Search Results: "rra"

19 October 2017

Daniel Pocock: FOSDEM 2018 Real-Time Communications Call for Participation

FOSDEM is one of the world's premier meetings of free software developers, with over five thousand people attending each year. FOSDEM 2018 takes place 3-4 February 2018 in Brussels, Belgium. This email contains information about:
  • Real-Time communications dev-room and lounge,
  • speaking opportunities,
  • volunteering in the dev-room and lounge,
  • related events around FOSDEM, including the XMPP summit,
  • social events (the legendary FOSDEM Beer Night and Saturday night dinners provide endless networking opportunities),
  • the Planet aggregation sites for RTC blogs
Call for participation - Real Time Communications (RTC) The Real-Time dev-room and Real-Time lounge is about all things involving real-time communication, including: XMPP, SIP, WebRTC, telephony, mobile VoIP, codecs, peer-to-peer, privacy and encryption. The dev-room is a successor to the previous XMPP and telephony dev-rooms. We are looking for speakers for the dev-room and volunteers and participants for the tables in the Real-Time lounge. The dev-room is only on Sunday, 4 February 2018. The lounge will be present for both days. To discuss the dev-room and lounge, please join the FSFE-sponsored Free RTC mailing list. To be kept aware of major developments in Free RTC, without being on the discussion list, please join the Free-RTC Announce list. Speaking opportunities Note: if you used FOSDEM Pentabarf before, please use the same account/username Real-Time Communications dev-room: deadline 23:59 UTC on 30 November. Please use the Pentabarf system to submit a talk proposal for the dev-room. On the "General" tab, please look for the "Track" option and choose "Real Time Communications devroom". Link to talk submission. Other dev-rooms and lightning talks: some speakers may find their topic is in the scope of more than one dev-room. It is encouraged to apply to more than one dev-room and also consider proposing a lightning talk, but please be kind enough to tell us if you do this by filling out the notes in the form. You can find the full list of dev-rooms on this page and apply for a lightning talk at https://fosdem.org/submit Main track: the deadline for main track presentations is 23:59 UTC 3 November. Leading developers in the Real-Time Communications field are encouraged to consider submitting a presentation to the main track. First-time speaking? FOSDEM dev-rooms are a welcoming environment for people who have never given a talk before. Please feel free to contact the dev-room administrators personally if you would like to ask any questions about it. Submission guidelines The Pentabarf system will ask for many of the essential details. Please remember to re-use your account from previous years if you have one. In the "Submission notes", please tell us about:
  • the purpose of your talk
  • any other talk applications (dev-rooms, lightning talks, main track)
  • availability constraints and special needs
You can use HTML and links in your bio, abstract and description. If you maintain a blog, please consider providing us with the URL of a feed with posts tagged for your RTC-related work. We will be looking for relevance to the conference and dev-room themes, presentations aimed at developers of free and open source software about RTC-related topics. Please feel free to suggest a duration between 20 minutes and 55 minutes but note that the final decision on talk durations will be made by the dev-room administrators based on the received proposals. As the two previous dev-rooms have been combined into one, we may decide to give shorter slots than in previous years so that more speakers can participate. Please note FOSDEM aims to record and live-stream all talks. The CC-BY license is used. Volunteers needed To make the dev-room and lounge run successfully, we are looking for volunteers:
  • FOSDEM provides video recording equipment and live streaming, volunteers are needed to assist in this
  • organizing one or more restaurant bookings (dependending upon number of participants) for the evening of Saturday, 4 February
  • participation in the Real-Time lounge
  • helping attract sponsorship funds for the dev-room to pay for the Saturday night dinner and any other expenses
  • circulating this Call for Participation (text version) to other mailing lists
Related events - XMPP and RTC summits The XMPP Standards Foundation (XSF) has traditionally held a summit in the days before FOSDEM. There is discussion about a similar summit taking place on 2 February 2018. XMPP Summit web site - please join the mailing list for details. Social events and dinners The traditional FOSDEM beer night occurs on Friday, 2 February. On Saturday night, there are usually dinners associated with each of the dev-rooms. Most restaurants in Brussels are not so large so these dinners have space constraints and reservations are essential. Please subscribe to the Free-RTC mailing list for further details about the Saturday night dinner options and how you can register for a seat. Spread the word and discuss If you know of any mailing lists where this CfP would be relevant, please forward this email (text version). If this dev-room excites you, please blog or microblog about it, especially if you are submitting a talk. If you regularly blog about RTC topics, please send details about your blog to the planet site administrators:
Planet site Admin contact
All projects Free-RTC Planet (http://planet.freertc.org) contact planet@freertc.org
XMPP Planet Jabber (http://planet.jabber.org) contact ralphm@ik.nu
SIP Planet SIP (http://planet.sip5060.net) contact planet@sip5060.net
SIP (Espa ol) Planet SIP-es (http://planet.sip5060.net/es/) contact planet@sip5060.net
Please also link to the Planet sites from your own blog or web site as this helps everybody in the free real-time communications community. Contact For any private queries, contact us directly using the address fosdem-rtc-admin@freertc.org and for any other queries please ask on the Free-RTC mailing list. The dev-room administration team:

18 October 2017

Norbert Preining: Kobo firmware 4.6.9995 mega update (KSM, nickel patch, ssh, fonts)

It has been ages that I haven t updated the MegaUpdate package for Kobo. Now that a new and seemingly rather bug-free and quick firmware release (4.6.9995) has been released, I finally took the time to update the whole package to the latest releases of all the included items. The update includes all my favorite patches and features: Kobo Start Menu, koreader, coolreader, pbchess, ssh access, custom dictionaries, and some side-loaded fonts. Kobo Logo So what are all these items: Install procedure Download Mark6 Kobo GloHD firmware: Kobo 4.6.9995 for GloHD Mega update: Kobo-4.6.9995-combined/Mark6/KoboRoot.tgz Mark5 Aura firmware: Kobo 4.6.9995 for Aura Mega update: Kobo-4.6.9995-combined/Mark5/KoboRoot.tgz Mark4 Kobo Glo, Aura HD firmware: Kobo 4.6.9995 for Glo and AuraHD Mega update: Kobo-4.6.9995-combined/Mark4/KoboRoot.tgz Latest firmware Warning: Sideloading or crossloading the incorrect firmware can break/brick your device. The link below is for Kobo GloHD ONLY. The first step is to update the Kobo to the latest firmware. This can easily be done by just getting the latest firmware from the links above and unpacking the zip file into the .kobo directory on your device. Eject and enjoy the updating procedure. Mega update Get the combined KoboRoot.tgz for your device from the links above and put it into the .kobo directory, then eject and enjoy the updating procedure again. After this the device should reboot and you will be kicked into KSM, from where after some time of waiting Nickel will be started. If you consider the fonts too small, select Configure, then the General, and add item, then select kobomenuFontsize=55 and save. Remarks to some of the items included The full list of included things is above, here are only some notes about what specific I have done. WARNINGS If this is the first time you install this patch, you to fix the password for root and disable telnet. This is an important step, here are the steps you have to take (taken from this old post):
  1. Turn on Wifi on the Kobo and find IP address
    Go to Settings Connect and after this is done, go to Settings Device Information where you will see something like
    IP Address: 192.168.1.NN

    (numbers change!)
  2. telnet into your device
    telnet 192.168.1.NN
    it will ask you the user name, enter root (without the quotes) and no password
  3. (ON THE GLO) change home directory of root
    edit /etc/passwd with vi and change the entry for root by changing the 6th field from: / to /root (without the quotes). After this procedure the line should look like
    root::0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
    don t forget to save the file
  4. (ON THE GLO) create ssh keys for dropbear
    [root@(none) ~]# mkdir /etc/dropbear
    [root@(none) ~]# cd /etc/dropbear
    [root@(none) ~]# dropbearkey -t dss -f dropbear_dss_host_key
    [root@(none) ~]# dropbearkey -t rsa -f dropbear_rsa_host_key
  5. (ON YOUR PERSONAL COMPUTER) check that you can log in with ssh
    ssh root@192.168.1.NN
    You should get dropped into your device again
  6. (ON THE GLO) log out of the telnet session (the first one you did)
    [root@(none) ~]# exit
  7. (ON THE GLO) in your ssh session, change the password of root
    [root@(none) ~]# passwd
    you will have to enter the new password two times. Remember it well, you will not be easily able to recover it without opening your device.
  8. (ON THE GLO) disable telnet login
    edit the file /etc/inetd.conf.local on the GLO (using vi) and remove the telnet line (the line starting with 23).
  9. restart your device
The combined KoboRoot.tgz is provided without warranty. If you need to reset your device, don t blame me!

17 October 2017

Antoine Beaupr : A comparison of cryptographic keycards

An earlier article showed that private key storage is an important problem to solve in any cryptographic system and established keycards as a good way to store private key material offline. But which keycard should we use? This article examines the form factor, openness, and performance of four keycards to try to help readers choose the one that will fit their needs. I have personally been using a YubiKey NEO, since a 2015 announcement on GitHub promoting two-factor authentication. I was also able to hook up my SSH authentication key into the YubiKey's 2048 bit RSA slot. It seemed natural to move the other subkeys onto the keycard, provided that performance was sufficient. The mail client that I use, (Notmuch), blocks when decrypting messages, which could be a serious problems on large email threads from encrypted mailing lists. So I built a test harness and got access to some more keycards: I bought a FST-01 from its creator, Yutaka Niibe, at the last DebConf and Nitrokey donated a Nitrokey Pro. I also bought a YubiKey 4 when I got the NEO. There are of course other keycards out there, but those are the ones I could get my hands on. You'll notice none of those keycards have a physical keypad to enter passwords, so they are all vulnerable to keyloggers that could extract the key's PIN. Keep in mind, however, that even with the PIN, an attacker could only ask the keycard to decrypt or sign material but not extract the key that is protected by the card's firmware.

Form factor The Nitrokey Pro, YubiKey NEO (worn out), YubiKey 4, and FST-01 The four keycards have similar form factors: they all connect to a standard USB port, although both YubiKey keycards have a capacitive button by which the user triggers two-factor authentication and the YubiKey 4 can also require a button press to confirm private key use. The YubiKeys feel sturdier than the other two. The NEO has withstood two years of punishment in my pockets along with the rest of my "real" keyring and there is only minimal wear on the keycard in the picture. It's also thinner so it fits well on the keyring. The FST-01 stands out from the other two with its minimal design. Out of the box, the FST-01 comes without a case, so the circuitry is exposed. This is deliberate: one of its goals is to be as transparent as possible, both in terms of software and hardware design and you definitely get that feeling at the physical level. Unfortunately, that does mean it feels more brittle than other models: I wouldn't carry it in my pocket all the time, although there is a case that may protect the key a little better, but it does not provide an easy way to hook it into a keyring. In the group picture above, the FST-01 is the pink plastic thing, which is a rubbery casing I received along with the device when I got it. Notice how the USB connectors of the YubiKeys differ from the other two: while the FST-01 and the Nitrokey have standard USB connectors, the YubiKey has only a "half-connector", which is what makes it thinner than the other two. The "Nano" form factor takes this even further and almost disappears in the USB port. Unfortunately, this arrangement means the YubiKey NEO often comes loose and falls out of the USB port, especially when connected to a laptop. On my workstation, however, it usually stays put even with my whole keyring hanging off of it. I suspect this adds more strain to the host's USB port but that's a tradeoff I've lived with without any noticeable wear so far. Finally, the NEO has this peculiar feature of supporting NFC for certain operations, as LWN previously covered, but I haven't used that feature yet. The Nitrokey Pro looks like a normal USB key, in contrast with the other two devices. It does feel a little brittle when compared with the YubiKey, although only time will tell how much of a beating it can take. It has a small ring in the case so it is possible to carry it directly on your keyring, but I would be worried the cap would come off eventually. Nitrokey devices are also two times thicker than the Yubico models which makes them less convenient to carry around on keyrings.

