Search Results: "will"

14 May 2025

Jonathan Dowland: Orbital

Orbital at NX, Newcastle in 2023 Orbital at NX, Newcastle in 2023
I'm on a bit of an Orbital kick at the moment. Last year they re-issued their 1991 debut album with 43 extra tracks. Later this month they're doing the same for their 1993 sophomore album. I thought I'd try to narrow down some tracks to recommend. I seem to have settled on roughly 5 in previous posts (for Underworld, The Cure, Coil and Gazelle Twin). This time I've done 6 (I borrowed one from Underworld) As always it's a hard choice. I've tried to select some tracks I really enjoy that don't often come up on best-of compilation albums. For a more conventional choice of best-of tracks, I recommend the recent-ish 30 something "compilation" (of sorts, previously written about)
  1. The Naked and the Dead (1992) The Naked and the Dead by Orbital From an early EP Radiccio, which is being re-issued this month. Digital versions of the re-issue will feature a new recording "Deepest" featuring Tilda Swinton. Sadly this isn't making it onto the pressed version. She performed with them live at Glastonbury 2024. That entire performance was a real pick-me-up during my convolescence, and is recommended. Anyway I've now written more about a song I haven't recommended than the one I did
  2. Remind (1993) Remind by Orbital From the Brown Album, I first heard this as the Encore from their "final show", for John Peel, when they split up in 2004. "Remind" wasn't broadcast, but an audience recording was circulated on fan site Loopz. Remarkably, 21 years on, it's still there. In writing this I discovered that it's a re-working of a remix Orbital did for Meat Beat Manifesto: MindStream (Mind The Bend The Mind)
  3. You Lot (2004) From the unfairly-maligned "final" Blue album. Featuring a sample of pre-Doctor Who Christoper Eccleston, from another Russell T Davies production, Second Coming.
  4. Beached (2000) Beached (Long version) by Orbital, Angelo Badalamenti Co-written by Angelo Badalamenti, it's built around a sample of Badalamenti's score for the movie "The Beach". Orbital's re-work adds some grit to the orchestral instrumentation and opens with a monologue, delivered by Leonardo Di Caprio, sampled from the movie.
  5. Spare Parts Express (1999) Spare Parts Express by Orbital Critics had started to be quite unfair to Orbital by this point. The band themselves said that they'd ran out of ideas (pointing at album closer "Style", built around a Stylophone melody, as proof). Their malaise continued right up to the Blue Album, at which point the split up; ostensibly for good, before regrouping 8 years later. Spare Parts Express is a hatchet job of various bits that they didn't develop into full songs on their own. Despite this I think it works. I love long-form electronica, and this clocks in at 10:07. My favourite segment (06:37) is adjacent to a reference (05:05) to John Baker's theme for the BBC children's program Newsround (sadly they aren't using it today. Here's a rundown of Newsround themes over time)
  6. Attached (1994) Attached by Orbital This originally debuted on a Peel session before appearing on the subsequent album Snivilisation a few months later. An album closer, and a good come-down song to close this list.

Evgeni Golov: running modified containers with podman

Everybody (who runs containers) knows this situation: you've been running happycontainer:stable for a while and it's been great but now something external changed and you need to adjust the code while there is still no release with the patch. I've encountered exactly this when our Home-Assistant stopped showing the presence of our cat correctly, but we've also been discussing this at work recently. Now the most obvious (to me?) solution would be to build a new container, based on the original one, and perform the modifications at build time. Something like this:
FROM happycontainer:stable
RUN curl     patch -p1
But that's not interactive, and if you don't have a patch readily available, that's not what you want. (And I'll save you the idea of RUNing sed and friends to alter files!) You could run vim inside the container, but that requires vim to be installed there in the first place. And a reasonable configuration. And Well, turns out podman can mount the root fs of a running container.
[root@sai ~]# podman mount homeassistant
/var/lib/containers/storage/overlay/f3ac502d97b5681989dff
And if you're running as non-root, you'll get an error:
[container@sai ~]$ podman mount homeassistant
Error: cannot run command "podman mount" in rootless mode, must execute  podman unshare  first
Luckily the solution is in the error message - use podman unshare
[container@sai ~]$ podman unshare
[root@sai ~]# podman mount homeassistant
/home/container/.local/share/containers/storage/overlay/95d3809d53125e4d40ad05e52efaa5a48e6e61fe9b8a8478416ff44459c7eb31/merged
So in both cases (root and rootless) we get a path, which is the mounted root fs and we can edit things in there as we like.
[root@sai ~]# vi /home/container/.local/share/containers/storage/overlay/95d3809d53125e4d40ad05e52efaa5a48e6e61fe9b8a8478416ff44459c7eb31/merged/usr/src/homeassistant/homeassistant/components/surepetcare/binary_sensor.py
Once done, the container can be unmounted again, and the namespace left
[root@sai ~]# podman umount homeassistant
homeassistant
[root@sai ~]# exit
[container@sai ~]$
At this point we have modified the code inside the container, but the running process is still using the old code. If we restart the container now to restart the process, our changes will be lost. Instead, we can commit the changes as a new layer and tag the result.
[container@sai ~]$ podman commit homeassistant docker.io/homeassistant/home-assistant:stable
And now, when we restart the container, it will use the new code with our changes
[container@sai ~]$ systemctl --user restart homeassistant
Is this the best workflow you can get? Probably not. Does it work? Hell yeah!

13 May 2025

Ravi Dwivedi: KDE India Conference 2025

Last month, I attended the KDE India conference in Gandhinagar, Gujarat from the 4th to the 6th of April. I made my mind to attend when Sahil told me about his plans to attend and giving a talk. A day after my talk submission, the organizer Bhushan contacted me on Matrix and informed me that my talk had been accepted. I was also informed that KDE will cover my travel and accommodation expenses. So, I planned to attend the conference at this point. I am a longtime KDE user, so why not ;) I arrived in Ahmedabad, the twin city of Gandhinagar, a day before the conference. The first thing that struck me as soon as I came out of the Ahmedabad airport was the heat. I felt as if I was being cooked exactly how Bhushan put it earlier in the group chat. I took a taxi to get to my hotel, which was close to the conference venue. Later that afternoon, I met Bhushan and Joseph. Joseph lived in Germany. Bhushan was taking him to get a SIM card, so I tagged along and got to roam around. Joseph was unsure about where to go after the conference, so I asked him what he wanted out of his trip and had conversations along that line. Later, Vishal convinced him to go to Lucknow. Since he was adamant about taking the train, I booked a Tatkal train ticket for him to Lucknow. He was curious about how Tatkal booking works and watched me in amusement while I was booking the ticket. The 4th of April marked the first day of the conference, with around 25 attendees. Bhushan started the day with an overview of KDE conferences in India, followed by Vishal, who discussed FOSS United s activities. After the lunch, Joseph gave an overview of his campaign to help people switch from Windows to GNU/Linux due to environmental and security reasons. He continued his session in detail the next day.
Conference hall Conference hall
A key takeaway for me from Joseph s session was the idea pointed out by Adwaith: marketing GNU/Linux as a cheap alternative may not attract as much attention as marketing it as a status symbol. He gave the example of how the Tata Nano didn t do well in the Indian market due to being perceived as a poor person s car. My talk was scheduled for the evening of the first day. I hadn t prepared any slides because I wanted to make my session interactive. During my talk, I did an activity with the attendees to demonstrate the federated nature of XMPP messaging, of which Prav is a part. After the talk, I got a lot of questions, signalling engagement. The audience was cooperative (just like Prav ;)), contrary to my expectations (I thought they will be tired and sleepy). On the third day, I did a demo on editing OpenStreetMap (referred to as OSM in short) using the iD editor. It involved adding points to OSM based on the students suggestions. Since my computer didn t have an HDMI port, I used Subin s computer, and he logged into his OSM account for my session. Therefore, any mistakes I made will be under Subin s name. :) On the third day, I attended Aaruni s talk about backing up a GNU/Linux system. This was the talk that resonated with me the most. He suggested formatting the system with the btrfs file system during the installation, which helps in taking snapshots of the system and provides an easy way to roll back to a previous version if, for example, a file is accidentally deleted. I have tried many backup techniques, including this one, but I never tried backing up on the internal disk. I ll certainly give this a try. A conference is not only about the talks, that s why we had a Prav table as well ;) Just kidding. What I really mean is that a conference is more about interactions than talks. Since the conference was a three-day affair, attendees got plenty of time to bond and share ideas.
Prav stall at the conference Prav stall at the conference
Conference group photo Conference group photo
After the conference, Bhushan took us to Adalaj Stepwell, an attraction near Gandhinagar. Upon entering the complex, we saw a park where there were many langurs. Going further, there were stairs that led down to a well. I guess this is why it is called a stepwell.
Adalaj Stepwell Adalaj Stepwell
Later that day, we had Gujarati Thali for dinner. It was an all-you-can-eat buffet and was reasonably priced at 300 rupees per plate. Aamras (Mango juice) was the highlight for me. This was the only time we had Gujarati food during this visit. After the dinner, Aaruni dropped Sahil and I off at the airport. The hospitality was superb - for instance, in addition to Aaruni dropping us, Bhushan also picked up some of the attendees from the airport. Finally, I would like to thank KDE for sponsoring my travel and accommodation costs. Let s wrap up this post here and meet you in the next one. Thanks to contrapunctus and Joseph for proofreading.

Sergio Talens-Oliag: Running dind with sysbox

When I configured forgejo-actions I used a docker-compose.yaml file to execute the runner and a dind container configured to run using privileged mode to be able to build images with it; as mentioned on my post about my setup, the use of the privileged mode is not a big issue for my use case, but reduces the overall security of the installation. On a work chat the other day someone mentioned that the GitLab documentation about using kaniko says it is no longer maintained (see the kaniko issue #3348) so we should look into alternatives for kubernetes clusters. I never liked kaniko too much, but it works without privileged mode and does not need a daemon, which is a good reason to use it, but if it is deprecated it makes sense to look into alternatives, and today I looked into some of them to use with my forgejo-actions setup. I was going to try buildah and podman but it seems that they need to adjust things on the systems running them:
  • When I tried to use buildah inside a docker container in Ubuntu I found the problems described on the buildah issue #1901 so I moved on.
  • Reading the podman documentation I saw that I need to export the fuse device to run it inside a container and, as I found other option, I also skipped it.
As my runner was already configured to use dind I decided to look into sysbox as a way of removing the privileged flag to make things more secure but have the same functionality.

Installing the sysbox packageAs I use Debian and Ubuntu systems I used the .deb packages distributed from the sysbox release page to install it (in my case I used the one from the 0.6.7 version). On the machine running forgejo (a Debian 12 server) I downloaded the package, stopped the running containers (it is needed to install the package and the only ones running where the ones started by the docker-compose.yaml file) and installed the sysbox-ce_0.6.7.linux_amd64.deb package using dpkg.

Updating the docker-compose.yaml fileTo run the dind container without setting the privileged mode we set sysbox-runc as the runtime on the dind container definition and set the privileged flag to false (it is the same as removing the key, as it defaults to false):
--- a/docker-compose.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.yml
@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ services:
   dind:
     image: docker:dind
     container_name: 'dind'
-    privileged: 'true'
+    # use sysbox-runc instead of using privileged mode
+    runtime: 'sysbox-runc'
+    privileged: 'false'
     command: ['dockerd', '-H', 'unix:///dind/docker.sock', '-G', '$RUNNER_GID']
     restart: 'unless-stopped'
     volumes:

Testing the changesAfter applying the changes to the docker-compose.yaml file we start the containers and to test things we re-run previously executed jobs to see if things work as before. In my case I re-executed the build-image-from-tag workflow #18 from the oci project and everything worked as expected.

ConclusionFor my current use case (docker + dind) seems that sysbox is a good solution but I m not sure if I ll be installing it on kubernetes anytime soon unless I find a valid reason to do it (last time we talked about it my co workers said that they are evaluating buildah and podman for kubernetes and probably we will use them to replace kaniko in our gitlab-ci pipelines and for those tools the use of sysbox seems an overkill).

12 May 2025

Sergio Talens-Oliag: Playing with vCluster

After my previous posts related to Argo CD (one about argocd-autopilot and another with some usage examples) I started to look into Kluctl (I also plan to review Flux, but I m more interested on the kluctl approach right now). While reading an entry on the project blog about Cluster API somehow I ended up on the vCluster site and decided to give it a try, as it can be a valid way of providing developers with on demand clusters for debugging or run CI/CD tests before deploying things on common clusters or even to have multiple debugging virtual clusters on a local machine with only one of them running at any given time. On this post I will deploy a vcluster using the k3d_argocd kubernetes cluster (the one we created on the posts about argocd) as the host and will show how to:
  • use its ingress (in our case traefik) to access the API of the virtual one (removes the need of having to use the vcluster connect command to access it with kubectl),
  • publish the ingress objects deployed on the virtual cluster on the host ingress, and
  • use the sealed-secrets of the host cluster to manage the virtual cluster secrets.

Creating the virtual cluster

Installing the vcluster applicationTo create the virtual clusters we need the vcluster command, we can install it with arkade:
  arkade get vcluster

The vcluster.yaml fileTo create the cluster we are going to use the following vcluster.yaml file (you can find the documentation about all its options here):
controlPlane:
  proxy:
    # Extra hostnames to sign the vCluster proxy certificate for
    extraSANs:
    - my-vcluster-api.lo.mixinet.net
exportKubeConfig:
  context: my-vcluster_k3d-argocd
  server: https://my-vcluster-api.lo.mixinet.net:8443
  secret:
    name: my-vcluster-kubeconfig
sync:
  toHost:
    ingresses:
      enabled: true
    serviceAccounts:
      enabled: true
  fromHost:
    ingressClasses:
      enabled: true
    nodes:
      enabled: true
      clearImageStatus: true
    secrets:
      enabled: true
      mappings:
        byName:
          # sync all Secrets from the 'my-vcluster-default' namespace to the
          # virtual "default" namespace.
          "my-vcluster-default/*": "default/*"
          # We could add other namespace mappings if needed, i.e.:
          # "my-vcluster-kube-system/*": "kube-system/*"
On the controlPlane section we ve added the proxy.extraSANs entry to add an extra host name to make sure it is added to the cluster certificates if we use it from an ingress. The exportKubeConfig section creates a kubeconfig secret on the virtual cluster namespace using the provided host name; the secret can be used by GitOps tools or we can dump it to a file to connect from our machine. On the sync section we enable the synchronization of Ingress objects and ServiceAccounts from the virtual to the host cluster:
  • We copy the ingress definitions to use the ingress server that runs on the host to make them work from the outside world.
  • The service account synchronization is not really needed, but we enable it because if we test this configuration with EKS it would be useful if we use IAM roles for the service accounts.
On the opposite direction (from the host to the virtual cluster) we synchronize:
  • The IngressClass objects, to be able to use the host ingress server(s).
  • The Nodes (we are not using the info right now, but it could be interesting if we want to have the real information of the nodes running pods of the virtual cluster).
  • The Secrets from the my-vcluster-default host namespace to the default of the virtual cluster; that synchronization allows us to deploy SealedSecrets on the host that generate secrets that are copied automatically to the virtual one. Initially we only copy secrets for one namespace but if the virtual cluster needs others we can add namespaces on the host and their mappings to the virtual one on the vcluster.yaml file.

