I tailed off on blog posts towards the end of the year; I blame a bunch of travel (personal + business), catching the flu, then December being its usual busy self. Anyway, to try and start off the year a bit better I thought I d do my annual recap of my Free Software activities. For previous years see 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 + 2023.

Conferences In 2024 I managed to make it to FOSDEM again. It s a hectic conference, and I know there are legitimate concerns about it being a super spreader event, but it has the advantage of being relatively close and having a lot of different groups of people I want to talk to / see talk at it. I m already booked to go this year as well. I spoke at All Systems Go in Berlin about Using TPMs at scale for protecting keys. It was nice to actually be able to talk publicly about some of the work stuff my team and I have been working on. I d a talk submission in for FOSDEM about our use of attestation and why it s not necessarily the evil some folk claim, but there were a lot of good talks submitted and I wasn t selected. Maybe I ll find somewhere else suitable to do it. BSides Belfast may or may not count - it s a security conference, but there s a lot of overlap with various bits of Free software, so I feel it deserves a mention. I skipped DebConf for 2024 for a variety of reasons, but I m expecting to make DebConf25 in Brest, France in July.

Debian Most of my contributions to Free software continue to happen within Debian. In 2023 I d done a bunch of work on retrogaming with Kodi on Debian, so I made an effort to try and keep those bits more up to date, even if I m not actually regularly using them at present. RetroArch got 1.18.0+dfsg-1 and 1.19.1+dfsg-1 uploads. libretro-core-info got associated 1.18.0-1 and 1.19.0-1 uploads too. I note 1.20.0 has been released recently, so I ll have to find some time to build the appropriate DFSG tarball and update it. rcheevos saw 11.2.0-1, 11.5.0-1 + 11.6.0-1 uploaded. kodi-game-libretro itself had 20.2.7-1 uploaded, then 21.0.7-1. Latest upstream is 22.1.0, but that s tracking Kodi 22 and we re still on Kodi 21 so I plan to follow the Omega branch for now. Which I ve just noticed had a 21.0.8 release this week. Finally in the games space I uploaded mgba 0.10.3+dfsg-1 and 0.10.3+dfsg-2 for Ryan Tandy, before realising he was already a Debian Maintainer and granting him the appropriate ACL access so he can upload it himself; I ve had zero concerns about any of his packaging. The Debian Electronics Packaging Team continues to be home for a bunch of packages I care about. There was nothing big there, for me, in 2024, but a few bits of cleanup here and there. I seem to have become one of the main uploaders for sdcc - I have some interest in the space, and the sigrok firmware requires it to build, so I at least like to ensure it s in half decent state. I uploaded 4.4.0+dfsg-1, 4.4.0+dfsg-2, and, just in time to count for 2024, 4.4.0+dfsg-3. The sdcc 4.4 upload lead to some compilation issues for sigrok-firmware-fx2laf so I uploaded 0.1.7-2 fixing that, then 0.1.7-3 doing some further cleanups. OpenOCD had 0.12.0-2 uploaded to disable the libgpiod backend thanks to incompatible changes upstream. There were some in-discussion patches with OpenOCD upstream at the time, but they didn t seem to be ready yet so I held off on pulling them in. 0.12.0-3 fixed builds with more recent versions of jimtcl. It looks like the next upstream release is about a year away, so Trixie will in all probability ship with 0.12.0 as well. libjaylink had a new upstream release, so 0.4.0-1 was uploaded. libserialsport also had a new upstream release, leading to 0.1.2-1. I finally cracked and uploaded sg3-utils 1.48-1 into experimental. I m not the primary maintainer, but 1.46 is nearly 4 years old now and I wanted to get it updated in enough time to shake out any problems before we get to a Trixie freeze. Outside of team owned packages, libcli had compilation issues with GCC 14, leading to 1.10.7-2. I also added a new package, sedutil 1.20.0-2 back in April; it looks fairly unmaintained upstream (there s been some recent activity, but it doesn t seem to be release quality), but there was an outstanding ITP and I ve some familiarity with the space as we ve been using it at work as part of investigating TCG OPAL encryption. I continue to keep an eye on Debian New Members, even though I m mostly inactive as an application manager - we generally seem to have enough available recently. Mostly my involvement is via Front Desk activities, helping out with queries to the team alias, and contributing to internal discussions. Finally the 3 month rotation for Debian Keyring continues to operate smoothly. I dealt with 2023.03.24, 2023.06.24, 2023.09.22 + 2023.11.24.

Linux I d a single kernel contribution this year, to Clean up TPM space after command failure. That was based on some issues we saw at work. I ve another fix in progress that I hope to submit in 2025, but it s for an intermittent failure so confirming the fix is necessary + sufficient is taking a little while.

Personal projects I didn t end up doing much in the way of externally published personal project work in 2024. Despite the release of OpenPGP v6 in RFC 9580 I did not manage to really work on onak. I started on the v6 support, but have not had sufficient time to complete anything worth pushing external yet. listadmin3 got some minor updates based on external feedback / MRs. It s nice to know it s useful to other folk even in its basic state. That wraps up 2024. I ve got no particular goals for this year at present. Ideally I d get v6 support into onak, and it would be nice to implement some of the wishlist items people have provided for listadmin3, but I ll settle for making sure all my Debian packages are in reasonable state for Trixie.

Are you aware that Git commits and tags may be signed using OpenSSH? Git signatures may be used to improve integrity and authentication of our software supply-chain. Popular signature algorithms include Ed25519, ECDSA and RSA. Did you consider that these algorithms may not be safe if someone builds a post-quantum computer? As you may recall, I have earlier blogged about the efficient post-quantum key agreement mechanism called Streamlined NTRU Prime and its use in SSH and I have attempted to promote the conservatively designed Classic McEliece in a similar way, although it remains to be adopted. What post-quantum signature algorithms are available? There is an effort by NIST to standardize post-quantum algorithms, and they have a category for signature algorithms. According to wikipedia, after round three the selected algorithms are CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON and SPHINCS+. Of these, SPHINCS+ appears to be a conservative choice suitable for long-term digital signatures. Can we get this to work? Recall that Git uses the ssh-keygen tool from OpenSSH to perform signing and verification. To refresh your memory, let s study the commands that Git uses under the hood for Ed25519. First generate a Ed25519 private key:

jas@kaka:~$ ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f my_ed25519_key -P ""
Generating public/private ed25519 key pair.
Your identification has been saved in my_ed25519_key
Your public key has been saved in my_ed25519_key.pub
The key fingerprint is:
SHA256:fDa5+jmC2+/aiLhWeWA3IV8Wj6yMNTSuRzqUZlIGlXQ jas@kaka
The key's randomart image is:
+--[ED25519 256]--+
     .+=.E ..      
      oo=.ooo      
     . =o=+o .     
      =oO+o .      
      .=+S.=       
       oo.o o      
      . o  .       
     ...o.+..      
    .o.o.=**.      
+----[SHA256]-----+
jas@kaka:~$ cat my_ed25519_key
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
QyNTUxOQAAACAWP/aZ8hzN0WNRMSpjzbgW1tJXNd2v6/dnbKaQt7iIBQAAAJCeDotOng6L
TgAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAWP/aZ8hzN0WNRMSpjzbgW1tJXNd2v6/dnbKaQt7iIBQ
AAAEBFRvzgcD3YItl9AMmVK4xDKj8NTg4h2Sluj0/x7aSPlhY/9pnyHM3RY1ExKmPNuBbW
0lc13a/r92dsppC3uIgFAAAACGphc0BrYWthAQIDBAU=
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
jas@kaka:~$ cat my_ed25519_key.pub 
ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBY/9pnyHM3RY1ExKmPNuBbW0lc13a/r92dsppC3uIgF jas@kaka
jas@kaka:~$ 

Then let s sign something with this key:

jas@kaka:~$ echo "Hello world!" > msg
jas@kaka:~$ ssh-keygen -Y sign -f my_ed25519_key -n my-namespace msg
Signing file msg
Write signature to msg.sig
jas@kaka:~$ cat msg.sig 
-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgFj/2mfIczdFjUTEqY824FtbSVz
Xdr+v3Z2ymkLe4iAUAAAAMbXktbmFtZXNwYWNlAAAAAAAAAAZzaGE1MTIAAABTAAAAC3Nz
aC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAQLmWsq05tqOOZIJqjxy5ZP/YRFoaX30lfIllmfyoeM5lpVnxJ3ZxU8
SF0KodDr8Rtukg2N3Xo80NGvZOzbG/9Aw=
-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
jas@kaka:~$

Now let s create a list of trusted public-keys and associated identities:

jas@kaka:~$ echo 'my.name@example.org ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBY/9pnyHM3RY1ExKmPNuBbW0lc13a/r92dsppC3uIgF' > allowed-signers
jas@kaka:~$ 

Then let s verify the message we just signed:

jas@kaka:~$ cat msg   ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed-signers -I my.name@example.org -n my-namespace -s msg.sig
Good "my-namespace" signature for my.name@example.org with ED25519 key SHA256:fDa5+jmC2+/aiLhWeWA3IV8Wj6yMNTSuRzqUZlIGlXQ
jas@kaka:~$ 

I have implemented support for SPHINCS+ in OpenSSH. This is early work, but I wanted to announce it to get discussion of some of the details going and to make people aware of it. What would a better way to demonstrate SPHINCS+ support in OpenSSH than by validating the Git commit that implements it using itself? Here is how to proceed, first get a suitable development environment up and running. I m using a Debian container launched in a protected environment using podman.

jas@kaka:~$ podman run -it --rm debian:stable

Then install the necessary build dependencies for OpenSSH.

# apt-get update 
# apt-get install git build-essential autoconf libz-dev libssl-dev

Now clone my OpenSSH branch with the SPHINCS+ implentation and build it. You may browse the commit on GitHub first if you are curious.

# cd
# git clone https://github.com/jas4711/openssh-portable.git -b sphincsp
# cd openssh-portable
# autoreconf -fvi
# ./configure
# make

Configure a Git allowed signers list with my SPHINCS+ public key (make sure to keep the public key on one line with the whitespace being one ASCII SPC character):

# mkdir -pv ~/.ssh
# echo 'simon@josefsson.org ssh-sphincsplus@openssh.com AAAAG3NzaC1zcGhpbmNzcGx1c0BvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAAECI6eacTxjB36xcPtP0ZyxJNIGCN350GluLD5h0KjKDsZLNmNaPSFH2ynWyKZKOF5eRPIMMKSCIV75y+KP9d6w3' > ~/.ssh/allowed_signers
# git config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile ~/.ssh/allowed_signers

Then verify the commit using the newly built ssh-keygen binary:

# PATH=$PWD:$PATH
# git log -1 --show-signature
commit ce0b590071e2dc845373734655192241a4ace94b (HEAD -> sphincsp, origin/sphincsp)
Good "git" signature for simon@josefsson.org with SPHINCSPLUS key SHA256:rkAa0fX0lQf/7V7QmuJHSI44L/PAPPsdWpis4nML7EQ
Author: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
Date:   Tue Dec 3 18:44:25 2024 +0100
    Add SPHINCS+.
# git verify-commit ce0b590071e2dc845373734655192241a4ace94b
Good "git" signature for simon@josefsson.org with SPHINCSPLUS key SHA256:rkAa0fX0lQf/7V7QmuJHSI44L/PAPPsdWpis4nML7EQ
# 

Yay! So what are some considerations? SPHINCS+ comes in many different variants. First it comes with three security levels approximately matching 128/192/256 bit symmetric key strengths. Second choice is between the SHA2-256, SHAKE256 (SHA-3) and Haraka hash algorithms. Final choice is between a robust and a simple variant with different security and performance characteristics. To get going, I picked the sphincss256sha256robust SPHINCS+ implementation from SUPERCOP 20241022. There is a good size comparison table in the sphincsplus implementation, if you want to consider alternative variants. SPHINCS+ public-keys are really small, as you can see in the allowed signers file. This is really good because they are handled by humans and often by cut n paste. What about private keys? They are slightly longer than Ed25519 private keys but shorter than typical RSA private keys.

