Search Results: "Daniel Kahn Gillmor"

12 January 2026

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: AI as a Compression Problem

A recent article in The Atlantic makes the case that very large language models effectively contain much of the works they're trained on. This article is an attempt to popularize the insights in the recent academic paper Extracting books from production language models from Ahmed et al. The authors of the paper demonstrate convincingly that well-known copyrighted textual material can be extracted from the chatbot interfaces of popular commercial LLM services. The Atlantic article cites a podcast quote about the Stable Diffusion AI image-generator model, saying "We took 100,000 gigabytes of images and compressed it to a two-gigabyte file that can re-create any of those and iterations of those". By analogy, this suggests we might think of LLMs (which work on text, not the images handled by Stable Diffusion) as a form of lossy textual compression. The entire text of Moby Dick, the canonical Big American Novel is merely 1.2MiB uncompressed (and less than 0.4MiB losslessly compressed with bzip2 -9). It's not surprising to imagine that a model with hundreds of billions of parameters might contain copies of these works. Warning: The next paragraph contains fuzzy math with no real concrete engineering practice behind it! Consider a hypothetical model with 100 billion parameters, where each parameter is stored as a 16-bit floating point value. The model weights would take 200 GB of storage. If you were to fill the parameter space only with losslessly compressed copies of books like Moby Dick, you could still fit half a million books, more than anyone can read in a lifetime. And lossy compression is typically orders of magnitude less in size than lossless compression, so we're talking about millions of works effectively encoded, with the acceptance of some artifacts being injected in the output. I first encountered this "compression" view of AI nearly three years ago, in Ted Chiang's insightful ChatGPT is a Blurry JPEG of the Web. I was suprised that The Atlantic article didn't cite Chiang's piece. If you haven't read Ted Chiang, i strongly recommend his work, and this piece is a great place to start. Chiang aside, the more recent writing that focuses on the idea of compressed works being "contained" in the model weights seems to be used by people interested in wielding some sort of copyright claims against the AI companies that maintain or provide access to these models. There are many many problems with AI today, but attacking AI companies based on copyright concerns seems similar to going after Al Capone for tax evasion. We should be much more concerned with the effect these projects have on cultural homogeneity, mental health, labor rights, privacy, and social control than whether they're violating copyright in some specific instance.

23 December 2025

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: AI and Secure Messaging Don't Mix

AI and Secure Messaging Don't Mix Over on the ACLU's Free Future blog, I just published an article titled AI and Secure Messaging Don't Mix. The blogpost assumes for the sake of the argument that people might actually want to have an AI involved in their personal conversations, and explores why Meta's Private Processing doesn't offer the level of assurance that they want it to offer. In short, the promises of "confidential cloud computing" are built on shaky foundations, especially against adversaries as powerful as Meta themselves. If you really want AI in your chat, the baseline step for privacy preservation is to include it in your local compute base, not to use a network service! But these operators clearly don't value private communication as much as they value binding you to their services. But let's imagine some secure messenger that actually does put message confidentiality first -- and imagine they had integrated some sort of AI capability into the messenger. That at least bypasses the privacy questions around AI use. Would you really want to talk with your friends, as augmented by their local AI, though? Would you want an AI, even one running locally with perfect privacy, intervening in your social connections? What if it summarized your friend's messages to you in a way that led you to misunderstand (or ignore) an important point your friend had made? What if it encouraged you to make an edgy joke that comes across wrong? Or to say something that seriously upsets a friend? How would you respond? How would you even know that it had happened? My handle is dkg. More times than i can count, i've had someone address me in a chat as "dog" and then cringe and apologize and blame their spellchecker/autocorrect. I can laugh these off because the failure mode is so obvious and transparent -- and repeatable. (also, dogs are awesome, so i don't really mind!) But when our attention (and our responses!) are being shaped and molded by these plausibility engines, how will we even know that mistakes are being made? What if the plausibility engine you've hooked into your messenger embeds subtle (or unsubtle!) bias? Don't we owe it to each other to engage with actual human attention?

21 November 2025

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: Transferring Signal on Android

Transferring a Signal account between two Android devices I spent far too much time recently trying to get a Signal Private Messenger account to transfer from one device to another. What I eventually found worked was a very finicky path to enable functioning "Wi-Fi Direct", which I go into below. I also offer some troubleshooting and recovery-from-failure guidance. All of this blogpost uses "original device" to refer to the Android pocket supercomputer that already has Signal installed and set up, and "new device" to mean the Android device that doesn't yet have Signal on it.

Why Transfer? Signal Private Messenger is designed with the expectation that the user has a "primary device", which is either an iPhone or an Android pocket supercomputer. If you have an existing Signal account, and try to change your primary device by backing up and restoring from backup, it looks to me like Signal will cause your long-term identity keys to be changed. This in turn causes your peers to see a message like "Your safety number with Alice has changed." These warning messages are the same messages that they would get if an adversary were to take over your account. So it's a good idea to minimize them when there isn't an account takeover false alarms train people to ignore real alarms. You can avoid "safety number changed" warnings by using signal's "account transfer" process during setup, at least if you're transferring between two Android devices. However, my experience was that the transfer between two Android devices was very difficult to get to happen at all. I ran into many errors trying to do this, until I finally found a path that worked.

Dealing with Failure After each failed attempt at a transfer, my original device's Signal installation would need to be re-registered. Having set a PIN meant that i could re-register the device without needing to receive a text message or phone call. Set a PIN before you transfer! Also, after a failure, you need to re-link any "linked device" (i.e. any Signal Desktop or iPad installation). If any message came in during the aborted transfer, the linked device won't get a copy of that message. Finally, after a failed transfer, i recommend completely uninstalling Signal from the new device, and starting over with a fresh install on the new device.

Permissions My understanding is that Signal on Android uses Wi-Fi Direct to accomplish the transfer. But to use Wi-Fi Direct, Signal needs to have the right permissions. On each device:
  • Entirely stop the Signal app
  • Go to Settings Apps Signal Permissions
  • Ensure that the following permissions are all enabled whenever the app is running:
  • Location
  • Nearby Devices
  • Network

Preparing for Wi-Fi Direct The transfer process depends on "Wi-Fi Direct", which is a bit of a disaster on its own. I found that if i couldn't get Wi-Fi Direct to work between the two devices, then the Signal transfer was guaranteed to fail. So, for clearer debugging, i first tried to establish a Wi-Fi Direct link on Android, without Signal being involved at all. Setting up a Wi-Fi Direct connection directly failed, multiple times, until i found the following combination of steps, to be done on each device:
  • Turn off Bluetooth
  • Ensure Wi-Fi is enabled
  • Disconnect from any Wi-Fi network you are connected to (go to the "Internet" or "Wi-Fi" settings page, long-press on the currently connected network, and choose "Disconnect"). If your device knows how to connect to multiple local Wi-Fi networks, disconnct from each of them in turn until you are in a stable state where Wi-Fi is enabled, but no network is connected.
  • Close to the bottom of the "Inteernet" or "Wi-Fi" settings page, choose "Network Preferences" and then "Wi-Fi Direct"
  • if there are any entries listed under "Remembered groups", tap them and choose to "Forget this group"
  • If there are Peer devices that say "Invited", tap them and choose to "Cancel invitation"
I found that this configuration is the most likely to enable a successful Wi-Fi Direct connection, where clicking "invite" on one device would pop up an alert on the other asking to accept the connection, and result in a "Connected" state between the two devices.

