Search Results: "dkg"

28 February 2013

Gunnar Wolf: Dkg: Unwrap it with Blender. And ask @octagesimal / @casyopea !

Daniel tells his story building a wooly mammoth, and throws some ideas on how this could be implemented easily with free software. But if I read his post correctly, Daniel still misses the precise ways to do it. Our friends Octavio and Claudia (twitted hereby) have given some Blender courses here at our classroom at home (Guys! Come again! We miss you!), and host the Spanish-speaking g-blender community. At one of their courses, they showed how to model an object/character, and in order to color/texture its parts, you can unwrap it This process yields a flattened image with the surfaces that build your object, that you can then color. Well, you can also use it as a base pattern to cut and sew your plush! It is not meant to be used for this (although it works), so it won't give you the extra tabs to be sewn in place, and the joints might not be at the most comfortable places. But it is base you can work from.

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: Make a Woolly Mammoth (thanks, inkscape!)

I feel like i've done a lot of blogging recently about failing to do things with proprietary software. That's annoying. This post is about something i made successfully with free software (and some non-software crafting): I made a Woolly Mammoth for my nephew!I documented the pattern (with pictures!) that i came up with using Inkscape (and used markdown, pandoc, emacs, pdftk, and other free software in the process). i've also published the source for the pattern via git if you want to modify it:
git clone git://lair.fifthhorseman.net/~dkg/woolly
Writing up the documentation makes me realize that i don't know of any software tools designed specifically for facilitating fabric/craft construction. Some interesting software ideas: Anyone have any ideas?Tags: brainstorming, crafting, inkscape

23 February 2013

Tiago Bortoletto Vaz: #DPLgame

in a random disorder:
MadameZou - photo by Andrew McMillan, CC-BY-SA 2.0 dkg moray h01ger

1 February 2013

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: proprietary software activation fail

i have a colleague who is forced by work situations to use Windows. Somehow, I'm the idiot^W^W^W^W^Wfriendly guy who gets tapped to fix it when things break. Well, this time, the power supply broke. As in, dead, no lights, no fan, no nothing. No problem, though, the disk is still good, and i've got a spare machine lying around; and the spare is actually superior hardware to the old machine so it'll be an upgrade in addition to a fix. Nice! So i transplant the disk and fire up the new chassis. But WinXP fails to boot with a lovely "0x0000007b" BSOD. The internet tells me that this might mean it can't find its own disk. OK, pop into the new chassis' BIOS, tell it to run the SATA ports in "legacy IDE" mode, and try again. Now we get a "0x0000007e" BSOD. Some digging on the 'net makes me think it's now complaining now about the graphics driver. Hmm. Well, i figure i can probably work around that by installing new drivers from Safe Mode. So i reboot into Safe Mode. Success! It boots to the login screen in Safe Mode. And, mirabile dictu, i happen to know the Administrator password. I put it in, and get a message that this Windows installation isn't "activated" yet -- presumably because the hardware has changed out from under it. And by the way, i'm not allowed to log in via safe mode until it's activated. So please reboot to "normal" Windows and activate it first. Except, of course, the whole reason i'm booting into safe mode was because normal Windows gives a BSOD. Grrrr. Who thought up this particular lovely catch-22? OK, change tactics. Scavenging the scrap bin turns up a machine with a failed mainboard, but a power supply with all the right leads. It's rated for about 80W less than the old machine's failed supply, but i figure if i rip out the DVD-burner and the floppy drive maybe it will hold. Oh, and the replacement power supply doesn't physically fit the old chassis, but it hangs halfway out the back and sort of rattles around a bit. I sacrifice the rest of the scrap machine, rip out its power supply, stuff the power supply into the old chassis, swap the original disk back in, and ... it boots successfully, finally. That was the shorter version of the story :P So now my colleague has a horrible mess of a frankencomputer which is more likely to fail again in the future, instead of a nice shiny upgrade. Why? Because Microsoft's need to control the flow of software takes priority over the needs of their users. This is what you get when you let Marketing and BizDev drive your technical decisions. Do i still need to explain why i prefer free software? Tags: griping, windows

29 January 2013

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: visualizing MIME structure

Better debugging tools can help us understand what's going on with MIME messages. A python scrap i wrote a couple years ago named printmimestructure has been very useful to me, so i thought i'd share it. It reads a message from stdin, and prints a visualisation of its structure, like this:
0 dkg@alice:~$ printmimestructure < 'Maildir/cur/1269025522.M338697P12023.monkey,S=6459,W=6963:2,Sa' 
 multipart/signed 6546 bytes
  text/plain inline 895 bytes
  application/pgp-signature inline [signature.asc] 836 bytes
0 dkg@alice:~$ 
You can fetch it with git if you like:
git clone git://lair.fifthhorseman.net/~dkg/printmimestructure
It feels silly to treat this ~30 line script as its own project, but i don't know of another simple tool that does this. If you know of one, or of something similar, i'd love to hear about it in the comments (or by sending me e-mail if you prefer). If it's useful for others, I'd be happy to contribute printmimestructure to a project of like-minded tools. Does such a project exist? Or if people think it would be handy to have in debian, i can also package it up, though that feels like it might be overkill. and oh yeah, as always: bug reports, suggestions, complaints, and patches are welcome :)Tags: debugging, mime, python

