Search Results: "ecki"

25 September 2022

Sergio Talens-Oliag: Kubernetes Static Content Server

This post describes how I ve put together a simple static content server for kubernetes clusters using a Pod with a persistent volume and multiple containers: an sftp server to manage contents, a web server to publish them with optional access control and another one to run scripts which need access to the volume filesystem. The sftp server runs using MySecureShell, the web server is nginx and the script runner uses the webhook tool to publish endpoints to call them (the calls will come from other Pods that run backend servers or are executed from Jobs or CronJobs).

HistoryThe system was developed because we had a NodeJS API with endpoints to upload files and store them on S3 compatible services that were later accessed via HTTPS, but the requirements changed and we needed to be able to publish folders instead of individual files using their original names and apply access restrictions using our API. Thinking about our requirements the use of a regular filesystem to keep the files and folders was a good option, as uploading and serving files is simple. For the upload I decided to use the sftp protocol, mainly because I already had an sftp container image based on mysecureshell prepared; once we settled on that we added sftp support to the API server and configured it to upload the files to our server instead of using S3 buckets. To publish the files we added a nginx container configured to work as a reverse proxy that uses the ngx_http_auth_request_module to validate access to the files (the sub request is configurable, in our deployment we have configured it to call our API to check if the user can access a given URL). Finally we added a third container when we needed to execute some tasks directly on the filesystem (using kubectl exec with the existing containers did not seem a good idea, as that is not supported by CronJobs objects, for example). The solution we found avoiding the NIH Syndrome (i.e. write our own tool) was to use the webhook tool to provide the endpoints to call the scripts; for now we have three:
  • one to get the disc usage of a PATH,
  • one to hardlink all the files that are identical on the filesystem,
  • one to copy files and folders from S3 buckets to our filesystem.

Container definitions

mysecureshellThe mysecureshell container can be used to provide an sftp service with multiple users (although the files are owned by the same UID and GID) using standalone containers (launched with docker or podman) or in an orchestration system like kubernetes, as we are going to do here. The image is generated using the following Dockerfile:
ARG ALPINE_VERSION=3.16.2
FROM alpine:$ALPINE_VERSION as builder
LABEL maintainer="Sergio Talens-Oliag <sto@mixinet.net>"
RUN apk update &&\
 apk add --no-cache alpine-sdk git musl-dev &&\
 git clone https://github.com/sto/mysecureshell.git &&\
 cd mysecureshell &&\
 ./configure --prefix=/usr --sysconfdir=/etc --mandir=/usr/share/man\
 --localstatedir=/var --with-shutfile=/var/lib/misc/sftp.shut --with-debug=2 &&\
 make all && make install &&\
 rm -rf /var/cache/apk/*
FROM alpine:$ALPINE_VERSION
LABEL maintainer="Sergio Talens-Oliag <sto@mixinet.net>"
COPY --from=builder /usr/bin/mysecureshell /usr/bin/mysecureshell
COPY --from=builder /usr/bin/sftp-* /usr/bin/
RUN apk update &&\
 apk add --no-cache openssh shadow pwgen &&\
 sed -i -e "s ^.*\(AuthorizedKeysFile\).*$ \1 /etc/ssh/auth_keys/%u "\
 /etc/ssh/sshd_config &&\
 mkdir /etc/ssh/auth_keys &&\
 cat /dev/null > /etc/motd &&\
 add-shell '/usr/bin/mysecureshell' &&\
 rm -rf /var/cache/apk/*
COPY bin/* /usr/local/bin/
COPY etc/sftp_config /etc/ssh/
COPY entrypoint.sh /
EXPOSE 22
VOLUME /sftp
ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.sh"]
CMD ["server"]
The /etc/sftp_config file is used to configure the mysecureshell server to have all the user homes under /sftp/data, only allow them to see the files under their home directories as if it were at the root of the server and close idle connections after 5m of inactivity:
etc/sftp_config
# Default mysecureshell configuration
<Default>
   # All users will have access their home directory under /sftp/data
   Home /sftp/data/$USER
   # Log to a file inside /sftp/logs/ (only works when the directory exists)
   LogFile /sftp/logs/mysecureshell.log
   # Force users to stay in their home directory
   StayAtHome true
   # Hide Home PATH, it will be shown as /
   VirtualChroot true
   # Hide real file/directory owner (just change displayed permissions)
   DirFakeUser true
   # Hide real file/directory group (just change displayed permissions)
   DirFakeGroup true
   # We do not want users to keep forever their idle connection
   IdleTimeOut 5m
</Default>
# vim: ts=2:sw=2:et
The entrypoint.sh script is the one responsible to prepare the container for the users included on the /secrets/user_pass.txt file (creates the users with their HOME directories under /sftp/data and a /bin/false shell and creates the key files from /secrets/user_keys.txt if available). The script expects a couple of environment variables:
  • SFTP_UID: UID used to run the daemon and for all the files, it has to be different than 0 (all the files managed by this daemon are going to be owned by the same user and group, even if the remote users are different).
  • SFTP_GID: GID used to run the daemon and for all the files, it has to be different than 0.
And can use the SSH_PORT and SSH_PARAMS values if present. It also requires the following files (they can be mounted as secrets in kubernetes):
  • /secrets/host_keys.txt: Text file containing the ssh server keys in mime format; the file is processed using the reformime utility (the one included on busybox) and can be generated using the gen-host-keys script included on the container (it uses ssh-keygen and makemime).
  • /secrets/user_pass.txt: Text file containing lines of the form username:password_in_clear_text (only the users included on this file are available on the sftp server, in fact in our deployment we use only the scs user for everything).
And optionally can use another one:
  • /secrets/user_keys.txt: Text file that contains lines of the form username:public_ssh_ed25519_or_rsa_key; the public keys are installed on the server and can be used to log into the sftp server if the username exists on the user_pass.txt file.
The contents of the entrypoint.sh script are:
entrypoint.sh
#!/bin/sh
set -e
# ---------
# VARIABLES
# ---------
# Expects SSH_UID & SSH_GID on the environment and uses the value of the
# SSH_PORT & SSH_PARAMS variables if present
# SSH_PARAMS
SSH_PARAMS="-D -e -p $ SSH_PORT:=22  $ SSH_PARAMS "
# Fixed values
# DIRECTORIES
HOME_DIR="/sftp/data"
CONF_FILES_DIR="/secrets"
AUTH_KEYS_PATH="/etc/ssh/auth_keys"
# FILES
HOST_KEYS="$CONF_FILES_DIR/host_keys.txt"
USER_KEYS="$CONF_FILES_DIR/user_keys.txt"
USER_PASS="$CONF_FILES_DIR/user_pass.txt"
USER_SHELL_CMD="/usr/bin/mysecureshell"
# TYPES
HOST_KEY_TYPES="dsa ecdsa ed25519 rsa"
# ---------
# FUNCTIONS
# ---------
# Validate HOST_KEYS, USER_PASS, SFTP_UID and SFTP_GID
_check_environment()  
  # Check the ssh server keys ... we don't boot if we don't have them
  if [ ! -f "$HOST_KEYS" ]; then
    cat <<EOF
We need the host keys on the '$HOST_KEYS' file to proceed.
Call the 'gen-host-keys' script to create and export them on a mime file.
EOF
    exit 1
  fi
  # Check that we have users ... if we don't we can't continue
  if [ ! -f "$USER_PASS" ]; then
    cat <<EOF
We need at least the '$USER_PASS' file to provision users.
Call the 'gen-users-tar' script to create a tar file to create an archive that
contains public and private keys for users, a 'user_keys.txt' with the public
keys of the users and a 'user_pass.txt' file with random passwords for them 
(pass the list of usernames to it).
EOF
    exit 1
  fi
  # Check SFTP_UID
  if [ -z "$SFTP_UID" ]; then
    echo "The 'SFTP_UID' can't be empty, pass a 'GID'."
    exit 1
  fi
  if [ "$SFTP_UID" -eq "0" ]; then
    echo "The 'SFTP_UID' can't be 0, use a different 'UID'"
    exit 1
  fi
  # Check SFTP_GID
  if [ -z "$SFTP_GID" ]; then
    echo "The 'SFTP_GID' can't be empty, pass a 'GID'."
    exit 1
  fi
  if [ "$SFTP_GID" -eq "0" ]; then
    echo "The 'SFTP_GID' can't be 0, use a different 'GID'"
    exit 1
  fi
 
# Adjust ssh host keys
_setup_host_keys()  
  opwd="$(pwd)"
  tmpdir="$(mktemp -d)"
  cd "$tmpdir"
  ret="0"
  reformime <"$HOST_KEYS"   ret="1"
  for kt in $HOST_KEY_TYPES; do
    key="ssh_host_$ kt _key"
    pub="ssh_host_$ kt _key.pub"
    if [ ! -f "$key" ]; then
      echo "Missing '$key' file"
      ret="1"
    fi
    if [ ! -f "$pub" ]; then
      echo "Missing '$pub' file"
      ret="1"
    fi
    if [ "$ret" -ne "0" ]; then
      continue
    fi
    cat "$key" >"/etc/ssh/$key"
    chmod 0600 "/etc/ssh/$key"
    chown root:root "/etc/ssh/$key"
    cat "$pub" >"/etc/ssh/$pub"
    chmod 0600 "/etc/ssh/$pub"
    chown root:root "/etc/ssh/$pub"
  done
  cd "$opwd"
  rm -rf "$tmpdir"
  return "$ret"
 
# Create users
_setup_user_pass()  
  opwd="$(pwd)"
  tmpdir="$(mktemp -d)"
  cd "$tmpdir"
  ret="0"
  [ -d "$HOME_DIR" ]   mkdir "$HOME_DIR"
  # Make sure the data dir can be managed by the sftp user
  chown "$SFTP_UID:$SFTP_GID" "$HOME_DIR"
  # Allow the user (and root) to create directories inside the $HOME_DIR, if
  # we don't allow it the directory creation fails on EFS (AWS)
  chmod 0755 "$HOME_DIR"
  # Create users
  echo "sftp:sftp:$SFTP_UID:$SFTP_GID:::/bin/false" >"newusers.txt"
  sed -n "/^[^#]/   s/:/ /p  " "$USER_PASS"   while read -r _u _p; do
    echo "$_u:$_p:$SFTP_UID:$SFTP_GID::$HOME_DIR/$_u:$USER_SHELL_CMD"
  done >>"newusers.txt"
  newusers --badnames newusers.txt
  # Disable write permission on the directory to forbid remote sftp users to
  # remove their own root dir (they have already done it); we adjust that
  # here to avoid issues with EFS (see before)
  chmod 0555 "$HOME_DIR"
  # Clean up the tmpdir
  cd "$opwd"
  rm -rf "$tmpdir"
  return "$ret"
 
# Adjust user keys
_setup_user_keys()  
  if [ -f "$USER_KEYS" ]; then
    sed -n "/^[^#]/   s/:/ /p  " "$USER_KEYS"   while read -r _u _k; do
      echo "$_k" >>"$AUTH_KEYS_PATH/$_u"
    done
  fi
 
# Main function
exec_sshd()  
  _check_environment
  _setup_host_keys
  _setup_user_pass
  _setup_user_keys
  echo "Running: /usr/sbin/sshd $SSH_PARAMS"
  # shellcheck disable=SC2086
  exec /usr/sbin/sshd -D $SSH_PARAMS
 
# ----
# MAIN
# ----
case "$1" in
"server") exec_sshd ;;
*) exec "$@" ;;
esac
# vim: ts=2:sw=2:et
The container also includes a couple of auxiliary scripts, the first one can be used to generate the host_keys.txt file as follows:
$ docker run --rm stodh/mysecureshell gen-host-keys > host_keys.txt
Where the script is as simple as:
bin/gen-host-keys
#!/bin/sh
set -e
# Generate new host keys
ssh-keygen -A >/dev/null
# Replace hostname
sed -i -e 's/@.*$/@mysecureshell/' /etc/ssh/ssh_host_*_key.pub
# Print in mime format (stdout)
makemime /etc/ssh/ssh_host_*
# vim: ts=2:sw=2:et
And there is another script to generate a .tar file that contains auth data for the list of usernames passed to it (the file contains a user_pass.txt file with random passwords for the users, public and private ssh keys for them and the user_keys.txt file that matches the generated keys). To generate a tar file for the user scs we can execute the following:
$ docker run --rm stodh/mysecureshell gen-users-tar scs > /tmp/scs-users.tar
To see the contents and the text inside the user_pass.txt file we can do:
$ tar tvf /tmp/scs-users.tar
-rw-r--r-- root/root        21 2022-09-11 15:55 user_pass.txt
-rw-r--r-- root/root       822 2022-09-11 15:55 user_keys.txt
-rw------- root/root       387 2022-09-11 15:55 id_ed25519-scs
-rw-r--r-- root/root        85 2022-09-11 15:55 id_ed25519-scs.pub
-rw------- root/root      3357 2022-09-11 15:55 id_rsa-scs
-rw------- root/root      3243 2022-09-11 15:55 id_rsa-scs.pem
-rw-r--r-- root/root       729 2022-09-11 15:55 id_rsa-scs.pub
$ tar xfO /tmp/scs-users.tar user_pass.txt
scs:20JertRSX2Eaar4x
The source of the script is:
bin/gen-users-tar
#!/bin/sh
set -e
# ---------
# VARIABLES
# ---------
USER_KEYS_FILE="user_keys.txt"
USER_PASS_FILE="user_pass.txt"
# ---------
# MAIN CODE
# ---------
# Generate user passwords and keys, return 1 if no username is received
if [ "$#" -eq "0" ]; then
  return 1
fi
opwd="$(pwd)"
tmpdir="$(mktemp -d)"
cd "$tmpdir"
for u in "$@"; do
  ssh-keygen -q -a 100 -t ed25519 -f "id_ed25519-$u" -C "$u" -N ""
  ssh-keygen -q -a 100 -b 4096 -t rsa -f "id_rsa-$u" -C "$u" -N ""
  # Legacy RSA private key format
  cp -a "id_rsa-$u" "id_rsa-$u.pem"
  ssh-keygen -q -p -m pem -f "id_rsa-$u.pem" -N "" -P "" >/dev/null
  chmod 0600 "id_rsa-$u.pem"
  echo "$u:$(pwgen -s 16 1)" >>"$USER_PASS_FILE"
  echo "$u:$(cat "id_ed25519-$u.pub")" >>"$USER_KEYS_FILE"
  echo "$u:$(cat "id_rsa-$u.pub")" >>"$USER_KEYS_FILE"
done
tar cf - "$USER_PASS_FILE" "$USER_KEYS_FILE" id_* 2>/dev/null
cd "$opwd"
rm -rf "$tmpdir"
# vim: ts=2:sw=2:et

nginx-scsThe nginx-scs container is generated using the following Dockerfile:
ARG NGINX_VERSION=1.23.1
FROM nginx:$NGINX_VERSION
LABEL maintainer="Sergio Talens-Oliag <sto@mixinet.net>"
RUN rm -f /docker-entrypoint.d/*
COPY docker-entrypoint.d/* /docker-entrypoint.d/
Basically we are removing the existing docker-entrypoint.d scripts from the standard image and adding a new one that configures the web server as we want using a couple of environment variables:
  • AUTH_REQUEST_URI: URL to use for the auth_request, if the variable is not found on the environment auth_request is not used.
  • HTML_ROOT: Base directory of the web server, if not passed the default /usr/share/nginx/html is used.
Note that if we don t pass the variables everything works as if we were using the original nginx image. The contents of the configuration script are:
docker-entrypoint.d/10-update-default-conf.sh
#!/bin/sh
# Replace the default.conf nginx file by our own version.
set -e
if [ -z "$HTML_ROOT" ]; then
  HTML_ROOT="/usr/share/nginx/html"
fi
if [ "$AUTH_REQUEST_URI" ]; then
  cat >/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf <<EOF
server  
  listen       80;
  server_name  localhost;
  location /  
    auth_request /.auth;
    root  $HTML_ROOT;
    index index.html index.htm;
   
  location /.auth  
    internal;
    proxy_pass $AUTH_REQUEST_URI;
    proxy_pass_request_body off;
    proxy_set_header Content-Length "";
    proxy_set_header X-Original-URI \$request_uri;
   
  error_page   500 502 503 504  /50x.html;
  location = /50x.html  
    root /usr/share/nginx/html;
   
 
EOF
else
  cat >/etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf <<EOF
server  
  listen       80;
  server_name  localhost;
  location /  
    root  $HTML_ROOT;
    index index.html index.htm;
   
  error_page   500 502 503 504  /50x.html;
  location = /50x.html  
    root /usr/share/nginx/html;
   
