Search Results: "Aurelien Jarno"

3 December 2023

Ben Hutchings: FOSS activity in August 2023

12 October 2023

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in September 2023

Welcome to the September 2023 report from the Reproducible Builds project In these reports, we outline the most important things that we have been up to over the past month. As a quick recap, whilst anyone may inspect the source code of free software for malicious flaws, almost all software is distributed to end users as pre-compiled binaries.
Andreas Herrmann gave a talk at All Systems Go 2023 titled Fast, correct, reproducible builds with Nix and Bazel . Quoting from the talk description:

You will be introduced to Google s open source build system Bazel, and will learn how it provides fast builds, how correctness and reproducibility is relevant, and how Bazel tries to ensure correctness. But, we will also see where Bazel falls short in ensuring correctness and reproducibility. You will [also] learn about the purely functional package manager Nix and how it approaches correctness and build isolation. And we will see where Bazel has an advantage over Nix when it comes to providing fast feedback during development.
Andreas also shows how you can get the best of both worlds and combine Nix and Bazel, too. A video of the talk is available.
diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can locate and diagnose reproducibility issues. This month, Chris Lamb fixed compatibility with file(1) version 5.45 [ ] and updated some documentation [ ]. In addition, Vagrant Cascadian extended support for GNU Guix [ ][ ] and updated the version in that distribution as well. [ ].
Yet another reminder that our upcoming Reproducible Builds Summit is set to take place from October 31st November 2nd 2023 in Hamburg, Germany. If you haven t been before, our summits are a unique gathering that brings together attendees from diverse projects, united by a shared vision of advancing the Reproducible Builds effort. During this enriching event, participants will have the opportunity to engage in discussions, establish connections and exchange ideas to drive progress in this vital field. If you re interested in joining us this year, please make sure to read the event page, the news item, or the invitation email that Mattia Rizzolo sent out recently, all of which have more details about the event and location. We are also still looking for sponsors to support the event, so please reach out to the organising team if you are able to help. Also note that PackagingCon 2023 is taking place in Berlin just before our summit.
On the Reproducible Builds website, Greg Chabala updated the JVM-related documentation to update a link to the BUILDSPEC.md file. [ ] And Fay Stegerman fixed the builds failing because of a YAML syntax error.

Distribution work In Debian, this month: September saw F-Droid add ten new reproducible apps, and one existing app switched to reproducible builds. In addition, two reproducible apps were archived and one was disabled for a current total of 199 apps published with Reproducible Builds and using the upstream developer s signature. [ ] In addition, an extensive blog post was posted on f-droid.org titled Reproducible builds, signing keys, and binary repos .

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

Testing framework The Reproducible Builds project operates a comprehensive testing framework (available at tests.reproducible-builds.org) in order to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. In August, a number of changes were made by Holger Levsen:
  • Disable armhf and i386 builds due to Debian bug #1052257. [ ][ ][ ][ ]
  • Run diffoscope with a lower ionice priority. [ ]
  • Log every build in a simple text file [ ] and create persistent stamp files when running diffoscope to ease debugging [ ].
  • Run schedulers one hour after dinstall again. [ ]
  • Temporarily use diffoscope from the host, and not from a schroot running the tested suite. [ ][ ]
  • Fail the diffoscope distribution test if the diffoscope version cannot be determined. [ ]
  • Fix a spelling error in the email to IRC gateway. [ ]
  • Force (and document) the reconfiguration of all jobs, due to the recent rise of zombies. [ ][ ][ ][ ]
  • Deal with a rare condition when killing processes which should not be there. [ ]
  • Install the Debian backports kernel in an attempt to address Debian bug #1052257. [ ][ ]
In addition, Mattia Rizzolo fixed a call to diffoscope --version (as suggested by Fay Stegerman on our mailing list) [ ], worked on an openQA credential issue [ ] and also made some changes to the machine-readable reproducible metadata, reproducible-tracker.json [ ]. Lastly, Roland Clobus added instructions for manual configuration of the openQA secrets [ ].
If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

23 July 2023

Aurelien Jarno: Welcome Debian riscv64

After many years of effort, I am happy to announce that Debian riscv64 is now an official architecture! This milestone is not the end of the journey but rather the beginning of a new one: the port will need to be rebootstrapped in the official archive, build daemons will have to be reinstalled and handed over to DSA, many bugs will need to be fixed. If everything goes well, the architecture will eventually be released with Trixie. Please note that this process will be long and will span several months. I would like to take this opportunity to thanks everyone who contributed to this significant milestone, including individuals and Debian teams, as well as the organizations and companies that provided us with resources (by rough chronological order): MIT CSAIL, Sifive, Mullvad, tetaneutral.net, OSU Open Source Lab, Microchip, BeagleBoard.org Foundation, RISC-V international, PLCT Lab (ISCAS), StarFive, and Metropolitan Area Network Darmstadt.

14 July 2023

Aurelien Jarno: Goodbye Debian GNU/kFreeBSD

Over the years, the Debian GNU/kFreeBSD port has gone through various phases. After many years of development, it was released as technology preview with the release of Squeeze and eventually became an official architecture with the release of Wheezy. However it ceased being an official architecture a couple of years later with the release of Jessie, although a jessie-kfreebsd suite was available in the official archive. Some years later, it was moved to the debian-ports archive, where it slowly regressed over the years. The development totally has now been stopped for over a year, and the port has been removed from the debian-ports archive. It's time to say it goodbye! I feel a touch of nostalgia as I was deeply involved in the Debian GNU/kFreeBSD port for nearly a decade, starting in 2006. There are many different reasons to like GNU/kFreeBSD ranging from political to technical considerations. Personally, I liked the technical aspect, as the FreeBSD kernel, at that time, was ahead of the Linux kernel in term of features: jails, ZFS, IPv6 stateful firewalling, and at a later point superpages. That said it was way behind for hardware support and to the best of my knowledge this remains unchanged. Meanwhile, the Linux kernel development accelerated in the latter stages of the 2.6.x series, and eventually closed the feature gap. At some point, I began to lose interest, and also to lack time, and slowly stepped away from its development.