Actually Transferring Start with both devices fully powered up and physically close to one another (on the same desk should be fine). On the new device:
  • Reboot the device, and log into the profile you want to use
  • Enable Internet access via Wi-Fi.
  • Remove any old version of Signal.
  • Install Signal, but DO NOT OPEN IT!
  • Set up the permissions for the Signal app as described above
  • Open Signal, and choose "restore or transfer" -- you still need to be connected to the network at this point.
  • The new device should display a QR code.
On the original device:
  • Reboot the device, and log into the profile that has the Signal account you're looking to transfer
  • Enable Internet access via Wi-Fi, using the same network that the old device is using.
  • Make sure the permissions for Signal are set up as described above
  • Open Signal, and tap the camera button
  • Point the camera at the new device's QR code
Now tap the "continue" choices on both devices until they both display a message that they are searching for each other. You might see the location indicator (a green dot) turn on during this process. If you see an immediate warning of failure on either device, you probably don't have the permissions set up right. You might see an alert (a "toast") on one of the devices that the other one is trying to connect. You should click OK on that alert. In my experience, both devices are likely to get stuck "searching" for each other. Wait for both devices to show Signal's warning that the search has timed out. At this point, leave Signal open on both devices, and go through all the steps described above to prepare for Wi-Fi Direct. Your Internet access will be disabled. Now, tap "Try again" in Signal on both devices, pressing the buttons within a few seconds of each other. You should see another alert that one device is trying to connect to the other. Press OK there. At this point, the transfer should start happening! The old device will indicate what percentag has been transferred, and the new device will indicate how many messages hav been transferred. When this is all done, re-connect to Wi-Fi on the new device.

Temporal gap for Linked Devices Note that during this process, if new messages are arriving, they will be queuing up for you. When you reconnect to wi-fi, the queued messages will flow to your new device. But the process of transferring automatically unlinks any linked devices. So if you want to keep your instance of Signal Desktop with as short a gap as possible, you should re-link that installation promptly after the transfer completes.

Clean-up After all this is done successfully, you probably want to go into the Permissions settings and turn off the Location and Nearby Devices permissions for Signal on both devices. I recommend also going into Wi-Fi Direct and removing any connected devices and forgetting any existing connections.

Conclusion This is an abysmally clunky user experience, and I'm glad I don't have to do it often. It would have been much simpler to make a backup and restore from it, but I didn't want to freak out my contacts with a safety number change. By contrast, when i wanted extend a DeltaChat account across two devices, the transfer was prompt and entirely painless -- i just had to make sure the devices were on the same network, and then scanned a QR code from one to the other. And there was no temporal gap for any other deviees. And i could use Delta on both devices simultaneously until i was convinced that it would work on the new device -- Delta doesn't have the concept of a primary account. I wish Signal made it that easy! Until it's that easy, i hope the processes described here are useful to someone.

18 November 2025

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: App Store Oligopoly

A Call for Public Discussion about App Store Oligopoly Over on the ACLU's Free Future blog, I just published an article titled Your Smartphone, Their Rules: How App Stores Enable Corporate-Government Censorship. Free Software users and developers likely already understand the reasons why it matters who controls what tools you have access to. Hopefully this post can help clarify, even to people typically used to common non-free tooling, that there are real world risks to consolidated, proprietary control over computing and communication tools. Big shout out to the projects out there doing good work in the "pocket supercomputer" space, providing an escape valve for many users and a counter-example to centralized corporate control, including F-Droid, GrapheneOS, and phosh. The screws are tightening on user freedom, in the very place where most computing is happening today. The smartphone is already far too similar to an ankle monitor than it should be. Please, publish your own suggestions on creative forms of mutual technical liberation. These are communications tools, so no person can fix the problems alone. I would love to see a flourishing of non-Android, non-iOS systems in people's pockets, but i also know with the market the way it is, that is a long haul. Until that happens, we should also try to keep Android open, check out keepandroidopen.org for more suggestions.

8 June 2025

Colin Watson: Free software activity in May 2025

My Debian contributions this month were all sponsored by Freexian. Things were a bit quieter than usual, as for the most part I was sticking to things that seemed urgent for the upcoming trixie release. You can also support my work directly via Liberapay or GitHub Sponsors. OpenSSH After my appeal for help last month to debug intermittent sshd crashes, Michel Casabona helped me put together an environment where I could reproduce it, which allowed me to track it down to a root cause and fix it. (I also found a misuse of strlcpy affecting at least glibc-based systems in passing, though I think that was unrelated.) I worked with Daniel Kahn Gillmor to fix a regression in ssh-agent socket handling. I fixed a reproducibility bug depending on whether passwd is installed on the build system, which would have affected security updates during the lifetime of trixie. I backported openssh 1:10.0p1-5 to bookworm-backports. I issued bookworm and bullseye updates for CVE-2025-32728. groff I backported a fix for incorrect output when formatting multiple documents as PDF/PostScript at once. debmirror I added a simple autopkgtest. Python team I upgraded these packages to new upstream versions: In bookworm-backports, I updated these packages: I fixed problems building these packages reproducibly: I backported fixes for some security vulnerabilities to unstable (since we re in freeze now so it s not always appropriate to upgrade to new upstream versions): I fixed various other build/test failures: I added non-superficial autopkgtests to these packages: I packaged python-django-hashids and python-django-pgbulk, needed for new upstream versions of python-django-pgtrigger. I ported storm to Python 3.14. Science team I fixed a build failure in apertium-oci-fra.