 
EOF
fi
# vim: ts=2:sw=2:et
As we will see later the idea is to use the /sftp/data or /sftp/data/scs folder as the root of the web published by this container and create an Ingress object to provide access to it outside of our kubernetes cluster.

webhook-scsThe webhook-scs container is generated using the following Dockerfile:
ARG ALPINE_VERSION=3.16.2
ARG GOLANG_VERSION=alpine3.16
FROM golang:$GOLANG_VERSION AS builder
LABEL maintainer="Sergio Talens-Oliag <sto@mixinet.net>"
ENV WEBHOOK_VERSION 2.8.0
ENV WEBHOOK_PR 549
ENV S3FS_VERSION v1.91
WORKDIR /go/src/github.com/adnanh/webhook
RUN apk update &&\
 apk add --no-cache -t build-deps curl libc-dev gcc libgcc patch
RUN curl -L --silent -o webhook.tar.gz\
 https://github.com/adnanh/webhook/archive/$ WEBHOOK_VERSION .tar.gz &&\
 tar xzf webhook.tar.gz --strip 1 &&\
 curl -L --silent -o $ WEBHOOK_PR .patch\
 https://patch-diff.githubusercontent.com/raw/adnanh/webhook/pull/$ WEBHOOK_PR .patch &&\
 patch -p1 < $ WEBHOOK_PR .patch &&\
 go get -d && \
 go build -o /usr/local/bin/webhook
WORKDIR /src/s3fs-fuse
RUN apk update &&\
 apk add ca-certificates build-base alpine-sdk libcurl automake autoconf\
 libxml2-dev libressl-dev mailcap fuse-dev curl-dev
RUN curl -L --silent -o s3fs.tar.gz\
 https://github.com/s3fs-fuse/s3fs-fuse/archive/refs/tags/$S3FS_VERSION.tar.gz &&\
 tar xzf s3fs.tar.gz --strip 1 &&\
 ./autogen.sh &&\
 ./configure --prefix=/usr/local &&\
 make -j && \
 make install
FROM alpine:$ALPINE_VERSION
LABEL maintainer="Sergio Talens-Oliag <sto@mixinet.net>"
WORKDIR /webhook
RUN apk update &&\
 apk add --no-cache ca-certificates mailcap fuse libxml2 libcurl libgcc\
 libstdc++ rsync util-linux-misc &&\
 rm -rf /var/cache/apk/*
COPY --from=builder /usr/local/bin/webhook /usr/local/bin/webhook
COPY --from=builder /usr/local/bin/s3fs /usr/local/bin/s3fs
COPY entrypoint.sh /
COPY hooks/* ./hooks/
EXPOSE 9000
ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.sh"]
CMD ["server"]
Again, we use a multi-stage build because in production we wanted to support a functionality that is not already on the official versions (streaming the command output as a response instead of waiting until the execution ends); this time we build the image applying the PATCH included on this pull request against a released version of the source instead of creating a fork. The entrypoint.sh script is used to generate the webhook configuration file for the existing hooks using environment variables (basically the WEBHOOK_WORKDIR and the *_TOKEN variables) and launch the webhook service:
entrypoint.sh
#!/bin/sh
set -e
# ---------
# VARIABLES
# ---------
WEBHOOK_BIN="$ WEBHOOK_BIN:-/webhook/hooks "
WEBHOOK_YML="$ WEBHOOK_YML:-/webhook/scs.yml "
WEBHOOK_OPTS="$ WEBHOOK_OPTS:--verbose "
# ---------
# FUNCTIONS
# ---------
print_du_yml()  
  cat <<EOF
- id: du
  execute-command: '$WEBHOOK_BIN/du.sh'
  command-working-directory: '$WORKDIR'
  response-headers:
  - name: 'Content-Type'
    value: 'application/json'
  http-methods: ['GET']
  include-command-output-in-response: true
  include-command-output-in-response-on-error: true
  pass-arguments-to-command:
  - source: 'url'
    name: 'path'
  pass-environment-to-command:
  - source: 'string'
    envname: 'OUTPUT_FORMAT'
    name: 'json'
EOF
 
print_hardlink_yml()  
  cat <<EOF
- id: hardlink
  execute-command: '$WEBHOOK_BIN/hardlink.sh'
  command-working-directory: '$WORKDIR'
  http-methods: ['GET']
  include-command-output-in-response: true
  include-command-output-in-response-on-error: true
EOF
 
print_s3sync_yml()  
  cat <<EOF
- id: s3sync
  execute-command: '$WEBHOOK_BIN/s3sync.sh'
  command-working-directory: '$WORKDIR'
  http-methods: ['POST']
  include-command-output-in-response: true
  include-command-output-in-response-on-error: true
  pass-environment-to-command:
  - source: 'payload'
    envname: 'AWS_KEY'
    name: 'aws.key'
  - source: 'payload'
    envname: 'AWS_SECRET_KEY'
    name: 'aws.secret_key'
  - source: 'payload'
    envname: 'S3_BUCKET'
    name: 's3.bucket'
  - source: 'payload'
    envname: 'S3_REGION'
    name: 's3.region'
  - source: 'payload'
    envname: 'S3_PATH'
    name: 's3.path'
  - source: 'payload'
    envname: 'SCS_PATH'
    name: 'scs.path'
  stream-command-output: true
EOF
 
print_token_yml()  
  if [ "$1" ]; then
    cat << EOF
  trigger-rule:
    match:
      type: 'value'
      value: '$1'
      parameter:
        source: 'header'
        name: 'X-Webhook-Token'
EOF
  fi
 
exec_webhook()  
  # Validate WORKDIR
  if [ -z "$WEBHOOK_WORKDIR" ]; then
    echo "Must define the WEBHOOK_WORKDIR variable!" >&2
    exit 1
  fi
  WORKDIR="$(realpath "$WEBHOOK_WORKDIR" 2>/dev/null)"   true
  if [ ! -d "$WORKDIR" ]; then
    echo "The WEBHOOK_WORKDIR '$WEBHOOK_WORKDIR' is not a directory!" >&2
    exit 1
  fi
  # Get TOKENS, if the DU_TOKEN or HARDLINK_TOKEN is defined that is used, if
  # not if the COMMON_TOKEN that is used and in other case no token is checked
  # (that is the default)
  DU_TOKEN="$ DU_TOKEN:-$COMMON_TOKEN "
  HARDLINK_TOKEN="$ HARDLINK_TOKEN:-$COMMON_TOKEN "
  S3_TOKEN="$ S3_TOKEN:-$COMMON_TOKEN "
  # Create webhook configuration
    
    print_du_yml
    print_token_yml "$DU_TOKEN"
    echo ""
    print_hardlink_yml
    print_token_yml "$HARDLINK_TOKEN"
    echo ""
    print_s3sync_yml
    print_token_yml "$S3_TOKEN"
   >"$WEBHOOK_YML"
  # Run the webhook command
  # shellcheck disable=SC2086
  exec webhook -hooks "$WEBHOOK_YML" $WEBHOOK_OPTS
 
# ----
# MAIN
# ----
case "$1" in
"server") exec_webhook ;;
*) exec "$@" ;;
esac
The entrypoint.sh script generates the configuration file for the webhook server calling functions that print a yaml section for each hook and optionally adds rules to validate access to them comparing the value of a X-Webhook-Token header against predefined values. The expected token values are taken from environment variables, we can define a token variable for each hook (DU_TOKEN, HARDLINK_TOKEN or S3_TOKEN) and a fallback value (COMMON_TOKEN); if no token variable is defined for a hook no check is done and everybody can call it. The Hook Definition documentation explains the options you can use for each hook, the ones we have right now do the following:
  • du: runs on the $WORKDIR directory, passes as first argument to the script the value of the path query parameter and sets the variable OUTPUT_FORMAT to the fixed value json (we use that to print the output of the script in JSON format instead of text).
  • hardlink: runs on the $WORKDIR directory and takes no parameters.
  • s3sync: runs on the $WORKDIR directory and sets a lot of environment variables from values read from the JSON encoded payload sent by the caller (all the values must be sent by the caller even if they are assigned an empty value, if they are missing the hook fails without calling the script); we also set the stream-command-output value to true to make the script show its output as it is working (we patched the webhook source to be able to use this option).

The du hook scriptThe du hook script code checks if the argument passed is a directory, computes its size using the du command and prints the results in text format or as a JSON dictionary:
hooks/du.sh
#!/bin/sh
set -e
# Script to print disk usage for a PATH inside the scs folder
# ---------
# FUNCTIONS
# ---------
print_error()  
  if [ "$OUTPUT_FORMAT" = "json" ]; then
    echo " \"error\":\"$*\" "
  else
    echo "$*" >&2
  fi
  exit 1
 
usage()  
  if [ "$OUTPUT_FORMAT" = "json" ]; then
    echo " \"error\":\"Pass arguments as '?path=XXX\" "
  else
    echo "Usage: $(basename "$0") PATH" >&2
  fi
  exit 1
 
# ----
# MAIN
# ----
if [ "$#" -eq "0" ]   [ -z "$1" ]; then
  usage
fi
if [ "$1" = "." ]; then
  DU_PATH="./"
else
  DU_PATH="$(find . -name "$1" -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1)"   true
fi
if [ -z "$DU_PATH" ]   [ ! -d "$DU_PATH/." ]; then
  print_error "The provided PATH ('$1') is not a directory"
fi
# Print disk usage in bytes for the given PATH
OUTPUT="$(du -b -s "$DU_PATH")"
if [ "$OUTPUT_FORMAT" = "json" ]; then
  # Format output as  "path":"PATH","bytes":"BYTES" 
  echo "$OUTPUT"  
    sed -e "s%^\(.*\)\t.*/\(.*\)$% \"path\":\"\2\",\"bytes\":\"\1\" %"  
    tr -d '\n'
else
  # Print du output as is
  echo "$OUTPUT"
fi
# vim: ts=2:sw=2:et:ai:sts=2

The s3sync hook scriptThe s3sync hook script uses the s3fs tool to mount a bucket and synchronise data between a folder inside the bucket and a directory on the filesystem using rsync; all values needed to execute the task are taken from environment variables:
hooks/s3sync.sh
#!/bin/ash
set -euo pipefail
set -o errexit
set -o errtrace
# Functions
finish()  
  ret="$1"
  echo ""
  echo "Script exit code: $ret"
  exit "$ret"
 
# Check variables
if [ -z "$AWS_KEY" ]   [ -z "$AWS_SECRET_KEY" ]   [ -z "$S3_BUCKET" ]  
  [ -z "$S3_PATH" ]   [ -z "$SCS_PATH" ]; then
  [ "$AWS_KEY" ]   echo "Set the AWS_KEY environment variable"
  [ "$AWS_SECRET_KEY" ]   echo "Set the AWS_SECRET_KEY environment variable"
  [ "$S3_BUCKET" ]   echo "Set the S3_BUCKET environment variable"
  [ "$S3_PATH" ]   echo "Set the S3_PATH environment variable"
  [ "$SCS_PATH" ]   echo "Set the SCS_PATH environment variable"
  finish 1
fi
if [ "$S3_REGION" ] && [ "$S3_REGION" != "us-east-1" ]; then
  EP_URL="endpoint=$S3_REGION,url=https://s3.$S3_REGION.amazonaws.com"
else
  EP_URL="endpoint=us-east-1"
fi
# Prepare working directory
WORK_DIR="$(mktemp -p "$HOME" -d)"
MNT_POINT="$WORK_DIR/s3data"
PASSWD_S3FS="$WORK_DIR/.passwd-s3fs"
# Check the moutpoint
if [ ! -d "$MNT_POINT" ]; then
  mkdir -p "$MNT_POINT"
elif mountpoint "$MNT_POINT"; then
  echo "There is already something mounted on '$MNT_POINT', aborting!"
  finish 1
fi
# Create password file
touch "$PASSWD_S3FS"
chmod 0400 "$PASSWD_S3FS"
echo "$AWS_KEY:$AWS_SECRET_KEY" >"$PASSWD_S3FS"
# Mount s3 bucket as a filesystem
s3fs -o dbglevel=info,retries=5 -o "$EP_URL" -o "passwd_file=$PASSWD_S3FS" \
  "$S3_BUCKET" "$MNT_POINT"
echo "Mounted bucket '$S3_BUCKET' on '$MNT_POINT'"
# Remove the password file, just in case
rm -f "$PASSWD_S3FS"
# Check source PATH
ret="0"
SRC_PATH="$MNT_POINT/$S3_PATH"
if [ ! -d "$SRC_PATH" ]; then
  echo "The S3_PATH '$S3_PATH' can't be found!"
  ret=1
fi
# Compute SCS_UID & SCS_GID (by default based on the working directory owner)
SCS_UID="$ SCS_UID:=$(stat -c "%u" "." 2>/dev/null) "   true
SCS_GID="$ SCS_GID:=$(stat -c "%g" "." 2>/dev/null) "   true
# Check destination PATH
DST_PATH="./$SCS_PATH"
if [ "$ret" -eq "0" ] && [ -d "$DST_PATH" ]; then
  mkdir -p "$DST_PATH"   ret="$?"
fi
# Copy using rsync
if [ "$ret" -eq "0" ]; then
  rsync -rlptv --chown="$SCS_UID:$SCS_GID" --delete --stats \
    "$SRC_PATH/" "$DST_PATH/"   ret="$?"
fi
# Unmount the S3 bucket
umount -f "$MNT_POINT"
echo "Called umount for '$MNT_POINT'"
# Remove mount point dir
rmdir "$MNT_POINT"
# Remove WORK_DIR
rmdir "$WORK_DIR"
# We are done
finish "$ret"
# vim: ts=2:sw=2:et:ai:sts=2

Deployment objectsThe system is deployed as a StatefulSet with one replica. Our production deployment is done on AWS and to be able to scale we use EFS for our PersistenVolume; the idea is that the volume has no size limit, its AccessMode can be set to ReadWriteMany and we can mount it from multiple instances of the Pod without issues, even if they are in different availability zones. For development we use k3d and we are also able to scale the StatefulSet for testing because we use a ReadWriteOnce PVC, but it points to a hostPath that is backed up by a folder that is mounted on all the compute nodes, so in reality Pods in different k3d nodes use the same folder on the host.

secrets.yamlThe secrets file contains the files used by the mysecureshell container that can be generated using kubernetes pods as follows (we are only creating the scs user):
$ kubectl run "mysecureshell" --restart='Never' --quiet --rm --stdin \
  --image "stodh/mysecureshell:latest" -- gen-host-keys >"./host_keys.txt"
$ kubectl run "mysecureshell" --restart='Never' --quiet --rm --stdin \
  --image "stodh/mysecureshell:latest" -- gen-users-tar scs >"./users.tar"
Once we have the files we can generate the secrets.yaml file as follows:
$ tar xf ./users.tar user_keys.txt user_pass.txt
$ kubectl --dry-run=client -o yaml create secret generic "scs-secret" \
  --from-file="host_keys.txt=host_keys.txt" \
  --from-file="user_keys.txt=user_keys.txt" \
  --from-file="user_pass.txt=user_pass.txt" > ./secrets.yaml
The resulting secrets.yaml will look like the following file (the base64 would match the content of the files, of course):
secrets.yaml
apiVersion: v1
data:
  host_keys.txt: TWlt...
  user_keys.txt: c2Nz...
  user_pass.txt: c2Nz...
kind: Secret
metadata:
  creationTimestamp: null
  name: scs-secret

pvc.yamlThe persistent volume claim for a simple deployment (one with only one instance of the statefulSet) can be as simple as this:
pvc.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
  name: scs-pvc
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: scs
spec:
  accessModes:
  - ReadWriteOnce
  resources:
    requests:
      storage: 8Gi
On this definition we don t set the storageClassName to use the default one.

