Search Results: "andres"

16 January 2026

Freexian Collaborators: Monthly report about Debian Long Term Support, December 2025 (by Santiago Ruano Rinc n)

The Debian LTS Team, funded by [Freexian s Debian LTS offering] (https://www.freexian.com/lts/debian/), is pleased to report its activities for December.

Activity summary During the month of December, 18 contributors have been paid to work on Debian LTS (links to individual contributor reports are located below). The team released 41 DLAs fixing 252 CVEs. The team currently focuses on preparing security updates for Debian 11 bullseye , but also looks for contributing with updates for Debian 12 bookworm , Debian 13 trixie and even Debian unstable. Notable security updates:
  • libsoup2.4 (DLA-4398-1), prepared by Andreas Henrikson, fixing several vulnerabilities.
  • glib2.0 (DLA-4412-1), published by Emilio Pozuelo Monfort, addressing multiple issues.
  • lasso (DLA-4397-1), prepared by Sylvain Beucler, addressing multiple issues, including a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2025-47151)
  • roundcube (DLA 4415-1), prepared by Guilhem Moulin, fixing a cross-site-scripting (XSS) (CVE-2025-68461) and an information disclosure (CVE-2025-68460) vulnerabilities
  • mediawiki (DLA 4428-1), published by Guilhem, fixing multiple vulnerabilities could lead to information disclosure, denial of service or privilege escalation.
  • While the DLA has not been published yet, Charles Henrique Melara proposed upstream fixes for seven CVEs in ffmpeg: https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/pulls/21275.
  • python-apt (DLA 4408-1), prepared by Utkarsh Gupta, in coordination with the Debian Security Team and Julian Andres Klode, the apt s maintainer.
  • libpng1.6 (DLA-4396-1), published by Tobias Frost, completing the work started the previous month.
Notable non-security updates:
  • tzdata (DLA-4403-1), prepared by Emilio, including the latest changes to the leap second list and its expiry date, which was set for the end of December.
Contributions from outside the LTS Team:
  • Christoph Berg, co-maintainer of PostgreSQL in Debian, prepared a postgresql-13 update, released as DLA-4420-1
The LTS Team has also contributed with updates to the latest Debian releases:

Individual Debian LTS contributor reports

Thanks to our sponsors Sponsors that joined recently are in bold.

30 December 2025

Utkarsh Gupta: FOSS Activites in December 2025

Here s my monthly but brief update about the activities I ve done in the FOSS world.

Debian
Whilst I didn t get a chance to do much, here are still a few things that I worked on:
  • Prepared security update for wordpress for trixie and bookworm.
  • A few discussions with the new DFSG team, et al.
  • Assited a few folks in getting their patches submitted via Salsa.
  • Mentoring for newcomers.
  • Moderation of -project mailing list.

Ubuntu
I joined Canonical to work on Ubuntu full-time back in February 2021. Whilst I can t give a full, detailed list of things I did, here s a quick TL;DR of what I did:
  • Successfully released Resolute Snapshot 2!
    • This one was also done without the ISO tracker and cdimage access.
    • I think this one went rather smooth. Let s see what we re able to do for snapshot 3.
  • Worked on removing GPG keys from the cdimage instance. That took a while, whew!
  • Assisted a bunch of folks with my Archive Admin and Release team hats to:
    • review NEW packages for Ubuntu Studio.
    • remove old binaries that are stalling transition and/or migration.
    • LTS requalification of Ubuntu flavours.
    • bootstrapping dotnet-10 packages for Stable Release Updates.
  • With that, we ve entered the EOY break. :)
    • I was anyway on vacation for majority of this month. ;)

Debian (E)LTS
This month I have worked 72 hours on Debian Long Term Support (LTS) and on its sister Extended LTS project and did the following things:

Released Security Updates
  • ruby-git: Multiple vulnerabilities leading to command line injection and improper path escaping.
  • ruby-sidekiq: Multiple vulnerabilities leading to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) and Denial of Service in Web UI.
  • python-apt: Vulnerability leading to crash via invalid nullptr dereference in TagSection.keys().
    • [LTS]: Fixed CVE-2025-6966 via 2.2.1.1 for bullseye. This has been released as DLA 4408-1.
    • [ELTS]: Fixed CVE-2025-6966 via 1.8.4.4 for buster and 1.4.4 for stretch. This has been released as ELA 1596-1.
    • All of this was coordinated b/w the Security team and Julian Andres Klode. Julian will take care of the stable uploads.
  • node-url-parse: Vulnerability allowing authorization bypass through specially crafted URL with empty userinfo and no host.
  • wordpress: Multiple vulnerabilities in WordPress core, leading to Sent Data & Cross-site Scripting.
  • usbmuxd: Privilege escalation vulnerability via path traversal in SavePairRecord command.
    • [LTS]: Fixed CVE-2025-66004 via 1.1.1-2+deb11u1 for bullseye. This has been released as DLA 4417-1.
    • [ELTS]: Fixed CVE-2025-66004 via 1.1.1~git20181007.f838cf6-1+deb10u1 for buster and 1.1.0-2+deb9u1 for stretch. This has been released as ELA 1599-1.
    • All of this was coordinated b/w the Security team and Yves-Alexis Perez. Yves will take care of the stable uploads.
  • gst-plugins-good1.0: Multiple vulnerabilities in isomp4 plugin leading to potential out-of-bounds reads and information disclosure.
  • postgresql-13: Multiple vulnerabilities including unauthorized schema statistics creation and integer overflow in libpq allocation calculations.
  • gst-plugins-base1.0: Multiple vulnerabilities in SubRip subtitle parsing leading to potential crashes and buffer issues.

Work in Progress
  • ceph: Affected by CVE-2024-47866, using the argument x-amz-copy-source to put an object and specifying an empty string as its content leads to the RGW daemon crashing, resulting in a DoS attack.
  • knot-resolver: Affected by CVE-2023-26249, CVE-2023-46317, and CVE-2022-40188, leading to Denial of Service.
  • adminer: Affected by CVE-2023-45195 and CVE-2023-45196, leading to SSRF and DoS, respectively.
  • u-boot: Affected by CVE-2025-24857, where boot code access control flaw in U-Boot allowing arbitrary code execution via physical access.
    • [ELTS]: As it s only affected the version in stretch, I ve started the work to find the fixing commits and prepare a backport. Not much progress there, I ll roll it over to January.
  • ruby-rack: There were multiple vulnerabilities reported in Rack, leading to DoS (memory exhaustion) and proxy bypass.
    • [ELTS]: After completing the work for LTS myself, Bastien picked it up for ELTS and reached out about an upstream regression and we ve been doing some exchanges. Bastien has done most of the work backporting the patches but needs a review and help backporting CVE-2025-61771.

Other Activities
  • Frontdesk from 01-12-2025 to 07-12-2025.
    • Auto EOL d a bunch of packages.
    • Marked CVE-2025-12084/python2.7 as end-of-life for bullseye, buster, and stretch.
    • Marked CVE-2025-12084/jython as end-of-life for bullseye.
    • Marked CVE-2025-13992/chromium as end-of-life for bullseye.
    • Marked apache2 CVEs as postponed for bullseye, buster, and stretch.
    • Marked CVE-2025-13654/duc as postponed for bullseye and buster.
    • Marked CVE-2025-32900/kdeconnect as ignored for bullseye.
    • Marked CVE-2025-12084/pypy3 as postponed for bullseye.
    • Marked CVE-2025-14104/util-linux as postponed for bullseye, buster, and stretch.
    • Marked several CVEs for fastdds as postponed for bullseye.
    • Marked several CVEs for pytorch as postponed for bullseye.
    • Marked CVE-2025-2486/edk2 as postponed for bullseye.
    • Marked CVE-2025-6172 7,9 /golang-1.15 as postponed for bullseye.
    • Marked CVE-2025-65637/golang-logrus as postponed for bullseye.
    • Marked CVE-2025-12385/qtdeclarative-opensource-src ,gles as postponed for bullseye, buster, and stretch.
    • Marked TEMP-0000000-D08402/rust-maxminddb as postponed for bullseye.
    • Added the following packages to d,e la-needed.txt:
      • liblivemedia, sogo.
    • During my triage, I had to make the bin/elts-eol script robust to determine the lts_admin repository - did a back and forth with Emilio about this on the list.
    • I sent a gentle reminder to the LTS team about the issues fixed in bullseye but not in bookworm via mailing list: https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts/2025/12/msg00013.html.
  • I claimed php-horde-css-parser to work on CVE-2020-13756 for buster and did almost all the work only to realize that the patch already existed in buster and the changelog confirmed that it was intentionally fixed.
    • After speaking with Andreas Henriksson, we figured that the CVE ID was missed when the ELA was generated and so I fixed that via 87afaaf19ce56123bc9508d9c6cd5360b18114ef and 5621431e84818b4e650ffdce4c456daec0ee4d51 in the ELTS security tracker to reflect the situation.
  • Participated in a thread which I started last month around using Salsa CI for E/LTS packages and if we plan to sunset it in favor of using Debusine. The plan for now is to keep it around as it s still beneficial and Debusine is still in its early phase.
  • Did a lot of back and forth with Helmut about debusine uploads on #debian-elts.
    • While debugging a failure in dcut uploads, I ran into an SSH compatibility issue on deb-master.freexian.com that could be fixed on the server-side. I shared all my findings to Freexian s sysadmin team.
    • A minimal fix on the server side would be one of:
      PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms -ssh-dss
      
      or explicitly restricting to modern algorithms, e.g.:
      PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
      ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
      
  • Jelly on #debian-lts reported that all my DLA mails had broken GMail s DKIM signature. So I set up sending replies from @debian.org and that seems to have fixed that! \o/
  • [LTS] Attended a rather short monthly LTS meeting on Jitsi. Summary here.
  • [E/LTS] Monitored discussions on mailing lists, IRC, and all the documentation updates.

Until next time.
:wq for today.

5 November 2025

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in October 2025

Welcome to the October 2025 report from the Reproducible Builds project! Welcome to the very latest report from the Reproducible Builds project. Our monthly reports outline what we ve been up to over the past month, and highlight items of news from elsewhere in the increasingly-important area of software supply-chain security. As ever, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please see the Contribute page on our website. In this report:

  1. Farewell from the Reproducible Builds Summit 2025
  2. Google s Play Store breaks reproducible builds for Signal
  3. Mailing list updates
  4. The Original Sin of Computing that no one can fix
  5. Reproducible Builds at the Transparency.dev summit
  6. Supply Chain Security for Go
  7. Three new academic papers published
  8. Distribution work
  9. Upstream patches
  10. Website updates
  11. Tool development

Farewell from the Reproducible Builds Summit 2025 Thank you to everyone who joined us at the Reproducible Builds Summit in Vienna, Austria! We were thrilled to host the eighth edition of this exciting event, following the success of previous summits in various iconic locations around the world, including Venice, Marrakesh, Paris, Berlin, Hamburg and Athens. During this event, participants had the opportunity to engage in discussions, establish connections and exchange ideas to drive progress in this vital field. Our aim was to create an inclusive space that fosters collaboration, innovation and problem-solving. The agenda of the three main days is available online however, some working sessions may still lack notes at time of publication. One tangible outcome of the summit is that Johannes Starosta finished their rebuilderd tutorial, which is now available online and Johannes is actively seeking feedback.

Google s Play Store breaks reproducible builds for Signal On the issue tracker for the popular Signal messenger app, developer Greyson Parrelli reports that updates to the Google Play store have, in effect, broken reproducible builds:
The most recent issues have to do with changes to the APKs that are made by the Play Store. Specifically, they add some attributes to some .xml files around languages are resources, which is not unexpected because of how the whole bundle system works. This is trickier to resolve, because unlike current expected differences (like signing information), we can t just exclude a whole file from the comparison. We have to take a more nuanced look at the diff. I ve been hesitant to do that because it ll complicate our currently-very-readable comparison script, but I don t think there s any other reasonable option here.
The full thread with additional context is available on GitHub.

Mailing list updates On our mailing list this month:
  • kpcyrd forwarded a fascinating tidbit regarding so-called ninja and samurai build ordering, that uses data structures in which the pointer values returned from malloc are used to determine some order of execution.
  • Arnout Engelen, Justin Cappos, Ludovic Court s and kpcyrd continued a conversation started in September regarding the Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials . (Full thread)
  • Felix Moessbauer of Siemens posted to the list reporting that he had recently stumbled upon a couple of Debian source packages on the snapshot mirrors that are listed multiple times (same name and version), but each time with a different checksum . The thread, which Felix titled, Debian: what precisely identifies a source package is about precisely that what can be axiomatically relied upon by consumers of the Debian archives, as well as indicating an issue where we can t exactly say which packages were used during build time (even when having the .buildinfo files).
  • Luca DiMaio posted to the list announcing the release of xfsprogs 6.17.0 which specifically includes a commit that implements the functionality to populate a newly created XFS filesystem directly from an existing directory structure which makes it easier to create populated filesystems without having to mount them [and thus is] particularly useful for reproducible builds . Luca asked the list how they might contribute to the docs of the System images page.

The Original Sin of Computing that no one can fix Popular YouTuber @laurewired published a video this month with an engaging take on the Trusting Trust problem. Titled The Original Sin of Computing that no one can fix, the video touches on David A. Wheeler s Diverse Double-Compiling dissertation. GNU developer Janneke Nieuwenhuizen followed-up with an email (additionally sent to our mailing list) as well, underscoring that GNU Mes s current solution [to this issue] uses ancient softwares in its bootstrap path, such as gcc-2.95.3 and glibc-2.2.5 . (According to Colby Russell, the GNU Mes bootstrapping sequence is shown at 18m54s in the video.)

Reproducible Builds at the Transparency.dev summit Holger Levsen gave a talk at this year s Transparency.dev summit in Gothenburg, Sweden, outlining the achievements of the Reproducible Builds project in the last 12 years, covering both upstream developments as well as some distribution-specific details. As mentioned on the talk s page, Holger s presentation concluded with an outlook into the future and an invitation to collaborate to bring transparency logs into Reproducible Builds projects . The slides of the talk are available, although a video has yet to be released. Nevertheless, as a result of the discussions at Transparency.dev there is a new page on the Debian wiki with the aim of describing a potential transparency log setup for Debian.

Supply Chain Security for Go Andrew Ayer has setup a new service at sourcespotter.com that aims to monitor the supply chain security for Go releases. It consists of four separate trackers:
  1. A tool to verify that the Go Module Mirror and Checksum Database is behaving honestly and has not presented inconsistent information to clients.
  2. A module monitor that records every module version served by the Go Module Mirror and Checksum Database, allowing you to monitor for unexpected versions of your modules.
  3. A tool to verifies that the Go toolchains published in the Go Module Mirror can be reproduced from source code, making it difficult to hide backdoors in the binaries downloaded by the go command.
  4. A telemetry config tracker that tracks the names of telemetry counters uploaded by the Go toolchain, to ensure that Go telemetry is not violating users privacy.
As the homepage of the service mentions, the trackers are free software and do not rely on Google infrastructure.

Three new academic papers published Julien Malka of the Institut Polytechnique de Paris published an exciting paper this month on How NixOS could have detected the XZ supply-chain attack for the benefit of all thanks to reproducible-builds. Julien outlines his paper as follows:
In March 2024, a sophisticated backdoor was discovered in xz, a core compression library in Linux distributions, covertly inserted over three years by a malicious maintainer, Jia Tan. The attack, which enabled remote code execution via ssh, was only uncovered by chance when Andres Freund investigated a minor performance issue. This incident highlights the vulnerability of the open-source supply chain and the effort attackers are willing to invest in gaining trust and access. In this article, I analyze the backdoor s mechanics and explore how bitwise build reproducibility could have helped detect it.
A PDF of the paper is available online.
Iy n M ndez Veiga and Esther H nggi (of the Lucerne University of Applied Sciences and Arts and ETH Zurich) published a paper this month on the topic of Reproducible Builds for Quantum Computing. The abstract of their paper mentions the following:
Although quantum computing is a rapidly evolving field of research, it can already benefit from adopting reproducible builds. This paper aims to bridge the gap between the quantum computing and reproducible builds communities. We propose a generalization of the definition of reproducible builds in the quantum setting, motivated by two threat models: one targeting the confidentiality of end users data during circuit preparation and submission to a quantum computer, and another compromising the integrity of quantum computation results. This work presents three examples that show how classical information can be hidden in transpiled quantum circuits, and two cases illustrating how even minimal modifications to these circuits can lead to incorrect quantum computation results.
A full PDF of their paper is available.
Congratulations to Georg Kofler who submitted their Master s thesis for the Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria on the topic of Reproducible builds of E2EE-messengers for Android using Nix hermetic builds:
The thesis focuses on providing a reproducible build process for two open-source E2EE messaging applications: Signal and Wire. The motivation to ensure reproducibility and thereby the integrity of E2EE messaging applications stems from their central role as essential tools for modern digital privacy. These applications provide confidentiality for private and sensitive communications, and their compromise could undermine encryption mechanisms, potentially leaking sensitive data to third parties.
A full PDF of their thesis is available online.
Shawkot Hossain of Aalto University, Finland has also submitted their Master s thesis on the The Role of SBOM in Modern Development with a focus on the extant tooling:
Currently, there are numerous solutions and techniques available in the market to tackle supply chain security, and all claim to be the best solution. This thesis delves deeper by implementing those solutions and evaluates them for better understanding. Some of the tools that this thesis implemented are Syft, Trivy, Grype, FOSSA, dependency-check, and Gemnasium. Software dependencies are generated in a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) format by using these open-source tools, and the corresponding results have been analyzed. Among these tools, Syft and Trivy outperform others as they provide relevant and accurate information on software dependencies.
A PDF of the thesis is also available.

