As I said a month ago, my main server Delmak was dying. Well it still runs (proof: you could read this blog some days ago).
Thanks to friends I host for free, they've kindly given enough money to buy a brand new server (C2D E8400, 4 GB RAM, 2x500 GB RAID 1) in order to replace the good old Delmak.
This new box has been named Prometheus after the only BC-303 class battleship ever built.
Delmak was used to mainly run as a Web, mail and databases server. I decided to do use this server switch to change the server software I use.
The first mail server I setup was based on Exim 3, courier- imap,pop -ssl, with userdb files. That was... rough. Later I switched to Exim 4, using vexim, and MySQL as a back-end. That was something like 3 years ago I guess. Since then I never really touched that back. I added spamassassin and clamav filtering some months after, because some users asked for it. That's all.
So this week, I decided to switch away from this configuration. I do not understand Exim anymore anyway, so I decided to use Postfix which I often use and administrate at work. Obviously, I also now use PostgreSQL as database back-end, since it rocks, and since Postfixadmin supports it. By the way, be aware that the Debian package of postfixadmin is crappy (the configuration file is readable by anyone by default, with the database password in it).
I also set up postgrey which is quite nice and efficient.
Well, then was time for amavisd-new installation, but I did not do it. Seriously, amavisd-new configuration is a bloody mess, as the language it is written in (yes, Perl).
So I switched to dspam which I heard is nice. Well, it seems to be for now, since it even supports clamav daemon usage directly, which is very very nice because that means I do not have to set up another thing for that.
I also switched from courier to dovecot, mainly because the latter seems to be faster and lighter. I then changed the default virtual_transport to Dovecot LDA. The main advantage of this is that the LDA updates the Dovecot index while delivering. It also supports quota, which I do not use and plug-ins, like the Sieve language for mail filtering.
So I decided to change my procmailrc to a new Sieve filter. My procmailrc is quite small since I only use regex to match lists and some mail address, so it has only something like 12 rules.
And well, I did not do it since I discovered after some googling that Dovecot implementation of Sieve is grabbed from Cyrus which does not support variables for now. That means that the following procmailrc code:
:0: * ^X-Mailing-List: <debian-.+@lists.debian.org> * ^X-Mailing-List: <debian-\/[^@]+ list-debian-$MATCH/which will translate to:
require [ "regex", "variables", "fileinto" ]
if header :regex "X-Mailing-List" "<debian-(.+)@"
fileinto "lists.debian.$ 1 ";
stop;
But that won't work since Dovecot Sieve implementation does not support "variables". Well, since I'm not ready to list all the lists I'm subscribed to, Sieve is a no-go for now. I'll stick with procmail.
(tl;dr: if you have a few minutes, please add information here)
Joss,
the problem with the new package formats is that there is nothing that actually uses the additional information in a way that adds significant new functionality, so the net result of the change was that we throw away the information at a different layer in our software stack, and one of the interfaces got a lot more complicated in the process.
One possible application would be a "poor man's patch tracking" inside the BTS, perhaps with a new state "fixed in patch".
I can see two ways of implementing that:
Whoa, this security bug exposed by Luciano Bello (Ola!) is one of the worst I’ve ever seen.
Time to regenerate your key with the updated openssl 0.9.8c packages.
I mentioned on my switch to Movable Type post that there were a few things that were hopefully going to happen RSN and that I'd talk about them if they did.Do not connect your laptop to these jacks. You may loose all data in your computer.If I wasn’t a computer-savy person, I’m completely sure I would’ve thought: “They’re bluffing.” And then shit happens, because they’re not. (Oh, but then of course the sign is not 100% honest either.)
Free software finally gets significant coverage on BBC TV's Click show
this week, but I think it's very much Linux rather than GNU/Linux and
free cost rather than freedom. They mentioned free security software
and even raised the possibility of trojans, but didn't mention how
free (as in freedom) software allows any random end-user to check or
have it checked.
Quite a missed opportunity! However, Click has a regular letters
section, so watch it (times below), email click@bbc.co.uk
and see if we can get the free software view across.
The letters section this week seemed to be flaming proprietary SaaS
social network site facebook for their pathetic default-permit
approach to security of user details. I really think there's a role
for something like
noserub
in free software social networking.
Click-UK
is shown on BBC News Channel Saturday 1130, Sunday
0430 and 1130, Monday 0030 and Sunday 0430 on BBC-1 (times BST)
Click-World
is shown Thursday 19:30 GMT, Repeated Friday 09:30
and 12:30 (Asia Pacific only), Saturdays 06:30, Mondays 15:30,
Tuesdays 01:30 (not Asia Pacific, Middle East or South Asia) and 07:30 GMT
Anyone else see this?