Volumes in our development environment (k3d)In our development deployment we create the following PersistentVolume as required by the Local Persistence Volume Static Provisioner (note that the /volumes/scs-pv has to be created by hand, in our k3d system we mount the same host directory on the /volumes path of all the nodes and create the scs-pv directory by hand before deploying the persistent volume):
k3d-pv.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolume
metadata:
  name: scs-pv
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: scs
spec:
  capacity:
    storage: 8Gi
  volumeMode: Filesystem
  accessModes:
  - ReadWriteOnce
  persistentVolumeReclaimPolicy: Delete
  claimRef:
    name: scs-pvc
  storageClassName: local-storage
  local:
    path: /volumes/scs-pv
  nodeAffinity:
    required:
      nodeSelectorTerms:
      - matchExpressions:
        - key: node.kubernetes.io/instance-type
          operator: In
          values:
          - k3s
And to make sure that everything works as expected we update the PVC definition to add the right storageClassName:
k3d-pvc.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
  name: scs-pvc
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: scs
spec:
  accessModes:
  - ReadWriteOnce
  resources:
    requests:
      storage: 8Gi
  storageClassName: local-storage

Volumes in our production environment (aws)In the production deployment we don t create the PersistentVolume (we are using the aws-efs-csi-driver which supports Dynamic Provisioning) but we add the storageClassName (we set it to the one mapped to the EFS driver, i.e. efs-sc) and set ReadWriteMany as the accessMode:
efs-pvc.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
  name: scs-pvc
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: scs
spec:
  accessModes:
  - ReadWriteMany
  resources:
    requests:
      storage: 8Gi
  storageClassName: efs-sc

statefulset.yamlThe definition of the statefulSet is as follows:
statefulset.yaml
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: StatefulSet
metadata:
  name: scs
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: scs
spec:
  serviceName: scs
  replicas: 1
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: scs
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: scs
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: nginx
        image: stodh/nginx-scs:latest
        ports:
        - containerPort: 80
          name: http
        env:
        - name: AUTH_REQUEST_URI
          value: ""
        - name: HTML_ROOT
          value: /sftp/data
        volumeMounts:
        - mountPath: /sftp
          name: scs-datadir
      - name: mysecureshell
        image: stodh/mysecureshell:latest
        ports:
        - containerPort: 22
          name: ssh
        securityContext:
          capabilities:
            add:
            - IPC_OWNER
        env:
        - name: SFTP_UID
          value: '2020'
        - name: SFTP_GID
          value: '2020'
        volumeMounts:
        - mountPath: /secrets
          name: scs-file-secrets
          readOnly: true
        - mountPath: /sftp
          name: scs-datadir
      - name: webhook
        image: stodh/webhook-scs:latest
        securityContext:
          privileged: true
        ports:
        - containerPort: 9000
          name: webhook-http
        env:
        - name: WEBHOOK_WORKDIR
          value: /sftp/data/scs
        volumeMounts:
        - name: devfuse
          mountPath: /dev/fuse
        - mountPath: /sftp
          name: scs-datadir
      volumes:
      - name: devfuse
        hostPath:
          path: /dev/fuse
      - name: scs-file-secrets
        secret:
          secretName: scs-secrets
      - name: scs-datadir
        persistentVolumeClaim:
          claimName: scs-pvc
Notes about the containers:
  • nginx: As this is an example the web server is not using an AUTH_REQUEST_URI and uses the /sftp/data directory as the root of the web (to get to the files uploaded for the scs user we will need to use /scs/ as a prefix on the URLs).
  • mysecureshell: We are adding the IPC_OWNER capability to the container to be able to use some of the sftp-* commands inside it, but they are not really needed, so adding the capability is optional.
  • webhook: We are launching this container in privileged mode to be able to use the s3fs-fuse, as it will not work otherwise for now (see this kubernetes issue); if the functionality is not needed the container can be executed with regular privileges; besides, as we are not enabling public access to this service we don t define *_TOKEN variables (if required the values should be read from a Secret object).
Notes about the volumes:
  • the devfuse volume is only needed if we plan to use the s3fs command on the webhook container, if not we can remove the volume definition and its mounts.

service.yamlTo be able to access the different services on the statefulset we publish the relevant ports using the following Service object:
service.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
  name: scs-svc
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: scs
spec:
  ports:
  - name: ssh
    port: 22
    protocol: TCP
    targetPort: 22
  - name: http
    port: 80
    protocol: TCP
    targetPort: 80
  - name: webhook-http
    port: 9000
    protocol: TCP
    targetPort: 9000
  selector:
    app: scs

ingress.yamlTo download the scs files from the outside we can add an ingress object like the following (the definition is for testing using the localhost name):
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
  name: scs-ingress
  labels:
    app.kubernetes.io/name: scs
spec:
  ingressClassName: nginx
  rules:
  - host: 'localhost'
    http:
      paths:
      - path: /scs
        pathType: Prefix
        backend:
          service:
            name: scs-svc
            port:
              number: 80

DeploymentTo deploy the statefulSet we create a namespace and apply the object definitions shown before:
$ kubectl create namespace scs-demo
namespace/scs-demo created
$ kubectl -n scs-demo apply -f secrets.yaml
secret/scs-secrets created
$ kubectl -n scs-demo apply -f pvc.yaml
persistentvolumeclaim/scs-pvc created
$ kubectl -n scs-demo apply -f statefulset.yaml
statefulset.apps/scs created
$ kubectl -n scs-demo apply -f service.yaml
service/scs-svc created
$ kubectl -n scs-demo apply -f ingress.yaml
ingress.networking.k8s.io/scs-ingress created
Once the objects are deployed we can check that all is working using kubectl:
$ kubectl  -n scs-demo get all,secrets,ingress
NAME        READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
pod/scs-0   3/3     Running   0          24s
NAME            TYPE       CLUSTER-IP  EXTERNAL-IP  PORT(S)                  AGE
service/scs-svc ClusterIP  10.43.0.47  <none>       22/TCP,80/TCP,9000/TCP   21s

NAME                   READY   AGE
statefulset.apps/scs   1/1     24s
NAME                         TYPE                                  DATA   AGE
secret/default-token-mwcd7   kubernetes.io/service-account-token   3      53s
secret/scs-secrets           Opaque                                3      39s
NAME                                   CLASS  HOSTS      ADDRESS     PORTS   AGE
ingress.networking.k8s.io/scs-ingress  nginx  localhost  172.21.0.5  80      17s
At this point we are ready to use the system.

Usage examples

File uploadsAs previously mentioned in our system the idea is to use the sftp server from other Pods, but to test the system we are going to do a kubectl port-forward and connect to the server using our host client and the password we have generated (it is on the user_pass.txt file, inside the users.tar archive):
$ kubectl -n scs-demo port-forward service/scs-svc 2020:22 &
Forwarding from 127.0.0.1:2020 -> 22
Forwarding from [::1]:2020 -> 22
$ PF_PID=$!
$ sftp -P 2020 scs@127.0.0.1                                                 1
Handling connection for 2020
The authenticity of host '[127.0.0.1]:2020 ([127.0.0.1]:2020)' can't be \
  established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:eHNwCnyLcSSuVXXiLKeGraw0FT/4Bb/yjfqTstt+088.
This key is not known by any other names
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '[127.0.0.1]:2020' (ED25519) to the list of known \
  hosts.
scs@127.0.0.1's password: **********
Connected to 127.0.0.1.
sftp> ls -la
drwxr-xr-x    2 sftp     sftp         4096 Sep 25 14:47 .
dr-xr-xr-x    3 sftp     sftp         4096 Sep 25 14:36 ..
sftp> !date -R > /tmp/date.txt                                               2
sftp> put /tmp/date.txt .
Uploading /tmp/date.txt to /date.txt
date.txt                                      100%   32    27.8KB/s   00:00
sftp> ls -l
-rw-r--r--    1 sftp     sftp           32 Sep 25 15:21 date.txt
sftp> ln date.txt date.txt.1                                                 3
sftp> ls -l
-rw-r--r--    2 sftp     sftp           32 Sep 25 15:21 date.txt
-rw-r--r--    2 sftp     sftp           32 Sep 25 15:21 date.txt.1
sftp> put /tmp/date.txt date.txt.2                                           4
Uploading /tmp/date.txt to /date.txt.2
date.txt                                      100%   32    27.8KB/s   00:00
sftp> ls -l                                                                  5
-rw-r--r--    2 sftp     sftp           32 Sep 25 15:21 date.txt
-rw-r--r--    2 sftp     sftp           32 Sep 25 15:21 date.txt.1
-rw-r--r--    1 sftp     sftp           32 Sep 25 15:21 date.txt.2
sftp> exit
$ kill "$PF_PID"
[1]  + terminated  kubectl -n scs-demo port-forward service/scs-svc 2020:22
  1. We connect to the sftp service on the forwarded port with the scs user.
  2. We put a file we have created on the host on the directory.
  3. We do a hard link of the uploaded file.
  4. We put a second copy of the file we created locally.
  5. On the file list we can see that the two first files have two hardlinks

File retrievalsIf our ingress is configured right we can download the date.txt file from the URL http://localhost/scs/date.txt:
$ curl -s http://localhost/scs/date.txt
Sun, 25 Sep 2022 17:21:51 +0200

Use of the webhook containerTo finish this post we are going to show how we can call the hooks directly, from a CronJob and from a Job.

Direct script call (du)In our deployment the direct calls are done from other Pods, to simulate it we are going to do a port-forward and call the script with an existing PATH (the root directory) and a bad one:
$ kubectl -n scs-demo port-forward service/scs-svc 9000:9000 >/dev/null &
$ PF_PID=$!
$ JSON="$(curl -s "http://localhost:9000/hooks/du?path=.")"
$ echo $JSON
 "path":"","bytes":"4160" 
$ JSON="$(curl -s "http://localhost:9000/hooks/du?path=foo")"
$ echo $JSON
 "error":"The provided PATH ('foo') is not a directory" 
$ kill $PF_PID
As we only have files on the base directory we print the disk usage of the . PATH and the output is in json format because we export OUTPUT_FORMAT with the value json on the webhook configuration.

Jobs (s3sync)The following job can be used to synchronise the contents of a directory in a S3 bucket with the SCS Filesystem:
job.yaml
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
  name: s3sync
  labels:
    cronjob: 's3sync'
spec:
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        cronjob: 's3sync'
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: s3sync-job
        image: alpine:latest
        command: 
        - "wget"
        - "-q"
        - "--header"
        - "Content-Type: application/json"
        - "--post-file"
        - "/secrets/s3sync.json"
        - "-O-"
        - "http://scs-svc:9000/hooks/s3sync"
        volumeMounts:
        - mountPath: /secrets
          name: job-secrets
          readOnly: true
      restartPolicy: Never
      volumes:
      - name: job-secrets
        secret:
          secretName: webhook-job-secrets
The file with parameters for the script must be something like this:
s3sync.json
 
  "aws":  
    "key": "********************",
    "secret_key": "****************************************"
   ,
  "s3":  
    "region": "eu-north-1",
    "bucket": "blogops-test",
    "path": "test"
   ,
  "scs":  
    "path": "test"
   
 
Once we have both files we can run the Job as follows:
$ kubectl -n scs-demo create secret generic webhook-job-secrets \            1
  --from-file="s3sync.json=s3sync.json"
secret/webhook-job-secrets created
$ kubectl -n scs-demo apply -f webhook-job.yaml                              2
job.batch/s3sync created
$ kubectl -n scs-demo get pods -l "cronjob=s3sync"                           3
NAME           READY   STATUS      RESTARTS   AGE
s3sync-zx2cj   0/1     Completed   0          12s
$ kubectl -n scs-demo logs s3sync-zx2cj                                      4
Mounted bucket 's3fs-test' on '/root/tmp.jiOjaF/s3data'
sending incremental file list
created directory ./test
./
kyso.png
Number of files: 2 (reg: 1, dir: 1)
Number of created files: 2 (reg: 1, dir: 1)
Number of deleted files: 0
Number of regular files transferred: 1
Total file size: 15,075 bytes
Total transferred file size: 15,075 bytes
Literal data: 15,075 bytes
Matched data: 0 bytes
File list size: 0
File list generation time: 0.147 seconds
File list transfer time: 0.000 seconds
Total bytes sent: 15,183
Total bytes received: 74
sent 15,183 bytes  received 74 bytes  30,514.00 bytes/sec
total size is 15,075  speedup is 0.99
Called umount for '/root/tmp.jiOjaF/s3data'
Script exit code: 0
$ kubectl -n scs-demo delete -f webhook-job.yaml                             5
job.batch "s3sync" deleted
$ kubectl -n scs-demo delete secrets webhook-job-secrets                     6
secret "webhook-job-secrets" deleted
  1. Here we create the webhook-job-secrets secret that contains the s3sync.json file.
  2. This command runs the job.
  3. Checking the label cronjob=s3sync we get the Pods executed by the job.
  4. Here we print the logs of the completed job.
  5. Once we are finished we remove the Job.
  6. And also the secret.

Final remarksThis post has been longer than I expected, but I believe it can be useful for someone; in any case, next time I ll try to explain something shorter or will split it into multiple entries.

4 August 2022

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in July 2022

Welcome to the July 2022 report from the Reproducible Builds project! In our reports we attempt to outline the most relevant things that have been going on in the past month. As a brief introduction, the reproducible builds effort is concerned with ensuring no flaws have been introduced during this compilation process by promising identical results are always generated from a given source, thus allowing multiple third-parties to come to a consensus on whether a build was compromised. As ever, if you are interested in contributing to the project, please visit our Contribute page on our website.

Reproducible Builds summit 2022 Despite several delays, we are pleased to announce that registration is open for our in-person summit this year: November 1st November 3rd
The event will happen in Venice (Italy). We intend to pick a venue reachable via the train station and an international airport. However, the precise venue will depend on the number of attendees. Please see the announcement email for information about how to register.

Is reproducibility practical? Ludovic Court s published an informative blog post this month asking the important question: Is reproducibility practical?:
Our attention was recently caught by a nice slide deck on the methods and tools for reproducible research in the R programming language. Among those, the talk mentions Guix, stating that it is for professional, sensitive applications that require ultimate reproducibility , which is probably a bit overkill for Reproducible Research . While we were flattered to see Guix suggested as good tool for reproducibility, the very notion that there s a kind of reproducibility that is ultimate and, essentially, impractical, is something that left us wondering: What kind of reproducibility do scientists need, if not the ultimate kind? Is reproducibility practical at all, or is it more of a horizon?
The post goes on to outlines the concept of reproducibility, situating examples within the context of the GNU Guix operating system.

diffoscope diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility. Not only can it locate and diagnose reproducibility issues, it can provide human-readable diffs from many kinds of binary formats. This month, Chris Lamb prepared and uploaded versions 218, 219 and 220 to Debian, as well as made the following changes:
  • New features:
  • Bug fixes:
    • Fix a regression introduced in version 207 where diffoscope would crash if one directory contained a directory that wasn t in the other. Thanks to Alderico Gallo for the testcase. [ ]
    • Don t traceback if we encounter an invalid Unicode character in Haskell versioning headers. [ ]
  • Output improvements:
  • Codebase improvements:
    • Space out a file a little. [ ]
    • Update various copyright years. [ ]

Mailing list On our mailing list this month:
  • Roland Clobus posted his Eleventh status update about reproducible [Debian] live-build ISO images, noting amongst many other things! that all major desktops build reproducibly with bullseye, bookworm and sid.
  • Santiago Torres-Arias announced a Call for Papers (CfP) for a new SCORED conference, an academic workshop around software supply chain security . As Santiago highlights, this new conference invites reviewers from industry, open source, governement and academia to review the papers [and] I think that this is super important to tackle the supply chain security task .

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. This month, however, we submitted the following patches:

Reprotest reprotest is the Reproducible Builds project s end-user tool to build the same source code twice in widely and deliberate different environments, and checking whether the binaries produced by the builds have any differences. This month, the following changes were made:
  • Holger Levsen:
    • Uploaded version 0.7.21 to Debian unstable as well as mark 0.7.22 development in the repository [ ].
    • Make diffoscope dependency unversioned as the required version is met even in Debian buster. [ ]
    • Revert an accidentally committed hunk. [ ]
  • Mattia Rizzolo:
    • Apply a patch from Nick Rosbrook to not force the tests to run only against Python 3.9. [ ]
    • Run the tests through pybuild in order to run them against all supported Python 3.x versions. [ ]
    • Fix a deprecation warning in the setup.cfg file. [ ]
    • Close a new Debian bug. [ ]

Reproducible builds website A number of changes were made to the Reproducible Builds website and documentation this month, including:
  • Arnout Engelen:
  • Chris Lamb:
    • Correct some grammar. [ ]
  • Holger Levsen:
    • Add talk from FOSDEM 2015 presented by Holger and Lunar. [ ]
    • Show date of presentations if we have them. [ ][ ]
    • Add my presentation from DebConf22 [ ] and from Debian Reunion Hamburg 2022 [ ].
    • Add dhole to the speakers of the DebConf15 talk. [ ]
    • Add raboof s talk Reproducible Builds for Trustworthy Binaries from May Contain Hackers. [ ]
    • Drop some Debian-related suggested ideas which are not really relevant anymore. [ ]
    • Add a link to list of packages with patches ready to be NMUed. [ ]
  • Mattia Rizzolo:
    • Add information about our upcoming event in Venice. [ ][ ][ ][ ]

Testing framework The Reproducible Builds project runs a significant testing framework at tests.reproducible-builds.org, to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. This month, Holger Levsen made the following changes:
  • Debian-related changes:
    • Create graphs displaying existing .buildinfo files per each Debian suite/arch. [ ][ ]
    • Fix a typo in the Debian dashboard. [ ][ ]
    • Fix some issues in the pkg-r package set definition. [ ][ ][ ]
    • Improve the builtin-pho HTML output. [ ][ ][ ][ ]
    • Temporarily disable all live builds as our snapshot mirror is offline. [ ]
  • Automated node health checks:
    • Detect dpkg failures. [ ]
    • Detect files with bad UNIX permissions. [ ]
    • Relax a regular expression in order to detect Debian Live image build failures. [ ]
  • Misc changes:
    • Test that FreeBSD virtual machine has been updated to version 13.1. [ ]
    • Add a reminder about powercycling the armhf-architecture mst0X node. [ ]
    • Fix a number of typos. [ ][ ]
    • Update documentation. [ ][ ]
    • Fix Munin monitoring configuration for some nodes. [ ]
    • Fix the static IP address for a node. [ ]
In addition, Vagrant Cascadian updated host keys for the cbxi4pro0 and wbq0 nodes [ ] and, finally, node maintenance was also performed by Mattia Rizzolo [ ] and Holger Levsen [ ][ ][ ].