Creating the virtual clusterTo create the virtual cluster we run the following command:
vcluster create my-vcluster --namespace my-vcluster --upgrade --connect=false \
  --values vcluster.yaml
It creates the virtual cluster on the my-vcluster namespace using the vcluster.yaml file shown before without connecting to the cluster from our local machine (if we don t pass that option the command adds an entry on our kubeconfig and launches a proxy to connect to the virtual cluster that we don t plan to use).

Adding an ingress TCP route to connect to the vcluster apiAs explained before, we need to create an IngressTcpRoute object to be able to connect to the vcluster API, we use the following definition:
apiVersion: traefik.containo.us/v1alpha1
kind: IngressRouteTCP
metadata:
  name: my-vcluster-api
  namespace: my-vcluster
spec:
  entryPoints:
    - websecure
  routes:
    - match: HostSNI( my-vcluster-api.lo.mixinet.net )
      services:
        - name: my-vcluster
          port: 443
  tls:
    passthrough: true
Once we apply those changes the cluster API will be available on the https://my-cluster-api.lo.mixinet.net:8443 URL using its own self signed certificate (we have enabled TLS passthrough) that includes the hostname we use (we adjusted it on the vcluster.yaml file, as explained before).

Getting the kubeconfig for the vclusterOnce the vcluster is running we will have its kubeconfig available on the my-vcluster-kubeconfig secret on its namespace on the host cluster. To dump it to the ~/.kube/my-vcluster-config we can do the following:
  kubectl get -n my-vcluster secret/my-vcluster-kubeconfig \
    --template=" .data.config "   base64 -d > ~/.kube/my-vcluster-config
Once available we can define the vkubectl alias to adjust the KUBECONFIG variable to access it:
alias vkubectl="KUBECONFIG=~/.kube/my-vcluster-config kubectl"
Or we can merge the configuration with the one on the KUBECONFIG variable and use kubectx or a similar tool to change the context (for our vcluster the context will be my-vcluster_k3d-argocd). If the KUBECONFIG variable is defined and only has the PATH to a single file the merge can be done running the following:
KUBECONFIG="$KUBECONFIG:~/.kube/my-vcluster-config" kubectl config view \
  --flatten >"$KUBECONFIG.new"
mv "$KUBECONFIG.new" "$KUBECONFIG"
On the rest of this post we will use the vkubectl alias when connecting to the virtual cluster, i.e. to check that it works we can run the cluster-info subcommand:
  vkubectl cluster-info
Kubernetes control plane is running at https://my-vcluster-api.lo.mixinet.net:8443
CoreDNS is running at https://my-vcluster-api.lo.mixinet.net:8443/api/v1/namespaces/kube-system/services/kube-dns:dns/proxy
To further debug and diagnose cluster problems, use 'kubectl cluster-info dump'.

Installing the dummyhttpd applicationTo test the virtual cluster we are going to install the dummyhttpd application using the following kustomization.yaml file:
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
  - https://forgejo.mixinet.net/blogops/argocd-applications.git//dummyhttp/?ref=dummyhttp-v1.0.0
# Add the config map
configMapGenerator:
  - name: dummyhttp-configmap
    literals:
      - CM_VAR="Vcluster Test Value"
    behavior: create
    options:
      disableNameSuffixHash: true
patches:
  # Change the ingress host name
  - target:
      kind: Ingress
      name: dummyhttp
    patch:  -
      - op: replace
        path: /spec/rules/0/host
        value: vcluster-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net
  # Add reloader annotations -- it will only work if we install reloader on the
  # virtual cluster, as the one on the host cluster doesn't see the vcluster
  # deployment objects
  - target:
      kind: Deployment
      name: dummyhttp
    patch:  -
      - op: add
        path: /metadata/annotations
        value:
          reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true"
          reloader.stakater.com/rollout-strategy: "restart"
It is quite similar to the one we used on the Argo CD examples but uses a different DNS entry; to deploy it we run kustomize and vkubectl:
  kustomize build .   vkubectl apply -f -
configmap/dummyhttp-configmap created
service/dummyhttp created
deployment.apps/dummyhttp created
ingress.networking.k8s.io/dummyhttp created
We can check that everything worked using curl:
  curl -s https://vcluster-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net:8443/   jq -cM .
 "c": "Vcluster Test Value","s": "" 
The objects available on the vcluster now are:
  vkubectl get all,configmap,ingress
NAME                             READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
pod/dummyhttp-55569589bc-9zl7t   1/1     Running   0          24s
NAME                 TYPE        CLUSTER-IP     EXTERNAL-IP   PORT(S)   AGE
service/dummyhttp    ClusterIP   10.43.51.39    <none>        80/TCP    24s
service/kubernetes   ClusterIP   10.43.153.12   <none>        443/TCP   14m

NAME                        READY   UP-TO-DATE   AVAILABLE   AGE
deployment.apps/dummyhttp   1/1     1            1           24s
NAME                                   DESIRED   CURRENT   READY   AGE
replicaset.apps/dummyhttp-55569589bc   1         1         1       24s
NAME                            DATA   AGE
configmap/dummyhttp-configmap   1      24s
configmap/kube-root-ca.crt      1      14m
NAME                                CLASS   HOSTS                             ADDRESS                          PORTS AGE
ingress.networking.k8s.io/dummyhttp traefik vcluster-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net 172.20.0.2,172.20.0.3,172.20.0.4 80    24s
While we have the following ones on the my-vcluster namespace of the host cluster:
  kubectl get all,configmap,ingress -n my-vcluster
NAME                                                      READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
pod/coredns-bbb5b66cc-snwpn-x-kube-system-x-my-vcluster   1/1     Running   0          18m
pod/dummyhttp-55569589bc-9zl7t-x-default-x-my-vcluster    1/1     Running   0          45s
pod/my-vcluster-0                                         1/1     Running   0          19m
NAME                                           TYPE        CLUSTER-IP      EXTERNAL-IP   PORT(S)                  AGE
service/dummyhttp-x-default-x-my-vcluster      ClusterIP   10.43.51.39     <none>        80/TCP                   45s
service/kube-dns-x-kube-system-x-my-vcluster   ClusterIP   10.43.91.198    <none>        53/UDP,53/TCP,9153/TCP   18m
service/my-vcluster                            ClusterIP   10.43.153.12    <none>        443/TCP,10250/TCP        19m
service/my-vcluster-headless                   ClusterIP   None            <none>        443/TCP                  19m
service/my-vcluster-node-k3d-argocd-agent-1    ClusterIP   10.43.189.188   <none>        10250/TCP                18m

NAME                           READY   AGE
statefulset.apps/my-vcluster   1/1     19m
NAME                                                     DATA   AGE
configmap/coredns-x-kube-system-x-my-vcluster            2      18m
configmap/dummyhttp-configmap-x-default-x-my-vcluster    1      45s
configmap/kube-root-ca.crt                               1      19m
configmap/kube-root-ca.crt-x-default-x-my-vcluster       1      11m
configmap/kube-root-ca.crt-x-kube-system-x-my-vcluster   1      18m
configmap/vc-coredns-my-vcluster                         1      19m
NAME                                                        CLASS   HOSTS                             ADDRESS                          PORTS AGE
ingress.networking.k8s.io/dummyhttp-x-default-x-my-vcluster traefik vcluster-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net 172.20.0.2,172.20.0.3,172.20.0.4 80    45s
As shown, we have copies of the Service, Pod, Configmap and Ingress objects, but there is no copy of the Deployment or ReplicaSet.

Creating a sealed secret for dummyhttpdTo use the hosts sealed secrets controller with the virtual cluster we will create the my-vcluster-default namespace and add there the sealed secrets we want to have available as secrets on the default namespace of the virtual cluster:
  kubectl create namespace my-vcluster-default
  echo -n "Vcluster Boo"   kubectl create secret generic "dummyhttp-secret" \
    --namespace "my-vcluster-default" --dry-run=client \
    --from-file=SECRET_VAR=/dev/stdin -o yaml >dummyhttp-secret.yaml
  kubeseal -f dummyhttp-secret.yaml -w dummyhttp-sealed-secret.yaml
  kubectl apply -f dummyhttp-sealed-secret.yaml
  rm -f dummyhttp-secret.yaml dummyhttp-sealed-secret.yaml
After running the previous commands we have the following objects available on the host cluster:
  kubectl get sealedsecrets.bitnami.com,secrets -n my-vcluster-default
NAME                                        STATUS   SYNCED   AGE
sealedsecret.bitnami.com/dummyhttp-secret            True     34s
NAME                      TYPE     DATA   AGE
secret/dummyhttp-secret   Opaque   1      34s
And we can see that the secret is also available on the virtual cluster with the content we expected:
  vkubectl get secrets
NAME               TYPE     DATA   AGE
dummyhttp-secret   Opaque   1      34s
  vkubectl get secret/dummyhttp-secret --template=" .data.SECRET_VAR " \
    base64 -d
Vcluster Boo
But the output of the curl command has not changed because, although we have the reloader controller deployed on the host cluster, it does not see the Deployment object of the virtual one and the pods are not touched:
  curl -s https://vcluster-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net:8443/   jq -cM .
 "c": "Vcluster Test Value","s": "" 

Installing the reloader applicationTo make reloader work on the virtual cluster we just need to install it as we did on the host using the following kustomization.yaml file:
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
namespace: kube-system
resources:
- github.com/stakater/Reloader/deployments/kubernetes/?ref=v1.4.2
patches:
# Add flags to reload workloads when ConfigMaps or Secrets are created or deleted
- target:
    kind: Deployment
    name: reloader-reloader
  patch:  -
    - op: add
      path: /spec/template/spec/containers/0/args
      value:
        - '--reload-on-create=true'
        - '--reload-on-delete=true'
        - '--reload-strategy=annotations'
We deploy it with kustomize and vkubectl:
  kustomize build .   vkubectl apply -f -
serviceaccount/reloader-reloader created
clusterrole.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/reloader-reloader-role created
clusterrolebinding.rbac.authorization.k8s.io/reloader-reloader-role-binding created
deployment.apps/reloader-reloader created
As the controller was not available when the secret was created the pods linked to the Deployment are not updated, but we can force things removing the secret on the host system; after we do that the secret is re-created from the sealed version and copied to the virtual cluster where the reloader controller updates the pod and the curl command shows the new output:
  kubectl delete -n my-vcluster-default secrets dummyhttp-secret
secret "dummyhttp-secret" deleted
  sleep 2
  vkubectl get pods
NAME                         READY   STATUS        RESTARTS   AGE
dummyhttp-78bf5fb885-fmsvs   1/1     Terminating   0          6m33s
dummyhttp-c68684bbf-nx8f9    1/1     Running       0          6s
  curl -s https://vcluster-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net:8443/   jq -cM .
 "c":"Vcluster Test Value","s":"Vcluster Boo" 
If we change the secret on the host systems things get updated pretty quickly now:
  echo -n "New secret"   kubectl create secret generic "dummyhttp-secret" \
    --namespace "my-vcluster-default" --dry-run=client \
    --from-file=SECRET_VAR=/dev/stdin -o yaml >dummyhttp-secret.yaml
  kubeseal -f dummyhttp-secret.yaml -w dummyhttp-sealed-secret.yaml
  kubectl apply -f dummyhttp-sealed-secret.yaml
  rm -f dummyhttp-secret.yaml dummyhttp-sealed-secret.yaml
  curl -s https://vcluster-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net:8443/   jq -cM .
 "c":"Vcluster Test Value","s":"New secret" 

Pause and restore the vclusterThe status of pods and statefulsets while the virtual cluster is active can be seen using kubectl:
  kubectl get pods,statefulsets -n my-vcluster
NAME                                                                 READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
pod/coredns-bbb5b66cc-snwpn-x-kube-system-x-my-vcluster              1/1     Running   0          127m
pod/dummyhttp-587c7855d7-pt9b8-x-default-x-my-vcluster               1/1     Running   0          4m39s
pod/my-vcluster-0                                                    1/1     Running   0          128m
pod/reloader-reloader-7f56c54d75-544gd-x-kube-system-x-my-vcluster   1/1     Running   0          60m
NAME                           READY   AGE
statefulset.apps/my-vcluster   1/1     128m

Pausing the vclusterIf we don t need to use the virtual cluster we can pause it and after a small amount of time all Pods are gone because the statefulSet is scaled down to 0 (note that other resources like volumes are not removed, but all the objects that have to be scheduled and consume CPU cycles are not running, which can translate in a lot of savings when running on clusters from cloud platforms or, in a local cluster like the one we are using, frees resources like CPU and memory that now can be used for other things):
  vcluster pause my-vcluster
11:20:47 info Scale down statefulSet my-vcluster/my-vcluster...
11:20:48 done Successfully paused vcluster my-vcluster/my-vcluster
  kubectl get pods,statefulsets -n my-vcluster
NAME                           READY   AGE
statefulset.apps/my-vcluster   0/0     130m
Now the curl command fails:
  curl -s https://vcluster-dummyhttp.localhost.mixinet.net:8443
404 page not found
Although the ingress is still available (it returns a 404 because there is no pod behind the service):
  kubectl get ingress -n my-vcluster
NAME                                CLASS     HOSTS                               ADDRESS                            PORTS   AGE
dummyhttp-x-default-x-my-vcluster   traefik   vcluster-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net   172.20.0.2,172.20.0.3,172.20.0.4   80      120m
In fact, the same problem happens when we try to connect to the vcluster API; the error shown by kubectl is related to the TLS certificate because the 404 page uses the wildcard certificate instead of the self signed one:
  vkubectl get pods
Unable to connect to the server: tls: failed to verify certificate: x509: certificate signed by unknown authority
  curl -s https://my-vcluster-api.lo.mixinet.net:8443/api/v1/
404 page not found
  curl -v -s https://my-vcluster-api.lo.mixinet.net:8443/api/v1/ 2>&1   grep subject
*  subject: CN=lo.mixinet.net
*  subjectAltName: host "my-vcluster-api.lo.mixinet.net" matched cert's "*.lo.mixinet.net"

Resuming the vclusterWhen we want to use the virtual cluster again we just need to use the resume command:
  vcluster resume my-vcluster
12:03:14 done Successfully resumed vcluster my-vcluster in namespace my-vcluster
Once all the pods are running the virtual cluster goes back to its previous state, although all of them were started, of course.