# ssh-keygen -t sphincsplus -f my_sphincsplus_key -P ""
Generating public/private sphincsplus key pair.
Your identification has been saved in my_sphincsplus_key
Your public key has been saved in my_sphincsplus_key.pub
The key fingerprint is:
SHA256:4rNfXdmLo/ySQiWYzsBhZIvgLu9sQQz7upG8clKziBg root@ad600ff56253
The key's randomart image is:
+[SPHINCSPLUS 256-+
  .  .o            
 o . oo.           
  = .o.. o         
 o o  o o . .   o  
 .+    = S o   o . 
 Eo=  . + . . .. . 
 =*.+  o . . oo .  
 B+=    o o.o. .   
 o*o   ... .oo.    
+----[SHA256]-----+
# cat my_sphincsplus_key.pub 
ssh-sphincsplus@openssh.com AAAAG3NzaC1zcGhpbmNzcGx1c0BvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAAEAltAX1VhZ8pdW9FgC+NdM6QfLxVXVaf1v2yW4v+tk2Oj5lxmVgZftfT37GOMOlK9iBm9SQHZZVYZddkEJ9F1D7 root@ad600ff56253
# cat my_sphincsplus_key 
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAYwAAABtzc2gtc3
BoaW5jc3BsdXNAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAABAJbQF9VYWfKXVvRYAvjXTOkHy8VV1Wn9b9slu
L/rZNjo+ZcZlYGX7X09+xjjDpSvYgZvUkB2WVWGXXZBCfRdQ+wAAAQidiIwanYiMGgAAAB
tzc2gtc3BoaW5jc3BsdXNAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAABAJbQF9VYWfKXVvRYAvjXTOkHy8VV1
Wn9b9sluL/rZNjo+ZcZlYGX7X09+xjjDpSvYgZvUkB2WVWGXXZBCfRdQ+wAAAIAbwBxEhA
NYzITN6VeCMqUyvw/59JM+WOLXBlRbu3R8qS7ljc4qFVWUtmhy8B3t9e4jrhdO6w0n5I4l
mnLnBi2hJbQF9VYWfKXVvRYAvjXTOkHy8VV1Wn9b9sluL/rZNjo+ZcZlYGX7X09+xjjDpS
vYgZvUkB2WVWGXXZBCfRdQ+wAAABFyb290QGFkNjAwZmY1NjI1MwECAwQ=
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
# 

Signature size? Now here is the challenge, for this variant the size is around 29kb or close to 600 lines of base64 data:

# git cat-file -p ce0b590071e2dc845373734655192241a4ace94b   head -10
tree ede42093e7d5acd37fde02065a4a19ac1f418703
parent 826483d51a9fee60703298bbf839d9ce37943474
author Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> 1733247865 +0100
committer Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> 1734907869 +0100
gpgsig -----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
 U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAAGMAAAAbc3NoLXNwaGluY3NwbHVzQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAQIjp5p
 xPGMHfrFw+0/RnLEk0gYI3fnQaW4sPmHQqMoOxks2Y1o9IUfbKdbIpko4Xl5E8gwwpIIhX
 vnL4o/13rDcAAAADZ2l0AAAAAAAAAAZzaGE1MTIAAHSDAAAAG3NzaC1zcGhpbmNzcGx1c0
 BvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAdGDHlobgfgkKKQBo3UHmnEnNXczCMNdzJmeYJau67QM6xZcAU+d+
 2mvhbksm5D34m75DWEngzBb3usJTqWJeeDdplHHRe3BKVCQ05LHqRYzcSdN6eoeZqoOBvR
# git cat-file -p ce0b590071e2dc845373734655192241a4ace94b   tail -5 
 ChvXUk4jfiNp85RDZ1kljVecfdB2/6CHFRtxrKHJRDiIavYjucgHF1bjz0fqaOSGa90UYL
 RZjZ0OhdHOQjNP5QErlIOcZeqcnwi0+RtCJ1D1wH2psuXIQEyr1mCA==
 -----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
Add SPHINCS+.
# git cat-file -p ce0b590071e2dc845373734655192241a4ace94b   wc -l
579
# 

What about performance? Verification is really fast:

# time git verify-commit ce0b590071e2dc845373734655192241a4ace94b
Good "git" signature for simon@josefsson.org with SPHINCSPLUS key SHA256:rkAa0fX0lQf/7V7QmuJHSI44L/PAPPsdWpis4nML7EQ
real	0m0.010s
user	0m0.005s
sys	0m0.005s
# 

On this machine, verifying an Ed25519 signature is a couple of times slower, and needs around 0.07 seconds. Signing is slower, it takes a bit over 2 seconds on my laptop.

# echo "Hello world!" > msg
# time ssh-keygen -Y sign -f my_sphincsplus_key -n my-namespace msg
Signing file msg
Write signature to msg.sig
real	0m2.226s
user	0m2.226s
sys	0m0.000s
# echo 'my.name@example.org ssh-sphincsplus@openssh.com AAAAG3NzaC1zcGhpbmNzcGx1c0BvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAAEAltAX1VhZ8pdW9FgC+NdM6QfLxVXVaf1v2yW4v+tk2Oj5lxmVgZftfT37GOMOlK9iBm9SQHZZVYZddkEJ9F1D7' > allowed-signers
# cat msg   ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed-signers -I my.name@example.org -n my-namespace -s msg.sig
Good "my-namespace" signature for my.name@example.org with SPHINCSPLUS key SHA256:4rNfXdmLo/ySQiWYzsBhZIvgLu9sQQz7upG8clKziBg
# 

Welcome to our new world of Post-Quantum safe digital signatures of Git commits, and Happy Hacking!

I recently got a OnePlus 6 for the purpose of running Debian, here s the Debian wiki page about it [1]. It runs Debian nicely and the basic functions all work, but the problem I m having now is that AldiMobile (Telstra) and KoganMobile (Vodafone) don t enable VoLTE for that and all the Australian telcos have turned off 3G. The OnePlus 6 does VoLTE with Chinese SIMs so the phone itself can do it. The OnePlus 6 was never sold in Australia by the telcos, so they are all gray-market imports which aren t designed by OnePlus to work in Australia. Until recently that wasn t a problem, but now that the 3G network has been turned off we need VoLTE and OnePlus didn t include that in the OS. Reddit has documentation on how to fix this but it has to be done on Android [2]. So I had to go back from Mobian to Android to get VoLTE (and VoWifi) working and then install Mobian again. For people with similar issues Telstra has a page for checking which phones are supported [3], it s the only way to determine if it s the phone or the network that makes VoLTE not work Android isn t informative about such things. Telstra lists the OP6 as a suitable phone. Now after doing this I still can t get the OP6 working for phone calls on Phosh or PlasmaMobile and I m not sure why. I m going to give the PinePhone Pro another go and see if it now works better. In the past I had problems with the PinePhonePro battery discharging too fast, charging too slowly, and having poor call quality [4]. The battery discharge issue should be at least alleviated by some of the changes in the Plasma 6 code that s now in Debian/Unstable. I ve also been lent a PinePhone (non-pro) and been told that it will have better battery life in many situations. I ll do some tests of that. The PinePhonePro isn t capable of doing the convergence things I was hoping to do so the greater RAM and CPU power that it has aren t as relevant as they otherwise would be. I have a vision for how phones should work. I am not discouraged by the Librem 5, PinePhonePro, Note 9, and OnePlus 6 failing in various ways to do what I hoped for. I will eventually find a phone that I can get working well enough.

• [1] https://wiki.debian.org/InstallingDebianOn/OnePlus/OnePlus6
• [2] https://tinyurl.com/29lo6srp
• [3] https://tinyurl.com/23ta7pjf
• [4] https://etbe.coker.com.au/2023/10/11/pinephone-status/

Welcome to the October 2024 report from the Reproducible Builds project. Our reports attempt to outline what we ve been up to over the past month, highlighting news items from elsewhere in tech where they are related. As ever, if you are interested in contributing to the project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. Table of contents:

1. Beyond bitwise equality for Reproducible Builds?
2. Two Ways to Trustworthy at SeaGL 2024
3. Number of cores affected Android compiler output
4. On our mailing list
5. diffoscope
6. IzzyOnDroid passed 25% reproducible apps
7. Distribution work
8. Website updates
9. Reproducibility testing framework
10. Supply-chain security at Open Source Summit EU
11. Upstream patches

---

Beyond bitwise equality for Reproducible Builds? Jens Dietrich, Tim White, of Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand along with Behnaz Hassanshahi and Paddy Krishnan of Oracle Labs Australia published a paper entitled Levels of Binary Equivalence for the Comparison of Binaries from Alternative Builds :

The availability of multiple binaries built from the same sources creates new challenges and opportunities, and raises questions such as: Does build A confirm the integrity of build B? or Can build A reveal a compromised build B? . To answer such questions requires a notion of equivalence between binaries. We demonstrate that the obvious approach based on bitwise equality has significant shortcomings in practice, and that there is value in opting for alternative notions. We conceptualise this by introducing levels of equivalence, inspired by clone detection types.

A PDF of the paper is freely available.

Two Ways to Trustworthy at SeaGL 2024 On Friday 8th November, Vagrant Cascadian will present a talk entitled Two Ways to Trustworthy at SeaGL in Seattle, WA. Founded in 2013, SeaGL is a free, grassroots technical summit dedicated to spreading awareness and knowledge about free source software, hardware and culture. Vagrant s talk:

[ ] delves into how two project[s] approaches fundamental security features through Reproducible Builds, Bootstrappable Builds, code auditability, etc. to improve trustworthiness, allowing independent verification; trustworthy projects require little to no trust. Exploring the challenges that each project faces due to very different technical architectures, but also contextually relevant social structure, adoption patterns, and organizational history should provide a good backdrop to understand how different approaches to security might evolve, with real-world merits and downsides.

Number of cores affected Android compiler output Fay Stegerman wrote that the cause of the Android toolchain bug from September s report that she reported to the Android issue tracker has been found and the bug has been fixed.

the D8 Java to DEX compiler (part of the Android toolchain) eliminated a redundant field load if running the class s static initialiser was known to be free of side effects, which ended up accidentally depending on the sharding of the input, which is dependent on the number of CPU cores used during the build.

To make it easier to understand the bug and the patch, Fay also made a small example to illustrate when and why the optimisation involved is valid.

On our mailing list On our mailing list this month:

• Following-up to previous work, James Addison informed the list that the recently-released Sphinx documentation generator includes improvements to the next copyright notice substitutions.
• Pol Dellaiera wrote to the list in order to seek advice around introducing the concept of reproducibility to computer science Masters students at the University of Mons, Belgium.
• James Addison also followed-up to a previous thread on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG and the unreproducible Linux Kernel to add: I wonder whether it would be possible to use the Linux kernel s Integrity Policy Enforcement to deploy a policy that would prevent loading of anything except a set of expected kernel modules. [ ]
• There were also two informative replies from David Wheeler to a broad-based discussion on Reproducible Builds being defined in various standards. [ ][ ]

diffoscope diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can locate and diagnose reproducibility issues. This month, Chris Lamb made the following changes, including preparing and uploading versions 279, 280, 281 and 282 to Debian:

• Ignore errors when listing .ar archives (#1085257). [ ]
• Don t try and test with systemd-ukify in the Debian stable distribution. [ ]
• Drop Depends on the deprecated python3-pkg-resources (#1083362). [ ]

In addition, Jelle van der Waa added support for Unified Kernel Image (UKI) files. [ ][ ][ ] Furthermore, Vagrant Cascadian updated diffoscope in GNU Guix to version 282. [ ][ ]

IzzyOnDroid passed 25% reproducible apps The IzzyOnDroid project has reached a good milestone by reaching over 25% of the ~1,200 Android apps provided by their repository (of official APKs built by the original application developers) having been confirmed to be reproducible by a rebuilder.

Distribution work In Debian this month:

• Holger Levsen uploaded devscripts version 2.24.2, including many changes to the debootsnap, debrebuild and reproducible-check scripts. This is the first time that debrebuild actually works (using sbuild s unshare backend). As part of this, Holger also fixed an issue in the reproducible-check script where a typo in the code led to incorrect results [ ]
• Recently, a news entry was added to snapshot.debian.org s homepage, describing the recent changes that made the system stable again:

  The new server has no problems keeping up with importing the full archives on every update, as each run finishes comfortably in time before it s time to run again. [While] the new server is the one doing all the importing of updated archives, the HTTP interface is being served by both the new server and one of the VM s at LeaseWeb.

  The entry list a number of specific updates surrounding the API endpoints and rate limiting.
• Lastly, 12 reviews of Debian packages were added, 3 were updated and 18 were removed this month adding to our knowledge about identified issues.

Elsewhere in distribution news, Zbigniew J drzejewski-Szmek performed another rebuild of Fedora 42 packages, with the headline result being that 91% of the packages are reproducible. Zbigniew also reported a reproducibility problem with QImage. Finally, in openSUSE, Bernhard M. Wiedemann published another report for that distribution.

Website updates There were an enormous number of improvements made to our website this month, including:

• Alba Herrerias:
  • Improve consistency across distribution-specific guides. [ ]
  • Fix a number of links on the Contribute page. [ ]
• Chris Lamb:
  • Correct the name of Civil Infrastructure Platform name and update image on the Projects page. [ ]
  • Update broken link on the Value Initialization page. [ ]
  • Try and make pipeline/branch builds of the website easier to browse. [ ][ ][ ][ ]
• hulkoba
  • Contribute to the new Success stories page. [ ]
• James Addison:
  • Huge and significant work on a (as-yet-merged) quickstart guide to be linked from the homepage [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ]
  • On the homepage, link directly to the Projects subpage. [ ]
  • Relocate dependency-drift notes to the Volatile inputs page. [ ]
• Ninette Adhikari:
  • Add a brand new Success stories page that highlights the success stories of Reproducible Builds, showcasing real-world examples of projects shipping with verifiable, reproducible builds . [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ]
• Pol Dellaiera:
  • Update the website s README page for building the website under NixOS. [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ]
  • Add a new academic paper citation. [ ]

Lastly, Holger Levsen filed an extensive issue detailing a request to create an overview of recommendations and standards in relation to reproducible builds.

Reproducibility testing framework The Reproducible Builds project operates a comprehensive testing framework running primarily at tests.reproducible-builds.org in order to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. In October, a number of changes were made by Holger Levsen, including:

• Add a basic index.html for rebuilderd. [ ]
• Update the nginx.conf configuration file for rebuilderd. [ ]
• Document how to use a rescue system for Infomaniak s OpenStack cloud. [ ]
• Update usage info for two particular nodes. [ ]
• Fix up a version skew check to fix the name of the riscv64 architecture. [ ]
• Update the rebuilderd-related TODO. [ ]

In addition, Mattia Rizzolo added a new IP address for the inos5 node [ ] and Vagrant Cascadian brought 4 virt nodes back online [ ].