12 April 2023

Aurelien Jarno: Backup server upgraded to Bookworm

A few months ago, I switched my backup server to an ODROID-M1 SBC. It uses a RK3568 SoC with a quad-core Cortex-A55 and AES extensions (useful for disk encryption), and I added a 2 TB NVME SSD to the M2 slot. It also has a SATA connector, but the default enclosure does not have space for 2.5" drives. It's not the fastest SBC, but it runs stable and quite well as a backup server, and it's fanless, and low-power (less than 2 W idle). The support for the SoC has been added recently to the Linux kernel (it's used by various SBC), however the device tree for the ODROID-M1 was missing, so I contributed it based on the vendor one, and also submitted a few small fixes. All the changes ended in the Bookworm kernel, and with the Bookworm release approaching, I decided it was the good moment to upgrade it. It went quite well, and now I can enjoy running dist-upgrade like on other stable servers without having to care about the kernel. I am currently using Borg as a backup software, but the upgrade also gave access to a newer Restic version supporting compression (a must have for me), so I may give it a try.

11 April 2023

Aurelien Jarno: New website, or kind of...

For over 15 years, I've hardly made any updates to my website, and it remains low on my priority list. So I made a radical decision to replace it entirely with my blog. The content of the website has been reduced to just two additional pages. But nothing has been lost: nowadays, Wikipedia is a much better platform for sharing knowledge than random websites. And it happens that they already cover all that was on my website about subaquatic diving in French. They also offer a multitude of resources in electronics, including the topics that were on my website: LCD displays, I C bus, barcodes, parallel ports, serial ports, and DCF77 reception. Finally if you're in need of Debian QEMU images for various architectures, I recommend the Debian Quick Image Baker pre-baked images page instead.

8 November 2022

Aurelien Jarno: riscv64 porterbox

For quite some time, many people asked for a riscv64 porterbox. Now we've got one called debian-riscv64-porterbox-01.debian.net. A big thanks to SiFive for providing the HiFive Unmatched board and OSUOSL for assembling the hardware and hosting it.

7 August 2022

Aurelien Jarno: GNU libc 2.34 in unstable

The GNU libc version 2.34 has just been accepted into unstable. Getting it ready has been more challenging than other versions, as this version integrates a few libraries (libpthread, libdl, libutil, libanl) into libc. While this is handled transparently at runtime, there are a few corner cases at build time: The next challenge is to get it migrating into testing! For the adventurous persons, GNU libc 2.35 is now available in experimental. And as people keep asking, the goal is to get the just released GNU libc 2.36 into Bookworm.

25 December 2021

Aurelien Jarno: James Webb Space Telescope launched!

The long awaited James Webb Space Telescope has finally been successfully launched today. It is a Xmas gift for many people who have been waiting for it for many years. On a more personal side, I am happy and proud to have contributed to a tiny part of a tiny piece of software of this huge project over the last 15 years: the Instrument Performance Simulator of the NIRSpec instrument.

5 October 2020

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in September 2020

Welcome to the September 2020 report from the Reproducible Builds project. In our monthly reports, we attempt to summarise the things that we have been up to over the past month, but if you are interested in contributing to the project, please visit our main website. This month, the Reproducible Builds project was pleased to announce a donation from Amateur Radio Digital Communications (ARDC) in support of its goals. ARDC s contribution will propel the Reproducible Builds project s efforts in ensuring the future health, security and sustainability of our increasingly digital society. Amateur Radio Digital Communications (ARDC) is a non-profit which was formed to further research and experimentation with digital communications using radio, with a goal of advancing the state of the art of amateur radio and to educate radio operators in these techniques. You can view the full announcement as well as more information about ARDC on their website.
In August s report, we announced that Jennifer Helsby (redshiftzero) launched a new reproduciblewheels.com website to address the lack of reproducibility of Python wheels . This month, Kushal Das posted a brief follow-up to provide an update on reproducible sources as well. The Threema privacy and security-oriented messaging application announced that within the next months , their apps will become fully open source, supporting reproducible builds :
This is to say that anyone will be able to independently review Threema s security and verify that the published source code corresponds to the downloaded app.
You can view the full announcement on Threema s website.

Events Sadly, due to the unprecedented events in 2020, there will be no in-person Reproducible Builds event this year. However, the Reproducible Builds project intends to resume meeting regularly on IRC, starting on Monday, October 12th at 18:00 UTC (full announcement). The cadence of these meetings will probably be every two weeks, although this will be discussed and decided on at the first meeting. (An editable agenda is available.) On 18th September, Bernhard M. Wiedemann gave a presentation in German titled Wie reproducible builds Software sicherer machen ( How reproducible builds make software more secure ) at the Internet Security Digital Days 2020 conference. (View video.) On Saturday 10th October, Morten Linderud will give a talk at Arch Conf Online 2020 on The State of Reproducible Builds in the Arch Linux distribution:
The previous year has seen great progress in Arch Linux to get reproducible builds in the hands of the users and developers. In this talk we will explore the current tooling that allows users to reproduce packages, the rebuilder software that has been written to check packages and the current issues in this space.
During the Reproducible Builds summit in Marrakesh, GNU Guix, NixOS and Debian were able to produce a bit-for-bit identical binary when building GNU Mes, despite using three different major versions of GCC. Since the summit, additional work resulted in a bit-for-bit identical Mes binary using tcc and this month, a fuller update was posted by the individuals involved.

Development work In openSUSE, Bernhard M. Wiedemann published his monthly Reproducible Builds status update.

Debian Chris Lamb uploaded a number of Debian packages to address reproducibility issues that he had previously provided patches for, including cfingerd (#831021), grap (#870573), splint (#924003) & schroot (#902804) Last month, an issue was identified where a large number of Debian .buildinfo build certificates had been tainted on the official Debian build servers, as these environments had files underneath the /usr/local/sbin directory to prevent the execution of system services during package builds. However, this month, Aurelien Jarno and Wouter Verhelst fixed this issue in varying ways, resulting in a special policy-rcd-declarative-deny-all package. Building on Chris Lamb s previous work on reproducible builds for Debian .ISO images, Roland Clobus announced his work in progress on making the Debian Live images reproducible. [ ] Lucas Nussbaum performed an archive-wide rebuild of packages to test enabling the reproducible=+fixfilepath Debian build flag by default. Enabling the fixfilepath feature will likely fix reproducibility issues in an estimated 500-700 packages. The test revealed only 33 packages (out of 30,000 in the archive) that fail to build with fixfilepath. Many of those will be fixed when the default LLVM/Clang version is upgraded. 79 reviews of Debian packages were added, 23 were updated and 17 were removed this month adding to our knowledge about identified issues. Chris Lamb added and categorised a number of new issue types, including packages that captures their build path via quicktest.h and absolute build directories in documentation generated by Doxygen , etc. Lastly, Lukas Puehringer s uploaded a new version of the in-toto to Debian which was sponsored by Holger Levsen. [ ]

