default: Creating image (snapshot of base box volume).==> default: Creating domain with the following settings...==> default: -- Name: tmp.JV8X48n30U_default==> default: -- Description: Source: /tmp/tmp.JV8X48n30U/Vagrantfile==> default: -- Domain type: kvm==> default: -- Cpus: 1==> default: -- Feature: acpi==> default: -- Feature: apic==> default: -- Feature: pae==> default: -- Clock offset: utc==> default: -- Memory: 2048M==> default: -- Loader: /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/OVMF_CODE.fd==> default: -- Nvram: /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/efivars.fd==> default: -- Base box: boxen/debian-13==> default: -- Storage pool: default==> default: -- Image(vda): /home/evgeni/.local/share/libvirt/images/tmp.JV8X48n30U_default.img, virtio, 20G==> default: -- Disk driver opts: cache='default'==> default: -- Graphics Type: vnc==> default: -- Video Type: cirrus==> default: -- Video VRAM: 16384==> default: -- Video 3D accel: false==> default: -- Keymap: en-us==> default: -- TPM Backend: passthrough==> default: -- INPUT: type=mouse, bus=ps2==> default: -- CHANNEL: type=unix, mode===> default: -- CHANNEL: target_type=virtio, target_name=org.qemu.guest_agent.0==> default: Creating shared folders metadata...==> default: Starting domain.==> default: Removing domain...==> default: Deleting the machine folder/usr/share/gems/gems/fog-libvirt-0.13.1/lib/fog/libvirt/requests/compute/vm_action.rb:7:in 'Libvirt::Domain#create': Call to virDomainCreate failed: internal error: process exited while connecting to monitor: 2025-09-22T10:07:55.081081Z qemu-system-x86_64: -blockdev "driver":"file","filename":"/home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/OVMF_CODE.fd","node-name":"libvirt-pflash0-storage","auto-read-only":true,"discard":"unmap" : Could not open '/home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/OVMF_CODE.fd': Permission denied (Libvirt::Error) from /usr/share/gems/gems/fog-libvirt-0.13.1/lib/fog/libvirt/requests/compute/vm_action.rb:7:in 'Fog::Libvirt::Compute::Shared#vm_action' from /usr/share/gems/gems/fog-libvirt-0.13.1/lib/fog/libvirt/models/compute/server.rb:81:in 'Fog::Libvirt::Compute::Server#start' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/start_domain.rb:546:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::StartDomain#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/set_boot_order.rb:22:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::SetBootOrder#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/share_folders.rb:22:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::ShareFolders#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/prepare_nfs_settings.rb:21:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::PrepareNFSSettings#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builtin/synced_folders.rb:87:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builtin::SyncedFolders#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builtin/delayed.rb:19:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builtin::Delayed#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builtin/synced_folder_cleanup.rb:28:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builtin::SyncedFolderCleanup#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/plugins/synced_folders/nfs/action_cleanup.rb:25:in 'VagrantPlugins::SyncedFolderNFS::ActionCleanup#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/prepare_nfs_valid_ids.rb:14:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::PrepareNFSValidIds#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:127:in 'block in Vagrant::Action::Warden#finalize_action' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builder.rb:180:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builder#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/runner.rb:101:in 'block in Vagrant::Action::Runner#run' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/util/busy.rb:19:in 'Vagrant::Util::Busy.busy' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/runner.rb:101:in 'Vagrant::Action::Runner#run' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builtin/call.rb:53:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builtin::Call#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:127:in 'block in Vagrant::Action::Warden#finalize_action' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builder.rb:180:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builder#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/runner.rb:101:in 'block in Vagrant::Action::Runner#run' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/util/busy.rb:19:in 'Vagrant::Util::Busy.busy' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/runner.rb:101:in 'Vagrant::Action::Runner#run' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builtin/call.rb:53:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builtin::Call#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/create_network_interfaces.rb:197:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::CreateNetworkInterfaces#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/create_networks.rb:40:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::CreateNetworks#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/create_domain.rb:452:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::CreateDomain#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/resolve_disk_settings.rb:143:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::ResolveDiskSettings#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/create_domain_volume.rb:97:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::CreateDomainVolume#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/handle_box_image.rb:127:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::HandleBoxImage#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builtin/handle_box.rb:56:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builtin::HandleBox#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/handle_storage_pool.rb:63:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::HandleStoragePool#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/set_name_of_domain.rb:34:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::SetNameOfDomain#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builtin/provision.rb:80:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builtin::Provision#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-libvirt-0.11.2/lib/vagrant-libvirt/action/cleanup_on_failure.rb:21:in 'VagrantPlugins::ProviderLibvirt::Action::CleanupOnFailure#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:127:in 'block in Vagrant::Action::Warden#finalize_action' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builder.rb:180:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builder#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/runner.rb:101:in 'block in Vagrant::Action::Runner#run' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/util/busy.rb:19:in 'Vagrant::Util::Busy.busy' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/runner.rb:101:in 'Vagrant::Action::Runner#run' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builtin/call.rb:53:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builtin::Call#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builtin/box_check_outdated.rb:93:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builtin::BoxCheckOutdated#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builtin/config_validate.rb:25:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builtin::ConfigValidate#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/warden.rb:48:in 'Vagrant::Action::Warden#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/builder.rb:180:in 'Vagrant::Action::Builder#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/runner.rb:101:in 'block in Vagrant::Action::Runner#run' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/util/busy.rb:19:in 'Vagrant::Util::Busy.busy' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/action/runner.rb:101:in 'Vagrant::Action::Runner#run' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/machine.rb:248:in 'Vagrant::Machine#action_raw' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/machine.rb:217:in 'block in Vagrant::Machine#action' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/environment.rb:631:in 'Vagrant::Environment#lock' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/machine.rb:203:in 'Method#call' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/machine.rb:203:in 'Vagrant::Machine#action' from /usr/share/vagrant/gems/gems/vagrant-2.3.4/lib/vagrant/batch_action.rb:86:in 'block (2 levels) in Vagrant::BatchAction#run'
The important part here is
Call to virDomainCreate failed: internal error: process exited while connecting to monitor:
2025-09-22T10:07:55.081081Z qemu-system-x86_64: -blockdev "driver":"file","filename":"/home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/OVMF_CODE.fd","node-name":"libvirt-pflash0-storage","auto-read-only":true,"discard":"unmap" :
Could not open '/home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/OVMF_CODE.fd': Permission denied (Libvirt::Error)
Of course we checked that the file permissions on this file are correct (I'll save you the ls output), so what's next?
Yes, of course, SELinux!
A process in the svirt_t domain tries to access something in the user_home_t domain and is denied by the kernel.
So far, SELinux is both working as designed and preventing us from doing our work, nice.
For "normal" (non-UEFI) boxes, Vagrant uploads the image to libvirt, which stores it in ~/.local/share/libvirt/images/ and boots fine from there.
For UEFI boxen, one also needs loader and nvram files, which Vagrant keeps in ~/.vagrant.d/boxes/<box_name> and that's what explodes in our face here.