Supply-chain security at Open Source Summit EU The Open Source Summit EU took place recently, and covered plenty of topics related to supply-chain security, including:

• Public Sector & OpenSSF: Principles for Package Repository Security
• The Model Openness Framework: Promoting Completeness and Openness for Reproducibility, Transparency and Usability in AI
• Structured Scorecard Results: Tailor Your Own Supply-Chain Security Policies
• Lightning Talk: Elephant in the Room: How Supply Chain Security Standards Are Not Standard and What to Do About It
• Lightning Talk: Charting the Course for Secure Software Supply Chain with Guac-AI-Mole!
• TPMs, Merkle Trees and TEEs: Enhancing SLSA with Hardware-Assisted Build Environment Verification
• Accountability Taxonomy for AI Software Bill of Materials
• Securing Your Supply Chain with an Open Source Ecosystem
• OSS Supply Chain Threats and Why You Need a Holistic Security Strategy
• A Step Closer to in-Toto lly Secure: Using in-Toto and OPA Gatekeeper to Verify Artifact Integrity
• Panel Discussion: Improving Supply Chain Integrity with OpenSSF Technologies
• Case Study: 10+ Years of Developing an SBOM System and the Dos and Don ts
• SBOM in SaaS Environments: An Update
• Securing Git Repositories with Gittuf

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

• Bernhard M. Wiedemann
  • apache-ivy (.zip modification time)
  • ccache (build failure)
  • colord (CPU)
  • efivar (CPU/march=native)
  • gsl (no check)
  • libcamera (date/copyright year)
  • libreoffice (possible rpm/build toolchain corruption bug)
  • moto (.gz modification time)
  • openssl-1_1 (date-related issue)
  • python-pygraphviz (benchmark)
  • sphinx/python-pygraphviz (benchmark)
  • python-panel (package.lock has random port)
  • python-propcache (random temporary path)
  • python314 (.gz-related modification time)
  • rusty_v8 (random .o files)
  • scapy (date)
  • wine (parallelism)
  • ibmtss (FTBFS-2026)
  • pymol (date)
  • pandas (ASLR)
  • linutil (drop date)
  • lsof (also filed in openSUSE: uname -r in LSOF_VSTR)
  • schily (also filed in openSUSE: uname -r)
  • superlu (nocheck)
  • util (random test failure)
  • ceph (year-2038 variation from embedded boost)
• Chris Lamb:
  • #1085097 filed against python-roborock.
  • #1085280 filed against pywayland.
  • #1085283 filed against readsb.
  • #1085381 filed against xraylarch.
• James Addison:
  • #1085112 filed against distro-info.
• Zbigniew J drzejewski-Szmek:
  • calibre (two sort issues) [ ][ ]

---

Finally, If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

• IRC: #reproducible-builds on irc.oftc.net.
• Mastodon: @reproducible_builds@fosstodon.org
• Mailing list: rb-general@lists.reproducible-builds.org
• Twitter: @ReproBuilds

Almost all of my Debian contributions this month were sponsored by Freexian. You can also support my work directly via Liberapay. Pydantic My main Debian project for the month turned out to be getting Pydantic back into a good state in Debian testing. I ve used Pydantic quite a bit in various projects, most recently in Debusine, so I have an interest in making sure it works well in Debian. However, it had been stalled on 1.10.17 for quite a while due to the complexities of getting 2.x packaged. This was partly making sure everything else could cope with the transition, but in practice mostly sorting out packaging of its new Rust dependencies. Several other people (notably Alexandre Detiste, Andreas Tille, Drew Parsons, and Timo R hling) had made some good progress on this, but nobody had quite got it over the line and it seemed a bit stuck. Learning Rust is on my to-do list, but merely not knowing a language hasn t stopped me before. So I learned how the Debian Rust team s packaging works, upgraded a few packages to new upstream versions (including rust-half and upstream rust-idna test fixes), and packaged rust-jiter. After a lot of waiting around for various things and chasing some failures in other packages I was eventually able to get current versions of both pydantic-core and pydantic into testing. I m looking forward to being able to drop our clunky v1 compatibility code once debusine can rely on running on trixie! OpenSSH I upgraded the Debian packaging to OpenSSH 9.9p1. YubiHSM I upgraded python-yubihsm, yubihsm-connector, and yubihsm-shell to new upstream versions. I noticed that I could enable some tests in python-yubihsm and yubihsm-shell; I d previously thought the whole test suite required a real YubiHSM device, but when I looked closer it turned out that this was only true for some tests. I fixed yubihsm-shell build failures on some 32-bit architectures (upstream PRs #431, #432), and also made it build reproducibly. Thanks to Helmut Grohne, I fixed yubihsm-connector to apply udev rules to existing devices when the package is installed. As usual, bookworm-backports is up to date with all these changes. Python team setuptools 72.0.0 removed the venerable setup.py test command. This caused some fallout in Debian, some of which was quite non-obvious as packaging helpers sometimes fell back to different ways of running test suites that didn t quite work. I fixed django-guardian, manuel, python-autopage, python-flask-seeder, python-pgpdump, python-potr, python-precis-i18n, python-stopit, serpent, straight.plugin, supervisor, and zope.i18nmessageid. As usual for new language versions, the addition of Python 3.13 caused some problems. I fixed psycopg2, python-time-machine, and python-traits. I fixed build/autopkgtest failures in keymapper, python-django-test-migrations, python-rosettasciio, routes, transmissionrpc, and twisted. buildbot was in a bit of a mess due to being incompatible with SQLAlchemy 2.0. Fortunately by the time I got to it upstream had committed a workable set of patches, and the main difficulty was figuring out what to cherry-pick since they haven t made a new upstream release with all of that yet. I figured this out and got us up to 4.0.3. Adrian Bunk asked whether python-zipp should be removed from trixie. I spent some time investigating this and concluded that the answer was no, but looking into it was an interesting exercise anyway. On the other hand, I looked into flask-appbuilder, concluded that it should be removed, and filed a removal request. I upgraded some embedded CSS files in nbconvert. I upgraded importlib-resources, ipywidgets, jsonpickle, pydantic-settings, pylint (fixing a test failure), python-aiohttp-session, python-apptools, python-asyncssh, python-django-celery-beat, python-django-rules, python-limits, python-multidict, python-persistent, python-pkginfo, python-rt, python-spur, python-zipp, stravalib, transmissionrpc, vulture, zodbpickle, zope.exceptions (adopting it), zope.i18nmessageid, zope.proxy, and zope.security to new upstream versions. debmirror The experimental and *-proposed-updates suites used to not have Contents-* files, and a long time ago debmirror was changed to just skip those files in those suites. They were added to the Debian archive some time ago, but debmirror carried on skipping them anyway. Once I realized what was going on, I removed these unnecessary special cases (#819925, #1080168).

After rebuilding all added/modified packages in Trisquel, I have been circling around the elephant in the room: 99% of the binary packages in Trisquel comes from Ubuntu, which to a large extent are built from Debian source packages. Is it possible to rebuild the official binary packages identically? Does anyone make an effort to do so? Does anyone care about going through the differences between the official package and a rebuilt version? Reproducible-build.org s effort to track reproducibility bugs in Debian (and other systems) is amazing. However as far as I know, they do not confirm or deny that their rebuilds match the official packages. In fact, typically their rebuilds do not match the official packages, even when they say the package is reproducible, which had me surprised at first. To understand why that happens, compare the buildinfo file for the official coreutils 9.1-1 from Debian bookworm with the buildinfo file for reproducible-build.org s build and you will see that the SHA256 checksum does not match, but still they declare it as a reproducible package. As far as I can tell of the situation, the purpose of their rebuilds are not to say anything about the official binary build, instead the purpose is to offer a QA service to maintainers by performing two builds of a package and declaring success if both builds match. I have felt that something is lacking, and months have passed and I haven t found any project that address the problem I am interested in. During my earlier work I created a project called debdistreproduce which performs rebuilds of the difference between two distributions in a GitLab pipeline, and display diffoscope output for further analysis. A couple of days ago I had the idea of rewriting it to perform rebuilds of a single distribution. A new project debdistrebuild was born and today I m happy to bless it as version 1.0 and to announces the project! Debdistrebuild has rebuilt the top-50 popcon packages from Debian bullseye, bookworm and trixie, on amd64 and arm64, as well as Ubuntu jammy and noble on amd64, see the summary status page for links. This is intended as a proof of concept, to allow people experiment with the concept of doing GitLab-based package rebuilds and analysis. Compare how Guix has the guix challenge command. Or I should say debdistrebuild has attempted to rebuild those distributions. The number of identically built packages are fairly low, so I didn t want to waste resources building the rest of the archive until I understand if the differences are due to consequences of my build environment (plain apt-get build-dep followed by dpkg-buildpackage in a fresh container), or due to some real difference. Summarizing the results, debdistrebuild is able to rebuild 34% of Debian bullseye on amd64, 36% of bookworm on amd64, 32% of bookworm on arm64. The results for trixie and Ubuntu are disappointing, below 10%. So what causes my rebuilds to be different from the official rebuilds? Some are trivial like the classical problem of varying build paths, resulting in a different NT_GNU_BUILD_ID causing a mismatch. Some are a bit strange, like a subtle difference in one of perl s headers file. Some are due to embedded version numbers from a build dependency. Several of the build logs and diffoscope outputs doesn t make sense, likely due to bugs in my build scripts, especially for Ubuntu which appears to strip translations and do other build variations that I don t do. In general, the classes of reproducibility problems are the expected. Some are assembler differences for GnuPG s gpgv-static, likely triggered by upload of a new version of gcc after the original package was built. There are at least two ways to resolve that problem: either use the same version of build dependencies that were used to produce the original build, or demand that all packages that are affected by a change in another package are rebuilt centrally until there are no more differences. The current design of debdistrebuild uses the latest version of a build dependency that is available in the distribution. We call this a idempotent rebuild . This is usually not how the binary packages were built originally, they are often built against earlier versions of their build dependency. That is the situation for most binary distributions. Instead of using the latest build dependency version, higher reproducability may be achieved by rebuilding using the same version of the build dependencies that were used during the original build. This requires parsing buildinfo files to find the right version of the build dependency to install. We believe doing so will lead to a higher number of reproducibly built packages. However it begs the question: can we rebuild that earlier version of the build dependency? This circles back to really old versions and bootstrappable builds eventually. While rebuilding old versions would be interesting on its own, we believe that is less helpful for trusting the latest version and improving a binary distribution: it is challenging to publish a new version of some old package that would fix a reproducibility bug in another package when used as a build dependency, and then rebuild the later packages with the modified earlier version. Those earlier packages were already published, and are part of history. It may be that ultimately it will no longer be possible to rebuild some package, because proper source code is missing (for packages using build dependencies that were never part of a release); hardware to build a package could be missing; or that the source code is no longer publicly distributable. I argue that getting to 100% idempotent rebuilds is an interesting goal on its own, and to reach it we need to start measure idempotent rebuild status. One could conceivable imagine a way to rebuild modified versions of earlier packages, and then rebuild later packages using the modified earlier packages as build dependencies, for the purpose of achieving higher level of reproducible rebuilds of the last version, and to reach for bootstrappability. However, it may be still be that this is insufficient to achieve idempotent rebuilds of the last versions. Idempotent rebuilds are different from a reproducible build (where we try to reproduce the build using the same inputs), and also to bootstrappable builds (in which all binaries are ultimately built from source code). Consider a cycle where package X influence the content of package Y, which in turn influence the content of package X. These cycles may involve several packages, and it is conceivable that a cycle could be circular and infinite. It may be difficult to identify these chains, and even more difficult to break them up, but this effort help identify where to start looking for them. Rebuilding packages using the same build dependency versions as were used during the original build, or rebuilding packages using a bootsrappable build process, both seem orthogonal to the idempotent rebuild problem. Our notion of rebuildability appears thus to be complementary to reproducible-builds.org s definition and bootstrappable.org s definition. Each to their own devices, and Happy Hacking! Addendum about terminology: With idempotent rebuild I am talking about a rebuild of the entire operating system, applied to itself. Compare how you build the latest version of the GNU C Compiler: it first builds itself using whatever system compiler is available (often an earlier version of gcc) which we call step 1. Then step 2 is to build a copy of itself using the compiler built in step 1. The final step 3 is to build another copy of itself using the compiler from step 2. Debian, Ubuntu etc are at step 1 in this process right now. The output of step 2 and step 3 ought to be bit-by-bit identical, or something is wrong. The comparison between step 2 and 3 is what I refer to with an idempotent rebuild. Of course, most packages aren t a compiler that can compile itself. However entire operating systems such as Trisquel, PureOS, Ubuntu or Debian are (hopefully) a self-contained system that ought to be able to rebuild itself to an identical copy. Or something is amiss. The reproducible build and bootstrappable build projects are about improve the quality of step 1. The property I am interested is the identical rebuild and comparison in step 2 and 3. I feel the word idempotent describes the property I m interested in well, but I realize there may be better ways to describe this. Ideas welcome!

I have accidentally rewritten screentest, an old X11/GTK2 program that I was previously using to, well, test screens.

Screentest is dead It was removed from Debian in May 2023 but had already missed two releases (Debian 11 "bullseye" and 12 "bookworm") due to release critical bugs. The stated reason for removal was:

The package is orphaned and its upstream is no longer developed. It depends on gtk2, has a low popcon and no reverse dependencies.

So I had little hope to see this program back in Debian. The git repository shows little activity, the last being two years ago. Interestingly, I do not quite remember what it was testing, but I do remember it to find dead pixels, confirm native resolution, and various pixel-peeping. Here's a screenshot of one of the screentest screens: Now, I think it's safe to assume this program is dead and buried, and anyways I'm running wayland now, surely there's something better? Well, no. Of course not. Someone would know about it and tell me before I go on a random coding spree in a fit of procrastination... riiight? At least, the Debconf video team didn't seem to know of any replacement. They actually suggested I just "invoke gstreamer directly" and "embrace the joy of shell scripting".