Open and closed designs The FST-01 is as open as hardware comes, down to the PCB design available as KiCad files in this Git repository. The software running on the card is the Gnuk firmware that implements the OpenPGP card protocol, but you can also get it with firmware implementing a true random number generator (TRNG) called NeuG (pronounced "noisy"); the device is programmable through a standard Serial Wire Debug (SWD) port. The Nitrokey Start model also runs the Gnuk firmware. However, the Nitrokey website announces only ECC and RSA 2048-bit support for the Start, while the FST-01 also supports RSA-4096. Nitrokey's founder Jan Suhr, in a private email, explained that this is because "Gnuk doesn't support RSA-3072 or larger at a reasonable speed". Its devices (the Pro, Start, and HSM models) use a similar chip to the FST-01: the STM32F103 microcontroller. Nitrokey Pro with STM32F103TBU6 MCU Nitrokey also publishes its hardware designs, on GitHub, which shows the Pro is basically a fork of the FST-01, according to the ChangeLog. I opened the case to confirm it was using the STM MCU, something I should warn you against; I broke one of the pins holding it together when opening it so now it's even more fragile. But at least, I was able to confirm it was built using the STM32F103TBU6 MCU, like the FST-01. Nitrokey back side But this is where the comparison ends: on the back side, we find a SIM card reader that holds the OpenPGP card that, in turn, holds the private key material and does the cryptographic operations. So, in effect, the Nitrokey Pro is really a evolution of the original OpenPGP card readers. Nitrokey confirmed the OpenPGP card featured in the Pro is the same as the one shipped by the Free Software Foundation Europe (FSFE): the BasicCard built by ZeitControl. Those cards, however, are covered by NDAs and the firmware is only partially open source. This makes the Nitrokey Pro less open than the FST-01, but that's an inevitable tradeoff when choosing a design based on the OpenPGP cards, which Suhr described to me as "pretty proprietary". There are other keycards out there, however, for example the SLJ52GDL150-150k smartcard suggested by Debian developer Yves-Alexis Perez, which he prefers as it is certified by French and German authorities. In that blog post, he also said he was experimenting with the GPL-licensed OpenPGP applet implemented by the French ANSSI. But the YubiKey devices are even further away in the closed-design direction. Both the hardware designs and firmware are proprietary. The YubiKey NEO, for example, cannot be upgraded at all, even though it is based on an open firmware. According to Yubico's FAQ, this is due to "best security practices": "There is a 'no upgrade' policy for our devices since nothing, including malware, can write to the firmware." I find this decision questionable in a context where security updates are often more important than trying to design a bulletproof design, which may simply be impossible. And the YubiKey NEO did suffer from critical security issue that allowed attackers to bypass the PIN protection on the card, which raises the question of the actual protection of the private key material on those cards. According to Niibe, "some OpenPGP cards store the private key unencrypted. It is a common attitude for many smartcard implementations", which was confirmed by Suhr: "the private key is protected by hardware mechanisms which prevent its extraction and misuse". He is referring to the use of tamper resistance. After that security issue, there was no other option for YubiKey NEO users than to get a new keycard (for free, thankfully) from Yubico, which also meant discarding the private key material on the key. For OpenPGP keys, this may mean having to bootstrap the web of trust from scratch if the keycard was responsible for the main certification key. But at least the NEO is running free software based on the OpenPGP card applet and the source is still available on GitHub. The YubiKey 4, on the other hand, is now closed source, which was controversial when the new model was announced last year. It led the main Linux Foundation system administrator, Konstantin Ryabitsev, to withdraw his endorsement of Yubico products. In response, Yubico argued that this approach was essential to the security of its devices, which are now based on "a secure chip, which has built-in countermeasures to mitigate a long list of attacks". In particular, it claims that:
A commercial-grade AVR or ARM controller is unfit to be used in a security product. In most cases, these controllers are easy to attack, from breaking in via a debug/JTAG/TAP port to probing memory contents. Various forms of fault injection and side-channel analysis are possible, sometimes allowing for a complete key recovery in a shockingly short period of time.
While I understand those concerns, they eventually come down to the trust you have in an organization. Not only do we have to trust Yubico, but also hardware manufacturers and designs they have chosen. Every step in the hidden supply chain is then trusted to make correct technical decisions and not introduce any backdoors. History, unfortunately, is not on Yubico's side: Snowden revealed the example of RSA security accepting what renowned cryptographer Bruce Schneier described as a "bribe" from the NSA to weaken its ECC implementation, by using the presumably backdoored Dual_EC_DRBG algorithm. What makes Yubico or its suppliers so different from RSA Security? Remember that RSA Security used to be an adamant opponent to the degradation of encryption standards, campaigning against the Clipper chip in the first crypto wars. Even if we trust the Yubico supply chain, how can we trust a closed design using what basically amounts to security through obscurity? Publicly auditable designs are an important tradition in cryptography, and that principle shouldn't stop when software is frozen into silicon. In fact, a critical vulnerability called ROCA disclosed recently affects closed "smartcards" like the YubiKey 4 and allows full private key recovery from the public key if the key was generated on a vulnerable keycard. When speaking with Ars Technica, the researchers outlined the importance of open designs and questioned the reliability of certification:
Our work highlights the dangers of keeping the design secret and the implementation closed-source, even if both are thoroughly analyzed and certified by experts. The lack of public information causes a delay in the discovery of flaws (and hinders the process of checking for them), thereby increasing the number of already deployed and affected devices at the time of detection.
This issue with open hardware designs seems to be recurring topic of conversation on the Gnuk mailing list. For example, there was a discussion in September 2017 regarding possible hardware vulnerabilities in the STM MCU that would allow extraction of encrypted key material from the key. Niibe referred to a talk presented at the WOOT 17 workshop, where Johannes Obermaier and Stefan Tatschner, from the Fraunhofer Institute, demonstrated attacks against the STMF0 family MCUs. It is still unclear if those attacks also apply to the older STMF1 design used in the FST-01, however. Furthermore, extracted private key material is still protected by user passphrase, but the Gnuk uses a weak key derivation function, so brute-forcing attacks may be possible. Fortunately, there is work in progress to make GnuPG hash the passphrase before sending it to the keycard, which should make such attacks harder if not completely pointless. When asked about the Yubico claims in a private email, Niibe did recognize that "it is true that there are more weak points in general purpose implementations than special implementations". During the last DebConf in Montreal, Niibe explained:
If you don't trust me, you should not buy from me. Source code availability is only a single factor: someone can maliciously replace the firmware to enable advanced attacks.
Niibe recommends to "build the firmware yourself", also saying the design of the FST-01 uses normal hardware that "everyone can replicate". Those advantages are hard to deny for a cryptographic system: using more generic components makes it harder for hostile parties to mount targeted attacks. A counter-argument here is that it can be difficult for a regular user to audit such designs, let alone physically build the device from scratch but, in a mailing list discussion, Debian developer Ian Jackson explained that:
You don't need to be able to validate it personally. The thing spooks most hate is discovery. Backdooring supposedly-free hardware is harder (more costly) because it comes with greater risk of discovery. To put it concretely: if they backdoor all of them, someone (not necessarily you) might notice. (Backdooring only yours involves messing with the shipping arrangements and so on, and supposes that you specifically are of interest.)
Since that, as far as we know, the STM microcontrollers are not backdoored, I would tend to favor those devices instead of proprietary ones, as such a backdoor would be more easily detectable than in a closed design. Even though physical attacks may be possible against those microcontrollers, in the end, if an attacker has physical access to a keycard, I consider the key compromised, even if it has the best chip on the market. In our email exchange, Niibe argued that "when a token is lost, it is better to revoke keys, even if the token is considered secure enough". So like any other device, physical compromise of tokens may mean compromise of the key and should trigger key-revocation procedures.

Algorithms and performance To establish reliable performance results, I wrote a benchmark program naively called crypto-bench that could produce comparable results between the different keys. The program takes each algorithm/keycard combination and runs 1000 decryptions of a 16-byte file (one AES-128 block) using GnuPG, after priming it to get the password cached. I assume the overhead of GnuPG calls to be negligible, as it should be the same across all tokens, so comparisons are possible. AES encryption is constant across all tests as it is always performed on the host and fast enough to be irrelevant in the tests. I used the following:
  • Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-6100U CPU @ 2.30GHz running Debian 9 ("stretch"/stable amd64), using GnuPG 2.1.18-6 (from the stable Debian package)
  • Nitrokey Pro 0.8 (latest firmware)
  • FST-01, running Gnuk version 1.2.5 (latest firmware)
  • YubiKey NEO OpenPGP applet 1.0.10 (not upgradable)
  • YubiKey 4 4.2.6 (not upgradable)
I ran crypto-bench for each keycard, which resulted in the following:
Algorithm Device Mean time (s)
ECDH-Curve25519 CPU 0.036
FST-01 0.135
RSA-2048 CPU 0.016
YubiKey-4 0.162
Nitrokey-Pro 0.610
YubiKey-NEO 0.736
FST-01 1.265
RSA-4096 CPU 0.043
YubiKey-4 0.875
Nitrokey-Pro 3.150
FST-01 8.218
Decryption graph There we see the performance of the four keycards I tested, compared with the same operations done without a keycard: the "CPU" device. That provides the baseline time of GnuPG decrypting the file. The first obvious observation is that using a keycard is slower: in the best scenario (FST-01 + ECC) we see a four-fold slowdown, but in the worst case (also FST-01, but RSA-4096), we see a catastrophic 200-fold slowdown. When I presented the results on the Gnuk mailing list, GnuPG developer Werner Koch confirmed those "numbers are as expected":
With a crypto chip RSA is much faster. By design the Gnuk can't be as fast - it is just a simple MCU. However, using Curve25519 Gnuk is really fast.
And yes, the FST-01 is really fast at doing ECC, but it's also the only keycard that handles ECC in my tests; the Nitrokey Start and Nitrokey HSM should support it as well, but I haven't been able to test those devices. Also note that the YubiKey NEO doesn't support RSA-4096 at all, so we can only compare RSA-2048 across keycards. We should note, however, that ECC is slower than RSA on the CPU, which suggests the Gnuk ECC implementation used by the FST-01 is exceptionally fast. In discussions about improving the performance of the FST-01, Niibe estimated the user tolerance threshold to be "2 seconds decryption time". In a new design using the STM32L432 microcontroller, Aurelien Jarno was able to bring the numbers for RSA-2048 decryption from 1.27s down to 0.65s, and for RSA-4096, from 8.22s down to 3.87s seconds. RSA-4096 is still beyond the two-second threshold, but at least it brings the FST-01 close to the YubiKey NEO and Nitrokey Pro performance levels. We should also underline the superior performance of the YubiKey 4: whatever that thing is doing, it's doing it faster than anyone else. It does RSA-4096 faster than the FST-01 does RSA-2048, and almost as fast as the Nitrokey Pro does RSA-2048. We should also note that the Nitrokey Pro also fails to cross the two-second threshold for RSA-4096 decryption. For me, the FST-01's stellar performance with ECC outshines the other devices. Maybe it says more about the efficiency of the algorithm than the FST-01 or Gnuk's design, but it's definitely an interesting avenue for people who want to deploy those modern algorithms. So, in terms of performance, it is clear that both the YubiKey 4 and the FST-01 take the prize in their own areas (RSA and ECC, respectively).

Conclusion In the above presentation, I have evaluated four cryptographic keycards for use with various OpenPGP operations. What the results show is that the only efficient way of storing a 4096-bit encryption key on a keycard would be to use the YubiKey 4. Unfortunately, I do not feel we should put our trust in such closed designs so I would argue you should either stick with 2048-bit encryption subkeys or keep the keys on disk. Considering that losing such a key would be catastrophic, this might be a good approach anyway. You should also consider switching to ECC encryption: even though it may not be supported everywhere, GnuPG supports having multiple encryption subkeys on a keyring: if one algorithm is unsupported (e.g. GnuPG 1.4 doesn't support ECC), it will fall back to a supported algorithm (e.g. RSA). Do not forget your previously encrypted material doesn't magically re-encrypt itself using your new encryption subkey, however. For authentication and signing keys, speed is not such an issue, so I would warmly recommend either the Nitrokey Pro or Start, or the FST-01, depending on whether you want to start experimenting with ECC algorithms. Availability also seems to be an issue for the FST-01. While you can generally get the device when you meet Niibe in person for a few bucks (I bought mine for around \$30 Canadian), the Seeed online shop says the device is out of stock at the time of this writing, even though Jonathan McDowell said that may be inaccurate in a debian-project discussion. Nevertheless, this issue may make the Nitrokey devices more attractive. When deciding on using the Pro or Start, Suhr offered the following advice:
In practice smart card security has been proven to work well (at least if you use a decent smart card). Therefore the Nitrokey Pro should be used for high security cases. If you don't trust the smart card or if Nitrokey Start is just sufficient for you, you can choose that one. This is why we offer both models.
So far, I have created a signing subkey and moved that and my authentication key to the YubiKey NEO, because it's a device I physically trust to keep itself together in my pockets and I was already using it. It has served me well so far, especially with its extra features like U2F and HOTP support, which I use frequently. Those features are also available on the Nitrokey Pro, so that may be an alternative if I lose the YubiKey. I will probably move my main certification key to the FST-01 and a LUKS-encrypted USB disk, to keep that certification key offline but backed up on two different devices. As for the encryption key, I'll wait for keycard performance to improve, or simply switch my whole keyring to ECC and use the FST-01 or Nitrokey Start for that purpose.
[The author would like to thank Nitrokey for providing hardware for testing.] This article first appeared in the Linux Weekly News.