As ~/.local/share/libvirt/images/ works well, and is labeled svirt_home_t let's see what other folders use that label:
# semanagefcontext-lgrepsvirt_home_t
/home/[^/]+/\.cache/libvirt/qemu(/.*)? all files unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0/home/[^/]+/\.config/libvirt/qemu(/.*)? all files unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0/home/[^/]+/\.libvirt/qemu(/.*)? all files unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0/home/[^/]+/\.local/share/gnome-boxes/images(/.*)? all files unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0/home/[^/]+/\.local/share/libvirt/boot(/.*)? all files unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0/home/[^/]+/\.local/share/libvirt/images(/.*)? all files unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0
Okay, that all makes sense, and it's just missing the Vagrant-specific folders!
% restorecon-rv~/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13
Relabeled /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13 from unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 to unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0Relabeled /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/metadata_url from unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 to unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0Relabeled /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12 from unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 to unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0Relabeled /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt from unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 to unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0Relabeled /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/box_0.img from unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 to unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0Relabeled /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/metadata.json from unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 to unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0Relabeled /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/Vagrantfile from unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 to unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0Relabeled /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/OVMF_CODE.fd from unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 to unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0Relabeled /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/OVMF_VARS.fd from unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 to unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0Relabeled /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/box_update_check from unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 to unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0Relabeled /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/efivars.fd from unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 to unconfined_u:object_r:svirt_home_t:s0
And it works!
% vagrantup
Bringing machine 'default' up with 'libvirt' provider...==> default: Checking if box 'boxen/debian-13' version '2025.08.20.12' is up to date...==> default: Creating image (snapshot of base box volume).==> default: Creating domain with the following settings...==> default: -- Name: tmp.JV8X48n30U_default==> default: -- Description: Source: /tmp/tmp.JV8X48n30U/Vagrantfile==> default: -- Domain type: kvm==> default: -- Cpus: 1==> default: -- Feature: acpi==> default: -- Feature: apic==> default: -- Feature: pae==> default: -- Clock offset: utc==> default: -- Memory: 2048M==> default: -- Loader: /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/OVMF_CODE.fd==> default: -- Nvram: /home/evgeni/.vagrant.d/boxes/boxen-VAGRANTSLASH-debian-13/2025.08.20.12/libvirt/efivars.fd==> default: -- Base box: boxen/debian-13==> default: -- Storage pool: default==> default: -- Image(vda): /home/evgeni/.local/share/libvirt/images/tmp.JV8X48n30U_default.img, virtio, 20G==> default: -- Disk driver opts: cache='default'==> default: -- Graphics Type: vnc==> default: -- Video Type: cirrus==> default: -- Video VRAM: 16384==> default: -- Video 3D accel: false==> default: -- Keymap: en-us==> default: -- TPM Backend: passthrough==> default: -- INPUT: type=mouse, bus=ps2==> default: -- CHANNEL: type=unix, mode===> default: -- CHANNEL: target_type=virtio, target_name=org.qemu.guest_agent.0==> default: Creating shared folders metadata...==> default: Starting domain.==> default: Domain launching with graphics connection settings...==> default: -- Graphics Port: 5900==> default: -- Graphics IP: 127.0.0.1==> default: -- Graphics Password: Not defined==> default: -- Graphics Websocket: 5700==> default: Waiting for domain to get an IP address...==> default: Waiting for machine to boot. This may take a few minutes... default: SSH address: 192.168.124.157:22 default: SSH username: vagrant default: SSH auth method: private key default: default: Vagrant insecure key detected. Vagrant will automatically replace default: this with a newly generated keypair for better security. default: default: Inserting generated public key within guest... default: Removing insecure key from the guest if it's present... default: Key inserted! Disconnecting and reconnecting using new SSH key...==> default: Machine booted and ready!
Akvorado 2.0 was released today! Akvorado collects network flows with
IPFIX and sFlow. It enriches flows and stores them in a ClickHouse database.
Users can browse the data through a web console. This release introduces an
important architectural change and other smaller improvements. Let s dive in!
New outlet service
The major change in Akvorado 2.0 is splitting the inlet service into two
parts: the inlet and the outlet. Previously, the inlet handled all flow
processing: receiving, decoding, and enrichment. Flows were then sent to Kafka
for storage in ClickHouse:
Akvorado flow processing before the introduction of the outlet service
Network flows reach the inlet service using UDP, an unreliable protocol. The
inlet must process them fast enough to avoid losing packets. To handle a
high number of flows, the inlet spawns several sets of workers to receive flows,
fetch metadata, and assemble enriched flows for Kafka. Many configuration
options existed for scaling, which increased complexity for users. The code
needed to avoid blocking at any cost, making the processing pipeline complex
and sometimes unreliable, particularly the BMP receiver.1 Adding new
features became difficult without making the problem worse.2
In Akvorado 2.0, the inlet receives flows and pushes them to Kafka without
decoding them. The new outlet service handles the remaining tasks:
Akvorado flow processing after the introduction of the outlet service
This change goes beyond a simple split:3 the outlet now reads flows from
Kafka and pushes them to ClickHouse, two tasks that Akvorado did not handle
before. Flows are heavily batched to increase efficiency and reduce the load
on ClickHouse using ch-go, a low-level Go client for ClickHouse. When
batches are too small, asynchronous inserts are used (e20645). The number of
outlet workers scales dynamically (e5a625) based on the target batch
size and latency (50,000 flows and 5 seconds by default).
This new architecture also allows us to simplify and optimize the code. The
outlet fetches metadata synchronously (e20645). The BMP component becomes
simpler by removing cooperative multitasking (3b9486). Reusing the same
RawFlow object to decode protobuf-encoded flows from Kafka reduces pressure on
the garbage collector (8b580f).
The effect on Akvorado s overall performance was somewhat uncertain, but a
user reported 35% lower CPU usage after migrating from the previous
version, plus resolution of the long-standing BMP component issue.
Other changes
This new version includes many miscellaneous changes, such as completion for
source and destination ports (f92d2e), and automatic restart of the
orchestrator service (0f72ff) when configuration changes to avoid a common
pitfall for newcomers.
Let s focus on some key areas for this release: observability,
documentation, CI,
Docker, Go, and JavaScript.
Observability
Akvorado exposes metrics to provide visibility into the processing pipeline and
help troubleshoot issues. These are available through Prometheus HTTP metrics
endpoints, such as /api/v0/inlet/metrics. With the introduction
of the outlet, many metrics moved. Some were also renamed (4c0b15) to match
Prometheus best practices. Kafka consumer lag was added as a new metric
(e3a778).
If you do not have your own observability stack, the Docker Compose setup
shipped with Akvorado provides one. You can enable it by activating the profiles
introduced for this purpose (529a8f).
The prometheus profile ships Prometheus to store metrics and Alloy
to collect them (2b3c46, f81299, and 8eb7cd). Redis and Kafka
metrics are collected through the exporter bundled with Alloy (560113).
Other metrics are exposed using Prometheus metrics endpoints and are
automatically fetched by Alloy with the help of some Docker labels, similar to
what is done to configure Traefik. cAdvisor was also added (83d855) to
provide some container-related metrics.
The loki profile ships Loki to store logs (45c684). While Alloy
can collect and ship logs to Loki, its parsing abilities are limited: I could
not find a way to preserve all metadata associated with structured logs produced
by many applications, including Akvorado. Vector replaces Alloy (95e201)
and features a domain-specific language, VRL, to transform logs. Annoyingly,
Vector currently cannot retrieve Docker logs from before it was
started.
Finally, the grafana profile ships Grafana, but the shipped dashboards are
broken. This is planned for a future version.
