• The check for paramiko version turned out not to work with versions 1.7.8 through 1.10.4, due to the paramiko.__version_info__ variable being missing. It's there in earlier and later versions. Lars Wirzenius added code to make the check work if the paramiko.__version__ variable is there. Jan Niggemann provided research and testing.

• I had some hard-coded http:// links in my wordpress theme, that needed changes,
• Since my wordpress instance is reverse-proxied and the real server not behind HTTPS, I had to adjust the wordpress configuration so that it doesn t do an infinite redirect loop,
• Nginx s config for multiple virtualhosts needs SSL configuration to be repeated. Fortunately, one can use include statements,
• Contrary to the suggested configuration, setting ssl_session_tickets off; makes browsers unhappy (at least, it made my Firefox unhappy, with a SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET error message).

Creating Oxidized container image The official documentation describes the procedure. I used a slightly different approach.

docking-station:~# mkdir -p /srv/docker/oxidized/  
docking-station:~# git clone https://github.com/ytti/oxidized \  
 /srv/docker/oxidized/oxidized.git
docking-station:~# docker build -q -t oxidized/oxidized:latest \  
 /srv/docker/oxidized/oxidized.git

I thought it might be a good idea to also tag the image with the actual version of the gem.

docking-station:~# docker tag oxidized/oxidized:latest \  
 oxidized/oxidized:0.11.0
docking-station:~# docker images   grep oxidized  
oxidized/oxidized   latest    35a325792078  15 seconds ago  496.1 MB  
oxidized/oxidized   0.11.0    35a325792078  15 seconds ago  496.1 MB  

Create initial default configuration like described in the documentation.

docking-station:~# mkir -p /srv/docker/oxidized/.config/  
docking-station:~# docker run -e CONFIG_RELOAD_INTERVAL=600 \  
 -v /srv/docker/oxidized/.config/:/root/.config/oxidized \
 -p 8888:8888/tcp -t oxidized/oxidized:latest oxidized

Adjusting configuration After this I adjusted the default configuration for writing a log, the nodes config into a bare git, having nodes secrets in router.db and some hooks for debugging.

Creating node configuration

docking-station:~# echo "7204vxr.lab.cyconet.org:cisco:admin:password:enable" >> \  
 /srv/docker/oxidized/.config/router.db
docking-station:~# echo "ccr1036.lab.cyconet.org:routeros:admin:password" >> \  
 /srv/docker/oxidized/.config/router.db

Starting the oxidized beast

docking-station:~# docker run -e CONFIG_RELOAD_INTERVAL=600 \  
 -v /srv/docker/oxidized/.config/:/root/.config/oxidized \
 -p 8888:8888/tcp -t oxidized/oxidized:latest oxidized
Puma 2.16.0 starting...  
* Min threads: 0, max threads: 16
* Environment: development
* Listening on tcp://127.0.0.1:8888

If you want to have the container get started with the docker daemon automatically, you can start the container with --restart always and docker will take care of it. If I wanted to make it running permanent, I would use a systemd unitfile.

Reload configuration immediately If you don't want to wait to automatically reload of the configuration, you can trigger it.

docking-station:~# curl -s http://localhost:8888/reload?format=json \  
 -O /dev/null
docking-station:~# tail -2 /srv/docker/oxidized/.config/log/oxidized.log  
I, [2016-01-29T16:50:46.971904 #1]  INFO -- : Oxidized starting, running as pid 1  
I, [2016-01-29T16:50:47.073307 #1]  INFO -- : Loaded 2 nodes  

Writing nodes configuration

docking-station:/srv/docker/oxidized/.config/oxidized.git# git shortlog  
Oxidizied (2):  
      update 7204vxr.lab.cyconet.org
      update ccr1036.lab.cyconet.org

Writing the nodes configurations into a local bare git repository is neat but far from perfect. It would be cool to have all the stuff in a central VCS. So I'm pushing it every 5 minutes into one with a cron job.

docking-station:~# cat /etc/cron.d/doxidized  
# m h dom mon dow user  command                                                 
*/5 * * * *    root    $(/srv/docker/oxidized/bin/oxidized_cron_git_push.sh)
docking-station:~# cat /srv/docker/oxidized/bin/oxidized_cron_git_push.sh  
#!/bin/bash
DOCKER_OXIDIZED_BASE="/srv/docker/oxidized/"  
OXIDIZED_GIT_DIR=".config/oxidized.git"
cd $ DOCKER_OXIDIZED_BASE /$ OXIDIZED_GIT_DIR   
git push origin master --quiet  

Now having all the nodes configurations in a source code hosting system, we can browse the configurations, changes, history and even establish notifications for changes. Mission accomplished! Now I can test the coverage of our equipment. The last thing that would make me super happy, a oxidized Debian package!