4 May 2025

Colin Watson: Free software activity in April 2025

About 90% of my Debian contributions this month were sponsored by Freexian. You can also support my work directly via Liberapay. Request for OpenSSH debugging help Following the OpenSSH work described below, I have an open report about the sshd server sometimes crashing when clients try to connect to it. I can t reproduce this myself, and arm s-length debugging is very difficult, but three different users have reported it. For the time being I can t pass it upstream, as it s entirely possible it s due to a Debian patch. Is there anyone reading this who can reproduce this bug and is capable of doing some independent debugging work, most likely involving bisecting changes to OpenSSH? I d suggest first seeing whether a build of the unmodified upstream 10.0p2 release exhibits the same bug. If it does, then bisect between 9.9p2 and 10.0p2; if not, then bisect the list of Debian patches. This would be extremely helpful, since at the moment it s a bit like trying to look for a needle in a haystack from the next field over by sending instructions to somebody with a magnifying glass. OpenSSH I upgraded the Debian packaging to OpenSSH 10.0p1 (now designated 10.0p2 by upstream due to a mistake in the release process, but they re the same thing), fixing CVE-2025-32728. This also involved a diffoscope bug report due to the version number change. I enabled the new --with-linux-memlock-onfault configure option to protect sshd against being swapped out, but this turned out to cause test failures on riscv64, so I disabled it again there. Debugging this took some time since I needed to do it under emulation, and in the process of setting up a testbed I added riscv64 support to vmdb2. In coordination with the wtmpdb maintainer, I enabled the new Y2038-safe native wtmpdb support in OpenSSH, so wtmpdb last now reports the correct tty. I fixed a couple of packaging bugs: I reviewed and merged several packaging contributions from others: dput-ng Since we added dput-ng integration to Debusine recently, I wanted to make sure that it was in good condition in trixie, so I fixed dput-ng: will FTBFS during trixie support period. Previously a similar bug had been fixed by just using different Ubuntu release names in tests; this time I made the tests independent of the current supported release data returned by distro_info, so this shouldn t come up again. We also ran into dput-ng: override doesn t override profile parameters, which needed somewhat more extensive changes since it turned out that that option had never worked. I fixed this after some discussion with Paul Tagliamonte to make sure I understood the background properly. man-db I released man-db 2.13.1. This just included various small fixes and a number of translation updates, but I wanted to get it into trixie in order to include a contribution to increase the MAX_NAME constant, since that was now causing problems for some pathological cases of manual pages in the wild that documented a very large number of terms. debmirror I fixed one security bug: debmirror prints credentials with progress. Python team I upgraded these packages to new upstream versions: In bookworm-backports, I updated these packages: I dropped a stale build-dependency from python-aiohttp-security that kept it out of testing (though unfortunately too late for the trixie freeze). I fixed or helped to fix various other build/test failures: I packaged python-typing-inspection, needed for a new upstream version of pydantic. I documented the architecture field in debian/tests/autopkgtest-pkg-pybuild.conf files. I fixed other odds and ends of bugs: Science team I fixed various build/test failures:

2 May 2025

Daniel Lange: Cleaning a broken GnuPG (gpg) key

I've long said that the main tools in the Open Source security space, OpenSSL and GnuPG (gpg), are broken and only a complete re-write will solve this. And that is still pending as nobody came forward with the funding. It's not a sexy topic, so it has to get really bad before it'll get better. Gpg has a UI that is close to useless. That won't substantially change with more bolted-on improvements. Now Robert J. Hansen and Daniel Kahn Gillmor had somebody add ~50k signatures (read 1, 2, 3, 4 for the g l ory details) to their keys and - oops - they say that breaks gpg. But does it? I downloaded Robert J. Hansen's key off the SKS-Keyserver network. It's a nice 45MB file when de-ascii-armored (gpg --dearmor broken_key.asc ; mv broken_key.asc.gpg broken_key.gpg). Now a friendly:
$ /usr/bin/time -v gpg --no-default-keyring --keyring ./broken_key.gpg --batch --quiet --edit-key 0x1DCBDC01B44427C7 clean save quit

pub rsa3072/0x1DCBDC01B44427C7
erzeugt: 2015-07-16 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: SC
Vertrauen: unbekannt G ltigkeit: unbekannt
sub ed25519/0xA83CAE94D3DC3873
erzeugt: 2017-04-05 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: S
sub cv25519/0xAA24CC81B8AED08B
erzeugt: 2017-04-05 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: E
sub rsa3072/0xDC0F82625FA6AADE
erzeugt: 2015-07-16 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: E
[ unbekannt ] (1). Robert J. Hansen <rjh@sixdemonbag.org>
[ unbekannt ] (2) Robert J. Hansen <rob@enigmail.net>
[ unbekannt ] (3) Robert J. Hansen <rob@hansen.engineering>

User-ID "Robert J. Hansen <rjh@sixdemonbag.org>": 49705 Signaturen entfernt
User-ID "Robert J. Hansen <rob@enigmail.net>": 49704 Signaturen entfernt
User-ID "Robert J. Hansen <rob@hansen.engineering>": 49701 Signaturen entfernt

pub rsa3072/0x1DCBDC01B44427C7
erzeugt: 2015-07-16 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: SC
Vertrauen: unbekannt G ltigkeit: unbekannt
sub ed25519/0xA83CAE94D3DC3873
erzeugt: 2017-04-05 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: S
sub cv25519/0xAA24CC81B8AED08B
erzeugt: 2017-04-05 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: E
sub rsa3072/0xDC0F82625FA6AADE
erzeugt: 2015-07-16 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: E
[ unbekannt ] (1). Robert J. Hansen <rjh@sixdemonbag.org>
[ unbekannt ] (2) Robert J. Hansen <rob@enigmail.net>
[ unbekannt ] (3) Robert J. Hansen <rob@hansen.engineering>