17 January 2013

Russ Allbery: A few last thoughts on Aaron Swartz

Daniel Kahn Gillmor has a very good blog post. You should read it. It includes a thoughtful rebuttal to some of my earlier thoughts about activism. I think I'm developing a richer understanding of where I see boundaries here, but after my last post, I also realized that by focusing on the specific details of what should have been a minor alleged crime, I'm derailing. Swartz did so much else. I made a note to come back to the more theoretical discussion in six months; now isn't the time. Now is the time to celebrate open content and all of the things Swartz achieved. (But thank you very much to the multiple people who have pointed out flaws in my reasoning and attempted approach.) Hopefully, it's also an opportunity to keep the pressure on for a saner and less abusive judicial system that doesn't threaten people with ridiculous and disproportional punishment in order to terrify them into unwarranted plea bargains. The petition I mentioned has reached nearly 40,000 signatures and passed the threshold (at the time it was posted) for forcing a White House response. Probably more importantly, it also seems to be creating the feedback cycle that I was hoping to see: the popularity of the petition is causing this story to stay in the news cycle and continue to be written about, which in turn drives more signatures to the petition. I'm not particularly hopeful that the Obama administration cares about the vast and deep problems with our criminal justice system, but I'm somewhat more hopeful that they, like most politicians, hate news cycles that they don't control. The longer this goes on, the stronger the incentive to find some way to make it go away, which could lead to real disciplinary action. A key committee in the US House of Representatives is starting a formal investigation. One of my local representatives has proposed modifying the US federal law on computer fraud and abuse to remove violations of terms of service from the definition of the crime. (I don't have much hope that this will pass when proposed by the minority party in a fairly hostile House, but the mere act of proposing it keeps the news focus on.) Glenn Greenwald has a (typically long-winded) round-up of news in the Guardian. Note that both Greenwald and Declan McCullagh link directly to the petition in articles in mainstream news outlets. One thing that slacktivism can do is perpetuate a news cycle until it gets more uncomfortable for people in power. It's still nowhere near as effective as the types of activism that Swartz was so good at, but in this specific case I think one gets a reasonable return on one's five-minute investment of effort. I'm going to stop talking about this now, since other people are a lot better at this sort of post than I am. But one last link: the medical community has a related open content problem, and theirs is also killing people. Possibly people you know. If all of this has inspired you, as it has me, to care even more about open content, be watching the push for open access to clinical trial data. More background is in Ben Goldacre's TED talk.

15 January 2013

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: in memory of Aaron Swartz

I was upset to learn about Aaron Swartz's death last week. I continue to be upset about his loss, and about our loss. He didn't just show promise of great things to come in the future -- he had already done more work for the public good than many of us will ever do. I'd only met him IRL a couple times, but (like many others) i had encountered him on the 'net in many places. He was a good person, someone i didn't need to always agree with to respect. I read Russ Allbery's posts about Aaron and "slacktivism" with much appreciation. I had been ambivalent about signing the whitehouse.gov petition asking for the removal of the prosecutor for overreach, because I generally distrust the effectiveness of online petitions (and offline petitions, for that matter). But Russ's analysis convinced me to go ahead and sign it. The petition is concrete, clear (despite wanting a grammatical proofread), and actionable. For people willing to go beyond petition signing to civil disobedience, The Aaron Swartz Memorial JSTOR Liberator is an option. It makes it straightforward to potentially violate the onerous JSTOR terms of service by re-publishing a public-domain article from JSTOR to archive.org, where it will be accessible to anyone directly. As someone who builds and maintains information/communications infrastructure, i have very mixed feelings about most online civil disobedience, since it often takes the form of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack of some sort. DDoS attacks of public services are notoriously difficult to defend against without having huge resources to throw at the problem, so encouraging participation in a DDoS often feels a little bit like handing out cans of gasoline when you know that everyone is living in a house of straw. However, the JSTOR Liberator is not a DDoS at all -- it's simply a facilitation of people breaking the JSTOR Terms of Service (ToS), some of the same terms that Aaron was facing charges for violating. So it is a well-targeted way to demonstrate that the prosecutions were overreaching. I wanted to take issue with one of Russ' statements, though. In his second post about the situation, Russ wrote:
Social activism and political disobedience are important and often valuable things, but performing your social activism using other people's stuff is just rude. I think it can be a forgivable rudeness; people can get caught up in the moment and not realize what they're doing. But it's still rude, and it's still not the way to go about civil disobedience.
While i generally agree with Russ' thoughtful consideration of consent, I have to take issue with this elevation of some sort of hyper-extended property right over the moral agency that drives civil disobedience. To use someone else's property for the sake of a just cause without damaging the property or depriving the owner of its use is not "forgivable rudeness" -- it's forgivable, laudable even, because it is just. And the person using the property doesn't need to be "caught up in the moment and not realize what they're doing" for it to be acceptable. Civil disobedience often involves putting some level of inconvenience or discomfort on other people, including innocent people. It might be the friends and family of the activist who have to deal with the jail time; it might be the drivers stuck in a traffic jam caused by a demonstration; it might be the people forced to shop elsewhere because the store's doors are barricaded by protestors. All of these people could be troubled by the civil disobedience more than MIT's network users and admins were troubled by Aaron's protest, and that doesn't make the protests described worse or "not the way to go about civil disobedience." The trouble highlights a more significant injustice, and in its troubling way does what it can to help right it. Aaron was a troublemaker, and a good one. He will be missed. Tags: aaronsw