Nageru is an M/E (mixer/effects) video mixer capable of high-quality output on modest hardware. We'll go through the fundamental goals of the project, what we can learn from the outside world, performance challenges in mixing 720p60 video on an ultraportable laptop, and how all of this translates into a design and implementation that differs significantly from existing choices in the free software world.

Filed under: Debian English phpMyAdmin 4 comments

Recently, at a summer-school-like event, we were discussing pen-and-paper role playing. I m not sure if this was after a session of role-playing, but I was making the point that you don t need much or any at all of the rules, and scores, and dice, if you are one of the story-telling role players, and it can actually be more fun this way. As an example, I said, it can make sense if one of the players (and the game master, I suppose) reads up a lot about one aspect of the fantasy world, e.g. one geographical area, one cult, one person, and then this knowledge is used to create an exciting puzzle, even without any opponents. I m not quite sure, but I think I fell asleep shortly after, and I dreamed of such a role playing session. It was going roughly like this:

I (a human), and my fellows (at least a dwarf, not sure about the rest) went to some castle. It was empty, but scary. We crossed its hall, and went into a room on the other side. It was locked towards the hall by a door that covered the door frame only partly, and suddenly we could see a large Ogre, together with other foul folk not worth mentioning, hammered at the door. My group (which was a bit larger in that moment) all prepared shooting arrows at him the moment it burst through the door. I had the time to appreciate the ingenuity that we all waited for him to burst through, so that none of the arrows would bounce of the door, but it did not help, and we ran from the castle, over a field, through a forest, at the other side of which we could see, below a sleep slope, a house, so we went there. The path towards that was filled with tracks that looked surprisingly like car tracks. When we reached the spot there was no house any more, but rather a cold camp side. We saw digging tools, and helmets (strangely, baseball helmets) were arranged in a circle, as if it was a burial site. We set up camp there and slept. It occurred to me that I must have been the rightful owner of the castle, and it was taken by me from my brother and his wife, who denied my existence or something treacherously like that. When we woke up at the camp side, she were there, together with what must be my niece. My sister in law mocked us for fighting unsuccessfully at the castle, but my niece was surprised to see me, as I must have a very similar appearance to my brother. She said that her mother forbid it, but she nevertheless sneakily takes out something which looks like a Gameboy with a camera attachment and a CompactFlash card from her mothers purse, puts it in and take a photo of me. This is when I realize that I will get my castle back.

At that moment, I woke up. I somewhat liked the story (and it was a bit more coherent in my mind than what I then wrote down here), so I wanted to write it down. I quickly fetched my laptop. My friends at the summer school were a bit worried, and I promised not to mention their names and concrete places, and started writing. They distracted me, so I searched for a place of my own, lied down (why? no idea), and continued writing. I had to to touch writing on my belly, because my laptop was not actually there. I also noticed that I am back at the camp side, and that I am still wearing my back protector that I must have been wearing while fighting in the castle, and which I did not take off while sleeping at the camp side. Funnily, it was not a proper medieval amour, but rather my snowboarding back protector.

sudo apt-get install torbrowser-launcher

• [1] https://letsencrypt.org/

• initrd.gz
• vmlinuz
• armada-370-netgear-rn104.dtb

# apt-get install u-boot-tools
$ cat vmlinuz armada-370-netgear-rn104.dtb > vmlinuz-rn104
$ mkimage -A arm -O linux -T multi -C none -a 0x04000000 -e 0x04000000 -n "Debian Jessie armhf installer" -d vmlinuz-rn104:initrd.gz uImage-installer-rn104
# cp uImage-installer-rn104 /srv/tftp

dhcp
setenv serverip 192.168.1.17
tftp uImage-installer-rn104
bootm $load_addr

# depmod -a 
# modprobe pxa3xx_nand
# apt-install flash-kernel
# mount --bind /proc /target/proc
# chroot /target
# cat >> /etc/flash-kernel/db << EOF
Machine: NETGEAR ReadyNAS 104
DTB-Id: armada-370-netgear-rn104.dtb
DTB-Append: yes
Mtd-Kernel: uImage
Mtd-Initrd: minirootfs
U-Boot-Kernel-Address: 0x04000000
U-Boot-Initrd-Address: 0x05000000
Required-Packages: u-boot-tools
EOF
# flash-kernel

A problem of interpretation?

December 14th, 1900 is known as the date of birth of quantum physics. In fact, that day Max Planck presented his report to the German Physical Society in Berlin, in which he argued that the exchange of energy in the phenomena of emission and absorption of electromagnetic radiation occurs in discrete form, not in continuous form as claimed by electromagnetic classic theory.