Cleaning upThe virtual cluster can be removed using the delete command:
  vcluster delete my-vcluster
12:09:18 info Delete vcluster my-vcluster...
12:09:18 done Successfully deleted virtual cluster my-vcluster in namespace my-vcluster
12:09:18 done Successfully deleted virtual cluster namespace my-vcluster
12:09:18 info Waiting for virtual cluster to be deleted...
12:09:50 done Virtual Cluster is deleted
That removes everything we used on this post except the sealed secrets and secrets that we put on the my-vcluster-default namespace because it was created by us. If we delete the namespace all the secrets and sealed secrets on it are also removed:
  kubectl delete namespace my-vcluster-default
namespace "my-vcluster-default" deleted

ConclusionsI believe that the use of virtual clusters can be a good option for two of the proposed use cases that I ve encountered in real projects in the past:
  • need of short lived clusters for developers or teams,
  • execution of integration tests from CI pipelines that require a complete cluster (the tests can be run on virtual clusters that are created on demand or paused and resumed when needed).
For both cases things can be set up using the Apache licensed product, although maybe evaluating the vCluster Platform offering could be interesting. In any case when everything is not done inside kubernetes we will also have to check how to manage the external services (i.e. if we use databases or message buses as SaaS instead of deploying them inside our clusters we need to have a way of creating, deleting or pause and resume those services).

11 May 2025

Bits from Debian: Bits from the DPL

Dear Debian community, This is bits from the DPL for April. End of 10 I am sure I was speaking in the interest of the whole project when joining the "End of 10" campaign. Here is what I wrote to the initiators:
Hi Joseph and all drivers of the "End of 10" campaign, On behalf of the entire Debian project, I would like to say that we proudly join your great campaign. We stand with you in promoting Free Software, defending users' freedoms, and protecting our planet by avoiding unnecessary hardware waste. Thank you for leading this important initiative.
Andreas Tille Debian Project Leader
I have some goals I would like to share with you for my second term. Ftpmaster delegation This splits up into tasks that can be done before and after Trixie release. Before Trixie: 1. Reducing Barriers to DFSG Compliance Checks Back in 2002, Debian established a way to distribute cryptographic software in the main archive, whereas such software had previously been restricted to the non-US archive. One result of this arrangement which influences our workflow is that all packages uploaded to the NEW queue must remain on the server that hosts it. This requirement means that members of the ftpmaster team must log in to that specific machine, where they are limited to a restricted set of tools for reviewing uploaded code. This setup may act as a barrier to participation--particularly for contributors who might otherwise assist with reviewing packages for DFSG compliance. I believe it is time to reassess this limitation and work toward removing such hurdles. In October last year, we had some initial contact with SPI's legal counsel, who noted that US regulations around cryptography have been relaxed somewhat in recent years (as of 2021). This suggests it may now be possible to revisit and potentially revise the conditions under which we manage cryptographic software in the NEW queue. I plan to investigate this further. If you have expertise in software or export control law and are interested in helping with this topic, please get in touch with me. The ultimate goal is to make it easier for more people to contribute to ensuring that code in the NEW queue complies with the DFSG. 2. Discussing Alternatives My chances to reach out to other distributions remained limited. However, regarding the processing of new software, I learned that OpenSUSE uses a Git-based workflow that requires five "LGTM" approvals from a group of trusted developers. As far as I know, Fedora follows a similar approach. Inspired by this, a recent community initiative--the Gateway to NEW project--enables peer review of new packages for DFSG compliance before they enter the NEW queue. This effort allows anyone to contribute by reviewing packages and flagging potential issues in advance via Git. I particularly appreciate that the DFSG review is coupled with CI, allowing for both license and technical evaluation. While this process currently results in some duplication of work--since final reviews are still performed by the ftpmaster team--it offers a valuable opportunity to catch issues early and improve the overall quality of uploads. If the community sees long-term value in this approach, it could serve as a basis for evolving our workflows. Integrating it more closely into DAK could streamline the process, and we've recently seen that merge requests reflecting community suggestions can be accepted promptly. For now, I would like to gather opinions about how such initiatives could best complement the current NEW processing, and whether greater consensus on trusted peer review could help reduce the burden on the team doing DFSG compliance checks. Submitting packages for review and automated testing before uploading can improve quality and encourage broader participation in safeguarding Debian's Free Software principles. My explicit thanks go out to the Gateway to NEW team for their valuable and forward-looking contribution to Debian. 3. Documenting Critical Workflows Past ftpmaster trainees have told me that understanding the full set of ftpmaster workflows can be quite difficult. While there is some useful documentation thanks in particular to Sean Whitton for his work on documenting NEW processing rules many other important tasks carried out by the ftpmaster team remain undocumented or only partially so. Comprehensive and accessible documentation would greatly benefit current and future team members, especially those onboarding or assisting in specific workflows. It would also help ensure continuity and transparency in how critical parts of the archive are managed. If such documentation already exists and I have simply overlooked it, I would be happy to be corrected. Otherwise, I believe this is an area where we need to improve significantly. Volunteers with a talent for writing technical documentation are warmly invited to contact me--I'd be happy to help establish connections with ftpmaster team members who are willing to share their knowledge so that it can be written down and preserved. Once Trixie is released (hopefully before DebConf): 4. Split of the Ftpmaster Team into DFSG and Archive Teams As discussed during the "Meet the ftpteam" BoF at DebConf24, I would like to propose a structural refinement of the current Ftpmaster team by introducing two different delegated teams:
  1. DFSG Team
  2. Archive Team (responsible for DAK maintenance and process tooling, including releases)
(Alternative name suggestions are, of course, welcome.) The primary task of the DFSG team would be the processing of the NEW queue and ensuring that packages comply with the DFSG. The Archive team would focus on maintaining DAK and handling the technical aspects of archive management. I am aware that, in the recent past, the ftpmaster team has decided not to actively seek new members. While I respect the autonomy of each team, the resulting lack of a recruitment pipeline has led to some friction and concern within the wider community, including myself. As Debian Project Leader, it is my responsibility to ensure the long-term sustainability and resilience of our project, which includes fostering an environment where new contributors can join and existing teams remain effective and well-supported. Therefore, even if the current team does not prioritize recruitment, I will actively seek and encourage new contributors for both teams, with the aim of supporting openness and collaboration. This proposal is not intended as criticism of the current team's dedication or achievements--on the contrary, I am grateful for the hard work and commitment shown, often under challenging circumstances. My intention is to help address the structural issues that have made onboarding and specialization difficult and to ensure that both teams are well-supported for the future. I also believe that both teams should regularly inform the Debian community about the policies and procedures they apply. I welcome any suggestions for a more detailed description of the tasks involved, as well as feedback on how best to implement this change in a way that supports collaboration and transparency. My intention with this proposal is to foster a more open and effective working environment, and I am committed to working with all involved to ensure that any changes are made collaboratively and with respect for the important work already being done. I'm aware that the ideas outlined above touch on core parts of how Debian operates and involve responsibilities across multiple teams. These are not small changes, and implementing them will require thoughtful discussion and collaboration. To move this forward, I've registered a dedicated BoF for DebConf. To make the most of that opportunity, I'm looking for volunteers who feel committed to improving our workflows and processes. With your help, we can prepare concrete and sensible proposals in advance--so the limited time of the BoF can be used effectively for decision-making and consensus-building. In short: I need your help to bring these changes to life. From my experience in my last term, I know that when it truly matters, the Debian community comes together--and I trust that spirit will guide us again. Please also note: we had a "Call for volunteers" five years ago, and much of what was written there still holds true today. I've been told that the response back then was overwhelming--but that training such a large number of volunteers didn't scale well. This time, I hope we can find a more sustainable approach: training a few dedicated people first, and then enabling them to pass on their knowledge. This will also be a topic at the DebCamp sprint. Dealing with Dormant Packages Debian was founded on the principle that each piece of software should be maintained by someone with expertise in it--typically a single, responsible maintainer. This model formed the historical foundation of Debian's packaging system and helped establish high standards of quality and accountability. However, as the project has grown and the number of packages has expanded, this model no longer scales well in all areas. Team maintenance has since emerged as a practical complement, allowing multiple contributors to share responsibility and reduce bottlenecks--depending on each team's internal policy. While working on the Bug of the Day initiative, I observed a significant number of packages that have not been updated in a long time. In the case of team-maintained packages, addressing this is often straightforward: team uploads can be made, or the team can be asked whether the package should be removed. We've also identified many packages that would fit well under the umbrella of active teams, such as language teams like Debian Perl and Debian Python, or blends like Debian Games and Debian Multimedia. Often, no one has taken action--not because of disagreement, but simply due to inattention or a lack of initiative. In addition, we've found several packages that probably should be removed entirely. In those cases, we've filed bugs with pre-removal warnings, which can later be escalated to removal requests. When a package is still formally maintained by an individual, but shows signs of neglect (e.g., no uploads for years, unfixed RC bugs, failing autopkgtests), we currently have three main tools:
  1. The MIA process, which handles inactive or unreachable maintainers.
  2. Package Salvaging, which allows contributors to take over maintenance if conditions are met.
  3. Non-Maintainer Uploads (NMUs), which are limited to specific, well-defined fixes (which do not include things like migration to Salsa).
These mechanisms are important and valuable, but they don't always allow us to react swiftly or comprehensively enough. Our tools for identifying packages that are effectively unmaintained are relatively weak, and the thresholds for taking action are often high. The Package Salvage team is currently trialing a process we've provisionally called "Intend to NMU" (ITN). The name is admittedly questionable--some have suggested alternatives like "Intent to Orphan"--and discussion about this is ongoing on debian-devel. The mechanism is intended for situations where packages appear inactive but aren't yet formally orphaned, introducing a clear 21-day notice period before NMUs, similar in spirit to the existing ITS process. The discussion has sparked suggestions for expanding NMU rules. While it is crucial not to undermine the autonomy of maintainers who remain actively involved, we also must not allow a strict interpretation of this autonomy to block needed improvements to obviously neglected packages. To be clear: I do not propose to change the rights of maintainers who are clearly active and invested in their packages. That model has served us well. However, we must also be honest that, in some cases, maintainers stop contributing--quietly and without transition plans. In those situations, we need more agile and scalable procedures to uphold Debian's high standards. To that end, I've registered a BoF session for DebConf25 to discuss potential improvements in how we handle dormant packages. These discussions will be prepared during a sprint at DebCamp, where I hope to work with others on concrete ideas. Among the topics I want to revisit is my proposal from last November on debian-devel, titled "Barriers between packages and other people". While the thread prompted substantial discussion, it understandably didn't lead to consensus. I intend to ensure the various viewpoints are fairly summarised--ideally by someone with a more neutral stance than myself--and, if possible, work toward a formal proposal during the DebCamp sprint to present at the DebConf BoF. My hope is that we can agree on mechanisms that allow us to act more effectively in situations where formerly very active volunteers have, for whatever reason, moved on. That way, we can protect both Debian's quality and its collaborative spirit. Building Sustainable Funding for Debian Debian incurs ongoing expenses to support its infrastructure--particularly hardware maintenance and upgrades--as well as to fund in-person meetings like sprints and mini-DebConfs. These investments are essential to our continued success: they enable productive collaboration and ensure the robustness of the operating system we provide to users and derivative distributions around the world. While DebConf benefits from generous sponsorship, and we regularly receive donated hardware, there is still considerable room to grow our financial base--especially to support less visible but equally critical activities. One key goal is to establish a more constant and predictable stream of income, helping Debian plan ahead and respond more flexibly to emerging needs. This presents an excellent opportunity for contributors who may not be involved in packaging or technical development. Many of us in Debian are engineers first--and fundraising is not something we've been trained to do. But just like technical work, building sustainable funding requires expertise and long-term engagement. If you're someone who's passionate about Free Software and has experience with fundraising, donor outreach, sponsorship acquisition, or nonprofit development strategy, we would deeply value your help. Supporting Debian doesn't have to mean writing code. Helping us build a steady and reliable financial foundation is just as important--and could make a lasting impact. Kind regards Andreas. PS: In April I also planted my 5000th tree and while this is off-topic here I'm proud to share this information with my fellow Debian friends.

6 May 2025

Enrico Zini: Python-like abspath for c++

Python's os.path.abspath or Path.absolute are great: you give them a path, which might not exist, and you get a path you can use regardless of the current directory. os.path.abspath will also normalize it, while Path will not by default because with Paths a normal form is less needed. This is great to normalize input, regardless of if it's an existing file you're needing to open, or a new file you're needing to create. In C++17, there is a filesystem library with methods with enticingly similar names, but which are almost, but not quite, totally unlike Python's abspath. Because in my C++ code I need to normalize input, regardless of if it's an existing file I'm needing to open or a new file I'm needing to create, here's an apparently working Python-like abspath for C++ implemented on top of the std::filesystem library:
std::filesystem::path abspath(const std::filesystem::path& path)
 
    // weakly_canonical is defined as "the result of calling canonical() with a
    // path argument composed of the leading elements of p that exist (as
    // determined by status(p) or status(p, ec)), if any, followed by the
    // elements of p that do not exist."
    //
    // This means that if no lead components of the path exist then the
    // resulting path is not made absolute, and we need to work around that.
    if (!path.is_absolute())
        return abspath(std::filesystem::current_path() / path);
    // This is further and needlessly complicated because we need to work
    // around https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=118733
    unsigned retry = 0;
    while (true)
     
        std::error_code code;
        auto result = std::filesystem::weakly_canonical(path, code);
        if (!code)
         
            // fprintf(stderr, "%s: ok in %u tries\n", path.c_str(), retry+1);
            return result;
         
        if (code == std::errc::no_such_file_or_directory)
         
            ++retry;
            if (retry > 50)
                throw std::system_error(code);
         
        else
            throw std::system_error(code);
     
    // Alternative implementation that however may not work on all platforms
    // since, formally, "[std::filesystem::absolute] Implementations are
    // encouraged to not consider p not existing to be an error", but they do
    // not mandate it, and if they did, they might still be affected by the
    // undefined behaviour outlined in https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=118733
    //
    // return std::filesystem::absolute(path).lexically_normal();
 
I added it to my wobble code repository, which is the thin repository of components I use to ease my C++ systems programming.

5 May 2025

Daniel Lange: Make apt shut up about "modernize-sources" in Trixie

Apt in Trixie (Debian 13) has the annoying function to tell you "Notice: Some sources can be modernized. Run 'apt modernize-sources' to do so." ... every single time you run apt update. Not cool for logs and log monitoring. And - of course - if you had the option to do this, you ... would have run the indicated apt modernize-sources command to convert your sources.list to "deb822 .sources format" files already. So an information message once or twice would have done. Well, luckily you can help yourself: apt -o APT::Get::Update::SourceListWarnings=false will keep apt shut up. This could go into an alias or your systems management tool / update script. Alternatively add
# Keep apt shut about preferring the "deb822" sources file format
APT::Get::Update::SourceListWarnings "false";
to /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/10quellsourceformatwarnings . This silences the notices about sources file formats (not only the deb822 one) system-wide. That way you can decide when you can / want to migrate to the new, more verbose, apt sources format yourself.