diffoscope diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can not only locate and diagnose reproducibility issues, it provides human-readable diffs of all kinds too. In September, Chris Lamb made the following changes to diffoscope, including preparing and uploading versions 159 and 160 to Debian:
  • New features:
    • Show ordering differences only in strings(1) output by applying the ordering check to all differences across the codebase. [ ]
  • Bug fixes:
    • Mark some PGP tests that they require pgpdump, and check that the associated binary is actually installed before attempting to run it. (#969753)
    • Don t raise exceptions when cleaning up after guestfs cleanup failure. [ ]
    • Ensure we check FALLBACK_FILE_EXTENSION_SUFFIX, otherwise we run pgpdump against all files that are recognised by file(1) as data. [ ]
  • Codebase improvements:
    • Add some documentation for the EXTERNAL_TOOLS dictionary. [ ]
    • Abstract out a variable we use a couple of times. [ ]
  • diffoscope.org website improvements:
    • Make the (long) demonstration GIF less prominent on the page. [ ]
In addition, Paul Spooren added support for automatically deploying Docker images. [ ]

Website and documentation This month, a number of updates to the main Reproducible Builds website and related documentation. Chris Lamb made the following changes: In addition, Holger Levsen re-added the documentation link to the top-level navigation [ ] and documented that the jekyll-polyglot package is required [ ]. Lastly, diffoscope.org and reproducible-builds.org were transferred to Software Freedom Conservancy. Many thanks to Brett Smith from Conservancy, J r my Bobbio (lunar) and Holger Levsen for their help with transferring and to Mattia Rizzolo for initiating this.

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of these patches, including: Bernhard M. Wiedemann also reported issues in git2-rs, pyftpdlib, python-nbclient, python-pyzmq & python-sidpy.

Testing framework The Reproducible Builds project operates a Jenkins-based testing framework to power tests.reproducible-builds.org. This month, Holger Levsen made the following changes:
  • Debian:
    • Shorten the subject of nodes have gone offline notification emails. [ ]
    • Also track bugs that have been usertagged with usrmerge. [ ]
    • Drop abort-related codepaths as that functionality has been removed from Jenkins. [ ]
    • Update the frequency we update base images and status pages. [ ][ ][ ][ ]
  • Status summary view page:
    • Add support for monitoring systemctl status [ ] and the number of diffoscope processes [ ].
    • Show the total number of nodes [ ] and colourise critical disk space situations [ ].
    • Improve the visuals with respect to vertical space. [ ][ ]
  • Debian rebuilder prototype:
    • Resume building random packages again [ ] and update the frequency that packages are rebuilt. [ ][ ]
    • Use --no-respect-build-path parameter until sbuild 0.81 is available. [ ]
    • Treat the inability to locate some packages as a debrebuild problem, and not as a issue with the rebuilder itself. [ ]
  • Arch Linux:
    • Update various components to be compatible with Arch Linux s move to the xz compression format. [ ][ ][ ]
    • Allow scheduling of old packages to catch up on the backlog. [ ][ ][ ]
    • Improve formatting on the summary page. [ ][ ]
    • Update HTML pages once every hour, not every 30 minutes. [ ]
    • Use the Ubuntu (!) GPG keyserver to validate packages. [ ]
  • System health checks:
    • Highlight important bad conditions in colour. [ ][ ]
    • Add support for detecting more problems, including Jenkins shutdown issues [ ], failure to upgrade Arch Linux packages [ ], kernels with wrong permissions [ ], etc.
  • Misc:
    • Delete old schroot sessions after 2 days, not 3. [ ]
    • Use sudo to cleanup diffoscope schroot sessions. [ ]
In addition, stefan0xC fixed a query for unknown results in the handling of Arch Linux packages [ ] and Mattia Rizzolo updated the template that notifies maintainers by email of their newly-unreproducible packages to ensure that it did not get caught in junk/spam folders [ ]. Finally, build node maintenance was performed by Holger Levsen [ ][ ][ ][ ], Mattia Rizzolo [ ][ ] and Vagrant Cascadian [ ][ ][ ].
If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

17 October 2017

Antoine Beaupr : A comparison of cryptographic keycards

An earlier article showed that private key storage is an important problem to solve in any cryptographic system and established keycards as a good way to store private key material offline. But which keycard should we use? This article examines the form factor, openness, and performance of four keycards to try to help readers choose the one that will fit their needs. I have personally been using a YubiKey NEO, since a 2015 announcement on GitHub promoting two-factor authentication. I was also able to hook up my SSH authentication key into the YubiKey's 2048 bit RSA slot. It seemed natural to move the other subkeys onto the keycard, provided that performance was sufficient. The mail client that I use, (Notmuch), blocks when decrypting messages, which could be a serious problems on large email threads from encrypted mailing lists. So I built a test harness and got access to some more keycards: I bought a FST-01 from its creator, Yutaka Niibe, at the last DebConf and Nitrokey donated a Nitrokey Pro. I also bought a YubiKey 4 when I got the NEO. There are of course other keycards out there, but those are the ones I could get my hands on. You'll notice none of those keycards have a physical keypad to enter passwords, so they are all vulnerable to keyloggers that could extract the key's PIN. Keep in mind, however, that even with the PIN, an attacker could only ask the keycard to decrypt or sign material but not extract the key that is protected by the card's firmware.

Form factor The Nitrokey Pro, YubiKey NEO (worn out), YubiKey 4, and FST-01 The four keycards have similar form factors: they all connect to a standard USB port, although both YubiKey keycards have a capacitive button by which the user triggers two-factor authentication and the YubiKey 4 can also require a button press to confirm private key use. The YubiKeys feel sturdier than the other two. The NEO has withstood two years of punishment in my pockets along with the rest of my "real" keyring and there is only minimal wear on the keycard in the picture. It's also thinner so it fits well on the keyring. The FST-01 stands out from the other two with its minimal design. Out of the box, the FST-01 comes without a case, so the circuitry is exposed. This is deliberate: one of its goals is to be as transparent as possible, both in terms of software and hardware design and you definitely get that feeling at the physical level. Unfortunately, that does mean it feels more brittle than other models: I wouldn't carry it in my pocket all the time, although there is a case that may protect the key a little better, but it does not provide an easy way to hook it into a keyring. In the group picture above, the FST-01 is the pink plastic thing, which is a rubbery casing I received along with the device when I got it. Notice how the USB connectors of the YubiKeys differ from the other two: while the FST-01 and the Nitrokey have standard USB connectors, the YubiKey has only a "half-connector", which is what makes it thinner than the other two. The "Nano" form factor takes this even further and almost disappears in the USB port. Unfortunately, this arrangement means the YubiKey NEO often comes loose and falls out of the USB port, especially when connected to a laptop. On my workstation, however, it usually stays put even with my whole keyring hanging off of it. I suspect this adds more strain to the host's USB port but that's a tradeoff I've lived with without any noticeable wear so far. Finally, the NEO has this peculiar feature of supporting NFC for certain operations, as LWN previously covered, but I haven't used that feature yet. The Nitrokey Pro looks like a normal USB key, in contrast with the other two devices. It does feel a little brittle when compared with the YubiKey, although only time will tell how much of a beating it can take. It has a small ring in the case so it is possible to carry it directly on your keyring, but I would be worried the cap would come off eventually. Nitrokey devices are also two times thicker than the Yubico models which makes them less convenient to carry around on keyrings.