Contact As ever, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

1 August 2022

Sergio Talens-Oliag: Using Git Server Hooks on GitLab CE to Validate Tags

Since a long time ago I ve been a gitlab-ce user, in fact I ve set it up on three of the last four companies I ve worked for (initially I installed it using the omnibus packages on a debian server but on the last two places I moved to the docker based installation, as it is easy to maintain and we don t need a big installation as the teams using it are small). On the company I work for now (kyso) we are using it to host all our internal repositories and to do all the CI/CD work (the automatic deployments are triggered by web hooks in some cases, but the rest is all done using gitlab-ci). The majority of projects are using nodejs as programming language and we have automated the publication of npm packages on our gitlab instance npm registry and even the publication into the npmjs registry. To publish the packages we have added rules to the gitlab-ci configuration of the relevant repositories and we publish them when a tag is created. As the we are lazy by definition, I configured the system to use the tag as the package version; I tested if the contents of the package.json where in sync with the expected version and if it was not I updated it and did a force push of the tag with the updated file using the following code on the script that publishes the package:
# Update package version & add it to the .build-args
INITIAL_PACKAGE_VERSION="$(npm pkg get version tr -d '"')"
npm version --allow-same --no-commit-hooks --no-git-tag-version \
  "$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
UPDATED_PACKAGE_VERSION="$(npm pkg get version tr -d '"')"
echo "UPDATED_PACKAGE_VERSION=$UPDATED_PACKAGE_VERSION" >> .build-args
# Update tag if the version was updated or abort
if [ "$INITIAL_PACKAGE_VERSION" != "$UPDATED_PACKAGE_VERSION" ]; then
  if [ -n "$CI_GIT_USER" ] && [ -n "$CI_GIT_TOKEN" ]; then
    git commit -m "Updated version from tag $CI_COMMIT_TAG" package.json
    git tag -f "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" -m "Updated version from tag"
    git push -f -o ci.skip origin "$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
  else
    echo "!!! ERROR !!!"
    echo "The updated tag could not be uploaded."
    echo "Set CI_GIT_USER and CI_GIT_TOKEN or fix the 'package.json' file"
    echo "!!! ERROR !!!"
    exit 1
  fi
fi
This feels a little dirty (we are leaving commits on the tag but not updating the original branch); I thought about trying to find the branch using the tag and update it, but I drop the idea pretty soon as there were multiple issues to consider (i.e. we can have tags pointing to commits present in multiple branches and even if it only points to one the tag does not have to be the HEAD of the branch making the inclusion difficult). In any case this system was working, so we left it until we started to publish to the NPM Registry; as we are using a token to push the packages that we don t want all developers to have access to (right now it would not matter, but when the team grows it will) I started to use gitlab protected branches on the projects that need it and adjusting the .npmrc file using protected variables. The problem then was that we can no longer do a standard force push for a branch (that is the main point of the protected branches feature) unless we use the gitlab api, so the tags with the wrong version started to fail. As the way things were being done seemed dirty anyway I thought that the best way of fixing things was to forbid users to push a tag that includes a version that does not match the package.json version. After thinking about it we decided to use githooks on the gitlab server for the repositories that need it, as we are only interested in tags we are going to use the update hook; it is executed once for each ref to be updated, and takes three parameters:
  • the name of the ref being updated,
  • the old object name stored in the ref,
  • and the new object name to be stored in the ref.
To install our hook we have found the gitaly relative path of each repo and located it on the server filesystem (as I said we are using docker and the gitlab s data directory is on /srv/gitlab/data, so the path to the repo has the form /srv/gitlab/data/git-data/repositories/@hashed/xx/yy/hash.git). Once we have the directory we need to:
  • create a custom_hooks sub directory inside it,
  • add the update script (as we only need one script we used that instead of creating an update.d directory, the good thing is that this will also work with a standard git server renaming the base directory to hooks instead of custom_hooks),
  • make it executable, and
  • change the directory and file ownership to make sure it can be read and executed from the gitlab container
On a console session:
$ cd /srv/gitlab/data/git-data/repositories/@hashed/xx/yy/hash.git
$ mkdir custom_hooks
$ edit_or_copy custom_hooks/update
$ chmod 0755 custom_hooks/update
$ chown --reference=. -R custom_hooks
The update script we are using is as follows:
#!/bin/sh
set -e
# kyso update hook
#
# Right now it checks version.txt or package.json versions against the tag name
# (it supports a 'v' prefix on the tag)
# Arguments
ref_name="$1"
old_rev="$2"
new_rev="$3"
# Initial test
if [ -z "$ref_name" ]    [ -z "$old_rev" ]   [ -z "$new_rev" ]; then
  echo "usage: $0 <ref> <oldrev> <newrev>" >&2
  exit 1
fi
# Get the tag short name
tag_name="$ ref_name##refs/tags/ "
# Exit if the update is not for a tag
if [ "$tag_name" = "$ref_name" ]; then
  exit 0
fi
# Get the null rev value (string of zeros)
zero=$(git hash-object --stdin </dev/null   tr '0-9a-f' '0')
# Get if the tag is new or not
if [ "$old_rev" = "$zero" ]; then
  new_tag="true"
else
  new_tag="false"
fi
# Get the type of revision:
# - delete: if the new_rev is zero
# - commit: annotated tag
# - tag: un-annotated tag
if [ "$new_rev" = "$zero" ]; then
  new_rev_type="delete"
else
  new_rev_type="$(git cat-file -t "$new_rev")"
fi
# Exit if we are deleting a tag (nothing to check here)
if [ "$new_rev_type" = "delete" ]; then
  exit 0
fi
# Check the version against the tag (supports version.txt & package.json)
if git cat-file -e "$new_rev:version.txt" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  version="$(git cat-file -p "$new_rev:version.txt")"
  if [ "$version" = "$tag_name" ]   [ "$version" = "$ tag_name#v " ]; then
    exit 0
  else
    EMSG="tag '$tag_name' and 'version.txt' contents '$version' don't match"
    echo "GL-HOOK-ERR: $EMSG"
    exit 1
  fi
elif git cat-file -e "$new_rev:package.json" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  version="$(
    git cat-file -p "$new_rev:package.json"   jsonpath version   tr -d '\[\]"'
  )"
  if [ "$version" = "$tag_name" ]   [ "$version" = "$ tag_name#v " ]; then
    exit 0
  else
    EMSG="tag '$tag_name' and 'package.json' version '$version' don't match"
    echo "GL-HOOK-ERR: $EMSG"
    exit 1
  fi
else
  # No version.txt or package.json file found
  exit 0
fi
Some comments about it:
  • we are only looking for tags, if the ref_name does not have the prefix refs/tags/ the script does an exit 0,
  • although we are checking if the tag is new or not we are not using the value (in gitlab that is handled by the protected tag feature),
  • if we are deleting a tag the script does an exit 0, we don t need to check anything in that case,
  • we are ignoring if the tag is annotated or not (we set the new_rev_type to tag or commit, but we don t use the value),
  • we test first the version.txt file and if it does not exist we check the package.json file, if it does not exist either we do an exit 0, as there is no version to check against and we allow that on a tag,
  • we add the GL-HOOK-ERR: prefix to the messages to show them on the gitlab web interface (can be tested creating a tag from it),
  • to get the version on the package.json file we use the jsonpath binary (it is installed by the jsonpath ruby gem) because it is available on the gitlab container (initially I used sed to get the value, but a real JSON parser is always a better option).
Once the hook is installed when a user tries to push a tag to a repository that has a version.txt file or package.json file and the tag does not match the version (if version.txt is present it takes precedence) the push fails. If the tag matches or the files are not present the tag is added if the user has permission to add it in gitlab (our hook is only executed if the user is allowed to create or update the tag).

19 July 2022

Craig Small: Linux Memory Statistics

Pretty much everyone who has spent some time on a command line in Linux would have looked at the free command. This command provides some overall statistics on the memory and how it is used. Typical output looks something like this:
             total        used        free      shared  buff/cache  available
Mem:      32717924     3101156    26950016      143608     2666752  29011928
Swap:      1000444           0     1000444
Memory sits in the first row after the headers then we have the swap statistics. Most of the numbers are directly fetched from the procfs file /proc/meminfo which are scaled and presented to the user. A good example of a simple stat is total, which is just the MemTotal row located in that file. For the rest of this post, I ll make the rows from /proc/meminfo have an amber background. What is Free, and what is Used? While you could say that the free value is also merely the MemFree row, this is where Linux memory statistics start to get odd. While that value is indeed what is found for MemFree and not a calculated field, it can be misleading. Most people would assume that Free means free to use, with the implication that only this amount of memory is free to use and nothing more. That would also mean the used value is really used by something and nothing else can use it. In the early days of free and Linux statistics in general that was how it looked. Used is a calculated field (there is no MemUsed row) and was, initially, Total - Free. The problem was, Used also included Buffers and Cached values. This meant that it looked like Linux was using a lot of memory for something. If you read old messages before 2002 that are talking about excessive memory use, they quite likely are looking at the values printed by free. The thing was, under memory pressure the kernel could release Buffers and Cached for use. Not all of the storage but some of it so it wasn t all used. To counter this, free showed a row between Memory and Swap with Used having Buffers and Cached removed and Free having the same values added:
             total       used       free     shared    buffers     cached
Mem:      32717924    6063648   26654276          0     313552    2234436
-/+ buffers/cache:    3515660   29202264
Swap:      1000444          0    1000444
You might notice that this older version of free from around 2001 shows buffers and cached separately and there s no available column (we ll get to Available later.) Shared appears as zero because the old row was labelled MemShared and not Shmem which was changed in Linux 2.6 and I m running a system way past that version. It s not ideal, you can say that the amount of free memory is something above 26654276 and below 29202264 KiB but nothing more accurate. buffers and cached are almost never all-used or all-unused so the real figure is not either of those numbers but something in-between. Cached, just not for Caches That appeared to be an uneasy truce within the Linux memory statistics world for a while. By 2014 we realised that there was a problem with Cached. This field used to have the memory used for a cache for files read from storage. While this value still has that component, it was also being used for tmpfs storage and the use of tmpfs went from an interesting idea to being everywhere. Cheaper memory meant larger tmpfs partitions went from a luxury to something everyone was doing. The problem is with large files put into a tmpfs partition the Free would decrease, but so would Cached meaning the free column in the -/+ row would not change much and understate the impact of files in tmpfs. Lucky enough in Linux 2.6.32 the developers added a Shmem row which was the amount of memory used for shmem and tmpfs. Subtracting that value from Cached gave you the real cached value which we call main_cache and very briefly this is what the cached value would show in free. However, this caused further problems because not all Shem can be reclaimed and reused and probably swapped one set of problematic values for another. It did however prompt the Linux kernel community to have a look at the problem. Enter Available There was increasing awareness of the issues with working out how much memory a system has free within the kernel community. It wasn t just the output of free or the percentage values in top, but load balancer or workload placing systems would have their own view of this value. As memory management and use within the Linux kernel evolved, what was or wasn t free changed and all the userland programs were expected somehow to keep up. The kernel developers realised the best place to get an estimate of the memory not used was in the kernel and they created a new memory statistic called Available. That way if how the memory is used or set to be unreclaimable they could change it and userland programs would go along with it. procps has a fallback for this value and it s a pretty complicated setup.
  1. Find the min_free_kybtes setting in sysfs which is the minimum amount of free memory the kernel will handle
  2. Add a 25% to this value (e.g. if it was 4000 make it 5000), this is the low watermark
  3. To find available, start with MemFree and subtract the low watermark
  4. If half of both Inactive(file) and Active(file) values are greater than the low watermark, add that half value otherwise add the sum of the values minus the low watermark
  5. If half of Slab Claimable is greater than the low watermark, add that half value otherwise add Slab Claimable minus the low watermark
  6. If what you get is less than zero, make available zero
  7. Or, just look at Available in /proc/meminfo
For the free program, we added the Available value and the +/- line was removed. The main_cache value was Cached + Slab while Used was calculated as Total - Free - main_cache - Buffers. This was very close to what the Used column in the +/- line used to show. What s on the Slab? The next issue that came across was the use of slabs. At this point, main_cache was Cached + Slab, but Slab consists of reclaimable and unreclaimable components. One part of Slab can be used elsewhere if needed and the other cannot but the procps tools treated them the same. The Used calculation should not subtract SUnreclaim from the Total because it is actually being used. So in 2015 main_cache was changed to be Cached + SReclaimable. This meant that Used memory was calculated as Total - Free - Cached - SReclaimable - Buffers. Revenge of tmpfs and the return of Available The tmpfs impacting Cached was still an issue. If you added a 10MB file into a tmpfs partition, then Free would reduce by 10MB and Cached would increase by 10MB meaning Used stayed unchanged even though 10MB had gone somewhere. It was time to retire the complex calculation of Used. For procps 4.0.1 onwards, Used now means not available . We take the Total memory and subtract the Available memory. This is not a perfect setup but it is probably going to be the best one we have and testing is giving us much more sensible results. It s also easier for people to understand (take the total value you see in free, then subtract the available value). What does that mean for main_cache which is part of the buff/cache value you see? As this value is no longer in the used memory calculation, it is less important. Should it also be reverted to simply Cached without the reclaimable Slabs? The calculated fields In summary, what this means for the calculated fields in procps at least is:
  • Used: Total - Available, unless Available is not present then it s Total Free
  • Cached: Cached + Reclaimable Slabs
  • Swap/Low/HighUsed: Corresponding Total - Free (no change here)
Almost everything else, with the exception of some bounds checking, is what you get out of /proc/meminfo which is straight from the kernel.

13 July 2022

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in June 2022

Welcome to the June 2022 report from the Reproducible Builds project. In these reports, we outline the most important things that we have been up to over the past month. As a quick recap, whilst anyone may inspect the source code of free software for malicious flaws, almost all software is distributed to end users as pre-compiled binaries.

Save the date! Despite several delays, we are pleased to announce dates for our in-person summit this year: November 1st 2022 November 3rd 2022
The event will happen in/around Venice (Italy), and we intend to pick a venue reachable via the train station and an international airport. However, the precise venue will depend on the number of attendees. Please see the announcement mail from Mattia Rizzolo, and do keep an eye on the mailing list for further announcements as it will hopefully include registration instructions.

News David Wheeler filed an issue against the Rust programming language to report that builds are not reproducible because full path to the source code is in the panic and debug strings . Luckily, as one of the responses mentions: the --remap-path-prefix solves this problem and has been used to great effect in build systems that rely on reproducibility (Bazel, Nix) to work at all and that there are efforts to teach cargo about it here .
The Python Security team announced that:
The ctx hosted project on PyPI was taken over via user account compromise and replaced with a malicious project which contained runtime code which collected the content of os.environ.items() when instantiating Ctx objects. The captured environment variables were sent as a base64 encoded query parameter to a Heroku application [ ]
As their announcement later goes onto state, version-pinning using hash-checking mode can prevent this attack, although this does depend on specific installations using this mode, rather than a prevention that can be applied systematically.
Developer vanitasvitae published an interesting and entertaining blog post detailing the blow-by-blow steps of debugging a reproducibility issue in PGPainless, a library which aims to make using OpenPGP in Java projects as simple as possible . Whilst their in-depth research into the internals of the .jar may have been unnecessary given that diffoscope would have identified the, it must be said that there is something to be said with occasionally delving into seemingly low-level details, as well describing any debugging process. Indeed, as vanitasvitae writes:
Yes, this would have spared me from 3h of debugging But I probably would also not have gone onto this little dive into the JAR/ZIP format, so in the end I m not mad.