Sergio Talens-Oliag: Argo CD Usage Examples

As a followup of my post about the use of argocd-autopilot I m going to deploy various applications to the cluster using Argo CD from the same repository we used on the previous post. For our examples we are going to test a solution to the problem we had when we updated a ConfigMap used by the argocd-server (the resource was updated but the application Pod was not because there was no change on the argocd-server deployment); our original fix was to kill the pod manually, but the manual operation is something we want to avoid. The proposed solution to this kind of issues on the helm documentation is to add annotations to the Deployments with values that are a hash of the ConfigMaps or Secrets used by them, this way if a file is updated the annotation is also updated and when the Deployment changes are applied a roll out of the pods is triggered. On this post we will install a couple of controllers and an application to show how we can handle Secrets with argocd and solve the issue with updates on ConfigMaps and Secrets, to do it we will execute the following tasks:
  1. Deploy the Reloader controller to our cluster. It is a tool that watches changes in ConfigMaps and Secrets and does rolling upgrades on the Pods that use them from Deployment, StatefulSet, DaemonSet or DeploymentConfig objects when they are updated (by default we have to add some annotations to the objects to make things work).
  2. Deploy a simple application that can use ConfigMaps and Secrets and test that the Reloader controller does its job when we add or update a ConfigMap.
  3. Install the Sealed Secrets controller to manage secrets inside our cluster, use it to add a secret to our sample application and see that the application is reloaded automatically.

Creating the test project for argocd-autopilotAs we did our installation using argocd-autopilot we will use its structure to manage the applications. The first thing to do is to create a project (we will name it test) as follows:
  argocd-autopilot project create test
INFO cloning git repository: https://forgejo.mixinet.net/blogops/argocd.git
Enumerating objects: 18, done.
Counting objects: 100% (18/18), done.
Compressing objects: 100% (16/16), done.
Total 18 (delta 1), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0
INFO using revision: "", installation path: "/"
INFO pushing new project manifest to repo
INFO project created: 'test'
Now that the test project is available we will use it on our argocd-autopilot invocations when creating applications.

Installing the reloader controllerTo add the reloader application to the test project as a kustomize application and deploy it on the tools namespace with argocd-autopilot we do the following:
  argocd-autopilot app create reloader \
    --app 'github.com/stakater/Reloader/deployments/kubernetes/?ref=v1.4.2' \
    --project test --type kustomize --dest-namespace tools
INFO cloning git repository: https://forgejo.mixinet.net/blogops/argocd.git
Enumerating objects: 19, done.
Counting objects: 100% (19/19), done.
Compressing objects: 100% (18/18), done.
Total 19 (delta 2), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0
INFO using revision: "", installation path: "/"
INFO created 'application namespace' file at '/bootstrap/cluster-resources/in-cluster/tools-ns.yaml'
INFO committing changes to gitops repo...
INFO installed application: reloader
That command creates four files on the argocd repository:
  1. One to create the tools namespace:
    bootstrap/cluster-resources/in-cluster/tools-ns.yaml
    apiVersion: v1
    kind: Namespace
    metadata:
      annotations:
        argocd.argoproj.io/sync-options: Prune=false
      creationTimestamp: null
      name: tools
    spec:  
    status:  
  2. Another to include the reloader base application from the upstream repository:
    apps/reloader/base/kustomization.yaml
    apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
    kind: Kustomization
    resources:
    - github.com/stakater/Reloader/deployments/kubernetes/?ref=v1.4.2
  3. The kustomization.yaml file for the test project (by default it includes the same configuration used on the base definition, but we could make other changes if needed):
    apps/reloader/overlays/test/kustomization.yaml
    apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
    kind: Kustomization
    namespace: tools
    resources:
    - ../../base
  4. The config.json file used to define the application on argocd for the test project (it points to the folder that includes the previous kustomization.yaml file):
    apps/reloader/overlays/test/config.json
     
      "appName": "reloader",
      "userGivenName": "reloader",
      "destNamespace": "tools",
      "destServer": "https://kubernetes.default.svc",
      "srcPath": "apps/reloader/overlays/test",
      "srcRepoURL": "https://forgejo.mixinet.net/blogops/argocd.git",
      "srcTargetRevision": "",
      "labels": null,
      "annotations": null
     
We can check that the application is working using the argocd command line application:
  argocd app get argocd/test-reloader -o tree
Name:               argocd/test-reloader
Project:            test
Server:             https://kubernetes.default.svc
Namespace:          tools
URL:                https://argocd.lo.mixinet.net:8443/applications/test-reloader
Source:
- Repo:             https://forgejo.mixinet.net/blogops/argocd.git
  Target:
  Path:             apps/reloader/overlays/test
SyncWindow:         Sync Allowed
Sync Policy:        Automated (Prune)
Sync Status:        Synced to  (2893b56)
Health Status:      Healthy
KIND/NAME                                          STATUS  HEALTH   MESSAGE
ClusterRole/reloader-reloader-role                 Synced
ClusterRoleBinding/reloader-reloader-role-binding  Synced
ServiceAccount/reloader-reloader                   Synced           serviceaccount/reloader-reloader created
Deployment/reloader-reloader                       Synced  Healthy  deployment.apps/reloader-reloader created
 ReplicaSet/reloader-reloader-5b6dcc7b6f                  Healthy
   Pod/reloader-reloader-5b6dcc7b6f-vwjcx                 Healthy

Adding flags to the reloader serverThe runtime configuration flags for the reloader server are described on the project README.md file, in our case we want to adjust three values:
  • We want to enable the option to reload a workload when a ConfigMap or Secret is created,
  • We want to enable the option to reload a workload when a ConfigMap or Secret is deleted,
  • We want to use the annotations strategy for reloads, as it is the recommended mode of operation when using argocd.
To pass them we edit the apps/reloader/overlays/test/kustomization.yaml file to patch the pod container template, the text added is the following:
patches:
# Add flags to reload workloads when ConfigMaps or Secrets are created or deleted
- target:
    kind: Deployment
    name: reloader-reloader
  patch:  -
    - op: add
      path: /spec/template/spec/containers/0/args
      value:
        - '--reload-on-create=true'
        - '--reload-on-delete=true'
        - '--reload-strategy=annotations'
After committing and pushing the updated file the system launches the application with the new options.

The dummyhttp applicationTo do a quick test we are going to deploy the dummyhttp web server using an image generated using the following Dockerfile:
# Image to run the dummyhttp application <https://github.com/svenstaro/dummyhttp>
# This arg could be passed by the container build command (used with mirrors)
ARG OCI_REGISTRY_PREFIX
# Latest tested version of alpine
FROM $ OCI_REGISTRY_PREFIX alpine:3.21.3
# Tool versions
ARG DUMMYHTTP_VERS=1.1.1
# Download binary
RUN ARCH="$(apk --print-arch)" && \
  VERS="$DUMMYHTTP_VERS" && \
  URL="https://github.com/svenstaro/dummyhttp/releases/download/v$VERS/dummyhttp-$VERS-$ARCH-unknown-linux-musl" && \
  wget "$URL" -O "/tmp/dummyhttp" && \
  install /tmp/dummyhttp /usr/local/bin && \
  rm -f /tmp/dummyhttp
# Set the entrypoint to /usr/local/bin/dummyhttp
ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/local/bin/dummyhttp" ]
The kustomize base application is available on a monorepo that contains the following files:
  1. A Deployment definition that uses the previous image but uses /bin/sh -c as its entrypoint (command in the k8s Pod terminology) and passes as its argument a string that runs the eval command to be able to expand environment variables passed to the pod (the definition includes two optional variables, one taken from a ConfigMap and another one from a Secret):
    apiVersion: apps/v1
    kind: Deployment
    metadata:
      name: dummyhttp
      labels:
        app: dummyhttp
    spec:
      selector:
        matchLabels:
          app: dummyhttp
      template:
        metadata:
          labels:
            app: dummyhttp
        spec:
          containers:
          - name: dummyhttp
            image: forgejo.mixinet.net/oci/dummyhttp:1.0.0
            command: [ "/bin/sh", "-c" ]
            args:
            - 'eval dummyhttp -b \" \\\"c\\\": \\\"$CM_VAR\\\", \\\"s\\\": \\\"$SECRET_VAR\\\" \"'
            ports:
            - containerPort: 8080
            env:
            - name: CM_VAR
              valueFrom:
                configMapKeyRef:
                  name: dummyhttp-configmap
                  key: CM_VAR
                  optional: true
            - name: SECRET_VAR
              valueFrom:
                secretKeyRef:
                  name: dummyhttp-secret
                  key: SECRET_VAR
                  optional: true
  2. A Service that publishes the previous Deployment (the only relevant thing to mention is that the web server uses the port 8080 by default):
    apiVersion: v1
    kind: Service
    metadata:
      name: dummyhttp
    spec:
      selector:
        app: dummyhttp
      ports:
      - name: http
        port: 80
        targetPort: 8080
  3. An Ingress definition to allow access to the application from the outside:
    apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
    kind: Ingress
    metadata:
      name: dummyhttp
      annotations:
        traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.tls: "true"
    spec:
      rules:
        - host: dummyhttp.localhost.mixinet.net
          http:
            paths:
              - path: /
                pathType: Prefix
                backend:
                  service:
                    name: dummyhttp
                    port:
                      number: 80
  4. And the kustomization.yaml file that includes the previous files:
    apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
    kind: Kustomization
    resources:
    - deployment.yaml
    - service.yaml
    - ingress.yaml

Deploying the dummyhttp application from argocdWe could create the dummyhttp application using the argocd-autopilot command as we ve done on the reloader case, but we are going to do it manually to show how simple it is. First we ve created the apps/dummyhttp/base/kustomization.yaml file to include the application from the previous repository:
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
  - https://forgejo.mixinet.net/blogops/argocd-applications.git//dummyhttp/?ref=dummyhttp-v1.0.0
As a second step we create the apps/dummyhttp/overlays/test/kustomization.yaml file to include the previous file:
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- ../../base
And finally we add the apps/dummyhttp/overlays/test/config.json file to configure the application as the ApplicationSet defined by argocd-autopilot expects:
 
  "appName": "dummyhttp",
  "userGivenName": "dummyhttp",
  "destNamespace": "default",
  "destServer": "https://kubernetes.default.svc",
  "srcPath": "apps/dummyhttp/overlays/test",
  "srcRepoURL": "https://forgejo.mixinet.net/blogops/argocd.git",
  "srcTargetRevision": "",
  "labels": null,
  "annotations": null
 
Once we have the three files we commit and push the changes and argocd deploys the application; we can check that things are working using curl:
  curl -s https://dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net:8443/   jq -M .
 
  "c": "",
  "s": ""
 

Patching the applicationNow we will add patches to the apps/dummyhttp/overlays/test/kustomization.yaml file:
  • One to add annotations for reloader (one to enable it and another one to set the roll out strategy to restart to avoid touching the deployments, as that can generate issues with argocd).
  • Another to change the ingress hostname (not really needed, but something quite reasonable for a specific project).
The file diff is as follows:
--- a/apps/dummyhttp/overlays/test/kustomization.yaml
+++ b/apps/dummyhttp/overlays/test/kustomization.yaml
@@ -2,3 +2,22 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
 - ../../base
+patches:
+# Add reloader annotations
+- target:
+    kind: Deployment
+    name: dummyhttp
+  patch:  -
+    - op: add
+      path: /metadata/annotations
+      value:
+        reloader.stakater.com/auto: "true"
+        reloader.stakater.com/rollout-strategy: "restart"
+# Change the ingress host name
+- target:
+    kind: Ingress
+    name: dummyhttp
+  patch:  -
+    - op: replace
+      path: /spec/rules/0/host
+      value: test-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net
After committing and pushing the changes we can use the argocd cli to check the status of the application:
  argocd app get argocd/test-dummyhttp -o tree
Name:               argocd/test-dummyhttp
Project:            test
Server:             https://kubernetes.default.svc
Namespace:          default
URL:                https://argocd.lo.mixinet.net:8443/applications/test-dummyhttp
Source:
- Repo:             https://forgejo.mixinet.net/blogops/argocd.git
  Target:
  Path:             apps/dummyhttp/overlays/test
SyncWindow:         Sync Allowed
Sync Policy:        Automated (Prune)
Sync Status:        Synced to  (fbc6031)
Health Status:      Healthy
KIND/NAME                           STATUS  HEALTH   MESSAGE
Deployment/dummyhttp                Synced  Healthy  deployment.apps/dummyhttp configured
 ReplicaSet/dummyhttp-55569589bc           Healthy
   Pod/dummyhttp-55569589bc-qhnfk          Healthy
Ingress/dummyhttp                   Synced  Healthy  ingress.networking.k8s.io/dummyhttp configured
Service/dummyhttp                   Synced  Healthy  service/dummyhttp unchanged
 Endpoints/dummyhttp
 EndpointSlice/dummyhttp-x57bl
As we can see, the Deployment and Ingress where updated, but the Service is unchanged. To validate that the ingress is using the new hostname we can use curl:
  curl -s https://dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net:8443/
404 page not found
  curl -s https://test-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net:8443/
 "c": "", "s": "" 

Adding a ConfigMapNow that the system is adjusted to reload the application when the ConfigMap or Secret is created, deleted or updated we are ready to add one file and see how the system reacts. We modify the apps/dummyhttp/overlays/test/kustomization.yaml file to create the ConfigMap using the configMapGenerator as follows:
--- a/apps/dummyhttp/overlays/test/kustomization.yaml
+++ b/apps/dummyhttp/overlays/test/kustomization.yaml
@@ -2,6 +2,14 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
 - ../../base
+# Add the config map
+configMapGenerator:
+- name: dummyhttp-configmap
+  literals:
+  - CM_VAR="Default Test Value"
+  behavior: create
+  options:
+    disableNameSuffixHash: true
 patches:
 # Add reloader annotations
 - target:
After committing and pushing the changes we can see that the ConfigMap is available, the pod has been deleted and started again and the curl output includes the new value:
  kubectl get configmaps,pods
NAME                             READY   STATUS        RESTARTS   AGE
configmap/dummyhttp-configmap   1      11s
configmap/kube-root-ca.crt      1      4d7h
NAME                            DATA   AGE
pod/dummyhttp-779c96c44b-pjq4d   1/1     Running       0          11s
pod/dummyhttp-fc964557f-jvpkx    1/1     Terminating   0          2m42s
  curl -s https://test-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net:8443   jq -M .
 