Screentest reborn So, I naively did exactly that and wrote a horrible shell script. Then I realized the next step was to write an command line parser and monitor geometry guessing, and thought "NOPE, THIS IS WHERE THE SHELL STOPS", and rewrote the whole thing in Python. Now, screentest lives as a ~400-line Python script, half of which is unit test data and command-line parsing.

Why screentest Some smarty pants is going to complain and ask why the heck one would need something like that (and, well, someone already did), so maybe I can lay down a list of use case:

• testing color output, in broad terms (answering the question of "is it just me or this project really yellow?")
• testing focus and keystone ("this looks blurry, can you find a nice sharp frame in that movie to adjust focus?")
• test for native resolution and sharpness ("does this projector really support 4k for 30$? that sounds like bullcrap")
• looking for dead pixels ("i have a new monitor, i hope it's intact")

What does screentest do? Screentest displays a series of "patterns" on screen. The list of patterns is actually hardcoded in the script, copy-pasted from this list from the videotestsrc gstreamer plugin, but you can pass any pattern supported by your gstreamer installation with --patterns. A list of patterns relevant to your installation is available with the gst-inspect-1.0 videotestsrc command. By default, screentest goes through all patterns. Each pattern runs indefinitely until the you close the window, then the next pattern starts. You can restrict to a subset of patterns, for example this would be a good test for dead pixels:

screentest --patterns black,white,red,green,blue

This would be a good sharpness test:

screentest --patterns pinwheel,spokes,checkers-1,checkers-2,checkers-4,checkers-8

A good generic test is the classic SMPTE color bars and is the first in the list, but you can run only that test with:

screentest --patterns smpte

(I will mention, by the way, that as a system administrator with decades of experience, it is nearly impossible to type SMPTE without first typing SMTP and re-typing it again a few times before I get it right. I fully expect this post to have numerous typos.)

Here's an example of the SMPTE pattern from Wikipedia: For multi-monitor setups, screentest also supports specifying which output to use as a native resolution, with --output. Failing that, it will try to look at the outputs and use the first it will find. If it fails to find anything, you can specify a resolution with --resolution WIDTHxHEIGHT. I have tried to make it go full screen by default, but stumbled a bug in Sway that crashes gst-launch. If your Wayland compositor supports it, you can possibly enable full screen with --sink waylandsink fullscreen=true. Otherwise it will create a new window that you will have to make fullscreen yourself. For completeness, there's also an --audio flag that will emit the classic "drone", a sine wave at 440Hz at 40% volume (the audiotestsrc gstreamer plugin. And there's a --overlay-name option to show the pattern name, in case you get lost and want to start with one of them again.

How this works Most of the work is done by gstreamer. The script merely generates a pipeline and calls gst-launch to show the output. That both limits what it can do but also makes it much easier to use than figuring out gst-launch. There might be some additional patterns that could be useful, but I think those are better left to gstreamer. I, for example, am somewhat nostalgic of the Philips circle pattern that used to play for TV stations that were off-air in my area. But that, in my opinion, would be better added to the gstreamer plugin than into a separate thing. The script shows which command is being ran, so it's a good introduction to gstreamer pipelines. Advanced users (and the video team) will possibly not need screentest and will design their own pipelines with their own tools. I've previously worked with ffmpeg pipelines (in another such procrastinated coding spree, video-proxy-magic), and I found gstreamer more intuitive, even though it might be slightly less powerful. In retrospect, I should probably have picked a new name, to avoid crashing the namespace already used by the project, which is now on GitHub. Who knows, it might come back to life after this blog post; it would not be the first time. For now, the project lives along side the rest of my scripts collection but if there's sufficient interest, I might move it to its own git repositories. Comments, feedback, contributions are as usual welcome. And naturally, if you know something better for this kind of stuff, I'm happy to learn more about your favorite tool! So now I have finally found something to test my projector, which will likely confirm what I've already known all along: that it's kind of a piece of crap and I need to get a proper one.

This is a Public Service Announcement that my new OpenPGP key has now been updated in the active Debian keyring. I believe the only team that needs to be informed about this to manually update their systems is DSA, and I ve filed an RT ticket to give them a heads up. Thanks to all the folk who signed my new key, both at the Debian UK BBQ, and DebConf.

If you are an email system administrator, you are probably using DKIM to sign your outgoing emails. You should be rotating the key regularly and automatically, and publishing old private keys. I have just released dkim-rotate 1.0; dkim-rotate is a tool to do this key rotation and publication. If you are an email user, your email provider ought to be doing this. If this is not done, your emails are non-repudiable , meaning that if they are leaked, anyone (eg, journalists, haters) can verify that they are authentic, and prove that to others. This is not desirable (for you). Non-repudiation of emails is undesirable This problem was described at some length in Matthew Green s article Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys. Avoiding non-repudiation sounds a bit like lying. After all, I m advising creating a situation where some people can t verify that something is true, even though it is. So I m advocating casting doubt. Crucially, though, it s doubt about facts that ought to be private. When you send an email, that s between you and the recipient. Normally you don t intend for anyone, anywhere, who happens to get a copy, to be able to verify that it was really you that sent it. In practical terms, this verifiability has already been used by journalists to verify stolen emails. Associated Press provide a verification tool. Advice for all email users As a user, you probably don t want your emails to be non-repudiable. (Other people might want to be able to prove you sent some email, but your email system ought to serve your interests, not theirs.) So, your email provider ought to be rotating their DKIM keys, and publishing their old ones. At a rough guess, your provider probably isn t :-(. How to tell by looking at email headers A quick and dirty way to guess is to have a friend look at the email headers of a message you sent. (It is important that the friend uses a different email provider, since often DKIM signatures are not applied within a single email system.) If your friend sees a DKIM-Signature header then the message is DKIM signed. If they don t, then it wasn t. Most email traversing the public internet is DKIM signed nowadays; so if they don t see the header probably they re not looking using the right tools, or they re actually on the same email system as you. In messages signed by a system running dkim-rotate, there will also be a header about the key rotation, to notify potential verifiers of the situation. Other systems that avoid non-repudiation-through-DKIM might do something similar. dkim-rotate s header looks like this:

DKIM-Signature-Warning: NOTE REGARDING DKIM KEY COMPROMISE
 https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/dkim-rotate/README.txt
 https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/dkim-rotate/ae/aeb689c2066c5b3fee673355309fe1c7.pem

But an email system might do half of the job of dkim-rotate: regularly rotating the key would cause the signatures of old emails to fail to verify, which is a good start. In that case there probably won t be such a header. Testing verification of new and old messages You can also try verifying the signatures. This isn t entirely straightforward, especially if you don t have access to low-level mail tooling. Your friend will need to be able to save emails as raw whole headers and body, un-decoded, un-rendered. If your friend is using a traditional Unix mail program, they should save the message as an mbox file. Otherwise, ProPublica have instructions for attaching and transferring and obtaining the raw email. (Scroll down to How to Check DKIM and ARC .) Checking that recent emails are verifiable Firstly, have your friend test that they can in fact verify a DKIM signature. This will demonstrate that the next test, where the verification is supposed to fail, is working properly and fails for the right reasons. Send your friend a test email now, and have them do this on a Linux system:

    # save the message as test-email.mbox
    apt install libmail-dkim-perl # or equivalent on another distro
    dkimproxy-verify <test-email.mbox

You should see output containing something like this:

    originator address: ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk
    signature identity: @chiark.greenend.org.uk
    verify result: pass
    ...

If the output ontains verify result: fail (body has been altered) then probably your friend didn t manage to faithfully save the unalterered raw message. Checking old emails cannot be verified When you both have that working, have your friend find an older email of yours, from (say) month ago. Perform the same steps. Hopefully they will see something like this:

    originator address: ijackson@chiark.greenend.org.uk
    signature identity: @chiark.greenend.org.uk
    verify result: fail (bad RSA signature)

or maybe

    verify result: invalid (public key: not available)

This indicates that this old email can no longer be verified. That s good: it means that anyone who steals a copy, can t verify it either. If it s leaked, the journalist who receives it won t know it s genuine and unmodified; they should then be suspicious. If your friend sees verify result: pass, then they have verified that that old email of yours is genuine. Anyone who had a copy of the mail can do that. This is good for email thieves, but not for you. For email admins: announcing dkim-rotate 1.0 I have been running dkim-rotate 0.4 on my infrastructure, since last August. and I had entirely forgotten about it: it has run flawlessly for a year. I was reminded of the topic by seeing DKIM in other blog posts. Obviously, it is time to decreee that dkim-rotate is 1.0. If you re a mail system administrator, your users are best served if you use something like dkim-rotate. The package is available in Debian stable, and supports Exim out of the box, but other MTAs should be easy to support too, via some simple ad-hoc scripting. Limitation of this approach Even with this key rotation approach, emails remain nonrepudiable for a short period after they re sent - typically, a few days. Someone who obtains a leaked email very promptly, and shows it to the journalist (for example) right away, can still convince the journalist. This is not great, but at least it doesn t apply to the vast bulk of your email archive. There are possible email protocol improvements which might help, but they re quite out of scope for this article.

Edited 2023-10-01 00:20 +01:00 to fix some grammar

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About a week back Jio launched a laptop called JioBook that will be manufactured in China

The most interesting thing is that the whole thing will be produced in Hunan, China. Then 3 days later India mandates a licensing requirement for Apple, Dell and other laptop/tablet manufacturers. And all of these in the guise of Make in India . It is similar how India has exempted Adani and the Tatas from buying as much solar cells as are needed and then sell the same in India. Reliance will be basically monopolizing the laptop business. And if people think that projects like Raspberry Pi, Arduino etc. will be exempted they have another think coming.

History of License Raj After India became free, in the 1980s the Congress wanted to open its markets to the world just like China did. But at that time, the BJP, though small via Jan Sangh made the argument that we are not ready for the world. The indian businessman needs a bit more time. And hence a compromise was made. The compromise was simple. Indian Industry and people who wanted to get anything from the west, needed a license. This was very much in line how the Russian economy was evolving. All the three nations, India, China and Russia were on similar paths. China broke away where it opened up limited markets for competition and gave state support to its firms. Russia and Japan on the other hand, kept their markets relatively closed. The same thing happened in India, what happened in Russia and elsewhere. The businessman got what he wanted, he just corrupted the system. Reliance, the conglomerate today abused the same system as much as it could. Its defence was to be seen as the small guy. I wouldn t go into that as that itself would be a big story in itself. Whatever was sold in India was sold with huge commissions and just like Russia scarcity became the order of the day. Monopolies flourished and competition was nowhere. These remained till 1991 when Prime Minister Mr. Manmohan Singh was forced to liberalize and open up the markets. Even at that time, the RSS through its Swadeshi Jagran Manch was sharing the end of the world prophecies for the Indian businessman.

2014 Current Regime In 2010, in U.K. the Conservative party came in power under the leadership of David Cameron who was influenced by the policies of Margaret Thatcher who arguably ditched manufacturing in the UK. David Cameron and his party did the same 2010 onwards but for public services under the name austerity. India has been doing the same. The inequality has gone up while people s purchasing power has gone drastically down. CMIE figures are much more drastic and education is a joke.

Add to that since 2016 funding for scientists have gone to the dogs and now they are even playing with doctor s careers. I do not have to remind people that a woman scientist took almost a quarter century to find a drug delivery system that others said was impossible. And she did it using public finance. Science is hard. I have already shared in a previous blog post how it took the Chinese 20 years to reach where they are and somehow we think we will be able to both China and Japan. Of the 160 odd countries that are on planet earth, only a handful of countries have both the means and the knowledge to use and expand on that. While I was not part of Taiwan Debconf, later I came to know that even Taiwan in many ways is similar to Japan in the sense that a majority of its population is stuck in low-paid jobs (apart from those employed in TSMC) which is similar to Keiretsu or Chabeol from either Japan or South Korea. In all these cases, only a small percentage of the economy is going forward while the rest is stagnating or even going backwards. Similar is the case in India as well Unlike the Americans who chose the path to have more competition, we have chosen the path to have more monopolies. So even though, I very much liked Louis es project sooner or later finding the devices itself would be hard. While the recent notification is for laptops, what stops them from doing the same with mobiles or even desktop systems. As it is, both smartphones as well as desktop systems has been contracting since last year as food inflation has gone up. Add to that availability of products has been made scarce (whether by design or not, unknown.) The end result, the latest processor launched overseas becomes the new thing here 3-4 years later. And that was before this notification. This will only decrease competition and make Ambanis rich at cost of everyone else. So much for east of doing business . Also the backlash has been pretty much been tepid. So what I shared will probably happen again sooner or later. The only interesting thing is that it s based on Android, probably in part due to the issues people seeing in both Windows 10, 11 and whatnot. Till later. Update :- The print tried a decluttering but instead cluttered the topic. While what he shared all was true, and certainly it is a step backwards but he didn t need to show how most Indians had to go to RBI for the same. I remember my Mamaji doing the same and sharing afterwards that all he had was $100 for a day which while being a big sum was paltry if you were staying in a hotel and were there for company business. He survived on bananas and whatver cheap veg. he could find then. This is almost 35-40 odd years ago. As shared the Govt. has been doing missteps for quite sometime now. The print does try to take a balanced take so it doesn t run counter of the Government but even it knows that this is a bad take. The whole thing about security is just laughable, did they wake up after 9 years. And now in its own wisdom it apparently has shifted the ban instead from now to 3 months afterwards. Of course, most people on the right just applauding without understanding the complexities and implications of the same. Vendors like Samsung and Apple who have made assembly operations would do a double-think and shift to Taiwan, Vietnam, Mexico anywhere. Global money follows global trends. And such missteps do not help