9 January 2013

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: universally accessible storage for the wary user

A friend wrote me a simple question today. My response turned out to be longer than i expected, but i hope it's useful (and maybe other people will have better suggestions) so i thought i'd share it here too: Angela Starita wrote:
I'd like to save my work in a location where I can access it from any computer. I'm wary of using the mechanisms provided by Google and Apple. Can you suggest another service?
Here's my reply: I think you're right to be wary of the big cloud providers, who have a tendency to inspect your data to profile you, to participate in arbitrary surveillance regimes, and to try to sell your eyeballs to advertisers. Caveat: You have to trust the client machine too But it's also worth remembering that the network service provider is not the only source of risk. If you really mean "accessing your data from any computer", that means the computer you're using to access the data can do whatever it wants with it. That is, you need to trust both the operator of these "cloud" services, *and* the administrator/operating system of the client computer you're using to access your data. For example, if you log into any "secure" account from a terminal in a web caf , that leaves you vulnerable to the admins of the web caf (and, in the rather-common case of sloppily-administered web terminals, vulnerable to the previous user(s) of the terminal as well). Option 0: Portable physical storage One way to have your data so that you can access it from "any computer" is to not rely on the network at all, but rather to carry a high-capacity MicroSD card (and USB adapter) around with you (you'll probably want to format the card with a widely-understood filesystem like FAT32 instead of NTFS or HFS+ or ext4, which are only understood by some of the major operating systems, but not all). Here is some example hardware: Almost every computer these days has either a microSD slot or a USB port, while some computers are not connected to the network. This also means that you don't have to rely on someone else to manage servers that keep your data available all the time. Note that going the microSD route doesn't remove the caveat about needing to trust the client workstation you're using, and it has another consideration: You'd be responsible for your own backup in the case of hardware failure. You're responsible for your own backup in the case of online storage too, of course -- but the better online companies are probably better equipped than most of us to deal with hardware failure. OTOH, they're also susceptible to some data loss scenarios that we aren't as individual humans (e.g. the company might go bankrupt, or get bought by a competitor who wants to terminate the service, or have a malicious employee who decides to take revenge). Backup of a MicroSD card isn't particularly hard, though: just get a USB stick that's the same size, and regularly duplicate the contents of the MicroSD card to the USB stick. One last consideration is storage size -- MicroSD cards are currently limited to 32GB or 64GB. If you have significantly more data than that, this approach might not be possible, or you might need to switch to a USB hard disk, which would limit your ability to use the data on computers that don't have a USB port (such as some smartphones). Option 1: Proprietary service providers If you don't think this portable physical storage option is the right choice for you, here are a couple proprietary service providers who offer some flavor of "cloud" storage while claiming to not look at the contents of your data: I'm not particularly happy with either of those, though, in part because the local client software they want you to run is proprietary, so there's no way to verify that they are actually unable to access the contents of your data. But i'd be a lot happier with either wuala or spideroak than i would be with google drive, dropbox, or iCloud. Option 2: What i really want I'm much more excited about the network-accessible, free-software, privacy-sensitive network-based storage tool known as git-annex assistant. The project is spearheaded by Joey Hess, who is one of the most skilled and thoughtful software developers i know of. "assistant" (and git-annex, from which it derives) has the advantage of being pretty agnostic about the backend service (many plugins for many different cloud providers) and allows you to encrypt your data locally before sending it to the remote provider. This also means you can put your encrypted data in more than one provider, so that if one of the providers fails for some reason, you can be relatively sure that you have another copy available. But "assistant" won't be ready for Windows or Android for several months (builds are available for Linux and Mac OS X now), so i don't know if it meets the criterion for "accessible from any computer". And, of course, even with the encryption capabilities, the old caveat about needing to trust the local client machine still applies.

21 December 2012

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: libasound2-plugins is a resource hog!

I run mpd on debian on "igor", an NSLU2 -- a very low-power ~266MHz armel machine, with no FPU and a scanty 32MiB of RAM. This serves nicely to feed my stereo with music that is controllable from anywhere on my LAN. When playing music and talking to a single mpd client, the machine is about 50% idle. However, during a recent upgrade, something wanted to pull in pulseaudio, which in turn wanted to pull in libasound2-plugins, and i distractedly (foolishly) let it. With that package installed, after an mpd restart, the CPU was completely thrashed (100% utilization) and music only played in stutters of 1 second interrupted by a couple seconds of silence. igor was unusable for its intended purpose. Getting rid of pulseaudio was my first attempt to fix the stuttering, but the problem remained even after pulse was all gone and mpd was restarted. Then i did a little search of which packages had been freshly installed in the recent run:
grep ' install .* <none> ' /var/log/dpkg.log
and used that to pick out the offending package. After purging libasound2-plugins and restarting mpd, the igor is back in action. Lesson learned: on low-overhead machines, don't allow apt to install recommends!
echo 'APT::Install-Recommends "0";' >> /etc/apt/apt.conf
And it should go without saying, but sometimes i get sloppy: i need to pay closer attention during an "apt-get dist-upgrade" Tags: alsa, apt, low-power, mpd

6 December 2012

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: set default margins for OpenOffice as a sysadmin?