Kees Cook published a short and practical blog post detailing how he uses reproducibility properties to aid work to replace one-element arrays in the Linux kernel. Kees approach is based on the principle that if a (small) proposed change is considered equivalent by the compiler, then the generated output will be identical but only if no other arbitrary or unrelated changes are introduced. Kees mentions the fantastic diffoscope tool, as well as various kernel-specific build options (eg. KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP) in order to prepare my build with the known to disrupt code layout options disabled .
Stefano Zacchiroli gave a presentation at GDR S curit Informatique based in part on a paper co-written with Chris Lamb titled Increasing the Integrity of Software Supply Chains. (Tweet)

Debian In Debian in this month, 28 reviews of Debian packages were added, 35 were updated and 27 were removed this month adding to our knowledge about identified issues. Two issue types were added: nondeterministic_checksum_generated_by_coq and nondetermistic_js_output_from_webpack. After Holger Levsen found hundreds of packages in the bookworm distribution that lack .buildinfo files, he uploaded 404 source packages to the archive (with no meaningful source changes). Currently bookworm now shows only 8 packages without .buildinfo files, and those 8 are fixed in unstable and should migrate shortly. By contrast, Debian unstable will always have packages without .buildinfo files, as this is how they come through the NEW queue. However, as these packages were not built on the official build servers (ie. they were uploaded by the maintainer) they will never migrate to Debian testing. In the future, therefore, testing should never have packages without .buildinfo files again. Roland Clobus posted yet another in-depth status report about his progress making the Debian Live images build reproducibly to our mailing list. In this update, Roland mentions that all major desktops build reproducibly with bullseye, bookworm and sid but also goes on to outline the progress made with automated testing of the generated images using openQA.

GNU Guix Vagrant Cascadian made a significant number of contributions to GNU Guix: Elsewhere in GNU Guix, Ludovic Court s published a paper in the journal The Art, Science, and Engineering of Programming called Building a Secure Software Supply Chain with GNU Guix:
This paper focuses on one research question: how can [Guix]((https://www.gnu.org/software/guix/) and similar systems allow users to securely update their software? [ ] Our main contribution is a model and tool to authenticate new Git revisions. We further show how, building on Git semantics, we build protections against downgrade attacks and related threats. We explain implementation choices. This work has been deployed in production two years ago, giving us insight on its actual use at scale every day. The Git checkout authentication at its core is applicable beyond the specific use case of Guix, and we think it could benefit to developer teams that use Git.
A full PDF of the text is available.

openSUSE In the world of openSUSE, SUSE announced at SUSECon that they are preparing to meet SLSA level 4. (SLSA (Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts) is a new industry-led standardisation effort that aims to protect the integrity of the software supply chain.) However, at the time of writing, timestamps within RPM archives are not normalised, so bit-for-bit identical reproducible builds are not possible. Some in-toto provenance files published for SUSE s SLE-15-SP4 as one result of the SLSA level 4 effort. Old binaries are not rebuilt, so only new builds (e.g. maintenance updates) have this metadata added. Lastly, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted his usual monthly openSUSE reproducible builds status report.

diffoscope diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility. Not only can it locate and diagnose reproducibility issues, it can provide human-readable diffs from many kinds of binary formats. This month, Chris Lamb prepared and uploaded versions 215, 216 and 217 to Debian unstable. Chris Lamb also made the following changes:
  • New features:
    • Print profile output if we were called with --profile and we were killed via a TERM signal. This should help in situations where diffoscope is terminated due to some sort of timeout. [ ]
    • Support both PyPDF 1.x and 2.x. [ ]
  • Bug fixes:
    • Also catch IndexError exceptions (in addition to ValueError) when parsing .pyc files. (#1012258)
    • Correct the logic for supporting different versions of the argcomplete module. [ ]
  • Output improvements:
    • Don t leak the (likely-temporary) pathname when comparing PDF documents. [ ]
  • Logging improvements:
    • Update test fixtures for GNU readelf 2.38 (now in Debian unstable). [ ][ ]
    • Be more specific about the minimum required version of readelf (ie. binutils), as it appears that this patch level version change resulted in a change of output, not the minor version. [ ]
    • Use our @skip_unless_tool_is_at_least decorator (NB. at_least) over @skip_if_tool_version_is (NB. is) to fix tests under Debian stable. [ ]
    • Emit a warning if/when we are handling a UNIX TERM signal. [ ]
  • Codebase improvements:
    • Clarify in what situations the main finally block gets called with respect to TERM signal handling. [ ]
    • Clarify control flow in the diffoscope.profiling module. [ ]
    • Correctly package the scripts/ directory. [ ]
In addition, Edward Betts updated a broken link to the RSS on the diffoscope homepage and Vagrant Cascadian updated the diffoscope package in GNU Guix [ ][ ][ ].

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

Testing framework The Reproducible Builds project runs a significant testing framework at tests.reproducible-builds.org, to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. This month, the following changes were made:
  • Holger Levsen:
    • Add a package set for packages that use the R programming language [ ] as well as one for Rust [ ].
    • Improve package set matching for Python [ ] and font-related [ ] packages.
    • Install the lz4, lzop and xz-utils packages on all nodes in order to detect running kernels. [ ]
    • Improve the cleanup mechanisms when testing the reproducibility of Debian Live images. [ ][ ]
    • In the automated node health checks, deprioritise the generic kernel warning . [ ]
  • Roland Clobus (Debian Live image reproducibility):
    • Add various maintenance jobs to the Jenkins view. [ ]
    • Cleanup old workspaces after 24 hours. [ ]
    • Cleanup temporary workspace and resulting directories. [ ]
    • Implement a number of fixes and improvements around publishing files. [ ][ ][ ]
    • Don t attempt to preserve the file timestamps when copying artifacts. [ ]
And finally, node maintenance was also performed by Mattia Rizzolo [ ].

Mailing list and website On our mailing list this month: Lastly, Chris Lamb updated the main Reproducible Builds website and documentation in a number of small ways, but primarily published an interview with Hans-Christoph Steiner of the F-Droid project. Chris Lamb also added a Coffeescript example for parsing and using the SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH environment variable [ ]. In addition, Sebastian Crane very-helpfully updated the screenshot of salsa.debian.org s request access button on the How to join the Salsa group. [ ]

Contact If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

29 June 2022

Russell Coker: Philips 438P1 43 4K Monitor

I have just returned a Philips 438P1 43 4K Monitor [1] and gone back to my Samsung 28 4K monitor model LU28E590DS/XY AKA UE590. The main listed differences are the size and the fact that the Samsung is TN but the Philips is IPS. Here s a comparison of TN and IPS technologies [2]. Generally I think that TN is probably best for a monitor but in theory IPS shouldn t be far behind. The Philips monitor has a screen with a shiny surface which may be good for a TV but isn t good for a monitor. Also it seemed to blur the pixels a bit which again is probably OK for a TV that is trying to emulate curved images but not good for a monitor where it s all artificial straight lines. The most important thing for me in a monitor is how well it displays text in small fonts, for that I don t really want the round parts of the letters to look genuinely round as a clear octagon or rectangle is better than a fuzzy circle. There is some controversy about the ideal size for monitors. Some people think that nothing larger than 28 is needed and some people think that a 43 is totally usable. After testing I determined that 43 is really too big, I had to move to see it all. Also for my use it s convenient to be able to turn a monitor slightly to allow someone else to get a good view and a 43 monitor is too large to move much (maybe future technology for lighter monitors will change this). Previously I had been unable to get my Samsung monitor to work at 4K resolution with 60Hz and had believed it was due to cheap video cards. I got the Philips monitor to work with HDMI so it s apparent that the Samsung monitor doesn t do 4K@60Hz on HDMI. This isn t a real problem as the Samsung monitor doesn t have built in speakers. The Philips monitor has built in speakers for HDMI sound which means one less cable to my PC and no desk space taken by speakers. I bought the Philips monitor on eBay in opened unused condition. Inside the box was a sheet with a printout stating that the monitor blanks the screen periodically, so the seller knew that it wasn t in unused condition, it was tested and failed the test. If the Philips monitor had been as minimally broken as described then I might have kept it. However it seems that certain patterns of input caused it to reboot. For example I could be watching Netflix and have it drop out, I would press the left arrow to watch that bit again and have it drop out again. On one occasion I did a test and found that a 5 second section of Netflix content caused the monitor to reboot on 6/8 times I viewed it. The workaround I discovered was to switch between maximised window and full-screen mode when it had a dropout. So I just press left-arrow and then F and I can keep watching. That s not what I expect from a $700 monitor! I considered checking for Philips firmware updates but decided against it because I didn t want to risk voiding the warranty if it didn t work correctly and I decided I just didn t like the monitor that much. Ideally for my next monitor I ll get a 4K screen of about 35 , TN, and a screen that s not shiny. At the moment there doesn t seem to be many monitors between 32 and 43 in size, so 32 may do. I am quite happy with the Samsung monitor so getting the same but slightly larger is fine. It s a pity they stopped making 5K displays.

25 June 2022

Ryan Kavanagh: Routable network addresses with OpenIKED and systemd-networkd

I ve been using OpenIKED for some time now to configure my VPN. One of its features is that it can dynamically assign addresses on the internal network to clients, and clients can assign these addresses and routes to interfaces. However, these interfaces must exist before iked can start. Some months ago I switched my Debian laptop s configuration from the traditional ifupdown to systemd-networkd. It took me some time to figure out how to have systemd-networkd create dummy interfaces on which iked can install addresses, but also not interfere with iked by trying to manage these interfaces. Here is my working configuration. First, I have systemd create the interface dummy1 by creating a systemd.netdev(5) configuration file at /etc/systemd/network/20-dummy1.netdev:
[NetDev]
Name=dummy1
Kind=dummy 
Then I tell systemd not to manage this interface by creating a systemd.network(5) configuration file at /etc/systemd/network/20-dummy1.network:
[Match]
Name=dummy1
Unmanaged=yes
Restarting systemd-networkd causes these interfaces to get created, and we can then check their status using networkctl(8):
$ systemctl restart systemd-networkd.service
$ networkctl
IDX LINK     TYPE     OPERATIONAL SETUP
  1 lo       loopback carrier     unmanaged
  2 enp2s0f0 ether    off         unmanaged
  3 enp5s0   ether    off         unmanaged
  4 dummy1   ether    degraded    configuring
  5 dummy3   ether    degraded    configuring
  6 sit0     sit      off         unmanaged
  8 wlp3s0   wlan     routable    configured
  9 he-ipv6  sit      routable    configured

8 links listed.
Finally, I configure my flows in /etc/iked.conf, making sure to assign the received address to the interface dummy1.
ikev2 'hades' active esp \
        from dynamic to 10.0.1.0/24 \
        peer hades.rak.ac \
        srcid '/CN=asteria.rak.ac' \
        dstid '/CN=hades.rak.ac' \
        request address 10.0.1.103 \
        iface dummy1
Restarting openiked and checking the status of the interface reveals that it has been assigned an address on the internal network and that it is routable:
$ systemctl restart openiked.service
$ networkctl status dummy1
  4: dummy1
                     Link File: /usr/lib/systemd/network/99-default.link
                  Network File: /etc/systemd/network/20-dummy1.network
                          Type: ether
                          Kind: dummy
                         State: routable (configured)
                  Online state: online
                        Driver: dummy
              Hardware Address: 22:50:5f:98:a1:a9
                           MTU: 1500
                         QDisc: noqueue
  IPv6 Address Generation Mode: eui64
          Queue Length (Tx/Rx): 1/1
                       Address: 10.0.1.103
                                fe80::2050:5fff:fe98:a1a9
                           DNS: 10.0.1.1
                 Route Domains: .
             Activation Policy: up
           Required For Online: yes
             DHCP6 Client DUID: DUID-EN/Vendor:0000ab11aafa4f02d6ac68d40000
I d be happy to hear if there are simpler or more idiomatic ways to configure this under systemd.

24 June 2022

Kees Cook: finding binary differences

As part of the continuing work to replace 1-element arrays in the Linux kernel, it s very handy to show that a source change has had no executable code difference. For example, if you started with this:
struct foo  
    unsigned long flags;
    u32 length;
    u32 data[1];
 ;
void foo_init(int count)
 
    struct foo *instance;
    size_t bytes = sizeof(*instance) + sizeof(u32) * (count - 1);
    ...
    instance = kmalloc(bytes, GFP_KERNEL);
    ...
 ;
And you changed only the struct definition:
-    u32 data[1];
+    u32 data[];
The bytes calculation is going to be incorrect, since it is still subtracting 1 element s worth of space from the desired count. (And let s ignore for the moment the open-coded calculation that may end up with an arithmetic over/underflow here; that can be solved separately by using the struct_size() helper or the size_mul(), size_add(), etc family of helpers.) The missed adjustment to the size calculation is relatively easy to find in this example, but sometimes it s much less obvious how structure sizes might be woven into the code. I ve been checking for issues by using the fantastic diffoscope tool. It can produce a LOT of noise if you try to compare builds without keeping in mind the issues solved by reproducible builds, with some additional notes. I prepare my build with the known to disrupt code layout options disabled, but with debug info enabled:
$ KBF="KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP=1970-01-01 KBUILD_BUILD_USER=user KBUILD_BUILD_HOST=host KBUILD_BUILD_VERSION=1"
$ OUT=gcc
$ make $KBF O=$OUT allmodconfig
$ ./scripts/config --file $OUT/.config \
        -d GCOV_KERNEL -d KCOV -d GCC_PLUGINS -d IKHEADERS -d KASAN -d UBSAN \
        -d DEBUG_INFO_NONE -e DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT
$ make $KBF O=$OUT olddefconfig
Then I build a stock target, saving the output in before . In this case, I m examining drivers/scsi/megaraid/:
$ make -jN $KBF O=$OUT drivers/scsi/megaraid/
$ mkdir -p $OUT/before
$ cp $OUT/drivers/scsi/megaraid/*.o $OUT/before/
Then I patch and build a modified target, saving the output in after :
$ vi the/source/code.c
$ make -jN $KBF O=$OUT drivers/scsi/megaraid/
$ mkdir -p $OUT/after
$ cp $OUT/drivers/scsi/megaraid/*.o $OUT/after/
And then run diffoscope:
$ diffoscope $OUT/before/ $OUT/after/
If diffoscope output reports nothing, then we re done. Usually, though, when source lines move around other stuff will shift too (e.g. WARN macros rely on line numbers, so the bug table may change contents a bit, etc), and diffoscope output will look noisy. To examine just the executable code, the command that diffoscope used is reported in the output, and we can run it directly, but with possibly shifted line numbers not reported. i.e. running objdump without --line-numbers:
$ ARGS="--disassemble --demangle --reloc --no-show-raw-insn --section=.text"
$ for i in $(cd $OUT/before && echo *.o); do
        echo $i
        diff -u <(objdump $ARGS $OUT/before/$i   sed "0,/^Disassembly/d") \
                <(objdump $ARGS $OUT/after/$i    sed "0,/^Disassembly/d")
done
If I see an unexpected difference, for example:
-    c120:      movq   $0x0,0x800(%rbx)
+    c120:      movq   $0x0,0x7f8(%rbx)
Then I'll search for the pattern with line numbers added to the objdump output:
$ vi <(objdump --line-numbers $ARGS $OUT/after/megaraid_sas_fp.o)
I'd search for "0x0,0x7f8", find the source file and line number above it, open that source file at that position, and look to see where something was being miscalculated:
$ vi drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fp.c +329
Once tracked down, I'd start over at the "patch and build a modified target" step above, repeating until there were no differences. For example, in the starting example, I'd also need to make this change:
-    size_t bytes = sizeof(*instance) + sizeof(u32) * (count - 1);
+    size_t bytes = sizeof(*instance) + sizeof(u32) * count;
Though, as hinted earlier, better yet would be:
-    size_t bytes = sizeof(*instance) + sizeof(u32) * (count - 1);
+    size_t bytes = struct_size(instance, data, count);
But sometimes adding the helper usage will add binary output differences since they're performing overflow checking that might saturate at SIZE_MAX. To help with patch clarity, those changes can be done separately from fixing the array declaration.