16 October 2017

Russ Allbery: Free software log (September 2017)

I said that I was going to start writing these regularly, so I'm going to stick to it, even when the results are rather underwhelming. One of the goals is to make the time for more free software work, and I do better at doing things that I record. The only piece of free software work for September was that I made rra-c-util compile cleanly with the Clang static analyzer. This was fairly tedious work that mostly involved unconfusing the compiler or converting (semi-intentional) crashes into explicit asserts, but it unblocks using the Clang static analyzer as part of the automated test suite of my other projects that are downstream of rra-c-util. One of the semantic changes I made was that the vector utilities in rra-c-util (which maintain a resizable array of strings) now always allocate room for at least one string pointer. This wastes a small amount of memory for empty vectors that are never used, but ensures that the strings struct member is always valid. This isn't, strictly speaking, a correctness fix, since all the checks were correct, but after some thought, I decided that humans might have the same problem that the static analyzer had. It's a lot easier to reason about a field that's never NULL. Similarly, the replacement function for a missing reallocarray now does an allocation of size 1 if given a size of 0, just to avoid edge case behavior. (I'm sure the behavior of a realloc with size 0 is defined somewhere in the C standard, but if I have to look it up, I'd rather not make a human reason about it.) I started on, but didn't finish, making rra-c-util compile without Clang warnings (at least for a chosen set of warnings). By far the hardest problem here are the Clang warnings for comparisons between unsigned and signed integers. In theory, I like this warning, since it's the cause of a lot of very obscure bugs. In practice, gah does C ever do this all over the place, and it's incredibly painful to avoid. (One of the biggest offenders is write, which returns a ssize_t that you almost always want to compare against a size_t.) I did a bunch of mechanical work, but I now have a lot of bits of code like:
     if (status < 0)
         return;
    written = (size_t) status;
    if (written < avail)
        buffer->left += written;
which is ugly and unsatisfying. And I also have a ton of casts, such as with:
    buffer_resize(buffer, (size_t) st.st_size + used);
since st.st_size is an off_t, which may be signed. This is all deeply unsatisfying and ugly, and I think it makes the code moderately harder to read, but I do think the warning will potentially catch bugs and even security issues. I'm still torn. Maybe I can find some nice macros or programming styles to avoid the worst of this problem. It definitely requires more thought, rather than just committing this huge mechanical change with lots of ugly code. Mostly, this kind of nonsense makes me want to stop working on C code and go finish learning Rust.... Anyway, apart from work, the biggest thing I managed to do last month that was vaguely related to free software was upgrading my personal servers to stretch (finally). That mostly went okay; only a few things made it unnecessarily exciting. The first was that one of my systems had a very tiny / partition that was too small to hold the downloaded debs for the upgrade, so I had to resize it (VM disk, partition, and file system), and that was a bit exciting because it has an old-style DOS partition table that isn't aligned (hmmm, which is probably why disk I/O is so slow on those VMs), so I had to use the obsolete fdisk -c=dos mode because I wasn't up for replacing the partition right then. The second was that my first try at an upgrade died with a segfault during the libc6 postinst and then every executable segfaulted. A mild panic and a rescue disk later (and thirty minutes and a lot of swearing), I tracked the problem down to libc6-xen. Nothing in the dependency structure between jessie and stretch forces libc6-xen to be upgraded in lockstep or removed, but it's earlier in the search path. So ld.so gets upgraded, and then finds the old libc6 from the libc6-xen package, and the mismatch causes immediate segfaults. A chroot dpkg --purge from the rescue disk solved the problem as soon as I knew what was going on, but that was a stressful half-hour. The third problem was something I should have known was going to be an issue: an old Perl program that does some internal stuff for one of the services I ran had a defined @array test that has been warning for eons and that I never fixed. That became a full syntax error with the most recent Perl, and then I fixed it incorrectly the first time and had a bunch of trouble tracking down what I'd broken. All sorted out now, and everything is happily running stretch. (ejabberd, which other folks had mentioned was a problem, went completely smoothly, although I suspect I now have too many of the plugin packages installed and should do a purging.)

15 October 2017

Norbert Preining: TeX Live Manager: JSON output

With the development of TLCockpit continuing, I found the need for and easy exchange format between the TeX Live Manager tlmgr and frontend programs like TLCockpit. Thus, I have implemented JSON output for the tlmgr info command. While the format is not 100% stable I might change some thing I consider it pretty settled. The output of tlmgr info --data json is a JSON array with JSON objects for each package requested (default is to list all).
[ TLPackageObj, TLPackageObj, ... ]
The structure of the JSON object TLPackageObj reflects the internal Perl hash. Guaranteed to be present keys are name (String) and avilable (Boolean). In case the package is available, there are the following further keys sorted by their type: A rather long example showing the output for the package latex, formatted with json_pp and having the list of files and the long description shortened:
[
    
      "installed" : true,
      "doccontainerchecksum" : "5bdfea6b85c431a0af2abc8f8df160b297ad73f6a324ca88df990f01f24611c9ae80d2f6d12c7b3767308fbe3de3fca3d11664b923ea4080fb13fd056a1d0c3d",
      "docfiles" : [
         "texmf-dist/doc/latex/base/README.txt",
         ....
         "texmf-dist/doc/latex/base/webcomp.pdf"
      ],
      "containersize" : 163892,
      "depends" : [
         "luatex",
         "pdftex",
         "latexconfig",
         "latex-fonts"
      ],
      "runsize" : 414,
      "relocated" : false,
      "doccontainersize" : 12812184,
      "srcsize" : 752,
      "revision" : 43813,
      "srcfiles" : [
         "texmf-dist/source/latex/base/alltt.dtx",
         ....
         "texmf-dist/source/latex/base/utf8ienc.dtx"
      ],
      "category" : "Package",
      "cataloguedata" :  
         "version" : "2017/01/01 PL1",
         "topics" : "format",
         "license" : "lppl1.3",
         "date" : "2017-01-25 23:33:57 +0100"
       ,
      "srccontainerchecksum" : "1d145b567cf48d6ee71582a1f329fe5cf002d6259269a71d2e4a69e6e6bd65abeb92461d31d7137f3803503534282bc0c5546e5d2d1aa2604e896e607c53b041",
      "postactions" : [],
      "binsize" :  ,
      "longdesc" : "LaTeX is a widely-used macro package for TeX, [...]",
      "srccontainersize" : 516036,
      "containerchecksum" : "af0ac85f89b7620eb7699c8bca6348f8913352c473af1056b7a90f28567d3f3e21d60be1f44e056107766b1dce8d87d367e7f8a82f777d565a2d4597feb24558",
      "executes" : [],
      "binfiles" :  ,
      "name" : "latex",
      "catalogue" : null,
      "docsize" : 3799,
      "available" : true,
      "runfiles" : [
         "texmf-dist/makeindex/latex/gglo.ist",
         ...
         "texmf-dist/tex/latex/base/x2enc.dfu"
      ],
      "shortdesc" : "A TeX macro package that defines LaTeX"
    
]
What is currently not available via tlmgr info and thus also not via the JSON output is access to virtual TeX Live databases with several member databases (multiple repositories). I am thinking about how to incorporate this information. These changes are currently available in the tlcritical repository, but will enter proper TeX Live repositories soon. Using this JSON output I will rewrite the current TLCockpit tlmgr interface to display more complete information.

13 October 2017

Norbert Preining: Scala: parse JSON into nested case classes

I was playing around with parsing JSON in Scala, and got spray-json as recommendation from my Senpai. My aim was parsing some nested structure like:
  
  "key1" : "value1",
  "key2" :   "subkey1" : "subval1", "subkey2" : "subval2"  
 
into a nested Scala case class:
case class SubClass(subkey1: String, subkey2: String)
case class MainClass(key1: String, key2: SubClass)

To achieve this one needs to define one s own JsonProtocol that describes the parsing:
import spray.json._
object MyJsonProtocol extends DefaultJsonProtocol  
  implicit val subclassFormat = jsonFormat2(SubClass)
  implicit val mainclassFormat = jsonFormat2(MainClass)
 
import MyJsonProtocol._
Using this parsing can be done in the usual way:
val jsonstr = """
      
      "key1" : "value1",
      "key2" :   "subkey1" : "subval1", "subkey2" : "subval2"  
     
    """
val jsonAst = jsonstr.parseJson
val gotit = jsonAst.convertTo[MainClass]
If the input is from a JSON array of the above arrays:
[
    
    "key1" : "value1",
    "key2" :   "subkey1" : "subval1", "subkey2" : "subval2"  
   ,
    
    "key1" : "value10",
    "key2" :   "subkey1" : "subval10", "subkey2" : "subval20"  
   
]
the only change necessary is to call
val gotit = jsonAst.convertTo[List[MainClass]]

12 October 2017

Dirk Eddelbuettel: RcppArmadillo 0.8.100.1.0

armadillo image We are thrilled to announce a new big RcppArmadillo release! Conrad recently moved Armadillo to the 8.* series, with significant improvements and speed ups for sparse matrix operations, and more. See below for a brief summary. This also required some changes at our end which Binxiang Ni provided, and Serguei Sokol improved some instantiations. We now show the new vignette Binxiang Ni wrote for his GSoC contribution, and I converted it (and the other main vignette) to using the pinp package for sleeker pdf vignettes. This release resumes our bi-monthly CRAN release cycle. I may make interim updates available at GitHub "as needed". And this time I managed to mess up the reverse depends testing, and missed one sync() call on the way back to R---but all that is now taken care of. Armadillo is a powerful and expressive C++ template library for linear algebra aiming towards a good balance between speed and ease of use with a syntax deliberately close to a Matlab. RcppArmadillo integrates this library with the R environment and language--and is widely used by (currently) 405 other packages on CRAN. A high-level summary of changes follows.

Changes in RcppArmadillo version 0.8.100.1.0 (2017-10-05)
  • Upgraded to Armadillo release 8.100.1 (Feral Pursuits)
    • faster incremental construction of sparse matrices via element access operators
    • faster diagonal views in sparse matrices
    • expanded SpMat to save/load sparse matrices in coord format
    • expanded .save(),.load() to allow specification of datasets within HDF5 files
    • added affmul() to simplify application of affine transformations
    • warnings and errors are now printed by default to the std::cerr stream
    • added set_cerr_stream() and get_cerr_stream() to replace set_stream_err1(), set_stream_err2(), get_stream_err1(), get_stream_err2()
    • new configuration options ARMA_COUT_STREAM and ARMA_CERR_STREAM
  • Constructors for sparse matrices of types dgt, dtt amd dst now use Armadillo code for improved performance (Serguei Sokol in #175 addressing #173)
  • Sparse matrices call .sync() before accessing internal arrays (Binxiang Ni in #171)
  • The sparse matrix vignette has been converted to Rmarkdown using the pinp package, and is now correctly indexed. (#176)

Courtesy of CRANberries, there is a diffstat report. More detailed information is on the RcppArmadillo page. Questions, comments etc should go to the rcpp-devel mailing list off the R-Forge page.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.

2 October 2017

Antoine Beaupr : My free software activities, September 2017

Debian Long Term Support (LTS) This is my monthly Debian LTS report. I mostly worked on the git, git-annex and ruby packages this month but didn't have time to completely use my allocated hours because I started too late in the month.

Ruby I was hoping someone would pick up the Ruby work I submitted in August, but it seems no one wanted to touch that mess, understandably. Since then, new issues came up, and not only did I have to work on the rubygems and ruby1.9 package, but now the ruby1.8 package also had to get security updates. Yes: it's bad enough that the rubygems code is duplicated in one other package, but wheezy had the misfortune of having two Ruby versions supported. The Ruby 1.9 also failed to build from source because of test suite issues, which I haven't found a clean and easy fix for, so I ended up making test suite failures non-fatal in 1.9, which they were already in 1.8. I did keep a close eye on changes in the test suite output to make sure tests introduced in the security fixes would pass and that I wouldn't introduce new regressions as well. So I published the following advisories:
  • ruby 1.8: DLA-1113-1, fixing CVE-2017-0898 and CVE-2017-10784. 1.8 doesn't seem affected by CVE-2017-14033 as the provided test does not fail (but it does fail in 1.9.1). test suite was, before patch:
    2199 tests, 1672513 assertions, 18 failures, 51 errors
    
    and after patch:
    2200 tests, 1672514 assertions, 18 failures, 51 errors
    
  • rubygems: uploaded the package prepared in August as is in DLA-1112-1, fixing CVE-2017-0899, CVE-2017-0900, CVE-2017-0901. here the test suite passed normally.
  • ruby 1.9: here I used the used 2.2.8 release tarball to generate a patch that would cover all issues and published DLA-1114-1 that fixes the CVEs of the two packages above. the test suite was, before patches:
    10179 tests, 2232711 assertions, 26 failures, 23 errors, 51 skips
    
    and after patches:
    1.9 after patches (B): 10184 tests, 2232771 assertions, 26 failures, 23 errors, 53 skips
    

Git I also quickly issued an advisory (DLA-1120-1) for CVE-2017-14867, an odd issue affecting git in wheezy. The backport was tricky because it wouldn't apply cleanly and the git package had a custom patching system which made it tricky to work on.

Git-annex I did a quick stint on git-annex as well: I was able to reproduce the issue and confirm an approach to fixing the issue in wheezy, although I didn't have time to complete the work before the end of the month.

Other free software work

New project: feed2exec I should probably make a separate blog post about this, but ironically, I don't want to spend too much time writing those reports, so this will be quick. I wrote a new program, called feed2exec. It's basically a combination of feed2imap, rss2email and feed2tweet: it allows you to fetch RSS feeds and send them in a mailbox, but what's special about it, compared to the other programs above, is that it is more generic: you can basically make it do whatever you want on new feed items. I have, for example, replaced my feed2tweet instance with it, using this simple configuration:
[anarcat]
url = https://anarc.at/blog/index.rss
output = feed2exec.plugins.exec
args = tweet "%(title)0.70s %(link)0.70s"
The sample configuration file also has examples to talk with Mastodon, Pump.io and, why not, a torrent server to download torrent files available over RSS feeds. A trivial configuration can also make it work as a crude podcast client. My main motivation to work on this was that it was difficult to extend feed2imap to do what I needed (which was to talk to transmission to download torrent files) and rss2email didn't support my workflow (which is delivering to feed-specific mail folders). Because both projects also seemed abandoned, it seemed like a good idea at the time to start a new one, although the rss2email community has now restarted the project and may produce interesting results. As an experiment, I tracked my time working on this project. It turns out it took about 45 hours to write that software. Considering feed2exec is about 1400 SLOC, that's 30 lines of code per hour. I don't know if that's slow or fast, but it's an interesting metric for future projects. It sure seems slow to me, but we need to keep in mind those 30 lines of code don't include documentation and repeated head banging on the keyboard. For example, I found two issues with the upstream feedparser package which I use to parse feeds which also seems unmaintained, unfortunately. Feed2exec is beta software at this point, but it's working well enough for me and the design is much simpler than the other programs of the kind. The main issue people can expect from it at this point is formatting issues or parse errors on exotic feeds, and noisy error messages on network errors, all of which should be fairly easy to fix in the test suite. I hope it will be useful for the community and, as usual, I welcome contributions, help and suggestions on how to improve the software.

More Python templates As part of the work on feed2exec, I did cleanup a few things in the ecdysis project, mostly to hook tests up in the CI, improve on the advancedConfig logger and cleanup more stuff. While I was there, it turns out that I built a pretty decent basic CI configuration for Python on GitLab. Whereas the previous templates only had a non-working Django example, you should now be able to chose a Python template when you configure CI on GitLab 10 and above, which should hook you up with normal Python setup procedures like setup.py install and setup.py test.