Open and closed designs The FST-01 is as open as hardware comes, down to the PCB design available as KiCad files in this Git repository. The software running on the card is the Gnuk firmware that implements the OpenPGP card protocol, but you can also get it with firmware implementing a true random number generator (TRNG) called NeuG (pronounced "noisy"); the device is programmable through a standard Serial Wire Debug (SWD) port. The Nitrokey Start model also runs the Gnuk firmware. However, the Nitrokey website announces only ECC and RSA 2048-bit support for the Start, while the FST-01 also supports RSA-4096. Nitrokey's founder Jan Suhr, in a private email, explained that this is because "Gnuk doesn't support RSA-3072 or larger at a reasonable speed". Its devices (the Pro, Start, and HSM models) use a similar chip to the FST-01: the STM32F103 microcontroller. Nitrokey Pro with STM32F103TBU6 MCU Nitrokey also publishes its hardware designs, on GitHub, which shows the Pro is basically a fork of the FST-01, according to the ChangeLog. I opened the case to confirm it was using the STM MCU, something I should warn you against; I broke one of the pins holding it together when opening it so now it's even more fragile. But at least, I was able to confirm it was built using the STM32F103TBU6 MCU, like the FST-01. Nitrokey back side But this is where the comparison ends: on the back side, we find a SIM card reader that holds the OpenPGP card that, in turn, holds the private key material and does the cryptographic operations. So, in effect, the Nitrokey Pro is really a evolution of the original OpenPGP card readers. Nitrokey confirmed the OpenPGP card featured in the Pro is the same as the one shipped by the Free Software Foundation Europe (FSFE): the BasicCard built by ZeitControl. Those cards, however, are covered by NDAs and the firmware is only partially open source. This makes the Nitrokey Pro less open than the FST-01, but that's an inevitable tradeoff when choosing a design based on the OpenPGP cards, which Suhr described to me as "pretty proprietary". There are other keycards out there, however, for example the SLJ52GDL150-150k smartcard suggested by Debian developer Yves-Alexis Perez, which he prefers as it is certified by French and German authorities. In that blog post, he also said he was experimenting with the GPL-licensed OpenPGP applet implemented by the French ANSSI. But the YubiKey devices are even further away in the closed-design direction. Both the hardware designs and firmware are proprietary. The YubiKey NEO, for example, cannot be upgraded at all, even though it is based on an open firmware. According to Yubico's FAQ, this is due to "best security practices": "There is a 'no upgrade' policy for our devices since nothing, including malware, can write to the firmware." I find this decision questionable in a context where security updates are often more important than trying to design a bulletproof design, which may simply be impossible. And the YubiKey NEO did suffer from critical security issue that allowed attackers to bypass the PIN protection on the card, which raises the question of the actual protection of the private key material on those cards. According to Niibe, "some OpenPGP cards store the private key unencrypted. It is a common attitude for many smartcard implementations", which was confirmed by Suhr: "the private key is protected by hardware mechanisms which prevent its extraction and misuse". He is referring to the use of tamper resistance. After that security issue, there was no other option for YubiKey NEO users than to get a new keycard (for free, thankfully) from Yubico, which also meant discarding the private key material on the key. For OpenPGP keys, this may mean having to bootstrap the web of trust from scratch if the keycard was responsible for the main certification key. But at least the NEO is running free software based on the OpenPGP card applet and the source is still available on GitHub. The YubiKey 4, on the other hand, is now closed source, which was controversial when the new model was announced last year. It led the main Linux Foundation system administrator, Konstantin Ryabitsev, to withdraw his endorsement of Yubico products. In response, Yubico argued that this approach was essential to the security of its devices, which are now based on "a secure chip, which has built-in countermeasures to mitigate a long list of attacks". In particular, it claims that:
A commercial-grade AVR or ARM controller is unfit to be used in a security product. In most cases, these controllers are easy to attack, from breaking in via a debug/JTAG/TAP port to probing memory contents. Various forms of fault injection and side-channel analysis are possible, sometimes allowing for a complete key recovery in a shockingly short period of time.
While I understand those concerns, they eventually come down to the trust you have in an organization. Not only do we have to trust Yubico, but also hardware manufacturers and designs they have chosen. Every step in the hidden supply chain is then trusted to make correct technical decisions and not introduce any backdoors. History, unfortunately, is not on Yubico's side: Snowden revealed the example of RSA security accepting what renowned cryptographer Bruce Schneier described as a "bribe" from the NSA to weaken its ECC implementation, by using the presumably backdoored Dual_EC_DRBG algorithm. What makes Yubico or its suppliers so different from RSA Security? Remember that RSA Security used to be an adamant opponent to the degradation of encryption standards, campaigning against the Clipper chip in the first crypto wars. Even if we trust the Yubico supply chain, how can we trust a closed design using what basically amounts to security through obscurity? Publicly auditable designs are an important tradition in cryptography, and that principle shouldn't stop when software is frozen into silicon. In fact, a critical vulnerability called ROCA disclosed recently affects closed "smartcards" like the YubiKey 4 and allows full private key recovery from the public key if the key was generated on a vulnerable keycard. When speaking with Ars Technica, the researchers outlined the importance of open designs and questioned the reliability of certification:
Our work highlights the dangers of keeping the design secret and the implementation closed-source, even if both are thoroughly analyzed and certified by experts. The lack of public information causes a delay in the discovery of flaws (and hinders the process of checking for them), thereby increasing the number of already deployed and affected devices at the time of detection.
This issue with open hardware designs seems to be recurring topic of conversation on the Gnuk mailing list. For example, there was a discussion in September 2017 regarding possible hardware vulnerabilities in the STM MCU that would allow extraction of encrypted key material from the key. Niibe referred to a talk presented at the WOOT 17 workshop, where Johannes Obermaier and Stefan Tatschner, from the Fraunhofer Institute, demonstrated attacks against the STMF0 family MCUs. It is still unclear if those attacks also apply to the older STMF1 design used in the FST-01, however. Furthermore, extracted private key material is still protected by user passphrase, but the Gnuk uses a weak key derivation function, so brute-forcing attacks may be possible. Fortunately, there is work in progress to make GnuPG hash the passphrase before sending it to the keycard, which should make such attacks harder if not completely pointless. When asked about the Yubico claims in a private email, Niibe did recognize that "it is true that there are more weak points in general purpose implementations than special implementations". During the last DebConf in Montreal, Niibe explained:
If you don't trust me, you should not buy from me. Source code availability is only a single factor: someone can maliciously replace the firmware to enable advanced attacks.
Niibe recommends to "build the firmware yourself", also saying the design of the FST-01 uses normal hardware that "everyone can replicate". Those advantages are hard to deny for a cryptographic system: using more generic components makes it harder for hostile parties to mount targeted attacks. A counter-argument here is that it can be difficult for a regular user to audit such designs, let alone physically build the device from scratch but, in a mailing list discussion, Debian developer Ian Jackson explained that:
You don't need to be able to validate it personally. The thing spooks most hate is discovery. Backdooring supposedly-free hardware is harder (more costly) because it comes with greater risk of discovery. To put it concretely: if they backdoor all of them, someone (not necessarily you) might notice. (Backdooring only yours involves messing with the shipping arrangements and so on, and supposes that you specifically are of interest.)
Since that, as far as we know, the STM microcontrollers are not backdoored, I would tend to favor those devices instead of proprietary ones, as such a backdoor would be more easily detectable than in a closed design. Even though physical attacks may be possible against those microcontrollers, in the end, if an attacker has physical access to a keycard, I consider the key compromised, even if it has the best chip on the market. In our email exchange, Niibe argued that "when a token is lost, it is better to revoke keys, even if the token is considered secure enough". So like any other device, physical compromise of tokens may mean compromise of the key and should trigger key-revocation procedures.