I'm maintaining a lab of debian squeeze machines that run OpenOffice.org (i'm considering upgrading to LibreOffice from squeeze-backports). I'd like to adjust the default page margins for all users of Writer. Most instructions i've found suggest ways to do this as a single user, but not how to make the change system-wide. I don't want to ask every user of these machines to do this (and i also don't want to tamper with each home directory directly -- that's not something i can maintain reliably). Alas, i can find no documentation about how to change the default page margins system-wide for either Oo.o or LibreOffice. Surely this is something that can be done without a recompile. What am i missing? Tags: configuration, libreoffice, margins, openoffice.org, sysadmin, templates

4 December 2012

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: Error messages are your friend (postgres is good)

Here is a bit of simple (yet subtly-flawed) sql, which produces different answers on different database engines:
0 dkg@pip:~$ cat test.sql
drop table if exists foo;
create table foo (x int, y int);
insert into foo VALUES (1,3);
insert into foo VALUES (1,5);
select y from foo group by x;
0 dkg@pip:~$ sqlite3 < test.sql
5
0 dkg@pip:~$ mysql -N dkg < test.sql
3
0 dkg@pip:~$ psql -qtA dkg < test.sql
ERROR:  column "foo.y" must appear in the GROUP BY clause or be used in an aggregate function
LINE 1: select y from foo group by x;
               ^
0 dkg@pip:~$ 
are two of the many reasons postgresql is my database engine of choice.Tags: errors, postgresql, sql

27 November 2012

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: more proprietary workarounds, sigh

In supporting a labful of Debian GNU/Linux machines with NFS-mounted home directories, i find some of my users demand a few proprietary programs. Adobe Flash is one of the most demanded, in particular because some popular streaming video services (like Amazon Prime and Hulu) seem to require it. I'm not a fan of proprietary network services, but i'm happy to see that Amazon Prime takes Linux support seriously enough to direct users to Adobe's Linux Flash "Protected Content" troubleshooting page (Amazon Prime's rival NetFlix, by comparison, has an abysmal record on this platform). Of course, none of this will work on any platform but i386, since the flash player is proprietary software and its proprietors have shown no interest in porting it or letting others port it :( One of the main issues with proprietary network services is their inclination to view their customer as their adversary, as evidenced by various DRM schemes. In two examples, the Flash Player's DRM module appears to arbitrarily break when you use one home directory across multiple machines. Also, the DRM module appears to depend on HAL, which is being deprecated by most of the common distributions. Why bother with this kind of gratuitous breakage? We know that video streaming can and does work fine without DRM. With modern browsers, freely-formatted video, and HTML5 video tags, video just works, and it works under the control of the user, on any platform. But Flash appears to throw up unnecessary hurdles, requiring not only proprietary code, but deprecated subsystems and fiddly workarounds to get it functional. I'm reminded of Mako's concept of "antifeatures" -- how much engineering time and effort went into making this system actually be less stable and reliable than it would have otherwise been? How could that work have been better-directed? Tags: antifeatures, flash, hal, proprietary, streaming

16 June 2012

Vincent Bernat: GPG Key Transition Statement 2012

I am transitioning my GPG key from an old 1024-bit DSA key to a new 4096-bit RSA key. The old key will continue to be valid for some time but I prefer all new correspondance to be encrypted with the new key. I will be making all signatures going forward with the new key. I have followed the excellent tutorial from Daniel Kahn Gillmor which also explains why this migration is needed. The only step that I did not execute is issuing a new certification for keys I have signed in the past. I did not find any search engine to tell me which key I have signed. Here is the signed transition statement (I have stolen it from Zack):
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256,SHA1
I am transitioning GPG keys from an old 1024-bit DSA key to a new
4096-bit RSA key.  The old key will continue to be valid for some
time, but I prefer all new correspondance to be encrypted in the new
key, and will be making all signatures going forward with the new key.
This transition document is signed with both keys to validate the
transition.
If you have signed my old key, I would appreciate signatures on my new
key as well, provided that your signing policy permits that without
reauthenticating me.
The old key, which I am transitional away from, is:
  pub   1024D/F22A794E 2001-03-23
      Key fingerprint = 5854 AF2B 65B2 0E96 2161  E32B 285B D7A1 F22A 794E
The new key, to which I am transitioning, is:
  pub   4096R/353525F9 2012-06-16 [expires: 2014-06-16]
      Key fingerprint = AEF2 3487 66F3 71C6 89A7  3600 95A4 2FE8 3535 25F9
To fetch the full new key from a public key server using GnuPG, run:
  gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 95A42FE8353525F9
If you have already validated my old key, you can then validate that
the new key is signed by my old key:
  gpg --check-sigs 95A42FE8353525F9
If you then want to sign my new key, a simple and safe way to do that
is by using caff (shipped in Debian as part of the "signing-party"
package) as follows:
  caff 95A42FE8353525F9
Please contact me via e-mail at <vincent@bernat.im> if you have any
questions about this document or this transition.
  Vincent Bernat
  vincent@bernat.im
  16-06-2012
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux)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=0QnC
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
For easier access, I have also published it in text format. You can check it with:
$ gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv-key 95A42FE8353525F9
gpg: requesting key 353525F9 from hkp server keys.gnupg.net
gpg: key 353525F9: "Vincent Bernat <bernat@luffy.cx>" not changed
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:              unchanged: 1
$ curl http://vincent.bernat.im/media/files/key-transition-2012.txt   \
>       gpg --verify
To avoid signing/encrypting with the old key who share the same email addresses than the new one, I have saved it, removed it from the keyring and added it again. The new key is now first in both the secret and the public keyrings and will be used whenever the appropriate email address is requested.
$ gpg --export-secret-keys F22A794E > ~/tmp/secret
$ gpg --export F22A794E > ~/tmp/public
$ gpg --delete-secret-key F22A794
sec  1024D/F22A794E 2001-03-23 Vincent Bernat <bernat@luffy.cx>
Delete this key from the keyring? (y/N) y
This is a secret key! - really delete? (y/N) y
$ gpg --delete-key F22A794E
pub  1024D/F22A794E 2001-03-23 Vincent Bernat <bernat@luffy.cx>
Delete this key from the keyring? (y/N) y
$ gpg --import ~/tmp/public
gpg: key F22A794E: public key "Vincent Bernat <bernat@luffy.cx>" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1
gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, classic trust model
gpg: depth: 0  valid:   2  signed:   0  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 2u
gpg: next trustdb check due at 2014-06-16
$ gpg --import ~/tmp/secret
gpg: key F22A794E: secret key imported
gpg: key F22A794E: "Vincent Bernat <bernat@luffy.cx>" not changed
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:              unchanged: 1
gpg:       secret keys read: 1
gpg:   secret keys imported: 1
$ rm ~/tmp/public ~/tmp/secret
$ gpg --edit-key F22A794E
[...]
gpg> trust
[...]
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
  1 = I don't know or won't say
  2 = I do NOT trust
  3 = I trust marginally
  4 = I trust fully
  5 = I trust ultimately
  m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
I now need to gather some signatures for the new key. If this is appropriate for you, please sign the new key if you signed the old one.