Selfspy I mentioned working on a monitoring tool in my last post, because it was a feature from Workrave missing in SafeEyes. It turns out there is already such a tool called selfspy. I did an extensive review of the software to make sure it wouldn't leak out confidential information out before using it, and it looks, well... kind of okay. It crashed on me at least once so far, which is too bad because then it loses track of the precious activity. I have used it at least once to figure out what the heck I worked on during the day, so it's pretty useful. I particularly used it to backtrack my work on feed2exec as I didn't originally track my time on the project. Unfortunately, selfspy seems unmaintained. I have proposed a maintenance team and hopefully the project maintainer will respond and at least share access so we don't end up in a situation like linkchecker. I also sent a bunch of pull requests to fix some issues like being secure by default and fixing the build. Apart from the crash, the main issue I have found with the software is that it doesn't detect idle time which means certain apps are disproportionatly represented in statistics. There are also some weaknesses in the crypto that should be adressed for people that encrypt their database. Next step is to package selfspy in Debian which should hopefully be simple enough...

Restic documentation security As part of a documentation patch on the Restic backup software, I have improved on my previous Perl script to snoop on process commandline arguments. A common flaw in shell scripts and cron jobs is to pass secret material in the environment (usually safe) but often through commandline arguments (definitely not safe). The challenge, in this peculiar case, was the env binary, but the last time I encountered such an issue was with the Drush commandline tool, which was passing database credentials in clear to the mysql binary. Using my Perl sniffer, I could get to 60 checks per second (or 60Hz). After reimplementing it in Python, this number went up to 160Hz, which still wasn't enough to catch the elusive env command, which is much faster at hiding arguments than MySQL, in large part because it simply does an execve() once the environment is setup. Eventually, I just went crazy and rewrote the whole thing in C which was able to get 700-900Hz and did catch the env command about 10-20% of the time. I could probably have rewritten this by simply walking /proc myself (since this is what all those libraries do in the end) to get better result, but then my point was made. I was able to prove to the restic author the security issues that warranted the warning. It's too bad I need to repeat this again and again, but then my tools are getting better at proving that issue... I suspect it's not the last time I have to deal with this issue and I am happy to think that I can come up with an even more efficient proof of concept tool the next time around.

Ansible 101 After working on documentation last month, I ended up writing my first Ansible playbook this month, converting my tasksel list to a working Ansible configuration. This was a useful exercise: it allow me to find a bunch of packages which have been removed from Debian and provides much better usability than tasksel. For example, it provides a --diff argument that shows which packages are missing from a given setup. I am still unsure about Ansible. Manifests do seem really verbose and I still can't get used to the YAML DSL. I could probably have done the same thing with Puppet and just run puppet apply on the resulting config. But I must admit my bias towards Python is showing here: I can't help but think Puppet is going to be way less accessible with its rewrite in Clojure and C (!)... But then again, I really like Puppet's approach of having generic types like package or service rather than Ansible's clunky apt/yum/dnf/package/win_package types...

Pat and Ham radio After responding (too late) to a request for volunteers to help in Puerto Rico, I realized that my amateur radio skills were somewhat lacking in the "packet" (data transmission in ham jargon) domain, as I wasn't used to operate a Winlink node. Such a node can receive and transmit actual emails over the airwaves, for free, without direct access to the internet, which is very useful in disaster relief efforts. Through summary research, I stumbled upon the new and very promising Pat project which provides one of the first user-friendly Linux-compatible Winlink programs. I provided improvements on the documentation and some questions regarding compatibility issues which are still pending. But my pet issue is the establishment of pat as a normal internet citizen by using standard protocols for receiving and sending email. Not sure how that can be implemented, but we'll see. I am also hoping to upload an official Debian package and hopefully write more about this soon. Stay tuned!

Random stuff I ended up fixing my Kodi issue by starting it as a standalone systemd service, instead of gdm3, which is now completely disabled on the media box. I simply used the following /etc/systemd/service/kodi.service file:
[Unit]
Description=Kodi Media Center
After=systemd-user-sessions.service network.target sound.target
[Service]
User=xbmc
Group=video
Type=simple
TTYPath=/dev/tty7
StandardInput=tty
ExecStart=/usr/bin/xinit /usr/bin/dbus-launch --exit-with-session /usr/bin/kodi-standalone -- :1 -nolisten tcp vt7
Restart=on-abort
RestartSec=5
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
The downside of this is that it needs Xorg to run as root, whereas modern Xorg can now run rootless. Not sure how to fix this or where... But if I put needs_root_rights=no in Xwrapper.config, I get the following error in .local/share/xorg/Xorg.1.log:
[  2502.533] (EE) modeset(0): drmSetMaster failed: Permission denied
After fooling around with iPython, I ended up trying the xonsh shell, which is supposed to provide a bash-compatible Python shell environment. Unfortunately, I found it pretty unusable as a shell: it works fine to do Python stuff, but then all my environment and legacy bash configuration files were basically ignored so I couldn't get working quickly. This is too bad because the project looked very promising... Finally, one of my TLS hosts using a Let's Encrypt certificate wasn't renewing properly, and I figured out why. It turns out the ProxyPass command was passing everything to the backend, including the /.well-known requests, which obviously broke ACME verification. The solution was simple enough, disable the proxy for that directory:
ProxyPass /.well-known/ !

Antoine Beaupr : My free software activities, September 2017

Debian Long Term Support (LTS) This is my monthly Debian LTS report. I mostly worked on the git, git-annex and ruby packages this month but didn't have time to completely use my allocated hours because I started too late in the month.

Ruby I was hoping someone would pick up the Ruby work I submitted in August, but it seems no one wanted to touch that mess, understandably. Since then, new issues came up, and not only did I have to work on the rubygems and ruby1.9 package, but now the ruby1.8 package also had to get security updates. Yes: it's bad enough that the rubygems code is duplicated in one other package, but wheezy had the misfortune of having two Ruby versions supported. The Ruby 1.9 also failed to build from source because of test suite issues, which I haven't found a clean and easy fix for, so I ended up making test suite failures non-fatal in 1.9, which they were already in 1.8. I did keep a close eye on changes in the test suite output to make sure tests introduced in the security fixes would pass and that I wouldn't introduce new regressions as well. So I published the following advisories:
  • ruby 1.8: DLA-1113-1, fixing CVE-2017-0898 and CVE-2017-10784. 1.8 doesn't seem affected by CVE-2017-14033 as the provided test does not fail (but it does fail in 1.9.1). test suite was, before patch:
    2199 tests, 1672513 assertions, 18 failures, 51 errors
    
    and after patch:
    2200 tests, 1672514 assertions, 18 failures, 51 errors
    
  • rubygems: uploaded the package prepared in August as is in DLA-1112-1, fixing CVE-2017-0899, CVE-2017-0900, CVE-2017-0901. here the test suite passed normally.
  • ruby 1.9: here I used the used 2.2.8 release tarball to generate a patch that would cover all issues and published DLA-1114-1 that fixes the CVEs of the two packages above. the test suite was, before patches:
    10179 tests, 2232711 assertions, 26 failures, 23 errors, 51 skips
    
    and after patches:
    1.9 after patches (B): 10184 tests, 2232771 assertions, 26 failures, 23 errors, 53 skips
    

Git I also quickly issued an advisory (DLA-1120-1) for CVE-2017-14867, an odd issue affecting git in wheezy. The backport was tricky because it wouldn't apply cleanly and the git package had a custom patching system which made it tricky to work on.

Git-annex I did a quick stint on git-annex as well: I was able to reproduce the issue and confirm an approach to fixing the issue in wheezy, although I didn't have time to complete the work before the end of the month.

Other free software work

New project: feed2exec I should probably make a separate blog post about this, but ironically, I don't want to spend too much time writing those reports, so this will be quick. I wrote a new program, called feed2exec. It's basically a combination of feed2imap, rss2email and feed2tweet: it allows you to fetch RSS feeds and send them in a mailbox, but what's special about it, compared to the other programs above, is that it is more generic: you can basically make it do whatever you want on new feed items. I have, for example, replaced my feed2tweet instance with it, using this simple configuration:
[anarcat]
url = https://anarc.at/blog/index.rss
output = feed2exec.plugins.exec
args = tweet "%(title)0.70s %(link)0.70s"
The sample configuration file also has examples to talk with Mastodon, Pump.io and, why not, a torrent server to download torrent files available over RSS feeds. A trivial configuration can also make it work as a crude podcast client. My main motivation to work on this was that it was difficult to extend feed2imap to do what I needed (which was to talk to transmission to download torrent files) and rss2email didn't support my workflow (which is delivering to feed-specific mail folders). Because both projects also seemed abandoned, it seemed like a good idea at the time to start a new one, although the rss2email community has now restarted the project and may produce interesting results. As an experiment, I tracked my time working on this project. It turns out it took about 45 hours to write that software. Considering feed2exec is about 1400 SLOC, that's 30 lines of code per hour. I don't know if that's slow or fast, but it's an interesting metric for future projects. It sure seems slow to me, but we need to keep in mind those 30 lines of code don't include documentation and repeated head banging on the keyboard. For example, I found two issues with the upstream feedparser package which I use to parse feeds which also seems unmaintained, unfortunately. Feed2exec is beta software at this point, but it's working well enough for me and the design is much simpler than the other programs of the kind. The main issue people can expect from it at this point is formatting issues or parse errors on exotic feeds, and noisy error messages on network errors, all of which should be fairly easy to fix in the test suite. I hope it will be useful for the community and, as usual, I welcome contributions, help and suggestions on how to improve the software.

More Python templates As part of the work on feed2exec, I did cleanup a few things in the ecdysis project, mostly to hook tests up in the CI, improve on the advancedConfig logger and cleanup more stuff. While I was there, it turns out that I built a pretty decent basic CI configuration for Python on GitLab. Whereas the previous templates only had a non-working Django example, you should now be able to chose a Python template when you configure CI on GitLab 10 and above, which should hook you up with normal Python setup procedures like setup.py install and setup.py test.

Selfspy I mentioned working on a monitoring tool in my last post, because it was a feature from Workrave missing in SafeEyes. It turns out there is already such a tool called selfspy. I did an extensive review of the software to make sure it wouldn't leak out confidential information out before using it, and it looks, well... kind of okay. It crashed on me at least once so far, which is too bad because then it loses track of the precious activity. I have used it at least once to figure out what the heck I worked on during the day, so it's pretty useful. I particularly used it to backtrack my work on feed2exec as I didn't originally track my time on the project. Unfortunately, selfspy seems unmaintained. I have proposed a maintenance team and hopefully the project maintainer will respond and at least share access so we don't end up in a situation like linkchecker. I also sent a bunch of pull requests to fix some issues like being secure by default and fixing the build. Apart from the crash, the main issue I have found with the software is that it doesn't detect idle time which means certain apps are disproportionatly represented in statistics. There are also some weaknesses in the crypto that should be adressed for people that encrypt their database. Next step is to package selfspy in Debian which should hopefully be simple enough...

Restic documentation security As part of a documentation patch on the Restic backup software, I have improved on my previous Perl script to snoop on process commandline arguments. A common flaw in shell scripts and cron jobs is to pass secret material in the environment (usually safe) but often through commandline arguments (definitely not safe). The challenge, in this peculiar case, was the env binary, but the last time I encountered such an issue was with the Drush commandline tool, which was passing database credentials in clear to the mysql binary. Using my Perl sniffer, I could get to 60 checks per second (or 60Hz). After reimplementing it in Python, this number went up to 160Hz, which still wasn't enough to catch the elusive env command, which is much faster at hiding arguments than MySQL, in large part because it simply does an execve() once the environment is setup. Eventually, I just went crazy and rewrote the whole thing in C which was able to get 700-900Hz and did catch the env command about 10-20% of the time. I could probably have rewritten this by simply walking /proc myself (since this is what all those libraries do in the end) to get better result, but then my point was made. I was able to prove to the restic author the security issues that warranted the warning. It's too bad I need to repeat this again and again, but then my tools are getting better at proving that issue... I suspect it's not the last time I have to deal with this issue and I am happy to think that I can come up with an even more efficient proof of concept tool the next time around.

Ansible 101 After working on documentation last month, I ended up writing my first Ansible playbook this month, converting my tasksel list to a working Ansible configuration. This was a useful exercise: it allow me to find a bunch of packages which have been removed from Debian and provides much better usability than tasksel. For example, it provides a --diff argument that shows which packages are missing from a given setup. I am still unsure about Ansible. Manifests do seem really verbose and I still can't get used to the YAML DSL. I could probably have done the same thing with Puppet and just run puppet apply on the resulting config. But I must admit my bias towards Python is showing here: I can't help but think Puppet is going to be way less accessible with its rewrite in Clojure and C (!)... But then again, I really like Puppet's approach of having generic types like package or service rather than Ansible's clunky apt/yum/dnf/package/win_package types...

Pat and Ham radio After responding (too late) to a request for volunteers to help in Puerto Rico, I realized that my amateur radio skills were somewhat lacking in the "packet" (data transmission in ham jargon) domain, as I wasn't used to operate a Winlink node. Such a node can receive and transmit actual emails over the airwaves, for free, without direct access to the internet, which is very useful in disaster relief efforts. Through summary research, I stumbled upon the new and very promising Pat project which provides one of the first user-friendly Linux-compatible Winlink programs. I provided improvements on the documentation and some questions regarding compatibility issues which are still pending. But my pet issue is the establishment of pat as a normal internet citizen by using standard protocols for receiving and sending email. Not sure how that can be implemented, but we'll see. I am also hoping to upload an official Debian package and hopefully write more about this soon. Stay tuned!