Algorithms and performance To establish reliable performance results, I wrote a benchmark program naively called crypto-bench that could produce comparable results between the different keys. The program takes each algorithm/keycard combination and runs 1000 decryptions of a 16-byte file (one AES-128 block) using GnuPG, after priming it to get the password cached. I assume the overhead of GnuPG calls to be negligible, as it should be the same across all tokens, so comparisons are possible. AES encryption is constant across all tests as it is always performed on the host and fast enough to be irrelevant in the tests. I used the following:
  • Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-6100U CPU @ 2.30GHz running Debian 9 ("stretch"/stable amd64), using GnuPG 2.1.18-6 (from the stable Debian package)
  • Nitrokey Pro 0.8 (latest firmware)
  • FST-01, running Gnuk version 1.2.5 (latest firmware)
  • YubiKey NEO OpenPGP applet 1.0.10 (not upgradable)
  • YubiKey 4 4.2.6 (not upgradable)
I ran crypto-bench for each keycard, which resulted in the following:
Algorithm Device Mean time (s)
ECDH-Curve25519 CPU 0.036
FST-01 0.135
RSA-2048 CPU 0.016
YubiKey-4 0.162
Nitrokey-Pro 0.610
YubiKey-NEO 0.736
FST-01 1.265
RSA-4096 CPU 0.043
YubiKey-4 0.875
Nitrokey-Pro 3.150
FST-01 8.218
Decryption graph There we see the performance of the four keycards I tested, compared with the same operations done without a keycard: the "CPU" device. That provides the baseline time of GnuPG decrypting the file. The first obvious observation is that using a keycard is slower: in the best scenario (FST-01 + ECC) we see a four-fold slowdown, but in the worst case (also FST-01, but RSA-4096), we see a catastrophic 200-fold slowdown. When I presented the results on the Gnuk mailing list, GnuPG developer Werner Koch confirmed those "numbers are as expected":
With a crypto chip RSA is much faster. By design the Gnuk can't be as fast - it is just a simple MCU. However, using Curve25519 Gnuk is really fast.
And yes, the FST-01 is really fast at doing ECC, but it's also the only keycard that handles ECC in my tests; the Nitrokey Start and Nitrokey HSM should support it as well, but I haven't been able to test those devices. Also note that the YubiKey NEO doesn't support RSA-4096 at all, so we can only compare RSA-2048 across keycards. We should note, however, that ECC is slower than RSA on the CPU, which suggests the Gnuk ECC implementation used by the FST-01 is exceptionally fast. In discussions about improving the performance of the FST-01, Niibe estimated the user tolerance threshold to be "2 seconds decryption time". In a new design using the STM32L432 microcontroller, Aurelien Jarno was able to bring the numbers for RSA-2048 decryption from 1.27s down to 0.65s, and for RSA-4096, from 8.22s down to 3.87s seconds. RSA-4096 is still beyond the two-second threshold, but at least it brings the FST-01 close to the YubiKey NEO and Nitrokey Pro performance levels. We should also underline the superior performance of the YubiKey 4: whatever that thing is doing, it's doing it faster than anyone else. It does RSA-4096 faster than the FST-01 does RSA-2048, and almost as fast as the Nitrokey Pro does RSA-2048. We should also note that the Nitrokey Pro also fails to cross the two-second threshold for RSA-4096 decryption. For me, the FST-01's stellar performance with ECC outshines the other devices. Maybe it says more about the efficiency of the algorithm than the FST-01 or Gnuk's design, but it's definitely an interesting avenue for people who want to deploy those modern algorithms. So, in terms of performance, it is clear that both the YubiKey 4 and the FST-01 take the prize in their own areas (RSA and ECC, respectively).

