
Would all the paranoid crypto-users please stop flooding
Planet Debian with
GPG output?
And if you just cannot avoid it, please tag those posts
meme, because that s what they are.
If you really think there s a need for a new key, you re one
step ahead of me, because so far, there s only
a theoretical attack and
the valid question of
whether this is actually something to worry about in the context of
GPG (or
in
the context of Git, for that matter). There is no practical
exploit out there, and I don t expect one that would endanger your
use of GPG any time soon.
Of course, we ought to replace the current crypto infrastructure
with a new one
before the current one is compromised, but
that should really be motivated by careful consideration and
planning, not by lemming-like behaviour and the infamous
tipping
point.
I ve long been meaning to clean up my key and may also switch to
using a new one in the near future. However, I don t think there is
an immediate need and I ll take time first to investigate the
options RSA is hardly free from problems or an optimal choice.
For instance, why would I want to use an RSA key, which is limited
in GPG to 4096 bit keys? Do we really want to deal with signatures
that are 4-10 times longer than their DSA counterparts? When RSA is
broken, will we see a replay of this whole key-replacing
frenzy?
Wouldn t it make more sense to leverage the current situation
and work on pushing/improving the
DSA
algorithm with larger keys, and to strive towards better
algorithms in general, e.g. through
SHA-3.
If you still need to replace your key, revoke the old one, point
at the new one in the revocation reason, and please refrain from
abusing feed aggregators from letting the world know. If
gpg cannot follow the trust chain after the
revocation, please fix it.
In the mean time, it
is a good idea to use
RIPEMD160 instead of
SHA-1 for signing, with the following lines in
~/.gnupg/gpg.conf:
personal-digest-preferences SHA512 SHA384 SHA256 SHA224 RIPEMD160
default-preference-list [ ] H10 H9 H8 H11 H3 [ ]
and to set the preferences on your key accordingly:
% gpg --edit-key $KEYID
> setpref [ ] H10 H9 H8 H11 H3 [ ]
> save
% gpg --send-key
Then, make sure
RIPEMD160 is being used:
% gpg --clearsign -a </dev/null grep '^Hash:'
I ll end with a link to a decent
write-up on the
cryptographic basics of GPG.