It was like opening a door to a new universe, that of subatomic particles. In a few decades it was learned that the basis of the strength of the real world around us (people, objects, plants, animals, etc.) is a joyful swarm of tiny particles distributed in clouds of probability, essentially surrounded by empty space. A shocking and apparently incomprehensible reality for the man of the 900: how could that still solid rock actually contain billions of microscopic objects in motion?

With the passing of the years, the road was covered deeper and deeper, revealing ever smaller particles for which new unknown names were coined: Leptons, Gluons, Quarks, Neutrinos, Fermions, Bosons, and so on until

<Read More >

Tracking progress Since version 2.5.40, lintian will now issue a warning1 when it detects that a binary has not been compiled as a position independent executable. Kudos to Niels Thykier. Now that we can track our progress, I'm calling every Debian Developers: let's try to get as many ASLR-compatible executables in Stretch!

How to enable PIE Thanks to all contributors over the past years who have improved our toolchain, we now have a fairly easy way to enable hardening flags with dpkg-buildflags. For packages using dh, it now boils down with adding on top of debian/rules:

export DEB_BUILD_MAINT_OPTIONS = hardening=+all

You can even test if a package supports all hardening flags without any changes running DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS=hardening=+all dpkg-buildpackage. Running lintian or hardening-check can then tell you if the protections have been successfully enabled.

Hardening by default? But do we really need to change so many packages individually? The difference between the current default features and all hardening features are pie and bindnow. Could we turn them by default and do binNMUs instead of requiring actions from maintainers? I guess the question boils down to: how many packages would require a (one-liner) change to turn off the pie or bindnow features if they were on by default? To get the beginning of an answer, I took the top 502 (according to popcon installations) source packages shipping non-position independent executables. I've try to rebuild them enabling all hardening flags through DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS. Out of 49 packages3:

• 32 (65%) built fine and produced PIE binaries: acpi, bc, bind9, bsd-mailx, bsdmainutils, bzip2, cpio, cron, debianutils, diffutils, dpkg, file, fontconfig, gettext, glib2.0, glibc, gnupg, gzip, hostname, ifupdown, iputils, logrotate, m4, mutt, nano, net-tools, netcat, netkit-ftp, netkit-telnet, os-prober, pam, util-linux.
• 4 (8%) built fine but did not compiled hardened binaries: discover, mawk, mlocate, patch.
• 13 (27%) failed to build, with some of these expected failures, e.g. for *-static or GRUB: bash, busybox, coreutils, e2fsprogs, grub2, insserv, iptables, kbd, ncurses, newt, openssl, pciutils, perl.

The results are really encouraging. Especially taking in account that some of these packages are part of the tricky and weird set. To know for sure, we would need a mass-rebuild of the archive with DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS=hardening=+all in the environment. Any takers?

---

1. Verification of the whole archive by the latest version of lintian is still in progress by the time I'm writing these lines. According to Niels it should take 3-4 more days to look at all available packages.
2. As always, UDD does wonders:

   SELECT packages.source, MAX(popcon.insts) AS insts
     FROM lintian, popcon, packages
    WHERE lintian.tag = 'hardening-no-pie'
      AND lintian.package_arch = 'amd64'
      AND popcon.package = lintian.package
      AND packages.package = popcon.package
      AND packages.distribution = 'debian'
      AND packages.release = 'sid'
    GROUP BY packages.source
    ORDER BY MAX(popcon.insts) DESC
    LIMIT 50;
    

3. acpid currently fail to build from source in sid.

C-DAC and BOSS Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC) is a large organization serving country- and state-level institutions in India, with offices and training facilities several major cities. In Chennai, C-DAC has a staff of 25 developers working full time on Barath Operating System Solutions (BOSS). BOSS is a Debian derivative with several flavors - a desktop for use at primary schools (EduBOSS), a desktop for governmental offices (BOSS), and a range of server-oriented use cases using same core as the desktops with various (non-packaged) code and configuration on top. The core common to all BOSS flavors is a derivative of Debian. Major work has been in strengthening localization and related code - including the development of a font covering all officially supported indic scripts, tuning input methods configuration, and bugfixing LibreOffice handling of complex scripts. All that work is all passed directly to upstream code projects (some still show as derived work until sifting down again into Debian). Besides locale derivations, BOSS currently includes 11 packages not yet in Debian - a mixture of package dependencies, branding data and configuration tweaks. Seems most if not all can fit into Debian with a bit of restructuring work.