Distribution work Michael Plura published an interesting article on Heise.de on the topic of Trust is good, reproducibility is better:
In the wake of growing supply chain attacks, the FreeBSD developers are relying on a transparent build concept in the form of Zero-Trust Builds. The approach builds on the established Reproducible Builds, where binary files can be rebuilt bit-for-bit from the published source code. While reproducible builds primarily ensure verifiability, the zero-trust model goes a step further and removes trust from the build process itself. No single server, maintainer, or compiler can be considered more than potentially trustworthy.
The article mentions that this goal has now been achieved with a slight delay and can be used in the current development branch for FreeBSD 15 .
In Debian this month, 7 reviews of Debian packages were added, 5 were updated and 11 were removed this month adding to our knowledge about identified issues. For the Debian CI tests Holger fixed #786644 and set nocheck in DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS for the 2nd build..
Lastly, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted another openSUSE monthly update for their work there.

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

Website updates Once again, there were a number of improvements made to our website this month including: In addition, a number of contributors added a series of notes from our recent summit to the website, including Alexander Couzens [ ], Robin Candau [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] and kpcyrd [ ].

Tool development diffoscope version 307 was uploaded to Debian unstable by Chris Lamb, who made a number of changes including fixing compatibility with LLVM version 21 [ ], an attempt to automatically attempt to deploy to PyPI by liaising with the PyPI developers/maintainers (with this experimental feature). [ ] In addition, Vagrant Cascadian updated diffoscope in GNU Guix to version 307.

Finally, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

19 October 2025

Otto Kek l inen: Could the XZ backdoor have been detected with better Git and Debian packaging practices?

Featured image of post Could the XZ backdoor have been detected with better Git and Debian packaging practices?The discovery of a backdoor in XZ Utils in the spring of 2024 shocked the open source community, raising critical questions about software supply chain security. This post explores whether better Debian packaging practices could have detected this threat, offering a guide to auditing packages and suggesting future improvements. The XZ backdoor in versions 5.6.0/5.6.1 made its way briefly into many major Linux distributions such as Debian and Fedora, but luckily didn t reach that many actual users, as the backdoored releases were quickly removed thanks to the heroic diligence of Andres Freund. We are all extremely lucky that he detected a half a second performance regression in SSH, cared enough to trace it down, discovered malicious code in the XZ library loaded by SSH, and reported promtly to various security teams for quick coordinated actions. This episode makes software engineers pondering the following questions: As a Debian Developer, I decided to audit the xz package in Debian, share my methodology and findings in this post, and also suggest some improvements on how the software supply-chain security could be tightened in Debian specifically. Note that the scope here is only to inspect how Debian imports software from its upstreams, and how they are distributed to Debian s users. This excludes the whole story of how to assess if an upstream project is following software development security best practices. This post doesn t discuss how to operate an individual computer running Debian to ensure it remains untampered as there are plenty of guides on that already.

Downloading Debian and upstream source packages Let s start by working backwards from what the Debian package repositories offer for download. As auditing binaries is extremely complicated, we skip that, and assume the Debian build hosts are trustworthy and reliably building binaries from the source packages, and the focus should be on auditing the source code packages. As with everything in Debian, there are multiple tools and ways to do the same thing, but in this post only one (and hopefully the best) way to do something is presented for brevity. The first step is to download the latest version and some past versions of the package from the Debian archive, which is easiest done with debsnap. The following command will download all Debian source packages of xz-utils from Debian release 5.2.4-1 onwards:
$ debsnap --verbose --first 5.2.4-1 xz-utils
Getting json https://snapshot.debian.org/mr/package/xz-utils/
...
Getting dsc file xz-utils_5.2.4-1.dsc: https://snapshot.debian.org/file/a98271e4291bed8df795ce04d9dc8e4ce959462d
Getting file xz-utils_5.2.4.orig.tar.xz.asc: https://snapshot.debian.org/file/59ccbfb2405abe510999afef4b374cad30c09275
Getting file xz-utils_5.2.4-1.debian.tar.xz: https://snapshot.debian.org/file/667c14fd9409ca54c397b07d2d70140d6297393f
source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.2.4-1.dsc:
Good signature found
validating xz-utils_5.2.4.orig.tar.xz
validating xz-utils_5.2.4.orig.tar.xz.asc
validating xz-utils_5.2.4-1.debian.tar.xz
All files validated successfully.
Once debsnap completes there will be a subfolder source-<package name> with the following types of files:
  • *.orig.tar.xz: source code from upstream
  • *.orig.tar.xz.asc: detached signature (if upstream signs their releases)
  • *.debian.tar.xz: Debian packaging source, i.e. the debian/ subdirectory contents
  • *.dsc: Debian source control file, including signature by Debian Developer/Maintainer
Example:
$ ls -1 source-xz-utils/
...
xz-utils_5.6.4.orig.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.6.4.orig.tar.xz.asc
xz-utils_5.6.4-1.debian.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.6.4-1.dsc
xz-utils_5.8.0.orig.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.0.orig.tar.xz.asc
xz-utils_5.8.0-1.debian.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.0-1.dsc
xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc
xz-utils_5.8.1-1.1.debian.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.1-1.1.dsc
xz-utils_5.8.1-1.debian.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.1-1.dsc
xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.1-2.dsc

Verifying authenticity of upstream and Debian sources using OpenPGP signatures As seen in the output of debsnap, it already automatically verifies that the downloaded files match the OpenPGP signatures. To have full clarity on what files were authenticated with what keys, we should verify the Debian packagers signature with:
$ gpg --verify --auto-key-retrieve --keyserver hkps://keyring.debian.org xz-utils_5.8.1-2.dsc
gpg: Signature made Fri Oct 3 22:04:44 2025 UTC
gpg: using RSA key 57892E705233051337F6FDD105641F175712FA5B
gpg: requesting key 05641F175712FA5B from hkps://keyring.debian.org
gpg: key 7B96E8162A8CF5D1: public key "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
gpg: Good signature from "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" [unknown]
gpg: aka "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>" [unknown]
gpg: aka "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 6425 4695 FFF0 AA44 66CC 19E6 7B96 E816 2A8C F5D1
Subkey fingerprint: 5789 2E70 5233 0513 37F6 FDD1 0564 1F17 5712 FA5B
The upstream tarball signature (if available) can be verified with:
$ gpg --verify --auto-key-retrieve xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc
gpg: assuming signed data in 'xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz'
gpg: Signature made Thu Apr 3 11:38:23 2025 UTC
gpg: using RSA key 3690C240CE51B4670D30AD1C38EE757D69184620
gpg: key 38EE757D69184620: public key "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
gpg: Good signature from "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 3690 C240 CE51 B467 0D30 AD1C 38EE 757D 6918 4620
Note that this only proves that there is a key that created a valid signature for this content. The authenticity of the keys themselves need to be validated separately before trusting they in fact are the keys of these people. That can be done by checking e.g. the upstream website for what key fingerprints they published, or the Debian keyring for Debian Developers and Maintainers, or by relying on the OpenPGP web-of-trust .

Verifying authenticity of upstream sources by comparing checksums In case the upstream in question does not publish release signatures, the second best way to verify the authenticity of the sources used in Debian is to download the sources directly from upstream and compare that the sha256 checksums match. This should be done using the debian/watch file inside the Debian packaging, which defines where the upstream source is downloaded from. Continuing on the example situation above, we can unpack the latest Debian sources, enter and then run uscan to download:
$ tar xvf xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
...
debian/rules
debian/source/format
debian/source.lintian-overrides
debian/symbols
debian/tests/control
debian/tests/testsuite
debian/upstream/signing-key.asc
debian/watch
...
$ uscan --download-current-version --destdir /tmp
Newest version of xz-utils on remote site is 5.8.1, specified download version is 5.8.1
gpgv: Signature made Thu Apr 3 11:38:23 2025 UTC
gpgv: using RSA key 3690C240CE51B4670D30AD1C38EE757D69184620
gpgv: Good signature from "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>"
Successfully symlinked /tmp/xz-5.8.1.tar.xz to /tmp/xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.
The original files downloaded from upstream are now in /tmp along with the files renamed to follow Debian conventions. Using everything downloaded so far the sha256 checksums can be compared across the files and also to what the .dsc file advertised:
$ ls -1 /tmp/
xz-5.8.1.tar.xz
xz-5.8.1.tar.xz.sig
xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz
xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc
$ sha256sum xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz /tmp/xz-5.8.1.tar.xz
0b54f79df85912504de0b14aec7971e3f964491af1812d83447005807513cd9e xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz
0b54f79df85912504de0b14aec7971e3f964491af1812d83447005807513cd9e /tmp/xz-5.8.1.tar.xz
$ grep -A 3 Sha256 xz-utils_5.8.1-2.dsc
Checksums-Sha256:
0b54f79df85912504de0b14aec7971e3f964491af1812d83447005807513cd9e 1461872 xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz
4138f4ceca1aa7fd2085fb15a23f6d495d27bca6d3c49c429a8520ea622c27ae 833 xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc
3ed458da17e4023ec45b2c398480ed4fe6a7bfc1d108675ec837b5ca9a4b5ccb 24648 xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
In the example above the checksum 0b54f79df85... is the same across the files, so it is a match.

Repackaged upstream sources can t be verified as easily Note that uscan may in rare cases repackage some upstream sources, for example to exclude files that don t adhere to Debian s copyright and licensing requirements. Those files and paths would be listed under the Files-Excluded section in the debian/copyright file. There are also other situations where the file that represents the upstream sources in Debian isn t bit-by-bit the same as what upstream published. If checksums don t match, an experienced Debian Developer should review all package settings (e.g. debian/source/options) to see if there was a valid and intentional reason for divergence.

Reviewing changes between two source packages using diffoscope Diffoscope is an incredibly capable and handy tool to compare arbitrary files. For example, to view a report in HTML format of the differences between two XZ releases, run:
diffoscope --html-dir xz-utils-5.6.4_vs_5.8.0 xz-utils_5.6.4.orig.tar.xz xz-utils_5.8.0.orig.tar.xz
browse xz-utils-5.6.4_vs_5.8.0/index.html
Inspecting diffoscope output of differences between two XZ Utils releases If the changes are extensive, and you want to use a LLM to help spot potential security issues, generate the report of both the upstream and Debian packaging differences in Markdown with:
diffoscope --markdown diffoscope-debian.md xz-utils_5.6.4-1.debian.tar.xz xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
diffoscope --markdown diffoscope.md xz-utils_5.6.4.orig.tar.xz xz-utils_5.8.0.orig.tar.xz
The Markdown files created above can then be passed to your favorite LLM, along with a prompt such as:
Based on the attached diffoscope output for a new Debian package version compared with the previous one, list all suspicious changes that might have introduced a backdoor, followed by other potential security issues. If there are none, list a short summary of changes as the conclusion.

Reviewing Debian source packages in version control As of today only 93% of all Debian source packages are tracked in git on Debian s GitLab instance at salsa.debian.org. Some key packages such as Coreutils and Bash are not using version control at all, as their maintainers apparently don t see value in using git for Debian packaging, and the Debian Policy does not require it. Thus, the only reliable and consistent way to audit changes in Debian packages is to compare the full versions from the archive as shown above. However, for packages that are hosted on Salsa, one can view the git history to gain additional insight into what exactly changed, when and why. For packages that are using version control, their location can be found in the Git-Vcs header in the debian/control file. For xz-utils the location is salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils. Note that the Debian policy does not state anything about how Salsa should be used, or what git repository layout or development practices to follow. In practice most packages follow the DEP-14 proposal, and use git-buildpackage as the tool for managing changes and pushing and pulling them between upstream and salsa.debian.org. To get the XZ Utils source, run:
$ gbp clone https://salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils.git
gbp:info: Cloning from 'https://salsa.debian.org/debian/xz-utils.git'
At the time of writing this post the git history shows:
$ git log --graph --oneline
* bb787585 (HEAD -> debian/unstable, origin/debian/unstable, origin/HEAD) Prepare 5.8.1-2
* 4b769547 d: Remove the symlinks from -dev package.
* a39f3428 Correct the nocheck build profile
* 1b806b8d Import Debian changes 5.8.1-1.1
* b1cad34b Prepare 5.8.1-1
* a8646015 Import 5.8.1
* 2808ec2d Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/5.8.1'
 \
  * fa1e8796 (origin/upstream/v5.8, upstream/v5.8) New upstream version 5.8.1
  * a522a226 Bump version and soname for 5.8.1
  * 1c462c2a Add NEWS for 5.8.1
  * 513cabcf Tests: Call lzma_code() in smaller chunks in fuzz_common.h
  * 48440e24 Tests: Add a fuzzing target for the multithreaded .xz decoder
  * 0c80045a liblzma: mt dec: Fix lack of parallelization in single-shot decoding
  * 81880488 liblzma: mt dec: Don't modify thr->in_size in the worker thread
  * d5a2ffe4 liblzma: mt dec: Don't free the input buffer too early (CVE-2025-31115)
  * c0c83596 liblzma: mt dec: Simplify by removing the THR_STOP state
  * 831b55b9 liblzma: mt dec: Fix a comment
  * b9d168ee liblzma: Add assertions to lzma_bufcpy()
  * c8e0a489 DOS: Update Makefile to fix the build
  * 307c02ed sysdefs.h: Avoid <stdalign.h> even with C11 compilers
  * 7ce38b31 Update THANKS
  * 688e51bd Translations: Update the Croatian translation
*   a6b54dde Prepare 5.8.0-1.
*   77d9470f Add 5.8 symbols.
*   9268eb66 Import 5.8.0
*   6f85ef4f Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/5.8.0'
 \ \
  *   afba662b New upstream version 5.8.0
   /
  * 173fb5c6 doc/SHA256SUMS: Add 5.8.0
  * db9258e8 Bump version and soname for 5.8.0
  * bfb752a3 Add NEWS for 5.8.0
  * 6ccbb904 Translations: Run "make -C po update-po"
  * 891a5f05 Translations: Run po4a/update-po
  * 4f52e738 Translations: Partially fix overtranslation in Serbian man pages
  * ff5d9447 liblzma: Count the extra bytes in LZMA/LZMA2 decoder memory usage
  * 943b012d liblzma: Use SSE2 intrinsics instead of memcpy() in dict_repeat()
This shows both the changes on the debian/unstable branch as well as the intermediate upstream import branch, and the actual real upstream development branch. See my Debian source packages in git explainer for details of what these branches are used for. To only view changes on the Debian branch, run git log --graph --oneline --first-parent or git log --graph --oneline -- debian. The Debian branch should only have changes inside the debian/ subdirectory, which is easy to check with:
$ git diff --stat upstream/v5.8
debian/README.source   16 +++
debian/autogen.sh   32 +++++
debian/changelog   949 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
...
debian/upstream/signing-key.asc   52 +++++++++
debian/watch   4 +
debian/xz-utils.README.Debian   47 ++++++++
debian/xz-utils.docs   6 +
debian/xz-utils.install   28 +++++
debian/xz-utils.postinst   19 +++
debian/xz-utils.prerm   10 ++
debian/xzdec.docs   6 +
debian/xzdec.install   4 +
33 files changed, 2014 insertions(+)
All the files outside the debian/ directory originate from upstream, and for example running git blame on them should show only upstream commits:
$ git blame CMakeLists.txt
22af94128 (Lasse Collin 2024-02-12 17:09:10 +0200 1) # SPDX-License-Identifier: 0BSD
22af94128 (Lasse Collin 2024-02-12 17:09:10 +0200 2)
7e3493d40 (Lasse Collin 2020-02-24 23:38:16 +0200 3) ###############
7e3493d40 (Lasse Collin 2020-02-24 23:38:16 +0200 4) #
426bdc709 (Lasse Collin 2024-02-17 21:45:07 +0200 5) # CMake support for building XZ Utils
If the upstream in question signs commits or tags, they can be verified with e.g.:
$ git verify-tag v5.6.2
gpg: Signature made Wed 29 May 2024 09:39:42 AM PDT
gpg: using RSA key 3690C240CE51B4670D30AD1C38EE757D69184620
gpg: issuer "lasse.collin@tukaani.org"
gpg: Good signature from "Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>" [expired]
gpg: Note: This key has expired!
The main benefit of reviewing changes in git is the ability to see detailed information about each individual change, instead of just staring at a massive list of changes without any explanations. In this example, to view all the upstream commits since the previous import to Debian, one would view the commit range from afba662b New upstream version 5.8.0 to fa1e8796 New upstream version 5.8.1 with git log --reverse -p afba662b...fa1e8796. However, a far superior way to review changes would be to browse this range using a visual git history viewer, such as gitk. Either way, looking at one code change at a time and reading the git commit message makes the review much easier. Browsing git history in gitk --all

Comparing Debian source packages to git contents As stated in the beginning of the previous section, and worth repeating, there is no guarantee that the contents in the Debian packaging git repository matches what was actually uploaded to Debian. While the tag2upload project in Debian is getting more and more popular, Debian is still far from having any system to enforce that the git repository would be in sync with the Debian archive contents. To detect such differences we can run diff across the Debian source packages downloaded with debsnap earlier (path source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian) and the git repository cloned in the previous section (path xz-utils):
diff
$ diff -u source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian/ xz-utils/debian/
diff -u source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian/changelog xz-utils/debian/changelog
--- debsnap/source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian/changelog 2025-10-03 09:32:16.000000000 -0700
+++ xz-utils/debian/changelog 2025-10-12 12:18:04.623054758 -0700
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 * Remove the symlinks from -dev, pointing to the lib package.
 (Closes: #1109354)

- -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Fri, 03 Oct 2025 18:32:16 +0200
+ -- Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Fri, 03 Oct 2025 18:36:59 +0200
In the case above diff revealed that the timestamp in the changelog in the version uploaded to Debian is different from what was committed to git. This is not malicious, just a mistake by the maintainer who probably didn t run gbp tag immediately after upload, but instead some dch command and ended up with having a different timestamps in the git compared to what was actually uploaded to Debian.