29 May 2012

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: KVM, Windows XP, and Stop Error Code 0x0000007B

i dislike having to run Windows as much as the next free software developer, but like many sysadmins, i am occasionally asked to maintain some legacy systems. A nice way to keep these systems available (while not having to physically maintain them) is to put them in a virtual sandbox using a tool like kvm. While kvm makes it relatively straightforward to install WinXP from a CD (as long as you have the proper licensing key), it is more challenging to transition a pre-existing hardware windows XP installation into a virtual instance, due to Windows only wanting to boot to ide chipsets that it remembers being installed to. In particular, booting a disk image pulled from a soon-to-be-discarded physical disk can produce a Blue Screen of Death (BSOD) with the message:
Stop error code 0x0000007B
or
(INACCESSABLE_BOOT_DEVICE)
This seems like it's roughly the equivalent (in a standard debian GNU/Linux environment) of specifying MODULES=dep in /etc/initramfs-tools/initramfs.conf, and then trying to swap out all the hardware. At first blush, Microsoft's knowledge base suggests doing an in-place upgrade or full repartition and reinstall, which are both fairly drastic measures -- you might as well just start from scratch, which is exactly what you don't want to have to do for a nursed-along legacy system which no one who originally set it up is even with the organization any more. Fortunately, a bit more digging in the Knowledge Base turned up an unsupported set of steps that appears to be the equivalent of setting MODULES=most (at least for the IDE chipsets). Running this on the old hardware before imaging the disk worked for me, though i did need to re-validate Windows XP after the reboot by typing in the long magic code again. i guess they're keying it to the hardware, which clearly changed in this instance. Such silliness to spend time working around, really, when i'd rather be spending my time working on free software. :/

16 March 2012

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: Compromising webapps: a case study

This paper should be required reading for anyone developing, deploying, or administering web applications. It's also interesting to read the perspective of the folks operating the compromised webapp (details are in the section titled "Digital Vote-By-Mail" on pages 34 to 38).

4 March 2012

Jamie McClelland: Managing KVM instances

At May First/People Link we have been using KVM for several years now and recently I have been running KVM instances on my local laptop. I'm pleased to see all the work that has gone into libvirt, which seems like a robust and full-featured suite of tools for managing many virtualization technologies, including KVM. However, we don't use it at May First/People Link for a number of reasons. The most pressing is that it runs all virtual guests as the same user, but also because it offers far more features than we need (such as graphical access to virtual server, which we don't need since none of our guest servers run X). On May First/People Link hosts, we are using a relatively simple set of bash scripts (accessible via git at git://lair.fifthhorseman.net/~dkg/kvm-manager). These scripts re-use many tools we are already familiar with to build and launch kvm guests. Each guests runs as a dedicated non-provileged user, with a console available using screen, and the kvm process is managed using runit. Since our admins are familiar with these tools already, the learning curve involved is much less steep. Despite the relative simplicity of kvm-manager, it was still more complicated and involved than I wanted on my laptop. Additionally, I wanted to fully understand every piece of the puzzle and separating out user privileges wasn't important to me. So - I wrote the following bash script to launch virtual servers. It assumes you are using logical volume manager. Some editing required if you want to re-use it.
#!/bin/bash
# manage a virtual server
# add /etc/udev/rules.d/92-kvm.rules with the following line (change "jamie" 
# to the group you are running as and vg_animal0 to the name of your volume 
# group):
# ACTION=="change", SUBSYSTEM=="block", ATTR dm/name =="vg_animal0-*_root", GROUP="jamie"
#
# install a new server by:
# * create logical volume with the name: servername_root
# * $0 servername start /usr/local/share/ISOs/default.iso
bridge=virbr0
user=jamie
base=/home/jamie
server="$1"
vg=vg_animal0
# modify server memory here
mem=768
command="$2"
[ -z "$command" ] && command=start
die ()  
  printf "$1\n"
  exit 1
 