  "c": "Default Test Value",
  "s": ""
 

Using helm with argocd-autopilotRight now there is no direct support in argocd-autopilot to manage applications using helm (see the issue #38 on the project), but we want to use a chart in our next example. There are multiple ways to add the support, but the simplest one that allows us to keep using argocd-autopilot is to use kustomize applications that call helm as described here. The only thing needed before being able to use the approach is to add the kustomize.buildOptions flag to the argocd-cm on the bootstrap/argo-cd/kustomization.yaml file, its contents now are follows:
bootstrap/argo-cd/kustomization.yaml
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
configMapGenerator:
- behavior: merge
  literals:
  # Enable helm usage from kustomize (see https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/issues/2789#issuecomment-960271294)
  - kustomize.buildOptions="--enable-helm"
  -  
    repository.credentials=- passwordSecret:
        key: git_token
        name: autopilot-secret
      url: https://forgejo.mixinet.net/
      usernameSecret:
        key: git_username
        name: autopilot-secret
  name: argocd-cm
  # Disable TLS for the Argo Server (see https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/ingress/#traefik-v30)
- behavior: merge
  literals:
  - "server.insecure=true"
  name: argocd-cmd-params-cm
kind: Kustomization
namespace: argocd
resources:
- github.com/argoproj-labs/argocd-autopilot/manifests/base?ref=v0.4.19
- ingress_route.yaml
On the following section we will explain how the application is defined to make things work.

Installing the sealed-secrets controllerTo manage secrets in our cluster we are going to use the sealed-secrets controller and to install it we are going to use its chart. As we mentioned on the previous section, the idea is to create a kustomize application and use that to deploy the chart, but we are going to create the files manually, as we are not going import the base kustomization files from a remote repository. As there is no clear way to override helm Chart values using overlays we are going to use a generator to create the helm configuration from an external resource and include it from our overlays (the idea has been taken from this repository, which was referenced from a comment on the kustomize issue #38 mentioned earlier).

The sealed-secrets applicationWe have created the following files and folders manually:
apps/sealed-secrets/
  helm
    chart.yaml
    kustomization.yaml
  overlays
      test
          config.json
          kustomization.yaml
          values.yaml
The helm folder contains the generator template that will be included from our overlays. The kustomization.yaml includes the chart.yaml as a resource:
apps/sealed-secrets/helm/kustomization.yaml
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- chart.yaml
And the chart.yaml file defines the HelmChartInflationGenerator:
apps/sealed-secrets/helm/chart.yaml
apiVersion: builtin
kind: HelmChartInflationGenerator
metadata:
  name: sealed-secrets
releaseName: sealed-secrets
name: sealed-secrets
namespace: kube-system
repo: https://bitnami-labs.github.io/sealed-secrets
version: 2.17.2
includeCRDs: true
# Add common values to all argo-cd projects inline
valuesInline:
  fullnameOverride: sealed-secrets-controller
# Load a values.yaml file from the same directory that uses this generator
valuesFile: values.yaml
For this chart the template adjusts the namespace to kube-system and adds the fullnameOverride on the valuesInline key because we want to use those settings on all the projects (they are the values expected by the kubeseal command line application, so we adjust them to avoid the need to add additional parameters to it). We adjust global values as inline to be able to use a the valuesFile from our overlays; as we are using a generator the path is relative to the folder that contains the kustomization.yaml file that calls it, in our case we will need to have a values.yaml file on each overlay folder (if we don t want to overwrite any values for a project we can create an empty file, but it has to exist). Finally, our overlay folder contains three files, a kustomization.yaml file that includes the generator from the helm folder, the values.yaml file needed by the chart and the config.json file used by argocd-autopilot to install the application. The kustomization.yaml file contents are:
apps/sealed-secrets/overlays/test/kustomization.yaml
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
# Uncomment if you want to add additional resources using kustomize
#resources:
#- ../../base
generators:
- ../../helm
The values.yaml file enables the ingress for the application and adjusts its hostname:
apps/sealed-secrets/overlays/test/values.yaml
ingress:
  enabled: true
  hostname: test-sealed-secrets.lo.mixinet.net
And the config.json file is similar to the ones used with the other applications we have installed:
apps/sealed-secrets/overlays/test/config.json
 
  "appName": "sealed-secrets",
  "userGivenName": "sealed-secrets",
  "destNamespace": "kube-system",
  "destServer": "https://kubernetes.default.svc",
  "srcPath": "apps/sealed-secrets/overlays/test",
  "srcRepoURL": "https://forgejo.mixinet.net/blogops/argocd.git",
  "srcTargetRevision": "",
  "labels": null,
  "annotations": null
 
Once we commit and push the files the sealed-secrets application is installed in our cluster, we can check it using curl to get the public certificate used by it:
  curl -s https://test-sealed-secrets.lo.mixinet.net:8443/v1/cert.pem
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
[...]
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

The dummyhttp-secretTo create sealed secrets we need to install the kubeseal tool:
  arkade get kubeseal
Now we create a local version of the dummyhttp-secret that contains some value on the SECRET_VAR key (the easiest way for doing it is to use kubectl):
  echo -n "Boo"   kubectl create secret generic dummyhttp-secret \
    --dry-run=client --from-file=SECRET_VAR=/dev/stdin -o yaml \
    >/tmp/dummyhttp-secret.yaml
The secret definition in yaml format is:
apiVersion: v1
data:
  SECRET_VAR: Qm9v
kind: Secret
metadata:
  creationTimestamp: null
  name: dummyhttp-secret
To create a sealed version using the kubeseal tool we can do the following:
  kubeseal -f /tmp/dummyhttp-secret.yaml -w /tmp/dummyhttp-sealed-secret.yaml
That invocation needs to have access to the cluster to do its job and in our case it works because we modified the chart to use the kube-system namespace and set the controller name to sealed-secrets-controller as the tool expects. If we need to create the secrets without credentials we can connect to the ingress address we added to retrieve the public key:
  kubeseal -f /tmp/dummyhttp-secret.yaml -w /tmp/dummyhttp-sealed-secret.yaml \
    --cert https://test-sealed-secrets.lo.mixinet.net:8443/v1/cert.pem
Or, if we don t have access to the ingress address, we can save the certificate on a file and use it instead of the URL. The sealed version of the secret looks like this:
apiVersion: bitnami.com/v1alpha1
kind: SealedSecret
metadata:
  creationTimestamp: null
  name: dummyhttp-secret
  namespace: default
spec:
  encryptedData:
    SECRET_VAR: [...]
  template:
    metadata:
      creationTimestamp: null
      name: dummyhttp-secret
      namespace: default
This file can be deployed to the cluster to create the secret (in our case we will add it to the argocd application), but before doing that we are going to check the output of our dummyhttp service and get the list of Secrets and SealedSecrets in the default namespace:
  curl -s https://test-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net:8443   jq -M .
 
  "c": "Default Test Value",
  "s": ""
 
  kubectl get sealedsecrets,secrets
No resources found in default namespace.
Now we add the SealedSecret to the dummyapp copying the file and adding it to the kustomization.yaml file:
--- a/apps/dummyhttp/overlays/test/kustomization.yaml
+++ b/apps/dummyhttp/overlays/test/kustomization.yaml
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: Kustomization
 resources:
 - ../../base
+- dummyhttp-sealed-secret.yaml
 # Create the config map value
 configMapGenerator:
 - name: dummyhttp-configmap
Once we commit and push the files Argo CD creates the SealedSecret and the controller generates the Secret:
  kubectl apply -f /tmp/dummyhttp-sealed-secret.yaml
sealedsecret.bitnami.com/dummyhttp-secret created
  kubectl get sealedsecrets,secrets
NAME                                        STATUS   SYNCED   AGE
sealedsecret.bitnami.com/dummyhttp-secret            True     3s
NAME                      TYPE     DATA   AGE
secret/dummyhttp-secret   Opaque   1      3s
If we check the command output we can see the new value of the secret:
  curl -s https://test-dummyhttp.lo.mixinet.net:8443   jq -M .
 
  "c": "Default Test Value",
  "s": "Boo"
 

Using sealed-secrets in production clustersIf you plan to use sealed-secrets look into its documentation to understand how it manages the private keys, how to backup things and keep in mind that, as the documentation explains, you can rotate your sealed version of the secrets, but that doesn t change the actual secrets. If you want to rotate your secrets you have to update them and commit the sealed version of the updates (as the controller also rotates the encryption keys your new sealed version will also be using a newer key, so you will be doing both things at the same time).

Final remarksOn this post we have seen how to deploy applications using the argocd-autopilot model, including the use of helm charts inside kustomize applications and how to install and use the sealed-secrets controller. It has been interesting and I ve learnt a lot about argocd in the process, but I believe that if I ever want to use it in production I will also review the native helm support in argocd using a separate repository to manage the applications, at least to be able to compare it to the model explained here.

4 May 2025

Colin Watson: Free software activity in April 2025

About 90% of my Debian contributions this month were sponsored by Freexian. You can also support my work directly via Liberapay. Request for OpenSSH debugging help Following the OpenSSH work described below, I have an open report about the sshd server sometimes crashing when clients try to connect to it. I can t reproduce this myself, and arm s-length debugging is very difficult, but three different users have reported it. For the time being I can t pass it upstream, as it s entirely possible it s due to a Debian patch. Is there anyone reading this who can reproduce this bug and is capable of doing some independent debugging work, most likely involving bisecting changes to OpenSSH? I d suggest first seeing whether a build of the unmodified upstream 10.0p2 release exhibits the same bug. If it does, then bisect between 9.9p2 and 10.0p2; if not, then bisect the list of Debian patches. This would be extremely helpful, since at the moment it s a bit like trying to look for a needle in a haystack from the next field over by sending instructions to somebody with a magnifying glass. OpenSSH I upgraded the Debian packaging to OpenSSH 10.0p1 (now designated 10.0p2 by upstream due to a mistake in the release process, but they re the same thing), fixing CVE-2025-32728. This also involved a diffoscope bug report due to the version number change. I enabled the new --with-linux-memlock-onfault configure option to protect sshd against being swapped out, but this turned out to cause test failures on riscv64, so I disabled it again there. Debugging this took some time since I needed to do it under emulation, and in the process of setting up a testbed I added riscv64 support to vmdb2. In coordination with the wtmpdb maintainer, I enabled the new Y2038-safe native wtmpdb support in OpenSSH, so wtmpdb last now reports the correct tty. I fixed a couple of packaging bugs: I reviewed and merged several packaging contributions from others: dput-ng Since we added dput-ng integration to Debusine recently, I wanted to make sure that it was in good condition in trixie, so I fixed dput-ng: will FTBFS during trixie support period. Previously a similar bug had been fixed by just using different Ubuntu release names in tests; this time I made the tests independent of the current supported release data returned by distro_info, so this shouldn t come up again. We also ran into dput-ng: override doesn t override profile parameters, which needed somewhat more extensive changes since it turned out that that option had never worked. I fixed this after some discussion with Paul Tagliamonte to make sure I understood the background properly. man-db I released man-db 2.13.1. This just included various small fixes and a number of translation updates, but I wanted to get it into trixie in order to include a contribution to increase the MAX_NAME constant, since that was now causing problems for some pathological cases of manual pages in the wild that documented a very large number of terms. debmirror I fixed one security bug: debmirror prints credentials with progress. Python team I upgraded these packages to new upstream versions: In bookworm-backports, I updated these packages: I dropped a stale build-dependency from python-aiohttp-security that kept it out of testing (though unfortunately too late for the trixie freeze). I fixed or helped to fix various other build/test failures: I packaged python-typing-inspection, needed for a new upstream version of pydantic. I documented the architecture field in debian/tests/autopkgtest-pkg-pybuild.conf files. I fixed other odds and ends of bugs: Science team I fixed various build/test failures:

3 May 2025

Russell Coker: Silly Job Titles

Many years ago I was on a programming project porting code from OS/2 1.x to NT. When I was there they suddenly decided to make a database of all people and get job titles for everyone apparently the position description used when advertising the jobs wasn t sufficient. When I got given a clipboard with a form to write my details I looked at what everyone else had done, It was a heap of ridiculous propaganda with everyone trying to put in synonyms for senior or skillful and listing things that they were allegedly in charge of. There were even some people trying to create impressive titles for their managers to try and suck up. I chose the job title coder as the shortest and most accurate description of what I was doing. I had to confirm that yes I really did want to put a one word title and not a paragraph of frippery. Part of my intent was to mock the ridiculously long job titles used by others but I don t think anyone realised that. I was reminded of that company when watching a video of a Trump cabinet meeting where everyone had to tell Trump how great he is. I think that a programmer who wants to be known as a Principal Solutions Architect of Advanced Algorithmic Systems and Digital Innovation Strategy (suggested by ChatGPT because I can t write such ridiculous things) is showing a Trump level of lack of self esteem. When job titles are discussed there s always someone who will say what if my title isn t impressive enough and I don t get a pay rise . If a company bases salaries on how impressive job titles are and not on whether people actually do good work then it s a very dysfunctional workplace. But dysfunctional companies aren t uncommon so it s something you might reasonably have to do. In the company in question I could have described my work as lead debugger as I ended up doing most of the debugging on that project (as on many programming projects). The title lead debugger accurately described a significant part of my work and it s work that is essential to project completion. What do you think are the worst job titles?