Creating syntetic Debian packaging git repositories If no Debian packaging git repository exists, or if it is lagging behind what was uploaded to Debian s archive, one can use git-buildpackage s import-dscs feature to create synthetic git commits based on the files downloaded by debsnap, ensuring the git contents fully matches what was uploaded to the archive. To import a single version there is gbp import-dsc (no s at the end), of which an example invocation would be:
$ gbp import-dsc --verbose ../source-xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.dsc
Version '5.8.1-2' imported under '/home/otto/debian/xz-utils-2025-09-29'
Example commit history from a repository with commits added with gbp import-dsc:
$ git log --graph --oneline
* 86aed07b (HEAD -> debian/unstable, tag: debian/5.8.1-2, origin/debian/unstable) Import Debian changes 5.8.1-2
* f111d93b (tag: debian/5.8.1-1.1) Import Debian changes 5.8.1-1.1
* 1106e19b (tag: debian/5.8.1-1) Import Debian changes 5.8.1-1
 \
  * 08edbe38 (tag: upstream/5.8.1, origin/upstream/v5.8, upstream/v5.8) Import Upstream version 5.8.1
   \
    * a522a226 (tag: v5.8.1) Bump version and soname for 5.8.1
    * 1c462c2a Add NEWS for 5.8.1
    * 513cabcf Tests: Call lzma_code() in smaller chunks in fuzz_common.h
An online example repository with only a few missing uploads added using gbp import-dsc can be viewed at salsa.debian.org/otto/xz-utils-2025-09-29/-/network/debian%2Funstable An example repository that was fully crafted using gbp import-dscs can be viewed at salsa.debian.org/otto/xz-utils-gbp-import-dscs-debsnap-generated/-/network/debian%2Flatest. There exists also dgit, which in a similar way creates a synthetic git history to allow viewing the Debian archive contents via git tools. However, its focus is on producing new package versions, so fetching a package with dgit that has not had the history recorded in dgit earlier will only show the latest versions:
$ dgit clone xz-utils
canonical suite name for unstable is sid
starting new git history
last upload to archive: NO git hash
downloading http://ftp.debian.org/debian//pool/main/x/xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz...
downloading http://ftp.debian.org/debian//pool/main/x/xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz.asc...
downloading http://ftp.debian.org/debian//pool/main/x/xz-utils/xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz...
dpkg-source: info: extracting xz-utils in unpacked
dpkg-source: info: unpacking xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz
dpkg-source: info: unpacking xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz
synthesised git commit from .dsc 5.8.1-2
HEAD is now at f9bcaf7 xz-utils (5.8.1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
dgit ok: ready for work in xz-utils
$ dgit/sid   git log --graph --oneline
* f9bcaf7 xz-utils (5.8.1-2) unstable; urgency=medium 9 days ago (HEAD -> dgit/sid, dgit/dgit/sid)
 \
  * 11d3a62 Import xz-utils_5.8.1-2.debian.tar.xz 9 days ago
* 15dcd95 Import xz-utils_5.8.1.orig.tar.xz 6 months ago
Unlike git-buildpackage managed git repositories, the dgit managed repositories cannot incorporate the upstream git history and are thus less useful for auditing the full software supply-chain in git.

Comparing upstream source packages to git contents Equally important to the note in the beginning of the previous section, one must also keep in mind that the upstream release source packages, often called release tarballs, are not guaranteed to have the exact same contents as the upstream git repository. Projects might strip out test data or extra development files from their release tarballs to avoid shipping unnecessary files to users, or projects might add documentation files or versioning information into the tarball that isn t stored in git. While a small minority, there are also upstreams that don t use git at all, so the plain files in a release tarball is still the lowest common denominator for all open source software projects, and exporting and importing source code needs to interface with it. In the case of XZ, the release tarball has additional version info and also a sizeable amount of pregenerated compiler configuration files. Detecting and comparing differences between git contents and tarballs can of course be done manually by running diff across an unpacked tarball and a checked out git repository. If using git-buildpackage, the difference between the git contents and tarball contents can be made visible directly in the import commit. In this XZ example, consider this git history:
* b1cad34b Prepare 5.8.1-1
* a8646015 Import 5.8.1
* 2808ec2d Update upstream source from tag 'upstream/5.8.1'
 \
  * fa1e8796 (debian/upstream/v5.8, upstream/v5.8) New upstream version 5.8.1
  * a522a226 (tag: v5.8.1) Bump version and soname for 5.8.1
  * 1c462c2a Add NEWS for 5.8.1
The commit a522a226 was the upstream release commit, which upstream also tagged v5.8.1. The merge commit 2808ec2d applied the new upstream import branch contents on the Debian branch. Between these is the special commit fa1e8796 New upstream version 5.8.1 tagged upstream/v5.8. This commit and tag exists only in the Debian packaging repository, and they show what is the contents imported into Debian. This is generated automatically by git-buildpackage when running git import-orig --uscan for Debian packages with the correct settings in debian/gbp.conf. By viewing this commit one can see exactly how the upstream release tarball differs from the upstream git contents (if at all). In the case of XZ, the difference is substantial, and shown below in full as it is very interesting:
$ git show --stat fa1e8796
commit fa1e8796dabd91a0f667b9e90f9841825225413a
(debian/upstream/v5.8, upstream/v5.8)
Author: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Date: Thu Apr 3 22:58:39 2025 +0200
New upstream version 5.8.1
.codespellrc   30 -
.gitattributes   8 -
.github/workflows/ci.yml   163 -
.github/workflows/freebsd.yml   32 -
.github/workflows/netbsd.yml   32 -
.github/workflows/openbsd.yml   35 -
.github/workflows/solaris.yml   32 -
.github/workflows/windows-ci.yml   124 -
.gitignore   113 -
ABOUT-NLS   1 +
ChangeLog   17392 +++++++++++++++++++++
Makefile.in   1097 +++++++
aclocal.m4   1353 ++++++++
build-aux/ci_build.bash   286 --
build-aux/compile   351 ++
build-aux/config.guess   1815 ++++++++++
build-aux/config.rpath   751 +++++
build-aux/config.sub   2354 +++++++++++++
build-aux/depcomp   792 +++++
build-aux/install-sh   541 +++
build-aux/ltmain.sh   11524 ++++++++++++++++++++++
build-aux/missing   236 ++
build-aux/test-driver   160 +
config.h.in   634 ++++
configure   26434 ++++++++++++++++++++++
debug/Makefile.in   756 +++++
doc/SHA256SUMS   236 --
doc/man/txt/lzmainfo.txt   36 +
doc/man/txt/xz.txt   1708 ++++++++++
doc/man/txt/xzdec.txt   76 +
doc/man/txt/xzdiff.txt   39 +
doc/man/txt/xzgrep.txt   70 +
doc/man/txt/xzless.txt   36 +
doc/man/txt/xzmore.txt   31 +
lib/Makefile.in   623 ++++
m4/.gitignore   40 -
m4/build-to-host.m4   274 ++
m4/gettext.m4   392 +++
m4/host-cpu-c-abi.m4   529 +++
m4/iconv.m4   324 ++
m4/intlmacosx.m4   71 +
m4/lib-ld.m4   170 +
m4/lib-link.m4   815 +++++
m4/lib-prefix.m4   334 ++
m4/libtool.m4   8488 +++++++++++++++++++++
m4/ltoptions.m4   467 +++
m4/ltsugar.m4   124 +
m4/ltversion.m4   24 +
m4/lt~obsolete.m4   99 +
m4/nls.m4   33 +
m4/po.m4   456 +++
m4/progtest.m4   92 +
po/.gitignore   31 -
po/Makefile.in.in   517 +++
po/Rules-quot   66 +
po/boldquot.sed   21 +
po/ca.gmo   Bin 0 -> 15587 bytes
po/cs.gmo   Bin 0 -> 7983 bytes
po/da.gmo   Bin 0 -> 9040 bytes
po/de.gmo   Bin 0 -> 29882 bytes
po/en@boldquot.header   35 +
po/en@quot.header   32 +
po/eo.gmo   Bin 0 -> 15060 bytes
po/es.gmo   Bin 0 -> 29228 bytes
po/fi.gmo   Bin 0 -> 28225 bytes
po/fr.gmo   Bin 0 -> 10232 bytes
To be able to easily inspect exactly what changed in the release tarball compared to git release tag contents, the best tool for the job is Meld, invoked via git difftool --dir-diff fa1e8796^..fa1e8796. Meld invoked by git difftool --dir-diff afba662b..fa1e8796 to show differences between git release tag and release tarball contents To compare changes across the new and old upstream tarball, one would need to compare commits afba662b New upstream version 5.8.0 and fa1e8796 New upstream version 5.8.1 by running git difftool --dir-diff afba662b..fa1e8796. Meld invoked by git difftool --dir-diff afba662b..fa1e8796 to show differences between to upstream release tarball contents With all the above tips you can now go and try to audit your own favorite package in Debian and see if it is identical with upstream, and if not, how it differs.

Should the XZ backdoor have been detected using these tools? The famous XZ Utils backdoor (CVE-2024-3094) consisted of two parts: the actual backdoor inside two binary blobs masqueraded as a test files (tests/files/bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz, tests/files/good-large_compressed.lzma), and a small modification in the build scripts (m4/build-to-host.m4) to extract the backdoor and plant it into the built binary. The build script was not tracked in version control, but generated with GNU Autotools at release time and only shipped as additional files in the release tarball. The entire reason for me to write this post was to ponder if a diligent engineer using git-buildpackage best practices could have reasonably spotted this while importing the new upstream release into Debian. The short answer is no . The malicious actor here clearly anticipated all the typical ways anyone might inspect both git commits, and release tarball contents, and masqueraded the changes very well and over a long timespan. First of all, XZ has for legitimate reasons for several carefully crafted .xz files as test data to help catch regressions in the decompression code path. The test files are shipped in the release so users can run the test suite and validate that the binary is built correctly and xz works properly. Debian famously runs massive amounts of testing in its CI and autopkgtest system across tens of thousands of packages to uphold high quality despite frequent upgrades of the build toolchain and while supporting more CPU architectures than any other distro. Test data is useful and should stay. When git-buildpackage is used correctly, the upstream commits are visible in the Debian packaging for easy review, but the commit cf44e4b that introduced the test files does not deviate enough from regular sloppy coding practices to really stand out. It is unfortunately very common for git commit to lack a message body explaining why the change was done, and to not be properly atomic with test code and test data together in the same commit, and for commits to be pushed directly to mainline without using code reviews (the commit was not part of any PR in this case). Only another upstream developer could have spotted that this change is not on par to what the project expects, and that the test code was never added, only test data, and thus that this commit was not just a sloppy one but potentially malicious. Secondly, the fact that a new Autotools file appeared (m4/build-to-host.m4) in the XZ Utils 5.6.0 is not suspicious. This is perfectly normal for Autotools. In fact, starting from XZ Utils version 5.8.1 it is now shipping a m4/build-to-host.m4 file that it actually uses now. Spotting that there is anything fishy is practically impossible by simply reading the code, as Autotools files are full custom m4 syntax interwoven with shell script, and there are plenty of backticks ( ) that spawn subshells and evals that execute variable contents further, which is just normal for Autotools. Russ Cox s XZ post explains how exactly the Autotools code fetched the actual backdoor from the test files and injected it into the build. Inspecting the m4/build-to-host.m4 changes in Meld launched via git difftool There is only one tiny thing that maybe a very experienced Autotools user could potentially have noticed: the serial 30 in the version header is way too high. In theory one could also have noticed this Autotools file deviates from what other packages in Debian ship with the same filename, such as e.g. the serial 3, serial 5a or 5b versions. That would however require and an insane amount extra checking work, and is not something we should plan to start doing. A much simpler solution would be to simply strongly recommend all open source projects to stop using Autotools to eventually get rid of it entirely.

Not detectable with reasonable effort While planting backdoors is evil, it is hard not to feel some respect to the level of skill and dedication of the people behind this. I ve been involved in a bunch of security breach investigations during my IT career, and never have I seen anything this well executed. If it hadn t slowed down SSH by ~500 milliseconds and been discovered due to that, it would most likely have stayed undetected for months or years. Hiding backdoors in closed source software is relatively trivial, but hiding backdoors in plain sight in a popular open source project requires some unusual amount of expertise and creativity as shown above.

Is the software supply-chain in Debian easy to audit? While maintaining a Debian package source using git-buildpackage can make the package history a lot easier to inspect, most packages have incomplete configurations in their debian/gbp.conf, and thus their package development histories are not always correctly constructed or uniform and easy to compare. The Debian Policy does not mandate git usage at all, and there are many important packages that are not using git at all. Additionally the Debian Policy also allows for non-maintainers to upload new versions to Debian without committing anything in git even for packages where the original maintainer wanted to use git. Uploads that bypass git unfortunately happen surpisingly often. Because of the situation, I am afraid that we could have multiple similar backdoors lurking that simply haven t been detected yet. More audits, that hopefully also get published openly, would be welcome! More people auditing the contents of the Debian archives would probably also help surface what tools and policies Debian might be missing to make the work easier, and thus help improve the security of Debian s users, and improve trust in Debian.

Is Debian currently missing some software that could help detect similar things? To my knowledge there is currently no system in place as part of Debian s QA or security infrastructure to verify that the upstream source packages in Debian are actually from upstream. I ve come across a lot of packages where the debian/watch or other configs are incorrect and even cases where maintainers have manually created upstream tarballs as it was easier than configuring automation to work. It is obvious that for those packages the source tarball now in Debian is not at all the same as upstream. I am not aware of any malicious cases though (if I was, I would report them of course). I am also aware of packages in the Debian repository that are misconfigured to be of type 1.0 (native) packages, mixing the upstream files and debian/ contents and having patches applied, while they actually should be configured as 3.0 (quilt), and not hide what is the true upstream sources. Debian should extend the QA tools to scan for such things. If I find a sponsor, I might build it myself as my next major contribution to Debian. In addition to better tooling for finding mismatches in the source code, Debian could also have better tooling for tracking in built binaries what their source files were, but solutions like Fraunhofer-AISEC s supply-graph or Sony s ESSTRA are not practical yet. Julien Malka s post about NixOS discusses the role of reproducible builds, which may help in some cases across all distros.

Or, is Debian missing some policies or practices to mitigate this? Perhaps more importantly than more security scanning, the Debian Developer community should switch the general mindset from anyone is free to do anything to valuing having more shared workflows. The ability to audit anything is severely hampered by the fact that there are so many ways to do the same thing, and distinguishing what is a normal deviation from a malicious deviation is too hard, as the normal can basically be almost anything. Also, as there is no documented and recommended default workflow, both those who are old and new to Debian packaging might never learn any one optimal workflow, and end up doing many steps in the packaging process in a way that kind of works, but is actually wrong or unnecessary, causing process deviations that look malicious, but turn out to just be a result of not fully understanding what would have been the right way to do something. In the long run, once individual developers workflows are more aligned, doing code reviews will become a lot easier and smoother as the excess noise of workflow differences diminishes and reviews will feel much more productive to all participants. Debian fostering a culture of code reviews would allow us to slowly move from the current practice of mainly solo packaging work towards true collaboration forming around those code reviews. I have been promoting increased use of Merge Requests in Debian already for some time, for example by proposing DEP-18: Encourage Continuous Integration and Merge Request based Collaboration for Debian packages. If you are involved in Debian development, please give a thumbs up in dep-team/deps!21 if you want me to continue promoting it.

Can we trust open source software? Yes and I would argue that we can only trust open source software. There is no way to audit closed source software, and anyone using e.g. Windows or MacOS just have to trust the vendor s word when they say they have no intentional or accidental backdoors in their software. Or, when the news gets out that the systems of a closed source vendor was compromised, like Crowdstrike some weeks ago, we can t audit anything, and time after time we simply need to take their word when they say they have properly cleaned up their code base. In theory, a vendor could give some kind of contractual or financial guarantee to its customer that there are no preventable security issues, but in practice that never happens. I am not aware of a single case of e.g. Microsoft or Oracle would have paid damages to their customers after a security flaw was found in their software. In theory you could also pay a vendor more to have them focus more effort in security, but since there is no way to verify what they did, or to get compensation when they didn t, any increased fees are likely just pocketed as increased profit. Open source is clearly better overall. You can, if you are an individual with the time and skills, audit every step in the supply-chain, or you could as an organization make investments in open source security improvements and actually verify what changes were made and how security improved. If your organisation is using Debian (or derivatives, such as Ubuntu) and you are interested in sponsoring my work to improve Debian, please reach out.

18 October 2025

Julian Andres Klode: Sound Removals

Problem statement Currently if you have an automatically installed package A (= 1) where
  • A (= 1) Depends B (= 1)
  • A (= 2) Depends B (= 2)
and you upgrade B from 1 to 2; then you can:
  1. Remove A (= 1)
  2. Upgrade A to version 2
If A was installed by a chain initiated by Recommends (say X Rec Y, Y Depends A), the solver sometimes preferred removing A (and anything depending on it until it got). I have a fix pending to introduce eager Recommends which fixes the practical case, but this is still not sound. In fact we can show that the solver produces the wrong result for small minimal test cases, as well as the right result for some others without the fix (hooray?). Ensuring sound removals is more complex, and first of all it begs the question: When is a removal sound? This, of course, is on us to define. An easy case can be found in the Debian policy, 7.6.2 Replacing whole packages, forcing their removal : If B (= 2) declares a Conflicts: A (= 1) and Replaces: A (= 1), then the removal is valid. However this is incomplete as well, consider it declares Conflicts: A (< 1) and Replaces: A (< 1); the solution to remove A rather than upgrade it would still be wrong. This indicates that we should only allow removing A if the conflicts could not be solved by upgrading it. The other case to explore is package removals. If B is removed, A should be removed as well; however it there is another package X that Provides: B (= 1) and it is marked for install, A should not be removed. That said, the solver is not allowed to install X to satisfy the depends B (= 1) - only to satisfy other dependencies [we do not want to get into endless loops where we switch between alternatives to keep reverse dependencies installed].

Proposed solution To solve this, I propose the following definition: Definition (sound removal): A removal of package P is sound if either:
  1. A version v is installed that package-conflicts with B.
  2. A package Q is removed and the installable versions of P package-depends on Q.
where the other definitions are: Definition (installable version): A version v is installable if either it is installed, or it is newer than an installed version of the same package (you may wish to change this to accomodate downgrades, or require strict pinning, but here be dragons). Definition (package-depends): A version v package-depends on a package B if either:
  1. there exists a dependency in v that can be solved by any version of B, or
  2. there exists a package C where v package-depends C and any (c in C) package-depends B (transitivity)
Definition (package-conflicts): A version v package-conflicts with an installed package B if either:
  1. it declares a conflicts against an installable version of B; or
  2. there exists a package C where v package-conflicts C, and b package-depends C for installable versions b.