Command being timed: "gpg --no-default-keyring --keyring ./broken_key.gpg --batch --quiet --edit-key 0x1DCBDC01B44427C7 clean save quit"
User time (seconds): 3911.14
System time (seconds): 2442.87
Percent of CPU this job got: 99%
Elapsed (wall clock) time (h:mm:ss or m:ss): 1:45:56
Average shared text size (kbytes): 0
Average unshared data size (kbytes): 0
Average stack size (kbytes): 0
Average total size (kbytes): 0
Maximum resident set size (kbytes): 107660
Average resident set size (kbytes): 0
Major (requiring I/O) page faults: 1
Minor (reclaiming a frame) page faults: 26630
Voluntary context switches: 43
Involuntary context switches: 59439
Swaps: 0
File system inputs: 112
File system outputs: 48
Socket messages sent: 0
Socket messages received: 0
Signals delivered: 0
Page size (bytes): 4096
Exit status: 0
And the result is a nicely useable 3835 byte file of the clean public key. If you supply a keyring instead of --no-default-keyring it will also keep the non-self signatures that are useful for you (as you apparently know the signing party). So it does not break gpg. It does break things that call gpg at runtime and not asynchronously. I heard Enigmail is affected, quelle surprise. Now the main problem here is the runtime. 1h45min is just ridiculous. As Filippo Valsorda puts it:
Someone added a few thousand entries to a list that lets anyone append to it. GnuPG, software supposed to defeat state actors, suddenly takes minutes to process entries. How big is that list you ask? 17 MiB. Not GiB, 17 MiB. Like a large picture. https://dev.gnupg.org/T4592
If I were a gpg / SKS keyserver developer, I'd That way another key can only be added to the keyserver network if it contains at least one signature from a previously known strong-set key. Attacking the keyserver network would become at least non-trivial. And the web-of-trust thing may make sense again. Updates 09.07.2019 GnuPG 2.2.17 has been released with another set of quickly bolted together fixes:
   gpg: Ignore all key-signatures received from keyservers.  This
    change is required to mitigate a DoS due to keys flooded with
    faked key-signatures.  The old behaviour can be achieved by adding
    keyserver-options no-self-sigs-only,no-import-clean
    to your gpg.conf.  [#4607]
   gpg: If an imported keyblocks is too large to be stored in the
    keybox (pubring.kbx) do not error out but fallback to an import
    using the options "self-sigs-only,import-clean".  [#4591]
   gpg: New command --locate-external-key which can be used to
    refresh keys from the Web Key Directory or via other methods
    configured with --auto-key-locate.
   gpg: New import option "self-sigs-only".
   gpg: In --auto-key-retrieve prefer WKD over keyservers.  [#4595]
   dirmngr: Support the "openpgpkey" subdomain feature from
    draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-07. [#4590].
   dirmngr: Add an exception for the "openpgpkey" subdomain to the
    CSRF protection.  [#4603]
   dirmngr: Fix endless loop due to http errors 503 and 504.  [#4600]
   dirmngr: Fix TLS bug during redirection of HKP requests.  [#4566]
   gpgconf: Fix a race condition when killing components.  [#4577]
Bug T4607 shows that these changes are all but well thought-out. They introduce artificial limits, like 64kB for WKD-distributed keys or 5MB for local signature imports (Bug T4591) which weaken the web-of-trust further. I recommend to not run gpg 2.2.17 in production environments without extensive testing as these limits and the unverified network traffic may bite you. Do validate your upgrade with valid and broken keys that have segments (packet groups) surpassing the above mentioned limits. You may be surprised what gpg does. On the upside: you can now refresh keys (sans signatures) via WKD. So if your buddies still believe in limiting their subkey validities, you can more easily update them bypassing the SKS keyserver network. NB: I have not tested that functionality. So test before deploying. 10.08.2019 Christopher Wellons (skeeto) has released his pgp-poisoner tool. It is a go program that can add thousands of malicious signatures to a GNUpg key per second. He comments "[pgp-poisoner is] proof that such attacks are very easy to pull off. It doesn't take a nation-state actor to break the PGP ecosystem, just one person and couple evenings studying RFC 4880. This system is not robust." He also hints at the next likely attack vector, public subkeys can be bound to a primary key of choice.

9 March 2024

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in February 2024

Welcome to the February 2024 report from the Reproducible Builds project! In our reports, we try to outline what we have been up to over the past month as well as mentioning some of the important things happening in software supply-chain security.

Reproducible Builds at FOSDEM 2024 Core Reproducible Builds developer Holger Levsen presented at the main track at FOSDEM on Saturday 3rd February this year in Brussels, Belgium. However, that wasn t the only talk related to Reproducible Builds. However, please see our comprehensive FOSDEM 2024 news post for the full details and links.

Maintainer Perspectives on Open Source Software Security Bernhard M. Wiedemann spotted that a recent report entitled Maintainer Perspectives on Open Source Software Security written by Stephen Hendrick and Ashwin Ramaswami of the Linux Foundation sports an infographic which mentions that 56% of [polled] projects support reproducible builds .

Mailing list highlights From our mailing list this month:

Distribution work In Debian this month, 5 reviews of Debian packages were added, 22 were updated and 8 were removed this month adding to Debian s knowledge about identified issues. A number of issue types were updated as well. [ ][ ][ ][ ] In addition, Roland Clobus posted his 23rd update of the status of reproducible ISO images on our mailing list. In particular, Roland helpfully summarised that all major desktops build reproducibly with bullseye, bookworm, trixie and sid provided they are built for a second time within the same DAK run (i.e. [within] 6 hours) and that there will likely be further work at a MiniDebCamp in Hamburg. Furthermore, Roland also responded in-depth to a query about a previous report
Fedora developer Zbigniew J drzejewski-Szmek announced a work-in-progress script called fedora-repro-build that attempts to reproduce an existing package within a koji build environment. Although the projects README file lists a number of fields will always or almost always vary and there is a non-zero list of other known issues, this is an excellent first step towards full Fedora reproducibility.
Jelle van der Waa introduced a new linter rule for Arch Linux packages in order to detect cache files leftover by the Sphinx documentation generator which are unreproducible by nature and should not be packaged. At the time of writing, 7 packages in the Arch repository are affected by this.
Elsewhere, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted another monthly update for his work elsewhere in openSUSE.

diffoscope diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can locate and diagnose reproducibility issues. This month, Chris Lamb made a number of changes such as uploading versions 256, 257 and 258 to Debian and made the following additional changes:
  • Use a deterministic name instead of trusting gpg s use-embedded-filenames. Many thanks to Daniel Kahn Gillmor dkg@debian.org for reporting this issue and providing feedback. [ ][ ]
  • Don t error-out with a traceback if we encounter struct.unpack-related errors when parsing Python .pyc files. (#1064973). [ ]
  • Don t try and compare rdb_expected_diff on non-GNU systems as %p formatting can vary, especially with respect to MacOS. [ ]
  • Fix compatibility with pytest 8.0. [ ]
  • Temporarily fix support for Python 3.11.8. [ ]
  • Use the 7zip package (over p7zip-full) after a Debian package transition. (#1063559). [ ]
  • Bump the minimum Black source code reformatter requirement to 24.1.1+. [ ]
  • Expand an older changelog entry with a CVE reference. [ ]
  • Make test_zip black clean. [ ]
In addition, James Addison contributed a patch to parse the headers from the diff(1) correctly [ ][ ] thanks! And lastly, Vagrant Cascadian pushed updates in GNU Guix for diffoscope to version 255, 256, and 258, and updated trydiffoscope to 67.0.6.

reprotest reprotest is our tool for building the same source code twice in different environments and then checking the binaries produced by each build for any differences. This month, Vagrant Cascadian made a number of changes, including:
  • Create a (working) proof of concept for enabling a specific number of CPUs. [ ][ ]
  • Consistently use 398 days for time variation rather than choosing randomly and update README.rst to match. [ ][ ]
  • Support a new --vary=build_path.path option. [ ][ ][ ][ ]

Website updates There were made a number of improvements to our website this month, including:

Reproducibility testing framework The Reproducible Builds project operates a comprehensive testing framework (available at tests.reproducible-builds.org) in order to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. In February, a number of changes were made by Holger Levsen:
  • Debian-related changes:
    • Temporarily disable upgrading/bootstrapping Debian unstable and experimental as they are currently broken. [ ][ ]
    • Use the 64-bit amd64 kernel on all i386 nodes; no more 686 PAE kernels. [ ]
    • Add an Erlang package set. [ ]
  • Other changes:
    • Grant Jan-Benedict Glaw shell access to the Jenkins node. [ ]
    • Enable debugging for NetBSD reproducibility testing. [ ]
    • Use /usr/bin/du --apparent-size in the Jenkins shell monitor. [ ]
    • Revert reproducible nodes: mark osuosl2 as down . [ ]
    • Thanks again to Codethink, for they have doubled the RAM on our arm64 nodes. [ ]
    • Only set /proc/$pid/oom_score_adj to -1000 if it has not already been done. [ ]
    • Add the opemwrt-target-tegra and jtx task to the list of zombie jobs. [ ][ ]
Vagrant Cascadian also made the following changes:
  • Overhaul the handling of OpenSSH configuration files after updating from Debian bookworm. [ ][ ][ ]
  • Add two new armhf architecture build nodes, virt32z and virt64z, and insert them into the Munin monitoring. [ ][ ] [ ][ ]
In addition, Alexander Couzens updated the OpenWrt configuration in order to replace the tegra target with mpc85xx [ ], Jan-Benedict Glaw updated the NetBSD build script to use a separate $TMPDIR to mitigate out of space issues on a tmpfs-backed /tmp [ ] and Zheng Junjie added a link to the GNU Guix tests [ ]. Lastly, node maintenance was performed by Holger Levsen [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] and Vagrant Cascadian [ ][ ][ ][ ].

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

9 February 2024

Reproducible Builds (diffoscope): diffoscope 256 released

The diffoscope maintainers are pleased to announce the release of diffoscope version 256. This version includes the following changes:
* CVE-2024-25711: Use a determistic name when extracting content from GPG
  artifacts instead of trusting the value of gpg's --use-embedded-filenames.
  This prevents a potential information disclosure vulnerability that could
  have been exploited by providing a specially-crafted GPG file with an
  embedded filename of, say, "../../.ssh/id_rsa".
  Many thanks to Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@debian.org> for reporting this
  issue and providing feedback.
  (Closes: reproducible-builds/diffoscope#361)
* Temporarily fix support for Python 3.11.8 re. a potential regression
  with the handling of ZIP files. (See reproducible-builds/diffoscope#362)
You find out more by visiting the project homepage.

7 December 2023

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: New OpenPGP certificate for dkg, December 2023

dkg's New OpenPGP certificate in December 2023 In December of 2023, I'm moving to a new OpenPGP certificate. You might know my old OpenPGP certificate, which had an fingerprint of C29F8A0C01F35E34D816AA5CE092EB3A5CA10DBA. My new OpenPGP certificate has a fingerprint of: D477040C70C2156A5C298549BB7E9101495E6BF7. Both certificates have the same set of User IDs:
  • Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • <dkg@debian.org>
  • <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
You can find a version of this transition statement signed by both the old and new certificates at: https://dkg.fifthhorseman.net/2023-dkg-openpgp-transition.txt The new OpenPGP certificate is:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----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=9Yc8
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
When I have some reasonable number of certifications, i'll update the certificate associated with my e-mail addresses on https://keys.openpgp.org, in DANE, and in WKD. Until then, those lookups should continue to provide the old certificate.

5 March 2023

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in February 2023

Welcome to the February 2023 report from the Reproducible Builds project. As ever, if you are interested in contributing to our project, please visit the Contribute page on our website.
FOSDEM 2023 was held in Brussels on the 4th & 5th of February and featured a number of talks related to reproducibility. In particular, Akihiro Suda gave a talk titled Bit-for-bit reproducible builds with Dockerfile discussing deterministic timestamps and deterministic apt-get (original announcement). There was also an entire track of talks on Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs). SBOMs are an inventory for software with the intention of increasing the transparency of software components (the US National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) published a useful Myths vs. Facts document in 2021).
On our mailing list this month, Larry Doolittle was puzzled why the Debian verilator package was not reproducible [ ], but Chris Lamb pointed out that this was due to the use of Python s datetime.fromtimestamp over datetime.utcfromtimestamp [ ].
James Addison also was having issues with a Debian package: in this case, the alembic package. Chris Lamb was also able to identify the Sphinx documentation generator as the cause of the problem, and provided a potential patch that might fix it. This was later filed upstream [ ].
Anthony Harrison wrote to our list twice, first by introducing himself and their background and later to mention the increasing relevance of Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs):
As I am sure everyone is aware, there is a growing interest in [SBOMs] as a way of improving software security and resilience. In the last two years, the US through the Exec Order, the EU through the proposed Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) and this month the UK has issued a consultation paper looking at software security and SBOMs appear very prominently in each publication. [ ]

Tim Retout wrote a blog post discussing AlmaLinux in the context of CentOS, RHEL and supply-chain security in general [ ]:
Alma are generating and publishing Software Bill of Material (SBOM) files for every package; these are becoming a requirement for all software sold to the US federal government. What s more, they are sending these SBOMs to a third party (CodeNotary) who store them in some sort of Merkle tree system to make it difficult for people to tamper with later. This should theoretically allow end users of the distribution to verify the supply chain of the packages they have installed?

Debian

F-Droid & Android

diffoscope diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility. Not only can it locate and diagnose reproducibility issues, it can provide human-readable diffs from many kinds of binary formats. This month, Chris Lamb released versions 235 and 236; Mattia Rizzolo later released version 237. Contributions include:
  • Chris Lamb:
    • Fix compatibility with PyPDF2 (re. issue #331) [ ][ ][ ].
    • Fix compatibility with ImageMagick version 7.1 [ ].
    • Require at least version 23.1.0 to run the Black source code tests [ ].
    • Update debian/tests/control after merging changes from others [ ].
    • Don t write test data during a test [ ].
    • Update copyright years [ ].
    • Merged a large number of changes from others.
  • Akihiro Suda edited the .gitlab-ci.yml configuration file to ensure that versioned tags are pushed to the container registry [ ].
  • Daniel Kahn Gillmor provided a way to migrate from PyPDF2 to pypdf (#1029741).
  • Efraim Flashner updated the tool metadata for isoinfo on GNU Guix [ ].
  • FC Stegerman added support for Android resources.arsc files [ ], improved a number of file-matching regular expressions [ ][ ] and added support for Android dexdump [ ]; they also fixed a test failure (#1031433) caused by Debian s black package having been updated to a newer version.
  • Mattia Rizzolo:
    • updated the release documentation [ ],
    • fixed a number of Flake8 errors [ ][ ],
    • updated the autopkgtest configuration to only install aapt and dexdump on architectures where they are available [ ], making sure that the latest diffoscope release is in a good fit for the upcoming Debian bookworm freeze.

reprotest Reprotest version 0.7.23 was uploaded to both PyPI and Debian unstable, including the following changes:
  • Holger Levsen improved a lot of documentation [ ][ ][ ], tidied the documentation as well [ ][ ], and experimented with a new --random-locale flag [ ].
  • Vagrant Cascadian adjusted reprotest to no longer randomise the build locale and use a UTF-8 supported locale instead [ ] (re. #925879, #1004950), and to also support passing --vary=locales.locale=LOCALE to specify the locale to vary [ ].
Separate to this, Vagrant Cascadian started a thread on our mailing list questioning the future development and direction of reprotest.