2022, Kees Cook. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 License.
CC BY-SA 4.0

16 June 2022

Dirk Eddelbuettel: RcppArmadillo 0.11.2.0.0 on CRAN: New Upstream

armadillo image Armadillo is a powerful and expressive C++ template library for linear algebra and scientific computing. It aims towards a good balance between speed and ease of use, has a syntax deliberately close to Matlab, and is useful for algorithm development directly in C++, or quick conversion of research code into production environments. RcppArmadillo integrates this library with the R environment and language and is widely used by (currently) 991 other packages on CRAN, downloaded over 25 million times (per the partial logs from the cloud mirrors of CRAN), and the CSDA paper (preprint / vignette) by Conrad and myself has been cited 476 times according to Google Scholar. This release brings a second upstream fix by Conrad in the release series 11.*. We once again tested this very rigorously via a complete reverse-depedency check (for which results are always logged here). It so happens that CRAN then had a spurious error when re-checking on upload, and it took a fews days to square this as everybody remains busy but the release prepared on June 10 is now on CRAN. The full set of changes (since the last CRAN release 0.11.1.1.0) follows.

Changes in RcppArmadillo version 0.11.2.0.0 (2022-06-10)
  • Upgraded to Armadillo release 11.2 (Classic Roast)
    • faster handling of sparse submatrix column views by norm(), accu(), nonzeros()
    • extended randu() and randn() to allow specification of distribution parameters
    • internal refactoring, leading to faster compilation times

Courtesy of my CRANberries, there is a diffstat report relative to previous release. More detailed information is on the RcppArmadillo page. Questions, comments etc should go to the rcpp-devel mailing list off the R-Forge page. If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can sponsor me at GitHub.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.

19 May 2022

Joerg Jaspert: Rust? Munin? munin-plugin

My first Rust crate: munin-plugin Sooo, some time ago I had to rewrite a munin plugin from Shell to Rust, due to the shell version going crazy after some runtime and using up a CPU all for its own. Sure, it only did that on Systems with Oracle Database installed, so that monster seems to be bad (who would have guessed?), but somehow I had to fixup this plugin and wasn t allowed to drop that wannabe-database. A while later I wrote a plugin to graph Fibre Channel Host data, and then Network interface statistics, all with a one-second resolution for the graphs, to allow one to zoom in and see every spike. Not have RRD round of the interesting parts. As one can imagine, that turns out to be a lot of very similar code - after all, most of the difference is in the graph config statements and actual data gathering, but the rest of code is just the same. As I already know there are more plugins (hello rsyslog statistics) I have to (sometimes re-)write in Rust, I took some time and wrote me a Rust library to make writing munin-plugins in Rust easier. Yay, my first crate on crates.io (and wrote lots of docs for it). By now I made my 1 second resolution CPU load plugin and the 1 second resolution Network interface plugin use this lib already. To test less complicated plugins with the lib, I took the munin default plugin load (Linux variant) and made a Rust version from it, but mostly to see that something as simple as that is also easy to implement: Munin load I got some idea on how to provide a useful default implementation of the fetch function, so one can write even less code, when using this library. It is my first library in Rust, so if you see something bad or missing in there, feel free to open issues or pull requests. Now, having done this, one thing missing: Someone to (re)write munin itself in something that is actually fast Not munin-node, but munin. Or maybe the RRD usage, but with a few hundred nodes in it, with loads of graphs, we had to adjust munin code and change some timeout or it would commit suicide regularly. And some other code change for not always checking for a rename, or something like it. And only run parts of the default cronjob once an hour, not on every update run. And switch to fetching data over ssh (and munin-async on the nodes). And rrdcached with loads of caching for the trillions of files (currently amounts to ~800G of data).. And it still needs way more CPU than it should. Soo, lots of possible optimizations hidden in there. Though I bet a non-scripting language rewrite might gain the most. (Except, of course, someone needs to do it :) )

16 May 2022

Matthew Garrett: Can we fix bearer tokens?

Last month I wrote about how bearer tokens are just awful, and a week later Github announced that someone had managed to exfiltrate bearer tokens from Heroku that gave them access to, well, a lot of Github repositories. This has inevitably resulted in a whole bunch of discussion about a number of things, but people seem to be largely ignoring the fundamental issue that maybe we just shouldn't have magical blobs that grant you access to basically everything even if you've copied them from a legitimate holder to Honest John's Totally Legitimate API Consumer.

To make it clearer what the problem is here, let's use an analogy. You have a safety deposit box. To gain access to it, you simply need to be able to open it with a key you were given. Anyone who turns up with the key can open the box and do whatever they want with the contents. Unfortunately, the key is extremely easy to copy - anyone who is able to get hold of your keyring for a moment is in a position to duplicate it, and then they have access to the box. Wouldn't it be better if something could be done to ensure that whoever showed up with a working key was someone who was actually authorised to have that key?

To achieve that we need some way to verify the identity of the person holding the key. In the physical world we have a range of ways to achieve this, from simply checking whether someone has a piece of ID that associates them with the safety deposit box all the way up to invasive biometric measurements that supposedly verify that they're definitely the same person. But computers don't have passports or fingerprints, so we need another way to identify them.

When you open a browser and try to connect to your bank, the bank's website provides a TLS certificate that lets your browser know that you're talking to your bank instead of someone pretending to be your bank. The spec allows this to be a bi-directional transaction - you can also prove your identity to the remote website. This is referred to as "mutual TLS", or mTLS, and a successful mTLS transaction ends up with both ends knowing who they're talking to, as long as they have a reason to trust the certificate they were presented with.

That's actually a pretty big constraint! We have a reasonable model for the server - it's something that's issued by a trusted third party and it's tied to the DNS name for the server in question. Clients don't tend to have stable DNS identity, and that makes the entire thing sort of awkward. But, thankfully, maybe we don't need to? We don't need the client to be able to prove its identity to arbitrary third party sites here - we just need the client to be able to prove it's a legitimate holder of whichever bearer token it's presenting to that site. And that's a much easier problem.

Here's the simple solution - clients generate a TLS cert. This can be self-signed, because all we want to do here is be able to verify whether the machine talking to us is the same one that had a token issued to it. The client contacts a service that's going to give it a bearer token. The service requests mTLS auth without being picky about the certificate that's presented. The service embeds a hash of that certificate in the token before handing it back to the client. Whenever the client presents that token to any other service, the service ensures that the mTLS cert the client presented matches the hash in the bearer token. Copy the token without copying the mTLS certificate and the token gets rejected. Hurrah hurrah hats for everyone.

Well except for the obvious problem that if you're in a position to exfiltrate the bearer tokens you can probably just steal the client certificates and keys as well, and now you can pretend to be the original client and this is not adding much additional security. Fortunately pretty much everything we care about has the ability to store the private half of an asymmetric key in hardware (TPMs on Linux and Windows systems, the Secure Enclave on Macs and iPhones, either a piece of magical hardware or Trustzone on Android) in a way that avoids anyone being able to just steal the key.

How do we know that the key is actually in hardware? Here's the fun bit - it doesn't matter. If you're issuing a bearer token to a system then you're already asserting that the system is trusted. If the system is lying to you about whether or not the key it's presenting is hardware-backed then you've already lost. If it lied and the system is later compromised then sure all your apes get stolen, but maybe don't run systems that lie and avoid that situation as a result?

Anyway. This is covered in RFC 8705 so why aren't we all doing this already? From the client side, the largest generic issue is that TPMs are astonishingly slow in comparison to doing a TLS handshake on the CPU. RSA signing operations on TPMs can take around half a second, which doesn't sound too bad, except your browser is probably establishing multiple TLS connections to subdomains on the site it's connecting to and performance is going to tank. Fixing this involves doing whatever's necessary to convince the browser to pipe everything over a single TLS connection, and that's just not really where the web is right at the moment. Using EC keys instead helps a lot (~0.1 seconds per signature on modern TPMs), but it's still going to be a bottleneck.

The other problem, of course, is that ecosystem support for hardware-backed certificates is just awful. Windows lets you stick them into the standard platform certificate store, but the docs for this are hidden in a random PDF in a Github repo. Macs require you to do some weird bridging between the Secure Enclave API and the keychain API. Linux? Well, the standard answer is to do PKCS#11, and I have literally never met anybody who likes PKCS#11 and I have spent a bunch of time in standards meetings with the sort of people you might expect to like PKCS#11 and even they don't like it. It turns out that loading a bunch of random C bullshit that has strong feelings about function pointers into your security critical process is not necessarily something that is going to improve your quality of life, so instead you should use something like this and just have enough C to bridge to a language that isn't secretly plotting to kill your pets the moment you turn your back.

And, uh, obviously none of this matters at all unless people actually support it. Github has no support at all for validating the identity of whoever holds a bearer token. Most issuers of bearer tokens have no support for embedding holder identity into the token. This is not good! As of last week, all three of the big cloud providers support virtualised TPMs in their VMs - we should be running CI on systems that can do that, and tying any issued tokens to the VMs that are supposed to be making use of them.

So sure this isn't trivial. But it's also not impossible, and making this stuff work would improve the security of, well, everything. We literally have the technology to prevent attacks like Github suffered. What do we have to do to get people to actually start working on implementing that?

comment count unavailable comments

10 May 2022

Melissa Wen: Multiple syncobjs support for V3D(V) (Part 2)

In the previous post, I described how we enable multiple syncobjs capabilities in the V3D kernel driver. Now I will tell you what was changed on the userspace side, where we reworked the V3DV sync mechanisms to use Vulkan multiple wait and signal semaphores directly. This change represents greater adherence to the Vulkan submission framework. I was not used to Vulkan concepts and the V3DV driver. Fortunately, I counted on the guidance of the Igalia s Graphics team, mainly Iago Toral (thanks!), to understand the Vulkan Graphics Pipeline, sync scopes, and submission order. Therefore, we changed the original V3DV implementation for vkQueueSubmit and all related functions to allow direct mapping of multiple semaphores from V3DV to the V3D-kernel interface. Disclaimer: Here s a brief and probably inaccurate background, which we ll go into more detail later on. In Vulkan, GPU work submissions are described as command buffers. These command buffers, with GPU jobs, are grouped in a command buffer submission batch, specified by vkSubmitInfo, and submitted to a queue for execution. vkQueueSubmit is the command called to submit command buffers to a queue. Besides command buffers, vkSubmitInfo also specifies semaphores to wait before starting the batch execution and semaphores to signal when all command buffers in the batch are complete. Moreover, a fence in vkQueueSubmit can be signaled when all command buffer batches have completed execution. From this sequence, we can see some implicit ordering guarantees. Submission order defines the start order of execution between command buffers, in other words, it is determined by the order in which pSubmits appear in VkQueueSubmit and pCommandBuffers appear in VkSubmitInfo. However, we don t have any completion guarantees for jobs submitted to different GPU queue, which means they may overlap and complete out of order. Of course, jobs submitted to the same GPU engine follow start and finish order. A fence is ordered after all semaphores signal operations for signal operation order. In addition to implicit sync, we also have some explicit sync resources, such as semaphores, fences, and events. Considering these implicit and explicit sync mechanisms, we rework the V3DV implementation of queue submissions to better use multiple syncobjs capabilities from the kernel. In this merge request, you can find this work: v3dv: add support to multiple wait and signal semaphores. In this blog post, we run through each scope of change of this merge request for a V3D driver-guided description of the multisync support implementation.

Groundwork and basic code clean-up: As the original V3D-kernel interface allowed only one semaphore, V3DV resorted to booleans to translate multiple semaphores into one. Consequently, if a command buffer batch had at least one semaphore, it needed to wait on all jobs submitted complete before starting its execution. So, instead of just boolean, we created and changed structs that store semaphores information to accept the actual list of wait semaphores.

Expose multisync kernel interface to the driver: In the two commits below, we basically updated the DRM V3D interface from that one defined in the kernel and verified if the multisync capability is available for use.

Handle multiple semaphores for all GPU job types: At this point, we were only changing the submission design to consider multiple wait semaphores. Before supporting multisync, V3DV was waiting for the last job submitted to be signaled when at least one wait semaphore was defined, even when serialization wasn t required. V3DV handle GPU jobs according to the GPU queue in which they are submitted:
  • Control List (CL) for binning and rendering
  • Texture Formatting Unit (TFU)
  • Compute Shader Dispatch (CSD)
Therefore, we changed their submission setup to do jobs submitted to any GPU queues able to handle more than one wait semaphores. These commits created all mechanisms to set arrays of wait and signal semaphores for GPU job submissions:
  • Checking the conditions to define the wait_stage.
  • Wrapping them in a multisync extension.
  • According to the kernel interface (described in the previous blog post), configure the generic extension as a multisync extension.
Finally, we extended the ability of GPU jobs to handle multiple signal semaphores, but at this point, no GPU job is actually in charge of signaling them. With this in place, we could rework part of the code that tracks CPU and GPU job completions by verifying the GPU status and threads spawned by Event jobs.

Rework the QueueWaitIdle mechanism to track the syncobj of the last job submitted in each queue: As we had only single in/out syncobj interfaces for semaphores, we used a single last_job_sync to synchronize job dependencies of the previous submission. Although the DRM scheduler guarantees the order of starting to execute a job in the same queue in the kernel space, the order of completion isn t predictable. On the other hand, we still needed to use syncobjs to follow job completion since we have event threads on the CPU side. Therefore, a more accurate implementation requires last_job syncobjs to track when each engine (CL, TFU, and CSD) is idle. We also needed to keep the driver working on previous versions of v3d kernel-driver with single semaphores, then we kept tracking ANY last_job_sync to preserve the previous implementation.

Rework synchronization and submission design to let the jobs handle wait and signal semaphores: With multiple semaphores support, the conditions for waiting and signaling semaphores changed accordingly to the particularities of each GPU job (CL, CSD, TFU) and CPU job restrictions (Events, CSD indirect, etc.). In this sense, we redesigned V3DV semaphores handling and job submissions for command buffer batches in vkQueueSubmit. We scrutinized possible scenarios for submitting command buffer batches to change the original implementation carefully. It resulted in three commits more: We keep track of whether we have submitted a job to each GPU queue (CSD, TFU, CL) and a CPU job for each command buffer. We use syncobjs to track the last job submitted to each GPU queue and a flag that indicates if this represents the beginning of a command buffer. The first GPU job submitted to a GPU queue in a command buffer should wait on wait semaphores. The first CPU job submitted in a command buffer should call v3dv_QueueWaitIdle() to do the waiting and ignore semaphores (because it is waiting for everything). If the job is not the first but has the serialize flag set, it should wait on the completion of all last job submitted to any GPU queue before running. In practice, it means using syncobjs to track the last job submitted by queue and add these syncobjs as job dependencies of this serialized job. If this job is the last job of a command buffer batch, it may be used to signal semaphores if this command buffer batch has only one type of GPU job (because we have guarantees of execution ordering). Otherwise, we emit a no-op job just to signal semaphores. It waits on the completion of all last jobs submitted to any GPU queue and then signal semaphores. Note: We changed this approach to correctly deal with ordering changes caused by event threads at some point. Whenever we have an event job in the command buffer, we cannot use the last job in the last command buffer assumption. We have to wait all event threads complete to signal After submitting all command buffers, we emit a no-op job to wait on all last jobs by queue completion and signal fence. Note: at some point, we changed this approach to correct deal with ordering changes caused by event threads, as mentioned before.

Final considerations With many changes and many rounds of reviews, the patchset was merged. After more validations and code review, we polished and fixed the implementation together with external contributions: Also, multisync capabilities enabled us to add new features to V3DV and switch the driver to the common synchronization and submission framework:
  • v3dv: expose support for semaphore imports
    This was waiting for multisync support in the v3d kernel, which is already available. Exposing this feature however enabled a few more CTS tests that exposed pre-existing bugs in the user-space driver so we fix those here before exposing the feature.
  • v3dv: Switch to the common submit framework
    This should give you emulated timeline semaphores for free and kernel-assisted sharable timeline semaphores for cheap once you have the kernel interface wired in.
We used a set of games to ensure no performance regression in the new implementation. For this, we used GFXReconstruct to capture Vulkan API calls when playing those games. Then, we compared results with and without multisync caps in the kernelspace and also enabling multisync on v3dv. We didn t observe any compromise in performance, but improvements when replaying scenes of vkQuake game.