The Charter was enshrined to ensure that the rights of minorities are not subjected, are never subjected, to the will of the majority. The rights of Canadians who belong to a minority group must always be protected by virtue of their status as citizens, regardless of their numbers. These rights must never be left vulnerable to the impulses of the majority.

Worst Debian day ever since the 2003 compromise. And that was a BAD one.I disagree. This is far, far worse than the 2003 compromise. The compromise was scary, but the key updates for users were straightforward and as far as we know, user security was never actually compromised. In contrast, every single user who uses Debian or Ubuntu for anything serious is now (Update: and has been for two years) vulnerable to attacks on their supposedly secure cryptography [0] unless they perform a labor-intensive and error-prone series of steps to regenerate all their cryptographic keys -- not to mention finding a secure way to distribute their public keys to everyone who needs them! [0]: Update: I should perhaps make it clear that I mean anyone who generated a key on such a system. But in a way this makes things worse: unless you're willing to regenerate every key in sight, you need to check each key manually, which means that there's a nontrivial chance that you'll overlook one and leave yourself vulnerable...

For a project I was looking for a way to use GNU Mailman for mailinglist management (especially its powerful web based moderation, bounce handling and attachment scrubbing features) but storing the mailinglist member information in a SQL database. That's useful when you want to relate mailinglist members to extra information already in a database and functionality on an interactive website, and it's possible on a per-mailinglist basis. This turned out to be not very difficult but just not that clearly documented.
What I used:
MYSQL_MEMBER_DB_NAME = "mailman" MYSQL_MEMBER_DB_USER = "mailman" MYSQL_MEMBER_DB_PASS = "somethingrandom" MYSQL_MEMBER_DB_HOST = "localhost" MYSQL_MEMBER_TABLE_TYPE = "wide" # wide means one table per list, flat = one large table
from Mailman.MysqlMemberships import MysqlMemberships
def extend(list):
list._memberadaptor = MysqlMemberships(list)
(whitespace is significant in Python).
After recent not so funny thing with OpenSSL in Debian, I realized that I
will have to regenerate most of keys and certificates, because last big
changes I did in networking/vpn/ssh setup which involved generating keys are
not older than broken OpenSSL appeared in archives.
First obvious thing was SSH keys and cleanup of ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on
all hosts. While doing that, I realized that I still have there several keys,
which are more or less gone (not that I'd lost them, but I simply stopped to
use them). So it was good opportunity to do cleanup here. While I was at these
changes, cleaning up ~/.ssh/known_hosts was also good idea, because I still
had there lot of hosts I collected during some of my previous jobs and I
definitely won't (and can not) access these machines anymore. So good, big
cleanup in SSH configuration was forced :-).
Next and harder step was to found out where else I use certificates generated
by vulnerable OpenSSL. Server certificates for sure were also generated by
OpenSSL, so let's regenerate web and email certificates and hope I did not
miss anything.
All this happened yesterday, but today I realized that I missed other even
more important thing - OpenVPN certificates. While regenerating certificates,
I also found some machine keys which are not really used anymore, so I again
could drop some of them. So that was task for this evening and now I'm
hopefully really done with this issue and I really hope that this won't happen
again in near future, I don't need to cleanup that often ;-).

![Photo [SNR Event Welcome Slide]](http://mjr.towers.org.uk/writing/reflections/attachments/snrevent.jpg)
Anyone seen this before?
Today, I went to an event about the
Sub-National Review Consultation
(as a substitute for someone else AIUI).
I'd not heard about this before, but if
you're in England and you've any interest
in our regional planning system (which I
think you should, if you have
your main home here or run a business here),
you have six weeks left to comment on the
UK Government's suggested changes.
As I understand it, it will move the
second-highest tier of planning control
from democratically-accountable
regional bodies
to the business-led
Regional Development Agencies, with some
oversight by MPs and the very- indirectly-accountable council leaders.
I've posted
more detail on Co-opNet.
When I asked about local involvement and cooperatives, I was directed towards Local Strategic Partnerships, but I'm pessimistic about how easy it will be to influence regional planning through those: a few weeks ago, I was at the launch of the
North Somerset Partnership
Sustainable Community Strategy for 2008-2026.
It's a 72-page A4 glossy book
which I've still not found time to read
properly. I think the size says something
about its sustainability.
I've posted
a little more detail on WsMForum.
I'll try to answer questions about
either of them on this blog or those forums...
Dear Daniel,
It looks like you are referring to my post, though you got my name wrong so that wasn’t immediately obvious.
Of course this is far worse than the 2003 compromise in terms of the direct, known and quantifiable impact it has on our users. I don’t think I stated otherwise, so I hardly see why your post starts with “I disagree”.
I wasn't going to comment on the recent openssl security update, because too many people have already done so.
Personally I thought that Aigars Mahinovs made the best writeup I've seen so far.