Implications in A.I. products One of the things that has not been thought about how companies that are making A.I. products in India or even MNC s will suffer. Most of them right now are in stealth mode but are made for Intel or AMD or ARM depending upon how it works for them. There is nothing to tell if the companies made their plea and was it heard or unheard. If the Government doesn t revert it then sooner or later they would either have to go abroad or cash out/sell to somebody else. Some people on the right also know this but for whatever reason have chosen to remain silent. Till later

Last weekend was the bi-annual time to roll the main machine and server to the current Ubuntu release, now at 23.04. It must now have been fifteen or so years that I have used Ubuntu for my desktop / server (for reasons I may write about another time). And of course it all passed swimmingly as usual. [ And a small aside, if I may. Among all these upgrades, one of my favourite piece of tech trivia that may well be too little known remains the dedication of the PostgreSQL maintainers installing the new version, now PostgreSQL 15, seamlessly in parallel with the existing one, in my case PostgreSQL 14, keeping both running (!!) on two neighbouring ports (!!) so that there is no service disruption. So at some point, maybe this weekend, I will run the provided script to dump-and-restore to trigger the database migration at my convenience. Happy PostgreSQL on Debian/Ubuntu user since the late 1990s. It. Just. Works. ] [ Similarly, it is plainly amazeballs how apt orders and runs package updates to service to keep running for a maximum amount of time. This machine acts as e.g. a web server and it was up and running (as were other services) while thousands of package got updated/replaced. It is pretty amazing. Whereas on other platforms people still maintain the do not ever update anything we demonstrably offer the opposite here. Really not too shabby. ] This time, I had one small hickup. Emacs, now at version 28 bringing loads of niceties along, would not load. And the error soon lead to a post on the magit list where its indefatigable author Jonas Bernoulli suggested a rebuild (and hence re-compilation of the elisp files). Which I did, and which allowed a start of VM inside Emacs. So I was happy. But it allowed it only once for each VM package reinstall. Not good, and I remained curious. Some more digging lead to a breakthrough. A post and commit at the Fedora Project indicated that for just VM within Emacs, byte-compilation throws a spanner. Which one can work around by telling Emacs not to compile the files in the VM folder. So I applied that patch to the VM package in a local build et voil we have working VM. The world is clearly better when your email client of 25+ years just works. And feels snappier because everything under Emacs28 feels snappier! So I set this up properly and filed Debian Bug Report #1039105. To which Ian Jackson, the maintainer, replied a few days later nodding that he could reproduce. And that he concurred with the bug report, and was planning to update throughout. And lo and behold this morning s update reveals that this made into an update for the just-released Debian Bookworm. So yay. In all these years of Debian maintainership (somewhere between twentyfive and thirty) this may be my first bug report with patch going straight into a stable release. But of course, true and full credit goes of course to G ran Uddeborg for putting it up first for Fedora. Lovely how Open Source can work together. We really should do more, not less, of that. But I digress Anyway, in sum: If you try to use VM under the lovely Emacs 28, there is a fix, and if you use it with Debian Bookworm the fix should hit your mirrors soons. Ditto, methinks, for the next Ubuntu release. If you use it under Ubuntu now, the package is (elisp) text-only and can be safely installed on a derivative (which we do not enjoy in general but which is fine here). So enjoy! If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can now sponsor me at GitHub.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.

I m trying to replace my old OpenPGP key with a new one. The old key wasn t compromised or lost or anything bad. Is still valid, but I plan to get rid of it soon. It was created in 2013. The new key id fingerprint is: AA66280D4EF0BFCC6BFC2104DA5ECB231C8F04C4 I plan to use the new key for things like encrypted emails, uploads to the Debian archive, and more. Also, the new key includes an identity with a newer personal email address I plan to use soon: arturo.bg@arturo.bg The new key has been uploaded to some public keyservers. If you would like to sign the new key, please follow the steps in the Debian wiki. If you are curious about what that long code block contains, check this https://cirw.in/gpg-decoder/ For the record, the old key fingerprint is: DD9861AB23DC3333892E07A968E713981D1515F8 Cheers!

Welcome to the June 2022 report from the Reproducible Builds project. In these reports, we outline the most important things that we have been up to over the past month. As a quick recap, whilst anyone may inspect the source code of free software for malicious flaws, almost all software is distributed to end users as pre-compiled binaries.

Save the date! Despite several delays, we are pleased to announce dates for our in-person summit this year: November 1st 2022 November 3rd 2022
The event will happen in/around Venice (Italy), and we intend to pick a venue reachable via the train station and an international airport. However, the precise venue will depend on the number of attendees. Please see the announcement mail from Mattia Rizzolo, and do keep an eye on the mailing list for further announcements as it will hopefully include registration instructions.

News David Wheeler filed an issue against the Rust programming language to report that builds are not reproducible because full path to the source code is in the panic and debug strings . Luckily, as one of the responses mentions: the --remap-path-prefix solves this problem and has been used to great effect in build systems that rely on reproducibility (Bazel, Nix) to work at all and that there are efforts to teach cargo about it here .
The Python Security team announced that:

The ctx hosted project on PyPI was taken over via user account compromise and replaced with a malicious project which contained runtime code which collected the content of os.environ.items() when instantiating Ctx objects. The captured environment variables were sent as a base64 encoded query parameter to a Heroku application [ ]

As their announcement later goes onto state, version-pinning using hash-checking mode can prevent this attack, although this does depend on specific installations using this mode, rather than a prevention that can be applied systematically.
Developer vanitasvitae published an interesting and entertaining blog post detailing the blow-by-blow steps of debugging a reproducibility issue in PGPainless, a library which aims to make using OpenPGP in Java projects as simple as possible . Whilst their in-depth research into the internals of the .jar may have been unnecessary given that diffoscope would have identified the, it must be said that there is something to be said with occasionally delving into seemingly low-level details, as well describing any debugging process. Indeed, as vanitasvitae writes:

Yes, this would have spared me from 3h of debugging But I probably would also not have gone onto this little dive into the JAR/ZIP format, so in the end I m not mad.

Kees Cook published a short and practical blog post detailing how he uses reproducibility properties to aid work to replace one-element arrays in the Linux kernel. Kees approach is based on the principle that if a (small) proposed change is considered equivalent by the compiler, then the generated output will be identical but only if no other arbitrary or unrelated changes are introduced. Kees mentions the fantastic diffoscope tool, as well as various kernel-specific build options (eg. KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP) in order to prepare my build with the known to disrupt code layout options disabled .
Stefano Zacchiroli gave a presentation at GDR S curit Informatique based in part on a paper co-written with Chris Lamb titled Increasing the Integrity of Software Supply Chains. (Tweet)

Debian In Debian in this month, 28 reviews of Debian packages were added, 35 were updated and 27 were removed this month adding to our knowledge about identified issues. Two issue types were added: nondeterministic_checksum_generated_by_coq and nondetermistic_js_output_from_webpack. After Holger Levsen found hundreds of packages in the bookworm distribution that lack .buildinfo files, he uploaded 404 source packages to the archive (with no meaningful source changes). Currently bookworm now shows only 8 packages without .buildinfo files, and those 8 are fixed in unstable and should migrate shortly. By contrast, Debian unstable will always have packages without .buildinfo files, as this is how they come through the NEW queue. However, as these packages were not built on the official build servers (ie. they were uploaded by the maintainer) they will never migrate to Debian testing. In the future, therefore, testing should never have packages without .buildinfo files again. Roland Clobus posted yet another in-depth status report about his progress making the Debian Live images build reproducibly to our mailing list. In this update, Roland mentions that all major desktops build reproducibly with bullseye, bookworm and sid but also goes on to outline the progress made with automated testing of the generated images using openQA.

GNU Guix Vagrant Cascadian made a significant number of contributions to GNU Guix:

• Submitted patches to fix reproducibility issues in keyutils and isl as well as reported two bugs affecting reproducibility testing [ ][ ].
• 23 specific fixes related to reproducibility. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23]
• Proposed setting FORCE_SOURCE_DATE=1 in the environment of all builds in order to fix numerous timestamp issues in documentation generation tools.
• Identified reproducibility issues in the maradns package as it appears to embed a random prime number. (Patch)
• Responded in a thread to point out that GNU Guix already has the infrastructure in place to verify the reproducibility of downloaded substitutes for the vast majority of packages.
• Lastly, Vagrant performed an evaluation of the unreproducible packages that remain in the distribution.

Elsewhere in GNU Guix, Ludovic Court s published a paper in the journal The Art, Science, and Engineering of Programming called Building a Secure Software Supply Chain with GNU Guix:

This paper focuses on one research question: how can [Guix]((https://www.gnu.org/software/guix/) and similar systems allow users to securely update their software? [ ] Our main contribution is a model and tool to authenticate new Git revisions. We further show how, building on Git semantics, we build protections against downgrade attacks and related threats. We explain implementation choices. This work has been deployed in production two years ago, giving us insight on its actual use at scale every day. The Git checkout authentication at its core is applicable beyond the specific use case of Guix, and we think it could benefit to developer teams that use Git.

A full PDF of the text is available.

openSUSE In the world of openSUSE, SUSE announced at SUSECon that they are preparing to meet SLSA level 4. (SLSA (Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts) is a new industry-led standardisation effort that aims to protect the integrity of the software supply chain.) However, at the time of writing, timestamps within RPM archives are not normalised, so bit-for-bit identical reproducible builds are not possible. Some in-toto provenance files published for SUSE s SLE-15-SP4 as one result of the SLSA level 4 effort. Old binaries are not rebuilt, so only new builds (e.g. maintenance updates) have this metadata added. Lastly, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted his usual monthly openSUSE reproducible builds status report.

diffoscope diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility. Not only can it locate and diagnose reproducibility issues, it can provide human-readable diffs from many kinds of binary formats. This month, Chris Lamb prepared and uploaded versions 215, 216 and 217 to Debian unstable. Chris Lamb also made the following changes:

• New features:
  • Print profile output if we were called with --profile and we were killed via a TERM signal. This should help in situations where diffoscope is terminated due to some sort of timeout. [ ]
  • Support both PyPDF 1.x and 2.x. [ ]
• Bug fixes:
  • Also catch IndexError exceptions (in addition to ValueError) when parsing .pyc files. (#1012258)
  • Correct the logic for supporting different versions of the argcomplete module. [ ]
• Output improvements:
  • Don t leak the (likely-temporary) pathname when comparing PDF documents. [ ]
• Logging improvements:
  • Update test fixtures for GNU readelf 2.38 (now in Debian unstable). [ ][ ]
  • Be more specific about the minimum required version of readelf (ie. binutils), as it appears that this patch level version change resulted in a change of output, not the minor version. [ ]
  • Use our @skip_unless_tool_is_at_least decorator (NB. at_least) over @skip_if_tool_version_is (NB. is) to fix tests under Debian stable. [ ]
  • Emit a warning if/when we are handling a UNIX TERM signal. [ ]
• Codebase improvements:
  • Clarify in what situations the main finally block gets called with respect to TERM signal handling. [ ]
  • Clarify control flow in the diffoscope.profiling module. [ ]
  • Correctly package the scripts/ directory. [ ]

In addition, Edward Betts updated a broken link to the RSS on the diffoscope homepage and Vagrant Cascadian updated the diffoscope package in GNU Guix [ ][ ][ ].

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

• Bernhard M. Wiedemann:
  • build-compare caused a regression for a few days.
  • python-fasttext (CPU-related issue).
• Chris Lamb:
  • #1012614 filed against node-dommatrix.
  • #1012766 filed against rtpengine.
  • #1012790 filed against sphinxcontrib-mermaid.
  • #1012792 filed against yaru-theme.
  • #1012836 filed against mapproxy (forwarded upstream).
  • #1013257 filed against libxsmm.
  • #1014041 filed against yt-dlp (forwarded upstream).
  • #891263 was filed against puppet in February 2018 and the patch was finally proposed for inclusion upstream.

Testing framework The Reproducible Builds project runs a significant testing framework at tests.reproducible-builds.org, to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. This month, the following changes were made:

• Holger Levsen:
  • Add a package set for packages that use the R programming language [ ] as well as one for Rust [ ].
  • Improve package set matching for Python [ ] and font-related [ ] packages.
  • Install the lz4, lzop and xz-utils packages on all nodes in order to detect running kernels. [ ]
  • Improve the cleanup mechanisms when testing the reproducibility of Debian Live images. [ ][ ]
  • In the automated node health checks, deprioritise the generic kernel warning . [ ]
• Roland Clobus (Debian Live image reproducibility):
  • Add various maintenance jobs to the Jenkins view. [ ]
  • Cleanup old workspaces after 24 hours. [ ]
  • Cleanup temporary workspace and resulting directories. [ ]
  • Implement a number of fixes and improvements around publishing files. [ ][ ][ ]
  • Don t attempt to preserve the file timestamps when copying artifacts. [ ]

And finally, node maintenance was also performed by Mattia Rizzolo [ ].

Mailing list and website On our mailing list this month:

• David Wheeler started a thread stating his desire that reproducible builds and GitBOM are able to work together simultaneously. David first describes the goals of both GitBOM and reproducibility, outlines the potential problems and even outlines a number of prospective solutions.
• In a similar vein, David Wheeler also posted about the problems with Profile-Guided Optimisation (PGO) in relation to reproducible builds.
• Roland Clobus copied in our mailing list with a question about whether enabling link-time optimisations (LTO) in Debian as a whole might cause reproducibility problems.
• Mattia Rizzolo posted a request for assistance regarding the translations of our website.