Documentation
The Docker Compose setup provided by Akvorado makes it easy to get the web
interface up and running quickly. However, Akvorado requires a few mandatory
steps to be functional. It ships with comprehensive documentation, including
a chapter about troubleshooting problems. I hoped this documentation would
reduce the support burden. It is difficult to know if it works. Happy users
rarely report their success, while some users open discussions asking for help
without reading much of the documentation.
In this release, the documentation was significantly improved.
The documentation was updated (fc1028) to match Akvorado s new architecture.
The troubleshooting section was rewritten (17a272). Instructions on how to
improve ClickHouse performance when upgrading from versions earlier than 1.10.0
was added (5f1e9a). An LLM proofread the entire content (06e3f3).
Developer-focused documentation was also improved (548bbb, e41bae, and
871fc5).
From a usability perspective, table of content sections are now collapsable
(c142e5). Admonitions help draw user attention to important points
(8ac894).
Example of use of admonitions in Akvorado's documentation
Continuous integration
This release includes efforts to speed up continuous integration on GitHub.
Coverage and race tests run in parallel (6af216 and fa9e48). The Docker
image builds during the tests but gets tagged only after they succeed
(8b0dce).
GitHub workflow to test and build Akvorado
End-to-end tests (883e19) ensure the shipped Docker Compose setup works as
expected. Hurl runs tests on various HTTP endpoints, particularly to verify
metrics (42679b and 169fa9). For example:
## Test inlet has received NetFlow flowsGEThttp://127.0.0.1:8080/prometheus/api/v1/query[Query]query:sum(akvorado_inlet_flow_input_udp_packets_total job="akvorado-inlet",listener=":2055" )
HTTP200[Captures]inlet_receivedflows:jsonpath "$.data.result[0].value[1]" toInt
[Asserts]variable"inlet_receivedflows">10## Test inlet has sent them to KafkaGEThttp://127.0.0.1:8080/prometheus/api/v1/query[Query]query:sum(akvorado_inlet_kafka_sent_messages_total job="akvorado-inlet" )
HTTP200[Captures]inlet_sentflows:jsonpath "$.data.result[0].value[1]" toInt
[Asserts]variable"inlet_sentflows">=inlet_receivedflows
Docker
Akvorado ships with a comprehensive Docker Compose setup to help users get
started quickly. It ensures a consistent deployment, eliminating many
configuration-related issues. It also serves as a living documentation of the
complete architecture.
This release brings some small enhancements around Docker:
Previously, many Docker images were pulled from the Bitnami Containers
library. However, VMWare acquired Bitnami in 2019 and Broadcom acquired
VMWare in 2023. As a result, Bitnami images were deprecated in less than a
month. This was not really a surprise4. Previous versions of Akvorado
had already started moving away from them. In this release, the Apache project s
Kafka image replaces the Bitnami one (1eb382). Thanks to the switch to KRaft
mode, Zookeeper is no longer needed (0a2ea1, 8a49ca, and f65d20).
Akvorado s Docker images were previously compiled with Nix. However, building
AArch64 images on x86-64 is slow because it relies on QEMU userland emulation.
The updated Dockerfile uses multi-stage and multi-platform builds: one
stage builds the JavaScript part on the host platform, one stage builds the Go
part cross-compiled on the host platform, and the final stage assembles the
image on top of a slim distroless image (268e95 and d526ca).
# This is a simplified versionFROM--platform=$BUILDPLATFORMnode:20-alpineASbuild-js
RUNapkadd--no-cachemake
WORKDIR/buildCOPYconsole/frontendconsole/frontend
COPYMakefile.
RUNmakeconsole/data/frontend
FROM--platform=$BUILDPLATFORMgolang:alpineASbuild-go
RUNapkadd--no-cachemakecurlzip
WORKDIR/buildCOPY..
COPY--from=build-js/build/console/data/frontendconsole/data/frontend
RUNgomoddownload
RUNmakeall-indep
ARGTARGETOSTARGETARCHTARGETVARIANTVERSION
RUNmake
FROMgcr.io/distroless/static:latestCOPY--from=build-go/build/bin/akvorado/usr/local/bin/akvorado
ENTRYPOINT["/usr/local/bin/akvorado"]
When building for multiple platforms with --platform
linux/amd64,linux/arm64,linux/arm/v7, the build steps until the highlighted
line execute only once for all platforms. This significantly speeds up the
build.
Akvorado now ships Docker images for these platforms: linux/amd64,
linux/amd64/v3, linux/arm64, and linux/arm/v7. When requesting
ghcr.io/akvorado/akvorado, Docker selects the best image for the current CPU.
On x86-64, there are two choices. If your CPU is recent enough, Docker
downloads linux/amd64/v3. This version contains additional optimizations and
should run faster than the linux/amd64 version. It would be interesting to
ship an image for linux/arm64/v8.2, but Docker does not support the same
mechanism for AArch64 yet (792808).
Go
This release includes many changes related to Go but not visible to the users.
Toolchain
In the past, Akvorado supported the two latest Go versions, preventing immediate
use of the latest enhancements. The goal was to allow users of stable
distributions to use Go versions shipped with their distribution to compile
Akvorado. However, this became frustrating when interesting features, like go
tool, were released. Akvorado 2.0 requires Go 1.25 (77306d) but can be
compiled with older toolchains by automatically downloading a newer one
(94fb1c).5 Users can still override GOTOOLCHAIN to revert this
decision. The recommended toolchain updates weekly through CI to ensure we get
the latest minor release (5b11ec). This change also simplifies updates to
newer versions: only go.mod needs updating.
Thanks to this change, Akvorado now uses wg.Go() (77306d) and I have
started converting some unit tests to the new test/synctest package
(bd787e, 7016d8, and 159085).
Testing
When testing equality, I use a helper function Diff() to display the
differences when it fails:
This function uses kylelemons/godebug. This package is
no longer maintained and has some shortcomings: for example, by default, it does
not compare struct private fields, which may cause unexpectedly successful
tests. I replaced it with google/go-cmp, which is stricter
and has better output (e2f1df).
Another package for Kafka
Another change is the switch from Sarama to franz-go to interact with
Kafka (756e4a and 2d26c5). The main motivation for this change is to
get a better concurrency model. Sarama heavily relies on channels and it is
difficult to understand the lifecycle of an object handed to this package.
franz-go uses a more modern approach with callbacks6 that is both more
performant and easier to understand. It also ships with a package to spawn fake
Kafka broker clusters, which is more convenient than the mocking functions
provided by Sarama.
Improved routing table for BMP
To store its routing table, the BMP component used
kentik/patricia, an implementation of a patricia tree
focused on reducing garbage collection pressure.
gaissmai/bart is a more recent alternative using an
adaptation of [Donald Knuth s ART algorithm][] that promises better
performance and delivers it: 90% faster lookups and 27% faster
insertions (92ee2e and fdb65c).
Unlike kentik/patricia, gaissmai/bart does not help efficiently store values
attached to each prefix. I adapted the same approach as kentik/patricia to
store route lists for each prefix: store a 32-bit index for each prefix, and use
it to build a 64-bit index for looking up routes in a map. This leverages Go s
efficient map structure.
gaissmai/bart also supports a lockless routing table version, but this is not
simple because we would need to extend this to the map storing the routes and to
the interning mechanism. I also attempted to use Go s new unique package to
replace the intern package included in Akvorado, but performance was
worse.7
Miscellaneous
Previous versions of Akvorado were using a custom Protobuf encoder for
performance and flexibility. With the introduction of the outlet service,
Akvorado only needs a simple static schema, so this code was removed. However,
it is possible to enhance performance with
planetscale/vtprotobuf (e49a74, and 8b580f).