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

Testing framework The Reproducible Builds project operates a comprehensive testing framework (available at tests.reproducible-builds.org) in order to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. In February, the following changes were made by Holger Levsen:
  • Add three new OSUOSL nodes [ ][ ][ ] and decommission the osuosl174 node [ ].
  • Change the order of listed Debian architectures to show the 64-bit ones first [ ].
  • Reduce the frequency that the Debian package sets and dd-list HTML pages update [ ].
  • Sort Tested suite consistently (and Debian unstable first) [ ].
  • Update the Jenkins shell monitor script to only query disk statistics every 230min [ ] and improve the documentation [ ][ ].

Other development work disorderfs version 0.5.11-3 was uploaded by Holger Levsen, fixing a number of issues with the manual page [ ][ ][ ].
Bernhard M. Wiedemann published another monthly report about reproducibility within openSUSE.
If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit the Contribute page on our website. You can get in touch with us via:

27 February 2023

Daniel Lange: Getting gpg to import signatures again

The GnuPG (gpg) ecosystem has been played with a bit in 2019 by adding fake signatures en masse to well known keys. The main result is that the SKS Keyserver network based on the OCaml software of the same name is basically history. A few other keyservers have come up like Hagrid (Rust) and Hockeypuck (Go) but there seems to be no clear winner yet. In case you missed it in 2019, see my take on cleaning these polluted keys. Now the changed defaults in gpg to "mitigate" this issue are trickling down to even the conservative distributions. Debian Bullseye has self-sigs-only on gpg 2.2.27 and it looks like Debian Bookworm will get gpg 2.2.40. This would add import-clean but Daniel Kahn Gillmor patched it out. He argues correctly that this new default could delete data from good locally store pubkeys. This all ends in you getting some random combination of self-sigs-only and / or import-clean depending on which Linux distribution and version you happen to use. Better be explicit. I recommend to add:
# disable new gpg defaults
keyserver-options no-self-sigs-only
keyserver-options no-import-clean
to your ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf to make sure you can manage signatures yourself and receive them from keyservers or local imports as intended. In case you care: See info gnupg --index-search=keyserver-options for the fine documentation. Of course apt install info first to be able to read info pages. 'cause who still used them in 2023? Oh, wait...

10 February 2023

Reproducible Builds (diffoscope): diffoscope 235 released

The diffoscope maintainers are pleased to announce the release of diffoscope version 235. This version includes the following changes:
[ Akihiro Suda ]
* Update .gitlab-ci.yml to push versioned tags to the container registry.
  (Closes: reproducible-builds/diffoscope!119)
[ Chris Lamb ]
* Fix compatibility with PyPDF2. (Closes: reproducible-builds/diffoscope#331)
* Fix compatibility with ImageMagick 7.1.
  (Closes: reproducible-builds/diffoscope#330)
[ Daniel Kahn Gillmor ]
* Update from PyPDF2 to pypdf. (Closes: #1029741, #1029742)
[ FC Stegerman ]
* Add support for Android resources.arsc files.
  (Closes: reproducible-builds/diffoscope!116)
* Add support for dexdump. (Closes: reproducible-builds/diffoscope#134)
* Improve DexFile's FILE_TYPE_RE and add FILE_TYPE_HEADER_PREFIX, and remove
  "Dalvik dex file" from ApkFile's FILE_TYPE_RE as well.
[ Efraim Flashner ]
* Update external tool for isoinfo on guix.
  (Closes: reproducible-builds/diffoscope!124)
You find out more by visiting the project homepage.

10 May 2022

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: 2022 Digital Rights Job Fair

I'm lucky enough to work at the intersection between information communications technology and civil rights/civil liberties. I get to combine technical interests and social/political interests. I've talked with many folks over the years who are interested in doing similar work. Some come from a technical background, and some from an activist background (and some from both). Are you one of them? Are you someone who works as an activist or in a technical field who wants to look into different ways of meging these interests? Some great organizers maintain a job board for Digital Rights. Next month they'll host a Digital Rights Job Fair, which offers an opportunity to talk with good people at organizations that fight in different ways for a better world. You need to RSVP to attend. Digital Rights Job Fair

14 April 2022

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: Bitstream Vera Must Die

Bitstream Vera must die.

31 December 2020

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: New OpenPGP certificate for dkg, 2021

dkg's 2021 OpenPGP transition As 2021 begins, I'm changing to a new OpenPGP certificate. I did a similar transition two years ago, and a fair amount has changed since then. You might know my old OpenPGP certificate as:
pub   ed25519 2019-01-19 [C] [expires: 2021-01-18]
      C4BC2DDB38CCE96485EBE9C2F20691179038E5C6
uid          Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
uid          Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@debian.org>
My new OpenPGP certificate is:
pub   ed25519 2020-12-27 [C] [expires: 2023-12-24]
      C29F8A0C01F35E34D816AA5CE092EB3A5CA10DBA
uid           [ unknown] Daniel Kahn Gillmor
uid           [ unknown] <dkg@debian.org>
uid           [ unknown] <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
You can find a signed transition statement if you're into that sort of thing. If you're interested in the rationale for why I'm making this transition, read on.

Dangers of Offline Primary Secret Keys There are several reasons for transitioning, but one i simply couldn't argue with was my own technical failure. I put the primary secret key into offline storage some time ago for "safety", and used ext4's filesystem-level encryption layered on top of dm-crypt for additional security. But either the tools changed out from under me, or there were failures on the storage medium, or I've failed to remember my passphrase correctly, because I am unable to regain access to the cleartext of the secret key. In particular, I find myself unable to use e4crypt add_key with the passphrase I know to get a usable working directory. I confess I still find e4crypt pretty difficult to use and I don't use it often, so the problem may entirely be user error (either now, or two years ago when I did the initial setup). Anyway, lesson learned: don't use cryptosystems that you're not comfortable with to encrypt data that you care about recovering. This is a lesson I'm pretty sure I've learned before, sigh, but it's a good reminder.

Split User IDs I'm trying to split out my User IDs again -- this way if you know me by e-mail address, you don't have to think/worry about certifying my name, and if you know me by name, you don't have to think/worry about certifying my e-mail address. I think that's simpler and more sensible. It's also nice because e-mail address-only User IDs can be used effectively in contexts like Autocrypt, which I think are increasingly important if we want to have usable encrypted e-mail. Last time around I initially tried split User IDs but rolled them back and I think most of the bugs I discovered then have been fixed.