Lastly, Chris Lamb updated the main Reproducible Builds website and documentation in a number of small ways, but primarily published an interview with Hans-Christoph Steiner of the F-Droid project. Chris Lamb also added a Coffeescript example for parsing and using the SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH environment variable [ ]. In addition, Sebastian Crane very-helpfully updated the screenshot of salsa.debian.org s request access button on the How to join the Salsa group. [ ]

Contact If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

• IRC: #reproducible-builds on irc.oftc.net.
• Twitter: @ReproBuilds
• Mailing list: rb-general@lists.reproducible-builds.org

Focus This month I didn't have any particular focus. I just worked on issues in my info bubble.

Changes

• duck: add more obsolete domains (1 2), indicator phrases (1 2)
• lintian: add more obsolete domains
• Debian BTS usertags: fix old release goal tags, reassign edos tags to debian-qa, reassign sphinx tag to debian-python
• Debian userdir-ldap: modernise and cleanup welcome message wording
• Debian website: consultants fix
• Debian package uploads: sptag
• Debian wiki pages: AutomaticPackagingTools, Avahi, DebianJr, DebianPorts, Derivatives/Census, DeveloperNews, Firmware, Firmware/Open, Hardware/Database, PortsDocs/New, Ports (loongarch64, riscv64 (1, 2)), PortTemplate, RISC-V/32, SystemPrinting, Teams (DebianRakudoGroup, Lintian (1 2), pkg-fonts)
• FOSSjobs wiki pages: Resources

Issues

• New contributors needed for lintian
• Conffile removal needed in dkms
• Features in reportbug
• Deprecated module usage in SPTAG
• Embedded deps in SPTAG

Review

• Spam: reported 5 Debian bug reports and 45 Debian mailing list posts
• Debian wiki: RecentChanges for the month
• Debian BTS usertags: changes for the month
• Debian screenshots:
  • approved pforth timeshift virtualjaguar
  • rejected gcc (blank), gcc (GitHub repo card template), vagrant (low quality)

Administration

• Debian wiki: unblock IP addresses, assist with account recovery, approve accounts

Communication

• Initiate discussion about conveying Debian package porting details
• Respond to queries from Debian users and contributors on the mailing lists and IRC

Sponsors The sptag work was sponsored. All other work was done on a volunteer basis.

Welcome to the April 2022 report from the Reproducible Builds project! In these reports, we try to summarise the most important things that we have been up to over the past month. If you are interested in contributing to the project, please take a few moments to visit our Contribute page on our website.

News Cory Doctorow published an interesting article this month about the possibility of Undetectable backdoors for machine learning models. Given that machine learning models can provide unpredictably incorrect results, Doctorow recounts that there exists another category of adversarial examples that comprise a gimmicked machine-learning input that, to the human eye, seems totally normal but which causes the ML system to misfire dramatically that permit the possibility of planting undetectable back doors into any machine learning system at training time .
Chris Lamb published two supporter spotlights on our blog: the first about Amateur Radio Digital Communications (ARDC) and the second about the Google Open Source Security Team (GOSST).
Piergiorgio Ladisa, Henrik Plate, Matias Martinez and Olivier Barais published a new academic paper titled A Taxonomy of Attacks on Open-Source Software Supply Chains (PDF):

This work proposes a general taxonomy for attacks on open-source supply chains, independent of specific programming languages or ecosystems, and covering all supply chain stages from code contributions to package distribution. Taking the form of an attack tree, it covers 107 unique vectors, linked to 94 real-world incidents, and mapped to 33 mitigating safeguards.

Elsewhere in academia, Ly Vu Duc published his PhD thesis. Titled Towards Understanding and Securing the OSS Supply Chain (PDF), Duc s abstract reads as follows:

This dissertation starts from the first link in the software supply chain, developers . Since many developers do not update their vulnerable software libraries, thus exposing the user of their code to security risks. To understand how they choose, manage and update the libraries, packages, and other Open-Source Software (OSS) that become the building blocks of companies completed products consumed by end-users, twenty-five semi-structured interviews were conducted with developers of both large and small-medium enterprises in nine countries. All interviews were transcribed, coded, and analyzed according to applied thematic analysis

Upstream news Filippo Valsorda published an informative blog post recently called How Go Mitigates Supply Chain Attacks outlining the high-level features of the Go ecosystem that helps prevent various supply-chain attacks.
There was new/further activity on a pull request filed against openssl by Sebastian Andrzej Siewior in order to prevent saved CFLAGS (which may contain the -fdebug-prefix-map=<PATH> flag that is used to strip an arbitrary the build path from the debug info if this information remains recorded then the binary is no longer reproducible if the build directory changes.

Events The Linux Foundation s SupplyChainSecurityCon, will take place June 21st 24th 2022, both virtually and in Austin, Texas. Long-time Reproducible Builds and openSUSE contributor Bernhard M. Wiedemann learned that he had his talk accepted, and will speak on Reproducible Builds: Unexpected Benefits and Problems on June 21st.
There will be an in-person Debian Reunion in Hamburg, Germany later this year, taking place from 23 30 May. Although this is a Debian event, there will be some folks from the broader Reproducible Builds community and, of course, everyone is welcome. Please see the event page on the Debian wiki for more information. 41 people have registered so far, and there s approx 10 on-site beds still left.
The minutes and logs from our April 2022 IRC meeting have been published. In case you missed this one, our next IRC meeting will take place on May 31st at 15:00 UTC on #reproducible-builds on the OFTC network.

Debian Roland Clobus wrote another in-depth status update about the status of live Debian images, summarising the current situation that all major desktops build reproducibly with bullseye, bookworm and sid, including the Cinnamon desktop on bookworm and sid, but at a small functionality cost: 14 words will be incorrectly abbreviated . This work incorporated:

• Reporting an issue about unnecessarily modified timestamps in the daily Debian installer images. [ ]
• Reporting a bug against the debian-installer: in order to use a suitable kernel version. (#1006800)
• Reporting a bug in: texlive-binaries regarding the unreproducible content of .fmt files. (#1009196)
• Adding hacks to make the Cinnamon desktop image reproducible in bookworm and sid. [ ]
• Added a script to rebuild a live-build ISO image from a given timestamp. [
• etc.

On our mailing list, Venkata Pyla started a thread on the Debian debconf cache is non-reproducible issue while creating system images and Vagrant Cascadian posted an excellent summary of the reproducibility status of core package sets in Debian and solicited for similar information from other distributions.
Lastly, 122 reviews of Debian packages were added, 44 were updated and 193 were removed this month adding to our extensive knowledge about identified issues. A number of issue types have been updated as well, including timestamps_generated_by_hevea, randomness_in_ocaml_preprocessed_files, build_path_captured_in_emacs_el_file, golang_compiler_captures_build_path_in_binary and build_path_captured_in_assembly_objects,

Other distributions Happy birthday to GNU Guix, which recently turned 10 years old! People have been sharing their stories, in which reproducible builds and bootstrappable builds are a recurring theme as a feature important to its users and developers. The experiences are available on the GNU Guix blog as well as a post on fossandcrafts.org
In openSUSE, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted his usual monthly reproducible builds status report.

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

• Bernhard M. Wiedemann:
  • python-numcodecs (CPU-related issue)
  • salt (date issue)
  • golang-github-prometheus-node_exporter (date-related issue)
  • librsb (report compile-time CPU-detection)
• Chris Lamb:
  • #1009981 filed against rsync.
  • #1010279 filed against python-iso8601.
  • #1010316 filed against python-cai.
  • #1010318 filed against datalad.
• Johannes Schauer Marin Rodrigues:
  • #1010368 filed against python3.10.
• Roland Clobus:
  • #1009196 filed against texlive-bin.
• Vagrant Cascadian:
  • #1009337 filed against python-public.
  • #1009339 filed against python-gitlab.
  • #1009342 filed against xfce4-panel-profiles.
  • #1009796 & #1009797 filed against apt.
  • #1009799 filed against puppet.
  • #1009931 filed against gmp.
  • #1009934 filed against openssl.
  • #1010043 filed against serf.
  • #1010233 filed against glibc.
  • #1010238 filed against binutils.
  • #1010378 filed against leds-alix.
  • #1010379 filed against snacc.
  • #1010414 filed against libcec.

diffoscope diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility. Not only can it locate and diagnose reproducibility issues, it can provide human-readable diffs from many kinds of binary formats. This month, Chris Lamb prepared and uploaded versions 210 and 211 to Debian unstable, as well as noticed that some Python .pyc files are reported as data, so we should support .pyc as a fallback filename extension [ ]. In addition, Mattia Rizzolo disabled the Gnumeric tests in Debian as the package is not currently available [ ] and dropped mplayer from Build-Depends too [ ]. In addition, Mattia fixed an issue to ensure that the PATH environment variable is properly modified for all actions, not just when running the comparator. [ ]

Testing framework The Reproducible Builds project runs a significant testing framework at tests.reproducible-builds.org, to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. This month, the following changes were made:

• Daniel Golle:
  • Prefer a different solution to avoid building all OpenWrt packages; skip packages from optional community feeds. [ ]
• Holger Levsen:
  • Detect Python deprecation warnings in the node health check. [ ]
  • Detect failure to build the Debian Installer. [ ]
• Mattia Rizzolo:
  • Install disorderfs for building OpenWrt packages. [ ]
• Paul Spooren (OpenWrt-related changes):
  • Don t build all packages whilst the core packages are not yet reproducible. [ ]
  • Add a missing RUN directive to node_cleanup. [ ]
  • Be less verbose during a toolchain build. [ ]
  • Use disorderfs for rebuilds and update the documentation to match. [ ][ ][ ]
• Roland Clobus:
  • Publish the last reproducible Debian ISO image. [ ]
  • Use the rebuild.sh script from the live-build package. [ ]

Lastly, node maintenance was also performed by Holger Levsen [ ][ ].

---

If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

• IRC: #reproducible-builds on irc.oftc.net.
• Twitter: @ReproBuilds
• Mailing list: rb-general@lists.reproducible-builds.org

Every month we review the work funded by Freexian s Debian LTS offering. Please find the report for January below. Debian project funding

• In January we saw a new funded project proposed. The project is meant to bring in a number of changes to the Tryton modules and packages in Debian. Tryton, a full featured, entirely open source business software platform, is supported by its own foundation. You can track the current status of all our funded projects at its dedicated web page.
• Folks continue to add to the Grow Your Ideas project page, that s great.
• In January 2550 was put aside to fund Debian projects.

We continue to looking forward to hearing about Debian project proposals from various Debian stakeholders. This month has seen work on a survey that will go out to Debian Developers to gather feedback on what they think should be the priorities for funding in the project. Learn more about the rationale behind this initiative in this article. Debian LTS contributors In January, 13 contributors were paid to work on Debian LTS, their reports are available below. If you re interested in participating in the LTS or ELTS teams, we welcome participation from the Debian community. Simply get in touch with Jeremiah or Rapha l.

• Abhijith Pa worked 5 hours out of 5 available.
• Anton Gladky worked 12 hours out of 12 available.
• Ben Hutchings worked 16 hours out of 24 available and carried over 8 for February.
• Chris Lamb worked 18 hours out of 18 available.
• Emilio Pozuelo Monfort worked 55 hours out of 58.25 available and carried over 3.25 for February
• Jeremiah Foster worked 20 hours out of 20 available on LTS administration and 8.3 hours on funded projects.
• Lee Garrett didn t spend any hours in January and carries over 39.25 hours to February
• Markus Koschany worked 34 hours out of 40 available and carried over 6 for February.
• Ola Lundqvist reported via email that they didn t spend any hours in January and carries over 11 from December for a total of 12 hours for February.
• Roberto C. Sanchez worked 9 hours out of 32 available and carried over 23 for February
• Sylvain Beucler worked 22 hours out of 40 available and carried over 14 for February
• Thorsten Alteholz worked 40 hours out of 40 available.
• Utkarsh Gupta worked 58.25 hours out of 58.25 available.

Evolution of the situation In January we released 34 DLAs. The security tracker currently lists 39 packages with a known CVE and the dla-needed.txt file has 20 packages still needing an update. Thanks to our sponsors Sponsors that joined recently are in bold.