cdarg=
if [ -n "$3" ]; then
  [ ! -f "$3" ] && die "Third argument should be path to cd iso. Can't find that path."
  cdarg="-cdrom $3"
fi
function start()  
  lvname="$ vg -$ server _root"
  # trigger udev to ensure we have proper ownership of the block device
  sudo udevadm trigger --subsystem-match=block --attr-match=dm/name="$lvname"
  lv="/dev/mapper/$lvname"
  [ ! -e "$lv" ] && die "Can't find $lv"
  sudo modprobe -v tun   die "Failed to modprobe tun module"
  # create network device if it doesn't already exist
  ip tuntap   grep "$tap"   sudo ip tuntap add dev "$tap" mode tap user "$user"   die "Failed to create device $tap"
  # bring up device if it's not already up
  ip link   grep " $tap "   sudo ip link set "$tap" up   die "Failed to set $tap to up"
  # add the device to the bridge so it get use the upstream network connections
  /sbin/brctl show   grep "$tap"   sudo brctl addif "$bridge" "$tap"   die "Failed to add tap to bridge"
  # launch kvm in a screen session
  screen -S "$server" kvm -drive "file=$lv,if=virtio,id=hda,format=raw" -m "$mem" -device "virtio-net-pci,vlan=1,id=net0,mac=$mac,bus=pci.0" -net "tap,ifname=$tap,script=no,downscript=no,vlan=1,name=hostnet0" $cdarg -nographic   die "Failed to start kvm" 
 
function cleanup()  
  read -p "Please shutdown the host first then hit any key to continue..."
  sudo brctl delif "$bridge" "$tap"
  sudo ip link set "$tap" down
  sudo ip tuntap del mode tap dev "$tap"
 
# generate reproducible mac address
mac="$(printf "02:%s" "$(printf "%s\0%s" "$(hostname)" "$ server "   sha256sum   sed 's/\(..\)/\1:/g'   cut -f1-5 -d:)" )"
tap="$ server 0"
case "$command" in
  start)
    start
    ;;
  cleanup)
    cleanup
    ;;
  *)
    die "Please pass start or cleanup as first argument"
esac

6 January 2012

Timo Jyrinki: I have a new GPG key


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1,SHA512

Hello,

I'm transitioning from my 2003 GPG key to a new one.

The old key will continue to be valid for some time, but I eventually
plan to revoke it, so please use the new one from now on. I would also
like this new key to be re-integrated into the web of trust. This message
is signed by both keys to certify the transition.

The old key was:

pub 1024D/FC7F6D0F 2003-07-10
Key fingerprint = E6A8 8BA0 D28A 3629 30A9 899F 82D7 DF6D FC7F 6D0F

The new key is:

pub 4096R/90BDD207 2012-01-06
Key fingerprint = 6B85 4D46 E843 3CD7 CDC0 3630 E0F7 59F7 90BD D207

To fetch my new key from a public key server, you can simply do:

gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-key 90BDD207

If you already know my old key, you can now verify that the new key is
signed by the old one:

gpg --check-sigs 90BDD207

If you don't already know my old key, or you just want to be double
extra paranoid, you can check the fingerprint against the one above:

gpg --fingerprint 90BDD207

If you are satisfied that you've got the right key, and the UIDs match
what you expect, I'd appreciate it if you would sign my key:

gpg --sign-key 90BDD207

Lastly, if you could send me these signatures, i would appreciate it.
You can either send me an e-mail with the new signatures by attaching
the following file:

gpg --armor --export 90BDD207 > timojyrinki.asc

Or you can just upload the signatures to a public keyserver directly:

gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --send-key 90BDD207

Please let me know if there is any trouble, and sorry for the inconvenience.

(this post has been modified from the example at
http://www.debian-administration.org/users/dkg/weblog/48)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)
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=mklN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

26 December 2011

Asheesh Laroia: Short key IDs are bad news (with OpenPGP and GNU Privacy Guard)

Summary: It is important that we (the Debian community that relies on OpenPGP through GNU Privacy Guard) stop using short key IDs. There is no vulnerability in OpenPGP and GPG. However, using short key IDs (like 0x70096AD1) is fundementally insecure; it is easy to generate collisions for short key IDs. We should always use 64-bit (or longer) key IDs, like: 0x37E1C17570096AD1 or 0xEC4B033C70096AD1. TL;DR: This now gives two results: gpg --recv-key 70096AD1