small computers As some of you know, I always had a special interest in low-resource (yet general purpose) computers (partly driven by my lack of money to spend on shinier hardware), and since ~2009 particularly in ARM-based computers. After 4 days of meetings and discussion with C-DAC, - literally few minutes before departure - I casually mentioned my interest in small computers, and much to my surprise it turned out that C-DAC also works on that, just didn't get around to mention it yet at the Debian wiki page. C-DAC have worked for a year on tuning BOSS to work on the Vidyut laptop (successor to the Aakash tablet). All except builtin camera is allegedly working. C-DAC is also looking into Olimex boards - my favorites - possibly for use with small server setups but our time was up, we had to leave for our train to Pune, so details on that we will have to figure out through mail.

collaboration In the past, C-DAC have kept in touch with their users through BOSS-specific places like a dedicated IRC channel. Recent changes in management style at the development office have caused less attention available to that communication, however. C-DAC have politely offered their code changes upstram for years, but maybe "too polite": Maybe they have offered only polished fixes, being less loud about "interesting problems". I suggested, as way to improve while limiting (ideally avoiding) extra work, is to mentally take a step up the stream: Treat BOSS not as a derivative but a subset of Debian itself, hang out and discuss issues and ideas at debian irc channels, and maintain your packages directly in Debian. Only parts unfit for Debian - secret stuff done for India military, and dirty configuration hacks not yet possible within Debian Policy - really need to be kept away from Debian. C-DAC agreed, and Debian now has a BOSS team! Anyone interested to follow BOSS as a Debian blend, and perhaps even contribute with opinions and/or code, is quite welcome to join the newly created mailinglist on Debian Alioth: https://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/boss-devel. Our meetings with BOSS developers have been very pleasant. Even those working at the top of cloud or big data stacks - furthest away from our mindset of tightly "locking down" all parts as packages - were patient with us. Thanks in particular to Prema S and Prathibha B, working on packaging of BOSS for the past 5+ years, and both likely to enter the Debian New Maintainer Queue before long

Tracking progress Since version 2.5.40, lintian will now issue a warning1 when it detects that a binary has not been compiled as a position independent executable. Kudos to Niels Thykier. Now that we can track our progress, I'm calling every Debian Developers: let's try to get as many ALSR-compatible executables in Stretch!

How to enable PIE Thanks to all contributors over the past years who have improved our toolchain, we now have a fairly easy way to enable hardening flags with dpkg-buildflags. For packages using dh, it now boils down with adding on top of debian/rules:

export DEB_BUILD_MAINT_OPTIONS = hardening=+all

You can even test if a package supports all hardening flags without any changes running DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS=hardening=+all dpkg-buildpackage. Running lintian or hardening-check can then tell you if the protections have been successfully enabled.

Hardening by default? But do we really need to change so many packages individually? The difference between the current default features and all hardening features are pie and bindnow. Could we turn them by default and do binNMUs instead of requiring actions from maintainers? I guess the question boils down to: how many packages would require a (one-liner) change to turn off the pie or bindnow features if they were on by default? To get the beginning of an answer, I took the top 502 (according to popcon installations) source packages shipping non-position independent executables. I've try to rebuild them enabling all hardening flags through DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS. Out of 49 packages3:

• 32 (65%) built fine and produced PIE binaries: acpi, bc, bind9, bsd-mailx, bsdmainutils, bzip2, cpio, cron, debianutils, diffutils, dpkg, file, fontconfig, gettext, glib2.0, glibc, gnupg, gzip, hostname, ifupdown, iputils, logrotate, m4, mutt, nano, net-tools, netcat, netkit-ftp, netkit-telnet, os-prober, pam, util-linux.
• 4 (8%) built fine but did not compiled hardened binaries: discover, mawk, mlocate, patch.
• 13 (27%) failed to build, with some of these expected failures, e.g. for *-static or GRUB: bash, busybox, coreutils, e2fsprogs, grub2, insserv, iptables, kbd, ncurses, newt, openssl, pciutils, perl.

The results are really encouraging. Especially taking in account that some of these packages are part of the tricky and weird set. To know for sure, we would need a mass-rebuild of the archive with DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS=hardening=+all in the environment. Any takers?

---

1. Verification of the whole archive by the latest version of lintian is still in progress by the time I'm writing these lines. According to Niels it should take 3-4 more days to look at all available packages.
2. As always, UDD does wonders:

   SELECT packages.source, MAX(popcon.insts) AS insts
     FROM lintian, popcon, packages
    WHERE lintian.tag = 'hardening-no-pie'
      AND lintian.package_arch = 'amd64'
      AND popcon.package = lintian.package
      AND packages.package = popcon.package
      AND packages.distribution = 'debian'
      AND packages.release = 'sid'
    GROUP BY packages.source
    ORDER BY MAX(popcon.insts) DESC
    LIMIT 50;
    

3. acpid currently fail to build from source in sid.