Russ Allbery: Review: Paper Soldiers

Review: Paper Soldiers, by Saleha Mohsin
Publisher: Portfolio
Copyright: 2024
ISBN: 0-593-53912-5
Format: Kindle
Pages: 250
The subtitle of Paper Soldiers is "How the Weaponization of the Dollar Changed the World Order," which may give you the impression that this book is about US use of the dollar system for political purposes such as sanctions. Do not be fooled like I was; this subtitle is, at best, deceptive. Coverage of the weaponization of the dollar is superficial and limited to a few chapters. This book is, instead, a history of the strong dollar policy told via a collection of hagiographies of US Treasury Secretaries and written with all of the skeptical cynicism of a poleaxed fawn. There is going to be some grumbling about the state of journalism in this review. Per the author's note, Saleha Mohsin is the Bloomberg News beat reporter for the US Department of the Treasury. That is, sadly, exactly what this book reads like: routine beat reporting. Mohsin asked current and former Treasury officials what they were thinking at various points in history and then wrote down their answers without, so far as I can tell, considering any contradictory evidence or wondering whether they were telling the truth. Paper Soldiers does contain extensive notes (those plus the index fill about forty pages), so I guess you could do the cross-checking yourself, although apparently most of the interviews for this book were "on background" and are therefore unattributed. (Is this weird? I feel like this is weird.) Mohsin adds a bit of utterly conventional and uncritical economic framing and casts the whole project in the sort of slightly breathless and dramatized prose style that infests routine news stories in the US. I find this style of book unbelievably frustrating because it represents such a wasted opportunity. To me, the point of book-length journalism is precisely to not write in this style. When you're trying to crank out two or three articles a week covering current events, I understand why there isn't always space or time to go deep into background, skepticism, and contrary opinions. But when you expand that material into a book, surely the whole point is to take the time to do some real reporting. Dig into what people told you, see if they're lying, talk to the people who disagree with them, question the conventional assumptions, and show your work on the page so that the reader is smarter after finishing your book than they were before they started. International political economics is not a sequence of objective facts. It's a set of decisions made in pursuit of economic and political theories that are disputed and arguable, and I think you owe the reader some sense of the argument and, ideally, some defensible position on the merits that is more than a transcription of your interviews. This is... not that.
It's a power loop that the United States still enjoys today: trust in America's dollar (and its democratic government) allows for cheap debt financing, which buys health care built on the most advanced research and development and inventions like airplanes and the iPhone. All of this is propelled by free market innovation and the superpowered strength to keep the nation safe from foreign threats. That investment boosts the nation's economic, military, and technological prowess, making its economy (and the dollar) even more attractive.
Let me be precise about my criticism. I am not saying that every contention in the above excerpt is wrong. Some of them are probably correct; more of them are at least arguable. This book is strictly about the era after Bretton Woods, so using airplanes as an example invention is a bizarre choice, but sure, whatever, I get the point. My criticism is that paragraphs like this, as written in this book, are not introductions to deeper discussions that question or defend that model of economic and political power. They are simple assertions that stand entirely unsupported. Mohsin routinely writes paragraphs like the above as if they are self-evident, and then immediately moves on to the next anecdote about Treasury dollar policy. Take, for example, the role of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency, which roughly means that most international transactions are conducted in dollars and numerous countries and organizations around the world hold large deposits in dollars instead of in their native currency. The conventional wisdom holds that this is a great boon to the US economy, but there are also substantive critiques and questions about that conventional wisdom. You would never know that from this book; Mohsin asserts the conventional wisdom about reserve currencies without so much as a hint that anyone might disagree. For example, one common argument, repeated several times by Mohsin, is that the US can only get away with the amount of deficit spending and cheap borrowing that it does because the dollar is the world's reserve currency. Consider two other countries whose currencies are clearly not the international reserve currency: Japan and the United Kingdom. The current US debt to GDP ratio is about 125% and the current interest rate on US 10-year bonds is about 4.2%. The current Japanese debt to GDP ratio is about 260% and the current interest rate on Japanese 10-year bonds is about 1.2%. The current UK debt to GDP ratio is 160% and the current interest rate on UK 10-year bonds is 4.5%. Are you seeing the dramatic effects of the role of the dollar as reserve currency? Me either. Again, I am not saying that this is a decisive counter-argument. I am not an economist; I'm just some random guy on the Internet who finds macroeconomics interesting and reads a few newsletters. I know the Japanese bond market is unusual in ways I'm not accounting for. There may well be compelling arguments for why reserve currency status matters immensely for US borrowing capacity. My point is not that Mohsin is wrong; my point is that you have to convince me and she doesn't even try. Nowhere in this book is a serious effort to view conventional wisdom with skepticism or confront it with opposing arguments. Instead, this book is full of blithe assertions that happen to support the narrative the author was fed by a bunch of former Treasury officials and does not appear to question in any way. I want books like this to increase my understanding of the world. To do that, they need to show me multiple sides of debates and teach me how to evaluate evidence, not simply reinforce a superficial conventional wisdom. It doesn't help that whatever fact-checking process this book went through left some glaring errors. For example, on the Plaza Accord:
With their central banks working in concert, enough dollars were purchased on the open market to weaken the currency, making American goods more affordable for foreign buyers.
I don't know what happened after the Plaza Accord (I read books like this to find out!), but clearly it wasn't that. This is utter nonsense. Buying dollars on the open market would increase the value of the dollar, not weaken it; this is basic supply and demand that you learn in the first week of a college economics class. This is the type of error that makes me question all the other claims in the book that I can't easily check. Mohsin does offer a more credible explanation of the importance of a reserve currency late in the book, although it's not clear to me that she realizes it: The widespread use of the US dollar gives US government sanctions vast international reach, allowing the US to punish and coerce its enemies through the threat of denying them access to the international financial system. Now we're getting somewhere! This is a more believable argument than a small and possibly imaginary effect on government borrowing costs. It is clear why a bellicose US government, particularly one led by advocates of a unitary executive theory that elevates the US president to a status of near-emperor, want to turn the dollar into a weapon of international control. It's much less obvious how comfortable the rest of the world should be with that concentration of power. This would be a fascinating topic for a journalistic non-fiction book. Some reporter should dive deep into the mechanics of sanctions and ask serious questions about the moral, practical, and diplomatic consequences of this aggressive wielding of US power. One could give it a title like Paper Soldiers that reflected the use of banks and paper currency as foot soldiers enforcing imperious dictates on the rest of the world. Alas, apart from a brief section in which the US scared other countries away from questioning the dollar, Mohsin does not tug at this thread. Maybe someone should write that book someday. As you will have gathered by now, I think this is a bad book and I do not recommend that you read it. Its worst flaw is one that it shares with far too much mainstream US print and TV journalism: the utter credulity of the author. I have the old-fashioned belief that a journalist should be more than a transcriptionist for powerful people. They should be skeptical, they should assume public figures may be lying, they should look for ulterior motives, and they should try to bring the reader closer to some objective truths about the world, wherever they may lie. I have no solution for this degradation of journalism. I'm not even sure that it's a change. There were always reporters eager to transcribe the voice of power into the newspaper, and if we remember the history of journalism differently, that may be because we have elevated the rare exceptions and forgotten the average. But after watching too many journalists I once respected start parroting every piece of nonsense someone tells them, from NFTs to UFOs to the existential threat of AI, I've concluded that the least I can do as a reader is to stop rewarding reporters who cannot approach powerful subjects with skepticism, suspicion, and critical research. I failed in this case, but perhaps I can serve as a warning to others. Rating: 3 out of 10

2 May 2025

Daniel Lange: The Stallman wars

So, 2021 isn't bad enough yet, but don't despair, people are working to fix that:

Welcome to the Stallman wars Team Cancel: https://rms-open-letter.github.io/ (repo) Team Support: https://rms-support-letter.github.io/ (repo) Current Final stats are:

Team Cancel:  3019 signers from 1415 individual commit authors
Team Support: 6853 signers from 5418 individual commit authors
Git shortlog (Top 10):
rms_cancel.git (Last update: 2021-08-16 00:11:15 (UTC))
  1230  Neil McGovern
   251  Joan Touzet
    99  Elana Hashman
    73  Molly de Blanc
    36  Shauna
    19  Juke
    18  Stefano Zacchiroli
    17  Alexey Mirages
    16  Devin Halladay
    14  Nader Jafari
rms_support.git (Last update: 2021-09-29 07:14:39 (UTC))
  1821  shenlebantongying
  1585  nukeop
  1560  Ivanq
  1057  Victor
   880  Job Bautista
   123  nekonee
   101  Victor Gridnevsky
    41  Patrick Spek
    25  Borys Kabakov
    17  KIM Taeyeob
(data as of 2021-10-01) Technical info:
Signers are counted from their "Signed / Individuals" sections. Commits are counted with git shortlog -s.
Team Cancel also has organizational signatures with Mozilla, Suse and X.Org being among the notable signatories. The 16 original signers of the Cancel petition are added in their count. Neil McGovern, Juke and shenlebantongying need .mailmap support as they have committed with different names. Further reading: 12.04.2021 Statements from the accused 18.04.2021 Debian General Resolution The Debian General Resolution (GR) vote of the developers has concluded to not issue a public statement at all, see https://www.debian.org/vote/2021/vote_002#outcome for the results.
It is better to keep quiet and seem ignorant than to speak up and remove all doubt.
See Quote Investigator for the many people that rephrased these words over the centuries. They still need to be recalled more often as too many people in the FLOSS community have forgotten about that wisdom... 01.10.2021 Final stats It seems enough dust has settled on this unfortunate episode of mob activity now. Hence I stopped the cronjob that updated the stats above regularly. Team Support has kept adding signature all the time while Team Cancel gave up very soon after the FSF decided to stand with Mr. Stallman. So this battle was decided within two months. The stamina of the accused and determined support from some dissenting web devs trumped the orchestrated outrage of well known community figures and their publicity power this time. But history teaches us that does not mean the war is over. There will a the next opportunity to call for arms. And people will call. Unfortunately. 01.11.2024 Team Cancel is opening a new round; Team Support responds with exposing the author of "The Stallman report" I hate to be right. Three years later than the above: An anonymous member of team Cancel has published https://stallman-report.org/ [local pdf mirror, 504kB] to "justify our unqualified condemnation of Richard Stallman". It contains a detailed collection of quotes that are used to allege supporting (sexual) misconduct. The demand is again that Mr. Stallman "step[s] down from all positions at the FSF and the GNU project". Addressing him: "the scope and extent of your misconduct disqualifies you from formal positions of power within our community indefinitely". Team Support has not issues a rebuttal (yet?) but has instead identified the anonymous author as Drew "sircmpwn" DeVault, a gifted software developer, but also a vocal and controversial figure in the Open Source / Free Software space. Ironically quite similar to Richard "rms" Stallman. Their piece is published at https://dmpwn.info/ [local pdf mirror, 929kB]. They also allege a proximity of Mr. DeVault to questionable "Lolita" anime preferences and societal positions to disqualify him.

Ben Hutchings: FOSS activity in April 2025

I also co-organised a Debian BSP (Bug-Squashing Party) last weekend, for which I will post a separate report later.

Daniel Lange: Cleaning a broken GnuPG (gpg) key

I've long said that the main tools in the Open Source security space, OpenSSL and GnuPG (gpg), are broken and only a complete re-write will solve this. And that is still pending as nobody came forward with the funding. It's not a sexy topic, so it has to get really bad before it'll get better. Gpg has a UI that is close to useless. That won't substantially change with more bolted-on improvements. Now Robert J. Hansen and Daniel Kahn Gillmor had somebody add ~50k signatures (read 1, 2, 3, 4 for the g l ory details) to their keys and - oops - they say that breaks gpg. But does it? I downloaded Robert J. Hansen's key off the SKS-Keyserver network. It's a nice 45MB file when de-ascii-armored (gpg --dearmor broken_key.asc ; mv broken_key.asc.gpg broken_key.gpg). Now a friendly:
$ /usr/bin/time -v gpg --no-default-keyring --keyring ./broken_key.gpg --batch --quiet --edit-key 0x1DCBDC01B44427C7 clean save quit

pub rsa3072/0x1DCBDC01B44427C7
erzeugt: 2015-07-16 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: SC
Vertrauen: unbekannt G ltigkeit: unbekannt
sub ed25519/0xA83CAE94D3DC3873
erzeugt: 2017-04-05 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: S
sub cv25519/0xAA24CC81B8AED08B
erzeugt: 2017-04-05 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: E
sub rsa3072/0xDC0F82625FA6AADE
erzeugt: 2015-07-16 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: E
[ unbekannt ] (1). Robert J. Hansen <rjh@sixdemonbag.org>
[ unbekannt ] (2) Robert J. Hansen <rob@enigmail.net>
[ unbekannt ] (3) Robert J. Hansen <rob@hansen.engineering>

User-ID "Robert J. Hansen <rjh@sixdemonbag.org>": 49705 Signaturen entfernt
User-ID "Robert J. Hansen <rob@enigmail.net>": 49704 Signaturen entfernt
User-ID "Robert J. Hansen <rob@hansen.engineering>": 49701 Signaturen entfernt

pub rsa3072/0x1DCBDC01B44427C7
erzeugt: 2015-07-16 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: SC
Vertrauen: unbekannt G ltigkeit: unbekannt
sub ed25519/0xA83CAE94D3DC3873
erzeugt: 2017-04-05 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: S
sub cv25519/0xAA24CC81B8AED08B
erzeugt: 2017-04-05 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: E
sub rsa3072/0xDC0F82625FA6AADE
erzeugt: 2015-07-16 verf llt: niemals Nutzung: E
[ unbekannt ] (1). Robert J. Hansen <rjh@sixdemonbag.org>
[ unbekannt ] (2) Robert J. Hansen <rob@enigmail.net>
[ unbekannt ] (3) Robert J. Hansen <rob@hansen.engineering>

Command being timed: "gpg --no-default-keyring --keyring ./broken_key.gpg --batch --quiet --edit-key 0x1DCBDC01B44427C7 clean save quit"
User time (seconds): 3911.14
System time (seconds): 2442.87
Percent of CPU this job got: 99%
Elapsed (wall clock) time (h:mm:ss or m:ss): 1:45:56
Average shared text size (kbytes): 0
Average unshared data size (kbytes): 0
Average stack size (kbytes): 0
Average total size (kbytes): 0
Maximum resident set size (kbytes): 107660
Average resident set size (kbytes): 0
Major (requiring I/O) page faults: 1
Minor (reclaiming a frame) page faults: 26630
Voluntary context switches: 43
Involuntary context switches: 59439
Swaps: 0
File system inputs: 112
File system outputs: 48
Socket messages sent: 0
Socket messages received: 0
Signals delivered: 0
Page size (bytes): 4096
Exit status: 0
And the result is a nicely useable 3835 byte file of the clean public key. If you supply a keyring instead of --no-default-keyring it will also keep the non-self signatures that are useful for you (as you apparently know the signing party). So it does not break gpg. It does break things that call gpg at runtime and not asynchronously. I heard Enigmail is affected, quelle surprise. Now the main problem here is the runtime. 1h45min is just ridiculous. As Filippo Valsorda puts it:
Someone added a few thousand entries to a list that lets anyone append to it. GnuPG, software supposed to defeat state actors, suddenly takes minutes to process entries. How big is that list you ask? 17 MiB. Not GiB, 17 MiB. Like a large picture. https://dev.gnupg.org/T4592
If I were a gpg / SKS keyserver developer, I'd That way another key can only be added to the keyserver network if it contains at least one signature from a previously known strong-set key. Attacking the keyserver network would become at least non-trivial. And the web-of-trust thing may make sense again. Updates 09.07.2019 GnuPG 2.2.17 has been released with another set of quickly bolted together fixes:
   gpg: Ignore all key-signatures received from keyservers.  This
    change is required to mitigate a DoS due to keys flooded with
    faked key-signatures.  The old behaviour can be achieved by adding
    keyserver-options no-self-sigs-only,no-import-clean
    to your gpg.conf.  [#4607]
   gpg: If an imported keyblocks is too large to be stored in the
    keybox (pubring.kbx) do not error out but fallback to an import
    using the options "self-sigs-only,import-clean".  [#4591]
   gpg: New command --locate-external-key which can be used to
    refresh keys from the Web Key Directory or via other methods
    configured with --auto-key-locate.
   gpg: New import option "self-sigs-only".
   gpg: In --auto-key-retrieve prefer WKD over keyservers.  [#4595]
   dirmngr: Support the "openpgpkey" subdomain feature from
    draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-07. [#4590].
   dirmngr: Add an exception for the "openpgpkey" subdomain to the
    CSRF protection.  [#4603]
   dirmngr: Fix endless loop due to http errors 503 and 504.  [#4600]
   dirmngr: Fix TLS bug during redirection of HKP requests.  [#4566]
   gpgconf: Fix a race condition when killing components.  [#4577]
Bug T4607 shows that these changes are all but well thought-out. They introduce artificial limits, like 64kB for WKD-distributed keys or 5MB for local signature imports (Bug T4591) which weaken the web-of-trust further. I recommend to not run gpg 2.2.17 in production environments without extensive testing as these limits and the unverified network traffic may bite you. Do validate your upgrade with valid and broken keys that have segments (packet groups) surpassing the above mentioned limits. You may be surprised what gpg does. On the upside: you can now refresh keys (sans signatures) via WKD. So if your buddies still believe in limiting their subkey validities, you can more easily update them bypassing the SKS keyserver network. NB: I have not tested that functionality. So test before deploying. 10.08.2019 Christopher Wellons (skeeto) has released his pgp-poisoner tool. It is a go program that can add thousands of malicious signatures to a GNUpg key per second. He comments "[pgp-poisoner is] proof that such attacks are very easy to pull off. It doesn't take a nation-state actor to break the PGP ecosystem, just one person and couple evenings studying RFC 4880. This system is not robust." He also hints at the next likely attack vector, public subkeys can be bound to a primary key of choice.