Random stuff I ended up fixing my Kodi issue by starting it as a standalone systemd service, instead of gdm3, which is now completely disabled on the media box. I simply used the following /etc/systemd/service/kodi.service file:
[Unit]
Description=Kodi Media Center
After=systemd-user-sessions.service network.target sound.target
[Service]
User=xbmc
Group=video
Type=simple
TTYPath=/dev/tty7
StandardInput=tty
ExecStart=/usr/bin/xinit /usr/bin/dbus-launch --exit-with-session /usr/bin/kodi-standalone -- :1 -nolisten tcp vt7
Restart=on-abort
RestartSec=5
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
The downside of this is that it needs Xorg to run as root, whereas modern Xorg can now run rootless. Not sure how to fix this or where... But if I put needs_root_rights=no in Xwrapper.config, I get the following error in .local/share/xorg/Xorg.1.log:
[  2502.533] (EE) modeset(0): drmSetMaster failed: Permission denied
After fooling around with iPython, I ended up trying the xonsh shell, which is supposed to provide a bash-compatible Python shell environment. Unfortunately, I found it pretty unusable as a shell: it works fine to do Python stuff, but then all my environment and legacy bash configuration files were basically ignored so I couldn't get working quickly. This is too bad because the project looked very promising... Finally, one of my TLS hosts using a Let's Encrypt certificate wasn't renewing properly, and I figured out why. It turns out the ProxyPass command was passing everything to the backend, including the /.well-known requests, which obviously broke ACME verification. The solution was simple enough, disable the proxy for that directory:
ProxyPass /.well-known/ !

James McCoy: Monthly FLOSS activity - 2017/09 edition

Debian devscripts Before deciding to take an indefinite hiatus from devscripts, I prepared one more upload merging various contributed patches and a bit of last minute cleanup. I also setup integration with Travis CI to hopefully catch issues sooner than "while preparing an upload", as was typically the case before. Anyone with push access to the Debian/devscripts GitHub repo can take advantage of this to test out changes, or keep the development branches up to date. In the process, I was able to make some improvements to travis.debian.net, namely support for DEB_BUILD_PROFILES and using a separate, minimal docker image for running autopkgtests. unibilium neovim Oddly, the mips64el builds were in BD-Uninstallable state, even though luajit's buildd status showed it was built. Looking further, I noticed the libluajit-5.1 ,-dev binary packages didn't have the mips64el architecture enabled, so I asked for it to be enabled. msgpack-c There were a few packages left which would FTBFS if I uploaded msgpack-c 2.x to unstable. All of the bug reports had either trivial work arounds (i.e., forcing use of the v1 C++ API) or trivial patches. However, I didn't want to continue waiting for the packages to get fixed since I knew other people had expressed interest in the new msgpack-c. Trying to avoid making other packages insta-buggy, I NMUed autobahn-cpp with the v1 work around. That didn't go over well, partly because I didn't send a finalized "Hey, I'd like to get this done and here's my plan to NMU" email. Based on that feedback, I decided to bump the remaining bugs to "serious" instead of NMUing and upload msgpack-c. Thanks to Jonas Smedegaard for quickly integrating my proposed fix for libdata-messagepack-perl. Hopefully, upstream has some time to review the PR soon. vim subversion
neovim

28 September 2017

Russ Allbery: Review: The Seventh Bride

Review: The Seventh Bride, by T. Kingfisher
Publisher: 47North
Copyright: 2015
ISBN: 1-5039-4975-3
Format: Kindle
Pages: 225
There are two editions of this book, although only one currently for sale. This review is of the second edition, released in November of 2015. T. Kingfisher is a pen name for Ursula Vernon when she's writing for adults. Rhea is a miller's daughter. She's fifteen, obedient, wary of swans, respectful to her parents, and engaged to Lord Crevan. The last was a recent and entirely unexpected development. It's not that she didn't expect to get married eventually, since of course that's what one does. And it's not that Lord Crevan was a stranger, since that's often how it went with marriage for people like her. But she wasn't expecting to get married now, and it was not at all clear why Lord Crevan would want to marry her in particular. Also, something felt not right about the entire thing. And it didn't start feeling any better when she finally met Lord Crevan for the first time, some days after the proposal to her parents. The decidedly non-romantic hand kissing didn't help, nor did the smug smile. But it's not like she had any choice. The miller's daughter doesn't say no to a lord and a friend of the viscount. The miller's family certainly doesn't say no when they're having trouble paying the bills, the viscount owns the mill, and they could be turned out of their livelihood at a whim. They still can't say no when Lord Crevan orders Rhea to come to his house in the middle of the night down a road that quite certainly doesn't exist during the day, even though that's very much not the sort of thing that is normally done. Particularly before the marriage. Friends of the viscount who are also sorcerers can get away with quite a lot. But Lord Crevan will discover that there's still a limit to how far he can order Rhea around, and practical-minded miller's daughters can make a lot of unexpected friends even in dire circumstances. The Seventh Bride is another entry in T. Kingfisher's series of retold fairy tales, although the fairy tale in question is less clear than with The Raven and the Reindeer. Kirkus says it's a retelling of Bluebeard, but I still don't quite see that in the story. I think one could argue equally easily that it's an original story. Nonetheless, it is a fairy tale: it has that fairy tale mix of magical danger and practical morality, and it's about courage and friendships and their consequences. It also has a hedgehog. This is an T. Kingfisher story, so it's packed full of bits of marvelous phrasing that I want to read over and over again. It has wonderful characters, the hedgehog among them, and it has, at its heart, a sort of foundational decency and stubborn goodness that's deeply satisfying for the reader. The Seventh Bride is a lot closer to horror than the other T. Kingfisher books I've read, but it never fell into my dislike of the horror genre, despite a few gruesome bits. I think that's because neither Rhea nor the narrator treat the horrific aspects as representative of the true shape of the world. Rhea instead confronts them with a stubborn determination and an attempt to make the best of each moment, and with a practical self-awareness that I loved reading about.
The problem with crying in the woods, by the side of a white road that leads somewhere terrible, is that the reason for crying isn't inside your head. You have a perfectly legitimate and pressing reason for crying, and it will still be there in five minutes, except that your throat will be raw and your eyes will itch and absolutely nothing else will have changed.
Lord Crevan, when Rhea finally reaches him, toys with her by giving her progressively more horrible puzzle tasks, threatening her with the promised marriage if she fails at any of them. The way this part of the book finally resolves is one of the best moments I've read in any book. Kingfisher captures an aspect of moral decisions, and a way in which evil doesn't work the way that evil people expect it to work, that I can't remember seeing an author capture this well. There are a lot of things here for Rhea to untangle: the nature of Crevan's power, her unexpected allies in his manor, why he proposed marriage to her, and of course how to escape his power. The plot works, but I don't think it was the best part of the book, and it tends to happen to Rhea rather than being driven by her. But I have rarely read a book quite this confident of its moral center, or quite as justified in that confidence. I am definitely reading everything Vernon has published under the T. Kingfisher name, and quite possibly most of her children's books as well. Recommended, particularly if you liked the excerpt above. There's an entire book full of paragraphs like that waiting for you. Rating: 8 out of 10

26 September 2017

Russ Allbery: Review: Artemis Fowl

Review: Artemis Fowl, by Eoin Colfer
Series: Artemis Fowl #1
Publisher: Disney-Hyperion
Copyright: 2001
ISBN: 1-4231-2452-9
Format: Kindle
Pages: 281
Artemis Fowl is the heir to the Fowl criminal empire and a child prodigy. He's also one of the few humans to know of the existence of fairies, who are still present in the world, hiding from humans and living by their own rules. As the book opens, he's in search of those rules: a copy of the book that governs the lives of fairies. With that knowledge, he should be able to pull off a heist worthy of his family's legacy. Captain Holly Short is a leprechaun... or, more correctly, a LEPrecon. She's one of the fairy police officers that investigate threats to the fairies who are hiding in a vast underground civilization. The fairies have magic, but they also have advanced (and miniaturized) technology, maintained in large part by a grumpy and egotistical centaur (named Foaly, because it's that sort of book). She's also the fairy unlucky enough to be captured by Artemis's formidable personal bodyguard their first attempt to kidnap a hostage for their ransom demands. This is the first book of a long series of young adult novels that has also spawned graphic novels and a movie currently in production. It has that lean and clear feeling of the younger side of young adult writing: larger-than-life characters who are distinctive and easy to remember, a short introductory setup that dives directly into the main plot, and a story that neatly pulls together every element raised in the story. The world-building is its strongest point, particularly the mix of tongue-in-cheek technology ships that ride magma plumes, mechanical wings, and helmet-mounted lights to blind trolls and science-tinged magic that the fairies build their police and army on. Fairies are far beyond humans in capability, and can be deadly and ruthless, but they have to follow a tightly constrained set of rules that are often not convenient. Sadly, the characters don't live up to the world-building. I did enjoy a few of them, particularly Artemis's loyal bodyguards and the dwarf Mulch Diggums. But Holly, despite being likable, is a bit of a blank slate: the empathetic, overworked trooper who is mostly indistinguishable from other characters in similar stories. The gruff captain, the sarcastic technician Foaly, and the various other LEP agents all felt like they were taken straight from central casting. And then there's Artemis himself. Artemis is the protagonist of the story, in that he's the one who initiates all of the action and the one who has the most interesting motivations. The story is about him, as the third-person narrator in the introduction makes clear. He's trying very hard to be a criminal genius with the deductive abilities of Sherlock Holmes and the speaking style of a Bond villain, but he's also twelve, his father has disappeared, and his mother is going slowly insane. I picked this book up on the recommendation of another reader who found that contrast compelling. Unfortunately, I thought Artemis was just an abusive jerk. Yes, yes, family tragedy, yes, he's trapped in his conception of himself, but he's arrogant, utterly uncaring about how his actions affect other people, and dismissive and cruel even to his bodyguards (who are much better friends than he deserves). I think liking this book requires liking Artemis at least well enough to consider him an anti-hero, and I can squint and see that appeal if you have that reaction. But I just wanted him to lose. Not in the "you will be slowly redeemed over the course of a long series" way, but in the "you are a horrible person and I hope you get what's coming to you" way. The humor of the fairy parts of the book was undermined too much by the fact that many of them would like to kill Artemis for real, and I mostly wanted them to succeed. This may or may not have to do with my low tolerance for egotistical smart-asses who order other people to do things that they refuse to explain. Without some appreciation for Artemis, this is a story with some neat world-building, a fairly generic protagonist in Holly, and a plot in which the bad guys win. To make matters worse, I thought the supposedly bright note at the end of the story was just creepy, as was everything else involving Artemis's mother. The review I read was of the first three books, so it's entirely possible that this series gets better as it goes along, but there wasn't enough I enjoyed in the first book for me to keep reading. Followed by Artemis Fowl: The Arctic Incident. Rating: 5 out of 10

10 September 2017

Sylvain Beucler: dot-zed archive file format

TL,DR: I reverse-engineered the .zed encrypted archive format.
Following a clean-room design, I'm providing a description that can be implemented by a third-party.
Interested? :) (reference version at: https://www.beuc.net/zed/) .zed archive file format Introduction Archives with the .zed extension are conceptually similar to an encrypted .zip file. In addition to a specific format, .zed files support multiple users: files are encrypted using the archive master key, which itself is encrypted for each user and/or authentication method (password, RSA key through certificate or PKCS#11 token). Metadata such as filenames is partially encrypted. .zed archives are used as stand-alone or attached to e-mails with the help of a MS Outlook plugin. A variant, which is not covered here, can encrypt/decrypt MS Windows folders on the fly like ecryptfs. In the spirit of academic and independent research this document provides a description of the file format and encryption algorithms for this encrypted file archive. See the conventions section for conventions and acronyms used in this document. Structure overview The .zed file format is composed of several layers. Or as a diagram:
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  .zed archive (MS-CBF)                                                                               
                                                                                                      
   stream #1                         stream #2                       stream #3...                     
  +------------------------------+  +---------------------------+  +---------------------------+      
    metadata (MS-OLEPS)               encryption (AES)               encryption (AES)                 
                                      512-bytes chunks               512-bytes chunks                 
    +--------------------------+                                                                      
      obfuscation (static key)        +-----------------------+      +-----------------------+        
      +----------------------+       -  compression (zlib)     -    -  compression (zlib)     -       
       _ctlfile (TLV)                                                                            ...  
      +----------------------+          +---------------+              +---------------+               
    +--------------------------+          file contents                  file contents                
                                                                                                      