Some background, and my two keys Years ago, I read dkg's instructions on migrating the Debian OpenPGP infrastructure. It told me that the time and effort I had spent getting my key into the strong set wasn't as useful as I thought it had been. I felt deflated. I had put in quite a bit of effort over the years to strongly-connect my key to a variety of signatures, and I had helped people get their own keys into the strong set this way. If I migrated off my old key and revoked it, I'd be abandoning some people for whom I was their only link into the strong set. And what fun it was to first become part of the strong set! And all the eyebrows I raised when I told people I was going meet up with people I met on a website called Biglumber... I even made it my Facebook.com user ID. So if I had to generate a new key, I decided I had better really love the short key ID. But at that point, I already felt pretty attached to the number 0x70096AD1. And I couldn't come up with anything better. So that settled it: no key upgrade until I had a new key whose ID is the same as my old key. That dream has become a reality. Search for my old key ID, and you get two keys!
$ gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-key 0x70096AD1
gpg: requesting key 70096AD1 from hkp server pgp.mit.edu
gpg: key 70096AD1: public key "Asheesh Laroia <asheesh@asheesh.org>" imported
gpg: key 70096AD1: public key "Asheesh Laroia <asheesh@asheesh.org>" imported
gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found
gpg: Total number processed: 2
gpg:               imported: 2  (RSA: 1)
I also saw it as an opportunity: I know that cryptography tools are tragically easy to mis-use. The use of 32-bit key IDs is fundamentally incorrect -- too little entropy. Maybe shocking people by creating two "identical" keys will help speed the transition away from this mis-use.

A neat stunt abusing --refresh-keys Thanks to a GNU Privacy Guard bug, it is super easy to get my new key. Let's say that, like many people, you only have my old key on your workstation:
$ gpg --list-keys   grep 70096AD1
pub   1024D/70096AD1 2005-12-28
Just ask GPG to refresh:
$ gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --refresh-keys
gpg: refreshing 1 key from hkp://pgp.mit.edu
gpg: requesting key 70096AD1 from hkp server pgp.mit.edu
gpg: key 70096AD1: public key "Asheesh Laroia <asheesh@asheesh.org>" imported
gpg: key 70096AD1: "Asheesh Laroia <asheesh@asheesh.org>" not changed
gpg: Total number processed: 2
gpg:               imported: 1  (RSA: 1)
gpg:              unchanged: 1
gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found
You can see that it set out to refresh just 1 key. It did that by querying the keyserver for the short ID. The keyserver provided two hits for that query. In the end, GPG refreshes one key and actually imports a new key into the keyring! Now you have two:
$ gpg --list-keys   grep 70096AD1
pub   1024D/70096AD1 2005-12-28
pub   4096R/70096AD1 2011-03-11
There is a bug filed in GNU Privacy Guard about this. It has a patch attached. There is, at the moment, no plan for a new release.

A faster attack, but nothing truly new My friend Venkatesh tells me there is an apocryphal old Perl script that could be used to generate key ID collisions. Here in the twenty-first century, l33t h4x0rz like Georgi Guninski are trying to create collisions. In May 2010, "halfdog" posted a note to the full-disclosure list that generates PGP keys with chosen short key IDs. I haven't benchmarked or tested that tool, but I have used a different tool (private for now) that can generate collisions in a similar fashion. It takes about 3 hours to loop through all key IDs on a dinky little netbook. You don't have to use any of these tools. You can just rent time on an elastic computing service or a botnet, or your own personal computer, and generate keys until you have a match. I think that it's easy to under-estimate the seriousness of this problem: tools like the PGP Key Pathfinder should be updated to only accept 64-bit (or longer) key IDs if we want to trust their output.

My offer: I will make you a key I've been spending some time wondering: What sort of exciting demonstration can I create to highlight that this is a real problem? Some ideas I've had:
  • Publish a private/public key pair whose key ID is the same as Phil Zimmerman's, original author of PGP
  • Publish a private/public key pair whose key ID is the same as Werner Koch's, maintainer of GNU Privacy Guard
  • Publish a set of public keys that mimic the entire PGP strong set, except where I control the private key of all these keys
The last one would be extremely amusing, and would be a hat-tip to some work discussed in Raph Levien's Google Tech Talk about Advogato. For now, here is my offer: If you send me a request signed with a key in the strong set, I will create a 4096-bit RSA public/private key pair whose 32-bit key ID is one greater than yours. So if you are 0x517DD4E4 I will generate 0x517DD4E5. I will post the keys here, along a note about who requested it, and instructions on how to import them into your keyring. (Note: I will politely decline to create a new key whose 32-bit key ID would create a collision; apologies if your key ID is just one away from someone else's.) P.S. The prize for best sarcastic retort goes to Ian Jackson. He said, "I should go and create a lot of keys with your key ID. I'll set the real name to 'Not Asheesh Laroia' so everyone is totally clear about what is going on."