• my first attempt (in the semi opaque plastic) resulted in a correct top and bottom but the height was a couple of mm short and the audio connector cutout was too small
• second attempt was in clear acrylic and omitting the top and bottom. I stuffed the laser cutter setup and the resulting cutouts would not actually fit together properly.
• third attempt went together ok but my connector cutouts were 0.5mm high so the board did not sit properly, this case would have been usable but I like to publish refined designs so I fixed all the small issues.
• Fourth version is pretty much correct and I have tried all three different Raspberry Pi model B boards (mine and the spaces) and they all fit so I am confident I have a design I can now use anytime I want a case for this SBC.

"Censorship" and workarounds Unfortunately, I have been connected to the internet only through the the Varadero airport and the WiFi of a "full included" resort near Jibacoa. I have to come to assume that this network is likely to be on a segregated, uncensored internet while the rest of the country suffers the wrath of the Internet censorship in Cuba I have seen documented elsewhere. Through my research, I couldn't find any sort of direct censorship. The Netalyzr tool couldn't find anything significantly wrong with the connection, other than the obvious performance problems related both to the overloaded uplinks of the Cuban internet. I ran an incomplete OONI probe as well, and it seems there was no obvious censorship detected there as well, at least according to folks in the helpful #ooni IRC channel. Tor also works fine, and could be a great way to avoid the global surveillance system described later in this article. Nevertheless, it still remains to be seen how the internet is censored in the "real" Cuban internet, outside of the tourist designated areas - hopefully future visitors or locals can expand on this using the tools mentioned above, using the regular internet. Usual care should be taken when using any workaround tools, mentioned in this post or not, as different regimes over the world have accused, detained, tortured and killed sometimes for the mere fact of using or distributing circumvention tools. For example, a Russian developer was arrested and detained in 2001 by United States' FBI for exposing vulnerabilities in the Adobe e-books copy protection mechanisms. Similarly, people distributing Tor and other tools have been arrested during the period prior to the revolution in Tunisia.

The Cuban captive portal There is, however, a more pernicious and yet very obvious censorship mechanism at work in Cuba: to get access to the internet, you have to go through what seems to be a state-wide captive portal, which I have seen both at the hotel and the airport. It is presumably deployed at all levels of the internet access points. To get credentials through that portal, you need a username and password which you get by buying a Nauta card. Those cards cost 2$CUC and get you an hour of basically unlimited internet access. That may not seem like a lot for a rich northern hotel party-goer, but for Cubans, it's a lot of money, given that the average monthly salary is around 20$CUC. The system is also pretty annoying to use, because it means you do not get continuous network access: every hour, you need to input a new card, which will obviously make streaming movies and other online activities annoying. It also makes hosting servers basically impossible. So while Cuba does not have, like China or Iran, a "great firewall", there is definitely a big restriction to going online in Cuba. Indeed, it seems to be how the government ensures that Cubans do not foment too much dissent online: keep the internet slow and inaccessible, and you won't get too many Arab spring / blogger revolutions.

Bypassing the Cuban captive portal The good news is that it is perfectly possible for Cubans (or at least for a tourist like me with resources outside of the country) to bypass the captive portal. Like many poorly implemented portals, the portal allows DNS traffic to go through, which makes it possible to access the global network for free by using a tool like iodine which tunnels IP traffic over DNS requests. Of course, the bandwidth and reliability of the connection you get through such a portal is pretty bad. I have regularly seen 80% packet loss and over two minutes of latency:

--- 10.0.0.1 ping statistics ---
163 packets transmitted, 31 received, 80% packet loss, time 162391ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 133.700/2669.535/64188.027/11257.336 ms, pipe 65

Still, it allowed me to login to my home server through SSH using Mosh to workaround the reliability issues. Every once in a while, mosh would get stuck and keep on trying to send packets to probe the server, which would clog the connection even more. So I regularly had to restart the whole stack using these commands:

killall iodine # stop DNS tunnel
nmcli n off # turn off wifi to change MAC address
macchanger -A wlan0 # change MAC address
nmcli n on # turn wifi back on
sleep 3 # wait for wifi to settle
iodine-client-start # restart DNS tunnel

The Koumbit Wiki has good instructions on how to setup a DNS tunnel. I am wondering if such a public service could be of use for Cubans, although I am not sure how it could be deployed only for Cubans, and what kind of traffic it could support... The fact is that iodine does require a server to operate, and that server must be run on the outside of the censored perimeter, something that Cubans may not be able to afford in the first place. Another possible way to save money with the captive portal would be to write something that automates connecting and disconnecting from the portal. You would feed that program a list of credentials and it would connect to the portal only on demand, and disconnect as soon as no traffic goes through. There are details on the implementation of the captive portal below that may help future endeavours in that field.