Translating this into a (modified) SAT solver One approach may be to implement the logic in the conflict analysis that drives backtracking, i.e. we assume a package A and when we reach not A, we analyse if the implication graph for not A constitutes a sound removal, and then replace the assumption A with the assumption A or "learned reason. However, while this seems a plausible mechanism for a DPLL solver, for a modern CDCL solver, it s not immediately evident how to analyse whether not A is sound if the reason for it is a learned clause, rather than a problem clause. Instead we propose a static encoding of the rules into a slightly modified SAT solver: Given c1, , cn that transitive-conflicts A and D1, , Dn that A package-depends on, introduce the rule: A unless c1 or c2 or ... cn ... or not D1 or not D2 ... or not Dn Rules of the form A... unless B... - where A... and B... are CNF - are intuitively the same as A... or B..., however the semantic here is different: We are not allowed to select B... to satisfy this clause. This requires a SAT solver that tracks a reason for each literal being assigned, such as solver3, rather than a SAT solver like MiniSAT that only tracks reasons across propagation (solver3 may track A depends B or C as the reason for B without evaluating C, whereas MiniSAT would only track it as the reason given not C).

Is it actually sound? The proposed definition of a sound removal may still proof unsound as I either missed something in the conclusion of the proposed definition that violates my goal I set out to achieve, or I missed some of the goals. I challenge you to find cases that cause removals that look wrong :D

27 September 2025

Julian Andres Klode: Dependency Tries

As I was shopping groceries I had a shocking realization: The active dependencies of packages in a solver actually form a trie (a dependency A B - A or B - of a package X is considered active if we marked X for install). Consider the dependencies A B C, A B, B X. In most package managers these just express alternatives, that is, the or relationship, but in Debian packages, it also expresses a preference relationship between its operands, so in A B C, A is preferred over B and B over C (and A transitively over C). This means that we can convert the three dependencies into a trie as follows: Dependency trie of the three dependencies Solving the dependency here becomes a matter of trying to install the package referenced by the first edge of the root, and seeing if that sticks. In this case, that would be a . Let s assume that a failed to install, the next step is to remove the empty node of a, and merging its children into the root. Reduced dependency trie with  not A  containing b, b c, b x For ease of visualisation, we remove a from the dependency nodes as well, leading us to a trie of the dependencies b , b c , and b x . Presenting the Debian dependency problem, or the positive part of it as a trie allows us for a great visualization of the problem but it may not proof to be an effective implementation choice. In the real world we may actually store this as a priority queue that we can delete from. Since we don t actually want to delete from the queue for real, our queue items are pairs of a pointer to dependency and an activitity level, say A B@1. Whenever a variable is assigned false, we look at its reverse dependencies and bump their activity, and reinsert them (the priority of the item being determined by the leftmost solution still possible, it has now changed). When we iterate the queue, we remove items with a lower activity level:
  1. Our queue is A B@1, A B C@1, B X@1
  2. Rejecting A bump the activity for its reverse dependencies and reinset them: Our queue is A B@1, A B C@1, (A )B@2, (A )B C@2, B X@1
  3. We visit A B@1 but see the activity of the underlying dependency is now 2 and remove it Our queue is A B C@1, (A )B@2, (A )B C@2, B X@1
  4. We visit A B C@1 but see the activity of the underlying dependency is now 2 and remove it Our queue is (A )B@2, (A )B C@2, B X@1
  5. We visit A B@2, see the activity matches and find B is the solution.

12 August 2025

Freexian Collaborators: Debian Contributions: DebConf 25, OpenSSH upgrades, Cross compilation collaboration and more! (by Anupa Ann Joseph)

Debian Contributions: 2025-07 Contributing to Debian is part of Freexian s mission. This article covers the latest achievements of Freexian and their collaborators. All of this is made possible by organizations subscribing to our Long Term Support contracts and consulting services.

DebConf 25, by Stefano Rivera and Santiago Ruano Rinc n In July, DebConf 25 was held in Brest, France. Freexian was a gold sponsor and most of the Freexian team attended the event. Many fruitful discussions were had amongst our team and within the Debian community. DebConf itself was organized by a local team in Brest, that included Santiago (who now lives in Uruguay). Stefano was also deeply involved in the organization, as a DebConf committee member, core video team, and the lead developer for the conference website. Running the conference took an enormous amount of work, consuming all of Stefano and Santiago s time for most of July. Lucas Kanashiro was active in the DebConf content team, reviewing talks and scheduling them. There were many last-minute changes to make during the event. Anupa Ann Joseph was part of the Debian publicity team doing live coverage of DebConf 25 and was part of the DebConf 25 content team reviewing the talks. She also assisted the local team to procure the lanyards. Recorded sessions presented by Freexian collaborators, often alongside other friends in Debian, included:

OpenSSH upgrades, by Colin Watson Towards the end of a release cycle, people tend to do more upgrade testing, and this sometimes results in interesting problems. Manfred Stock reported No new SSH connections possible during large part of upgrade to Debian Trixie , which would have affected many people upgrading from Debian 12 (bookworm), with potentially severe consequences for people upgrading remote systems. In fact, there were two independent problems that each led to much the same symptom:
  • As part of hardening the OpenSSH server, OpenSSH 9.8 split the monolithic sshd listener process into two pieces: a minimal network listener (still called sshd), and an sshd-session process dealing with each individual session. Before this change, when sshd received an incoming connection, it forked and re-executed itself with some special parameters to deal with it; after this change, it forks and executes sshd-session instead, and sshd no longer accepts the parameters it used to accept for this.

    Debian package upgrades happen (roughly) in two phases: first we unpack the new files onto disk, and then we run some configuration steps which usually include things like restarting services. Normally this is fine, because the old service keeps on working until it s restarted. In this case, unpacking the new files onto disk immediately stopped new SSH connections from working: the old sshd received the connection and tried to hand it off to a freshly-executed copy of the new sshd binary on disk, which no longer supports this. This wasn t much of a problem when upgrading OpenSSH on its own or with a small number of other packages, but in release upgrades it left a large gap when you can t SSH to the system any more, and if anything fails in that interval then you could be in trouble.

    After trying a couple of other approaches, Colin landed on the idea of having the openssh-server package divert /usr/sbin/sshd to /usr/sbin/sshd.session-split before the unpack step of an upgrade from before 9.8, then removing the diversion and moving the new file into place once it s ready to restart the service. This reduces the period when new connections fail to a minimum.
  • Most OpenSSH processes, including sshd, check for a compatible version of the OpenSSL library when they start up. This check used to be very picky, among other things requiring both the major and minor part of the version number to match. OpenSSL 3 has a better versioning policy, and so OpenSSH 9.4p1 relaxed this check.

    Unfortunately, bookworm shipped with OpenSSH 9.2p1, so as soon as you unpacked the new OpenSSL library during an upgrade, sshd stopped working. This couldn t be fixed by a change in trixie; we needed to change bookworm in advance of the upgrade so that it would tolerate newer versions of OpenSSL, and time was tight if we wanted this to be available before the release of Debian 13.

    Fortunately, there s a stable-updates mechanism for exactly this sort of thing, and the stable release managers kindly accepted Colin s proposal to fix this there.
The net result is that if you apply updates to bookworm (including stable-updates / bookworm-updates, which is enabled by default) before starting the upgrade to trixie, everything should be fine.

Cross compilation collaboration, by Helmut Grohne Supporting cross building in Debian packages touches lots of areas of the archive and quite some of these matters reside in shared responsibility between different teams. Hence, DebConf was an ideal opportunity to settle long-standing issues. The cross building bof sparked lively discussions as a significant fraction of developers employ cross builds to get their work done. In the trixie release, about two thirds of the packages can satisfy their cross Build-Depends and about half of the packages actually can be cross built.

Miscellaneous contributions
  • Rapha l Hertzog updated tracker.debian.org to remove references to Debian 10 which was moved to archive.debian.org, and had many fruitful discussions related to Debusine during DebConf 25.
  • Carles Pina prepared some data, questions and information for the DebConf 25 l10n and i18n BoF.
  • Carles Pina demoed and discussed possible next steps for po-debconf-manager with different teams in DebConf 25. He also reviewed Catalan translations and sent them to the packages.
  • Carles Pina started investigating a django-compressor bug: reproduced the bug consistently and prepared a PR for django-compressor upstream (likely more details next month). Looked at packaging frictionless-py.
  • Stefano Rivera triaged Python CVEs against pypy3.
  • Stefano prepared an upload of a new upstream release of pypy3 to Debian experimental (due to the freeze).
  • Stefano uploaded python3.14 RC1 to Debian experimental.
  • Thorsten Alteholz uploaded a new upstream version of sane-airscan to experimental. He also started to work on a new upstream version of hplip.
  • Colin backported fixes for CVE-2025-50181 and CVE-2025-50182 in python-urllib3, and fixed several other release-critical or important bugs in Python team packages.
  • Lucas uploaded ruby3.4 to experimental as a starting point for the ruby-defaults transition that will happen after Trixie release.
  • Lucas coordinated with the Release team the fix of the remaining RC bugs involving ruby packages, and got them all fixed.
  • Lucas, as part of the Debian Ruby team, kicked off discussions to improve internal process/tooling.
  • Lucas, as part of the Debian Outreach team, engaged in multiple discussions around internship programs we run and also what else we could do to improve outreach in the Debian project.
  • Lucas joined the Local groups BoF during DebConf 25 and shared all the good experiences from the Brazilian community and committed to help to document everything to try to support other groups.
  • Helmut spent significant time with Samuel Thibault on improving architecture cross bootstrap for hurd-any mostly reviewing Samuel s patches. He proposed a patch for improving bash s detection of its pipesize and a change to dpkg-shlibdeps to improve behavior for building cross toolchains.
  • Helmut reiterated the multiarch policy proposal with a lot of help from Nattie Mayer-Hutchings, Rhonda D Vine and Stuart Prescott.
  • Helmut finished his work on the process based unschroot prototype that was the main feature of his talk (see above).
  • Helmut analyzed a multiarch-related glibc upgrade failure induced by a /usr-move mitigation of systemd and sent a patch and regression fix both of which reached trixie in time. Thanks to Aurelien Jarno and the release team for their timely cooperation.
  • Helmut resurrected an earlier discussion about changing the semantics of Architecture: all packages in a multiarch context in order to improve the long-standing interpreter problem. With help from Tollef Fog Heen better semantics were discovered and agreement was reached with Guillem Jover and Julian Andres Klode to consider this change. The idea is to record a concrete architecture for every Architecture: all package in the dpkg database and enable choosing it as non-native.
  • Helmut implemented type hints for piuparts.
  • Helmut reviewed and improved a patch set of Jochen Sprickerhof for debvm.
  • Anupa was involved in discussions with the Debian Women team during DebConf 25.
  • Anupa started working for the trixie release coverage and started coordinating release parties.
  • Emilio helped coordinate the release of Debian 13 trixie.

24 May 2025

Julian Andres Klode: A SomewhatMaxSAT Solver

As you may recall from previous posts and elsewhere I have been busy writing a new solver for APT. Today I want to share some of the latest changes in how to approach solving. The idea for the solver was that manually installed packages are always protected from removals in terms of SAT solving, they are facts. Automatically installed packages become optional unit clauses. Optional clauses are solved after manual ones, they don t partake in normal unit propagation. This worked fine, say you had
A                                   # install request for A
B                                   # manually installed, keep it
A depends on: conflicts-B   C
Installing A on a system with B installed installed C, as it was not allowed to install the conflicts-B package since B is installed. However, I also introduced a mode to allow removing manually installed packages, and that s where it broke down, now instead of B being a fact, our clauses looked like:
A                               # install request for A
A depends on: conflicts-B   C
Optional: B                     # try to keep B installed
As a result, we installed conflicts-B and removed B; the steps the solver takes are:
  1. A is a fact, mark it
  2. A depends on: conflicts-B C is the strongest clause, try to install conflicts-B
  3. We unit propagate that conflicts-B conflicts with B, so we mark not B
  4. Optional: B is reached, but not satisfiable, ignore it because it s optional.
This isn t correct: Just because we allow removing manually installed packages doesn t mean that we should remove manually installed packages if we don t need to. Fixing this turns out to be surprisingly easy. In addition to adding our optional (soft) clauses, let s first assume all of them! But to explain how this works, we first need to explain some terminology:
  1. The solver operates on a stack of decisions
  2. enqueue means a fact is being added at the current decision level, and enqueued for propagation
  3. assume bumps the decision level, and then enqueues the assumed variable
  4. propagate looks at all the facts and sees if any clause becomes unit, and then enqueues it
  5. unit is when a clause has a single literal left to assign
To illustrate this in pseudo Python code:
  1. We introduce all our facts, and if they conflict, we are unsat:
    for fact in facts:
        enqueue(fact)
    if not propagate():
        return False
    
  2. For each optional literal, we register a soft clause and assume it. If the assumption fails, we ignore it. If it succeeds, but propagation fails, we undo the assumption.
    for optionalLiteral in optionalLiterals:
        registerClause(SoftClause([optionalLiteral]))
        if assume(optionalLiteral) and not propagate():
            undo()
    
  3. Finally we enter the main solver loop:
    while True:
        if not propagate():
            if not backtrack():
                return False
        elif <all clauses are satisfied>:
            return True
        elif it := find("best unassigned literal satisfying a hard clause"):
            assume(it)
        elif it := find("best literal satisfying a soft clause"):
            assume(it)
    
The key point to note is that the main loop will undo the assumptions in order; so if you assume A,B,C and B is not possible, we will have also undone C. But since C is also enqueued as a soft clause, we will then later find it again:
  1. Assume A: State=[Assume(A)], Clauses=[SoftClause([A])]
  2. Assume B: State=[Assume(A),Assume(B)], Clauses=[SoftClause([A]),SoftClause([B])]
  3. Assume C: State=[Assume(A),Assume(B),Assume(C)], Clauses=[SoftClause([A]),SoftClause([B]),SoftClause([C])]
  4. Solve finds a conflict, backtracks, and sets not C: State=[Assume(A),Assume(B),not(C)]
  5. Solve finds a conflict, backtracks, and sets not B: State=[Assume(A),not(B)] C is no longer assumed either
  6. Solve, assume C as it satisfies SoftClause([C]) as next best literal: State=[Assume(A),not(B),Assume(C)]
  7. All clauses are satisfied, solution is A, not B, and C.
This is not (correct) MaxSAT, because we actually do not guarantee that we satisfy as many soft clauses as possible. Consider you have the following clauses:
Optional: A
Optional: B
Optional: C
B Conflicts with A
C Conflicts with A
There are two possible results here:
  1. A If we assume A first, we are unable to satisfy B or C.
  2. B,C If we assume either B or C first, A is unsat.
The question to ponder though is whether we actually need a global maximum or whether a local maximum is satisfactory in practice for a dependency solver If you look at it, a naive MaxSAT solver needs to run the SAT solver 2**n times for n soft clauses, whereas our heuristic only needs n runs. For dependency solving, it seems we do not seem have a strong need for a global maximum: There are various other preferences between our literals, say priorities; and empirically, from evaluating hundreds of regressions without the initial assumptions, I can say that the assumptions do fix those cases and the result is correct. Further improvements exist, though, and we can look into them if they are needed, such as:

25 April 2025

Bits from Debian: Debian Project Leader election 2025 is over, Andreas Tille re-elected!

The voting period and tally of votes for the Debian Project Leader election has just concluded and the winner is Andreas Tille, who has been elected for the second time. Congratulations! Out of a total of 1,030 developers, 362 voted. As usual in Debian, the voting method used was the Condorcet method. More information about the result is available in the Debian Project Leader Elections 2025 page. Many thanks to Andreas Tille, Gianfranco Costamagna, Julian Andres Klode, and Sruthi Chandran for their campaigns, and to our Developers for voting. The new term for the project leader started on April 21st and will expire on April 20th 2026.

24 May 2024

Julian Andres Klode: Observations in Debian dependency solving

In my previous blog, I explored The New APT 3.0 solver. Since then I have been at work in the test suite making tests pass and fixing some bugs. You see for all intents and purposes, the new solver is a very stupid naive DPLL SAT solver (it just so happens we don t actually have any pure literals in there). We can control it in a bunch of ways:
  1. We can mark packages as install or reject
  2. We can order actions/clauses. When backtracking the action that came later will be the first we try to backtrack on
  3. We can order the choices of a dependency - we try them left to right.
This is about all that we really want to do, we can t go if we reach a conflict, say oh but this conflict was introduced by that upgrade, and it seems more important, so let s not backtrack on the upgrade request but on this dependency instead. . This forces us to think about lowering the dependency problem into this form, such that not only do we get formally correct solutions, but also semantically correct ones. This is nice because we can apply a systematic way to approach the issue rather than introducing ad-hoc rules in the old solver which had a which of these packages should I flip the opposite way to break the conflict kind of thinking. Now our test suite has a whole bunch of these semantics encoded in it, and I m going to share some problems and ideas for how to solve them. I can t wait to fix these and the error reporting and then turn it on in Ubuntu and later Debian (the defaults change is a post-trixie change, let s be honest).

apt upgrade is hard The apt upgrade commands implements a safe version of dist-upgrade that essentially calculates the dist-upgrade, and then undoes anything that would cause a package to be removed, but it (unlike its apt-get counterpart) allows the solver to install new packages. Now, consider the following package is installed:
X Depends: A (= 1)   B
An upgrade from A=1 to A=2 is available. What should happen? The classic solver would choose to remove X in a dist-upgrade, and then upgrade A, so it s answer is quite clear: Keep back the upgrade of A. The new solver however sees two possible solutions:
  1. Install B to satisfy X Depends A (= 1) B.
  2. Keep back the upgrade of A
Which one does it pick? This depends on the order in which it sees the upgrade action for A and the dependency, as it will backjump chronologically. So
  1. If it gets to the dependency first, it marks A=1 for install to satisfy A (= 1). Then it gets to the upgrade request, which is just A Depends A (= 2) A (= 1) and sees it is satisfied already and is content.
  2. If it gets to the upgrade request first, it marks A=2 for install to satisfy A (= 2). Then later it gets to X Depends: A (= 1) B, sees that A (= 1) is not satisfiable, and picks B.
We have two ways to approach this issue:
  1. We always order upgrade requests last, so they will be kept back in case of conflicting dependencies
  2. We require that, for apt upgrade a currently satisfied dependency must be satisfied by currently installed packages, hence eliminating B as a choice.