Moreover, the dependency on protoc, a C++ program, was somewhat annoying.
Therefore, Akvorado now uses buf, written in Go, to convert a Protobuf
schema into Go code (f4c879).
Another small optimization to reduce the size of the Akvorado binary by
10 MB was to compress the static assets embedded in Akvorado in a ZIP file. It
includes the ASN database, as well as the SVG images for the documentation. A
small layer of code makes this change transparent (b1d638 and e69b91).
JavaScript
Recently, two large supply-chain attacks hit the JavaScript ecosystem: one
affecting the popular packages chalk and debug and another
impacting the popular package @ctrl/tinycolor. These attacks also
exist in other ecosystems, but JavaScript is a prime target due to heavy use of
small third-party dependencies. The previous version of Akvorado relied on 653
dependencies.
npm-run-all was removed (3424e8, 132 dependencies). patch-package was
removed (625805 and e85ff0, 69 dependencies) by moving missing
TypeScript definitions to env.d.ts. eslint was replaced with oxlint, a
linter written in Rust (97fd8c, 125 dependencies, including the plugins).
I switched from npm to Pnpm, an alternative package manager (fce383).
Pnpm does not run install scripts by default8 and prevents installing
packages that are too recent. It is also significantly faster.9 Node.js
does not ship Pnpm but it ships Corepack, which allows us to use Pnpm
without installing it. Pnpm can also list licenses used by each dependency,
removing the need for license-compliance (a35ca8, 42 dependencies).
For additional speed improvements, beyond switching to Pnpm and Oxlint, Vite
was replaced with its faster Rolldown version (463827).
After these changes, Akvorado only pulls 225 dependencies.
Next steps
I would like to land three features in the next version of Akvorado:
Add Grafana dashboards to complete the observability stack. See issue
#1906 for details.
Integrate OVH s Grafana plugin by providing a stable API for such
integrations. Akvorado s web console would still be useful for browsing
results, but if you want to build and share dashboards, you should switch to
Grafana. See issue #1895.
Move some work currently done in ClickHouse (custom dictionaries, GeoIP and IP
enrichment) back into the outlet service. This should give more flexibility
for adding features like the one requested in issue #1030. See issue #2006.
I started working on splitting the inlet into two parts more than one year ago.
I found more motivation in recent months, partly thanks to Claude Code,
which I used as a rubber duck. Almost none of the produced code was
kept:10 it is like an intern who does not learn.
Many attempts were made to make the BMP component both performant and
not blocking. See for example PR #254, PR #255, and PR #278.
Despite these efforts, this component remained problematic for most users.
See issue #1461 as an example.
Some features have been pushed to ClickHouse to avoid the
processing cost in the inlet. See for example PR #1059.
Broadcom is known for its user-hostile moves. Look at what happened
with VMWare.
As a Debian developer, I dislike these mechanisms that circumvent
the distribution package manager. The final straw came when Go 1.25 spent one month in the Debian NEW queue, an arbitrary mechanism I
don t like at all.
In the early years of Go, channels were heavily promoted. Sarama
was designed during this period. A few years later, a more nuanced approach
emerged. See notably Go channels are bad and you should feel bad.
This should be investigated further, but my theory is that the
intern package uses 32-bit integers, while unique uses 64-bit pointers.
See commit 74e5ac.
This is also possible with npm. See commit dab2f7.
An even faster alternative is Bun, but it is less available.
The exceptions are part of the code for the admonition blocks,
the code for collapsing the table of content, and part of the documentation.
A brand new release 0.1.14 of the RcppSimdJson
package is now on CRAN.
RcppSimdJson
wraps the fantastic and genuinely impressive simdjson library by Daniel Lemire and collaborators. Via
very clever algorithmic engineering to obtain largely branch-free code,
coupled with modern C++ and newer compiler instructions, it results in
parsing gigabytes of JSON parsed per second which is quite
mindboggling. The best-case performance is faster than CPU speed as
use of parallel SIMD instructions and careful branch avoidance can lead
to less than one cpu cycle per byte parsed; see the video of the talk by Daniel Lemire
at QCon.
This version includes the new major
upstream release 4.0.0 with major new features including a builder
for creating JSON from the C++ side objects. This is something a little
orthogonal to the standard R usage of the package to parse and load JSON
data but could still be of interest to some.
The short NEWS entry for this release follows.
Changes in version 0.1.14
(2025-09-13)
simdjson was upgraded to version 4.0.0
(Dirk in #96
Continuous integration now relies a token for codecov.io
My trip to pgday.at started Wednesday at the airport in D sseldorf. I was there on time, and the plane started with an estimated flight time of about 90 minutes. About half an hour into the flight, the captain announced that we would be landing in 30 minutes - in D sseldorf, because of some unspecified technical problems. Three hours after the original departure time, the plane made another attempt, and we made it to Vienna.
On the plane I had already met Dirk Krautschick who had the great honor of bringing Slonik (in the form of a big extra bag) to the conference, and we took a taxi to the hotel. On the taxi, the next surprise happened: Hans-J rgen Sch nig unfortunately couldn't make it to the conference, and his talks had to be replaced. I had submitted a talk to the conference, but it was not accepted, and neither queued on the reserve list. But two speakers on the reserve list had cancelled, and another was already giving a talk in parallel to the slot that had to be filled, so Pavlo messaged me if I could hold the talk - well of course I could. Before, I didn't have any specific plans for the evening yet, but suddenly I was a speaker, so I joined the folks going to the speakers dinner at the Wiener Grill Haus two corners from the hotel. It was a very nice evening, chatting with a lot of folks from the PostgreSQL community that I had not seen for a while.
Thursday was the conference day. The hotel was a short walk from the venue, the Apothekertrakt in Vienna's Schloss Sch nbrunn. The courtyard was already filled with visitors registering for the conference. Since I originally didn't have a talk scheduled, I had signed up to volunteer for a shift as room host. We got our badge and swag bag, and I changed into the "crew" T-shirt.
The opening and sponsor keynotes took place in the main room, the Orangerie. We were over 100 people in the room, but apparently still not enough to really fill it, so the acoustics with some echo made it a bit difficult to understand everything. I hope that part can be improved for next time (which is planned to happen!).
I was host for the Maximilian room, where the sponsor sessions were scheduled in the morning. The first talk was by our Peter Hofer, also replacing the absent Hans. He had only joined the company at the beginning of the same week, and was already tasked to give Hans' talk on PostgreSQL as Open Source. Of course he did well.
Next was Tanmay Sinha from Readyset. They are building a system that caches expensive SQL queries and selectively invalidates the cache whenever any data used by these queries changes. Whenever actually fixing the application isn't feasible, that system looks like an interesting alternative to manually maintaining materialized views, or perhaps using pg_ivm.
After lunch, I went to Federico Campoli's Mastering Index Performance, but really spent the time polishing the slides for my talk. I had given the original version at pgconf.de in Berlin in May, and the slides were still in German, so I had to do some translating. Luckily, most slides are just git commit messages, so the effort was manageable.