Private information revealed to the captive portal It should be mentioned, however, that the captive portal has a significant amount of information on clients, which is a direct threat to the online privacy of Cuban internet users. Of course the unique identifiers issued with the Nauta cards can be correlated with your identity, right from the start. For example, I had to give my room number to get a Nauta card issued. Then the central portal also knows which access point you are connected to. For example, the central portal I was connected to Wifi_Memories_Jibacoa which, for anyone that cares to research, will give them a location of about 20 square meters where I was located when connected (there is only one access point in the whole hotel). Finally, the central portal also knows my MAC address, a unique identifier for the computer I am using which also reveals which brand of computer I am using (Mac, Lenovo, etc). While this address can be changed, very few people know that, let alone how. This led me to question whether I would be allowed back in Cuba (or even allowed out!) after publishing this blog post, as it is obvious that I can be easily identified based on the time this article was published, my name and other details. Hopefully the Cuban government will either not notice or not care, but this can be a tricky situation, obviously. I have heard that Cuban prisons are not the best hangout place in Cuba, to say the least...

Network configuration assessment This section is more technical and delves more deeply in the Cuban internet to analyze the quality and topology of the network, along with hints as to which hardware and providers are being used to support the Cuban government.

Line quality The internet is actually not so bad in the hotel. Again, this may be because of the very fact that I am in that hotel, and I get a privileged access to the new fiber line to Venezuela, the ALBA-1 link. The line speed I get is around 1mbps, according to speedtest, which selected a server from LIME in George Town, Cayman Islands:

[1034]anarcat@angela:cuba$ speedtest
Retrieving speedtest.net configuration...
Retrieving speedtest.net server list...
Testing from Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba (152.206.92.146)...
Selecting best server based on latency...
Hosted by LIME (George Town) [391.78 km]: 317.546 ms
Testing download speed........................................
Download: 1.01 Mbits/s
Testing upload speed..................................................
Upload: 1.00 Mbits/s

Latency to the rest of the world is of couse slow:

--- koumbit.org ping statistics ---
122 packets transmitted, 120 received, 1,64% packet loss, time 18731,6ms
rtt min/avg/max/sdev = 127,457/156,097/725,211/94,688 ms
--- google.com ping statistics ---
122 packets transmitted, 121 received, 0,82% packet loss, time 19371,4ms
rtt min/avg/max/sdev = 132,517/160,095/724,971/93,273 ms
--- redcta.org.ar ping statistics ---
122 packets transmitted, 120 received, 1,64% packet loss, time 40748,6ms
rtt min/avg/max/sdev = 303,035/339,572/965,092/97,503 ms
--- ccc.de ping statistics ---
122 packets transmitted, 72 received, 40,98% packet loss, time 19560,2ms
rtt min/avg/max/sdev = 244,266/271,670/594,104/61,933 ms

Interestingly, Koumbit is actually the closest host in the above test. It could be that Canadian hosts are less affected by bandwidth problems compared to US hosts because of the embargo.

Network topology The various traceroutes show a fairly odd network topology, but that is typical of what I would described as "colonized internet users", which have layers and layers of NAT and obscure routing that keep them from the real internet. Just like large corporations are implementing NAT in a large scale, Cuba seems to have layers and layers of private RFC 1918 IPv4 space. A typical traceroute starts with:

traceroute to koumbit.net (199.58.80.33), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
 1  10.156.41.1 (10.156.41.1)  9.724 ms  9.472 ms  9.405 ms
 2  192.168.134.137 (192.168.134.137)  16.089 ms  15.612 ms  15.509 ms
 3  172.31.252.113 (172.31.252.113)  15.350 ms  15.805 ms  15.358 ms
 4  pos6-0-0-agu-cr-1.mpls.enet.cu (172.31.253.197)  15.286 ms  14.832 ms  14.405 ms
 5  172.31.252.29 (172.31.252.29)  13.734 ms  13.685 ms  14.485 ms
 6  200.0.16.130 (200.0.16.130)  14.428 ms  11.393 ms  10.977 ms
 7  200.0.16.74 (200.0.16.74)  10.738 ms  10.019 ms  10.326 ms
 8  ix-11-3-1-0.tcore1.TNK-Toronto.as6453.net (64.86.33.45)  108.577 ms  108.449 ms

Let's take this apart line by line:

 1  10.156.41.1 (10.156.41.1)  9.724 ms  9.472 ms  9.405 ms

This is my local gateway, probably the hotel's wifi router.