• Platinum sponsors:
  • TOSHIBA (for 77 months)
  • GitHub (for 68 months)
  • Civil Infrastructure Platform (CIP) (for 45 months)
• Gold sponsors:
  • Roche Diagnostics International AG (for 88 months)
  • Linode (for 82 months)
  • Babiel GmbH (for 71 months)
  • Plat Home (for 71 months)
  • University of Oxford (for 27 months)
  • Deveryware (for 14 months)
  • VyOS Inc (for 9 months)
• Silver sponsors:
  • The Positive Internet Company (for 93 months)
  • Domeneshop AS (for 92 months)
  • Nantes M tropole (for 86 months)
  • Univention GmbH (for 78 months)
  • Universit Jean Monnet de St Etienne (for 78 months)
  • Ribbon Communications, Inc. (for 72 months)
  • Exonet B.V. (for 62 months)
  • Leibniz Rechenzentrum (for 56 months)
  • CINECA (for 45 months)
  • Minist re de l Europe et des Affaires trang res (for 39 months)
  • Cloudways Ltd (for 29 months)
  • Dinahosting SL (for 27 months)
  • Bauer Xcel Media Deutschland KG (for 21 months)
  • Platform.sh (for 21 months)
  • Moxa Intelligence Co., Ltd. (for 15 months)
  • sipgate GmbH (for 12 months)
  • OVH US LLC (for 10 months)
  • Tilburg University (for 10 months)
  • GSI Helmholtzzentrum f r Schwerionenforschung GmbH
  • Telecats BV
• Bronze sponsors:
  • Evolix (for 93 months)
  • Seznam.cz, a.s. (for 93 months)
  • Intevation GmbH (for 90 months)
  • Linuxhotel GmbH (for 90 months)
  • Daevel SARL (for 88 months)
  • Bitfolk LTD (for 87 months)
  • Megaspace Internet Services GmbH (for 87 months)
  • Greenbone Networks GmbH (for 86 months)
  • NUMLOG (for 86 months)
  • WinGo AG (for 86 months)
  • Ecole Centrale de Nantes LHEEA (for 82 months)
  • Entr ouvert (for 77 months)
  • Adfinis AG (for 74 months)
  • GNI MEDIA (for 69 months)
  • Laboratoire LEGI UMR 5519 / CNRS (for 69 months)
  • Tesorion (for 69 months)
  • Bearstech (for 60 months)
  • LiHAS (for 60 months)
  • People Doc (for 57 months)
  • Catalyst IT Ltd (for 55 months)
  • Supagro (for 50 months)
  • Demarcq SAS (for 49 months)
  • Universit Grenoble Alpes (for 35 months)
  • TouchWeb SAS (for 27 months)
  • SPiN AG (for 24 months)
  • CoreFiling (for 19 months)
  • Institut des sciences cognitives Marc Jeannerod (for 14 months)
  • Observatoire des Sciences de l Univers de Grenoble (for 11 months)
  • Tem Innovations GmbH (for 6 months)
  • WordFinder.pro (for 5 months)
  • CNRS DT INSU R sif (for 4 months)

As a follow-up to yesterday's post listing my favourite memoirs and biographies I read in 2021, today I'll be outlining my favourite works of non-fiction. Books that just missed the cut include: The Unusual Suspect by Ben Machell for its thrilleresque narrative of a modern-day Robin Hood (and if you get to the end, a completely unexpected twist); Paul Fussell's Class: A Guide to the American Status System as an amusing chaser of sorts to Kate Fox's Watching the English; John Carey's Little History of Poetry for its exhilarating summation of almost four millennia of verse; David Graeber's Debt: The First 5000 Years for numerous historical insights, not least its rejoinder to our dangerously misleading view of ancient barter systems; and, although I didn't treasure everything about it, I won't hesitate to gift Pen Vogler's Scoff to a number of friends over the next year. The weakest book of non-fiction I read this year was undoubtedly Roger Scruton's How to Be a Conservative: I much preferred The Decadent Society for Ross Douthat for my yearly ration of the 'intellectual right'. I also very much enjoyed reading a number of classic texts from academic sociology, but they are difficult to recommend or even summarise. These included One-Dimensional Man by Herbert Marcuse, Postmodernism: Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism by Frederic Jameson and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism by Max Weber. 'These are heavy books', remarks John Proctor in Arthur Miller's The Crucible... All round-up posts for 2021: Memoir/biography, Non-fiction (this post) & Fiction (coming soon).

Hidden Valley Road (2020) Robert Kolker A compelling and disturbing account of the Galvin family six of whom were diagnosed with schizophrenia which details a journey through the study and misunderstanding of the condition. The story of the Galvin family offers a parallel history of the science of schizophrenia itself, from the era of institutionalisation, lobotomies and the 'schizo mother', to the contemporary search for genetic markers for the disease... all amidst fundamental disagreements about the nature of schizophrenia and, indeed, of all illnesses of the mind. Samples of the Galvins' DNA informed decades of research which, curiously, continues to this day, potentially offering paths to treatment, prediction and even eradication of the disease, although on this last point I fancy that I detect a kind of neo-Victorian hubris that we alone will be the ones to find a cure. Either way, a gentle yet ultimately tragic view of a curiously 'American' family, where the inherent lack of narrative satisfaction brings a frustration and sadness of its own.

Islands of Abandonment: Life in the Post-Human Landscape (2021) Cat Flyn In this disarmingly lyrical book, Cat Flyn addresses the twin questions of what happens after humans are gone and how far can our damage to nature be undone. From the forbidden areas of post-war France to the mining regions of Scotland, Islands of Abandonment explores the extraordinary places where humans no longer live in an attempt to give us a glimpse into what happens when mankind's impact on nature is, for one reason or another, forced to stop. Needless to say, if anxieties in this area are not curdling away in your subconscious mind, you are probably in some kind of denial. Through a journey into desolate, eerie and ravaged areas in the world, this artfully-written study offers profound insights into human nature, eschewing the usual dry sawdust of Wikipedia trivia. Indeed, I summed it up to a close friend remarking that, through some kind of hilarious administrative error, the book's publisher accidentally dispatched a poet instead of a scientist to write this book. With glimmers of hope within the (mostly) tragic travelogue, Islands of Abandonment is not only a compelling read, but also a fascinating insight into the relationship between Nature and Man.

The Anatomy of Fascism (2004) Robert O. Paxton Everyone is absolutely sure they know what fascism is... or at least they feel confident choosing from a buffet of features to suit the political mood. To be sure, this is not a new phenomenon: even as 'early' as 1946, George Orwell complained in Politics and the English Language that the word Fascism has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies something not desirable . Still, it has proved uncommonly hard to define the core nature of fascism and what differentiates it from related political movements. This is still of great significance in the twenty-first century, for the definition ultimately determines where the powerful label of 'fascist' can be applied today. Part of the enjoyment of reading this book was having my own cosy definition thoroughly dismantled and replaced with a robust system of abstractions and common themes. This is achieved through a study of the intellectual origins of fascism and how it played out in the streets of Berlin, Rome and Paris. Moreover, unlike Strongmen (see above), fascisms that failed to gain meaningful power are analysed too, including Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists. Curiously enough, Paxton's own definition of fascism is left to the final chapter, and by the time you reach it, you get an anti-climatic feeling of it being redundant. Indeed, whatever it actually is, fascism is really not quite like any other 'isms' at all, so to try and classify it like one might be a mistake. In his introduction, Paxton warns that many of those infamous images associated with fascism (eg. Hitler in Triumph of the Will, Mussolini speaking from a balcony, etc.) have the ability to induce facile errors about the fascist leader and the apparent compliance of the crowd. (Contemporary accounts often record how sceptical the common man was of the leader's political message, even if they were transfixed by their oratorical bombast.) As it happens, I thus believe I had something of an advantage of reading this via an audiobook, and completely avoided re-absorbing these iconic images. To me, this was an implicit reminder that, however you choose to reduce it to a definition, fascism is undoubtedly the most visual of all political forms, presenting itself to us in vivid and iconic primary images: ranks of disciplined marching youths, coloured-shirted militants beating up members of demonised minorities; the post-war pictures from the concentration camps... Still, regardless of you choose to read it, The Anatomy of Fascism is a powerful book that can teach a great deal about fascism in particular and history in general.

What Good are the Arts? (2005) John Carey What Good are the Arts? takes a delightfully sceptical look at the nature of art, and cuts through the sanctimony and cant that inevitably surrounds them. It begins by revealing the flaws in lofty aesthetic theories and, along the way, debunks the claims that art makes us better people. They may certainly bring joy into your life, but by no means do the fine arts make you automatically virtuous. Carey also rejects the entire enterprise of separating things into things that are art and things that are not, making a thoroughly convincing case that there is no transcendental category containing so-called 'true' works of art. But what is perhaps equally important to what Carey is claiming is the way he does all this. As in, this is an extremely enjoyable book to read, with not only a fine sense of pace and language, but a devilish sense of humour as well. To be clear, What Good are the Arts? it is no crotchety monograph: Leo Tolstoy's *What Is Art? (1897) is hilarious to read in similar ways, but you can't avoid feeling its cantankerous tone holds Tolstoy's argument back. By contrast, Carey makes his argument in a playful sort of manner, in a way that made me slightly sad to read other polemics throughout the year. It's definitely not that modern genre of boomer jeremiad about the young, political correctness or, heaven forbid, 'cancel culture'... which, incidentally, made Carey's 2014 memoir, The Unexpected Professor something of a disappointing follow-up. Just for fun, Carey later undermines his own argument by arguing at length for the value of one art in particular. Literature, Carey asserts, is the only art capable of reasoning and the only art with the ability to criticise. Perhaps so, and Carey spends a chapter or so contending that fiction has the exclusive power to inspire the mind and move the heart towards practical ends... or at least far better than any work of conceptual art. Whilst reading this book I found myself taking down innumerable quotations and laughing at the jokes far more than I disagreed. And the sustained and intellectual style of polemic makes this a pretty strong candidate for my favourite overall book of the year.

Review: Out of Office, by Charlie Warzel & Anne Helen Petersen

Publisher:	Alfred A. Knopf
Copyright:	2021
ISBN:	0-593-32010-7
Format:	Kindle
Pages:	260

Out of Office opens with the provocative assertion that you were not working from home during the pandemic, even if you were among the 42% of Americans who were able to work remotely.

You were, quite literally, doing your job from home. But you weren't working from home. You were laboring in confinement and under duress. Others have described it as living at work. You were frantically tapping out an email while trying to make lunch and supervise distance learning. You were stuck alone in a cramped apartment for weeks, unable to see friends or family, exhausted, and managing a level of stress you didn't know was possible. Work became life, and life became work. You weren't thriving. You were surviving.

The stated goal of this book is to reclaim the concept of working from home, not only from the pandemic, but also from the boundary-destroying metastasis of work into non-work life. It does work towards that goal, but the description of what would be required for working from home to live up to its promise becomes a sweeping critique of the organization and conception of work, leaving it nearly as applicable to those who continue working from an office. Turns out that the main problem with working from home is the work part, not the "from home" part. This was a fascinating book to read in conjunction with A World Without Email. Warzel and Petersen do the the structural and political analysis that I sometimes wish Newport would do more of, but as a result offer less concrete advice. Both, however, have similar diagnoses of the core problems of the sort of modern office work that could be done from home: it's poorly organized, poorly managed, and desperately inefficient. Rather than attempting to fix those problems, which is difficult, structural, and requires thought and institutional cooperation, we're compensating by working more. This both doesn't work and isn't sustainable. Newport has a background in productivity books and a love of systems and protocols, so his focus in A World Without Email is on building better systems of communication and organization of work. Warzel and Petersen come from a background of reporting and cultural critique, so they put more focus on power imbalances and power-serving myths about the American dream. Where Newport sees an easy-to-deploy ad hoc work style that isn't fit for purpose, Warzel and Petersen are more willing to point out intentional exploitation of workers in the guise of flexibility. But they arrive at some similar conclusions. The way office work is organized is not leading to more productivity. Tools like Slack encourage the public performance of apparent productivity at the cost of the attention and focus required to do meaningful work. And the process is making us miserable. Out of Office is, in part, a discussion of what would be required to do better work with less stress, but it also shares a goal with Newport and some (but not most) corners of productivity writing: spend less time and energy on work. The goal of Out of Office is not to get more work done. It's to work more efficiently and sustainably and thus work less. To reclaim the promise of flexibility so that it benefits the employee and not the employer. To recognize, in the authors' words, that the office can be a bully, locking people in to commute schedules and unnatural work patterns, although it also provides valuable moments of spontaneous human connection. Out of Office tries to envision a style of work that includes the office sometimes, home sometimes, time during the day to attend to personal chores or simply to take a mental break from an unnatural eight hours (or more) of continuous focus, universal design, real worker-centric flexibility, and an end to the constant productivity ratchet where faster work simply means more work for the same pay. That's a lot of topics for a short book, and structurally this is a grab bag. Some sections will land and some won't. Loom's video messages sound like a nightmare to me, and I rolled my eyes heavily at the VR boosterism, reluctant as it may be. The section on DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) was a valiant effort that at least gestures towards the dismal track record of most such efforts, but still left me unconvinced that anyone knows how to improve diversity in an existing organization without far more brute-force approaches than anyone with power is usually willing to consider. But there's enough here, and the authors move through topics quickly enough, that a section that isn't working for you will soon be over. And some of the sections that do work are great. For example, the whole discussion of management.

Many of these companies view middle management as bloat, waste, what David Graeber would call a "bullshit job." But that's because bad management is a waste; you're paying someone more money to essentially annoy everyone around them. And the more people experience that sort of bad management, and think of it as "just the way it is," the less they're going to value management in general.

I admit to a lot of confirmation bias here, since I've been ranting about this for years, but management must be the most wide-spread professional job for which we ignore both training and capability and assume that anyone who can do any type of useful work can also manage people doing that work. It's simply not true, it creates workplaces full of horrible management, and that in turn creates a deep and unhelpful cynicism about all management. There is still a tendency on the left to frame this problem in terms of class struggle, on the reasonable grounds that for decades under "scientific management" of manufacturing that's what it was. Managers were there to overwork workers and extract more profits for the owners, and labor unions were there to fight back against managers. But while some of this does happen in the sort of office work this book is focused on, I think Warzel and Petersen correctly point to a different cause.

"The reason she was underpaid on the team was not because her boss was cackling in the corner. It was because nobody told the boss it was their responsibility to look at the fucking spreadsheet."