The next slot was mine, talking about Modern VACUUM. I started with a recap of MVCC, vacuum and freezing in PostgreSQL, and then showed how over the past years, the system was updated to be more focused (the PostgreSQL 8.4 visibility map tells vacuum which pages to visit), faster (12 made autovacuum run 10 times faster by default), less scary (14 has an emergency mode where freezing switches to maximum speed if it runs out of time; 16 makes freezing create much less WAL) and more performant (17 makes vacuum use much less memory). In summary, there is still room for the DBA to tune some knobs (for example, the default autovacuum_max_workers=3 isn't much), but the vacuum default settings are pretty much okay these days for average workloads. Specific workloads still have a whopping 31 postgresql.conf settings at their disposal just for vacuum.
Right after my talk, there was another vacuum talk: When Autovacuum Met FinOps by Mayuresh Bagayatkar. He added practical advice on tuning the performance in cloud environments. Luckily, our contents did not overlap.
After the coffee break, I was again room host, now for Floor Drees and Contributing to Postgres beyond code. She presented the various ways in which PostgreSQL is more than just the code in the Git repository: translators, web site, system administration, conference organizers, speakers, bloggers, advocates. As a member of the PostgreSQL Contributors Committee, I could only approve and we should closer cooperate in the future to make people's contributions to PostgreSQL more visible and give them the recognition they deserve.
That was already the end of the main talks and everyone rushed to the Orangerie for the lightning talks. My highlight was the Sheldrick Wildlife Trust. Tickets for the conference had included the option to donate for the elephants in Kenya, and the talk presented the trust's work in the elephant orphanage there.
After the conference had officially closed, there was a bonus track: the Celebrity DB Deathmatch, aptly presented by Boriss Mejias. PostgreSQL, MongoDB, CloudDB and Oracle were competing for the grace of a developer. MongoDB couldn't stand the JSON workload, CloudDB was dismissed for handing out new invoices all the time, and Oracle had even brought a lawyer to the stage, but then lost control over a literally 10 meter long contract with too much fine print. In the end, PostgreSQL (played by Floor) won the love of the developer (played by our Svitlana Lytvynenko).
The day closed with a gathering at the Brandauer Schlossbr u - just at the other end of the castle ground, but still a 15min walk away. We enjoyed good beer and Kaiserschmarrn. I went back to the hotel a bit before midnight, but some extended that time quite some bit more.
On Friday, my flight back was only in the afternoon, so I spent some time in morning in the Technikmuseum just next to the hotel, enjoying some old steam engines and a live demonstration of Tesla coils. This time, the flight actually went to the destination, and I was back in D sseldorf in the late afternoon.
In summary, pgday.at was a very nice event in a classy location. Thanks to the organizers for putting in all the work - and next year, Hans will hopefully be present in person!
The post A Trip To Vienna With Surprises appeared first on CYBERTEC PostgreSQL Services & Support.
Release 0.2.9 of our RcppSMC package arrived at
CRAN today. RcppSMC
provides Rcpp-based bindings to R for the Sequential Monte Carlo
Template Classes (SMCTC) by Adam
Johansen described in his JSS article. Sequential
Monte Carlo is also referred to as Particle Filter
in some contexts. The package now also features the Google Summer of Code
work by Leah South
in 2017, and by Ilya Zarubin in
2021.
This release is again entirely internal. It updates the code for the
just-released RcppArmadillo
15.0.2-1, in particular opts into Armadillo 15.0.2. And it makes one
small tweak to the continuous integration setup switching to the
r-ci action.
The release is summarized below.
Changes in RcppSMC
version 0.2.9 (2025-09-09)
Adjust to RcppArmadillo 15.0.* by
setting ARMA_USE_CURRENT and updating two expressions from
deprecated code
Rely on r-ci GitHub Action which includes the bootstrap
step
Welcome to the August 2025 report from the Reproducible Builds project!
Welcome to the latest report from the Reproducible Builds project for August 2025. These monthly reports outline what we ve been up to over the past month, and highlight items of news from elsewhere in the increasingly-important area of software supply-chain security. If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please see the Contribute page on our website.
In this report:
Reproducible Builds Summit 2025
Please join us at the upcoming Reproducible Builds Summit, set to take place from October 28th 30th 2025 in Vienna, Austria!**
We are thrilled to host the eighth edition of this exciting event, following the success of previous summits in various iconic locations around the world, including Venice, Marrakesh, Paris, Berlin, Hamburg and Athens. Our summits are a unique gathering that brings together attendees from diverse projects, united by a shared vision of advancing the Reproducible Builds effort.
During this enriching event, participants will have the opportunity to engage in discussions, establish connections and exchange ideas to drive progress in this vital field. Our aim is to create an inclusive space that fosters collaboration, innovation and problem-solving.
If you re interesting in joining us this year, please make sure to read the event page which has more details about the event and location. Registration is open until 20th September 2025, and we are very much looking forward to seeing many readers of these reports there!
Reproducible Builds and live-bootstrap at WHY2025
WHY2025 (What Hackers Yearn) is a nonprofit outdoors hacker camp that takes place in Geestmerambacht in the Netherlands (approximately 40km north of Amsterdam). The event is organised for and by volunteers from the worldwide hacker community, and knowledge sharing, technological advancement, experimentation, connecting with your hacker peers, forging friendships and hacking are at the core of this event .
At this year s event, Frans Faase gave a talk on live-bootstrap, an attempt to provide a reproducible, automatic, complete end-to-end bootstrap from a minimal number of binary seeds to a supported fully functioning operating system .
Frans talk is available to watch on video and his slides are available as well.
DALEQ Explainable Equivalence for Java Bytecode
Jens Dietrich of the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand and Behnaz Hassanshahi of Oracle Labs, Australia published an article this month entitled DALEQ Explainable Equivalence for Java Bytecode which explores the options and difficulties when Java binaries are not identical despite being from the same sources, and what avenues are available for proving equivalence despite the lack of bitwise correlation:
[Java] binaries are often not bitwise identical; however, in most cases, the differences can be attributed to variations in the build environment, and the binaries can still be considered equivalent. Establishing such equivalence, however, is a labor-intensive and error-prone process.
Jens and Behnaz therefore propose a tool called DALEQ, which:
disassembles Java byte code into a relational database, and can normalise this database by applying Datalog rules. Those databases can then be used to infer equivalence between two classes. Notably, equivalence statements are accompanied with Datalog proofs recording the normalisation process. We demonstrate the impact of DALEQ in an industrial context through a large-scale evaluation involving 2,714 pairs of jars, comprising 265,690 class pairs. In this evaluation, DALEQ is compared to two existing bytecode transformation tools. Our findings reveal a significant reduction in the manual effort required to assess non-bitwise equivalent artifacts, which would otherwise demand intensive human inspection. Furthermore, the results show that DALEQ outperforms existing tools by identifying more artifacts rebuilt from the same code as equivalent, even when no behavioral differences are present.
Reproducibility regression identifies issue with AppArmor security policies
Tails developer intrigeri has tracked and followed a reproducibility regression in the generation of AppArmor policy caches, and has identified an issue with the 4.1.0 version of AppArmor.
Although initially tracked on the Tails issue tracker, intrigeri filed an issue on the upstream bug tracker. AppArmor developer John Johansen replied, confirming that they can reproduce the issue and went to work on a draft patch. Through this, John revealed that it was caused by an actual underlying security bug in AppArmor that is to say, it resulted in permissions not (always) matching what the policy intends and, crucially, not merely a cache reproducibility issue.