 2  192.168.134.137 (192.168.134.137)  16.089 ms  15.612 ms  15.509 ms

This is likely not very far from the local gateway, probably still in Cuba. It in one bit away from the captive portal IP address (see below) so it is very likely related to the captive portal implementation.

 3  172.31.252.113 (172.31.252.113)  15.350 ms  15.805 ms  15.358 ms
 4  pos6-0-0-agu-cr-1.mpls.enet.cu (172.31.253.197)  15.286 ms  14.832 ms  14.405 ms
 5  172.31.252.29 (172.31.252.29)  13.734 ms  13.685 ms  14.485 ms

All those are withing RFC 1918 space. Interestingly, the Cuban DNS servers resolve one of those private IPs as within Cuban space, on line #4. That line is interesting because it reveals the potential use of MPLS.

 6  200.0.16.130 (200.0.16.130)  14.428 ms  11.393 ms  10.977 ms
 7  200.0.16.74 (200.0.16.74)  10.738 ms  10.019 ms  10.326 ms

Those two lines are the only ones that actually reveal that the route belongs in Cuba at all. Both IPs are in a tiny (/24, or 256 IP addresses) network allocated to ETECSA, the state telco in Cuba:

inetnum:     200.0.16/24
status:      allocated
aut-num:     N/A
owner:       EMPRESA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES DE CUBA S.A. (IXP CUBA)
ownerid:     CU-CUBA-LACNIC
responsible: Rafael L pez Guerra
address:     Ave. Independencia y 19 Mayo, s/n,
address:     10600 - La Habana - CH
country:     CU
phone:       +53 7 574242 []
owner-c:     JOQ
tech-c:      JOQ
abuse-c:     JEM52
inetrev:     200.0.16/24
nserver:     NS1.NAP.ETECSA.NET
nsstat:      20160123 AA
nslastaa:    20160123
nserver:     NS2.NAP.ETECSA.NET
nsstat:      20160123 AA
nslastaa:    20160123
created:     20030512
changed:     20140610

Then the last hop:

 8  ix-11-3-1-0.tcore1.TNK-Toronto.as6453.net (64.86.33.45)  108.577 ms  108.449 ms  108.257 ms

...interestingly, lands directly in Toronto, in this case going later to Koumbit but that is the first hop that varies according to the destination, hops 1-7 being a common trunk to all external communications. It's also interesting that this shoves a good 90 milliseconds extra in latency, showing that a significant distance and number of equipment crossed. Yet a single hop is crossed, not showing the intermediate step of the Venezuelan link or any other links for that matter. Something obscure is going on there... Also interesting to note is the traceroute to the redirection host, which is only one hop away:

traceroute to 192.168.134.138 (192.168.134.138), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
 1  192.168.134.138 (192.168.134.138)  6.027 ms  5.698 ms  5.596 ms

Even though it is not the gateway:

$ ip route
default via 10.156.41.1 dev wlan0  proto static  metric 1024
10.156.41.0/24 dev wlan0  proto kernel  scope link  src 10.156.41.4
169.254.0.0/16 dev wlan0  scope link  metric 1000

This means a very close coordination between the different access points and the captive portal system. Finally, note that there seems to be only three peers to the Cuban internet: Teleglobe, formerly Canadian, now owned by the Indian [[!wiki Tata group]], and Telef nica, the Spanish Telco that colonized most of Latin America's internet, all the way down to Argentina. This is confirmed by my traceroutes, which show traffic to Koumbit going through Tata and Google's going through Telef nica.

Captive portal implementation The captive portal is https://www.portal-wifi-temas.nauta.cu/ (not accessible outside of Cuba) and uses a self-signed certificate. The domain name resolves to 190.6.81.230 in the hotel. Accessing http://1.1.1.1/ gives you a status page which allows you to disconnect from the portal. It actually redirects you to https://192.168.134.138/logout.user. That is also a self-signed, but different certificate. That certificate actually reveals the implication of Gemtek which is a "world-leading provider of Wireless Broadband solutions, offering a wide range of solutions from residential to business". It is somewhat unclear if the implication of Gemtek here is deliberate or a misconfiguration on the part of Cuban officials, especially since the certificate is self-signed and was issued in 2002. It could be, however, a trace of the supposed involvement of China in the development of Cuba's networking systems, although Gemtek is based in Taiwan, and not in the China mainland. That IP, in turn, redirects you to the same portal but in a page that shows you the statistics:

https://www.portal-wifi-temas.nauta.cu/?mac=0024D1717D18&script=logout.user&remain_time=00%3A55%3A52&session_time=00%3A04%3A08&username=151003576287&clientip=10.156.41.21&nasid=Wifi_Memories_Jibacoa&r=ac%2Fpopup