Conclusion In the above presentation, I have evaluated four cryptographic keycards for use with various OpenPGP operations. What the results show is that the only efficient way of storing a 4096-bit encryption key on a keycard would be to use the YubiKey 4. Unfortunately, I do not feel we should put our trust in such closed designs so I would argue you should either stick with 2048-bit encryption subkeys or keep the keys on disk. Considering that losing such a key would be catastrophic, this might be a good approach anyway. You should also consider switching to ECC encryption: even though it may not be supported everywhere, GnuPG supports having multiple encryption subkeys on a keyring: if one algorithm is unsupported (e.g. GnuPG 1.4 doesn't support ECC), it will fall back to a supported algorithm (e.g. RSA). Do not forget your previously encrypted material doesn't magically re-encrypt itself using your new encryption subkey, however. For authentication and signing keys, speed is not such an issue, so I would warmly recommend either the Nitrokey Pro or Start, or the FST-01, depending on whether you want to start experimenting with ECC algorithms. Availability also seems to be an issue for the FST-01. While you can generally get the device when you meet Niibe in person for a few bucks (I bought mine for around \$30 Canadian), the Seeed online shop says the device is out of stock at the time of this writing, even though Jonathan McDowell said that may be inaccurate in a debian-project discussion. Nevertheless, this issue may make the Nitrokey devices more attractive. When deciding on using the Pro or Start, Suhr offered the following advice:
In practice smart card security has been proven to work well (at least if you use a decent smart card). Therefore the Nitrokey Pro should be used for high security cases. If you don't trust the smart card or if Nitrokey Start is just sufficient for you, you can choose that one. This is why we offer both models.
So far, I have created a signing subkey and moved that and my authentication key to the YubiKey NEO, because it's a device I physically trust to keep itself together in my pockets and I was already using it. It has served me well so far, especially with its extra features like U2F and HOTP support, which I use frequently. Those features are also available on the Nitrokey Pro, so that may be an alternative if I lose the YubiKey. I will probably move my main certification key to the FST-01 and a LUKS-encrypted USB disk, to keep that certification key offline but backed up on two different devices. As for the encryption key, I'll wait for keycard performance to improve, or simply switch my whole keyring to ECC and use the FST-01 or Nitrokey Start for that purpose.
[The author would like to thank Nitrokey for providing hardware for testing.] This article first appeared in the Linux Weekly News.

9 August 2016

Reproducible builds folks: Reproducible builds: week 67 in Stretch cycle

What happened in the Reproducible Builds effort between Sunday July 31 and Saturday August 6 2016: Toolchain development and fixes Packages fixed and bugs filed The following 24 packages have become reproducible - in our current test setup - due to changes in their build-dependencies: alglib aspcud boomaga fcl flute haskell-hopenpgp indigo italc kst ktexteditor libgroove libjson-rpc-cpp libqes luminance-hdr openscenegraph palabos petri-foo pgagent sisl srm-ifce vera++ visp x42-plugins zbackup The following packages have become reproducible after being fixed: The following newly-uploaded packages appear to be reproducible now, for reasons we were not able to figure out. (Relevant changelogs did not mention reproducible builds.) Some uploads have addressed some reproducibility issues, but not all of them: Patches submitted that have not made their way to the archive yet: Package reviews and QA These are reviews of reproduciblity issues of Debian packages. 276 package reviews have been added, 172 have been updated and 44 have been removed in this week. 7 FTBFS bugs have been reported by Chris Lamb. Reproducibility tools Test infrastructure For testing the impact of allowing variations of the buildpath (which up until now we required to be identical for reproducible rebuilds), Reiner Herrmann contribed a patch which enabled build path variations on testing/i386. This is possible now since dpkg 1.18.10 enables the --fixdebugpath build flag feature by default, which should result in reproducible builds (for C code) even with varying paths. So far we haven't had many results due to disturbances in our build network in the last days, but it seems this would mean roughly between 5-15% additional unreproducible packages - compared to what we see now. We'll keep you updated on the numbers (and problems with compilers and common frameworks) as we find them. lynxis continued work to test LEDE and OpenWrt on two different hosts, to include date variation in the tests. Mattia and Holger worked on the (mass) deployment scripts, so that the - for space reasons - only jenkins.debian.net GIT clone resides in ~jenkins-adm/ and not anymore in Holger's homedir, so that soon Mattia (and possibly others!) will be able to fully maintain this setup, while Holger is doing siesta. Miscellaneous Chris, dkg, h01ger and Ximin attended a Core Infrastricture Initiative summit meeting in New York City, to discuss and promote this Reproducible Builds project. The CII was set up in the wake of the Heartbleed SSL vulnerability to support software projects that are critical to the functioning of the internet. This week's edition was written by Ximin Luo and Holger Levsen and reviewed by a bunch of Reproducible Builds folks on IRC.