Certificate Flooding Another reason for making a transition to a new certificate is that my older certificate is one of the ones that was "flooded" on the SKS keyserver network last year, which was one of the final straws for that teetering project. Transitioning to a new certificate lets that old flooded cert expire and people can just simply move on from it, ideally deleting it from their local keyrings. Hopefully as a community we can move on from SKS to key distribution mechanisms like WKD, Autocrypt, DANE, and keys.openpgp.org, all of which address some of the known problems with keyserver abuse.

Trying New Tools Finally, I'm also interested in thinking about how key and certificate management might be handled in different ways. While I'm reasonably competent in handling GnuPG, the larger OpenPGP community (which I'm a part of) has done a lot of thinking and a lot of work about how people can use OpenPGP. I'm particularly happy with the collaborative work that has gone into the Stateless OpenPGP CLI (aka sop), which helps to generate a powerful interoperability test suite. While sop doesn't offer the level of certificate management I'd need to use it to manage this new certificate in full, I wish something like it would! Starting from a fresh certificate and actually using it helps me to think through what I might actually need from a tool that is roughly as straightforward and opinionated as sop is. If you're a software developer who might use or implement OpenPGP, or a protocol designer, and you haven't played around with any of the various implementations of sop yet, I recommend taking a look. And feedback on the specification is always welcome, too, including ideas for new functionality (maybe even like certificate management).

Next Steps If you're the kind of person who's into making OpenPGP certifications, feel free to check in with me via whatever channels you're used to using to verify that this transition is legit. If you think it is, and you're comfortable, please send me (e-mail is probably best) your certifications over the new certficate. I'll keep on working to make OpenPGP more usable and acceptable. Hopefully, 2021 will be a better year ahead for all of us.

17 April 2020

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: Tech-assisted Contact-Tracing against the COVID-19 pandemic

Today at the ACLU, we released a whitepaper discussing how to evaluate some novel cryptographic schemes that are being considered to provide technology-assisted contact-tracing in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. The document offers guidelines for thinking about potential schemes like this, and what kinds of safeguards we need to expect and demand from these systems so that we might try to address the (hopefully temporary) crisis of the pandemic without also creating a permanent crisis for civil liberties. The proposals that we're seeing (including PACT, DP^3T, TCN, and the Apple/Google proposal) work in pretty similar ways, and the challenges and tradeoffs there are remarkably similar to Internet protocol design decisions. Only now in addition to bytes and packets and questions of efficiency, privacy, and control, we're also dealing directly with risk of physical harm (who gets sick?), society-wide allocation of scarce and critical resources (who gets tested? who gets treatment?), and potentially serious means of exercising powerful social control (who gets forced into quarantine?). My ACLU colleague Jon Callas and i will be doing a Reddit AMA in r/Coronavirus tomorrow starting at 2020-04-17T19:00:00Z (that's 3pm Friday in TZ=America/New_York) about this very topic, if that's the kind of thing you're into.

20 November 2017

Reproducible builds folks: Reproducible Builds: Weekly report #133

Here's what happened in the Reproducible Builds effort between Sunday November 5 and Saturday November 11 2017: Upcoming events On November 17th Chris Lamb will present at Open Compliance Summit, Yokohama, Japan on how reproducible builds ensures the long-term sustainability of technology infrastructure. We plan to hold an assembly at 34C3 - hope to see you there! LEDE CI tests Thanks to the work of lynxis, Mattia and h01ger, we're now testing all LEDE packages in our setup. This is our first result for the ar71xx target: "502 (100.0%) out of 502 built images and 4932 (94.8%) out of 5200 built packages were reproducible in our test setup." - see below for details how this was achieved. Bootstrapping and Diverse Double Compilation As a follow-up of a discussion on bootstrapping compilers we had on the Berlin summit, Bernhard and Ximin worked on a Proof of Concept for Diverse Double Compilation of tinycc (aka tcc). Ximin Luo did a successful diverse-double compilation of tinycc git HEAD using gcc-7.2.0, clang-4.0.1, icc-18.0.0 and pgcc-17.10-0 (pgcc needs to triple-compile it). More variations are planned for the future, with the eventual aim to reproduce the same binaries cross-distro, and extend it to test GCC itself. Packages reviewed and fixed, and bugs filed Patches filed upstream: Patches filed in Debian: Patches filed in OpenSUSE: Reviews of unreproducible packages 73 package reviews have been added, 88 have been updated and 40 have been removed in this week, adding to our knowledge about identified issues. 4 issue types have been updated: Weekly QA work During our reproducibility testing, FTBFS bugs have been detected and reported by: diffoscope development Mattia Rizzolo uploaded version 88~bpo9+1 to stretch-backports. reprotest development reproducible-website development theunreproduciblepackage development tests.reproducible-builds.org in detail Misc. This week's edition was written by Ximin Luo, Bernhard M. Wiedemann, Chris Lamb and Holger Levsen & reviewed by a bunch of Reproducible Builds folks on IRC & the mailing lists.

6 June 2017

Reproducible builds folks: Reproducible Builds: week 110 in Stretch cycle

Here's what happened in the Reproducible Builds effort between Sunday May 28 and Saturday June 3 2017: Past an upcoming events Documentation updates Toolchain development and fixes Patches and bugs filed 4 package reviews have been added, 6 have been updated and 25 have been removed in this week, adding to our knowledge about identified issues. Weekly QA work During our reproducibility testing, FTBFS bugs have been detected and reported by: diffoscope development tests.reproducible-builds.org Mattia Rizzolo: Daniel Kahn Gillmor: Vagrant Cascadian: Holger Levsen: Misc. This week's edition was written by Chris Lamb, Bernhard M. Wiedemann and Holger Levsen & reviewed by a bunch of Reproducible Builds folks on IRC & the mailing lists.

22 February 2017

Antoine Beaupr : The case against password hashers

In previous articles, we have looked at how to generate passwords and did a review of various password managers. There is, however, a third way of managing passwords other than remembering them or encrypting them in a "vault", which is what I call "password hashing". A password hasher generates site-specific passwords from a single master password using a cryptographic hash function. It thus allows a user to have a unique and secure password for every site they use while requiring no storage; they need only to remember a single password. You may know these as "deterministic or stateless password managers" but I find the "password manager" phrase to be confusing because a hasher doesn't actually store any passwords. I do not think password hashers represent a good security tradeoff so I generally do not recommend their use, unless you really do not have access to reliable storage that you can access readily. In this article, I use the word "password" for a random string used to unlock things, but "token" to represent a generated random string that the user doesn't need to remember. The input to a password hasher is a password with some site-specific context and the output from a password hasher is a token.