However I would like to say that having 20+ people all mailing security[at]debian.org to say the webpage we referenced in the security advisory is currently blank is not useful, or ask for details already released in the advisory they replied to, or ask for even more details is not so much fun.
Having people immediately start mailing questions like "Huh? What can I do" is only natural, but you can't expect a response when things are as hectic as they have been recently. Ideally people would sit on their hands and bite their tongues. Realistically that isn't going to happen, and realistically this post will make no difference either...
Had the issue not leaked to unstable so quickly (and inappropriately IMHO) then we'd have had a little more time. But once an issue is reported you need to coordinate with other distributions, and etc. Handling something as severe as this is not fun, and random mails from users are a distraction, and a resource-hog.
I should say I was not in any way involved in the discovery, the reporting, the preparation of the fix(es), or the releasing of the update. I knew it was coming, but everybody else seemed to have it well in hand. When there are mails going back and forth for 5+ days with ever-growing Cc: lists, and mailing lists being involved I figure one more cook wouldn't be useful.
So in conclusion:
a. Bad hole. b. Fixing this will take years, probably. c. 50+ mails to the security team within an hour of the advisory going public complaining of missing information is not helpful, not useful, and quite irritating. (Albeit understandable). d. People who don't know the details of an attack, or issue, shouldn't speculate and start panic, fear, and confusion. Esp. when details are a little vague. e. I still like pies.Once again thanks to everybody who was involved and put in an insane amount of work. Yes this is only the start - our users have to suffer the pain of regenerating everything - but we did good. Really. Debian did good. It might not look like it right now, but it could have been so much worse, and Debian did do good. ObQuote: X-Men: The Last Stand
openssh-server (now enhanced with
openssh-blacklist, see the new advisory) and hope to $DEITY all gets
well soon. And maybe, just maybe, a minor suspicion that other Debian-packaged
software may be "tainted" with a similar blemish (that being having patches
that are supposed to fix something, applied with upstream's blessing, and yet
not really audited enough to ensure functionality AND security of the
system is maintained.)
Obviously, there's going to be some adjustments to be made on the Debian side.
But I do hope to $DEITY that major revamps ought to happen on the OpenSSL side
as well, in particular on clarifying their public channels to reaching upstream
developers (read: publish openssl-team@openssl.org in a legitimate way, being
the legitimate upstream contact endpoint it is,) and keeping a closer eye on
the vendors who package their software (yeah, it may not be an obligation at
all for OpenSSL, but heck, their vendors are users, too!) Upstream may be
free not to partake on a social contract like Debian's, but it shouldn't
escape from them the fact that vendors nevertheless aggregate continuing and
potential users (aside from being users themselves) for their benefit.
More importantly though, is that delivering FOSS is a community effort. Sure,
its easy to put blame now, but in the end, the blame isn't as important as the
real cause and effects of the problem/bug/issue are. Better to move on and
work together towards a real fix, rather than the bickering that currently
passes as FOSS entertainment.
openssl over the last couple of
years or so. Yes, you read it right: COUPLE.
Upgrading to the new OpenSSL is easy. Generating new keys is another story.
To save (or add to, depending on how you handle this) your pain, there is a
simple checker that can currently see if your OpenSSH or OpenVPN public
keys are weak enough to warrant replacement. I await a version that can handle
X.509 certificates too (though I only just generated a new one today, before
the announcement, so that means I have to do it again (and get its CSR to
CACert for signing, etc.)
And yeah, if you're running openssh-server, consider regenerating your
host RSA and DSA keys, e.g.:
# mv /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ dsa,rsa _key* /some/place/else
# dpkg-reconfigure -plow openssh-server
That should regenerate your keys and restart openssh-server once the new keys
are installed to /etc/ssh.
The hard part (of making sure all the keys of your systems are updated and
tested) is still up to you, however.
UPDATE: The Debian wiki has up-to-date information regarding other
packages that generate SSH/SSL keys at postinst. Please refer to that while
the key-rollover page isn't up yet.
UPDATE 2: openssh-server is updated (with corresponding
DSA-1576-1) that is linked to the updated OpenSSL library. Be sure to
upgrade! The new package also pulls in openssh-blacklist, a new package
that contains the database needed by the new ssh-vulnkey for checking SSH
public keys.
NOT.
Also see #363516.
Genius.
Now regenerating every single SSH key, SSL certificate and whatever else I can identify that’s been produced by one of the Valgrind-clean openssl. Also expiring and changing every single password I’ve ever typed in a vulnerable SSH session (be it at login or in the session).
Updating the packages on the machines was fun already.
Worst Debian day ever since the 2003 compromise. And that was a BAD one.
I guess we need a new openssl maintainer, we obviously cannot trust the current one(s).
Next.