8 May 2022

Thorsten Alteholz: My Debian Activities in April 2022

FTP master This month I accepted 186 and rejected 26 packages. The overall number of packages that got accepted was 188. Debian LTS This was my ninety-fourth month that I did some work for the Debian LTS initiative, started by Raphael Hertzog at Freexian. This month my all in all workload has been 40h. During that time I did LTS and normal security uploads of:
  • [DLA 2973-1] minidlna security update for one CVE
  • [DLA 2974-1] fribidi security update for three CVEs
  • [DLA 2988-1] tinyxml security update for one CVE
  • [DLA 2987-1] libarchive security update for three CVEs
  • [#1009076] buster-pu: minidlna/1.2.1+dfsg-2+deb10u3
  • [#1009077] bullseye-pu: minidlna/1.3.0+dfsg-2+deb11u1
  • [#1009251] buster-pu: fribidi/1.0.5-3.1+deb10u2
  • [#1009250] bullseye-pu: fribidi/1.0.8-2+deb11u1
  • [#1010380] buster-pu: flac/1.3.2-3+deb10u2
Further I worked on libvirt, the dependency problems in unstable have been resolved and fixing in other releases can continue. I also continued to work on security support for golang packages. Last but not least I did some days of frontdesk duties. Debian ELTS This month was the forty-siyth ELTS month. During my allocated time I uploaded:
  • ELA-591-1 for minidlna
  • ELA-592-1 for fribidi
  • ELA-602-1 for tinyxml
  • ELS-603-1 for libarchive
Last but not least I did some days of frontdesk duties. Debian Printing This month I uploaded new upstream versions or improved packaging of: As I already became the maintainer of usb-modeswitch I also adopted usb-modeswitch-data Debian Astro Unfortunately I didn t do anything for this group, but in May I will upload a new version of openvlbi and several indi-3rdparty packages. Other stuff Last but not least I uploaded several new upstream version of golang packages but not before checking with ratt that all dependencies still work.

13 April 2022

Antoine Beaupr : Tuning my wifi radios

After listening to an episode of the 2.5 admins podcast, I realized there was some sort of low-hanging fruit I could pick to better tune my WiFi at home. You see, I'm kind of a fraud in WiFi: I only started a WiFi mesh in Montreal (now defunct), I don't really know how any of that stuff works. So I was surprised to hear one of the podcast host say "it's all about airtime" and "you want to reduce the power on your access points" (APs). It seemed like sound advice: better bandwidth means less time on air, means less collisions, less latency, and less power also means less collisions. Worth a try, right?

Frequency So the first thing I looked at was WifiAnalyzer to see if I had any optimisation I could do there. Normally, I try to avoid having nearby APs on the same frequency to avoid collisions, but who knows, maybe I had messed that up. And turns out I did! Both APs were on "auto" for 5GHz, which typically means "do nothing or worse". 5GHz is really interesting, because, in theory, there are LOTS of channels to pick from, it goes up to 196!! And both my APs were on 36, what gives? So the first thing I did was to set it to channel 100, as there was that long gap in WifiAnalyzer where no other AP was. But that just broke 5GHz on the AP. The OpenWRT GUI (luci) would just say "wireless not associated" and the ESSID wouldn't show up in a scan anymore. At first, I thought this was a problem with OpenWRT or my hardware, but I could reproduce the problem with both my APs: a TP-Link Archer A7 v5 and a Turris Omnia (see also my review). As it turns out, that's because that range of the WiFi band interferes with trivial things like satellites and radar, which make the actually very useful radar maps look like useless christmas trees. So those channels require DFS to operate. DFS works by first listening on the frequency for a certain amount of time (1-2 minute, but could be as high as 10) to see if there's something else transmitting at all. So typically, that means they just don't operate at all in those bands, especially if you're near any major city which generally means you are near a weather radar that will transmit on that band. In the system logs, if you have such a problem, you might see this:
Apr  9 22:17:39 octavia hostapd: wlan0: DFS-CAC-START freq=5500 chan=100 sec_chan=1, width=0, seg0=102, seg1=0, cac_time=60s
Apr  9 22:17:39 octavia hostapd: DFS start_dfs_cac() failed, -1
... and/or this:
Sat Apr  9 18:05:03 2022 daemon.notice hostapd: Channel 100 (primary) not allowed for AP mode, flags: 0x10095b NO-IR RADAR
Sat Apr  9 18:05:03 2022 daemon.warn hostapd: wlan0: IEEE 802.11 Configured channel (100) not found from the channel list of current mode (2) IEEE 802.11a
Sat Apr  9 18:05:03 2022 daemon.warn hostapd: wlan0: IEEE 802.11 Hardware does not support configured channel
Here, it clearly says RADAR (in all caps too, which means it's really important). NO-IR is also important, I'm not sure what it means but it could be that you're not allowed to transmit in that band because of other local regulations. There might be a way to workaround those by changing the "region" in the Luci GUI, but I didn't mess with that, because I figured that other devices will have that already configured. So using a forbidden channel might make it more difficult for clients to connect (although it's possible this is enforced only on the AP side). In any case, 5GHz is promising, but in reality, you only get from channel 36 (5.170GHz) to 48 (5.250GHz), inclusively. Fast counters will notice that is exactly 80MHz, which means that if an AP is configured for that hungry, all-powerful 80MHz, it will effectively take up all 5GHz channels at once. This, in other words, is as bad as 2.4GHz, where you also have only two 40MHz channels. (Really, what did you expect: this is an unregulated frequency controlled by commercial interests...) So the first thing I did was to switch to 40MHz. This gives me two distinct channels in 5GHz at no noticeable bandwidth cost. (In fact, I couldn't find hard data on what the bandwidth ends up being on those frequencies, but I could still get 400Mbps which is fine for my use case.)

Power The next thing I did was to fiddle with power. By default, both radios were configured to transmit as much power as they needed to reach clients, which means that if a client gets farther away, it would boost its transmit power which, in turns, would mean the client would still connect to instead of failing and properly roaming to the other AP. The higher power also means more interference with neighbors and other APs, although that matters less if they are on different channels. On 5GHz, power was about 20dBm (100 mW) -- and more on the Turris! -- when I first looked, so I tried to lower it drastically to 5dBm (3mW) just for kicks. That didn't work so well, so I bumped it back up to 14 dBm (25 mW) and that seems to work well: clients hit about -80dBm when they get far enough from the AP, which gets close to the noise floor (and where the neighbor APs are), which is exactly what I want. On 2.4GHz, I lowered it down even further, to 10 dBm (10mW) since it's better at going through wells, I figured it would need less power. And anyways, I rather people use the 5GHz APs, so maybe that will act as an encouragement to switch. I was still able to connect correctly to the APs at that power as well.

Other tweaks I disabled the "Allow legacy 802.11b rates" setting in the 5GHz configuration. According to this discussion:
Checking the "Allow b rates" affects what the AP will transmit. In particular it will send most overhead packets including beacons, probe responses, and authentication / authorization as the slow, noisy, 1 Mb DSSS signal. That is bad for you and your neighbors. Do not check that box. The default really should be unchecked.
This, in particular, "will make the AP unusable to distant clients, which again is a good thing for public wifi in general". So I just unchecked that box and I feel happier now. I didn't make tests to see the effect separately however, so this is mostly just a guess.

8 April 2022

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in March 2022

Welcome to the March 2022 report from the Reproducible Builds project! In our monthly reports we outline the most important things that we have been up to over the past month.
The in-toto project was accepted as an incubating project within the Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF). in-toto is a framework that protects the software supply chain by collecting and verifying relevant data. It does so by enabling libraries to collect information about software supply chain actions and then allowing software users and/or project managers to publish policies about software supply chain practices that can be verified before deploying or installing software. CNCF foundations hosts a number of critical components of the global technology infrastructure under the auspices of the Linux Foundation. (View full announcement.)
Herv Boutemy posted to our mailing list with an announcement that the Java Reproducible Central has hit the milestone of 500 fully reproduced builds of upstream projects . Indeed, at the time of writing, according to the nightly rebuild results, 530 releases were found to be fully reproducible, with 100% reproducible artifacts.
GitBOM is relatively new project to enable build tools trace every source file that is incorporated into build artifacts. As an experiment and/or proof-of-concept, the GitBOM developers are rebuilding Debian to generate side-channel build metadata for versions of Debian that have already been released. This only works because Debian is (partial) reproducible, so one can be sure that that, if the case where build artifacts are identical, any metadata generated during these instrumented builds applies to the binaries that were built and released in the past. More information on their approach is available in README file in the bomsh repository.
Ludovic Courtes has published an academic paper discussing how the performance requirements of high-performance computing are not (as usually assumed) at odds with reproducible builds. The received wisdom is that vendor-specific libraries and platform-specific CPU extensions have resulted in a culture of local recompilation to ensure the best performance, rendering the property of reproducibility unobtainable or even meaningless. In his paper, Ludovic explains how Guix has:
[ ] implemented what we call package multi-versioning for C/C++ software that lacks function multi-versioning and run-time dispatch [ ]. It is another way to ensure that users do not have to trade reproducibility for performance. (full PDF)

Kit Martin posted to the FOSSA blog a post titled The Three Pillars of Reproducible Builds. Inspired by the shock of infiltrated or intentionally broken NPM packages, supply chain attacks, long-unnoticed backdoors , the post goes on to outline the high-level steps that lead to a reproducible build:
It is one thing to talk about reproducible builds and how they strengthen software supply chain security, but it s quite another to effectively configure a reproducible build. Concrete steps for specific languages are a far larger topic than can be covered in a single blog post, but today we ll be talking about some guiding principles when designing reproducible builds. [ ]
The article was discussed on Hacker News.
Finally, Bernhard M. Wiedemann noticed that the GNU Helloworld project varies depending on whether it is being built during a full moon! (Reddit announcement, openSUSE bug report)

Events There will be an in-person Debian Reunion in Hamburg, Germany later this year, taking place from 23 30 May. Although this is a Debian event, there will be some folks from the broader Reproducible Builds community and, of course, everyone is welcome. Please see the event page on the Debian wiki for more information. Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted to our mailing list about a meetup for Reproducible Builds folks at the openSUSE conference in Nuremberg, Germany. It was also recently announced that DebConf22 will take place this year as an in-person conference in Prizren, Kosovo. The pre-conference meeting (or Debcamp ) will take place from 10 16 July, and the main talks, workshops, etc. will take place from 17 24 July.

Misc news Holger Levsen updated the Reproducible Builds website to improve the documentation for the SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH environment variable, both by expanding parts of the existing text [ ][ ] as well as clarifying meaning by removing text in other places [ ]. In addition, Chris Lamb added a Twitter Card to our website s metadata too [ ][ ][ ]. On our mailing list this month:

Distribution work In Debian this month:
  • Johannes Schauer Marin Rodrigues posted to the debian-devel list mentioning that he exploited the property of reproducibility within Debian to demonstrate that automatically converting a large number of packages to a new internal source version did not change the resulting packages. The proposed change could therefore be applied without causing breakage:
So now we have 364 source packages for which we have a patch and for which we can show that this patch does not change the build output. Do you agree that with those two properties, the advantages of the 3.0 (quilt) format are sufficient such that the change shall be implemented at least for those 364? [ ]
In openSUSE, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted his usual monthly reproducible builds status report.

Tooling diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility. Not only can it locate and diagnose reproducibility issues, it can provide human-readable diffs from many kinds of binary formats. This month, Chris Lamb prepared and uploaded versions 207, 208 and 209 to Debian unstable, as well as made the following changes to the code itself:
  • Update minimum version of Black to prevent test failure on Ubuntu jammy. [ ]
  • Updated the R test fixture for the 4.2.x series of the R programming language. [ ]
Brent Spillner also worked on adding graceful handling for UNIX sockets and named pipes to diffoscope. [ ][ ][ ]. Vagrant Cascadian also updated the diffoscope package in GNU Guix. [ ][ ] reprotest is the Reproducible Build s project end-user tool to build the same source code twice in widely different environments and checking whether the binaries produced by the builds have any differences. This month, Santiago Ruano Rinc n added a new --append-build-command option [ ], which was subsequently uploaded to Debian unstable by Holger Levsen.

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

Testing framework The Reproducible Builds project runs a significant testing framework at tests.reproducible-builds.org, to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. This month, the following changes were made:
  • Holger Levsen:
    • Replace a local copy of the dsa-check-running-kernel script with a packaged version. [ ]
    • Don t hide the status of offline hosts in the Jenkins shell monitor. [ ]
    • Detect undefined service problems in the node health check. [ ]
    • Update the sources.lst file for our mail server as its still running Debian buster. [ ]
    • Add our mail server to our node inventory so it is included in the Jenkins maintenance processes. [ ]
    • Remove the debsecan package everywhere; it got installed accidentally via the Recommends relation. [ ]
    • Document the usage of the osuosl174 host. [ ]
Regular node maintenance was also performed by Holger Levsen [ ], Vagrant Cascadian [ ][ ][ ] and Mattia Rizzolo.
If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

5 April 2022

Kees Cook: security things in Linux v5.10

Previously: v5.9 Linux v5.10 was released in December, 2020. Here s my summary of various security things that I found interesting: AMD SEV-ES
While guest VM memory encryption with AMD SEV has been supported for a while, Joerg Roedel, Thomas Lendacky, and others added register state encryption (SEV-ES). This means it s even harder for a VM host to reconstruct a guest VM s state. x86 static calls
Josh Poimboeuf and Peter Zijlstra implemented static calls for x86, which operates very similarly to the static branch infrastructure in the kernel. With static branches, an if/else choice can be hard-coded, instead of being run-time evaluated every time. Such branches can be updated too (the kernel just rewrites the code to switch around the branch ). All these principles apply to static calls as well, but they re for replacing indirect function calls (i.e. a call through a function pointer) with a direct call (i.e. a hard-coded call address). This eliminates the need for Spectre mitigations (e.g. RETPOLINE) for these indirect calls, and avoids a memory lookup for the pointer. For hot-path code (like the scheduler), this has a measurable performance impact. It also serves as a kind of Control Flow Integrity implementation: an indirect call got removed, and the potential destinations have been explicitly identified at compile-time. network RNG improvements
In an effort to improve the pseudo-random number generator used by the network subsystem (for things like port numbers and packet sequence numbers), Linux s home-grown pRNG has been replaced by the SipHash round function, and perturbed by (hopefully) hard-to-predict internal kernel states. This should make it very hard to brute force the internal state of the pRNG and make predictions about future random numbers just from examining network traffic. Similarly, ICMP s global rate limiter was adjusted to avoid leaking details of network state, as a start to fixing recent DNS Cache Poisoning attacks. SafeSetID handles GID
Thomas Cedeno improved the SafeSetID LSM to handle group IDs (which required teaching the kernel about which syscalls were actually performing setgid.) Like the earlier setuid policy, this lets the system owner define an explicit list of allowed group ID transitions under CAP_SETGID (instead of to just any group), providing a way to keep the power of granting this capability much more limited. (This isn t complete yet, though, since handling setgroups() is still needed.) improve kernel s internal checking of file contents
The kernel provides LSMs (like the Integrity subsystem) with details about files as they re loaded. (For example, loading modules, new kernel images for kexec, and firmware.) There wasn t very good coverage for cases where the contents were coming from things that weren t files. To deal with this, new hooks were added that allow the LSMs to introspect the contents directly, and to do partial reads. This will give the LSMs much finer grain visibility into these kinds of operations. set_fs removal continues
With the earlier work landed to free the core kernel code from set_fs(), Christoph Hellwig made it possible for set_fs() to be optional for an architecture. Subsequently, he then removed set_fs() entirely for x86, riscv, and powerpc. These architectures will now be free from the entire class of kernel address limit attacks that only needed to corrupt a single value in struct thead_info. sysfs_emit() replaces sprintf() in /sys
Joe Perches tackled one of the most common bug classes with sprintf() and snprintf() in /sys handlers by creating a new helper, sysfs_emit(). This will handle the cases where kernel code was not correctly dealing with the length results from sprintf() calls, which might lead to buffer overflows in the PAGE_SIZE buffer that /sys handlers operate on. With the helper in place, it was possible to start the refactoring of the many sprintf() callers. nosymfollow mount option
Mattias Nissler and Ross Zwisler implemented the nosymfollow mount option. This entirely disables symlink resolution for the given filesystem, similar to other mount options where noexec disallows execve(), nosuid disallows setid bits, and nodev disallows device files. Quoting the patch, it is useful as a defensive measure for systems that need to deal with untrusted file systems in privileged contexts. (i.e. for when /proc/sys/fs/protected_symlinks isn t a big enough hammer.) Chrome OS uses this option for its stateful filesystem, as symlink traversal as been a common attack-persistence vector. ARMv8.5 Memory Tagging Extension support
Vincenzo Frascino added support to arm64 for the coming Memory Tagging Extension, which will be available for ARMv8.5 and later chips. It provides 4 bits of tags (covering multiples of 16 byte spans of the address space). This is enough to deterministically eliminate all linear heap buffer overflow flaws (1 tag for free , and then rotate even values and odd values for neighboring allocations), which is probably one of the most common bugs being currently exploited. It also makes use-after-free and over/under indexing much more difficult for attackers (but still possible if the target s tag bits can be exposed). Maybe some day we can switch to 128 bit virtual memory addresses and have fully versioned allocations. But for now, 16 tag values is better than none, though we do still need to wait for anyone to actually be shipping ARMv8.5 hardware. fixes for flaws found by UBSAN
The work to make UBSAN generally usable under syzkaller continues to bear fruit, with various fixes all over the kernel for stuff like shift-out-of-bounds, divide-by-zero, and integer overflow. Seeing these kinds of patches land reinforces the the rationale of shifting the burden of these kinds of checks to the toolchain: these run-time bugs continue to pop up. flexible array conversions
The work on flexible array conversions continues. Gustavo A. R. Silva and others continued to grind on the conversions, getting the kernel ever closer to being able to enable the -Warray-bounds compiler flag and clear the path for saner bounds checking of array indexes and memcpy() usage. That s it for now! Please let me know if you think anything else needs some attention. Next up is Linux v5.11.