Recommends are hard too See if you have a X Recommends: A (= 1) and a new version of A, A (= 2), the solver currently will silently break the Recommends in some cases. But let s explore what the behavior of a X Recommends: A (= 1) in combination with an available upgrade of A (= 2) should be. We could say the rule should be:
  • An upgrade should keep back A instead of breaking the Recommends
  • A dist-upgrade should either keep back A or remove X (if it is obsolete)
This essentially leaves us the same choices as for the previous problem, but with an interesting twist. We can change the ordering (and we already did), but we could also introduce a new rule, promotions :
A Recommends in an installed package, or an upgrade to that installed package, where the Recommends existed in the installed version, that is currently satisfied, must continue to be satisfied, that is, it effectively is promoted to a Depends.
This neatly solves the problem for us. We will never break Recommends that are satisfied. Likewise, we already have a Recommends demotion rule:
A Recommends in an installed package, or an upgrade to that installed package, where the Recommends existed in the installed version, that is currently unsatisfied, will not be further evaluated (it is treated like a Suggests is in the default configuration).
Whether we should be allowed to break Suggests with our decisions or not (the old autoremover did not, for instance) is a different decision. Should we promote currently satisified Suggests to Depends as well? Should we follow currently satisified Suggests so the solver sees them and doesn t autoremove them, but treat them as optional?

tightening of versioned dependencies Another case of versioned dependencies with alternatives that has complex behavior is something like
X Depends: A (>= 2)   B
X Recommends: A (>= 2)   B
In both cases, installing X should upgrade an A < 2 in favour of installing B. But a naive SAT solver might not. If your request to keep A installed is encoded as A (= 1) A (= 2), then it first picks A (= 1). When it sees the Depends/Recommends it will switch to B. We can solve this again as in the previous example by ordering the keep A installed requests after any dependencies. Notably, we will enqueue the common dependencies of all A versions first before selecting a version of A, so something may select a version for us.

version narrowing instead of version choosing A different approach to dealing with the issue of version selection is to not select a version until the very last moment. So instead of selecting a version to satisfy A (>= 2) we instead translate
Depends: A (>= 2)
into two rules:
  1. The package selection rule:
     Depends: A
    
    This ensures that any version of A is installed (i.e. it adds a version choice clause, A (= 1) A (= 2) in an example with two versions for A.
  2. The version narrowing rule:
     Conflicts: A (<< 2)
    
    This outright would reject a choice of A (= 1).
So now we have 3 kinds of clauses:
  1. package selection
  2. version narrowing
  3. version selection
If we process them in that order, we should surely be able to find the solution that best matches the semantics of our Debian dependency model, i.e. selecting earlier choices in a dependency before later choices in the face of version restrictions. This still leaves one issue: What if our maintainer did not use Depends: A (>= 2) B but e.g. Depends: A (= 3) B A (= 2). He d expect us to fall back to B if A (= 3) is not installable, and not to B. But we d like to enqueue A and reject all choices other than 3 and 2. I think it s fair to say: Don t do that, then here.

Implementing strict pinning correctly APT knows a single candidate version per package, this makes the solver relatively deterministic: It will only ever pick the candidate, or an installed version. This also happens to significantly reduce the search space which is good - less backtracking. An uptodate system will only ever have one version per package that can be installed, so we never actually have to choose versions. But of course, APT allows you to specify a non-candidate version of a package to install, for example:
apt install foo/oracular-proposed
The way this works is that the core component of the previous solver, which is the pkgDepCache maintains what essentially amounts to an overlay of the policy that you could see with apt-cache policy. The solver currently however validates allowed version choices against the policy directly, and hence finds these versions are not allowed and craps out. This is an interesting problem because the solver should not be dependent on the pkgDepCache as the pkgDepCache initialization (Building dependency tree...) accounts for about half of the runtime of APT (until the Y/n prompt) and I d really like to get rid of it. But currently the frontend does go via the pkgDepCache. It marks the packages in there, building up what you could call a transaction, and then we translate it to the new solver, and once it is done, it translates the result back into the pkgDepCache. The current implementation of allowed version is implemented by reducing the search space, i.e. every dependency, we outright ignore any non-allowed versions. So if you have a version 3 of A that is ignored a Depends: A would be translated into A (= 2) A (= 1). However this has two disadvantages. (1) It means if we show you why A could not be installed, you don t even see A (= 3) in the list of choices and (2) you would need to keep the pkgDepCache around for the temporary overrides. So instead of actually enforcing the allowed version rule by filtering, a more reasonable model is that we apply the allowed version rule by just marking every other version as not allowed when discovering the package in the from depcache translation layer. This doesn t really increase the search space either but it solves both our problem of making overrides work and giving you a reasonable error message that lists all versions of A.

pulling up common dependencies to minimize backtracking cost One of the common issues we have is that when we have a dependency group
 A   B   C   D 
we try them in order, and if one fails, we undo everything it did, and move on to the next one. However, this isn t perhaps the best choice of operation. I explained before that one thing we do is queue the common dependencies of a package (i.e. dependencies shared in all versions) when marking a package for install, but we don t do this here: We have already lowered the representation of the dependency group into a list of versions, so we d need to extract the package back out of it. This can of course be done, but there may be a more interesting solution to the problem, in that we simply enqueue all the common dependencies. That is, we add n backtracking levels for n possible solutions:
  1. We enqueue the common dependencies of all possible solutions deps(A)&deps(B)&deps(C)&deps(D)
  2. We decide (adding a decision level) not to install D right now and enqueue deps(A)&deps(B)&deps(C)
  3. We decide (adding a decision level) not to install C right now and enqueue deps(A)&deps(B)
  4. We decide (adding a decision level) not to install B right now and enqueue A
Now if we need to backtrack from our choice of A we hopefully still have a lot of common dependencies queued that we do not need to redo. While we have more backtracking levels, each backtracking level would be significantly cheaper, especially if you have cheap backtracking (which admittedly we do not have, yet anyway). The caveat though is: It may be pretty expensive to find the common dependencies. We need to iterate over all dependency groups of A and see if they are in B, C, and D, so we have a complexity of roughly #A * (#B+#C+#D) Each dependency group we need to check i.e. is X Y in B meanwhile has linear cost: We need to compare the memory content of two pointer arrays containing the list of possible versions that solve the dependency group. This means that X Y and Y X are different dependencies of course, but that is to be expected they are. But any dependency of the same order will have the same memory layout. So really the cost is roughly N^4. This isn t nice. You can apply various heuristics here on how to improve that, or you can even apply binary logic:
  1. Enqueue common dependencies of A B C D
  2. Move into the left half, enqueue of A B
  3. Again divide and conquer and select A.
This has a significant advantage in long lists of choices, and also in the common case, where the first solution should be the right one. Or again, if you enqueue the package and a version restriction instead, you already get the common dependencies enqueued for the chosen package at least.

14 May 2024

Julian Andres Klode: The new APT 3.0 solver

APT 2.9.3 introduces the first iteration of the new solver codenamed solver3, and now available with the solver 3.0 option. The new solver works fundamentally different from the old one.

How does it work? Solver3 is a fully backtracking dependency solving algorithm that defers choices to as late as possible. It starts with an empty set of packages, then adds the manually installed packages, and then installs packages automatically as necessary to satisfy the dependencies. Deferring the choices is implemented multiple ways: First, all install requests recursively mark dependencies with a single solution for install, and any packages that are being rejected due to conflicts or user requests will cause their reverse dependencies to be transitively marked as rejected, provided their or group cannot be solved by a different package. Second, any dependency with more than one choice is pushed to a priority queue that is ordered by the number of possible solutions, such that we resolve a b before a b c. Not just by the number of solutions, though. One important point to note is that optional dependencies, that is, Recommends, are always sorting after mandatory dependencies. Do note on that: Recommended packages do not nest in backtracking - dependencies of a Recommended package themselves are not optional, so they will have to be resolved before the next Recommended package is seen in the queue. Another important step in deferring choices is extracting the common dependencies of a package across its version and then installing them before we even decide which of its versions we want to install - one of the dependencies might cycle back to a specific version after all. Decisions about package levels are recorded at a certain decision level, if we reach a conflict we backtrack to the previous decision level, mark the decision we made (install X) in the inverse (DO NOT INSTALL X), reset all the state all decisions made at the higher level, and restore any dependencies that are no longer resolved to the work queue.

Comparison to SAT solver design. If you have studied SAT solver design, you ll find that essentially this is a DPLL solver without pure literal elimination. A pure literal eliminitation phase would not work for a package manager: First negative pure literals (packages that everything conflicts with) do not exist, and positive pure literals (packages nothing conflicts with) we do not want to mark for install - we want to install as little as possible (well subject, to policy). As part of the solving phase, we also construct an implication graph, albeit a partial one: The first package installing another package is marked as the reason (A -> B), the same thing for conflicts (not A -> not B). Once we have added the ability to have multiple parents in the implication graph, it stands to reason that we can also implement the much more advanced method of conflict-driven clause learning; where we do not jump back to the previous decision level but exactly to the decision level that caused the conflict. This would massively speed up backtracking.

What changes can you expect in behavior? The most striking difference to the classic APT solver is that solver3 always keeps manually installed packages around, it never offers to remove them. We will relax that in a future iteration so that it can replace packages with new ones, that is, if your package is no longer available in the repository (obsolete), but there is one that Conflicts+Replaces+Provides it, solver3 will be allowed to install that and remove the other. Implementing that policy is rather trivial: We just need to queue obsolete replacement as a dependency to solve, rather than mark the obsolete package for install. Another critical difference is the change in the autoremove behavior: The new solver currently only knows the strongest dependency chain to each package, and hence it will not keep around any packages that are only reachable via weaker chains. A common example is when gcc-<version> packages accumulate on your system over the years. They all have Provides: c-compiler and the libtool Depends: gcc c-compiler is enough to keep them around.

New features The new option --no-strict-pinning instructs the solver to consider all versions of a package and not just the candidate version. For example, you could use apt install foo=2.0 --no-strict-pinning to install version 2.0 of foo and upgrade - or downgrade - packages as needed to satisfy foo=2.0 dependencies. This mostly comes in handy in use cases involving Debian experimental or the Ubuntu proposed pockets, where you want to install a package from there, but try to satisfy from the normal release as much as possible. The implication graph building allows us to implement an apt why command, that while not as nicely detailed as aptitude, at least tells you the exact reason why a package is installed. It will only show the strongest dependency chain at first of course, since that is what we record.

What is left to do? At the moment, error information is not stored across backtracking in any way, but we generally will want to show you the first conflict we reach as it is the most natural one; or all conflicts. Currently you get the last conflict which may not be particularly useful. Likewise, errors currently are just rendered as implication graphs of the form [not] A -> [not] B -> ..., and we need to put in some work to present those nicely. The test suite is not passing yet, I haven t really started working on it. A challenge is that most packages in the test suite are manually installed as they are mocked, and the solver now doesn t remove those. We plan to implement the replacement logic such that foo can be replaced by foo2 Conflicts/Replaces/Provides foo without needing to be automatically installed. Improving the backtracking to be non-chronological conflict-driven clause learning would vastly enhance our backtracking performance. Not that it seems to be an issue right now in my limited testing (mostly noble 64-bit-time_t upgrades). A lot of that complexity you have normally is not there because the manually installed packages and resulting unit propagation (single-solution Depends/Reverse-Depends for Conflicts) already ground us fairly far in what changes we can actually make. Once all the stuff has landed, we need to start rolling it out and gather feedback. On Ubuntu I d like automated feedback on regressions (running solver3 in parallel, checking if result is worse and then submitting an error to the error tracker), on Debian this could just be a role email address to send solver dumps to. At the same time, we can also incrementally start rolling this out. Like phased updates in Ubuntu, we can also roll out the new solver as the default to 10%, 20%, 50% of users before going to the full 100%. This will allow us to capture regressions early and fix them.

5 April 2024

Bits from Debian: apt install dpl-candidate: Andreas Tille

The Debian Project Developers will shortly vote for a new Debian Project Leader known as the DPL. The Project Leader is the official representative of The Debian Project tasked with managing the overall project, its vision, direction, and finances. The DPL is also responsible for the selection of Delegates, defining areas of responsibility within the project, the coordination of Developers, and making decisions required for the project. Our outgoing and present DPL Jonathan Carter served 4 terms, from 2020 through 2024. Jonathan shared his last Bits from the DPL post to Debian recently and his hopes for the future of Debian. Recently, we sat with the two present candidates for the DPL position asking questions to find out who they really are in a series of interviews about their platforms, visions for Debian, lives, and even their favorite text editors. The interviews were conducted by disaster2life (Yashraj Moghe) and made available from video and audio transcriptions: Voting for the position starts on April 6, 2024. Editors' note: This is our official return to Debian interviews, readers should stay tuned for more upcoming interviews with Developers and other important figures in Debian as part of our "Meet your Debian Developer" series. We used the following tools and services: Turboscribe.ai for the transcription from the audio and video files, IRC: Oftc.net for communication, Jitsi meet for interviews, and Open Broadcaster Software (OBS) for editing and video. While we encountered many technical difficulties in the return to this process, we are still able and proud to present the transcripts of the interviews edited only in a few areas for readability. 2024 Debian Project Leader Candidate: Andrea Tille Andreas' Interview Who are you? Tell us a little about yourself. [Andreas]:
How am I? Well, I'm, as I wrote in my platform, I'm a proud grandfather doing a lot of free software stuff, doing a lot of sports, have some goals in mind which I like to do and hopefully for the best of Debian.
And How are you today? [Andreas]:
How I'm doing today? Well, actually I have some headaches but it's fine for the interview. So, usually I feel very good. Spring was coming here and today it's raining and I plan to do a bicycle tour tomorrow and hope that I do not get really sick but yeah, for the interview it's fine.
What do you do in Debian? Could you mention your story here? [Andreas]:
Yeah, well, I started with Debian kind of an accident because I wanted to have some package salvaged which is called WordNet. It's a monolingual dictionary and I did not really plan to do more than maybe 10 packages or so. I had some kind of training with xTeddy which is totally unimportant, a cute teddy you can put on your desktop. So, and then well, more or less I thought how can I make Debian attractive for my employer which is a medical institute and so on. It could make sense to package bioinformatics and medicine software and it somehow evolved in a direction I did neither expect it nor wanted to do, that I'm currently the most busy uploader in Debian, created several teams around it. DebianMate is very well known from me. I created the Blends team to create teams and techniques around what we are doing which was Debian TIS, Debian Edu, Debian Science and so on and I also created the packaging team for R, for the statistics package R which is technically based and not topic based. All these blends are covering a certain topic and R is just needed by lots of these blends. So, yeah, and to cope with all this I have written a script which is routing an update to manage all these uploads more or less automatically. So, I think I had one day where I uploaded 21 new packages but it's just automatically generated, right? So, it's on one day more than I ever planned to do.
What is the first thing you think of when you think of Debian? Editors' note: The question was misunderstood as the worst thing you think of when you think of Debian [Andreas]:
The worst thing I think about Debian, it's complicated. I think today on Debian board I was asked about the technical progress I want to make and in my opinion we need to standardize things inside Debian. For instance, bringing all the packages to salsa, follow some common standards, some common workflow which is extremely helpful. As I said, if I'm that productive with my own packages we can adopt this in general, at least in most cases I think. I made a lot of good experience by the support of well-formed teams. Well-formed teams are those teams where people support each other, help each other. For instance, how to say, I'm a physicist by profession so I'm not an IT expert. I can tell apart what works and what not but I'm not an expert in those packages. I do and the amount of packages is so high that I do not even understand all the techniques they are covering like Go, Rust and something like this. And I also don't speak Java and I had a problem once in the middle of the night and I've sent the email to the list and was a Java problem and I woke up in the morning and it was solved. This is what I call a team. I don't call a team some common repository that is used by random people for different packages also but it's working together, don't hesitate to solve other people's problems and permit people to get active. This is what I call a team and this is also something I observed in, it's hard to give a percentage, in a lot of other teams but we have other people who do not even understand the concept of the team. Why is working together make some advantage and this is also a tough thing. I [would] like to tackle in my term if I get elected to form solid teams using the common workflow. This is one thing. The other thing is that we have a lot of good people in our infrastructure like FTP masters, DSA and so on. I have the feeling they have a lot of work and are working more or less on their limits, and I like to talk to them [to ask] what kind of change we could do to move that limits or move their personal health to the better side.
The DPL term lasts for a year, What would you do during that you couldn't do now? [Andreas]:
Yeah, well this is basically what I said are my main issues. I need to admit I have no really clear imagination what kind of tasks will come to me as a DPL because all these financial issues and law issues possible and issues [that] people who are not really friendly to Debian might create. I'm afraid these things might occupy a lot of time and I can't say much about this because I simply don't know.
What are three key terms about you and your candidacy? [Andreas]:
As I said, I like to work on standards, I d like to make Debian try [to get it right so] that people don't get overworked, this third key point is be inviting to newcomers, to everybody who wants to come. Yeah, I also mentioned in my term this diversity issue, geographical and from gender point of view. This may be the three points I consider most important.
Preferred text editor? [Andreas]:
Yeah, my preferred one? Ah, well, I have no preferred text editor. I'm using the Midnight Commander very frequently which has an internal editor which is convenient for small text. For other things, I usually use VI but I also use Emacs from time to time. So, no, I have not preferred text editor. Whatever works nicely for me.
What is the importance of the community in the Debian Project? How would like to see it evolving over the next few years? [Andreas]:
Yeah, I think the community is extremely important. So, I was on a lot of DebConfs. I think it's not really 20 but 17 or 18 DebCons and I really enjoyed these events every year because I met so many friends and met so many interesting people that it's really enriching my life and those who I never met in person but have read interesting things and yeah, Debian community makes really a part of my life.
And how do you think it should evolve specifically? [Andreas]:
Yeah, for instance, last year in Kochi, it became even clearer to me that the geographical diversity is a really strong point. Just discussing with some women from India who is afraid about not coming next year to Busan because there's a problem with Shanghai and so on. I'm not really sure how we can solve this but I think this is a problem at least I wish to tackle and yeah, this is an interesting point, the geographical diversity and I'm running the so-called mentoring of the month. This is a small project to attract newcomers for the Debian Med team which has the focus on medical packages and I learned that we had always men applying for this and so I said, okay, I dropped the constraint of medical packages. Any topic is fine, I teach you packaging but it must be someone who does not consider himself a man. I got only two applicants, no, actually, I got one applicant and one response which was kind of strange if I'm hunting for women or so. I did not understand but I got one response and interestingly, it was for me one of the least expected counters. It was from Iran and I met a very nice woman, very open, very skilled and gifted and did a good job or have even lose contact today and maybe we need more actively approach groups that are underrepresented. I don't know if what's a good means which I did but at least I tried and so I try to think about these kind of things.
What part of Debian has made you smile? What part of the project has kept you going all through the years? [Andreas]:
Well, the card game which is called Mao on the DebConf made me smile all the time. I admit I joined only two or three times even if I really love this kind of games but I was occupied by other stuff so this made me really smile. I also think the first online DebConf in 2020 made me smile because we had this kind of short video sequences and I tried to make a funny video sequence about every DebConf I attended before. This is really funny moments but yeah, it's not only smile but yeah. One thing maybe it's totally unconnected to Debian but I learned personally something in Debian that we have a do-ocracy and you can do things which you think that are right if not going in between someone else, right? So respect everybody else but otherwise you can do so. And in 2020 I also started to take trees which are growing widely in my garden and plant them into the woods because in our woods a lot of trees are dying and so I just do something because I can. I have the resource to do something, take the small tree and bring it into the woods because it does not harm anybody. I asked the forester if it is okay, yes, yes, okay. So everybody can do so but I think the idea to do something like this came also because of the free software idea. You have the resources, you have the computer, you can do something and you do something productive, right? And when thinking about this I think it was also my Debian work. Meanwhile I have planted more than 3,000 trees so it's not a small number but yeah, I enjoy this.
What part of Debian would you have some criticisms for? [Andreas]:
Yeah, it's basically the same as I said before. We need more standards to work together. I do not want to repeat this but this is what I think, yeah.
What field in Free Software generally do you think requires the most work to be put into it? What do you think is Debian's part in the field? [Andreas]:
It's also in general, the thing is the fact that I'm maintaining packages which are usually as modern software is maintained in Git, which is fine but we have some software which is at Sourceport, we have software laying around somewhere, we have software where Debian somehow became Upstream because nobody is caring anymore and free software is very different in several things, ways and well, I in principle like freedom of choice which is the basic of all our work. Sometimes this freedom goes in the way of productivity because everybody is free to re-implement. You asked me for the most favorite editor. In principle one really good working editor would be great to have and would work and we have maybe 500 in Debian or so, I don't know. I could imagine if people would concentrate and say five instead of 500 editors, we could get more productive, right? But I know this will not happen, right? But I think this is one thing which goes in the way of making things smooth and productive and we could have more manpower to replace one person who's [having] children, doing some other stuff and can't continue working on something and maybe this is a problem I will not solve, definitely not, but which I see.
What do you think is Debian's part in the field? [Andreas]:
Yeah, well, okay, we can bring together different Upstreams, so we are building some packages and have some general overview about similar things and can say, oh, you are doing this and some other person is doing more or less the same, do you want to join each other or so, but this is kind of a channel we have to our Upstreams which is probably not very successful. It starts with code copies of some libraries which are changed a little bit, which is fine license-wise, but not so helpful for different things and so I've tried to convince those Upstreams to forward their patches to the original one, but for this and I think we could do some kind of, yeah, [find] someone who brings Upstream together or to make them stop their forking stuff, but it costs a lot of energy and we probably don't have this and it's also not realistic that we can really help with this problem.
Do you have any questions for me? [Andreas]:
I enjoyed the interview, I enjoyed seeing you again after half a year or so. Yeah, actually I've seen you in the eating room or cheese and wine party or so, I do not remember we had to really talk together, but yeah, people around, yeah, for sure. Yeah.