Work on the fix is ongoing at time of writing.
Rust toolchain fixes
Rust Clippy is a linting tool for the Rust programming language. It provides a collection of lints (rules) designed to identify common mistakes, stylistic issues, potential performance problems and unidiomatic code patterns in Rust projects. This month, however, Sosth ne Gu don filed a new issue in the GitHub requesting a new check that would lint against non deterministic operations in proc-macros, such as iterating over a HashMap .
Dropping support for the armhf architecture. From July 2015, Vagrant Cascadian has been hosting a zoo of approximately 35 armhf systems which were used for building Debian packages for that architecture.
Holger Levsen also uploaded strip-nondeterminism, our program that improves reproducibility by stripping out non-deterministic information such as timestamps or other elements introduced during packaging. This new version, 1.14.2-1, adds some metadata to aid the deputy tool. ( #1111947)
Lastly, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted another openSUSEmonthly update for their work there.
diffoscopediffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can locate and diagnose reproducibility issues. This month, Chris Lamb made the following changes, including preparing and uploading versions, 303, 304 and 305 to Debian:
Improvements:
Use sed(1) backreferences when generating debian/tests/control to avoid duplicating ourselves. []
Move from a mono-utils dependency to versioned mono-devel mono-utils dependency, taking care to maintain the [!riscv64] architecture restriction. []
Use sed over awk to avoid mangling dependency lines containing = (equals) symbols such as version restrictions. []
Bug fixes:
Fix a test after the upload of systemd-ukify version 258~rc3. []
Ensure that Java class files are named .class on the filesystem before passing them to javap(1). []
Do not run jsondiff on files over 100KiB as the algorithm runs in O(n^2) time. []
Don t check for PyPDF version 3 specifically; check for >= 3. []
Misc:
Update copyright years. [][]
In addition, Martin Joerg fixed an issue with the HTML presenter to avoid crash when page limit is None [] and Zbigniew J drzejewski-Szmek fixed compatibility with RPM 6 []. Lastly, John Sirois fixed a missing requests dependency in the trydiffoscope tool. []
Website updates
Once again, there were a number of improvements made to our website this month including:
Chris Lamb:
Write and publish a news entry for the upcoming summit. []
Add some assets used at FOSSY, such as the badges and the paper handouts. []
Reproducibility testing framework
The Reproducible Builds project operates a comprehensive testing framework running primarily at tests.reproducible-builds.org in order to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. In August, however, a number of changes were made by Holger Levsen, including:
Ignore that the megacli RAID controller requires packages from Debian bookworm. []
In addition,
James Addison migrated away from deprecated toplevel deb822 Python module in favour of debian.deb822 in the bin/reproducible_scheduler.py script [] and removed a note on reproduce.debian.net note after the release of Debian trixie [].
Jochen Sprickerhof made a huge number of improvements to the reproduce.debian.net statistics calculation [][][][][][] as well as to the reproduce.debian.net service more generally [][][][][][][][].
Mattia Rizzolo performed a lot of work migrating scripts to SQLAlchemy version 2.0 [][][][][][] in addition to making some changes to the way openSUSE reproducibility tests are handled internally. []
Lastly, Roland Clobus updated the Debian Live packages after the release of Debian trixie. [][]
Upstream patches
The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:
Finally, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:
The Release of Debian 13 ("Trixie") last month marked another milestone on the
effort to provide automated test support for Debian packages in their installed
form. We have achieved the mark of 57% of the source packages in the archive
declaring support for autopkgtest.
Release
Packages with tests
Total number of packages
% of packages with tests
wheezy
5
17175
0%
jessie
1112
20596
5%
stretch
5110
24845
20%
buster
9966
28501
34%
bullseye
13949
30943
45%
bookworm
17868
34341
52%
trixie
21527
37670
57%
The code that generated this table is provided at the bottom.
The growth rate has been consistently decreasing at each release after stretch.
That probably means that the low hanging fruit -- adding support en masse for
large numbers of similar packages, such as team-maintained packages for a given
programming language -- has been picked, and from now on the work gets slightly
harder. Perhaps there is a significant long tail of packages that will never
get autopkgtest support.
Looking for common prefixes among the packages missing a Testsuite: field
gives me us the largest groups of packages missing autopkgtest support:
There seems to be a fair amount of Haskell and Python. If someone could figure
out a way of testing installed fonts in a meaningful way, this would a be a
good niche where we can cover 300+ packages.
There is a another analysis that can be made, which I didn't: which percentage
of new packages introduced in a given release have declared autopkgtest
support, compared with the total of new packages in that release? My data only
counts the totals, so we start with the technical debt of the almost all of the
17,000 packages with no tests in wheezy, which was the stable at the time I
started Debian CI. How many of those got tests since
then?
Note that not supporting autopkgtest does not mean that a package is not
tested at all: it can run build-time tests, which are also useful. Not
supporting autopkgtest, though, means that their binaries in the archive
can't be automatically tested in their installed, but then there is a entire
horde of volunteers running testing and unstable on a daily basis who test
Debian and report bugs.
This is the script that produced the table in the beginning of this post:
#!/bin/shset-eu
extract()local release
local url
release="$1"url="$2"if[!-f"$ release"];then
rm-f"$ release.gz"
curl --silent-o$ release.gz "$ url"gunzip"$ release.gz"fi
local with_tests
local total
with_tests="$(grep-dctrl -c-F Testsuite --regex.$release)"total="$(grep-dctrl -c-F Package --regex.$release)"echo" $ release$ with_tests$ total$((100*with_tests/total))% "echo" **Release** **Packages with tests** **Total number of packages** **% of packages with tests** "echo" ------------- ------------------------- ------------------------------ ------------------------------ "for release in wheezy jessie stretch buster;do
extract "$ release""http://archive.debian.org/debian/dists/$ release/main/source/Sources.gz"done
for release in bullseye bookworm trixie;do
extract "$ release""http://ftp.br.debian.org/debian/dists/$ release/main/source/Sources.gz"done
About 95% of my Debian contributions this month were
sponsored by Freexian.
You can also support my work directly via
Liberapay or GitHub
Sponsors.
Python team
forky is
open!
As a result I m starting to think about the upcoming Python
3.14. At some point we ll doubtless do
a full test rebuild, but in advance of that I concluded that one of the most
useful things I could do would be to work on our very long list of packages
with new upstream
versions.
Of course there s no real chance of this ever becoming empty since upstream
maintainers aren t going to stop work for that long, but there are a lot of
packages there where we re quite a long way out of date, and many of those
include fixes that we ll need for 3.14, either directly or by fixing
interactions with new versions of other packages that in turn will need to
be fixed. We can backport changes when we need to, but more often than not
the most efficient way to do things is just to keep up to date.
So, I upgraded these packages to new upstream versions (deep breath):
That s only about 10% of the backlog, but of course others are working on
this too. If we can keep this up for a while then it should help.
I packaged pytest-run-parallel,
pytest-unmagic (still in NEW), and
python-forbiddenfruit (still in NEW),
all needed as new dependencies of various other packages.
setuptools upstream will be removing the setup.py install
command on 31
October. While this may not trickle down immediately into Debian, it does
mean that in the near future nearly all Python packages will have to use
pybuild-plugin-pyproject (note that this does not mean that they
necessarily have to use pyproject.toml; this is just a question of how the
packaging runs the build system). We talked about this a bit at DebConf,
and I said that I d noticed a number of packages where this isn t
straightforward and promised to write up some notes. I wrote the
Python/PybuildPluginPyproject
wiki page for this; I expect to add more bits and pieces to it as I find them.