2022, Kees Cook. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 License.
CC BY-SA 4.0

22 March 2022

Tollef Fog Heen: DNSSEC, ssh and VerifyHostKeyDNS

OpenSSH has this very nice setting, VerifyHostKeyDNS, which when enabled, will pull SSH host keys from DNS, and you no longer need to either trust on first use, or copy host keys around out of band. Naturally, trusting unsecured DNS is a bit scary, so this requires the record to be signed using DNSSEC. This has worked for a long time, but then broke, seemingly out of the blue. Running ssh -vvv gave output similar to
debug1: found 4 insecure fingerprints in DNS
debug3: verify_host_key_dns: checking SSHFP type 1 fptype 2
debug3: verify_host_key_dns: checking SSHFP type 4 fptype 2
debug1: verify_host_key_dns: matched SSHFP type 4 fptype 2
debug3: verify_host_key_dns: checking SSHFP type 4 fptype 1
debug1: verify_host_key_dns: matched SSHFP type 4 fptype 1
debug3: verify_host_key_dns: checking SSHFP type 1 fptype 1
debug1: matching host key fingerprint found in DNS
even though the zone was signed, the resolver was checking the signature and I even checked that the DNS response had the AD bit set. The fix was to add options trust-ad to /etc/resolv.conf. Without this, glibc will discard the AD bit from any upstream DNS servers. Note that you should only add this if you actually have a trusted DNS resolver. I run unbound on localhost, so if somebody can do a man-in-the-middle attack on that traffic, I have other problems.

2 March 2022

Keith Packard: picolibc-testing

Testing Picolibc with the glibc tests Picolibc has a bunch of built-in tests, but more testing is always better, right? I decided to see how hard it would be to run some of the tests provided in the GNU C Library (glibc). Parallel meson build files Similar to how Picolibc uses meson build files to avoid modifying the newlib autotools infrastructure, I decided to take the glibc code and write meson build rules that would compile the tests against Picolibc header files and link against Picolibc libraries. I decided to select a single target for this project so I could focus on getting things building and not worry too much about making it portable. I wanted to pick something that had hardware floating point so that I would have rounding modes and exception support, so I picked the ARM Cortex M7 with hard float ABI:
$ arm-none-eabi-gcc -mcpu=cortex-m7 -mfloat-abi=hard
It should be fairly easy to extend this to other targets, but for now, that's what I've got working. There's a cross-cortex-m7.txt file containing all of the cross compilation details which is used when running meson setup. All of the Picolibc-specific files live in a new picolibc directory so they are isolated from the main glibc code. Pre-loading a pile of hacks Adapt Picolibc to support the Glibc test code required a bunch of random hacks, from providing _unlocked versions of the stdio macros to stubbing out various unsupportable syscalls (like sleep and chdir). Instead of modifying the Glibc code, I created a file called hacks.h which is full of this stuff and used the gcc -include parameter to read that into the compiler before starting compilation on all of the files. Supporting command line parameters The glibc tests all support a range of command line parameters, some of which turned out to be quite useful for this work. Picolibc had limited semihosting support for accessing the command line, but that required modifying applications to go fetch the command line using a special semihosting function. To make this easier, I added a new crt0 variant for picolibc called (oddly) semihost. This extends the existing hosted variant by adding a call to the semihosting library to fetch the current command line and splitting that into words at each space. It doesn't handle any quoting, but it's sufficient for the needs here. Avoiding glibc headers The glibc tests use some glibc-specific extensions to the standard POSIX C library, so I needed to include those in the test builds. Headers for those extensions are mixed in with the rest of the POSIX standard headers, which conflict with the Picolibc versions. To work around this, I stuck stub #include files in the picolibc directory which directly include the appropriate headers for the glibc API extensions. This includes things like argp.h and array_length.h. For other headers which weren't actually needed for picolibc, I created empty files. Adding more POSIX to Picolibc At this point, code was compiling but failing to find various standard POSIX functions which aren't available in Picolibc. That included some syscalls which could be emulated using semihosting, like gettimeofday and getpagesize. It also included some generally useful additions, like replacing ecvtbuf and fcvtbuf with ecvt_r and fcvt_r. The _r variants provide a target buffer size instead of assuming that it was large enough as the Picolibc buf variants did. Which tests are working? So far, I've got some of the tests in malloc, math, misc and stdio-common running. There are a lot of tests in the malloc directory which cover glibc API extensions or require POSIX syscalls not supported by semihosting. I think I've added all of the tests which should be supported. For the math tests, I'm testing the standard POSIX math APIs in both float and double forms, except for the Bessel and Gamma functions. Picolibc's versions of those are so bad that they violate some pretty basic assumptions about error bounds built into the glibc test code. Until Picolibc gets better versions of these functions, we'll have to skip testing them this way. In the misc directory, I've only added tests for ecvt, fcvt, gcvt, dirname and hsearch. I don't think there are any other tests there which should work. Finally, for stdio-common, almost all of the tests expect a fully functioning file system, which semihosting really can't support. As a result, we're only able to run the printf, scanf and some of the sprintf tests. All in all, we're running 78 of the glibc test programs, which is a small fraction of the total tests, but I think it's the bulk of the tests which cover APIs that don't depend too much on the underlying POSIX operating system. Bugs found and fixed in Picolibc This exercise has resulted in 17 fixes in Picolibc, which can be classified as:
  1. Math functions taking sNaN and not raising FE_INVALID and returning qNaN. Almost any operation on an sNaN value is supposed to signal an invalid operand and replace that with a qNaN so that further processing doesn't raise another exception. This was fairly easy to fix, just need to use return x + x; instead of return x;.
  2. Math functions failing to set errno. I'd recently restructured the math library to get rid of the separate IEEE version of the functions which didn't set errno and missed a couple of cases that needed to use the errno-setting helper functions.
  3. Corner cases in string/float conversion, including the need to perform round-to-even for '%a' conversions in printf and supporting negative decimal values for fcvt. This particular exercise led to replacing the ecvtbuf and fcvtbuf APIs with glibc's ecvt_r and fcvt_r versions as those pass explicit buffer lengths, making overflow prevention far more reliable.
  4. A bunch of malloc entry points were not handling failure correctly; allocation values close to the maximum possible size caused numerous numeric wrapping errors with the usual consequences (allocations "succeed", but return a far smaller buffer than requested). Also, realloc was failing to check the return value from malloc before copying the old data, which really isn't a good idea.
  5. Tinystdio's POSIX support code was returning an error instead of EOF at end of file.
  6. Error bounds for the Picolibc math library aren't great; I had to generate Picolibc-specific ulps files. Most functions are between 0 and 3 ulps, but for some reason, the float version of erfc (ercf) has errors as large as 64 ulps. That needs investigation.
Tests added to Picolibc With all of the fixes applied to Picolibc, I added some tests to verify them without relying on running the glibc tests, that includes sNaN vs qNaN tests for math functions, testing fopen and mktemp, checking the printf %a rounding support and adding a ecvt/fcvt tests. I also discovered that the github-based CI system was compiling but not testing when using clang with a riscv target, so that got added in. Where's the source code? The Picolibc changes are sitting on the glibc-testing branch. I'll merge them once the current CI pass finishes. The hacked-up Glibc bits are in a glibc mirror at github in the picolibc project on the picolibc-testing branch. It would be interesting to know what additional tests should be usable in this environment. And, perhaps, finding a way to use this for picolibc CI testing in the future. Concluding thoughts Overall, I'm pretty pleased with these results. The bugs in malloc are fairly serious and could easily result in trouble, but the remaining issues are mostly minor and shouldn't have a big impact on applications using Picolibc. I'll get the changes merged and start thinking about doing another Picolibc release.

18 February 2022

Colin Watson: Launchpad now supports SSH Ed25519 keys and RSA SHA-2 signatures

As of 2022-02-16, Launchpad supports a couple of features on its SSH endpoints (git.launchpad.net, bazaar.launchpad.net, ppa.launchpad.net, and upload.ubuntu.com) that it previously didn t: Ed25519 public keys (a well-regarded format, supported by OpenSSH since 6.5 in 2014) and signatures with existing RSA public keys using SHA-2 rather than SHA-1 (supported by OpenSSH since 7.2 in 2016). I m hesitant to call these features new , since they ve been around for a long time elsewhere, and people might quite reasonably ask why it s taken us so long. The problem has always been that Launchpad can t really use a normal SSH server such as OpenSSH because it needs features that aren t practical to implement that way, such as virtual filesystems and dynamic user key authorization against the Launchpad database. Instead, we use Twisted Conch, which is a very extensible Python SSH implementation that has generally served us well. The downside is that, because it s an independent implementation and one that occupies a relatively small niche, it often lags behind in terms of newer protocol features. Catching up to this point has been something we ve been working on for around five years, although it s taken a painfully long time for a variety of reasons which I thought some people might find interesting to go into, at least people who have the patience for details of the SSH protocol. Many of the delays were my own responsibility, although realistically we probably couldn t have added Ed25519 support before OpenSSL/cryptography work that landed in 2019.
  • In 2015, we did some similar work on SHA-2 key exchange and MAC algorithms.
  • In 2016, various other contributors were working on ECDSA and Ed25519 support (e.g. #533 and #644). At the time, it seemed best to keep an eye on this but mainly leave them to it. I m very glad that some people worked on this before me - studying their PRs helped a lot, even parts that didn t end up being merged directly.
  • In 2017, it became clear that this was likely to need some more attention, but before we could do anything else we had to revamp Launchpad s build system to use pip rather than buildout, since without that we couldn t upgrade to any newer versions of Twisted. That proved to be a substantial piece of yak-shaving: first we had to upgrade Launchpad off Ubuntu 12.04, and then the actual build system rewrite was a complicated project of its own.
  • In 2018, I fixed an authentication hang that happened if a client even tried to offer ECDSA or Ed25519 public keys to Launchpad, and we got ECDSA support fully working in Launchpad. We also discovered as a result of automated interoperability tests run as part of the Debian OpenSSH packaging that Twisted needed to gain support for the new openssh-key-v1 private key format, which became a prerequisite for Ed25519 support since OpenSSH only ever writes those keys in the new format, and so I fixed that.
  • In 2019, Python s cryptography package gained support for X25519 (the Diffie-Hellman key exchange function based on Curve25519) and Ed25519, and it became somewhat practical to add support to Twisted on top of that. However, it required OpenSSL 1.1.1b, and it seemed unlikely that we would be in a position to upgrade all the relevant bits of Launchpad s infrastructure to use that in the near term. I at least managed to add curve25519-sha256 key exchange support to Twisted based on some previous work by another contributor, and I prepared support for Ed25519 keys in Twisted even though I knew we weren t going to be able to use it yet.
  • 2020 was well, everyone knows what 2020 was like, plus we had a new baby. I did some experimentation in spare moments, but I didn t really have the focus to be able to move this sort of complex problem forward.
  • In 2021, I bit the bullet and started seriously working on fallback mechanisms to allow us to use Ed25519 even on systems lacking a sufficient version of OpenSSL, though found myself blocked on figuring out type-checking issues following a code review. It then became clear on the release of OpenSSH 8.8 that we were going to have to deal with RSA SHA-2 signatures as well, since otherwise OpenSSH in Ubuntu soon wouldn t be able to authenticate to Launchpad by default (which also caused me to delay uploading 8.8 to Debian unstable for a while). To deal with that, I first had to add SSH extension negotiation to Twisted.
  • Finally, in 2022, I added RSA SHA-2 signature support to Twisted, finally unblocked myself on the type-checking issue with the Ed25519 fallback mechanism, quickly put together a similar fallback mechanism for X25519, backported the whole mess to Twisted 20.3.0 since we currently can t use anything newer due to the somewhat old version of Python 3 that we re running, promptly ran into and fixed a regression that affected SFTP uploads to ppa.launchpad.net and upload.ubuntu.com, and finally added Ed25519 as a permissible key type in Launchpad s authserver.
Phew! Thanks to everyone who works on Twisted, cryptography, and OpenSSL - it s been really useful to be able to build on solid lower-level cryptographic primitives - and to those who helped with code review.

5 February 2022

Louis-Philippe V ronneau: Migrating from ledger to hledger

I first started using ledger the original plain-text accounting software in 2017. Since then, I had been pretty happy with my accounting routine, but grew a little annoyed by the repetitive manual work I had to do to assign recurring transactions to the right account. To make things easier, I had a collection of bash scripts to parse and convert the CSV files from my bank's website1 into ledger entries. They were of course ugly, unreadable piles of sed-grep-regex and did not let met achieve the automation complexity I longed for. Dissatisfied with ledger's features, I decided to migrate to hledger. Contrary to ledger, hledger comes with a CSV parser one can use to import and classify recurring transactions automagically. Having a proper DSL for this makes all the difference: I can easily add new rules and understand the old ones. In the end, I get a very consistent result, something my old bash scripts weren't great at. Here is what my debit.csv.rules file looks like. It is used to tell hledger how CSV data from my debit card should be parsed:
# skip the headings line:
skip 1
# assign fields
fields , , , date, , description, , amount2-in, amount2-out
# assign account where the money comes from
# 99 to get it at the bottom of the transaction
account99 assets:checking
include matchers.rules
As you can see, the rules matching transactions to specific accounts are imported from another file, matchers.rules. I'm doing this since I want to be able to use the same set of rules for debit and credit and use the cards interchangeably. Here's a snippet of my matchers.rules file:
# house
if Loyer/bail
  account2  expenses:rent
# leisure
if PAYPAL .*STEAM GAMES
  account2  expenses:leisure:videogame
if PAYPAL .*BANDCAMP
  account2  expenses:leisure:music
Using this ruleset, a transaction looking like this:
"SOME ACCOUNT DESC","111111","EOP","2022/01/03",00002,"Loyer/bail","",521.00,"","","","",""
Would be transformed into:
2022-01-03 Loyer/bail
    expenses:rent                               521.00
    assets:checking
Sadly, hledger's CSV rules won't let you do arithmetics. This can be useful when you know a certain transaction needs to be split between accounts. This is where auto postings come in. They are a way to specify arbitrary rules when an account is encountered. Going back to my previous rent example, I split it 50/50 with my SO using this rule:
= expenses:rent
    assets:receivable:rent    *0.5
    assets:checking
After it is applied, the final transaction looks like this:
2022-01-03 Loyer/bail  ; modified:
    expenses:rent                               521.00
    assets:receivable:rent                      260.50  ; generated-posting: = expenses:rent
    assets:checking
Neat eh? Here is the little bash script I've written to automate all these steps:
 #!/bin/bash
#
# Convert CSV to ledger using hledger
declare -a assets=("credit" "debit")
# Read the array values with space
for i in "$ assets[@] "
do
  if test -f "$i.csv"
  then
    # convert to ledger
    LEDGER=$(hledger -f "$i.csv" --rules-file rules/"$i.csv".rules print)
    # add auto_postings
    LEDGER=$(printf "include rules/auto_postings.ledger\n\n$LEDGER\n"   hledger print -f- --auto)
    # remove superfluous assets:checking lines
    LEDGER=$(printf "$LEDGER"   sed '/assets:checking \+; generated.\+/d')
    printf "$LEDGER" > "$i.ledger"
  else
    printf "File $i.csv does not exist\n"
  fi
done
Migrating to hledger, I've cut down the time I spend on accounting from 1 hour per month to about 10 minutes, all while making my workflow much cleaner. Many thanks to the kind folks on #hledger @irc.libera.chat for the help!

  1. One for my checking+savings account and another one for my credit card.

Next.