Bits from Debian: apt install dpl-candidate: Sruthi Chandran

The Debian Project Developers will shortly vote for a new Debian Project Leader known as the DPL. The DPL is the official representative of representative of The Debian Project tasked with managing the overall project, its vision, direction, and finances. The DPL is also responsible for the selection of Delegates, defining areas of responsibility within the project, the coordination of Developers, and making decisions required for the project. Our outgoing and present DPL Jonathan Carter served 4 terms, from 2020 through 2024. Jonathan shared his last Bits from the DPL post to Debian recently and his hopes for the future of Debian. Recently, we sat with the two present candidates for the DPL position asking questions to find out who they really are in a series of interviews about their platforms, visions for Debian, lives, and even their favorite text editors. The interviews were conducted by disaster2life (Yashraj Moghe) and made available from video and audio transcriptions: Voting for the position starts on April 6, 2024. Editors' note: This is our official return to Debian interviews, readers should stay tuned for more upcoming interviews with Developers and other important figures in Debian as part of our "Meet your Debian Developer" series. We used the following tools and services: Turboscribe.ai for the transcription from the audio and video files, IRC: Oftc.net for communication, Jitsi meet for interviews, and Open Broadcaster Software (OBS) for editing and video. While we encountered many technical difficulties in the return to this process, we are still able and proud to present the transcripts of the interviews edited only in a few areas for readability. 2024 Debian Project Leader Candidate: Sruthi Chandran Sruthi's interview Hi Sruthi, so for the first question, who are you and could you tell us a little bit about yourself? [Sruthi]:
I usually talk about me whenever I am talking about answering the question who am I, I usually say like I am a librarian turned free software enthusiast and a Debian Developer. So I had no technical background and I learned, I was introduced to free software through my husband and then I learned Debian packaging, and eventually I became a Debian Developer. So I always give my example to people who say I am not technically inclined, I don't have technical background so I can't contribute to free software. So yeah, that's what I refer to myself.
For the next question, could you tell me what do you do in Debian, and could you mention your story up until here today? [Sruthi]:
Okay, so let me start from my initial days in Debian. I started contributing to Debian, my first contribution was a Tibetan font. We went to a Tibetan place and they were saying they didn't have a font in Linux. So that's how I started contributing. Then I moved on to Ruby packages, then I have some JavaScript and Go packages, all dependencies of GitLab. So I was involved with maintaining GitLab for some time, now I'm not very active there. But yeah, so GitLab was the main package I was contributing to since I contributed since 2016 to maybe like 2020 or something. Later I have come [over to] packaging. Now I am part of some of the teams, delegated teams, like community team and outreach team, as well as the Debconf committee. And the biggest, I think, my activity in Debian, I would say is organizing Debconf 2023. So it was a great experience and yeah, so that's my story in Debian.
So what are three key terms about you and your candidacy? [Sruthi]:
Okay, let me first think about it. For candidacy, I can start with diversity is one point I started expressing from the first time I contested for DPL. But to be honest, that's the main point I want to bring.
[Yashraj]:
So for diversity, if you could break down your thoughts on diversity and make them, [about] your three points including diversity.
[Sruthi]:
So in addition to, eventually when starting it was just diversity. Now I have like a bit more ideas, like community, like I want to be a leader for the Debian community. More than, I don't know, maybe people may not agree, but I would say I want to be a leader of Debian community rather than a Debian operating system. I connect to community more and third point I would say.
The term of a DPL lasts for an year. So what do you think during, what would you try to do during that, that you can't do from your position now? [Sruthi]:
Okay. So I, like, I am very happy with the structure of Debian and how things work in Debian. Like you can do almost a lot of things, like almost all things without being a DPL. Whatever change you want to bring about or whatever you want to do, you can do without being a DPL. Anyone, like every DD has the same rights. Only things I feel [the] DPL has hold on are mainly the budget or the funding part, which like, that's where they do the decision making part. And then comes like, and one advantage of DPL driving some idea is that somehow people tend to listen to that with more, like, tend to give more attention to what DPL is saying rather than a normal DD. So I wanted to, like, I have answered some of the questions on how to, how I plan to do the financial budgeting part, how I want to handle, like, and the other thing is using the extra attention that I get as a DPL, I would like to obviously start with the diversity aspect in Debian. And yeah, like, I, what I want to do is not, like, be a leader and say, like, take Debian to one direction where I want to go, but I would rather take suggestions and inputs from the whole community and go about with that. So yes, that's what I would say.
And taking a less serious question now, what is your preferred text editor? [Sruthi]:
Vim.
[Yashraj]:
Vim, wholeheartedly team Vim?
[Sruthi]:
Yes.
[Yashraj]:
Great. Well, this was made in Vim, all the text for this.
[Sruthi]:
So, like, since you mentioned extra data, I'll give my example, like, it's just a fun note, when I started contributing to Debian, as I mentioned, I didn't have any knowledge about free software, like Debian, and I was not used to even using Linux. So, and I didn't have experience with these text editors. So, when I started contributing, I used to do the editing part using gedit. So, that's how I started. Eventually, I moved to Nano, and once I reached Vim, I didn't move on.
Team Vim. Next question. What, what do you think is the importance of the Debian project in the world today? And where would you like to see it in 10 years, like 10 years into the future? [Sruthi]:
Okay. So, Debian, as we all know, is referred to as the universal operating system without, like, it is said for a reason. We have hundreds and hundreds of operating systems, like Linux, distributions based on Debian. So, I believe Debian, like even now, Debian has good influence on the, at least on the Linux or Linux ecosystem. So, what we implement in Debian has, like, is going to affect quite a lot of, like, a very good percentage of people using Linux. So, yes. So, I think Debian is one of the leading Linux distributions. And I think in 10 years, we should be able to reach a position, like, where we are not, like, even now, like, even these many years after having Linux, we face a lot of problems in newer and newer hardware coming up and installing on them is a big problem. Like, firmwares and all those things are getting more and more complicated. Like, it should be getting simpler, but it's getting more and more complicated. So, I, one thing I would imagine, like, I don't know if we will ever reach there, but I would imagine that eventually with the Debian, we should be able to have some, at least a few of the hardware developers or hardware producers have Debian pre-installed and those kind of things. Like, not, like, become, I'm not saying it's all, it's also available right now. What I'm saying is that it becomes prominent enough to be opted as, like, default distro.
What part of Debian has made you And what part of the project has kept you going all through these years? [Sruthi]:
Okay. So, I started to contribute in 2016, and I was part of the team doing GitLab packaging, and we did have a lot of training workshops and those kind of things within India. And I was, like, I had interacted with some of the Indian DDs, but I never got, like, even through chat or mail. I didn't have a lot of interaction with the rest of the world, DDs. And the 2019 Debconf changed my whole perspective about Debian. Before that, I wasn't, like, even, I was interested in free software. I was doing the technical stuff and all. But after DebConf, my whole idea has been, like, my focus changed to the community. Debian community is a very welcoming, very interesting community to be with. And so, I believe that, like, 2019 DebConf was a for me. And that kept, from 2019, my focus has been to how to support, like, how, I moved to the community part of Debian from there. Then in 2020 I became part of the community team, and, like, I started being part of other teams. So, these, I would say, the Debian community is the one, like, aspect of Debian that keeps me whole, keeps me held on to the Debian ecosystem as a whole.
Continuing to speak about Debian, what do you think, what is the first thing that comes to your mind when you think of Debian, like, the word, the community, what's the first thing? [Sruthi]:
I think I may sound like a broken record or something.
[Yashraj]:
No, no.
[Sruthi]:
Again, I would say the Debian community, like, it's the people who makes Debian, that makes Debian special. Like, apart from that, if I say, I would say I'm very, like, one part of Debian that makes me very happy is the, how the governing system of Debian works, the Debian constitution and all those things, like, it's a very unique thing for Debian. And, and it's like, when people say you can't work without a proper, like, establishment or even somebody deciding everything for you, it's difficult. When people say, like, we have been, Debian has been proving it for quite a long time now, that it's possible. So, so that's one thing I believe, like, that's one unique point. And I am very proud about that.
What areas do you think Debian is failing in, how can it (that standing) be improved? [Sruthi]:
So, I think where Debian is failing now is getting new people into Debian. Like, I don't remember, like, exactly the answer. But I remember hearing someone mention, like, the average age of a Debian Developer is, like, above 40 or 45 or something, like, exact age, I don't remember. But it's like, Debian is getting old. Like, the people in Debian are getting old and we are not getting enough of new people into Debian. And that's very important to have people, like, new people coming up. Otherwise, eventually, like, after a few years, nobody, like, we won't have enough people to take the project forward. So, yeah, I believe that is where we need to work on. We are doing some efforts, like, being part of GSOC or outreachy and having maybe other events, like, local events. Like, we used to have a lot of Debian packaging workshops in India. And those kind of, I think, in Brazil and all, they all have, like, local communities are doing. But we are not very successful in retaining the people who maybe come and try out things. But we are not very good at retaining the people, like, retaining people who come. So, we need to work on those things. Right now, I don't have a solid answer for that. But one thing, like, I was thinking about is, like, having a Debian specific outreach project, wherein the focus will be about the Debian, like, starting will be more on, like, usually what happens in GSOC and outreach is that people come, have the, do the contributions, and they go back. Like, they don't have that connection with the Debian, like, Debian community or Debian project. So, what I envision with these, the Debian outreach, the Debian specific outreach is that we have some part of the internship, like, even before starting the internship, we have some sessions and, like, with the people in Debian having, like, getting them introduced to the Debian philosophy and Debian community and Debian, how Debian works. And those things, we focus on that. And then we move on to the technical internship parts. So, I believe this could do some good in having, like, when you have people you can connect to, you tend to stay back in a project mode. When you feel something more than, like, right now, we have so many technical stuff to do, like, the choice for a college student is endless. So, if they want, if they stay back for something, like, maybe for Debian, I would say, we need to have them connected to the Debian project before we go into technical parts. Like, technical parts, like, there are other things as well, where they can go and do the technical part, but, like, they can come here, like, yeah. So, that's what I was saying. Focused outreach projects is one thing. That's just one. That's not enough. We need more of, like, more ideas to have more new people come up. And I'm very happy with, like, the DebConf thing. We tend to get more and more people from the places where we have a DebConf. Brazil is an example. After the Debconf, they have quite a good improvement on Debian contributors. And I think in India also, it did give a good result. Like, we have more people contributing and staying back and those things. So, yeah. So, these were the things I would say, like, we can do to improve.
For the final question, what field in free software do you, what field in free software generally do you think requires the most work to be put into it? What do you think is Debian's part in that field? [Sruthi]:
Okay. Like, right now, what comes to my mind is the free software licenses parts. Like, we have a lot of free software licenses, and there are non-free software licenses. But currently, I feel free software is having a big problem in enforcing these licenses. Like, there are, there may be big corporations or like some people who take up the whole, the code and may not follow the whole, for example, the GPL licenses. Like, we don't know how much of those, how much of the free softwares are used in the bigger things. Yeah, I agree. There are a lot of corporations who are afraid to touch free software. But there would be good amount of free software, free work that converts into property, things violating the free software licenses and those things. And we do not have the kind of like, we have SFLC, SFC, etc. But still, we do not have the ability to go behind and trace and implement the licenses. So, enforce those licenses and bring people who are violating the licenses forward and those kind of things is challenging because one thing is it takes time, like, and most importantly, money is required for the legal stuff. And not always people who like people who make small software, or maybe big, but they may not have the kind of time and money to have these things enforced. So, that's a big challenge free software is facing, especially in our current scenario. I feel we are having those, like, we need to find ways how we can get it sorted. I don't have an answer right now what to do. But this is a challenge I felt like and Debian's part in that. Yeah, as I said, I don't have a solution for that. But the Debian, so DFSG and Debian sticking on to the free software licenses is a good support, I think.
So, that was the final question, Do you have anything else you want to mention for anyone watching this? [Sruthi]:
Not really, like, I am happy, like, I think I was able to answer the questions. And yeah, I would say who is watching. I won't say like, I'm the best DPL candidate, you can't have a better one or something. I stand for a reason. And if you believe in that, or the Debian community and Debian diversity, and those kinds of things, if you believe it, I hope you would be interested, like, you would want to vote for me. That's it. Like, I'm not, I'll make it very clear. I'm not doing a technical leadership part here. So, those, I can't convince people who want technical leadership to vote for me. But I would say people who connect with me, I hope they vote for me.