10 May 2016

Reproducible builds folks: Reproducible builds: week 54 in Stretch cycle

What happened in the Reproducible Builds effort between May 1st and May 7th 2016: Media coverage There has been a surprising tweet last week: "Props to @FiloSottile for his nifty gvt golang tool. We're using it to get reproducible builds for a Zika & West Nile monitoring project." and to our surprise Kenn confirmed privately that he indeed meant "reproducible builds" as in "bit by bit identical builds". Wow. We're looking forward to learn more details about this; for now we just know that they are doing this for software quality reasons basically. Two of the four GSoC and Outreachy participants for Reproducible builds posted their introductions to Planet Debian: Toolchain fixes and other upstream developments dpkg 1.18.5 was uploaded fixing two bugs relevant to us: This upload made it necessary to rebase our dpkg on the version on sid again, which Niko Tyni and Lunar promptly did. Then a few days later 1.18.6 was released to fix a regression in the previous upload, and Niko promptly updated our patched version again. Following this Niko Tyni found #823428: "dpkg: many packages affected by dpkg-source: error: source package uses only weak checksums". Alexis Bienven e worked on tex related packages and SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH: Emmanuel Bourg uploaded jflex/1.4.3+dfsg-2, which removes timestamps from generated files. Packages fixed The following 285 packages have become reproducible due to changes in their build dependencies (mostly from GCC honouring SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, see the previous week report): 0ad abiword abcm2ps acedb acpica-unix actiona alliance amarok amideco amsynth anjuta aolserver4-nsmysql aolserver4-nsopenssl aolserver4-nssqlite3 apbs aqsis aria2 ascd ascii2binary atheme-services audacity autodocksuite avis awardeco bacula ballerburg bb berusky berusky2 bindechexascii binkd boinc boost1.58 boost1.60 bwctl cairo-dock cd-hit cenon.app chipw ckermit clp clustalo cmatrix coinor-cbc commons-pool cppformat crashmail crrcsim csvimp cyphesis-cpp dact dar darcs darkradiant dcap dia distcc dolphin-emu drumkv1 dtach dune-localfunctions dvbsnoop dvbstreamer eclib ed2k-hash edfbrowser efax-gtk efax exonerate f-irc fakepop fbb filezilla fityk flasm flightgear fluxbox fmit fossil freedink-dfarc freehdl freemedforms-project freeplayer freeradius fxload gdb-arm-none-eabi geany-plugins geany geda-gaf gfm gif2png giflib gifticlib glaurung glusterfs gnokii gnubiff gnugk goaccess gocr goldencheetah gom gopchop gosmore gpsim gputils grcompiler grisbi gtkpod gvpe hardlink haskell-github hashrat hatari herculesstudio hpcc hypre i2util incron infiniband-diags infon ips iptotal ipv6calc iqtree jabber-muc jama jamnntpd janino jcharts joy2key jpilot jumpnbump jvim kanatest kbuild kchmviewer konclude krename kscope kvpnc latexdiff lcrack leocad libace-perl libcaca libcgicc libdap libdbi-drivers libewf libjlayer-java libkcompactdisc liblscp libmp3spi-java libpwiz librecad libspin-java libuninum libzypp lightdm-gtk-greeter lighttpd linpac lookup lz4 lzop maitreya meshlab mgetty mhwaveedit minbif minc-tools moc mrtrix mscompress msort mudlet multiwatch mysecureshell nifticlib nkf noblenote nqc numactl numad octave-optim omega-rpg open-cobol openmama openmprtl openrpt opensm openvpn openvswitch owx pads parsinsert pcb pd-hcs pd-hexloader pd-hid pd-libdir pear-channels pgn-extract phnxdeco php-amqp php-apcu-bc php-apcu php-solr pidgin-librvp plan plymouth pnscan pocketsphinx polygraph portaudio19 postbooks-updater postbooks powertop previsat progressivemauve puredata-import pycurl qjackctl qmidinet qsampler qsopt-ex qsynth qtractor quassel quelcom quickplot qxgedit ratpoison rlpr robojournal samplv1 sanlock saods9 schism scorched3d scummvm-tools sdlbasic sgrep simh sinfo sip-tester sludge sniffit sox spd speex stimfit swarm-cluster synfig synthv1 syslog-ng tart tessa theseus thunar-vcs-plugin ticcutils tickr tilp2 timbl timblserver tkgate transtermhp tstools tvoe ucarp ultracopier undbx uni2ascii uniutils universalindentgui util-vserver uudeview vfu virtualjaguar vmpk voms voxbo vpcs wipe x264 xcfa xfrisk xmorph xmount xyscan yacas yasm z88dk zeal zsync zynaddsubfx Last week the 1000th bug usertagged "reproducible" was fixed! This means roughly 2 bugs per day since 2015-01-01. Kudos and huge thanks to everyone involved! Please also note: FTBFS packages have not been counted here and there are still 600 open bugs with reproducible patches provided. Please help bringing that number down to 0! The following packages have become reproducible after being fixed: Some uploads have fixed some reproducibility issues, but not all of them: Uploads which fix reproducibility issues, but currently FTBFS: Patches submitted that have not made their way to the archive yet: Package reviews 54 reviews have been added, 6 have been updated and 44 have been removed in this week. 18 FTBFS bugs have been reported by Chris Lamb, James Cowgill and Niko Tyni. diffoscope development Thanks to Mattia, diffoscope 52~bpo8+1 is available in jessie-backports now. tests.reproducible-builds.org Misc. This week's edition was written by Reiner Herrmann, Holger Levsen and Mattia Rizzolo and reviewed by a bunch of Reproducible builds folks on IRC. Mattia also wrote a small ikiwiki macro for this blog to ease linking reproducible issues, packages in the package tracker and bugs in the Debian BTS.

21 March 2016

Lunar: Reproducible builds: week 47 in Stretch cycle

What happened in the reproducible builds effort between March 13th and March 19th 2016:

Toolchain fixes
  • Petter Reinholdtsen uploaded naturaldocs/1.51-1.1 which makes the output reproducible. Original patch by Chris Lamb.
  • Damyan Ivanov uploaded libpdf-api2-perl/2.025-2 which will make internal font ID reproducible.
  • Christian Hofstaedtler uploaded ruby2.3/2.3.0-5 which sets gzip embedded mtime field to fixed value for rdoc-generated compressed javascript data.

Packages fixed The following packages have become reproducible due to changes in their build dependencies: diction, doublecmd, ruby-hiredis, vdr-plugin-epgsearch. The following packages became reproducible after getting fixed: Some uploads fixed some reproducibility issues, but not all of them: Patches submitted which have not made their way to the archive yet:
  • #818128 on nethack by Reiner Herrmann: implement support for SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH, set LC_ALL to C, and ensure deterministic build order when running parallel builds.
  • #818111 on debian-keyring by Satyam Zode: fix the order of files in md5sums.
  • #818067 on ncurses by Niels Thykier: strip trailing whitespaces introduced when using dash as system shell.
  • #818230 on aircrack-ng by Reiner Herrmann: build assembly code as a separate .o file.
  • #818419 on mutt by Daniel Shahaf: use C locale when listing files to be put in README.Patches.
  • #818430 on ruby-coveralls by Dhole: ensure UTC is used as the timezone when generating the documentation.
  • #818686 on littlewizard by Reiner Herrmann: use the C locale in the script for iterating over the files.
  • #818704 on strigi by Reiner Herrmann: sort keys when traversing hashes in makecode.pl.

Package reviews 44 reviews have been removed, 40 added and 5 updated in the previous week. Chris Lamb has reported 16 FTBFS.