On that note, I converted several packages to pybuild-plugin-pyproject:
I reviewed Debian defaults: nftables as banaction and systemd as
backend,
but it looked as though nothing actually needed to be changed so we closed
this with no action.
Rust team
Upgrading Pydantic was complicated, and required a rust-pyo3 transition
(which Jelmer Vernoo started and Peter Michael Green has mostly been
driving, thankfully), packaging rust-malloc-size-of (including an upstream
portability fix), and
upgrading several packages to new upstream versions:
As per the previous Polkit blog post the policykit framwork has lost the ability to understand its own .pkla files and policies need to be expressed in Javascript with .rules files now.
To re-enable allowing remote users (think ssh) to reboot, hibernate, suspend or power off the local system, create a 10-shutdown-reboot.rules file in /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/:
The diffoscope maintainers are pleased to announce the release of diffoscope
version 304. This version includes the following changes:
[ Chris Lamb ]
* Do not run jsondiff on files over 100KiB as the algorithm runs in O(n^2)
time. (Closes: reproducible-builds/diffoscope#414)
* Fix test after the upload of systemd-ukify 258~rc3 (vs. 258~rc2).
* Move from a mono-utils dependency to versioned "mono-devel mono-utils"
dependency, taking care to maintain the [!riscv64] architecture
restriction. (Closes: #1111742)
* Use sed -ne over awk -F= to to avoid mangling dependency lines containing
equals signs (=), for example version restrictions.
* Use sed backreferences when generating debian/tests/control to avoid DRY
violations.
* Update copyright years.
[ Martin Joerg ]
* Avoid a crash in the HTML presenter when page limit is None.
Utkarsh Gupta
did 15.0h (out of 1.0h assigned and 14.0h from previous period).
Evolution of the situation
In July, we released 24 DLAs.
Notable security updates:
angular.js, prepared by Bastien Roucari s, fixes multiple vulnerabilities including input sanitization and potential regular expression denial of service (ReDoS)
tomcat9, prepared by Markus Koschany, fixes an assortment of vulnerabilities
mediawiki, prepared by Guilhem Moulin, fixes several information disclosure and privilege escalation vulnerabilities
php7.4, prepared by Guilhem Moulin, fixes several server side request forgery and denial of service vulnerabilities
This month s contributions from outside the regular team include an update to thunderbird, prepared by Christoph Goehre (the package maintainer).
LTS Team members also contributed updates of the following packages:
commons-beanutils (to stable and unstable), prepared by Adrian Bunk
djvulibre (to oldstable, stable, and unstable), prepared by Adrian Bunk
git (to stable), prepared by Adrian Bunk
redis (to oldstable), prepared by Chris Lamb
libxml2 (to oldstable), prepared by Guilhem Moulin
commons-vfs (to oldstable), prepared by Daniel Leidert
Additionally, LTS Team member Santiago Ruano Rinc n proposed and implemented an improvement to the debian-security-support package. This package is available so that interested users can quickly determine if any installed packages are subject to limited security support or are excluded entirely from security support. However, there was not previously a way to identify explicitly supported packages, which has become necessary to note exceptions to broad exclusion policies (e.g., those which apply to substantial package groups, like modules belonging to the Go and Rust language ecosystems). Santiago s work has enabled the notation of exceptions to these exclusions, thus ensuring that users of debian-security-support have accurate status information concerning installed packages.
DebCamp 25 Security Tracker Sprint
The previously announced security tracker sprint took place at DebCamp from 7-13 July. Participants included 8 members of the standing LTS Team, 2 active Debian Developers with an interest in LTS, 3 community members, and 1 member of the Debian Security Team (who provided guidance and reviews on proposed changes to the security tracker); participation was a mix of in person at the venue in Brest, France and remote. During the days of the sprint, the team tackled a wide range of bugs and improvements, mostly targeting the security tracker.
The sprint participants worked on the following items:
Continued work (which was in progress prior to the sprint) on improved tooling to support security releases of packages from language ecosystems that rely heavily on static linking
As can be seen from the above list, only a small number of changes were brought to completion during the sprint week itself. Given the very compressed timeframe involved, the broad scope of tasks which were under consideration, and the highly sensitive data managed by the security tracker, this is not entirely unexpected and in no way diminishes the great work done by the sprint participants. The LTS Team would especially like to thank Salvatore Bonaccorso of the Debian Security Team for making himself available throughout the sprint to answer questions, for providing guidance on the work, and for helping the work by reviewing and merging the MRs which were able to merged during the sprint itself.
In the weeks that follow the sprint, the team will continue working towards completing the in progress items.
Thanks to our sponsors
Sponsors that joined recently are in bold.
Debian LTS
This was my hundred-thirty-third month that I did some work for the Debian LTS initiative, started by Raphael Hertzog at Freexian. During my allocated time I uploaded or worked on:
[DLA 4255-1] audiofile security update of two CVEs related to an integer overflow and a memory leak.
[DLA 4256-1] libetpan security update to fix one CVE related to prevent a null pointer dereference.
[DLA 4257-1] libcaca security update to fix two CVEs related to heap buffer overflows.
[DLA 4258-1] libfastjson security update to fix one CVE related to an out of bounds write.
[#1106867] kmail-account-wizard was marked as accepted
I also continued my work on suricata, which turned out to be more challenging than expected. This month I also did a week of FD duties and attended the monthly LTS/ELTS meeting.
Debian ELTS
This month was the eighty-fourth ELTS month. Unfortunately my allocated hours were far less than expected, so I couldn t do as much work as planned.
Most of the time I spent with FD tasks and I also attended the monthly LTS/ELTS meeting. I further listened to the debusine talks during debconf. On the one hand I would like to use debusine to prepare uploads for embargoed ELTS issues, on the other hand I would like to use debusine to run the version of lintian that is used in the different releases. At the moment some manual steps are involved here and I tried to automate things. Of course like for LTS, I also continued my work on suricata.
Debian Printing
This month I uploaded a new upstream version of:
Guess what, I also started to work on a new version of hplip and intend to upload it in August.
This work is generously funded by Freexian!
Debian Astro
This month I uploaded new upstream versions of:
I also uploaded the new package boinor. This is a fork of poliastro, which was retired by upstream and removed from Debian some months ago. I adopted it and rebranded it at the desire of upstream. boinor is the abbreviation of BOdies IN ORbit and I hope this software is still useful.
Debian Mobcom
Unfortunately I didn t found any time to work on this topic.
misc
On my fight against outdated RFPs, I closed 31 of them in July. Their number is down to 3447 (how can you dare to open new RFPs? :-)). Don t be afraid of them, they don t bite and are happy to be released to a closed state.
FTP master
The peace will soon come to an end, so this month I accepted 87 and rejected 2 packages. The overall number of packages that got accepted was 100.
Welcome to the seventh report from the Reproducible Builds project in 2025. Our monthly reports outline what we ve been up to over the past month, and highlight items of news from elsewhere in the increasingly-important area of software supply-chain security. If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please see the Contribute page on our website.
In this report:
Reproducible Builds Summit 2025
We are extremely pleased to announce the upcoming Reproducible Builds Summit, set to take place from October 28th 30th 2025 in Vienna, Austria!