What is a password hasher? A password hasher uses the master password and a label (generally the host name) to generate the site-specific password. To change the generated password, the user can modify the label, for example by appending a number. Some password hashers also have different settings to generate tokens of different lengths or compositions (symbols or not, etc.) to accommodate different site-specific password policies. The whole concept of password hashers relies on the concept of one-way cryptographic hash functions or key derivation functions that take an arbitrary input string (say a password) and generate a unique token, from which it is impossible to guess the original input string. Password hashers are generally written as JavaScript bookmarklets or browser plugins and have been around for over a decade. The biggest advantage of password hashers is that you only need to remember a single password. You do not need to carry around a password manager vault: there's no "state" (other than site-specific settings, which can be easily guessed). A password hasher named Master Password makes a compelling case against traditional password managers in its documentation:
It's as though the implicit assumptions are that everybody backs all of their stuff up to at least two different devices and backups in the cloud in at least two separate countries. Well, people don't always have perfect backups. In fact, they usually don't have any.
It goes on to argue that, when you lose your password: "You lose everything. You lose your own identity." The stateless nature of password hashers also means you do not need to use cloud services to synchronize your passwords, as there is (generally, more on that later) no state to carry around. This means, for example, that the list of accounts that you have access to is only stored in your head, and not in some online database that could be hacked without your knowledge. The downside of this is, of course, that attackers do not actually need to have access to your password hasher to start cracking it: they can try to guess your master key without ever stealing anything from you other than a single token you used to log into some random web site. Password hashers also necessarily generate unique passwords for every site you use them on. While you can also do this with password managers, it is not an enforced decision. With hashers, you get distinct and strong passwords for every site with no effort.

The problem with password hashers If hashers are so great, why would you use a password manager? Programs like LessPass and Master Password seem to have strong crypto that is well implemented, so why isn't everyone using those tools? Password hashing, as a general concept, actually has serious problems: since the hashing outputs are constantly compromised (they are sent in password forms to various possibly hostile sites), it's theoretically possible to derive the master password and then break all the generated tokens in one shot. The use of stronger key derivation functions (like PBKDF2, scrypt, or HMAC) or seeds (like a profile-specific secret) makes those attacks much harder, especially if the seed is long enough to make brute-force attacks infeasible. (Unfortunately, in the case of Password Hasher Plus, the seed is derived from Math.random() calls, which are not considered cryptographically secure.) Basically, as stated by Julian Morrison in this discussion:
A password is now ciphertext, not a block of line noise. Every time you transmit it, you are giving away potential clues of use to an attacker. [...] You only have one password for all the sites, really, underneath, and it's your secret key. If it's broken, it's now a skeleton-key [...]
Newer implementations like LessPass and Master Password fix this by using reasonable key derivation algorithms (PBKDF2 and scrypt, respectively) that are more resistant to offline cracking attacks, but who knows how long those will hold? To give a concrete example, if you would like to use the new winner of the password hashing competition (Argon2) in your password manager, you can patch the program (or wait for an update) and re-encrypt your database. With a password hasher, it's not so easy: changing the algorithm means logging in to every site you visited and changing the password. As someone who used a password hasher for a few years, I can tell you this is really impractical: you quickly end up with hundreds of passwords. The LessPass developers tried to facilitate this, but they ended up mostly giving up. Which brings us to the question of state. A lot of those tools claim to work "without a server" or as being "stateless" and while those claims are partly true, hashers are way more usable (and more secure, with profile secrets) when they do keep some sort of state. For example, Password Hasher Plus records, in your browser profile, which site you visited and which settings were used on each site, which makes it easier to comply with weird password policies. But then that state needs to be backed up and synchronized across multiple devices, which led LessPass to offer a service (which you can also self-host) to keep those settings online. At this point, a key benefit of the password hasher approach (not keeping state) just disappears and you might as well use a password manager. Another issue with password hashers is choosing the right one from the start, because changing software generally means changing the algorithm, and therefore changing passwords everywhere. If there was a well-established program that was be recognized as a solid cryptographic solution by the community, I would feel more confident. But what I have seen is that there are a lot of different implementations each with its own warts and flaws; because changing is so painful, I can't actually use any of those alternatives. All of the password hashers I have reviewed have severe security versus usability tradeoffs. For example, LessPass has what seems to be a sound cryptographic implementation, but using it requires you to click on the icon, fill in the fields, click generate, and then copy the password into the field, which means at least four or five actions per password. The venerable Password Hasher is much easier to use, but it makes you type the master password directly in the site's password form, so hostile sites can simply use JavaScript to sniff the master password while it is typed. While there are workarounds implemented in Password Hasher Plus (the profile-specific secret), both tools are more or less abandoned now. The Password Hasher homepage, linked from the extension page, is now a 404. Password Hasher Plus hasn't seen a release in over a year and there is no space for collaborating on the software the homepage is simply the author's Google+ page with no information on the project. I couldn't actually find the source online and had to download the Chrome extension by hand to review the source code. Software abandonment is a serious issue for every project out there, but I would argue that it is especially severe for password hashers. Furthermore, I have had difficulty using password hashers in unified login environments like Wikipedia's or StackExchange's single-sign-on systems. Because they allow you to log in with the same password on multiple sites, you need to choose (and remember) what label you used when signing in. Did I sign in on stackoverflow.com? Or was it stackexchange.com? Also, as mentioned in the previous article about password managers, web-based password managers have serious security flaws. Since more than a few password hashers are implemented using bookmarklets, they bring all of those serious vulnerabilities with them, which can range from account name to master password disclosures. Finally, some of the password hashers use dubious crypto primitives that were valid and interesting a decade ago, but are really showing their age now. Stanford's pwdhash uses MD5, which is considered "cryptographically broken and unsuitable for further use". We have seen partial key recovery attacks against MD5 already and while those do not allow an attacker to recover the full master password yet (especially not with HMAC-MD5), I would not recommend anyone use MD5 in anything at this point, especially if changing that algorithm later is hard. Some hashers (like Password Hasher and Password Plus) use a a single round of SHA-1 to derive a token from a password; WPA2 (standardized in 2004) uses 4096 iterations of HMAC-SHA1. A recent US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report also recommends "at least 10,000 iterations of the hash function".

Conclusion Forced to suggest a password hasher, I would probably point to LessPass or Master Password, depending on the platform of the person asking. But, for now, I have determined that the security drawbacks of password hashers are not acceptable and I do not recommend them. It makes my password management recommendation shorter anyway: "remember a few carefully generated passwords and shove everything else in a password manager". [Many thanks to Daniel Kahn Gillmor for the thorough reviews provided for the password articles.]
Note: this article first appeared in the Linux Weekly News. Also, details of my research into password hashers are available in the password hashers history article.

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