    +--------------------------+     -  +---------------+      -    -  +---------------+      -       
      _catalog (TLV)                                                                                  
    +--------------------------+      +-----------------------+      +-----------------------+        
  +------------------------------+  +---------------------------+  +---------------------------+      
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Encryption schemes Several AES key sizes are supported, such as 128 and 256 bits. The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) block cipher mode of operation is used to decrypt multiple AES 16-byte blocks, which means an initialisation vector (IV) is stored in clear along with the ciphertext. All filenames and file contents are encrypted using the same encryption mode, key and IV (e.g. if you remove and re-add a file in the archive, the resulting stream will be identical). No cleartext padding is used during encryption; instead, several end-of-stream handlers are available, so the ciphertext has exactly the size of the cleartext (e.g. the size of the compressed file). The following variants were identified in the 'encryption_mode' field. STREAM This is the end-of-stream handler for: This end-of-stream handler is apparently specific to the .zed format, and applied when the cleartext's does not end on a 16-byte boundary ; in this case special processing is performed on the last partial 16-byte block. The encryption and decryption phases are identical: let's assume the last partial block of cleartext (for encryption) or ciphertext (for decryption) was appended after all the complete 16-byte blocks of ciphertext: In either case, if the full ciphertext is less then one AES block (< 16 bytes), then the IV is used instead of the second-to-last block. CTS CTS or CipherText Stealing is the end-of-stream handler for: It matches the CBC-CS3 variant as described in Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode. Empty cleartext Since empty filenames or metadata are invalid, and since all files are compressed (resulting in a minimum 8-byte zlib cleartext), no empty cleartext was encrypted in the archive. metadata stream It is named 05356861616161716149656b7a6565636e576a33317a7868304e63 (hexadecimal), i.e. the character with code 5 followed by '5haaaaqaIekzeecnWj31zxh0Nc' (ASCII). The format used is OLE Property Set (MS-OLEPS). It introduces 2 property names "_ctlfile" (index 3) and "_catalog" (index 4), and 2 instances of said properties each containing an application-specific VT_BLOB (type 0x0041). _ctlfile: obfuscated global properties and access list This subpart is stored under index 3 ("_ctlfile") of the MS-OLEPS metadata. It consists of: The ciphertext is encrypted with AES-CBC "STREAM" mode using 128-bit static key 37F13CF81C780AF26B6A52654F794AEF (hexadecimal) and the prepended IV so as to obfuscate the access list. The ciphertext is continuous and not split in chunks (unlike files), even when it is larger than 512 bytes. The decrypted text contain properties in a TLV format as described in _ctlfile TLV: Archives may include "mandatory" users that cannot be removed. They are typically used to add an enterprise wide recovery RSA key to all archives. Extreme care must be taken to protect these key, as it can decrypt all past archives generated from within that company. _catalog: file list This subpart is stored under index 4 ("_catalog") of the MS-OLEPS metadata. It contains a series of 'fileprops' TLV structures, one for each file or directory. The file hierarchy can be reconstructed by checking the 'parent_id' field of each file entry. If 'parent_id' is 0 then the file is located at the top-level of the hierarchy, otherwise it's located under the directory with the matching 'file_id'. TLV format This format is a series of fields : Value semantics depend on its Type. It may contain an uint32be integer, a UTF-16LE string, a character sequence, or an inner TLV structure. Unless otherwise noted, TLV structures appear once. Some fields are optional and may not be present at all (e.g. 'archive_createdwith'). Some fields are unique within a structure (e.g. 'files_iv'), other may be repeated within a structure to form a list (e.g. 'fileprops' and 'passworduser'). The following top-level types that have been identified, and detailed in the next sections: Some additional unidentified types may be present. _ctlfile TLV _catalog TLV Decrypting the archive AES key rsauser The user accessing the archive will be authenticated by comparing his/her X509 certificate with the one stored in the 'certificate' field using DER format. The 'files_key_ciphertext' field is then decrypted using the PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption mechanism, with the private key that matches the user certificate. passworduser An intermediary user key, a user IV and an integrity checksum will be derived from the user password, using the deprecated PKCS#12 method as described at rfc7292 appendix B. Note: this is not PKCS#5 (nor PBKDF1/PBKDF2), this is an incompatible method from PKCS#12 that notably does not use HMAC. The 'pkcs12_hashfunc' field defines the underlying hash function. The following values have been identified: PBA - Password-based authentication The user accessing the archive will be authenticated by deriving an 8-byte sequence from his/her password. The parameters for the derivation function are: The derivation is checked against 'pba_checksum'. PBE - Password-based encryption Once the user is identified, 2 new values are derived from the password with different parameters to produce the IV and the key decryption key, with the same hash function: The parameters specific to user key are: The user key needs to be truncated to a length of 'encryption_strength', as specified in bytes in the archive properties. The parameters specific to user IV are: Once the key decryption key and the IV are derived, 'files_key_ciphertext' is decrypted using AES CBC, with PKCS#7 padding. Identifying file streams The name of the MS-CFB stream is derived by shuffling the bytes from the 'file_id' field and then encoding the result as hexadecimal. The reordering is:
Initial  offset: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Shuffled offset: 3 2 1 0 5 4 7 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
The 16th byte is usually a NUL byte, hence the stream identifier is a 30-character-long string. Decrypting files The compressed stream is split in chunks of 512 bytes, each of them encrypted separately using AES CBS and the global archive encryption scheme. Decryption uses the global AES key (retrieved using the user credentials), and the global IV (retrieved from the deobfuscated archive metadata). The IV for each chunk is computed by: Each chunk is an independent stream and the decryption process involves end-of-stream handling even if this is not the end of the actual file. This is particularly important for the CTS handler. Note: this is not to be confused with CTR block cipher mode of operation with operates differently and requires a nonce. Decompressing files Compressed streams are zlib stream with default compression options and can be decompressed following the zlib format. Test cases Excluded for brevity, cf. https://www.beuc.net/zed/#test-cases. Conventions and references Feedback Feel free to send comments at beuc@beuc.net. If you have .zed files that you think are not covered by this document, please send them as well (replace sensitive files with other ones). The author's GPG key can be found at 8FF1CB6E8D89059F. Copyright (C) 2017 Sylvain Beucler Copying and distribution of this file, with or without modification, are permitted in any medium without royalty provided the copyright notice and this notice are preserved. This file is offered as-is, without any warranty.

Sylvain Beucler: dot-zed archive file format

TL,DR: I reverse-engineered the .zed encrypted archive format.
Following a clean-room design, I'm providing a description that can be implemented by a third-party.
Interested? :) (reference version at: https://www.beuc.net/zed/) .zed archive file format Introduction Archives with the .zed extension are conceptually similar to an encrypted .zip file. In addition to a specific format, .zed files support multiple users: files are encrypted using the archive master key, which itself is encrypted for each user and/or authentication method (password, RSA key through certificate or PKCS#11 token). Metadata such as filenames is partially encrypted. .zed archives are used as stand-alone or attached to e-mails with the help of a MS Outlook plugin. A variant, which is not covered here, can encrypt/decrypt MS Windows folders on the fly like ecryptfs. In the spirit of academic and independent research this document provides a description of the file format and encryption algorithms for this encrypted file archive. See the conventions section for conventions and acronyms used in this document. Structure overview The .zed file format is composed of several layers. Or as a diagram:
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  .zed archive (MS-CBF)                                                                               
                                                                                                      
   stream #1                         stream #2                       stream #3...                     
  +------------------------------+  +---------------------------+  +---------------------------+      
    metadata (MS-OLEPS)               encryption (AES)               encryption (AES)                 
                                      512-bytes chunks               512-bytes chunks                 
    +--------------------------+                                                                      
      obfuscation (static key)        +-----------------------+      +-----------------------+        
      +----------------------+       -  compression (zlib)     -    -  compression (zlib)     -       
       _ctlfile (TLV)                                                                            ...  
      +----------------------+          +---------------+              +---------------+               
    +--------------------------+          file contents                  file contents                
                                                                                                      
    +--------------------------+     -  +---------------+      -    -  +---------------+      -       
      _catalog (TLV)                                                                                  
    +--------------------------+      +-----------------------+      +-----------------------+        
  +------------------------------+  +---------------------------+  +---------------------------+      
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Encryption schemes Several AES key sizes are supported, such as 128 and 256 bits. The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) block cipher mode of operation is used to decrypt multiple AES 16-byte blocks, which means an initialisation vector (IV) is stored in clear along with the ciphertext. All filenames and file contents are encrypted using the same encryption mode, key and IV (e.g. if you remove and re-add a file in the archive, the resulting stream will be identical). No cleartext padding is used during encryption; instead, several end-of-stream handlers are available, so the ciphertext has exactly the size of the cleartext (e.g. the size of the compressed file). The following variants were identified in the 'encryption_mode' field. STREAM This is the end-of-stream handler for: This end-of-stream handler is apparently specific to the .zed format, and applied when the cleartext's does not end on a 16-byte boundary ; in this case special processing is performed on the last partial 16-byte block. The encryption and decryption phases are identical: let's assume the last partial block of cleartext (for encryption) or ciphertext (for decryption) was appended after all the complete 16-byte blocks of ciphertext: In either case, if the full ciphertext is less then one AES block (< 16 bytes), then the IV is used instead of the second-to-last block. CTS CTS or CipherText Stealing is the end-of-stream handler for: It matches the CBC-CS3 variant as described in Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode. Empty cleartext Since empty filenames or metadata are invalid, and since all files are compressed (resulting in a minimum 8-byte zlib cleartext), no empty cleartext was encrypted in the archive. metadata stream It is named 05356861616161716149656b7a6565636e576a33317a7868304e63 (hexadecimal), i.e. the character with code 5 followed by '5haaaaqaIekzeecnWj31zxh0Nc' (ASCII). The format used is OLE Property Set (MS-OLEPS). It introduces 2 property names "_ctlfile" (index 3) and "_catalog" (index 4), and 2 instances of said properties each containing an application-specific VT_BLOB (type 0x0041). _ctlfile: obfuscated global properties and access list This subpart is stored under index 3 ("_ctlfile") of the MS-OLEPS metadata. It consists of: The ciphertext is encrypted with AES-CBC "STREAM" mode using 128-bit static key 37F13CF81C780AF26B6A52654F794AEF (hexadecimal) and the prepended IV so as to obfuscate the access list. The ciphertext is continuous and not split in chunks (unlike files), even when it is larger than 512 bytes. The decrypted text contain properties in a TLV format as described in _ctlfile TLV: Archives may include "mandatory" users that cannot be removed. They are typically used to add an enterprise wide recovery RSA key to all archives. Extreme care must be taken to protect these key, as it can decrypt all past archives generated from within that company. _catalog: file list This subpart is stored under index 4 ("_catalog") of the MS-OLEPS metadata. It contains a series of 'fileprops' TLV structures, one for each file or directory. The file hierarchy can be reconstructed by checking the 'parent_id' field of each file entry. If 'parent_id' is 0 then the file is located at the top-level of the hierarchy, otherwise it's located under the directory with the matching 'file_id'. TLV format This format is a series of fields : Value semantics depend on its Type. It may contain an uint32be integer, a UTF-16LE string, a character sequence, or an inner TLV structure. Unless otherwise noted, TLV structures appear once. Some fields are optional and may not be present at all (e.g. 'archive_createdwith'). Some fields are unique within a structure (e.g. 'files_iv'), other may be repeated within a structure to form a list (e.g. 'fileprops' and 'passworduser'). The following top-level types that have been identified, and detailed in the next sections: Some additional unidentified types may be present. _ctlfile TLV _catalog TLV Decrypting the archive AES key rsauser The user accessing the archive will be authenticated by comparing his/her X509 certificate with the one stored in the 'certificate' field using DER format. The 'files_key_ciphertext' field is then decrypted using the PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption mechanism, with the private key that matches the user certificate. passworduser An intermediary user key, a user IV and an integrity checksum will be derived from the user password, using the deprecated PKCS#12 method as described at rfc7292 appendix B. Note: this is not PKCS#5 (nor PBKDF1/PBKDF2), this is an incompatible method from PKCS#12 that notably does not use HMAC. The 'pkcs12_hashfunc' field defines the underlying hash function. The following values have been identified: PBA - Password-based authentication The user accessing the archive will be authenticated by deriving an 8-byte sequence from his/her password. The parameters for the derivation function are: The derivation is checked against 'pba_checksum'. PBE - Password-based encryption Once the user is identified, 2 new values are derived from the password with different parameters to produce the IV and the key decryption key, with the same hash function: The parameters specific to user key are: The user key needs to be truncated to a length of 'encryption_strength', as specified in bytes in the archive properties. The parameters specific to user IV are: Once the key decryption key and the IV are derived, 'files_key_ciphertext' is decrypted using AES CBC, with PKCS#7 padding. Identifying file streams The name of the MS-CFB stream is derived by shuffling the bytes from the 'file_id' field and then encoding the result as hexadecimal. The reordering is:
Initial  offset: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Shuffled offset: 3 2 1 0 5 4 7 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
The 16th byte is usually a NUL byte, hence the stream identifier is a 30-character-long string. Decrypting files The compressed stream is split in chunks of 512 bytes, each of them encrypted separately using AES CBS and the global archive encryption scheme. Decryption uses the global AES key (retrieved using the user credentials), and the global IV (retrieved from the deobfuscated archive metadata). The IV for each chunk is computed by: Each chunk is an independent stream and the decryption process involves end-of-stream handling even if this is not the end of the actual file. This is particularly important for the CTS handler. Note: this is not to be confused with CTR block cipher mode of operation with operates differently and requires a nonce. Decompressing files Compressed streams are zlib stream with default compression options and can be decompressed following the zlib format. Test cases Excluded for brevity, cf. https://www.beuc.net/zed/#test-cases. Conventions and references Feedback Feel free to send comments at beuc@beuc.net. If you have .zed files that you think are not covered by this document, please send them as well (replace sensitive files with other ones). The author's GPG key can be found at 8FF1CB6E8D89059F. Copyright (C) 2017 Sylvain Beucler Copying and distribution of this file, with or without modification, are permitted in any medium without royalty provided the copyright notice and this notice are preserved. This file is offered as-is, without any warranty.