16 December 2011

Jamie McClelland: Privilege Separation

What are the biggest security threats to my laptop? Almost all the software I install is vetted and signed by a member of the Debian team. I run reliable virus software on our mail server. My disk is encrypted and xscreensaver locks my screen after a few minutes of inactivity. What else? The two biggest threats I've recently considered are: web browsing and non-free software or software that doesn't come from Debian (I regularly have to use skype and zimbra, for example). To mitigate these risks, I've configured these programs to run as their own users, thus adding a layer of separation between the programs and my primary user account, which has access to my gpg/ssh keys and email. With a program like zimbra it's fairly easy. I created a zimbra user, added my primary account's public ssh key to /home/zimbra/.ssh/authorized_keys, and add the following stanza to ~/.ssh/config:
Host zimbra 
Hostname localhost 
User zimbra 
ForwardX11 yes
Now I can start zimbra with:
ssh zimbra ./zdesktop-launch
Skype was a little harder, since the skype client has to access the audio system. With pulseaudio, though, it's a snap. I copied /etc/pulse/default.pa to ~/.pulse/ and added the line:
load-module module-native-protocol-tcp auth-ip-acl=127.0.0.1
Then, I added /home/skype/.pulse/client.conf with the contents:
default-server = 127.0.0.1
[Note: Jamie Rollins and dkg have pointed out that this arrangement allows any user on my laptop to send arbitrary data to pulseaudio, running as my primay account. They suggested configuring pulseaudio to listen on a unix-domain socket, and then configuring pulseaudio to only permit access to users in a particular group.] iceweasel is the most complicated. In addition to the pulseaudio trick, I had to make two other allowances. First, there are a lot of processes that launch a web browser in a number of different ways (sometimes asking for a new session, other times adding a tab to an existing one, sometimes passing an URL as an argument, etc). The one that I got the most stuck on was mutt. Sometimes I want to see how an HTML message looks in iceweasel. Via mailcap, mutt creates a temp file with the html content and then launches a web browser to view the file. As can be reasonably expected, this temp file is owned by my primary user, and only read-able by the owner. That means my iceweasel user can't read it. Eventually, I decided the easiest way to deal with these various scenarios was to write a simple bash script to launch my web browser (see below). I registered it via update-alternatives, so most reasonable programs that want to launch a web browser will use it. The second issue is that I use the monkeysphere xul plugin to verify TLS certificates, which requires iceweasel to communicate with my monkeysphere validation agent. My agent runs as my primary user and by default only responds to queries from my primary user. Fortunately, monkeysphere is well-designed and can handle this situation. As you can see from my web launcher script, I pass MONKEYSPHEREVALIDATIONAGENTSOCKET=$MONKEYSPHEREVALIDATIONAGENTSOCKET when calling iceweasel. In addition, I added the following before I exec monkeysphere-validation-agent:
export MSVA_ALLOWED_USERS="iceweasel jamie"
With this simple infrastructure setup, it's possible to easily isolate future programs as well. Lastly... here's the script for launching iceweasel.
#!/bin/bash
stdin=
new_session=no
url=
for arg in "$@"; do
  if <span class="createlink"> &#34;&#36;arg&#34; &#61;&#126; &#94;-- </span>; then 
    if [ "$arg" = "--new-session" ]; then
      new_session=yes
    elif [ "$arg" = "--from-stdin" ]; then
      stdin=yes
    fi
  else
    url="$1"
  fi
done
if [ "$stdin" = "yes" ]; then
  temp=$(mktemp)
  while read line; do
    echo "$line" >> "$temp"
  done
  # it must be readable by the iceweasel user
  chmod 755 "$temp"
  url="file:///$temp"
fi
args=
if [ "$new_session" = "yes" ]; then
  args="--no-remote -ProfileManager"
fi
if [ -n "$url" ]; then
  args="$args '$url'"
fi
ssh iceweasel "MONKEYSPHERE_VALIDATION_AGENT_SOCKET=$MONKEYSPHERE_VALIDATION_AGENT_SOCKET iceweasel $args" &
[ -f "$temp" ] && sleep 5 && rm "$temp"
Comments by email... Hi, http://current.workingdirectory.net/posts/2011/privilege-separation/ has good intentions but afaik it does not improve security much. X applications can sniff your passwords and inject commands to your terminal emulators. I personally use xpra to get a similar solution without the hazards of X. I've been using it for two months now both at work and home. There are still bugs but svn version is getting better all the time. See for example my reply to https://grepular.com/ProtectingaLaptopfromSimpleandSophisticated_Attacks Timo

21 November 2011

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: Adobe leaves Linux AIR users vulnerable

A few months ago, Adobe announced a slew of vulnerabilities in its Flash Player, which is a critical component of Adobe AIR:
Adobe recommends users of Adobe AIR 2.6.19140 and earlier versions for Windows, Macintosh and Linux update to Adobe AIR 2.7.0.1948. [...] June 14, 2011 - Bulletin updated with information on Adobe AIR
However, looking at Adobe's instructions for installing AIR on "Linux" systems, we see that it is impossible for people running a free desktop OS to follow Adobe's own recommendations:
Beginning June 14 2011, Adobe AIR is no longer supported for desktop Linux distributions. Users can install and run AIR 2.6 and earlier applications but can't install or update to AIR 2.7. The last version to support desktop Linux distributions is AIR 2.6.
So on the exact same day, Adobe said "we recommend you upgrade, as the version you are using is vulnerable" and "we offer you no way to upgrade". I'm left with the conclusion that Adobe's aggregate corporate message is "users of desktops based on free software should immediately uninstall AIR and stop using it". If Adobe's software was free, and they had a community around it, they could turn over support to the community if they found it too burdensome. Instead, once again, users of proprietary tools on free systems get screwed by the proprietary vendor. And they wonder why we tend to be less likely to install their tools? Application developers should avoid targeting AIR as a platform if they want to reach everyone.Tags: adobe, proprietary software, security

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