Russ Allbery: Review: Sixteen Ways to Defend a Walled City

Review: Sixteen Ways to Defend a Walled City, by K.J. Parker
Series: Siege #1
Publisher: Orbit
Copyright: April 2019
ISBN: 0-316-27080-6
Format: Kindle
Pages: 349
Sixteen Ways to Defend a Walled City is... hm, honestly, I'm not sure what the genre of this novel is. It is a story about medieval engineering and siege weapons in a Rome-inspired secondary world that so far as I can tell is not meant to match ours. There is not a hint of magic. It's not technically a fantasy, but it's marketed like a fantasy, and it's not historical fiction nor is it attempting to be alternate history. The most common description is a fantasy of logistics, so I guess I'll go with that, as long as you understand that the fantasy here is of the non-magical sort. K.J. Parker is a pen name for Tom Holt. Orhan is Colonel-in-Chief of the Engineers for the Robur empire, even though he's a milkface, not a blueskin like a proper Robur. (Both of those racial terms are quite offensive.) He started out as a slave, learned a trade, joined the navy as a shipwright, and worked his way up the ranks through luck and enemy action. He's canny, practical, highly respected by his men, happy to cheat and steal to get material for his projects and wages for his people, and just wants to build literal bridges. Nice, sturdy bridges that let people get from one place to another the short way. When this book opens, Orhan is in Classis trying to requisition some rope. He is saved from discovery of his forged paperwork by pirates burning down the warehouse that held all of the rope, and then saved from the pirates by the sorts of coincidences that seem to happen to Orhan all the time. A few subsequent discoveries about what the pirates were after, and news of another unexpected attack on the empire, make Orhan nervous enough that he takes his men to do a job as far away from the City at the heart of the empire as possible. It's just his luck to return in time to find slaughtered troops and to have to sneak his men into a City already under siege. Sixteen Ways to Defend a Walled City is told in the first person by Orhan, with an internal justification that the reader only discovers at the end of the book. That means your enjoyment of this book is going to depend a lot on how much you like Orhan's voice. This mostly worked for me; his voice is an odd combination of chatty, self-deprecating, and brusque, and it took a bit for me to get used to it, but I came around. This book is clearly competence porn nearly all the fun of this book is seeing what desperate plan Orhan will come up with next so it helps that Orhan does indeed come across as competent. The part that did not work for me was the morality. You would think from the title that would be straightforward: The City is under siege, people want to capture it and kill everyone, Orhan is on the inside, and his job is to keep them out. That would have been the morality of simplistic military fiction, but most of the appeal was in watching the problem-solving anyway. That's how the story starts, but then Parker started dropping hints of more complexity. Orhan is a disfavored minority and the Robur who run the empire are racist assholes, even though Orhan mostly gets along with the ones who work with him closely. Orhan says a few things that make the reader wonder whether the City warrants defending, and it becomes less clear whether Orhan's loyalties were as solid as they appeared to be. Parker then offers a few moral dilemmas and has Orhan not follow them in the expected directions, making me wonder where Parker was going with the morality of this story. And then we find out that the answer is nowhere. Parker is going nowhere. None of that setup has a payoff, and the ending is deeply unsatisfying and arguably pointless. I am not sure this is an objective analysis. This is one of those books where I would not be surprised to see someone else praise its realism. Orhan is in some ways a more likely figure than the typical hero of a book. He likes accomplishing things, he's a cheat and a liar when that serves his purposes, he's loyal to the people he considers friends in a way that often doesn't involve consulting them about what they want, and he makes decisions mostly on vibes and stubbornness. Both his cynicism and his idealism are different types of masks; beneath both, he's an incoherent muddle. You could argue that we're all that sort of muddle, deep down, and the consistent idealists are the unrealistic (and frightening) ones, and I think Parker may be attempting exactly that argument. I know some readers like this sort of fallibly human incoherence. But wow did I ever loathe this ending because I was not reading this book for a realistic psychological profile of an average guy. I was here for the competence porn, for the fantasy of logistics, for the experience of watching someone have a plan and get shit done. Apparently that extends to needing him to be competent at morality as well, or at least think about it as hard as he thinks about siege weapons. One of the reasons why I am primarily a genre reader is that I don't read books for depressing psychological profiles. There are enough of those in the news. I read books to spend some time in a world better than mine, where things work out the way that they are supposed to, or at least in a way that's satisfying. The other place where this book interfered with my vibes is that it's about a war, and a lot of Orhan's projects are finding more efficient ways to kill people. Parker takes a "war is hell" perspective, and Orhan gets deeply upset at the graphic sights of mangled human bodies that are the frequent results of his plans. I feel weird complaining about this because yes, it's good to be aware of the horrific things that we do to other people in wars, but man, I just wanted to watch some effective project management. I want to enjoy unexpected lateral thinking, appreciate the friendly psychological manipulation involved in getting a project to deliver on deadline, and watch someone solve logistical problems. Battlefields provide an endless supply of interesting challenges, but then Parker feels compelled to linger on the brutal consequences of Orhan's ideas and now I'm depressed and sickened rather than enjoying myself. I really wanted to like this book, and for a lot of the book I did, but that ending was a bottomless pit that sucked away all my enjoyment and retroactively made the rest of the book feel worse. I so wanted Parker to be going somewhere clever and surprising, and the disappointment when none of that happened was intense. This is probably an excessively negative reaction, and I will not be surprised when other people get along with this book better than I did, but not only will I not be recommending it, I'm now rather dubious about reading any more Parker. Followed by How to Rule an Empire and Get Away With It. Rating: 5 out of 10

1 May 2025

Ian Jackson: Free Software, internal politics, and governance

There is a thread of opinion in some Free Software communities, that we shouldn t be doing politics , and instead should just focus on technology. But that s impossible. This approach is naive, harmful, and, ultimately, self-defeating, even on its own narrow terms. Today I m talking about small-p politics In this article I m using politics in the very wide sense: us humans managing our disagreements with each other. I m not going to talk about culture wars, woke, racism, trans rights, and so on. I am not going to talk about how Free Software has always had explicitly political goals; or how it s impossible to be neutral because choosing not to take a stand is itself to take a stand. Those issues are all are important and Free Software definitely must engage with them. Many of the points I make are applicable there too. But those are not my focus today. Today I m talking in more general terms about politics, power, and governance. Many people working together always entails politics Computers are incredibly complicated nowadays. Making software is a joint enterprise. Even if an individual program has only a single maintainer, it fits into an ecosystem of other software, maintained by countless other developers. Larger projects can have thousands of maintainers and hundreds of thousands of contributors. Humans don t always agree about everything. This is natural. Indeed, it s healthy: to write the best code, we need a wide range of knowledge and experience. When we can t come to agreement, we need a way to deal with that: a way that lets us still make progress, but also leaves us able to work together afterwards. A way that feels OK for everyone. Providing a framework for disagreement is the job of a governance system. The rules say which people make which decisions, who must be consulted, how the decisions are made, and, how, if any, they can be reviewed. This is all politics. Consensus is great but always requiring it is harmful Ideally a discussion will converge to a synthesis that satisfies everyone, or at least a consensus. When consensus can t be achieved, we can hope for compromise: something everyone can live with. Compromise is achieved through negotiation. If every decision requires consensus, then the proponents of any wide-ranging improvement have an almost insurmountable hurdle: those who are favoured by the status quo and find it convenient can always object. So there will never be consensus for change. If there is any objection at all, no matter how ill-founded, the status quo will always win. This is where governance comes in. Governance is like backups: we need to practice it Governance processes are the backstop for when discussions, and then negotiations, fail, and people still don t see eye to eye. In a healthy community, everyone needs to know how the governance works and what the rules are. The participants need to accept the system s legitimacy. Everyone, including the losing side, must be prepared to accept and implement (or, at least not obstruct) whatever the decision is, and hopefully live with it and stay around. That means we need to practice our governance processes. We can t just leave them for the day we have a huge and controversial decision to make. If we do that, then when it comes to the crunch we ll have toxic rows where no-one can agree the rules; where determined people bend the rules to fit their outcome; and where afterwards people feel like the whole thing was horrible and unfair. So our decisionmaking bodies and roles need to be making decisions, as a matter of routine, and we need to get used to that. First-line decisionmaking bodies should be making decisions frequently. Last-line appeal mechanisms (large-scale votes, for example) are naturally going to be exercised more rarely, but they must happen, be seen as legitimate, and their outcomes must be implemented in full. Governance should usually be routine and boring When governance is working well it s quite boring. People offer their input, and are heard. Angles are debated, and concerns are addressed. If agreement still isn t reached, the committee, or elected leader, makes a decision. Hopefully everyone thinks the leadership is legitimate, and that it properly considered and heard their arguments, and made the decision for good reasons. Hopefully the losing side can still get their work done (and make their own computer work the way they want); so while they will be disappointed, they can live with the outcome. Many human institutions manage this most of the time. It does take some knowledge about principles of governance, and ideally some experience. Governance means deciding, not just mediating By making decisions I mean exercising their authority to rule on an actual disagreement: one that wasn t resolved by debate or negotiation. Governance processes by definition involve deciding, not just mediating. It s not governance if we re advising or cajoling: in that case, we re back to demanding consensus. Governance is necessary precisely when consensus is not achieved. If the governance systems are to mean anything, they must be able to (over)rule; that means (over)ruling must be normal and accepted. Otherwise, when the we need to overrule, we ll find that we can t, because we lack the collective practice. To be legitimate (and seen as legitimate) decisions must usually be made based on the merits, not on participants status, and not only on process questions. On the autonomy of the programmer Many programmers seem to find the very concept of governance, and binding decisionmaking, deeply uncomfortable. Ultimately, it means sometimes overruling someone s technical decision. As programmers and maintainers we naturally see how this erodes our autonomy. But we have all seen projects where the maintainers are unpleasant, obstinate, or destructive. We have all found this frustrating. Software is all interconnected, and one programmer s bad decisions can cause problems for many of the rest of us. We exasperate, why won t they just do the right thing . This is futile. People have never just ed and they re not going to start just ing now. So often the boot is on the other foot. More broadly, as software developers, we have a responsibility to our users, and a duty to write code that does good rather than ill in the world. We ought to be accountable. (And not just to capitalist bosses!) Governance mechanisms are the answer. (No, forking anything but the smallest project is very rarely a practical answer.) Mitigate the consequences of decisions retain flexibility In software, it is often possible to soften the bad social effects of a controversial decision, by retaining flexibility. With a bit of extra work, we can often provide hooks, non-default configuration options, or plugin arrangements. If we can convert the question from how will the software always behave into merely what should the default be , we can often save ourselves a lot of drama. So it is often worth keeping even suboptimal or untidy features or options, if people want to use them and are willing to maintain them. There is a tradeoff here, of course. But Free Software projects often significantly under-value the social benefits of keeping everyone happy. Wrestling software even crusty or buggy software is a lot more fun than having unpleasant arguments. But don t do decisionmaking like a corporation Many programmers experience of formal decisionmaking is from their boss at work. But corporations are often a very bad example. They typically don t have as much trouble actually making decisions, but the actual decisions are often terrible, and not just because corporations goals are often bad. You get to be a decisionmaker in a corporation by spouting plausible nonsense, sounding confident, buttering up the even-more-vacuous people further up the chain, and sometimes by sabotaging your rivals. Corporate senior managers are hardly ever held accountable typically the effects of their tenure are only properly felt well after they ve left to mess up somewhere else. We should select our leaders more wisely, and base decisions on substance. If you won t do politics, politics will do you As a participant in a project, or a society, you can of course opt out of getting involved in politics. You can opt out of learning how to do politics generally, and opt out of understanding your project s governance structures. You can opt out of making judgements about disputed questions, and tell yourself there s merit on both sides . You can hate politicians indiscriminately, and criticise anyone you see doing politics. If you do this, then you are abdicating your decisionmaking authority, to those who are the most effective manipulators, or the most committed to getting their way. You re tacitly supporting the existing power bases. You re ceding power to the best liars, to those with the least scruples, and to the people who are most motivated by dominance. This is precisely the opposite of what you wanted. If enough people won t do politics, and hate anyone who does, your discussion spaces will be reduced to a battleground of only the hardiest and the most toxic. If you don t see the politics, it s still happening If your governance systems don t work, then there is no effective redress against bad or even malicious decisions. Your roleholders and subteams are unaccountable power centres. Power radically distorts every human relationship, and it takes great strength of character for an unaccountable power centre not to eventually become an unaccountable toxic cabal. So if you have a reasonable sized community, but don t see your formal governance systems working people debating things, votes, leadership making explicit decisions that doesn t mean everything is fine, and all the decisions are great, and there s no politics happening. It just means that most of your community have given up on the official process. It also probably means that some parts of your project have formed toxic and unaccountable cabals. Those who won t put up with that will leave. The same is true if the only governance actions that ever happen are massive drama. That means that only the most determined victim of a bad decision, will even consider using such a process. Conclusions

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Russ Allbery: Review: Beyond Pain