7 September 2017

Reproducible builds folks: Reproducible Builds: Weekly report #123

Here's what happened in the Reproducible Builds effort between Sunday August 27 and Saturday September 2 2017: Talks and presentations Holger Levsen talked about our progress and our still-far goals at BornHack 2017 (Video). Toolchain development and fixes The Debian FTP archive will now reject changelogs where different entries have the same timestamps. UDD now uses reproducible-tracker.json (~25MB) which ignores our tests for Debian unstable, instead of our full set of results in reproducible.json. Our tests for Debian unstable uses a stricter definition of "reproducible" than what was recently added to Debian policy, and these stricter tests are currently more unreliable. Packages reviewed and fixed, and bugs filed Patches sent upstream: Debian bugs filed: Debian packages NMU-uploaded: Reviews of unreproducible packages 25 package reviews have been added, 50 have been updated and 86 have been removed in this week, adding to our knowledge about identified issues. Weekly QA work During our reproducibility testing, FTBFS bugs have been detected and reported by: diffoscope development Version 86 was uploaded to unstable by Mattia Rizzolo. It included previous weeks' contributions from: reprotest development Development continued in git with contributions from: Misc. This week's edition was written by Ximin Luo, Chris Lamb, Bernhard M. Wiedemann and Holger Levsen & reviewed by a bunch of Reproducible Builds folks on IRC & the mailing lists.

4 September 2017

Alessio Treglia: MeteoSurf: a free App for the Mediterranean Sea

meteosurf

MeteoSurf is a free multi-source weather forecasting App designed to provide wind and wave conditions of the Mediterranean Sea. It is an application for smartphones and tablets, built as a Progressive Web App able to supply detailed and updated maps and data showing heights of sea waves (and other information) in the Central Mediterranean. It is mainly targeted for surfers and wind-surfers but anyone who needs to know the sea conditions will take advantage from this app.

Data can be displayed as animated graphical maps, or as detailed table data. The maps refer to the whole Mediterranean Sea, while the table data is able to provide specific information for any of the major surf spots in the Med.

As of current version, MeteoSurf shows data collecting them from 3 different forecasting systems Read More [by Fabio Marzocca]

2 September 2017

Wouter Verhelst: Playing with Moose and FFmpeg

As I've blogged before, I've been on and off working on SReview, a video review system. Development over the past year has been mostly driven by the need to have something up and running for first FOSDEM 2017, and then DebConf17, and so I've cut corners left and right which made the system, while functional, not quite entirely perfect everywhere. For instance, the backend scripts were done in ad-hoc perl, each reinventing their own wheel. Doing so made it easier for me to experiment with things and figure out where I want them to go, without immediately creating a lot of baggage that is not necessarily something I want to be stuck to. This flexibility has already paid off, in that I've redone the state machine between FOSDEM and DebConf17 and all it needed was to update a few SQL statements here and there. Well, and add a few of them, too. It was always the intent to replace most of the ad-hoc perl with something better, however, once the time was ripe. One place where historical baggage is not so much of a problem, and where in fact abstracting away the complexity would now be an asset, is in the area of FFmpeg command lines. Currently, these are built by simple string expansion. For example, we do something like this (shortened for brevity):
system("ffmpeg -y -i $outputdir/$slug.ts -pass 1 -passlogfile ...");
inside an environment where the $outputdir and $slug variables are set in a perl environment. That works, but it has some downsides; e.g., adding or removing options based on which codecs we're using is not so easy. It would be much more flexible if the command lines were generated dynamically based on requested output bandwidth and codecs, rather than that they be hardcoded in the file. Case in point: currently there are multiple versions of some of the backend scripts, that only differ in details mostly the chosen codec on the ffmpeg command line. Obviously this is suboptimal. Instead, we want a way where video file formats can be autodetected, so that I can just say "create a file that uses encoder etc settings of this other file here". In addition, we also want a way where we can say "create a file that uses encoder etc settings of this other file here, except for these one or two options that I want to fine-tune manually". When I first thought about doing that about a year ago, that seemed complicated and not worth it or at least not to that extent. Enter Moose. The Moose OO system for Perl 5 is an interesting way to do object orientation in Perl. I knew Perl supports OO, and I had heard about Moose, but never had looked into it, mostly because the standard perl OO features were "good enough". Until now. Moose has a concept of adding 'attributes' to objects. Attributes can be set at object construction time, or can be accessed later on by way of getter/setter functions, or even simply functions named after the attribute itself (the default). For more complicated attributes, where the value may not be known until some time after the object has been created, Moose borrows the concept of "lazy" variables from Perl 6:
package Object;
use Moose;
has 'time' => (
    is => 'rw',
    builder => 'read_time',
    lazy => 1,
);
sub read_time  
    return localtime();
 
The above object has an attribute 'time', which will not have a value initially. However, upon first read, the 'localtime()' function will be called, the result is cached, and then (and on all further calls of the same function), the cached result will be returned. In addition, since the attribute is read/write, the time can also be written to. In that case, any cached value that may exist will be overwritten, and if no cached value exists yet, the read_time function will never be called. (it is also possible to clear values if needs be, so that the function would be called again). We use this with the following pattern:
package SReview::Video;
use Moose;
has 'url' => (
    is => 'rw',
)
has 'video_codec' => (
    is => 'rw',
    builder => '_probe_videocodec',
    lazy => 1,
);
has 'videodata' => (
    is => 'bare',
    reader => '_get_videodata',
    builder => '_probe_videodata',
    lazy => 1,
);
has 'probedata' => (
    is => 'bare',
    reader => '_get_probedata',
    builder => '_probe',
    lazy => 1,
);
sub _probe_videocodec  
    my $self = shift;
    return $self->_get_videodata-> codec_name ;
 
sub _probe_videodata  
    my $self = shift;
    if(!exists($self->_get_probedata-> streams ))  
        return  ;
     
    foreach my $stream(@ $self->_get_probedata-> streams )  
        if($stream-> codec_type  eq "video")  
            return $stream;
         
     
    return  ;
 
sub _probe  
    my $self = shift;
    open JSON, "ffprobe -print_format json -show_format -show_streams " . $self->url . " "
    my $json = "";
    while(<JSON>)  
        $json .= $_;
     
    close JSON;
    return decode_json($json);
 
The videodata and probedata attributes are internal-use only attributes, and are therefore of the 'bare' type that is, they cannot be read nor written to. However, we do add 'reader' functions that can be used from inside the object, so that the object itself can access them. These reader functions are generated, so they're not part of the object source. The probedata attribute's builder simply calls ffprobe with the right command-line arguments to retrieve data in JSON format, and then decodes that JSON file. Since the passed JSON file contains an array with (at least) two streams one for video and one for audio and since the ordering of those streams depends on the file and is therefore not guaranteed, we have to loop over them. Since doing so in each and every attribute of the file we might be interested in would be tedious, we add a videodata attribute that just returns the data for the first found video stream (the actual source also contains a similar one for audio streams). So, if you create an SReview::Video object and you pass it a filename in the url attribute, and then immediately run print $object->video_codec, then the object will However, if the caller first calls $object->video_codec('h264'), then the ffprobe and most of the caching will be skipped, and instead the h265 data will be returned as video codec name. Okay, so with a reasonably small amount of code, we now have a bunch of attributes that have defaults based on actual files but can be overwritten when necessary. Useful, right? Well, you might also want to care about the fact that sometimes you want to generate a video file that uses the same codec settings of this other file here. That's easy. First, we add another attribute:
has 'reference' => (
    is => 'ro',
    isa => 'SReview::Video',
    predicate => 'has_reference'
);
which we then use in the _probe method like so:
sub _probe  
    my $self = shift;
    if($self->has_reference)  
        return $self->reference->_get_probedata;
     
    # original code remains here
 
With that, we can create an object like so:
my $video = SReview::Video->new(url => 'file.ts');
my $generated = SReview::Video->new(url => 'file2.ts', reference => $video);
now if we ask the $generated object what the value of its video_codec setting is without telling it ourselves first, it will use the $video object for its probed data, and use that. That only misses generating the ffmpeg command line, but that's all fairly straightforward and therefore left as an exercise to the reader. Or you can cheat, and look it up.

1 September 2017

Russ Allbery: Review: Regeneration

Review: Regeneration, by Julie E. Czerneda
Series: Species Imperative #3
Publisher: DAW
Copyright: 2006
ISBN: 0-7564-0345-6
Format: Hardcover
Pages: 543
This is the third book of the Species Imperative trilogy, and this is the type of trilogy that's telling a single story in three books. You don't want to read this out of order, and I'll have to be cautious about aspects of the plot to not spoil the earlier books. Mac is still recovering from the effects of the first two books of the series, but she's primarily worried about a deeply injured friend. Worse, that friend is struggling to explain or process what's happened, and the gaps in her memory and her very ability to explain may point at frightening, lingering risks to humanity. As much as she wants to, Mac can't give her friend all of her focus, since she's also integral to the team trying to understand the broader implications of the events of Migration. Worse, some of the non-human species have their own contrary interpretations that, if acted on, Mac believes would be desperately risky for humanity and all the other species reachable through the transects. That set of competing priorities and motivations eventually sort themselves out into a tense and rewarding multi-species story, but they get off to an awkward start. The first 150 pages of Regeneration are long on worry, uncertainty, dread, and cryptic conversations, and short on enjoyable reading. Czerneda's recaps of the previous books are appreciated, but they weren't very smoothly integrated into the story. (I renew my occasional request for series authors to include a simple plot summary of the previous books as a prefix, without trying to weave it into the fiction.) I was looking forward to this book after the excellent previous volumes, but struggled to get into the story. That does change. It takes a bit too long, with a bit too much nameless dread, a bit too much of an irritating subplot between Fourteen and Oversight that I didn't think added anything to the book, and not enough of Mac barreling forward doing sensible things. But once Mac gets back into space, with a destination and a job and a collection of suspicious (or arrogant) humans and almost-incomprehensible aliens to juggle, Czerneda hits her stride. Czerneda doesn't entirely avoid Planet of the Hats problems with her aliens, but I think she does better than most of science fiction. Alien species in this series do tend to be a bit all of a type, and Mac does figure them out by drawing conclusions from biology, but those conclusions are unobvious and based on Mac's mix of biological and human social intuition. They refreshingly aren't as simple as biology completely shaping culture. (Czerneda's touch is more subtle than James White's Sector General, for example.) And Mac has a practical, determined, and selfless approach that's deeply likable and admirable. It's fun as a reader to watch her win people over by just being competent, thoughtful, observant, and unrelentingly ethical. But the best part of this book, by far, are the Sinzi. They first appeared in the second book, Migration, and seemed to follow the common SF trope of a wise elder alien race that can bring some order to the universe and that humanity can learn from. They, or more precisely the one Sinzi who appeared in Migration, was very good at that role. But Czerneda had something far more interesting planned, and in Regeneration they become truly alien in their own right, with their own nearly incomprehensible way of viewing the universe. There are so many ways that this twist can go wrong, and Czerneda avoids all of them. She doesn't undermine their gravitas, nor does she elevate them to the level of Arisians or other semi-angelic wise mentors of other series. Czerneda makes them different in profound ways that are both advantage and disadvantage, pulls that difference into the plot as a complicating element, and has Mac stumble yet again into a role that is accidentally far more influential than she intends. Mac is the perfect character to do that to: she has just the right mix of embarrassment, ethics, seat-of-the-pants blunt negotiation skills, and a strong moral compass. Given a lever and a place to stand, one can believe that Mac can move the world, and the Sinzi are an absolutely fascinating lever. There are also three separate, highly differentiated Sinzi in this story, with different goals, life experience, personalities, and levels of gravitas. Czerneda's aliens are good in general, but her focus is usually more on biology than individual differentiation. The Sinzi here combine the best of both types of character building. I think the ending of Regeneration didn't entirely work. After all the intense effort the characters put into understanding the complexity of the universe over the course of the series, the denouement has a mopping-up feel and a moral clarity that felt a bit too easy. But the climax has everything I was hoping for, there's a lot more of Mac being Mac, and I loved every moment of the Sinzi twist. Now I want a whole new series exploring the implications of the Sinzi's view of the universe on the whole history of galactic politics that sat underneath this story. But I'll settle for moments of revelation that sent shivers down my spine. This is a bit of an uneven book that falls short of its potential, but I'll remember it for a long time. Add it on to a deeply rewarding series, and I will recommend the whole package unreservedly. The Species Imperative is excellent science fiction that should be better-known than it is. I still think the romance subplot was unfortunate, and occasionally the aliens get too cartoony (Fourteen, in particular, goes a bit too far in that direction), but Czerneda never lingers too long on those elements. And the whole work is some of the best writing about working scientific research and small-group politics that I've read. Highly recommended, but read the whole series in order. Rating: 9 out of 10

30 August 2017

Daniel Silverstone: STM32 USB and Rust - Packet Memory Area

In this, our next exciting installment of STM32 and Rust for USB device drivers, we're going to look at what the STM32 calls the 'packet memory area'. If you've been reading along with the course, including reading up on the datasheet content then you'll be aware that as well as the STM32's normal SRAM, there's a 512 byte SRAM dedicated to the USB peripheral. This SRAM is called the 'packet memory area' and is shared between the main bus and the USB peripheral core. Its purpose is, simply, to store packets in transit. Both those IN to the host (so stored queued for transmission) or OUT from the host (so stored, queued for the application to extract and consume). It's time to actually put hand to keyboard on some Rust code, and the PMA is the perfect starting point, since it involves two basic structures. Packets are the obvious first structure, and they are contiguous sets of bytes which for the purpose of our work we shall assume are one to sixty-four bytes long. The second is what the STM32 datasheet refers to as the BTABLE or Buffer Descriptor Table. Let's consider the BTABLE first.