17 March 2016

Aurelien Jarno: (Pseudo-)virtualizing Intel USB controllers

I own a motherboard an Intel 8-Series Lynx Point chipset, with an Intel Haswell CPU supporting VT-d. This allow me to use Linux s VFIO features and assign PCIe devices to a KVM-based virtual machine. High-end network controllers goes even further with the Single Root I/O Virtualization (SR-IOV) capabilities, allowing them to be shared between to multiple virtual machines. The Lynx Point chipset provides a total of 14 USB ports arranged in 6 USB 3.0 ports and 8 USB 2.0 ports. It would be nice to be able to assign USB ports to virtual machines. QEMU already allows to assign a USB device to a virtual machine, but it works emulating a USB controller, and the traffic goes through userland. In addition it only works for a specific known device, a random device plugged to a given port is not automatically assigned to the guest (though I guess it can be scripted using the libvirt API). The xHCI specification, the one behind USB 3.0, has been designed to also support SR-IOV, to the best of my knowledege none of them actually support it. We ll see that with some hacks it is possible to actually assign a set of USB ports to a virtual machine, with the restrictions that running ports in SuperSpeed mode is allowed only on one side, host or virtual machine. First let s look at how the USB controllers appears on a Lynx Point chipset using lscpi:
00:14.0 USB controller [0c03]: Intel Corporation 8 Series/C220 Series Chipset Family USB xHCI [8086:8c31] (rev 04)
00:1a.0 USB controller [0c03]: Intel Corporation 8 Series/C220 Series Chipset Family USB EHCI #2 [8086:8c2d] (rev 04)
00:1d.0 USB controller [0c03]: Intel Corporation 8 Series/C220 Series Chipset Family USB EHCI #1 [8086:8c26] (rev 04)
 As one can see, three controllers are visible, one xHCI one and two EHCI ones. Let s now look at how the USB ports are arranged using lsusb -t
/: Bus 04.Port 1: Dev 1, Class=root_hub, Driver=ehci-pci/3p, 480M
__ Port 1: Dev 2, If 0, Class=Hub, Driver=hub/8p, 480M
/: Bus 03.Port 1: Dev 1, Class=root_hub, Driver=ehci-pci/3p, 480M
__ Port 1: Dev 2, If 0, Class=Hub, Driver=hub/6p, 480M
/: Bus 02.Port 1: Dev 1, Class=root_hub, Driver=xhci_hcd/6p, 5000M
/: Bus 01.Port 1: Dev 1, Class=root_hub, Driver=xhci_hcd/15p, 480M explain EHCI/OHCI/XHCI http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/chipsets/8-series-chipset-pch-datasheet.html the kernel in the VM might move back the devices to the xHCI controller. This is always the case for old kernels (like the 3.2 in Debian Wheezy), but for recent kernel it only happens if there is an intel EHCI controller available (either passed through VFIO or emulated by QEMU). add table Add warning

23 February 2016

Aurelien Jarno: 10 years ago

I joined the Debian GNU libc team and did my first glibc upload. At that time source-only upload were far from exiting, and I was using a HP 9000 model 715/80 HPPA workstation for my Debian builds. Still it seems to me like yesterday.

11 January 2016

Arturo Borrero Gonz lez: Great Debian meeting!



Last week we finally ended with a proper Debian informal meeting at Seville.

A total amount of 9 people attended, 3 of them DDs (Aurelien Jarno, Guillem Jover, Ana Guerrero) and 1 DM (me).

The meeting started with the usual "personal references" round, and then topics ranged from how to get more people involved with Debian, to GSoC-like programs discussions, and some Debian anecdotes as well.

There were also talks about when and how future meetings should be.

This meeting was hosted by http://www.plan4d.eu/, thanks to Pablo Neira (Netfilter project head).

Some pics of the moment:



14 October 2015

Lunar: Reproducible builds: week 24 in Stretch cycle

What happened in the reproducible builds effort this week: Toolchain fixes Scott Kitterman fixed an issue with non-deterministic Depends generated by dh-python identified by Santiago Vila and Chris Lamb. Lunar updated the patch against dpkg which makes the order of files in control.tar.gz deterministic using the new --sort=name option available in GNU Tar 1.28. josch released sbuild version 0.66.0-1 with several fixes and improvements. The most notable one for reproducible builds is the new --build-path option and $build_path configuration variable added by akira which allows to explicitly chose a given build path. Reiner Herrmann wrote a new patch for dh-systemd to sort the list of unit files in the generated maintainer scripts. Packages fixed The following packages became reproducible due to changes in their build dependencies: aoeui, apron, camlmix, cudf, findlib, glpk-java, hawtjni, haxe, java-atk-wrapper, llvm-py, misery, mtasc, ocamldsort, optcomp, spamoracle. The following packages became reproducible after getting fixed: Some uploads fixed some reproducibility issues but not all of them: Untested Patches submitted which have not made their way to the archive yet: reproducible.debian.net ProfitBricks once again increased their support for reproducible builds in Debian and in other free software projects by adding 58 new cores and 138 GiB of RAM to the already existing setup. Two new amd64 build nodes and 16 new amd64 build jobs have been added which doubles the build capacity per day and allows us to spot many kind of problems earlier. The size of the tmpfs where builds are performed has also been increased from 70 to 200 GiB on all amd64 build nodes. Huge thanks! When examining a package, a link now points to a table listing all previous recorded tests for the same package. (Mattia) The menu on the package pages has also been improved. (h01ger) Packages in the depwait state are now rescheduled automatically after five days. (h01ger) Links to documentation and other projects being tested have been made more visible on the landing page. (h01ger) To reduce noise on the team IRC channel five different types of notifications have been turned into mail notifications. The remaining ones have been shortened and the status changes have been limited to unstable and experimental. (h01ger) Maintainer notifications about status changes in a package will only be sent out once per day, and not on each status change. (h01ger) diffoscope development Some more experiments of concurrent processing have been made. None were good and reliable enough to be shared, though. Package reviews 48 reviews have been removed, 189 added and 23 updated this week. 9 FTBFS bugs were reported by Chris Lamb. Misc. h01ger met with Levente Polyak to discuss testing Arch Linux on Debian continuous test system with an easily extensible framework. The idea is to also allow testing of other distributions, and provide a nice package based view like the one for Debian.

4 October 2015

Johannes Schauer: new sbuild release 0.66.0

I just released sbuild 0.66.0-1 into unstable. It fixes a whopping 30 bugs! Thus, I'd like to use this platform to: And a super big thank you to Roger Leigh who, despite having resigned from Debian, was always available to give extremely helpful hints, tips, opinion and guidance with respect to sbuild development. Thank you! Here is a list of the major changes since the last release:

20 August 2014

Aurelien Jarno: MIPS Creator CI20

I have received two MIPS Creator CI20 boards, thanks to Imagination Technologies. It s a small MIPS32 development board: mips-ci20 As you can see it comes in a nice packaging with a world-compatible power adapter. It uses a Ingenic JZ4780 SoC with a dual core MIPS32 CPU running at 1.2GHz with a PowerVR SGX540 GPU. The board is fitted with 1GB of RAM, 8GB of NOR flash, HDMI output, USB 2.0 ports, Ethernet + Wi-Fi + BlueTooth, SD card slot, IR receiver, expansion headers and more. The schematics are available. The Linux kernel and the U-Boot bootloader sources are also available. Powering this board with a USB keyboard, a USB mouse and a HDMI display, it boots off the internal flash on a Debian Wheezy up to the XFCE environment. Besides the kernel, the Wi-Fi + Bluetooth firmware, and very few configuration changes, it runs a vanilla Debian. Unfortunately I haven t found time to play more with it yet, but it looks already quite promising. The board has not been formally announced yet, so I do not know when it will become available, nor the price, but if you are interested I ll bring it to DebConf14. Don t hesitate to ask me if you want to look at it or play with it.

Next.