Notice how you see the MAC address of the machine in the URL (randomized, this is not my MAC address), along with the remaining time, session time, client IP and the Wifi access point ESSID. There may be some potential in defrauding the session time there, I haven't tested it directly. Hitting Actualizar redirects you back to the IP address, which redirects you to the right URL on the portal. The "real" logout is at:

http://192.168.134.138/logout.user?cmd=logout

The login is performed against https://www.portal-wifi-temas.nauta.cu/index.php?r=ac/login with a referer of:

https://www.portal-wifi-temas.nauta.cu/?&nasid=Wifi_Memories_Jibacoa&nasip=192.168.134.138&clientip=10.156.41.21&mac=EC:55:F9:C5:F2:55&ourl=http%3a%2f%2fgoogle.ca%2f&sslport=443&lang=en-US%2cen%3bq%3d0.8&lanip=10.156.41.1

Again, notice the information revealed to the central portal.

Equipment and providers I ran Nmap probes against both the captive portal and the redirection host, in the hope of finding out how they were built and if they could reveal the source of the equipment used. The complete nmap probes are available in nmap, but it seems that the captive portal is running some embedded device. It is confusing because the probe for the captive portal responds as if it was the gateway, which blurs even more the distinction between the hotel's gateway and the captive portal. This raises the distinct possibility that all access points are actually captive portal that authenticate to another central server. The nmap traces do show three distinct hosts however:

• the captive portal (www.portal-wifi-temas.nauta.cu, 190.6.81.230)
• some redirection host (192.168.134.138)
• the hotel's gateway (10.156.41.1)

They do have distinct signatures so the above may be just me misinterpreting traceroute and nmap results. Your comments may help in clarifying the above. Still, the three devices show up as running Linux, in the two last cases versions between 2.4.21 and 2.4.31. Now, to find out which version of Linux it is running is way more challenging, and it is possible it is just some custom Linux distribution. Indeed, the webserver shows up as G4200.GSI.2.22.0155 and the SSH server is running OpenSSH 3.0.2p1, which is basically prehistoric (2002!) which corroborates the idea that this is some Gemtek embedded device. The fact that those devices are running 14 years old software should be a concern to the people responsible for those networks. There is, for example, a remote root vulnerability that affects that specific version of OpenSSH, among many other vulnerabilities.

A note on Nauta card's security Finally, one can note that it is probably trivial to guess card UIDs. All cards i have here start with the prefix 15100, the following digits being 3576 or 4595, presumably depending on the "batch" that was sent to different hotels, which seems to be batches of 1000 cards. You can also correlate the UID with the date at which the card was issued. For example, 15100357XXX cards are all valid until 19/03/2017, and 151004595XXX cards are all valid until 23/03/2017. Here's the list of UIDs I have seen:

151004595313
151004595974
151003576287
151003576105
151003576097

The passwords, on the other hand, do seem fairly random (although my sample size is small). Interestingly, those passwords are also 12 digits long, which is about as strong as a seven-letter password (mixed uppercase and lowercase). If there are no rate-limiting provisions on that captive portal, it could be possible to guess those passwords, since you have free rein on accessing those routers. Depending on the performance of the routers, you could be lucky and find a working password for free...

Conclusion Clearly, Internet access in Cuba needs to be modernized. We can clearly see that Cuba years behind the rest of the Americas, if only through the percentage of the population with internet access, or download speeds. The existence of a centralized captive portal also enables a huge surveillance potential that should be a concern for any Cuban, or for that matter, anyone wishing to live in a free society. The answer, however, lies not in the liberalization of commerce and opening the doors to the US companies and their own systems of surveillance. It should be possible, and even desirable for Cubans to establish their own neutral network, a proposal I have made in the past even for here in Qu bec. This network could be used and improved by Cubans themselves, prioritizing local communities that would establish their own infrastructure according to their own needs. I have been impressed by this article about the El Paquete system - it shows great innovation and initiative from Cubans which are known for engaging in technology in a creative way. This should be leveraged by letting Cubans do what they want with their networks, not telling them what to do. The best the Googles of this world can do to help Cuba is not to colonize Cuba's technological landscape but to cleanup their own and make their own tools more easily accessible and shareable offline. It is something companies can do right now, something I detailed in a previous article.

Changes in RcppExamples version 0.1.7 (2016-01-23)

• All examples were updated to use Rcpp Attributes and (where possible) use const & interfaces.
• Updated DESCRIPTION for current R CMD check standards
• The Rcpp package is now imported rather than depended upon.
• Added README.md as well as .travis.yml.
• Also updated and refreshed all manual pages and R files.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.