26 November 2023

Niels Thykier: Providing online reference documentation for debputy

I do not think seasoned Debian contributors quite appreciate how much knowledge we have picked up and internalized. As an example, when I need to look up documentation for debhelper, I generally know which manpage to look in. I suspect most long time contributors would be able to a similar thing (maybe down 2-3 manpages). But new contributors does not have the luxury of years of experience. This problem is by no means unique to debhelper. One thing that debhelper does very well, is that it is hard for users to tell where a addon "starts" and debhelper "ends". It is clear you use addons, but the transition in and out of third party provided tools is generally smooth. This is a sign that things "just work(tm)". Except when it comes to documentation. Here, debhelper's static documentation does not include documentation for third party tooling. If you think from a debhelper maintainer's perspective, this seems obvious. Embedding documentation for all the third-party code would be very hard work, a layer-violation, etc.. But from a user perspective, we should not have to care "who" provides "what". As as user, I want to understand how this works and the more hoops I have to jump through to get that understanding, the more frustrated I will be with the toolstack. With this, I came to the conclusion that the best way to help users and solve the problem of finding the documentation was to provide "online documentation". It should be possible to ask debputy, "What attributes can I use in install-man?" or "What does path-metadata do?". Additionally, the lookup should work the same no matter if debputy provided the feature or some third-party plugin did. In the future, perhaps also other types of documentation such as tutorials or how-to guides. Below, I have some tentative results of my work so far. There are some improvements to be done. Notably, the commands for these documentation features are still treated a "plugin" subcommand features and should probably have its own top level "ask-me-anything" subcommand in the future.
Automatic discard rules Since the introduction of install rules, debputy has included an automatic filter mechanism that prunes out unwanted content. In 0.1.9, these filters have been named "Automatic discard rules" and you can now ask debputy to list them.
$ debputy plugin list automatic-discard-rules
+-----------------------+-------------+
  Name                    Provided By  
+-----------------------+-------------+
  python-cache-files      debputy      
  la-files                debputy      
  backup-files            debputy      
  version-control-paths   debputy      
  gnu-info-dir-file       debputy      
  debian-dir              debputy      
  doxygen-cruft-files     debputy      
+-----------------------+-------------+
For these rules, the provider can both provide a description but also an example of their usage.
$ debputy plugin show automatic-discard-rules la-files
Automatic Discard Rule: la-files
================================
Documentation: Discards any .la files beneath /usr/lib
Example
-------
    /usr/lib/libfoo.la        << Discarded (directly by the rule)
    /usr/lib/libfoo.so.1.0.0
The example is a live example. That is, the provider will provide debputy with a scenario and the expected outcome of that scenario. Here is the concrete code in debputy that registers this example:
api.automatic_discard_rule(
    "la-files",
    _debputy_prune_la_files,
    rule_reference_documentation="Discards any .la files beneath /usr/lib",
    examples=automatic_discard_rule_example(
        "usr/lib/libfoo.la",
        ("usr/lib/libfoo.so.1.0.0", False),
    ),
)
When showing the example, debputy will validate the example matches what the plugin provider intended. Lets say I was to introduce a bug in the code, so that the discard rule no longer worked. Then debputy would start to show the following:
# Output if the code or example is broken
$ debputy plugin show automatic-discard-rules la-files
[...]
Automatic Discard Rule: la-files
================================
Documentation: Discards any .la files beneath /usr/lib
Example
-------
    /usr/lib/libfoo.la        !! INCONSISTENT (code: keep, example: discard)
    /usr/lib/libfoo.so.1.0.0
debputy: warning: The example was inconsistent. Please file a bug against the plugin debputy
Obviously, it would be better if this validation could be added directly as a plugin test, so the CI pipeline would catch it. That is one my personal TODO list. :) One final remark about automatic discard rules before moving on. In 0.1.9, debputy will also list any path automatically discarded by one of these rules in the build output to make sure that the automatic discard rule feature is more discoverable.
Plugable manifest rules like the install rule In the manifest, there are several places where rules can be provided by plugins. To make life easier for users, debputy can now since 0.1.8 list all provided rules:
$ debputy plugin list plugable-manifest-rules
+-------------------------------+------------------------------+-------------+
  Rule Name                       Rule Type                      Provided By  
+-------------------------------+------------------------------+-------------+
  install                         InstallRule                    debputy      
  install-docs                    InstallRule                    debputy      
  install-examples                InstallRule                    debputy      
  install-doc                     InstallRule                    debputy      
  install-example                 InstallRule                    debputy      
  install-man                     InstallRule                    debputy      
  discard                         InstallRule                    debputy      
  move                            TransformationRule             debputy      
  remove                          TransformationRule             debputy      
  [...]                           [...]                          [...]        
  remove                          DpkgMaintscriptHelperCommand   debputy      
  rename                          DpkgMaintscriptHelperCommand   debputy      
  cross-compiling                 ManifestCondition              debputy      
  can-execute-compiled-binaries   ManifestCondition              debputy      
  run-build-time-tests            ManifestCondition              debputy      
  [...]                           [...]                          [...]        
+-------------------------------+------------------------------+-------------+
(Output trimmed a bit for space reasons) And you can then ask debputy to describe any of these rules:
$ debputy plugin show plugable-manifest-rules install
Generic install ( install )
===========================
The generic  install  rule can be used to install arbitrary paths into packages
and is *similar* to how  dh_install  from debhelper works.  It is a two "primary" uses.
  1) The classic "install into directory" similar to the standard  dh_install 
  2) The "install as" similar to  dh-exec 's  foo => bar  feature.
Attributes:
 -  source  (conditional): string
    sources  (conditional): List of string
   A path match ( source ) or a list of path matches ( sources ) defining the
   source path(s) to be installed. [...]
 -  dest-dir  (optional): string
   A path defining the destination *directory*. [...]
 -  into  (optional): string or a list of string
   A path defining the destination *directory*. [...]
 -  as  (optional): string
   A path defining the path to install the source as. [...]
 -  when  (optional): manifest condition (string or mapping of string)
   A condition as defined in [Conditional rules](https://salsa.debian.org/debian/debputy/-/blob/main/MANIFEST-FORMAT.md#Conditional rules).
This rule enforces the following restrictions:
 - The rule must use exactly one of:  source ,  sources 
 - The attribute  as  cannot be used with any of:  dest-dir ,  sources 
[...]
(Output trimmed a bit for space reasons) All the attributes and restrictions are auto-computed by debputy from information provided by the plugin. The associated documentation for each attribute is supplied by the plugin itself, The debputy API validates that all attributes are covered and the documentation does not describe non-existing fields. This ensures that you as a plugin provider never forget to document new attributes when you add them later. The debputy API for manifest rules are not quite stable yet. So currently only debputy provides rules here. However, it is my intention to lift that restriction in the future. I got the idea of supporting online validated examples when I was building this feature. However, sadly, I have not gotten around to supporting it yet.
Manifest variables like PACKAGE I also added a similar documentation feature for manifest variables such as PACKAGE . When I implemented this, I realized listing all manifest variables by default would probably be counter productive to new users. As an example, if you list all variables by default it would include DEB_HOST_MULTIARCH (the most common case) side-by-side with the the much less used DEB_BUILD_MULTIARCH and the even lessor used DEB_TARGET_MULTIARCH variable. Having them side-by-side implies they are of equal importance, which they are not. As an example, the ballpark number of unique packages for which DEB_TARGET_MULTIARCH is useful can be counted on two hands (and maybe two feet if you consider gcc-X distinct from gcc-Y). This is one of the cases, where experience makes us blind. Many of us probably have the "show me everything and I will find what I need" mentality. But that requires experience to be able to pull that off - especially if all alternatives are presented as equals. The cross-building terminology has proven to notoriously match poorly to people's expectation. Therefore, I took a deliberate choice to reduce the list of shown variables by default and in the output explicitly list what filters were active. In the current version of debputy (0.1.9), the listing of manifest-variables look something like this:
$ debputy plugin list manifest-variables
+----------------------------------+----------------------------------------+------+-------------+
  Variable (use via:   NAME  )   Value                                    Flag   Provided by  
+----------------------------------+----------------------------------------+------+-------------+
  DEB_HOST_ARCH                      amd64                                           debputy      
  [... other DEB_HOST_* vars ...]    [...]                                           debputy      
  DEB_HOST_MULTIARCH                 x86_64-linux-gnu                                debputy      
  DEB_SOURCE                         debputy                                         debputy      
  DEB_VERSION                        0.1.8                                           debputy      
  DEB_VERSION_EPOCH_UPSTREAM         0.1.8                                           debputy      
  DEB_VERSION_UPSTREAM               0.1.8                                           debputy      
  DEB_VERSION_UPSTREAM_REVISION      0.1.8                                           debputy      
  PACKAGE                            <package-name>                                  debputy      
  path:BASH_COMPLETION_DIR           /usr/share/bash-completion/completions          debputy      
+----------------------------------+----------------------------------------+------+-------------+
+-----------------------+--------+-------------------------------------------------------+
  Variable type           Value    Option                                                 
+-----------------------+--------+-------------------------------------------------------+
  Token variables         hidden   --show-token-variables OR --show-all-variables         
  Special use variables   hidden   --show-special-case-variables OR --show-all-variables  
+-----------------------+--------+-------------------------------------------------------+
I will probably tweak the concrete listing in the future. Personally, I am considering to provide short-hands variables for some of the DEB_HOST_* variables and then hide the DEB_HOST_* group from the default view as well. Maybe something like ARCH and MULTIARCH, which would default to their DEB_HOST_* counter part. This variable could then have extended documentation that high lights DEB_HOST_<X> as its source and imply that there are special cases for cross-building where you might need DEB_BUILD_<X> or DEB_TARGET_<X>. Speaking of variable documentation, you can also lookup the documentation for a given manifest variable:
$ debputy plugin show manifest-variables path:BASH_COMPLETION_DIR
Variable: path:BASH_COMPLETION_DIR
==================================
Documentation: Directory to install bash completions into
Resolved: /usr/share/bash-completion/completions
Plugin: debputy
This was my update on online reference documentation for debputy. I hope you found it useful. :)
Thanks On a closing note, I would like to thanks Jochen Sprickerhof, Andres Salomon, Paul Gevers for their recent contributions to debputy. Jochen and Paul provided a number of real world cases where debputy would crash or not work, which have now been fixed. Andres and Paul also provided corrections to the documentation.

16 November 2023

Dimitri John Ledkov: Ubuntu 23.10 significantly reduces the installed kernel footprint


Photo by Pixabay
Ubuntu systems typically have up to 3 kernels installed, before they are auto-removed by apt on classic installs. Historically the installation was optimized for metered download size only. However, kernel size growth and usage no longer warrant such optimizations. During the 23.10 Mantic Minatour cycle, I led a coordinated effort across multiple teams to implement lots of optimizations that together achieved unprecedented install footprint improvements.

Given a typical install of 3 generic kernel ABIs in the default configuration on a regular-sized VM (2 CPU cores 8GB of RAM) the following metrics are achieved in Ubuntu 23.10 versus Ubuntu 22.04 LTS:

  • 2x less disk space used (1,417MB vs 2,940MB, including initrd)

  • 3x less peak RAM usage for the initrd boot (68MB vs 204MB)

  • 0.5x increase in download size (949MB vs 600MB)

  • 2.5x faster initrd generation (4.5s vs 11.3s)

  • approximately the same total time (103s vs 98s, hardware dependent)


For minimal cloud images that do not install either linux-firmware or modules extra the numbers are:

  • 1.3x less disk space used (548MB vs 742MB)

  • 2.2x less peak RAM usage for initrd boot (27MB vs 62MB)

  • 0.4x increase in download size (207MB vs 146MB)


Hopefully, the compromise of download size, relative to the disk space & initrd savings is a win for the majority of platforms and use cases. For users on extremely expensive and metered connections, the likely best saving is to receive air-gapped updates or skip updates.

This was achieved by precompressing kernel modules & firmware files with the maximum level of Zstd compression at package build time; making actual .deb files uncompressed; assembling the initrd using split cpio archives - uncompressed for the pre-compressed files, whilst compressing only the userspace portions of the initrd; enabling in-kernel module decompression support with matching kmod; fixing bugs in all of the above, and landing all of these things in time for the feature freeze. Whilst leveraging the experience and some of the design choices implementations we have already been shipping on Ubuntu Core. Some of these changes are backported to Jammy, but only enough to support smooth upgrades to Mantic and later. Complete gains are only possible to experience on Mantic and later.

The discovered bugs in kernel module loading code likely affect systems that use LoadPin LSM with kernel space module uncompression as used on ChromeOS systems. Hopefully, Kees Cook or other ChromeOS developers pick up the kernel fixes from the stable trees. Or you know, just use Ubuntu kernels as they do get fixes and features like these first.

The team that designed and delivered these changes is large: Benjamin Drung, Andrea Righi, Juerg Haefliger, Julian Andres Klode, Steve Langasek, Michael Hudson-Doyle, Robert Kratky, Adrien Nader, Tim Gardner, Roxana Nicolescu - and myself Dimitri John Ledkov ensuring the most optimal solution is implemented, everything lands on time, and even implementing portions of the final solution.

Hi, It's me, I am a Staff Engineer at Canonical and we are hiring https://canonical.com/careers.

Lots of additional technical details and benchmarks on a huge range of diverse hardware and architectures, and bikeshedding all the things below:

For questions and comments please post to Kernel section on Ubuntu Discourse.



10 October 2023

Julian Andres Klode: Divergence - A case for different upgrade approaches

APT currently knows about three types of upgrades: All of these upgrade types are necessary to deal with upgrades within a distribution release. Yes, sometimes even removals may be needed because bug fixes require adding a Conflicts somewhere. In Ubuntu we have a third type of upgrades, handled by a separate tool: release upgrades. ubuntu-release-upgrader changes your sources.list, and applies various quirks to the upgrade. In this post, I want to look not at the quirk aspects but discuss how dependency solving should differ between intra-release and inter-release upgrades. Previous solver projects (such as Mancoosi) operated under the assumption that minimizing the number of changes performed should ultimately be the main goal of a solver. This makes sense as every change causes risks. However it ignores a different risk, which especially applies when upgrading from one distribution release to a newer one: Increasing divergence from the norm. Consider a person installs foo in Debian 12. foo depends on a b, so a will be automatically installed to satisfy the dependency. A release later, a has some known issues and b is prefered, the dependency now reads: b a. A classic solver would continue to keep a installed because it was installed before, leading upgraded installs to have foo, a installed whereas new systems have foo, b installed. As systems get upgraded over and over, they continue to diverge further and further from new installs to the point that it adds substantial support effort. My proposal for the new APT solver is that when we perform release upgrades, we forget which packages where previously automatically installed. We effectively perform a normalization: All systems with the same set of manually installed packages will end up with the same set of automatically installed packages. Consider the solving starting with an empty set and then installing the latest version of each previously manually installed package: It will see now that foo depends b a and install b (and a will be removed later on as its not part of the solution). Another case of divergence is Suggests handling. Consider that foo also Suggests s. You now install another package bar that depends s, hence s gets installed. Upon removing bar, s is not being removed automatically because foo still suggests it (and you may have grown used to foo s integration of s). This is because apt considers Suggests to be important - they won t be automatically installed, but will not be automatically removed. In Ubuntu, we unset that policy on release upgrades to normalize the systems. The reasoning for that is simple: While you may have grown to use s as part of foo during the release, an upgrade to the next release already is big enough that removing s is going to have less of an impact - breakage of workflows is expected between release upgrades. I believe that apt release-upgrade will benefit from both of these design choices, and in the end it boils down to a simple mantra:

1 February 2023

Julian Andres Klode: Ubuntu 2022v1 secure boot key rotation and friends

This is the story of the currently progressing changes to secure boot on Ubuntu and the history of how we got to where we are.

taking a step back: how does secure boot on Ubuntu work? Booting on Ubuntu involves three components after the firmware:
  1. shim
  2. grub
  3. linux
Each of these is a PE binary signed with a key. The shim is signed by Microsoft s 3rd party key and embeds a self-signed Canonical CA certificate, and optionally a vendor dbx (a list of revoked certificates or binaries). grub and linux (and fwupd) are then signed by a certificate issued by that CA In Ubuntu s case, the CA certificate is sharded: Multiple people each have a part of the key and they need to meet to be able to combine it and sign things, such as new code signing certificates.

BootHole When BootHole happened in 2020, travel was suspended and we hence could not rotate to a new signing certificate. So when it came to updating our shim for the CVEs, we had to revoke all previously signed kernels, grubs, shims, fwupds by their hashes. This generated a very large vendor dbx which caused lots of issues as shim exported them to a UEFI variable, and not everyone had enough space for such large variables. Sigh. We decided we want to rotate our signing key next time. This was also when upstream added SBAT metadata to shim and grub. This gives a simple versioning scheme for security updates and easy revocation using a simple EFI variable that shim writes to and reads from.

Spring 2022 CVEs We still were not ready for travel in 2021, but during BootHole we developed the SBAT mechanism, so one could revoke a grub or shim by setting a single EFI variable. We actually missed rotating the shim this cycle as a new vulnerability was reported immediately after it, and we decided to hold on to it.