The Buffer Descriptor Table The BTABLE is arranged in quads of 16bit words. For "normal" endpoints this is a pair of descriptors, each consisting of two words, one for transmission, and one for reception. The STM32 also has a concept of double buffered endpoints, but we're not going to consider those in our proof-of-concept work. The STM32 allows for up to eight endpoints (EP0 through EP7) in internal register naming, though they support endpoints numbered from zero to fifteen in the sense of the endpoint address numbering. As such there're eight descriptors each four 16bit words long (eight bytes) making for a buffer descriptor table which is 64 bytes in size at most.
Buffer Descriptor Table
Byte offset in PMA Field name Description
(EPn * 8) + 0 USB_ADDRn_TX The address (inside the PMA) of the TX buffer for EPn
(EPn * 8) + 2 USB_COUNTn_TX The number of bytes present in the TX buffer for EPn
(EPn * 8) + 4 USB_ADDRn_RX The address (inside the PMA) of the RX buffer for EPn
(EPn * 8) + 6 USB_COUNTn_RX The number of bytes of space available for the RX buffer for EPn (and once received, the number of bytes received)
The TX entries are trivial to comprehend. To transmit a packet, part of the process involves writing the packet into the PMA, putting the address into the appropriate USB_ADDRn_TX entry, and the length into the corresponding USB_COUNTn_TX entry, before marking the endpoint as ready to transmit. To receive a packet though is slightly more complex. The application must allocate some space in the PMA, setting the address into the USB_ADDRn_RX entry of the BTABLE before filling out the top half of the USB_COUNTn_RX entry. For ease of bit sizing, the STM32 only supports space allocations of two to sixty-two bytes in steps of two bytes at a time, or thirty-two to five-hundred-twelve bytes in steps of thirty-two bytes at a time. Once the packet is received, the USB peripheral will fill out the lower bits of the USB_COUNTn_RX entry with the actual number of bytes filled out in the buffer.

Packets themselves Since packets are, typically, a maximum of 64 bytes long (for USB 2.0) and are simply sequences of bytes with no useful structure to them (as far as the USB peripheral itself is concerned) the PMA simply requires that they be present and contiguous in PMA memory space. Addresses of packets are relative to the base of the PMA and are byte-addressed, however they cannot start on an odd byte, so essentially they are 16bit addressed. Since the BTABLE can be anywhere within the PMA, as can the packets, the application will have to do some memory management (either statically, or dynamically) to manage the packets in the PMA.

Accessing the PMA The PMA is accessed in 16bit word sections. It's not possible to access single bytes of the PMA, nor is it conveniently structured as far as the CPU is concerned. Instead the PMA's 16bit words are spread on 32bit word boundaries as far as the CPU knows. This is done for convenience and simplicity of hardware, but it means that we need to ensure our library code knows how to deal with this. First up, to convert an address in the PMA into something which the CPU can use we need to know where in the CPU's address space the PMA is. Fortunately this is fixed at 0x4000_6000. Secondly we need to know what address in the PMA we wish to access, so we can determine which 16bit word that is, and thus what the address is as far as the CPU is concerned. If we assume we only ever want to access 16bit entries, we can just multiply the PMA offset by two before adding it to the PMA base address. So, to access the 16bit word at byte-offset 8 in the PMA, we'd look for the 16bit word at 0x4000_6000 + (0x08 * 2) => 0x4000_6010.

Bundling the PMA into something we can use I said we'd do some Rust, and so we shall
    // Thanks to the work by Jorge Aparicio, we have a convenient wrapper
    // for peripherals which means we can declare a PMA peripheral:
    pub const PMA: Peripheral<PMA> = unsafe   Peripheral::new(0x4000_6000)  ;
    // The PMA struct type which the peripheral will return a ref to
    pub struct PMA  
        pma_area: PMA_Area,
     
    // And the way we turn that ref into something we can put a useful impl on
    impl Deref for PMA  
        type Target = PMA_Area;
        fn deref(&self) -> &PMA_Area  
            &self.pma_area
         
     
    // This is the actual representation of the peripheral, we use the C repr
    // in order to ensure it ends up packed nicely together
    #[repr(C)]
    pub struct PMA_Area  
        // The PMA consists of 256 u16 words separated by u16 gaps, so lets
        // represent that as 512 u16 words which we'll only use every other of.
        words: [VolatileCell<u16>; 512],
     
That block of code gives us three important things. Firstly a peripheral object which we will be able to (later) manage nicely as part of the set of peripherals which RTFM will look after for us. Secondly we get a convenient packed array of u16s which will be considered volatile (the compiler won't optimise around the ordering of writes etc). Finally we get a struct on which we can hang an implementation to give our PMA more complex functionality. A useful first pair of functions would be to simply let us get and put u16s in and out of that word array, since we're only using every other word
    impl PMA_Area  
        pub fn get_u16(&self, offset: usize) -> u16  
            assert!((offset & 0x01) == 0);
            self.words[offset].get()
         
        pub fn set_u16(&self, offset: usize, val: u16)  
            assert!((offset & 0x01) == 0);
            self.words[offset].set(val);
         
     
These two functions take an offset in the PMA and return the u16 word at that offset. They only work on u16 boundaries and as such they assert that the bottom bit of the offset is unset. In a release build, that will go away, but during debugging this might be essential. Since we're only using 16bit boundaries, this means that the first word in the PMA will be at offset zero, and the second at offset two, then four, then six, etc. Since we allocated our words array to expect to use every other entry, this automatically converts into the addresses we desire. If we pop (and please don't worry about the unsafe stuff for now):
    unsafe   (&*usb::pma::PMA.get()).set_u16(4, 64);  
into our main function somewhere, and then build and objdump our test binary we can see the following set of instructions added:
 80001e4:   f246 0008   movw    r0, #24584  ; 0x6008
 80001e8:   2140        movs    r1, #64 ; 0x40
 80001ea:   f2c4 0000   movt    r0, #16384  ; 0x4000
 80001ee:   8001        strh    r1, [r0, #0]
This boils down to a u16 write of 0x0040 (64) to the address 0x4006008 which is the third 32 bit word in the CPU's view of the PMA memory space (where offset 4 is the third 16bit word) which is exactly what we'd expect to see. We can, from here, build up some functions for manipulating a BTABLE, though the most useful ones for us to take a look at are the RX counter functions:
    pub fn get_rxcount(&self, ep: usize) -> u16  
        self.get_u16(BTABLE + (ep * 8) + 6) & 0x3ff
     
    pub fn set_rxcount(&self, ep: usize, val: u16)  
        assert!(val <= 1024);
        let rval: u16 =  
            if val > 62  
                assert!((val & 0x1f) == 0);
                (((val >> 5) - 1) << 10)   0x8000
              else  
                assert!((val & 1) == 0);
                (val >> 1) << 10
             
         ;
        self.set_u16(BTABLE + (ep * 8) + 6, rval)
     
The getter is fairly clean and clear, we need the BTABLE base in the PMA, add the address of the USB_COUNTn_RX entry to that, retrieve the u16 and then mask off the bottom ten bits since that's the size of the relevant field. The setter is a little more complex, since it has to deal with the two possible cases, this isn't pretty and we might be able to write some better peripheral structs in the future, but for now, if the length we're setting is 62 or less, and is divisible by two, then we put a zero in the top bit, and the number of 2-byte lumps in at bits 14:10, and if it's 64 or more, we mask off the bottom to check it's divisible by 32, and then put the count (minus one) of those blocks in, instead, and set the top bit to mark it as such. Fortunately, when we set constants, Rust's compiler manages to optimise all this very quickly. For a BTABLE at the bottom of the PMA, and an initialisation statement of:
    unsafe   (&*usb::pma::PMA.get()).set_rxcount(1, 64);  
then we end up with the simple instruction sequence:
80001e4:    f246 001c   movw    r0, #24604  ; 0x601c
80001e8:    f44f 4104   mov.w   r1, #33792  ; 0x8400
80001ec:    f2c4 0000   movt    r0, #16384  ; 0x4000
80001f0:    8001        strh    r1, [r0, #0]
We can decompose that into a C like *((u16*)0x4000601c) = 0x8400 and from there we can see that it's writing to the u16 at 0x1c bytes into the CPU's view of the PMA, which is 14 bytes into the PMA itself. Since we know we set the BTABLE at the start of the PMA, it's 14 bytes into the BTABLE which is firmly in the EP1 entries. Specifically it's USB_COUNT1_RX which is what we were hoping for. To confirm this, check out page 651 of the datasheet. The value set was 0x8400 which we can decompose into 0x8000 and 0x0400. The first is the top bit and tells us that BL_SIZE is one, and thus the blocks are 32 bytes long. Next the 0x4000 if we shift it right ten places, we get the value 2 for the field NUM_BLOCK and multiplying 2 by 32 we get the 64 bytes we asked it to set as the size of the RX buffer. It has done exactly what we hoped it would, but the compiler managed to optimise it into a single 16 bit store of a constant value to a constant location. Nice and efficient. Finally, let's look at what happens if we want to write a packet into the PMA. For now, let's assume packets come as slices of u16s because that'll make our life a little simpler:
    pub fn write_buffer(&self, base: usize, buf: &[u16])  
        for (ofs, v) in buf.iter().enumerate()  
            self.set_u16(base + (ofs * 2), *v);
         
     
Yes, even though we're deep in no_std territory, we can still get an iterator over the slice, and enumerate it, getting a nice iterator of (index, value) though in this case, the value is a ref to the content of the slice, so we end up with *v to deref it. I am sure I could get that automatically happening but for now it's there. Amazingly, despite using iterators, enumerators, high level for loops, function calls, etc, if we pop:
    unsafe   (&*usb::pma::PMA.get()).write_buffer(0, &[0x1000, 0x2000, 0x3000]);  
into our main function and compile it, we end up with the instruction sequence:
80001e4:    f246 0000   movw    r0, #24576  ; 0x6000
80001e8:    f44f 5180   mov.w   r1, #4096   ; 0x1000
80001ec:    f2c4 0000   movt    r0, #16384  ; 0x4000
80001f0:    8001        strh    r1, [r0, #0]
80001f2:    f44f 5100   mov.w   r1, #8192   ; 0x2000
80001f6:    8081        strh    r1, [r0, #4]
80001f8:    f44f 5140   mov.w   r1, #12288  ; 0x3000
80001fc:    8101        strh    r1, [r0, #8]
which, as you can see, ends up being three sequential halfword stores directly to the right locations in the CPU's view of the PMA. You have to love seriously aggressive compile-time optimisation :-) Hopefully, by next time, we'll have layered some more pleasant routines on our PMA code, and begun a foray into the setup necessary before we can begin handling interrupts and start turning up on a USB port.

28 August 2017

John Goerzen: The Joy of Exploring: Old Phone Systems, Pizza, and Discovery

This story involves boys pretending to be pizza deliverymen using a working automated Strowger telephone exchange demonstrator on display in a museum, which is very old and is, to my knowledge, the only such working exhibit in the world. (Yes, I have video.) But first, a thought on exploration. There are those that would say that there is nothing left to explore anymore that the whole earth is mapped, photographed by satellites, and, well, known. I prefer to look at it a different way: the earth is full of places that billions of people will never see, and probably don t even know about. Those places may be quiet country creeks, peaceful neighborhoods one block away from major tourist attractions, an MTA museum in Brooklyn, a state park in Arkansas, or a beautiful church in Germany. Martha is not yet two months old, and last week she and I spent a surprisingly long amount of time just gazing at tree branches she was mesmerized, and why not, because to her, everything is new. As I was exploring in Portland two weeks ago, I happened to pick up a nearly-forgotten book by a nearly-forgotten person, Beryl Markham, a woman who was a pilot in Africa about 80 years ago. The passage that I happened to randomly flip to in the bookstore, which really grabbed my attention, was this:
The available aviation maps of Africa in use at that time all bore the cartographer s scale mark, 1/2,000,000 one over two million. An inch on the map was about thitry-two miles in the air, as compared to the flying maps of Europe on which one inch represented no more than four air miles. Moreover, it seemed that the printers of the African maps had a slightly malicious habit of including, in large letters, the names of towns, junctions, and villages which, while most of them did exist in fact, as a group of thatched huts may exist or a water hold, they were usually so inconsequential as completely to escape discovery from the cockpit. Beyond this, it was even more disconcerting to examine your charts before a proposed flight only to find that in many cases the bulk of the terrain over which you had to fly was bluntly marked: UNSURVEYED . It was as if the mapmakers had said, We are aware that between this spot and that one, there are several hundred thousands of acres, but until you make a forced landing there, we won t know whether it is mud, desert, or jungle and the chances are we won t know then! Beryl Markham, West With the Night
My aviation maps today have no such markings. The continent is covered with radio beacons, the world with GPS, the maps with precise elevations of the ground and everything from skyscrapers to antenna towers. And yet, despite all we know, the world is still a breathtaking adventure. Yesterday, the boys and I were going to fly to Abilene, KS, to see a museum (Seelye Mansion). Circumstances were such that we neither flew, nor saw that museum. But we still went to Abilene, and wound up at the Museum of Independent Telephony, a wondrous place for anyone interested in the history of technology. As it is one of those off-the-beaten-path sorts of places, the boys got 2.5 hours to use the hands-on exhibits of real old phones, switchboards, and also the schoolhouse out back. They decided why not? to use this historic equipment to pretend to order pizzas. Jacob and Oliver proceeded to invent all sorts of things to use the phones for: ordering pizza, calling the cops to chase the pizza delivery guys, etc. They were so interested that by 2PM we still hadn t had lunch and they claimed we re not hungry despite the fact that we were going to get pizza for lunch. And I certainly enjoyed the exhibits on the evolution of telephones, switching (from manual plugboards to automated switchboards), and such. This place was known it even has a website, I had been there before, and in fact so had the boys (my parents took them there a couple of years ago). But yesterday, we discovered the Strowger switch had been repaired since the last visit, and that it, in fact, is great for conversations about pizza. Whether it s seeing an eclipse, discovering a fascination with tree branches, or historic telephones, a spirit of curiosity and exploration lets a person find fun adventures almost anywhere.

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