Review: Beyond Pain, by Kit Rocha
Series: Beyond #3
Publisher: Kit Rocha
Copyright: December 2013
ASIN: B00GIA4GN8
Format: Kindle
Pages: 328
Beyond Pain is a science fiction dystopian erotic romance novel and a direct sequel to Beyond Control. Following the romance series convention, each book features new protagonists who were supporting characters in the previous book. You could probably start here if you wanted, but there are significant spoilers here for earlier books in the series. I read this book as part of the Beyond Series Bundle (Books 1-3), which is what the sidebar information is for. Six has had a brutally hard life. She was rescued from an awful situation in a previous book and is now lurking around the edges of the Sector Four gang, oddly fascinated (as are we all) with their constant sexuality and trying to decide if she wants to, and can, be part of their world. Bren is one of the few people she lets get close: a huge bruiser who likes cage fights and pain but treats Six with a protective, careful respect that she finds comforting. This book is the story of Six and Bren getting to the bottom of each other's psychological hangups while the O'Kanes start taking over Six's former sector. Yes, as threatened, I read another entry in the dystopian erotica series because I keep wondering how these people will fuck their way into a revolution. This is not happening very quickly, but it seems obvious that is the direction the series is going. It's been a while since I've reviewed one of these, so here's another variation of the massive disclaimer: I think erotica is harder to review than any other genre because what people like is so intensely personal and individual. This is not even an attempt at an erotica review. I'm both wholly unqualified and also less interested in that part of the book, which should lead you to question my reading choices since that's a good half of the book. Rather, I'm reading these somewhat for the plot and mostly for the vibes. This is not the most competent collection of individuals, and to the extent that they are, it's mostly because the men (who are, as a rule, charismatic but rather dim) are willing to listen to the women. What they are good at is communication, or rather, they're good about banging their heads (and other parts) against communication barriers until they figure out a way around them. Part of this is an obsession with consent that goes quite a bit deeper than the normal simplistic treatment. When you spend this much time trying to understand what other people want, you have to spend a lot of time communicating about sex, and in these books that means spending a lot of time communicating about everything else as well. They are also obsessively loyal and understand the merits of both collective action and in making space for people to do the things that they are the best at, while still insisting that people contribute when they can. On the surface, the O'Kanes are a dictatorship, but they're run more like a high-functioning collaboration. Dallas leads because Dallas is good at playing the role of leader (and listening to Lex), which is refreshingly contrary to how things work in the real world right now. I want to be clear that not only is this erotica, this is not the sort of erotica where there's a stand-alone plot that is periodically interrupted by vaguely-motivated sex scenes that you can skim past. These people use sex to communicate, and therefore most of the important exchanges in the book are in the middle of a sex scene. This is going to make this novel, and this series, very much not to the taste of a lot of people, and I cannot be emphatic enough about that warning. But, also, this is such a fascinating inversion. It's common in media for the surface plot of the story to be full of sexual tension, sometimes to the extent that the story is just a metaphor for the sex that the characters want to have. This is the exact opposite of that: The sex is a metaphor for everything else that's going on in the story. These people quite literally fuck their way out of their communication problems, and not in an obvious or cringy way. It's weirdly fascinating? It's also possible that my reaction to this series is so unusual as to not be shared by a single other reader. Anyway, the setup in this story is that Six has major trust issues and Bren is slowly and carefully trying to win her trust. It's a classic hurt/comfort setup, and if that had played out in the way that this story often does, Bren would have taken the role of the gentle hero and Six the role of the person he rescued. That is not at all where this story goes. Six doesn't need comfort; Six needs self-confidence and the ability to demand what she wants, and although the way Beyond Pain gets her there is a little ham-handed, it mostly worked for me. As with Beyond Shame, I felt like the moral of the story is that the O'Kane men are just bright enough to stop doing stupid things at the last possible moment. I think Beyond Pain worked a bit better than the previous book because Bren is not quite as dim as Dallas, so the reader doesn't have to suffer through quite as many stupid decisions. The erotica continues to mostly (although not entirely) follow traditional gender roles, with dangerous men and women who like attention. Presumably most people are reading these books for the sex, which I am wholly unqualified to review. For whatever it's worth, the physical descriptions are too mechanical for me, too obsessed with the precise structural assemblage of parts in novel configurations. I am not recommending (or disrecommending) these books, for a whole host of reasons. But I think the authors deserve to be rewarded for understanding that sex can be communication and that good communication about difficult topics is inherently interesting in a way that (at least for me) transcends the erotica. I bet I'm going to pick up another one of these about a year from now because I'm still thinking about these people and am still curious about how they are going to succeed. Followed by Beyond Temptation, an interstitial novella. The next novel is Beyond Jealousy. Rating: 6 out of 10

30 April 2025

Russell Coker: Links April 2025

Asianometry has an interesting YouTube video about elecrolytic capacitors degrading and how they affect computers [1]. Keep your computers cool people! Biella Coleman (famous for studying the Anthropology of Debian) and Eric Reinhart wrote an interesting article about MAHA (Make America Healthy Again) and how it ended up doing exactly the opposite of what was intended [2]. SciShow has an informative video about lung cancer cases among non-smokers, the risk factors are genetics, Radon, and cooking [3]. Ian Jackson wrote an insightful blog post about whether Rust is woke [4]. Bruce Schneier write an interesting blog post about research into making AIs Trusted Third Parties [5]. This has the potential to solve some cryptology problems. CHERIoT is an interesting project for controlling all jump statements in RISC-V among other related security features [6]. We need this sort of thing for IoT devices that will run for years without change. Brian Krebs wrote an informative post about how Trump is attacking the 1st Amendment of the US Constitution [7]. The Register has an interesting summary of the kernel enclave and exclave functionality in recent Apple OSs [8]. Dr Gabor Mate wrote an interesting psychological analysis of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump [9]. ChoiceJacking is an interesting variant of the JuiceJacking attack on mobile phones by hostile chargers [10]. They should require input for security sensitive events to come from the local hardware not USB or Bluetooth.

Simon Josefsson: Building Debian in a GitLab Pipeline

After thinking about multi-stage Debian rebuilds I wanted to implement the idea. Recall my illustration:
Earlier I rebuilt all packages that make up the difference between Ubuntu and Trisquel. It turned out to be a 42% bit-by-bit identical similarity. To check the generality of my approach, I rebuilt the difference between Debian and Devuan too. That was the debdistreproduce project. It only had to orchestrate building up to around 500 packages for each distribution and per architecture. Differential reproducible rebuilds doesn t give you the full picture: it ignore the shared package between the distribution, which make up over 90% of the packages. So I felt a desire to do full archive rebuilds. The motivation is that in order to trust Trisquel binary packages, I need to trust Ubuntu binary packages (because that make up 90% of the Trisquel packages), and many of those Ubuntu binaries are derived from Debian source packages. How to approach all of this? Last year I created the debdistrebuild project, and did top-50 popcon package rebuilds of Debian bullseye, bookworm, trixie, and Ubuntu noble and jammy, on a mix of amd64 and arm64. The amount of reproducibility was lower. Primarily the differences were caused by using different build inputs. Last year I spent (too much) time creating a mirror of snapshot.debian.org, to be able to have older packages available for use as build inputs. I have two copies hosted at different datacentres for reliability and archival safety. At the time, snapshot.d.o had serious rate-limiting making it pretty unusable for massive rebuild usage or even basic downloads. Watching the multi-month download complete last year had a meditating effect. The completion of my snapshot download co-incided with me realizing something about the nature of rebuilding packages. Let me below give a recap of the idempotent rebuilds idea, because it motivate my work to build all of Debian from a GitLab pipeline. One purpose for my effort is to be able to trust the binaries that I use on my laptop. I believe that without building binaries from source code, there is no practically feasible way to trust binaries. To trust any binary you receive, you can de-assemble the bits and audit the assembler instructions for the CPU you will execute it on. Doing that on a OS-wide level this is unpractical. A more practical approach is to audit the source code, and then confirm that the binary is 100% bit-by-bit identical to one that you can build yourself (from the same source) on your own trusted toolchain. This is similar to a reproducible build. My initial goal with debdistrebuild was to get to 100% bit-by-bit identical rebuilds, and then I would have trustworthy binaries. Or so I thought. This also appears to be the goal of reproduce.debian.net. They want to reproduce the official Debian binaries. That is a worthy and important goal. They achieve this by building packages using the build inputs that were used to build the binaries. The build inputs are earlier versions of Debian packages (not necessarily from any public Debian release), archived at snapshot.debian.org. I realized that these rebuilds would be not be sufficient for me: it doesn t solve the problem of how to trust the toolchain. Let s assume the reproduce.debian.net effort succeeds and is able to 100% bit-by-bit identically reproduce the official Debian binaries. Which appears to be within reach. To have trusted binaries we would only have to audit the source code for the latest version of the packages AND audit the tool chain used. There is no escaping from auditing all the source code that s what I think we all would prefer to focus on, to be able to improve upstream source code. The trouble is about auditing the tool chain. With the Reproduce.debian.net approach, that is a recursive problem back to really ancient Debian packages, some of them which may no longer build or work, or even be legally distributable. Auditing all those old packages is a LARGER effort than auditing all current packages! Doing auditing of old packages is of less use to making contributions: those releases are old, and chances are any improvements have already been implemented and released. Or that improvements are no longer applicable because the projects evolved since the earlier version. See where this is going now? I reached the conclusion that reproducing official binaries using the same build inputs is not what I m interested in. I want to be able to build the binaries that I use from source using a toolchain that I can also build from source. And preferably that all of this is using latest version of all packages, so that I can contribute and send patches for them, to improve matters. The toolchain that Reproduce.Debian.Net is using is not trustworthy unless all those ancient packages are audited or rebuilt bit-by-bit identically, and I don t see any practical way forward to achieve that goal. Nor have I seen anyone working on that problem. It is possible to do, though, but I think there are simpler ways to achieve the same goal. My approach to reach trusted binaries on my laptop appears to be a three-step effort: How to go about achieving this? Today s Debian build architecture is something that lack transparency and end-user control. The build environment and signing keys are managed by, or influenced by, unidentified people following undocumented (or at least not public) security procedures, under unknown legal jurisdictions. I always wondered why none of the Debian-derivates have adopted a modern GitDevOps-style approach as a method to improve binary build transparency, maybe I missed some project? If you want to contribute to some GitHub or GitLab project, you click the Fork button and get a CI/CD pipeline running which rebuild artifacts for the project. This makes it easy for people to contribute, and you get good QA control because the entire chain up until its artifact release are produced and tested. At least in theory. Many projects are behind on this, but it seems like this is a useful goal for all projects. This is also liberating: all users are able to reproduce artifacts. There is no longer any magic involved in preparing release artifacts. As we ve seen with many software supply-chain security incidents for the past years, where the magic is involved is a good place to introduce malicious code. To allow me to continue with my experiment, I thought the simplest way forward was to setup a GitDevOps-centric and user-controllable way to build the entire Debian archive. Let me introduce the debdistbuild project. Debdistbuild is a re-usable GitLab CI/CD pipeline, similar to the Salsa CI pipeline. It provide one build job definition and one deploy job definition. The pipeline can run on GitLab.org Shared Runners or you can set up your own runners, like my GitLab riscv64 runner setup. I have concerns about relying on GitLab (both as software and as a service), but my ideas are easy to transfer to some other GitDevSecOps setup such as Codeberg.org. Self-hosting GitLab, including self-hosted runners, is common today, and Debian rely increasingly on Salsa for this. All of the build infrastructure could be hosted on Salsa eventually. The build job is simple. From within an official Debian container image build packages using dpkg-buildpackage essentially by invoking the following commands.
sed -i 's/ deb$/ deb deb-src/' /etc/apt/sources.list.d/*.sources
apt-get -o Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false update
apt-get dist-upgrade -q -y
apt-get install -q -y --no-install-recommends build-essential fakeroot
env DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \
    apt-get build-dep -y --only-source $PACKAGE=$VERSION
useradd -m build
DDB_BUILDDIR=/build/reproducible-path
chgrp build $DDB_BUILDDIR
chmod g+w $DDB_BUILDDIR
su build -c "apt-get source --only-source $PACKAGE=$VERSION" > ../$PACKAGE_$VERSION.build
cd $DDB_BUILDDIR
su build -c "dpkg-buildpackage"
cd ..
mkdir out
mv -v $(find $DDB_BUILDDIR -maxdepth 1 -type f) out/
The deploy job is also simple. It commit artifacts to a Git project using Git-LFS to handle large objects, essentially something like this:
if ! grep -q '^pool/**' .gitattributes; then
    git lfs track 'pool/**'
    git add .gitattributes
    git commit -m"Track pool/* with Git-LFS." .gitattributes
fi
POOLDIR=$(if test "$(echo "$PACKAGE"   cut -c1-3)" = "lib"; then C=4; else C=1; fi; echo "$DDB_PACKAGE"   cut -c1-$C)
mkdir -pv pool/main/$POOLDIR/
rm -rfv pool/main/$POOLDIR/$PACKAGE
mv -v out pool/main/$POOLDIR/$PACKAGE
git add pool
git commit -m"Add $PACKAGE." -m "$CI_JOB_URL" -m "$VERSION" -a
if test "$ DDB_GIT_TOKEN:- " = ""; then
    echo "SKIP: Skipping git push due to missing DDB_GIT_TOKEN (see README)."
else
    git push -o ci.skip
fi
That s it! The actual implementation is a bit longer, but the major difference is for log and error handling. You may review the source code of the base Debdistbuild pipeline definition, the base Debdistbuild script and the rc.d/-style scripts implementing the build.d/ process and the deploy.d/ commands. There was one complication related to artifact size. GitLab.org job artifacts are limited to 1GB. Several packages in Debian produce artifacts larger than this. What to do? GitLab supports up to 5GB for files stored in its package registry, but this limit is too close for my comfort, having seen some multi-GB artifacts already. I made the build job optionally upload artifacts to a S3 bucket using SHA256 hashed file hierarchy. I m using Hetzner Object Storage but there are many S3 providers around, including self-hosting options. This hierarchy is compatible with the Git-LFS .git/lfs/object/ hierarchy, and it is easy to setup a separate Git-LFS object URL to allow Git-LFS object downloads from the S3 bucket. In this mode, only Git-LFS stubs are pushed to the git repository. It should have no trouble handling the large number of files, since I have earlier experience with Apt mirrors in Git-LFS. To speed up job execution, and to guarantee a stable build environment, instead of installing build-essential packages on every build job execution, I prepare some build container images. The project responsible for this is tentatively called stage-N-containers. Right now it create containers suitable for rolling builds of trixie on amd64, arm64, and riscv64, and a container intended for as use the stage-0 based on the 20250407 docker images of bookworm on amd64 and arm64 using the snapshot.d.o 20250407 archive. Or actually, I m using snapshot-cloudflare.d.o because of download speed and reliability. I would have prefered to use my own snapshot mirror with Hetzner bandwidth, alas the Debian snapshot team have concerns about me publishing the list of (SHA1 hash) filenames publicly and I haven t been bothered to set up non-public access. Debdistbuild has built around 2.500 packages for bookworm on amd64 and bookworm on arm64. To confirm the generality of my approach, it also build trixie on amd64, trixie on arm64 and trixie on riscv64. The riscv64 builds are all on my own hosted runners. For amd64 and arm64 my own runners are only used for large packages where the GitLab.com shared runners run into the 3 hour time limit. What s next in this venture? Some ideas include: What do you think?

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