2022 key rotation and the fall CVEs This caused some problems when the 2nd CVE round came, as we did not have a shim with the latest SBAT level, and neither did a lot of others, so we ended up deciding upstream to not bump the shim SBAT requirements just yet. Sigh. Anyway, in October we were meeting again for the first time at a Canonical sprint, and the shardholders got together and created three new signing keys: 2022v1, 2022v2, and 2022v3. It took us until January before they were installed into the signing service and PPAs setup to sign with them. We also submitted a shim 15.7 with the old keys revoked which came back at around the same time. Now we were in a hurry. The 22.04.2 point release was scheduled for around middle of February, and we had nothing signed with the new keys yet, but our new shim which we need for the point release (so the point release media remains bootable after the next round of CVEs), required new keys. So how do we ensure that users have kernels, grubs, and fwupd signed with the new key before we install the new shim?

upgrade ordering grub and fwupd are simple cases: For grub, we depend on the new version. We decided to backport grub 2.06 to all releases (which moved focal and bionic up from 2.04), and kept the versioning of the -signed packages the same across all releases, so we were able to simply bump the Depends for grub to specify the new minimum version. For fwupd-efi, we added Breaks. (Actually, we also had a backport of the CVEs for 2.04 based grub, and we did publish that for 20.04 signed with the old keys before backporting 2.06 to it.) Kernels are a different story: There are about 60 kernels out there. My initial idea was that we could just add Breaks for all of them. So our meta package linux-image-generic which depends on linux-image-$(uname -r)-generic, we d simply add Breaks: linux-image-generic ( 5.19.0-31) and then adjust those breaks for each series. This would have been super annoying, but ultimately I figured this would be the safest option. This however caused concern, because it could be that apt decides to remove the kernel metapackage. I explored checking the kernels at runtime and aborting if we don t have a trusted kernel in preinst. This ensures that if you try to upgrade shim without having a kernel, it would fail to install. But this ultimately has a couple of issues:
  1. It aborts the entire transaction at that point, so users will be unable to run apt upgrade until they have a recent kernel.
  2. We cannot even guarantee that a kernel would be unpacked first. So even if you got a new kernel, apt/dpkg might attempt to unpack it first and then the preinst would fail because no kernel is present yet.
Ultimately we believed the danger to be too large given that no kernels had yet been released to users. If we had kernels pushed out for 1-2 months already, this would have been a viable choice. So in the end, I ended up modifying the shim packaging to install both the latest shim and the previous one, and an update-alternatives alternative to select between the two: In it s post-installation maintainer script, shim-signed checks whether all kernels with a version greater or equal to the running one are not revoked, and if so, it will setup the latest alternative with priority 100 and the previous with a priority of 50. If one or more of those kernels was signed with a revoked key, it will swap the priorities around, so that the previous version is preferred. Now this is fairly static, and we do want you to switch to the latest shim eventually, so I also added hooks to the kernel install to trigger the shim-signed postinst script when a new kernel is being installed. It will then update the alternatives based on the current set of kernels, and if it now points to the latest shim, reinstall shim and grub to the ESP. Ultimately this means that once you install your 2nd non-revoked kernel, or you install a non-revoked kernel and then reconfigure shim or the kernel, you will get the latest shim. When you install your first non-revoked kernel, your currently booted kernel is still revoked, so it s not upgraded immediately. This has a benefit in that you will most likely have two kernels you can boot without disabling secure boot.

regressions Of course, the first version I uploaded had still some remaining hardcoded shimx64 in the scripts and so failed to install on arm64 where shimaa64 is used. And if that were not enough, I also forgot to include support for gzip compressed kernels there. Sigh, I need better testing infrastructure to be able to easily run arm64 tests as well (I only tested the actual booting there, not the scripts). shim-signed migrated to the release pocket in lunar fairly quickly, but this caused images to stop working, because the new shim was installed into images, but no kernel was available yet, so we had to demote it to proposed and block migration. Despite all the work done for end users, we need to be careful to roll this out for image building.

another grub update for OOM issues. We had two grubs to release: First there was the security update for the recent set of CVEs, then there also was an OOM issue for large initrds which was blocking critical OEM work. We fixed the OOM issue by cherry-picking all 2.12 memory management patches, as well as the red hat patches to the loader we take from there. This ended up a fairly large patch set and I was hesitant to tie the security update to that, so I ended up pushing the security update everywhere first, and then pushed the OOM fixes this week. With the OOM patches, you should be able to boot initrds of between 400M and 1GB, it also depends on the memory layout of your machine and your screen resolution and background images. So OEM team had success testing 400MB irl, and I tested up to I think it was 1.2GB in qemu, I ran out of FAT space then and stopped going higher :D

other features in this round
  • Intel TDX support in grub and shim
  • Kernels are allocated as CODE now not DATA as per the upstream mm changes, might fix boot on X13s

am I using this yet? The new signing keys are used in:
  • shim-signed 1.54 on 22.10+, 1.51.3 on 22.04, 1.40.9 on 20.04, 1.37~18.04.13 on 18.04
  • grub2-signed 1.187.2~ or newer (binary packages grub-efi-amd64-signed or grub-efi-arm64-signed), 1.192 on 23.04.
  • fwupd-signed 1.51~ or newer
  • various linux updates. Check apt changelog linux-image-unsigned-$(uname -r) to see if Revoke & rotate to new signing key (LP: #2002812) is mentioned in there to see if it signed with the new key.
If you were able to install shim-signed, your grub and fwupd-efi will have the correct version as that is ensured by packaging. However your shim may still point to the old one. To check which shim will be used by grub-install, you can check the status of the shimx64.efi.signed or (on arm64) shimaa64.efi.signed alternative. The best link needs to point to the file ending in latest:
$ update-alternatives --display shimx64.efi.signed
shimx64.efi.signed - auto mode
  link best version is /usr/lib/shim/shimx64.efi.signed.latest
  link currently points to /usr/lib/shim/shimx64.efi.signed.latest
  link shimx64.efi.signed is /usr/lib/shim/shimx64.efi.signed
/usr/lib/shim/shimx64.efi.signed.latest - priority 100
/usr/lib/shim/shimx64.efi.signed.previous - priority 50
If it does not, but you have installed a new kernel compatible with the new shim, you can switch immediately to the new shim after rebooting into the kernel by running dpkg-reconfigure shim-signed. You ll see in the output if the shim was updated, or you can check the output of update-alternatives as you did above after the reconfiguration has finished. For the out of memory issues in grub, you need grub2-signed 1.187.3~ (same binaries as above).

how do I test this (while it s in proposed)?
  1. upgrade your kernel to proposed and reboot into that
  2. upgrade your grub-efi-amd64-signed, shim-signed, fwupd-signed to proposed.
If you already upgraded your shim before your kernel, don t worry:
  1. upgrade your kernel and reboot
  2. run dpkg-reconfigure shim-signed
And you ll be all good to go.

deep dive: uploading signed boot assets to Ubuntu For each signed boot asset, we build one version in the latest stable release and the development release. We then binary copy the built binaries from the latest stable release to older stable releases. This process ensures two things: We know the next stable release is able to build the assets and we also minimize the number of signed assets. OK, I lied. For shim, we actually do not build in the development release but copy the binaries upward from the latest stable, as each shim needs to go through external signing. The entire workflow looks something like this:
  1. Upload the unsigned package to one of the following build PPAs:
  2. Upload the signed package to the same PPA
  3. For stable release uploads:
    • Copy the unsigned package back across all stable releases in the PPA
    • Upload the signed package for stable releases to the same PPA with ~<release>.1 appended to the version
  4. Submit a request to canonical-signing-jobs to sign the uploads. The signing job helper copies the binary -unsigned packages to the primary-2022v1 PPA where they are signed, creating a signing tarball, then it copies the source package for the -signed package to the same PPA which then downloads the signing tarball during build and places the signed assets into the -signed deb. Resulting binaries will be placed into the proposed PPA: https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-uefi-team/+archive/ubuntu/proposed
  5. Review the binaries themselves
  6. Unembargo and binary copy the binaries from the proposed PPA to the proposed-public PPA: https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-uefi-team/+archive/ubuntu/proposed-public. This step is not strictly necessary, but it enables tools like sru-review to work, as they cannot access the packages from the normal private proposed PPA.
  7. Binary copy from proposed-public to the proposed queue(s) in the primary archive
Lots of steps!

WIP As of writing, only the grub updates have been released, other updates are still being verified in proposed. An update for fwupd in bionic will be issued at a later point, removing the EFI bits from the fwupd 1.2 packaging and using the separate fwupd-efi project instead like later release series.

21 November 2021

Julian Andres Klode: APT Z3 Solver Basics

Z3 is a theorem prover developed at Microsoft research and available as a dynamically linked C++ library in Debian-based distributions. While the library is a whopping 16 MB, and the solver is a tad slow, it s permissive licensing, and number of tactics offered give it a huge potential for use in solving dependencies in a wide variety of applications. Z3 does not need normalized formulas, but offers higher level abstractions like atmost and atleast and implies, that we will make use of together with boolean variables to translate the dependency problem to a form Z3 understands. In this post, we ll see how we can apply Z3 to the dependency resolution in APT. We ll only discuss the basics here, a future post will explore optimization criteria and recommends.

Translating the universe APT s package universe consists of 3 relevant things: packages (the tuple of name and architecture), versions (basically a .deb), and dependencies between versions. While we could translate our entire universe to Z3 problems, we instead will construct a root set from packages that were manually installed and versions marked for installation, and then build the transitive root set from it by translating all versions reachable from the root set. For each package P in the transitive root set, we create a boolean literal P. We then translate each version P1, P2, and so on. Translating a version means building a boolean literal for it, e.g. P1, and then translating the dependencies as shown below. We now need to create two more clauses to satisfy the basic requirements for debs:
  1. If a version is installed, the package is installed; and vice versa. We can encode this requirement for P above as P == atleast( P1,P2 , 1).
  2. There can only be one version installed. We add an additional constraint of the form atmost( P1,P2 , 1).
We also encode the requirements of the operation.
  1. For each package P that is manually installed, add a constraint P.
  2. For each version V that is marked for install, add a constraint V.
  3. For each package P that is marked for removal, add a constraint !P.

Dependencies Packages in APT have dependencies of two basic forms: Depends and Conflicts, as well as variations like Breaks (identical to Conflicts in solving terms), and Recommends (soft Depends) - we ll ignore those for now. We ll discuss Conflicts in the next section. Let s take a basic dependency list: A Depends: X Y, Z. To represent that dependency, we expand each name to a list of versions that can satisfy the dependency, for example X1 X2 Y1, Z1. Translating this dependency list to our Z3 solver, we create boolean variables X1,X2,Y1,Z1 and define two rules:
  1. A implies atleast( X1,X2,Y1 , 1)
  2. A implies atleast( Z1 , 1)
If there actually was nothing that satisfied the Z requirement, we d have added a rule not A. It would be possible to simply not tell Z3 about the version at all as an optimization, but that adds more complexity, and the not A constraint should not cause too many problems.

Conflicts Conflicts cannot have or in them. A dependency B Conflicts: X, Y means that only one of B, X, and Y can be installed. We can directly encode this in Z3 by using the constraint atmost( B,X,Y , 1). This is an optimized encoding of the constraint: We could have encoded each conflict in the form !B or !X, !B or !X, and so on. Usually this leads to worse performance as it introduces additional clauses.

Complete example Let s assume we start with an empty install and want to install the package a below.
Package: a
Version: 1
Depends: c   b
Package: b
Version: 1
Package: b
Version: 2
Conflicts: x
Package: d
Version: 1
Package: x
Version: 1
The translation in Z3 rules looks like this:
  1. Package rules for a:
    1. a == atleast( a1 , 1) - package is installed iff one version is
    2. atmost( a1 , 1) - only one version may be installed
    3. a a must be installed
  2. Dependency rules for a
    1. implies(a1, atleast( b2, b1 , 1)) the translated dependency above. note that c is gone, it s not reachable.
  3. Package rules for b:
    1. b == atleast( b1,b2 , 1) - package is installed iff one version is
    2. atmost( b1, b2 , 1) - only one version may be installed
  4. Dependencies for b (= 2):
    1. atmost( b2, x1 , 1) - the conflicts between x and b = 2 above
  5. Package rules for x:
    1. x == atleast( x1 , 1) - package is installed iff one version is
    2. atmost( x1 , 1) - only one version may be installed
The package d is not translated, as it is not reachable from the root set a1 , the transitive root set is a1,b1,b2,x1 .

Next iteration: Optimization We have now constructed the basic set of rules that allows us to solve solve our dependency problems (equivalent to SAT), however it might lead to suboptimal solutions where it removes automatically installed packages, or installs more packages than necessary, to name a few examples. In our next iteration, we have to look at introducing optimization; for example, have the minimum number of removals, the minimal number of changed packages, or satisfy as many recommends as possible. We will also look at the upgrade problem (upgrade as many packages as possible), the autoremove problem (remove as many automatically installed packages as possible).

5 July 2021

B lint R czey: Hello zstd compressed .debs in Ubuntu!

When Julian Andres Klode and I added initial Zstandard compression support to Ubuntu s APT and dpkg in Ubuntu 18.04 LTS we planned getting the changes accepted to Debian quickly and making Ubuntu 18.10 the first release where the new compression could speed up package installations and upgrades. Well, it took slightly longer than that. Since then many other packages have been updated to support zstd compressed packages and read-only compression has been back-ported to the 16.04 Xenial LTS release, too, on Ubuntu s side. In Debian, zstd support is available now in APT, debootstrap and reprepro (thanks Dimitri!). It is still under review for inclusion in Debian s dpkg (BTS bug 892664). Given that there is sufficient archive-wide support for zstd, Ubuntu is switching to zstd compressed packages in Ubuntu 21.10, the current development release. Please welcome hello/2.10-2ubuntu3, the first zstd-compressed Ubuntu package that will be followed by many other built with dpkg (>= 1.20.9ubuntu2), and enjoy the speed!

20 June 2021

Julian Andres Klode: Migrating away from apt-key

This is an edited copy of an email I sent to provide guidance to users of apt-key as to how to handle things in a post apt-key world. The manual page already provides all you need to know for replacing apt-key add usage:
Note: Instead of using this command a keyring should be placed directly in the /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/ directory with a descriptive name and either gpg or asc as file extension
So it s kind of surprising people need step by step instructions for how to copy/download a file into a directory. I ll also discuss the alternative security snakeoil approach with signed-by that s become popular. Maybe we should not have added signed-by, people seem to forget that debs still run maintainer scripts as root. Aside from this email, Debian users should look into extrepo, which manages curated external repositories for you.

Direct translation Assume you currently have:
wget -qO- https://myrepo.example/myrepo.asc   sudo apt-key add  
To translate this directly for bionic and newer, you can use:
sudo wget -qO /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/myrepo.asc https://myrepo.example/myrepo.asc
or to avoid downloading as root:
wget -qO-  https://myrepo.example/myrepo.asc   sudo tee -a /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/myrepo.asc
Older (and all) releases only support unarmored files with an extension .gpg. If you care about them, provide one, and use
sudo wget -qO /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/myrepo.gpg https://myrepo.example/myrepo.gpg
Some people will tell you to download the .asc and pipe it to gpg --dearmor, but gpg might not be installed, so really, just offer a .gpg one instead that is supported on all systems. wget might not be available everywhere so you can use apt-helper:
sudo /usr/lib/apt/apt-helper download-file https://myrepo.example/myrepo.asc /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/myrepo.asc
or, to avoid downloading as root:
/usr/lib/apt/apt-helper download-file https://myrepo.example/myrepo.asc /tmp/myrepo.asc && sudo mv /tmp/myrepo.asc /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d

Pretending to be safer by using signed-by People say it s good practice to not use trusted.gpg.d and install the file elsewhere and then refer to it from the sources.list entry by using signed-by=<path to the file>. So this looks a lot safer, because now your key can t sign other unrelated repositories. In practice, security increase is minimal, since package maintainer scripts run as root anyway. But I guess it s better for publicity :) As an example, here are the instructions to install signal-desktop from signal.org. As mentioned, gpg --dearmor use in there is not a good idea, and I d personally not tell people to modify /usr as it s supposed to be managed by the package manager, but we don t have an /etc/apt/keyrings or similar at the moment; it s fine though if the keyring is installed by the package. You can also just add the file there as a starting point, and then install a keyring package overriding it (pretend there is a signal-desktop-keyring package below that would override the .gpg we added).
# NOTE: These instructions only work for 64 bit Debian-based
# Linux distributions such as Ubuntu, Mint etc.
# 1. Install our official public software signing key
wget -O- https://updates.signal.org/desktop/apt/keys.asc   gpg --dearmor > signal-desktop-keyring.gpg
cat signal-desktop-keyring.gpg   sudo tee -a /usr/share/keyrings/signal-desktop-keyring.gpg > /dev/null
# 2. Add our repository to your list of repositories
echo 'deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/signal-desktop-keyring.gpg] https://updates.signal.org/desktop/apt xenial main'  \
  sudo tee -a /etc/apt/sources.list.d/signal-xenial.list
# 3. Update your package database and install signal
sudo apt update && sudo apt install signal-desktop
I do wonder why they do wget gpg --dearmor, pipe that into the file and then cat sudo tee it, instead of having that all in one pipeline. Maybe they want nicer progress reporting.

Scenario-specific guidance We have three scenarios: For system image building, shipping the key in /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d seems reasonable to me; you are the vendor sort of, so it can be globally trusted. Chrome-style debs and repository config debs: If you ship a deb, embedding the sources.list.d snippet (calling it $myrepo.list) and shipping a $myrepo.gpg in /usr/share/keyrings is the best approach. Whether you ship that in product debs aka vscode/chromium or provide a repository configuration deb (let s call it myrepo-repo.deb) and then tell people to run apt update followed by apt install <package inside the repo> depends on how many packages are in the repo, I guess. Manual instructions (signal style): The third case, where you tell people to run wget themselves, I find tricky. As we see in signal, just stuffing keyring files into /usr/share/keyrings is popular, despite /usr supposed to be managed by the package manager. We don t have another dir inside /etc (or /usr/local), so it s hard to suggest something else. There s no significant benefit from actually using signed-by, so it s kind of extra work for little gain, though.

Addendum: Future work This part is new, just for this blog post. Let s look at upcoming changes and how they make things easier.

Bundled .sources files Assuming I get my merge request merged, the next version of APT (2.4/2.3.something) will do away with all the complexity and allow you to embed the key directly into a deb822 .sources file (which have been available for some time now):
Types: deb
URIs: https://myrepo.example/ https://myotherrepo.example/
Suites: stable not-so-stable
Components: main
Signed-By:
 -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
 .
 mDMEYCQjIxYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAD/P5Nvvnvk66SxBBHDbhRml9ORg1WV5CvzKY
 CuMfoIS0BmFiY2RlZoiQBBMWCgA4FiEErCIG1VhKWMWo2yfAREZd5NfO31cFAmAk
 IyMCGyMFCwkIBwMFFQoJCAsFFgIDAQACHgECF4AACgkQREZd5NfO31fbOwD6ArzS
 dM0Dkd5h2Ujy1b6KcAaVW9FOa5UNfJ9FFBtjLQEBAJ7UyWD3dZzhvlaAwunsk7DG
 3bHcln8DMpIJVXht78sL
 =IE0r
 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Then you can just provide a .sources files to users, they place it into sources.list.d, and everything magically works Probably adding a nice apt add-source command for it I guess. Well, python-apt s aptsources package still does not support deb822 sources, and never will, we ll need an aptsources2 for that for backwards-compatibility reasons, and then port software-properties and other users to it.

OpenPGP vs aptsign We do have a better, tighter replacement for gpg in the works which uses Ed25519 keys to sign Release files. It s temporarily named aptsign, but it s a generic signer for single-section deb822 files, similar to signify/minisign. We believe that this solves the security nightmare that our OpenPGP integration is while reducing complexity at the same time. Keys are much shorter, so the bundled sources file above will look much nicer.

Next.