We don't train managers, we have no clear expectations for what managers should do, we don't meaningfully measure their performance, we accept a high-overhead and high-chaos workstyle based on ad hoc one-to-one communication that de-emphasizes management, and many managers have never seen good management and therefore have no idea what they're supposed to be doing. The management problem for many office workers is less malicious management than incompetent management, or simply no effective management at all apart from an occasional reorg and a complicated and mind-numbing annual review form. The last section of this book (apart from concluding letters to bosses and workers) is on community, and more specifically on extracting time and energy from work (via the roadmap in previous chapters) and instead investing it in the people around you. Much ink has been spilled about the collapse of American civic life, about how we went from a nation of joiners to a nation of isolated individual workers with weak and failing community institutions. Warzel and Petersen correctly lay some blame for this at the foot of work, and see the reorganization of work and an increase in work from home (and thus a decrease in commutes) as an opportunity to reverse that trend. David Brooks recently filled in for Ezra Klein on his podcast and talked with University of Chicago professor Leon Kass, which I listened to shortly after reading this book. In one segment, they talked about marriage and complained about the decline in marriage rates. They were looking for causes in people's moral upbringing, in their life priorities, in the lack of aspiration for permanence in kids these days, and in any other personal or moral failing that would allow them to be smugly judgmental. It was a truly remarkable thing to witness. Neither man at any point in the conversation mentioned either money or time. Back in the world most Americans live in, real wages have been stagnant for decades, student loan debt is skyrocketing as people desperately try to keep up with the ever-shifting requirements for a halfway-decent job, and work has expanded to fill all hours of the day, even for people who don't have to work multiple jobs to make ends meet. Employers have fully embraced a "flexible" workforce via layoffs, micro-optimizing work scheduling, eliminating benefits, relying on contract and gig labor, and embracing exceptional levels of employee turnover. The American worker has far less of money, time, and stability, three important foundations for marriage and family as well as participation in most other civic institutions. People like Brooks and Kass stubbornly cling to their feelings of moral superiority instead of seeing a resource crisis. Work has stolen the resources that people previously put into those other areas of their life. And it's not even using those resources effectively. That's, in a way, a restatement of the topic of this book. Our current way of organizing work is not sustainable, healthy, or wise. Working from home may be part of a strategy for changing it. The pandemic has already heavily disrupted work, and some of those changes, including increased working from home, seem likely to stick. That provides a narrow opportunity to renegotiate our arrangement with work and try to make those changes stick. I largely agree with the analysis, but I'm pessimistic. I think the authors are as well. We're very bad at social change, and there will be immense pressure for everything to go "back to normal." Those in the best bargaining position to renegotiate work for themselves are not in the habit of sharing that renegotiation with anyone else. But I'm somewhat heartened by how much public discussion there currently is about a more fundamental renegotiation of the rules of office work. I'm also reminded of a deceptively profound aphorism from economist Herbert Stein: "If something cannot go on forever, it will stop." This book is a bit uneven and is more of a collection of related thoughts than a cohesive argument, but if you are hungry for more worker-centric analyses of the dynamics of office work (inside or outside the office), I think it's worth reading. Rating: 7 out of 10

Welcome to the November 2021 report from the Reproducible Builds project. As a quick recap, whilst anyone may inspect the source code of free software for malicious flaws, almost all software is distributed to end users as pre-compiled binaries. The motivation behind the reproducible builds effort is therefore to ensure no flaws have been introduced during this compilation process by promising identical results are always generated from a given source, thus allowing multiple third-parties to come to a consensus on whether a build was compromised. If you are interested in contributing to our project, please visit our Contribute page on our website.
On November 6th, Vagrant Cascadian presented at this year s edition of the SeaGL conference, giving a talk titled Debugging Reproducible Builds One Day at a Time:

I ll explore how I go about identifying issues to work on, learn more about the specific issues, recreate the problem locally, isolate the potential causes, dissect the problem into identifiable parts, and adapt the packaging and/or source code to fix the issues.

A video recording of the talk is available on archive.org.
Fedora Magazine published a post written by Zbigniew J drzejewski-Szmek about how to Use Diffoscope in packager workflows, specifically around ensuring that new versions of a package do not introduce breaking changes:

In the role of a packager, updating packages is a recurring task. For some projects, a packager is involved in upstream maintenance, or well written release notes make it easy to figure out what changed between the releases. This isn t always the case, for instance with some small project maintained by one or two people somewhere on GitHub, and it can be useful to verify what exactly changed. Diffoscope can help determine the changes between package releases. [ ]

kpcyrd announced the release of rebuilderd version 0.16.3 on our mailing list this month, adding support for builds to generate multiple artifacts at once.
Lastly, we held another IRC meeting on November 30th. As mentioned in previous reports, due to the global events throughout 2020 etc. there will be no in-person summit event this year.

diffoscope diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility. Not only can it locate and diagnose reproducibility issues, it can provide human-readable diffs from many kinds of binary formats. This month, Chris Lamb made the following changes, including preparing and uploading versions 190, 191, 192, 193 and 194 to Debian:

• New features:
  • Continue loading a .changes file even if the referenced files do not exist, but include a comment in the returned diff. [ ]
  • Log the reason if we cannot load a Debian .changes file. [ ]
• Bug fixes:
  • Detect XML files as XML files if file(1) claims if they are XML files or if they are named .xml. (#999438)
  • Don t duplicate file lists at each directory level. (#989192)
  • Don t raise a traceback when comparing nested directories with non-directories. [ ]
  • Re-enable test_android_manifest. [ ]
  • Don t reject Debian .changes files if they contain non-printable characters. [ ]
• Codebase improvements:
  • Avoid aliasing variables if we aren t going to use them. [ ]
  • Use isinstance over type. [ ]
  • Drop a number of unused imports. [ ]
  • Update a bunch of %-style string interpolations into f-strings or str.format. [ ]
  • When pretty-printing JSON, mark the difference as being reformatted, additionally avoiding including the full path. [ ]
  • Import itertools top-level module directly. [ ]

Chris Lamb also made an update to the command-line client to trydiffoscope, a web-based version of the diffoscope in-depth and content-aware diff utility, specifically only waiting for 2 minutes for try.diffoscope.org to respond in tests. (#998360) In addition Brandon Maier corrected an issue where parts of large diffs were missing from the output [ ], Zbigniew J drzejewski-Szmek fixed some logic in the assert_diff_startswith method [ ] and Mattia Rizzolo updated the packaging metadata to denote that we support both Python 3.9 and 3.10 [ ] as well as a number of warning-related changes[ ][ ]. Vagrant Cascadian also updated the diffoscope package in GNU Guix [ ][ ].

Distribution work In Debian, Roland Clobus updated the wiki page documenting Debian reproducible Live images to mention some new bug reports and also posted an in-depth status update to our mailing list. In addition, 90 reviews of Debian packages were added, 18 were updated and 23 were removed this month adding to our knowledge about identified issues. Chris Lamb identified a new toolchain issue, absolute_path_in_cmake_file_generated_by_meson.
Work has begun on classifying reproducibility issues in packages within the Arch Linux distribution. Similar to the analogous effort within Debian (outlined above), package information is listed in a human-readable packages.yml YAML file and a sibling README.md file shows how to classify packages too. Finally, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted his monthly reproducible builds status report for openSUSE and Vagrant Cascadian updated a link on our website to link to the GNU Guix reproducibility testing overview [ ].

Software development The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

• Bernhard M. Wiedemann:
  • ck (build failure in single-CPU machine)
  • libfabric (date-related issue)
  • python-dukpy-kovidgoyal (filesystem ordering)
  • python-thriftpy2 (build failure in the far future)
  • smplayer (date)
• Chris Lamb:
  • #998312 filed against ibus-input-pad.
  • #999848 filed against node-cssstyle.
  • #999866 filed against liboqs.
  • #1000326 filed against xrstools.
  • #1000327 filed against meson (forwarded).
  • #1000401 filed against golang-github-go-git-go-git.
  • #1000531 filed against sphinxcontrib-applehelp.
  • #1000532 filed against sphinxcontrib-jsmath.
  • #1000533 filed against sphinxcontrib-htmlhelp.
  • #1000535 filed against sphinxcontrib-restbuilder.
  • #1000769 filed against node-marked.
  • #1000770 filed against perfect-scrollbar.
• Roland Clobus:
  • #1000674 and #1000685 filed against dictionaries-common (randomness in Ispell dictionaries)
• Simon McVittie:
  • #999552 filed against pcs.
• Vagrant Cascadian:
  • #998420 filed against minia.
  • #1000768 filed against krb5.
  • #1000836 filed against libu2f-host.
  • #1000839 filed against gutenprint.
  • #1000893 filed against bind9.
  • #1000897 filed against lift.
  • #1000921 filed against syncevolution.
  • #1000944 filed against apbs.
  • #1000945 filed against binutils-riscv64-unknown-elf.
  • #1000946 filed against gcc-riscv64-unknown-elf.
  • opensbi, which later led to a better patch on their mailing list.

Elsewhere, in software development, Jonas Witschel updated strip-nondeterminism, our tool to remove specific non-deterministic results from a completed build so that it did not fail on JAR archives containing invalid members with a .jar extension [ ]. This change was later uploaded to Debian by Chris Lamb. reprotest is the Reproducible Build s project end-user tool to build the same source code twice in widely different environments and checking whether the binaries produced by the builds have any differences. This month, Mattia Rizzolo overhauled the Debian packaging [ ][ ][ ] and fixed a bug surrounding suffixes in the Debian package version [ ], whilst Stefano Rivera fixed an issue where the package tests were broken after the removal of diffoscope from the package s strict dependencies [ ].

Testing framework The Reproducible Builds project runs a testing framework at tests.reproducible-builds.org, to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. This month, the following changes were made:

• Holger Levsen:
  • Document the progress in setting up snapshot.reproducible-builds.org. [ ]
  • Add the packages required for debian-snapshot. [ ]
  • Make the dstat package available on all Debian based systems. [ ]
  • Mark virt32b-armhf and virt64b-armhf as down. [ ]
• Jochen Sprickerhof:
  • Add SSH authentication key and enable access to the osuosl168-amd64 node. [ ][ ]
• Mattia Rizzolo:

  • Revert reproducible Debian: mark virt(32

    64)b-armhf as down - restored. [ ]

• Roland Clobus (Debian live image generation):
  • Rename sid internally to unstable until an issue in the snapshot system is resolved. [ ]
  • Extend testing to include Debian bookworm too.. [ ]
  • Automatically create the Jenkins view to display jobs related to building the Live images. [ ]
• Vagrant Cascadian:
  • Add a Debian package set group for the packages and tools maintained by the Reproducible Builds maintainers themselves. [ ]

---

If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

• IRC: #reproducible-builds on irc.oftc.net.
• Twitter: @ReproBuilds
• Mailing list: rb-general@lists.reproducible-builds.org

After moving my Ikiwiki blog to my own server and enabling a basic CSP policy, I decided to see if I could tighten up the policy some more and stop relying on style-src 'unsafe-inline'. This does require that OpenID logins be disabled, but as a bonus, it also removes the need for jQuery to be present on the server.

Revised CSP policy First of all, I visited all of my pages in a Chromium browser and took note of the missing hashes listed in the developer tools console (Firefox doesn't show the missing hashes):

• 'sha256-4Su6mBWzEIFnH4pAGMOuaeBrstwJN4Z3pq/s1Kn4/KQ='
• 'sha256-j0bVhc2Wj58RJgvcJPevapx5zlVLw6ns6eYzK/hcA04='
• 'sha256-j6Tt8qv7z2kSc7fUs0YHbrxawwsQcS05fVaX1r2qrbk='
• 'sha256-p4cncjf0hAIeTSS5tXecf7qTUanDC27KdlKhT9eOsZU='
• 'sha256-Y6v8OCtFfMmI5mbpwqCreLofmGZQfXYK7jJHCoHvn7A='
• 'sha256-47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU='

which took care of all of the inline styles. Note that I kept unsafe-inline in the directive since it will be automatically ignored by browsers who understand hashes, but will be honored and make the site work on older browsers. Next I added the new unsafe-hashes source expression along with the hash of the CSS fragment (clear: both) that is present on all pages related to comments in Ikiwiki:

$ echo -n "clear: both"   openssl dgst -sha256 -binary   openssl base64 -A
matwEc6givhWX0+jiSfM1+E5UMk8/UGLdl902bjFBmY=

My final style-src directive is therefore the following:

style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-hashes' 'sha256-4Su6mBWzEIFnH4pAGMOuaeBrstwJN4Z3pq/s1Kn4/KQ=' 'sha256-j0bVhc2Wj58RJgvcJPevapx5zlVLw6ns6eYzK/hcA04=' 'sha256-j6Tt8qv7z2kSc7fUs0YHbrxawwsQcS05fVaX1r2qrbk=' 'sha256-p4cncjf0hAIeTSS5tXecf7qTUanDC27KdlKhT9eOsZU=' 'sha256-Y6v8OCtFfMmI5mbpwqCreLofmGZQfXYK7jJHCoHvn7A=' 'sha256-47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU=' 'sha256-matwEc6givhWX0+jiSfM1+E5UMk8/UGLdl902bjFBmY='

Browser compatibility While unsafe-hashes is not yet implemented in Firefox, it happens to work just fine due to a bug (i.e. unsafe-hashes is always enabled whether or not the policy contains it). It's possible that my new CSP policy won't work in Safari, but these CSS clears don't appear to be needed anyways and so it's just going to mean extra CSP reporting noise.

Removing jQuery Since jQuery appears to only be used to provide the authentication system selector UI, I decided to get rid of it. I couldn't find a way to get Ikiwiki to stop pulling it in and so I put the following hack in my Apache config file:

# Disable jQuery.
Redirect 204 /ikiwiki/jquery.fileupload.js
Redirect 204 /ikiwiki/jquery.fileupload-ui.js
Redirect 204 /ikiwiki/jquery.iframe-transport.js
Redirect 204 /ikiwiki/jquery.min.js
Redirect 204 /ikiwiki/jquery.tmpl.min.js
Redirect 204 /ikiwiki/jquery-ui.min.css
Redirect 204 /ikiwiki/jquery-ui.min.js
Redirect 204 /ikiwiki/login-selector/login-selector.js

Replacing the files on disk with an empty reponse seems to work very well and removes a whole lot of code that would otherwise be allowed by the script-src directive of my CSP policy. While there is a slight cosmetic change to the login page, I think the reduction in the attack surface is well worth it.