We are thrilled to host the eighth edition of this exciting event, following the success of previous summits in various iconic locations around the world, including Venice, Marrakesh, Paris, Berlin, Hamburg and Athens. Our summits are a unique gathering that brings together attendees from diverse projects, united by a shared vision of advancing the Reproducible Builds effort.
During this enriching event, participants will have the opportunity to engage in discussions, establish connections and exchange ideas to drive progress in this vital field. Our aim is to create an inclusive space that fosters collaboration, innovation and problem-solving.
If you re interesting in joining us this year, please make sure to read the event page which has more details about the event and location. Registration is open until 20th September 2025, and we are very much looking forward to seeing many readers of these reports there!
[Everything] changed earlier this year when reproducible-builds for SLES-16 became an official goal for the product. More people are talking about digital sovereignty and supply-chain security now. [ ] Today, only 9 of 3319 (source) packages have significant problems left (plus 7 with pending fixes), so 99.5% of packages have reproducible builds.
There are numerous policy compliance and regulatory processes being developed that target software development but do they solve actual problems? Does it improve the quality of software? Do Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs) actually give you the information necessary to verify how a given software artifact was built? What is the goal of all these compliance checklists anyways or more importantly, what should the goals be? If a software object is signed, who should be trusted to sign it, and can they be trusted forever?
Hosted by the Software Freedom Conservancy and taking place in Portland, Oregon, USA, FOSSY aims to be a community-focused event: Whether you are a long time contributing member of a free software project, a recent graduate of a coding bootcamp or university, or just have an interest in the possibilities that free and open source software bring, FOSSY will have something for you . More information on the event is available on the FOSSY 2025 website, including the full programme schedule.
Vagrant and Chris also staffed a table, where they will be available to answer any questions about Reproducible Builds and discuss collaborations with other projects.
Automation to derive declarative build definitions for existing PyPI (Python), npm (JS/TS), and Crates.io (Rust) packages.
SLSA Provenance for thousands of packages across our supported ecosystems, meeting SLSA Build Level 3 requirements with no publisher intervention.
Build observability and verification tools that security teams can integrate into their existing vulnerability management workflows.
Infrastructure definitions to allow organizations to easily run their own instances of OSS Rebuild to rebuild, generate, sign, and distribute provenance.
One difference with most projects that aim for bit-for-bit reproducibility, OSS Rebuild aims for a kind of semantic reproducibility:
Through automation and heuristics, we determine a prospective build definition for a target package and rebuild it. We semantically compare the result with the existing upstream artifact, normalizing each one to remove instabilities that cause bit-for-bit comparisons to fail (e.g. archive compression).
The extensive post includes examples about how to access OSS Rebuild attestations using the Go-based command-line interface.
New extension of Python setuptools to support reproducible builds
Wim Jeantine-Glenn has written a PEP 517 Build backend in order to enable reproducible builds when building Python projects that use setuptools.
Called setuptools-reproducible, the project s README file contains the following:
Setuptools can create reproducible wheel archives (.whl) by setting SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH at build time, but setting the env var is insufficient for creating reproducible sdists (.tar.gz). setuptools-reproducible [therefore] wraps the hooks build_sdistbuild_wheel with some modifications to make reproducible builds by default.
diffoscopediffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can locate and diagnose reproducibility issues. This month, Chris Lamb made the following changes, including preparing and uploading versions 301, 302 and 303 to Debian:
Improvements:
Use Difference.from_operation in an attempt to pipeline the output of the extract-vmlinux script, potentially avoiding it all in memory. []
Memoize a number of calls to --version, saving a very large number of external subprocess calls.
Bug fixes:
Don t check for PyPDF version 3 specifically, check for versions greater than 3. []
Ensure that Java class files are named .class on the filesystem before passing them to javap(1). []
Mask stderr from extract-vmlinux script. [][]
Avoid spurious differences in h5dump output caused by exposure of absolute internal extraction paths. (#1108690)
Misc:
Use our_check_output in the ODT comparator. []
Update copyright years. []
In addition:
Siva Mahadevan made a change to use the --print-armap long option when calling nm(1) for wider compatibility. []
Lastly, Chris Lamb added a tmpfs to try.diffoscope.org so that diffoscope has a non-trivial temporary area to unpack archives, etc. []
Elsewhere in our tooling, however, reprotest is our tool for building the same source code twice in different environments and then checking the binaries produced by each build for any differences. This month, reprotest version 0.7.30 was uploaded to Debian unstable by Holger Levsen, chiefly including a change by Rebecca N. Palmer to not call sudo with the -h flag in order to fix Debian bug #1108550. []
New library to patch system functions for reproducibility
Nicolas Graves has written and published libfate, a simple collection of tiny libraries to patch system functions deterministically using LD_PRELOAD. According to the project s README:
libfate provides deterministic replacements for common non-deterministic system functions that can break reproducible builds. Instead of relying on complex build systems or apps or extensive patching, libfate uses the LD_PRELOAD trick to intercept system calls and return fixed, predictable values.
Describing why he wrote it, Nicolas writes:
I originally used the OpenSUSE dettrace approach to make Emacs reproducible in Guix. But when Guix switch to GCC@14, dettrace stopped working as expected. dettrace is a complex piece of software, my need was much less heavy: I don t need to systematically patch all sources of nondetermism, just the ones that make a process/binary unreproducible in a container/chroot.
One desirable property is that someone else should be able to reproduce the same git bundle, and not only that a single individual is able to reproduce things on one machine. It surprised me to see that when I ran the same set of commands on a different machine (started from a fresh git clone), I got a different checksum. The different checksums occurred even when nothing had been committed on the server side between the two runs.
Website updates
Once again, there were a number of improvements made to our website this month including:
Bernhard M. Wiedemann added an entry related to R-B-OS on the History page. []
Chris Lamb:
Replaced rbtlog run by Fay by rbtlog run by Benl on the Who is involved page. []
Debian contributors have made significant progress toward ensuring package builds produce byte-for-byte reproducible results. You can check the status for packages installed on your system using the new package debian-repro-status, or visit reproduce.debian.net for Debian s overall statistics for trixie and later. You can contribute to these efforts by joining #debian-reproducible on IRC to discuss fixes, or verify the statistics by installing the new rebuilderd package and setting up your own instance.
Reproducibility testing framework
The Reproducible Builds project operates a comprehensive testing framework running primarily at tests.reproducible-builds.org in order to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. In July, however, a number of changes were made by Holger Levsen, including:
Make the dsa-check-packages output more useful. []
Setup the ppc64el architecture again, has it has returned this time with a 2.7 GiB database instead of 72 GiB. []
In addition, Jochen Sprickerhof improved the reproducibility statistics generation:
Enable caching of statistics. [][][]
Add some common non-reproducible patterns. []
Change output to directory. []
Add a page sorted by diffoscope size. [][]
Switch to Python s argparse module and separate output(). []
Holger also submitted a number of Debian bugs against rebuilderd and rebuilderd-worker:
Config files and scripts for a simple one machine setup. [][]
Create a rebuilderd user. []
Create rebuilderd-worker user with sbuild. []
Lastly, Mattia Rizzolo added a scheduled job to renew some SSL certificates [] and Vagrant Cascadian performed some node maintenance [][].
Upstream patches
The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:
Finally, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via: