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13 September 2017

Vincent Bernat: Route-based IPsec VPN on Linux with strongSwan

A common way to establish an IPsec tunnel on Linux is to use an IKE daemon, like the one from the strongSwan project, with a minimal configuration1:
conn V2-1
  left        = 2001:db8:1::1
  leftsubnet  = 2001:db8:a1::/64
  right       = 2001:db8:2::1
  rightsubnet = 2001:db8:a2::/64
  authby      = psk
  auto        = route
The same configuration can be used on both sides. Each side will figure out if it is left or right . The IPsec site-to-site tunnel endpoints are 2001:db8: 1::1 and 2001:db8: 2::1. The protected subnets are 2001:db8: a1::/64 and 2001:db8: a2::/64. As a result, strongSwan configures the following policies in the kernel:
$ ip xfrm policy
src 2001:db8:a1::/64 dst 2001:db8:a2::/64
        dir out priority 399999 ptype main
        tmpl src 2001:db8:1::1 dst 2001:db8:2::1
                proto esp reqid 4 mode tunnel
src 2001:db8:a2::/64 dst 2001:db8:a1::/64
        dir fwd priority 399999 ptype main
        tmpl src 2001:db8:2::1 dst 2001:db8:1::1
                proto esp reqid 4 mode tunnel
src 2001:db8:a2::/64 dst 2001:db8:a1::/64
        dir in priority 399999 ptype main
        tmpl src 2001:db8:2::1 dst 2001:db8:1::1
                proto esp reqid 4 mode tunnel
[ ]
This kind of IPsec tunnel is a policy-based VPN: encapsulation and decapsulation are governed by these policies. Each of them contains the following elements: When a matching policy is found, the kernel will look for a corresponding security association (using reqid and the endpoint source and destination addresses):
$ ip xfrm state
src 2001:db8:1::1 dst 2001:db8:2::1
        proto esp spi 0xc1890b6e reqid 4 mode tunnel
        replay-window 0 flag af-unspec
        auth-trunc hmac(sha256) 0x5b68[ ]8ba2904 128
        enc cbc(aes) 0x8e0e377ad8fd91e8553648340ff0fa06
        anti-replay context: seq 0x0, oseq 0x0, bitmap 0x00000000
[ ]
If no security association is found, the packet is put on hold and the IKE daemon is asked to negotiate an appropriate one. Otherwise, the packet is encapsulated. The receiving end identifies the appropriate security association using the SPI in the header. Two security associations are needed to establish a bidirectionnal tunnel:
$ tcpdump -pni eth0 -c2 -s0 esp
13:07:30.871150 IP6 2001:db8:1::1 > 2001:db8:2::1: ESP(spi=0xc1890b6e,seq=0x222)
13:07:30.872297 IP6 2001:db8:2::1 > 2001:db8:1::1: ESP(spi=0xcf2426b6,seq=0x204)
All IPsec implementations are compatible with policy-based VPNs. However, some configurations are difficult to implement. For example, consider the following proposition for redundant site-to-site VPNs: Redundant VPNs between 3 sites A possible configuration between V1-1 and V2-1 could be:
conn V1-1-to-V2-1
  left        = 2001:db8:1::1
  leftsubnet  = 2001:db8:a1::/64,2001:db8:a6::cc:1/128,2001:db8:a6::cc:5/128
  right       = 2001:db8:2::1
  rightsubnet = 2001:db8:a2::/64,2001:db8:a6::/64,2001:db8:a8::/64
  authby      = psk
  keyexchange = ikev2
  auto        = route
Each time a subnet is modified on one site, the configurations need to be updated on all sites. Moreover, overlapping subnets (2001:db8: a6::/64 on one side and 2001:db8: a6::cc:1/128 at the other) can also be problematic. The alternative is to use route-based VPNs: any packet traversing a pseudo-interface will be encapsulated using a security policy bound to the interface. This brings two features:
  1. Routing daemons can be used to distribute routes to be protected by the VPN. This decreases the administrative burden when many subnets are present on each side.
  2. Encapsulation and decapsulation can be executed in a different routing instance or namespace. This enables a clean separation between a private routing instance (where VPN users are) and a public routing instance (where VPN endpoints are).

Route-based VPN on Juniper Before looking at how to achieve that on Linux, let s have a look at the way it works with a JunOS-based platform (like a Juniper vSRX). This platform as long-standing history of supporting route-based VPNs (a feature already present in the Netscreen ISG platform). Let s assume we want to configure the IPsec VPN from V3-2 to V1-1. First, we need to configure the tunnel interface and bind it to the private routing instance containing only internal routes (with IPv4, they would have been RFC 1918 routes):
interfaces  
    st0  
        unit 1  
            family inet6  
                address 2001:db8:ff::7/127;
             
         
     
 
routing-instances  
    private  
        instance-type virtual-router;
        interface st0.1;
     
 
The second step is to configure the VPN:
security  
    /* Phase 1 configuration */
    ike  
        proposal IKE-P1  
            authentication-method pre-shared-keys;
            dh-group group20;
            encryption-algorithm aes-256-gcm;
         
        policy IKE-V1-1  
            mode main;
            proposals IKE-P1;
            pre-shared-key ascii-text "d8bdRxaY22oH1j89Z2nATeYyrXfP9ga6xC5mi0RG1uc";
         
        gateway GW-V1-1  
            ike-policy IKE-V1-1;
            address 2001:db8:1::1;
            external-interface lo0.1;
            general-ikeid;
            version v2-only;
         
     
    /* Phase 2 configuration */
    ipsec  
        proposal ESP-P2  
            protocol esp;
            encryption-algorithm aes-256-gcm;
         
        policy IPSEC-V1-1  
            perfect-forward-secrecy keys group20;
            proposals ESP-P2;
         
        vpn VPN-V1-1  
            bind-interface st0.1;
            df-bit copy;
            ike  
                gateway GW-V1-1;
                ipsec-policy IPSEC-V1-1;
             
            establish-tunnels on-traffic;
         
     
 
We get a route-based VPN because we bind the st0.1 interface to the VPN-V1-1 VPN. Once the VPN is up, any packet entering st0.1 will be encapsulated and sent to the 2001:db8: 1::1 endpoint. The last step is to configure BGP in the private routing instance to exchange routes with the remote site:
routing-instances  
    private  
        routing-options  
            router-id 1.0.3.2;
            maximum-paths 16;
         
        protocols  
            bgp  
                preference 140;
                log-updown;
                group v4-VPN  
                    type external;
                    local-as 65003;
                    hold-time 6;
                    neighbor 2001:db8:ff::6 peer-as 65001;
                    multipath;
                    export [ NEXT-HOP-SELF OUR-ROUTES NOTHING ];
                 
             
         
     
 
The export filter OUR-ROUTES needs to select the routes to be advertised to the other peers. For example:
policy-options  
    policy-statement OUR-ROUTES  
        term 10  
            from  
                protocol ospf3;
                route-type internal;
             
            then  
                metric 0;
                accept;
             
         
     
 
The configuration needs to be repeated for the other peers. The complete version is available on GitHub. Once the BGP sessions are up, we start learning routes from the other sites. For example, here is the route for 2001:db8: a1::/64:
> show route 2001:db8:a1::/64 protocol bgp table private.inet6.0 best-path
private.inet6.0: 15 destinations, 19 routes (15 active, 0 holddown, 0 hidden)
+ = Active Route, - = Last Active, * = Both
2001:db8:a1::/64   *[BGP/140] 01:12:32, localpref 100, from 2001:db8:ff::6
                      AS path: 65001 I, validation-state: unverified
                      to 2001:db8:ff::6 via st0.1
                    > to 2001:db8:ff::14 via st0.2
It was learnt both from V1-1 (through st0.1) and V1-2 (through st0.2). The route is part of the private routing instance but encapsulated packets are sent/received in the public routing instance. No route-leaking is needed for this configuration. The VPN cannot be used as a gateway from internal hosts to external hosts (or vice-versa). This could also have been done with JunOS security policies (stateful firewall rules) but doing the separation with routing instances also ensure routes from different domains are not mixed and a simple policy misconfiguration won t lead to a disaster.

Route-based VPN on Linux Starting from Linux 3.15, a similar configuration is possible with the help of a virtual tunnel interface3. First, we create the private namespace:
# ip netns add private
# ip netns exec private sysctl -qw net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1
Any private interface needs to be moved to this namespace (no IP is configured as we can use IPv6 link-local addresses):
# ip link set netns private dev eth1
# ip link set netns private dev eth2
# ip netns exec private ip link set up dev eth1
# ip netns exec private ip link set up dev eth2
Then, we create vti6, a tunnel interface (similar to st0.1 in the JunOS example):
# ip tunnel add vti6 \
   mode vti6 \
   local 2001:db8:1::1 \
   remote 2001:db8:3::2 \
   key 6
# ip link set netns private dev vti6
# ip netns exec private ip addr add 2001:db8:ff::6/127 dev vti6
# ip netns exec private sysctl -qw net.ipv4.conf.vti6.disable_policy=1
# ip netns exec private sysctl -qw net.ipv4.conf.vti6.disable_xfrm=1
# ip netns exec private ip link set vti6 mtu 1500
# ip netns exec private ip link set vti6 up
The tunnel interface is created in the initial namespace and moved to the private one. It will remember its original namespace where it will process encapsulated packets. Any packet entering the interface will temporarily get a firewall mark of 6 that will be used only to match the appropriate IPsec policy4 below. The kernel sets a low MTU on the interface to handle any possible combination of ciphers and protocols. We set it to 1500 and let PMTUD do its work. We can then configure strongSwan5:
conn V3-2
  left        = 2001:db8:1::1
  leftsubnet  = ::/0
  right       = 2001:db8:3::2
  rightsubnet = ::/0
  authby      = psk
  mark        = 6
  auto        = route
  keyexchange = ikev2
  keyingtries = %forever
  ike         = aes256gcm16-prfsha384-ecp384!
  esp         = aes256gcm16-prfsha384-ecp384!
  mobike      = no
The IKE daemon configures the following policies in the kernel:
$ ip xfrm policy
src ::/0 dst ::/0
        dir out priority 399999 ptype main
        mark 0x6/0xffffffff
        tmpl src 2001:db8:1::1 dst 2001:db8:3::2
                proto esp reqid 1 mode tunnel
src ::/0 dst ::/0
        dir fwd priority 399999 ptype main
        mark 0x6/0xffffffff
        tmpl src 2001:db8:3::2 dst 2001:db8:1::1
                proto esp reqid 1 mode tunnel
src ::/0 dst ::/0
        dir in priority 399999 ptype main
        mark 0x6/0xffffffff
        tmpl src 2001:db8:3::2 dst 2001:db8:1::1
                proto esp reqid 1 mode tunnel
[ ]
Those policies are used for any source or destination as long as the firewall mark is equal to 6, which matches the mark configured for the tunnel interface. The last step is to configure BGP to exchange routes. We can use BIRD for this:
router id 1.0.1.1;
protocol device  
   scan time 10;
 
protocol kernel  
   persist;
   learn;
   import all;
   export all;
   merge paths yes;
 
protocol bgp IBGP_V3_2  
   local 2001:db8:ff::6 as 65001;
   neighbor 2001:db8:ff::7 as 65003;
   import all;
   export where ifname ~ "eth*";
   preference 160;
   hold time 6;
 
Once BIRD is started in the private namespace, we can check routes are learned correctly:
$ ip netns exec private ip -6 route show 2001:db8:a3::/64
2001:db8:a3::/64 proto bird metric 1024
        nexthop via 2001:db8:ff::5  dev vti5 weight 1
        nexthop via 2001:db8:ff::7  dev vti6 weight 1
The above route was learnt from both V3-1 (through vti5) and V3-2 (through vti6). Like for the JunOS version, there is no route-leaking between the private namespace and the initial one. The VPN cannot be used as a gateway between the two namespaces, only for encapsulation. This also prevent a misconfiguration (for example, IKE daemon not running) from allowing packets to leave the private network. As a bonus, unencrypted traffic can be observed with tcpdump on the tunnel interface:
$ ip netns exec private tcpdump -pni vti6 icmp6
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode
listening on vti6, link-type LINUX_SLL (Linux cooked), capture size 262144 bytes
20:51:15.258708 IP6 2001:db8:a1::1 > 2001:db8:a3::1: ICMP6, echo request, seq 69
20:51:15.260874 IP6 2001:db8:a3::1 > 2001:db8:a1::1: ICMP6, echo reply, seq 69
You can find all the configuration files for this example on GitHub. The documentation of strongSwan also features a page about route-based VPNs.

  1. Everything in this post should work with Libreswan.
  2. fwd is for incoming packets on non-local addresses. It only makes sense in transport mode and is a Linux-only particularity.
  3. Virtual tunnel interfaces (VTI) were introduced in Linux 3.6 (for IPv4) and Linux 3.12 (for IPv6). Appropriate namespace support was added in 3.15. KLIPS, an alternative out-of-tree stack available since Linux 2.2, also features tunnel interfaces.
  4. The mark is set right before doing a policy lookup and restored after that. Consequently, it doesn t affect other possible uses (filtering, routing). However, as Netfilter can also set a mark, one should be careful for conflicts.
  5. The ciphers used here are the strongest ones currently possible while keeping compatibility with JunOS. The documentation for strongSwan contains a complete list of supported algorithms as well as security recommendations to choose them.

Reproducible builds folks: Reproducible Builds: Weekly report #124

Here's what happened in the Reproducible Builds effort between Sunday September 3 and Saturday September 9 2017: Media coverage GSoC and Outreachy updates Debian will participate in this year's Outreachy initiative and the Reproducible Builds is soliciting mentors and students to join this round. For more background please see the following mailing list posts: 1, 2 & 3. Reproduciblity work in Debian In addition, the following NMUs were accepted: Reproduciblity work in other projects Patches sent upstream: Packages reviewed and fixed, and bugs filed Reviews of unreproducible packages 3 package reviews have been added, 2 have been updated and 2 have been removed in this week, adding to our knowledge about identified issues. Weekly QA work During our reproducibility testing, FTBFS bugs have been detected and reported by: diffoscope development Development continued in git, including the following contributions: Mattia Rizzolo also uploaded the version 86 released last week to stretch-backports. reprotest development tests.reproducible-builds.org Misc. This week's edition was written by Bernhard M. Wiedemann, Chris Lamb, Holger Levsen, Mattia Rizzolo & reviewed by a bunch of Reproducible Builds folks on IRC & the mailing lists.

12 September 2017

Markus Koschany: My Free Software Activities in August 2017

Welcome to gambaru.de. Here is my monthly report that covers what I have been doing for Debian. If you re interested in Java, Games and LTS topics, this might be interesting for you. DebConf 17 in Montreal I traveled to DebConf 17 in Montreal/Canada. I arrived on 04. August and met a lot of different people which I only knew by name so far. I think this is definitely one of the best aspects of real life meetings, putting names to faces and getting to know someone better. I totally enjoyed my stay and I would like to thank all the people who were involved in organizing this event. You rock! I also gave a talk about the The past, present and future of Debian Games , listened to numerous other talks and got a nice sunburn which luckily turned into a more brownish color when I returned home on 12. August. The only negative experience I made was with my airline which was supposed to fly me home to Frankfurt again. They decided to cancel the flight one hour before check-in for unknown reasons and just gave me a telephone number to sort things out. No support whatsoever. Fortunately (probably not for him) another DebConf attendee suffered the same fate and together we could find another flight with Royal Air Maroc the same day. And so we made a short trip to Casablanca/Morocco and eventually arrived at our final destination in Frankfurt a few hours later. So which airline should you avoid at all costs (they still haven t responded to my refund claims) ? It s WoW-Air from Iceland. (just wow) Debian Games Debian Java Debian LTS This was my eighteenth month as a paid contributor and I have been paid to work 20,25 hours on Debian LTS, a project started by Rapha l Hertzog. In that time I did the following: Non-maintainer upload Thanks for reading and see you next time.

Arturo Borrero Gonz lez: Google Hangouts in Debian testing (Buster)

debian-suricata logo Google offers a lot of software components packaged specifically for Debian and Debian-like Linux distributions. Examples are: Chrome, Earth and the Hangouts plugin. Also, there are many other Internet services doing the same: Spotify, Dropbox, etc. I m really grateful for them, since this make our life easier. Problem is that our ecosystem is rather complex, with many distributions and many versions out there. I guess is not an easy task for them to keep such a big variety of support variations. In this particular case, it seems Google doesn t support Debian testing in their .deb packages. In this case, testing means Debian Buster. And the same happens with the official Spotify client package. I ve identified several issues with them, to name a few: I m in need of using Google Hangout so I ve been forced to solve this situation by editing the .deb package provided by Google. Simple steps:
% user@debian:~ $ mkdir pkg
% user@debian:~ $ cd pkg/
% user@debian:~/pkg $ wget https://dl.google.com/linux/direct/google-talkplugin_current_amd64.deb
[...]
% user@debian:~/pkg $ dpkg-deb -R google-talkplugin_current_amd64.deb google-talkplugin_current_amd64/
% user@debian:~/pkg $ nano google-talkplugin_current_amd64/DEBIAN/control
% user@debian:~/pkg $ dpkg -b google-talkplugin_current_amd64
% user@debian:~/pkg $ sudo dpkg -i google-talkpluging_current_amd64.deb
I have yet to investigate how to workaround the lsb-core thing, so still I can t use Google Earth.

11 September 2017

Steinar H. Gunderson: rANS encoding of signed coefficients

I'm currently trying to make sense of some still image coding (more details to come at a much later stage!), and for a variety of reasons, I've chosen to use rANS as the entropy coder. However, there's an interesting little detail that I haven't actually seen covered anywhere; maybe it's just because I've missed something, or maybe because it's too blindingly obvious, but I thought I would document what I ended up with anyway. (I had hoped for something even more elegant, but I guess the obvious would have to do.) For those that don't know rANS coding, let me try to handwave it as much as possible. Your state is typically a single word (in my case, a 32-bit word), which is refilled from the input stream as needed. The encoder and decoder works in reverse order; let's just talk about the decoder. Basically it works by looking at the lowest 12 (or whatever) bits of the decoder state, mapping each of those 2^12 slots to a decoded symbol. More common symbols are given more slots, proportionally to the frequency. Let me just write a tiny, tiny example with 2 bits and three symbols instead, giving four slots:
Lowest bits Symbol
00 0
01 0
10 1
11 2
Note that the zero coefficient here maps to one out of two slots (ie., a range); you don't choose which one yourself, the encoder stashes some information in there (which is used to recover the next control word once you know which symbol there is). Now for the actual problem: When storing DCT coefficients, we typically want to also store a sign (ie., not just 1 or 2, but also -1/+1 and -2/+2). The statistical distribution is symmetrical, so the sign bit is incompressible (except that of course there's no sign bit needed for 0). We could have done this by introducing new symbols -1 and -2 in addition to our three other ones, but this means we'll need more bits of precision, and accordingly larger look-up tables (which is negative for performance). So let's find something better. We could also simply store it separately somehow; if the coefficient is non-zero, store the bits in some separate repository. Perhaps more elegantly, you can encode a second symbol in the rANS stream with probability 1/2, but this is more expensive computationally. But both of these have the problem that they're divergent in terms of control flow; nonzero coefficients potentially need to do a lot of extra computation and even loads. This isn't nice for SIMD, and it's not nice for GPU. It's generally not really nice. The solution I ended up with was simulating a larger table with a smaller one. Simply rotate the table so that the zero symbol has the top slots instead of the bottom slots, and then replicate the rest of the table. For instance, take this new table:
Lowest bits Symbol
000 1
001 2
010 0
011 0
100 0
101 0
110 -1
111 -2
(The observant reader will note that this doesn't describe the exact same distribution as last time zero has twice the relative frequency as in the other table but ignore that for the time being.) In this case, the bottom half of the table doesn't actually need to be stored! We know that if the three bottom bits are >= 110 (6 in decimal), we have a negative value, can subtract 6, and then continue decoding. If we are go past the end of our 2-bit table despite that, we know we are decoding a zero coefficient (which doesn't have a sign), so we can just clamp the read; or for a GPU, reads out-of-bounds on a texture will typically return 0 anyway. So it all works nicely, and the divergent I/O is gone. If this pickled your interest, you probably want to read up on rANS in general; Fabian Giesen (aka ryg) has some notes that work as a good starting point, but beware; some of this is pretty confusing. :-)

10 September 2017

Adnan Hodzic: Secure traffic to ZNC on Synology with Let s Encrypt

I ve been using IRC since late 1990 s, and I continue to do so to this day due to it (still) being one of the driving development forces in various open source communities. Especially in Linux development and some of my acquintances I can only get in touch with via IRC :) My Setup On my Synology NAS I run ZNC (IRC bouncer/proxy) to which I connect using various IRC clients (irssi/XChat Azure/AndChat) from various platforms (Linux/Mac/Android). In this case ZNC serves as a gateway and no matter which device/client I connect from, I m always connected to same IRC servers/chat rooms/settings when I left off. This is all fine and dandy, but connecting from external networks to ZNC means you will hand in your ZNC credentials in plain text. Which is a problem for me, even thought we re only talking about IRC bouncer/proxy. With that said, how do we encrypt external traffic to our ZNC? HowTo: Chat securely with ZNC on Synology using Let s Encrypt SSL certificate For reference or more thorough explanation of some of the steps/topics please refer to: Secure (HTTPS) public access to Synology NAS using Let s Encrypt (free) SSL certificate

Requirements:

1: DNS setup Create A record for sub/domain you d like to use to connect to your ZNC and point it to your Synology NAS external (WAN) IP. For your reference, subdomain I ll use is: irc.hodzic.org 2: Create Let s Encrypt certificate
DSM: Control Panel > Security > Certificates > Add
Followed by:
Add a new certificate > Get a certificate from Let's Encrypt
Followed by adding domain name A record was created for in Step 1, i.e: Get a certificate from Let's Encrypt for irc.hodzic.org After certificate is created, don t forget to configure newly created certificate to point to correct domain name, i.e: Configure Let's Encrypt Certificate 3: Install ZNC In case you already have ZNC installed, I suggest you remove it and do a clean install. Mainly due to some problems with package in past, where ZNC wouldn t start automatically on boot which lead to creating projects like: synology-znc-autostart. In latest version, all of these problems have been fixed and couple of new features have been added. ZNC can be installed using Synology s Package Center, if community package sources are enabled. Which can simply be done by adding new package sources:
Name: SynoCommunity
Location: http://packages.synocommunity.com
Enable Community package sources in Synology Package Center To successfuly authenticate newly added source, under General tab, Trust Level should be set to Any publisher As part of installation process, ZNC config will be run with most sane/useful options and admin user will be created allowing you access to ZNC webadmin. 4: Secure access to ZNC webadmin Now we want to bind our sub/domain created in Step 1 to ZNC webadmin, and secure external access to it. This can be done by creating a reverse proxy. As part of this, you need to know which port has been allocated for SSL in ZNC Webadmin, i.e: ZNC Webadmin > Global settings - Listen Ports In this case, we can see it s 8251. Reverse Proxy can be created in:
DSM: Control Panel > Application Portal > Reverse Proxy > Create
Where sub/domain created in Step 1 needs to be point to ZNC SSL port on localhost, i.e: Reverse proxy: irc.hodzic.org setup ZNC Webadmin is now available via HTTPS on external network for the sub/domain you setup as part of Step 1, or in my case: ZNC webadmin (HTTPS) As part of this step, in ZNC webadmin I d advise you to create IRC servers and chatrooms you would like to connect to later. Step 5: Create .pem file from LetsEncrpyt certificate for ZNC to use On Synology, Let s Encrypt certificates are stored and located on:
/usr/syno/etc/certificate/_archive/
In case you have multiple certificates, based on date your certificate was created, you can determine in which directory is your newly generated certificated stored, i.e:
drwx------ 2 root root 4096 Sep 10 12:57 JeRh3Y
Once it s determined which certifiate is the one we want use, generate .pem by running following: sudo cat /usr/syno/etc/certificate/_archive/JeRh3Y/ privkey,cert,chain .pem > /usr/local/znc/var/znc.pem After this restart ZNC: sudo /var/packages/znc/scripts/start-stop-status stop && sudo /var/packages/znc/scripts/start-stop-status start 6: Configure IRC client In this example I ll use XChat Azure on MacOS, and same procedure should be identical for HexChat/XChat clients on any other platform. Altough all information is picked up from ZNC itself, user details will need to be filled in. In my setup I automatically connect to freenode and oftc networks, so I created two for local network and two for external network usage, later is the one we re concentrating on. On General tab of our newly created server, hostname for our server should be the sub/domain we ve setup as part of Step 1 , and port number should be the one we defined in Step 4 , SSL checkbox must be checked. Xchat Azure: Network list - General tab On Connecting tab Server password field needs to be filled in following format:
johndoe/freenode:password
Where, johndoe is ZNC username. freenode is ZNC network name, and password is ZNC password. Xchat Azure: Network list - Connecting tab freenode in this case must first be created as part of ZNC webadmin configuration, mentioned in step 4 . Same case is for oftc network configuration. As part of establishing the connection, information about our Let s Encrypt certificate will be displayed, after which connection will be established and you ll be automatically logged into all chatrooms. Happy hacking!

intrigeri: Can you reproduce this Tails ISO image?

Thanks to a Mozilla Open Source Software award, we have been working on making the Tails ISO images build reproducibly. We have made huge progress: since a few months, ISO images built by Tails core developers and our CI system have always been identical. But we're not done yet and we need your help! Our first call for testing build reproducibility in August uncovered a number of remaining issues. We think that we have fixed them all since, and we now want to find out what other problems may prevent you from building our ISO image reproducibly. Please try to build an ISO image today, and tell us whether it matches ours! Build an ISO These instructions have been tested on Debian Stretch and testing/sid. If you're using another distribution, you may need to adjust them. If you get stuck at some point in the process, see our more detailed build documentation and don't hesitate to contact us: Setup the build environment You need a system that supports KVM, 1 GiB of free memory, and about 20 GiB of disk space.
  1. Install the build dependencies:
    sudo apt install \
        git \
        rake \
        libvirt-daemon-system \
        dnsmasq-base \
        ebtables \
        qemu-system-x86 \
        qemu-utils \
        vagrant \
        vagrant-libvirt \
        vmdebootstrap && \
    sudo systemctl restart libvirtd
    
  2. Ensure your user is in the relevant groups:
    for group in kvm libvirt libvirt-qemu ; do
       sudo adduser "$(whoami)" "$group"
    done
    
  3. Logout and log back in to apply the new group memberships.
Build Tails 3.2~alpha2 This should produce a Tails ISO image:
git clone https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails && \
cd tails && \
git checkout 3.2-alpha2 && \
git submodule update --init && \
rake build
Send us feedback! No matter how your build attempt turned out we are interested in your feedback. Gather system information To gather the information we need about your system, run the following commands in the terminal where you've run rake build:
sudo apt install apt-show-versions && \
(
  for f in /etc/issue /proc/cpuinfo
  do
    echo "--- File: $ f  ---"
    cat "$ f "
    echo
  done
  for c in free locale env 'uname -a' '/usr/sbin/libvirtd --version' \
            'qemu-system-x86_64 --version' 'vagrant --version'
  do
    echo "--- Command: $ c  ---"
    eval "$ c "
    echo
  done
  echo '--- APT package versions ---'
  apt-show-versions qemu:amd64 linux-image-amd64:amd64 vagrant \
                    libvirt0:amd64
)   bzip2 > system-info.txt.bz2
Then check that the generated file doesn't contain any sensitive information you do not want to leak:
bzless system-info.txt.bz2
Next, please follow the instructions below that match your situation! If the build failed Sorry about that. Please help us fix it by opening a ticket: If the build succeeded Compute the SHA-512 checksum of the resulting ISO image:
sha512sum tails-amd64-3.2~alpha2.iso
Compare your checksum with ours:
9b4e9e7ee7b2ab6a3fb959d4e4a2db346ae322f9db5409be4d5460156fa1101c23d834a1886c0ce6bef2ed6fe378a7e76f03394c7f651cc4c9a44ba608dda0bc
If the checksums match: success, congrats for reproducing Tails 3.2~alpha2! Please send an email to tails-dev@boum.org (public) or tails@boum.org (private) with the subject "Reproduction of Tails 3.2~alpha2 successful" and system-info.txt.bz2 attached. Thanks in advance! Then you can stop reading here. Else, if the checksums differ: too bad, but really it's good news as the whole point of the exercise is precisely to identify such problems :) Now you are in a great position to help improve the reproducibility of Tails ISO images by following these instructions:
  1. Install diffoscope version 83 or higher and all the packages it recommends. For example, if you're using Debian Stretch:
    sudo apt remove diffoscope && \
    echo 'deb http://ftp.debian.org/debian stretch-backports main' \
        sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/stretch-backports.list && \
    sudo apt update && \
    sudo apt -o APT::Install-Recommends="true" \
             install diffoscope/stretch-backports
    
  2. Download the official Tails 3.2~alpha2 ISO image.
  3. Compare the official Tails 3.2~alpha2 ISO image with yours:
    diffoscope \
           --text diffoscope.txt \
           --html diffoscope.html \
           --max-report-size 262144000 \
           --max-diff-block-lines 10000 \
           --max-diff-input-lines 10000000 \
           path/to/official/tails-amd64-3.2~alpha2.iso \
           path/to/your/own/tails-amd64-3.2~alpha2.iso
    bzip2 diffoscope. txt,html 
    
  4. Send an email to tails-dev@boum.org (public) or tails@boum.org (private) with the subject "Reproduction of Tails 3.2~alpha2 failed", attaching:
    • system-info.txt.bz2;
    • the smallest file among diffoscope.txt.bz2 and diffoscope.html.bz2, except if they are larger than 100 KiB, in which case better upload the file somewhere (e.g. share.riseup.net and share the link in your email.
Thanks a lot! Credits Thanks to Ulrike & anonym who authored a draft on which this blog post is based.

Sylvain Beucler: dot-zed archive file format

TL,DR: I reverse-engineered the .zed encrypted archive format.
Following a clean-room design, I'm providing a description that can be implemented by a third-party.
Interested? :) (reference version at: https://www.beuc.net/zed/) .zed archive file format Introduction Archives with the .zed extension are conceptually similar to an encrypted .zip file. In addition to a specific format, .zed files support multiple users: files are encrypted using the archive master key, which itself is encrypted for each user and/or authentication method (password, RSA key through certificate or PKCS#11 token). Metadata such as filenames is partially encrypted. .zed archives are used as stand-alone or attached to e-mails with the help of a MS Outlook plugin. A variant, which is not covered here, can encrypt/decrypt MS Windows folders on the fly like ecryptfs. In the spirit of academic and independent research this document provides a description of the file format and encryption algorithms for this encrypted file archive. See the conventions section for conventions and acronyms used in this document. Structure overview The .zed file format is composed of several layers. Or as a diagram:
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  .zed archive (MS-CBF)                                                                               
                                                                                                      
   stream #1                         stream #2                       stream #3...                     
  +------------------------------+  +---------------------------+  +---------------------------+      
    metadata (MS-OLEPS)               encryption (AES)               encryption (AES)                 
                                      512-bytes chunks               512-bytes chunks                 
    +--------------------------+                                                                      
      obfuscation (static key)        +-----------------------+      +-----------------------+        
      +----------------------+       -  compression (zlib)     -    -  compression (zlib)     -       
       _ctlfile (TLV)                                                                            ...  
      +----------------------+          +---------------+              +---------------+               
    +--------------------------+          file contents                  file contents                
                                                                                                      
    +--------------------------+     -  +---------------+      -    -  +---------------+      -       
      _catalog (TLV)                                                                                  
    +--------------------------+      +-----------------------+      +-----------------------+        
  +------------------------------+  +---------------------------+  +---------------------------+      
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Encryption schemes Several AES key sizes are supported, such as 128 and 256 bits. The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) block cipher mode of operation is used to decrypt multiple AES 16-byte blocks, which means an initialisation vector (IV) is stored in clear along with the ciphertext. All filenames and file contents are encrypted using the same encryption mode, key and IV (e.g. if you remove and re-add a file in the archive, the resulting stream will be identical). No cleartext padding is used during encryption; instead, several end-of-stream handlers are available, so the ciphertext has exactly the size of the cleartext (e.g. the size of the compressed file). The following variants were identified in the 'encryption_mode' field. STREAM This is the end-of-stream handler for: This end-of-stream handler is apparently specific to the .zed format, and applied when the cleartext's does not end on a 16-byte boundary ; in this case special processing is performed on the last partial 16-byte block. The encryption and decryption phases are identical: let's assume the last partial block of cleartext (for encryption) or ciphertext (for decryption) was appended after all the complete 16-byte blocks of ciphertext: In either case, if the full ciphertext is less then one AES block (< 16 bytes), then the IV is used instead of the second-to-last block. CTS CTS or CipherText Stealing is the end-of-stream handler for: It matches the CBC-CS3 variant as described in Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode. Empty cleartext Since empty filenames or metadata are invalid, and since all files are compressed (resulting in a minimum 8-byte zlib cleartext), no empty cleartext was encrypted in the archive. metadata stream It is named 05356861616161716149656b7a6565636e576a33317a7868304e63 (hexadecimal), i.e. the character with code 5 followed by '5haaaaqaIekzeecnWj31zxh0Nc' (ASCII). The format used is OLE Property Set (MS-OLEPS). It introduces 2 property names "_ctlfile" (index 3) and "_catalog" (index 4), and 2 instances of said properties each containing an application-specific VT_BLOB (type 0x0041). _ctlfile: obfuscated global properties and access list This subpart is stored under index 3 ("_ctlfile") of the MS-OLEPS metadata. It consists of: The ciphertext is encrypted with AES-CBC "STREAM" mode using 128-bit static key 37F13CF81C780AF26B6A52654F794AEF (hexadecimal) and the prepended IV so as to obfuscate the access list. The ciphertext is continuous and not split in chunks (unlike files), even when it is larger than 512 bytes. The decrypted text contain properties in a TLV format as described in _ctlfile TLV: Archives may include "mandatory" users that cannot be removed. They are typically used to add an enterprise wide recovery RSA key to all archives. Extreme care must be taken to protect these key, as it can decrypt all past archives generated from within that company. _catalog: file list This subpart is stored under index 4 ("_catalog") of the MS-OLEPS metadata. It contains a series of 'fileprops' TLV structures, one for each file or directory. The file hierarchy can be reconstructed by checking the 'parent_id' field of each file entry. If 'parent_id' is 0 then the file is located at the top-level of the hierarchy, otherwise it's located under the directory with the matching 'file_id'. TLV format This format is a series of fields : Value semantics depend on its Type. It may contain an uint32be integer, a UTF-16LE string, a character sequence, or an inner TLV structure. Unless otherwise noted, TLV structures appear once. Some fields are optional and may not be present at all (e.g. 'archive_createdwith'). Some fields are unique within a structure (e.g. 'files_iv'), other may be repeated within a structure to form a list (e.g. 'fileprops' and 'passworduser'). The following top-level types that have been identified, and detailed in the next sections: Some additional unidentified types may be present. _ctlfile TLV _catalog TLV Decrypting the archive AES key rsauser The user accessing the archive will be authenticated by comparing his/her X509 certificate with the one stored in the 'certificate' field using DER format. The 'files_key_ciphertext' field is then decrypted using the PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption mechanism, with the private key that matches the user certificate. passworduser An intermediary user key, a user IV and an integrity checksum will be derived from the user password, using the deprecated PKCS#12 method as described at rfc7292 appendix B. Note: this is not PKCS#5 (nor PBKDF1/PBKDF2), this is an incompatible method from PKCS#12 that notably does not use HMAC. The 'pkcs12_hashfunc' field defines the underlying hash function. The following values have been identified: PBA - Password-based authentication The user accessing the archive will be authenticated by deriving an 8-byte sequence from his/her password. The parameters for the derivation function are: The derivation is checked against 'pba_checksum'. PBE - Password-based encryption Once the user is identified, 2 new values are derived from the password with different parameters to produce the IV and the key decryption key, with the same hash function: The parameters specific to user key are: The user key needs to be truncated to a length of 'encryption_strength', as specified in bytes in the archive properties. The parameters specific to user IV are: Once the key decryption key and the IV are derived, 'files_key_ciphertext' is decrypted using AES CBC, with PKCS#7 padding. Identifying file streams The name of the MS-CFB stream is derived by shuffling the bytes from the 'file_id' field and then encoding the result as hexadecimal. The reordering is:
Initial  offset: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Shuffled offset: 3 2 1 0 5 4 7 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
The 16th byte is usually a NUL byte, hence the stream identifier is a 30-character-long string. Decrypting files The compressed stream is split in chunks of 512 bytes, each of them encrypted separately using AES CBS and the global archive encryption scheme. Decryption uses the global AES key (retrieved using the user credentials), and the global IV (retrieved from the deobfuscated archive metadata). The IV for each chunk is computed by: Each chunk is an independent stream and the decryption process involves end-of-stream handling even if this is not the end of the actual file. This is particularly important for the CTS handler. Note: this is not to be confused with CTR block cipher mode of operation with operates differently and requires a nonce. Decompressing files Compressed streams are zlib stream with default compression options and can be decompressed following the zlib format. Test cases Excluded for brevity, cf. https://www.beuc.net/zed/#test-cases. Conventions and references Feedback Feel free to send comments at beuc@beuc.net. If you have .zed files that you think are not covered by this document, please send them as well (replace sensitive files with other ones). The author's GPG key can be found at 8FF1CB6E8D89059F. Copyright (C) 2017 Sylvain Beucler Copying and distribution of this file, with or without modification, are permitted in any medium without royalty provided the copyright notice and this notice are preserved. This file is offered as-is, without any warranty.

Sylvain Beucler: dot-zed archive file format

TL,DR: I reverse-engineered the .zed encrypted archive format.
Following a clean-room design, I'm providing a description that can be implemented by a third-party.
Interested? :) (reference version at: https://www.beuc.net/zed/) .zed archive file format Introduction Archives with the .zed extension are conceptually similar to an encrypted .zip file. In addition to a specific format, .zed files support multiple users: files are encrypted using the archive master key, which itself is encrypted for each user and/or authentication method (password, RSA key through certificate or PKCS#11 token). Metadata such as filenames is partially encrypted. .zed archives are used as stand-alone or attached to e-mails with the help of a MS Outlook plugin. A variant, which is not covered here, can encrypt/decrypt MS Windows folders on the fly like ecryptfs. In the spirit of academic and independent research this document provides a description of the file format and encryption algorithms for this encrypted file archive. See the conventions section for conventions and acronyms used in this document. Structure overview The .zed file format is composed of several layers. Or as a diagram:
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  .zed archive (MS-CBF)                                                                               
                                                                                                      
   stream #1                         stream #2                       stream #3...                     
  +------------------------------+  +---------------------------+  +---------------------------+      
    metadata (MS-OLEPS)               encryption (AES)               encryption (AES)                 
                                      512-bytes chunks               512-bytes chunks                 
    +--------------------------+                                                                      
      obfuscation (static key)        +-----------------------+      +-----------------------+        
      +----------------------+       -  compression (zlib)     -    -  compression (zlib)     -       
       _ctlfile (TLV)                                                                            ...  
      +----------------------+          +---------------+              +---------------+               
    +--------------------------+          file contents                  file contents                
                                                                                                      
    +--------------------------+     -  +---------------+      -    -  +---------------+      -       
      _catalog (TLV)                                                                                  
    +--------------------------+      +-----------------------+      +-----------------------+        
  +------------------------------+  +---------------------------+  +---------------------------+      
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Encryption schemes Several AES key sizes are supported, such as 128 and 256 bits. The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) block cipher mode of operation is used to decrypt multiple AES 16-byte blocks, which means an initialisation vector (IV) is stored in clear along with the ciphertext. All filenames and file contents are encrypted using the same encryption mode, key and IV (e.g. if you remove and re-add a file in the archive, the resulting stream will be identical). No cleartext padding is used during encryption; instead, several end-of-stream handlers are available, so the ciphertext has exactly the size of the cleartext (e.g. the size of the compressed file). The following variants were identified in the 'encryption_mode' field. STREAM This is the end-of-stream handler for: This end-of-stream handler is apparently specific to the .zed format, and applied when the cleartext's does not end on a 16-byte boundary ; in this case special processing is performed on the last partial 16-byte block. The encryption and decryption phases are identical: let's assume the last partial block of cleartext (for encryption) or ciphertext (for decryption) was appended after all the complete 16-byte blocks of ciphertext: In either case, if the full ciphertext is less then one AES block (< 16 bytes), then the IV is used instead of the second-to-last block. CTS CTS or CipherText Stealing is the end-of-stream handler for: It matches the CBC-CS3 variant as described in Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode. Empty cleartext Since empty filenames or metadata are invalid, and since all files are compressed (resulting in a minimum 8-byte zlib cleartext), no empty cleartext was encrypted in the archive. metadata stream It is named 05356861616161716149656b7a6565636e576a33317a7868304e63 (hexadecimal), i.e. the character with code 5 followed by '5haaaaqaIekzeecnWj31zxh0Nc' (ASCII). The format used is OLE Property Set (MS-OLEPS). It introduces 2 property names "_ctlfile" (index 3) and "_catalog" (index 4), and 2 instances of said properties each containing an application-specific VT_BLOB (type 0x0041). _ctlfile: obfuscated global properties and access list This subpart is stored under index 3 ("_ctlfile") of the MS-OLEPS metadata. It consists of: The ciphertext is encrypted with AES-CBC "STREAM" mode using 128-bit static key 37F13CF81C780AF26B6A52654F794AEF (hexadecimal) and the prepended IV so as to obfuscate the access list. The ciphertext is continuous and not split in chunks (unlike files), even when it is larger than 512 bytes. The decrypted text contain properties in a TLV format as described in _ctlfile TLV: Archives may include "mandatory" users that cannot be removed. They are typically used to add an enterprise wide recovery RSA key to all archives. Extreme care must be taken to protect these key, as it can decrypt all past archives generated from within that company. _catalog: file list This subpart is stored under index 4 ("_catalog") of the MS-OLEPS metadata. It contains a series of 'fileprops' TLV structures, one for each file or directory. The file hierarchy can be reconstructed by checking the 'parent_id' field of each file entry. If 'parent_id' is 0 then the file is located at the top-level of the hierarchy, otherwise it's located under the directory with the matching 'file_id'. TLV format This format is a series of fields : Value semantics depend on its Type. It may contain an uint32be integer, a UTF-16LE string, a character sequence, or an inner TLV structure. Unless otherwise noted, TLV structures appear once. Some fields are optional and may not be present at all (e.g. 'archive_createdwith'). Some fields are unique within a structure (e.g. 'files_iv'), other may be repeated within a structure to form a list (e.g. 'fileprops' and 'passworduser'). The following top-level types that have been identified, and detailed in the next sections: Some additional unidentified types may be present. _ctlfile TLV _catalog TLV Decrypting the archive AES key rsauser The user accessing the archive will be authenticated by comparing his/her X509 certificate with the one stored in the 'certificate' field using DER format. The 'files_key_ciphertext' field is then decrypted using the PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption mechanism, with the private key that matches the user certificate. passworduser An intermediary user key, a user IV and an integrity checksum will be derived from the user password, using the deprecated PKCS#12 method as described at rfc7292 appendix B. Note: this is not PKCS#5 (nor PBKDF1/PBKDF2), this is an incompatible method from PKCS#12 that notably does not use HMAC. The 'pkcs12_hashfunc' field defines the underlying hash function. The following values have been identified: PBA - Password-based authentication The user accessing the archive will be authenticated by deriving an 8-byte sequence from his/her password. The parameters for the derivation function are: The derivation is checked against 'pba_checksum'. PBE - Password-based encryption Once the user is identified, 2 new values are derived from the password with different parameters to produce the IV and the key decryption key, with the same hash function: The parameters specific to user key are: The user key needs to be truncated to a length of 'encryption_strength', as specified in bytes in the archive properties. The parameters specific to user IV are: Once the key decryption key and the IV are derived, 'files_key_ciphertext' is decrypted using AES CBC, with PKCS#7 padding. Identifying file streams The name of the MS-CFB stream is derived by shuffling the bytes from the 'file_id' field and then encoding the result as hexadecimal. The reordering is:
Initial  offset: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Shuffled offset: 3 2 1 0 5 4 7 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
The 16th byte is usually a NUL byte, hence the stream identifier is a 30-character-long string. Decrypting files The compressed stream is split in chunks of 512 bytes, each of them encrypted separately using AES CBS and the global archive encryption scheme. Decryption uses the global AES key (retrieved using the user credentials), and the global IV (retrieved from the deobfuscated archive metadata). The IV for each chunk is computed by: Each chunk is an independent stream and the decryption process involves end-of-stream handling even if this is not the end of the actual file. This is particularly important for the CTS handler. Note: this is not to be confused with CTR block cipher mode of operation with operates differently and requires a nonce. Decompressing files Compressed streams are zlib stream with default compression options and can be decompressed following the zlib format. Test cases Excluded for brevity, cf. https://www.beuc.net/zed/#test-cases. Conventions and references Feedback Feel free to send comments at beuc@beuc.net. If you have .zed files that you think are not covered by this document, please send them as well (replace sensitive files with other ones). The author's GPG key can be found at 8FF1CB6E8D89059F. Copyright (C) 2017 Sylvain Beucler Copying and distribution of this file, with or without modification, are permitted in any medium without royalty provided the copyright notice and this notice are preserved. This file is offered as-is, without any warranty.

Charles Plessy: Summary of the discussion on off-line keys.

Last month, there has been an interesting discussion about off-line GnuPG keys and their storage systems on the debian-project@l.d.o mailing list. I tried to summarise it in the Debian wiki, in particular by creating two new pages.

Joachim Breitner: Less parentheses

Yesterday, at the Haskell Implementers Workshop 2017 in Oxford, I gave a lightning talk titled syntactic musings , where I presented three possibly useful syntactic features that one might want to add to a language like Haskell. The talked caused quite some heated discussions, and since the Internet likes heated discussion, I will happily share these ideas with you

Context aka. Sections This is probably the most relevant of the three proposals. Consider a bunch of related functions, say analyseExpr and analyseAlt, like these:
analyseExpr :: Expr -> Expr
analyseExpr (Var v) = change v
analyseExpr (App e1 e2) =
  App (analyseExpr e1) (analyseExpr e2)
analyseExpr (Lam v e) = Lam v (analyseExpr flag e)
analyseExpr (Case scrut alts) =
  Case (analyseExpr scrut) (analyseAlt <$> alts)
analyseAlt :: Alt -> Alt
analyseAlt (dc, pats, e) = (dc, pats, analyseExpr e)
You have written them, but now you notice that you need to make them configurable, e.g. to do different things in the Var case. You thus add a parameter to all these functions, and hence an argument to every call:
type Flag = Bool
analyseExpr :: Flag -> Expr -> Expr
analyseExpr flag (Var v) = if flag then change1 v else change2 v
analyseExpr flag (App e1 e2) =
  App (analyseExpr flag e1) (analyseExpr flag e2)
analyseExpr flag (Lam v e) = Lam v (analyseExpr (not flag) e)
analyseExpr flag (Case scrut alts) =
  Case (analyseExpr flag scrut) (analyseAlt flag <$> alts)
analyseAlt :: Flag -> Alt -> Alt
analyseAlt flag (dc, pats, e) = (dc, pats, analyseExpr flag e)
I find this code problematic. The intention was: flag is a parameter that an external caller can use to change the behaviour of this code, but when reading and reasoning about this code, flag should be considered constant. But this intention is neither easily visible nor enforced. And in fact, in the above code, flag does change , as analyseExpr passes something else in the Lam case. The idiom is indistinguishable from the environment idiom, where a locally changing environment (such as variables in scope ) is passed around. So we are facing exactly the same problem as when reasoning about a loop in an imperative program with mutable variables. And we (pure functional programmers) should know better: We cherish immutability! We want to bind our variables once and have them scope over everything we need to scope over! The solution I d like to see in Haskell is common in other languages (Gallina, Idris, Agda, Isar), and this is what it would look like here:
type Flag = Bool
section (flag :: Flag) where
  analyseExpr :: Expr -> Expr
  analyseExpr (Var v) = if flag then change1 v else change2v 
  analyseExpr (App e1 e2) =
    App (analyseExpr e1) (analyseExpr e2)
  analyseExpr (Lam v e) = Lam v (analyseExpr e)
  analyseExpr (Case scrut alts) =
    Case (analyseExpr scrut) (analyseAlt <$> alts)
  analyseAlt :: Alt -> Alt
  analyseAlt (dc, pats, e) = (dc, pats, analyseExpr e)
Now the intention is clear: Within a clearly marked block, flag is fixed and when reasoning about this code I do not have to worry that it might change. Either all variables will be passed to change1, or all to change2. An important distinction! Therefore, inside the section, the type of analyseExpr does not mention Flag, whereas outside its type is Flag -> Expr -> Expr. This is a bit unusual, but not completely: You see precisely the same effect in a class declaration, where the type signature of the methods do not mention the class constraint, but outside the declaration they do. Note that idioms like implicit parameters or the Reader monad do not give the guarantee that the parameter is (locally) constant. More details can be found in the GHC proposal that I prepared, and I invite you to raise concern or voice support there. Curiously, this problem must have bothered me for longer than I remember: I discovered that seven years ago, I wrote a Template Haskell based implementation of this idea in the seal-module package!

Less parentheses 1: Bulleted argument lists The next two proposals are all about removing parentheses. I believe that Haskell s tendency to express complex code with no or few parentheses is one of its big strengths, as it makes it easier to visualy parse programs. A common idiom is to use the $ operator to separate a function from a complex argument without parentheses, but it does not help when there are multiple complex arguments. For that case I propose to steal an idea from the surprisingly successful markup language markdown, and use bulleted lists to indicate multiple arguments:
foo :: Baz
foo = bracket
          some complicated code
          that is evaluated first
          other complicated code for later
          even more complicated code
I find this very easy to visually parse and navigate. It is actually possible to do this now, if one defines ( ) = id with infixl 0 . A dedicated syntax extension (-XArgumentBullets) is preferable:
  • It only really adds readability if the bullets are nicely vertically aligned, which the compiler should enforce.
  • I would like to use $ inside these complex arguments, and multiple operators of precedence 0 do not mix. (infixl -1 would help).
  • It should be possible to nest these, and distinguish different nesting levers based on their indentation.

Less parentheses 1: Whitespace precedence The final proposal is the most daring. I am convinced that it improves readability and should be considered when creating a new language. As for Haskell, I am at the moment not proposing this as a language extension (but could be convinced to do so if there is enough positive feedback). Consider this definition of append:
(++) :: [a] -> [a] -> [a]
[]     ++ ys = ys
(x:xs) ++ ys = x : (xs++ys)
Imagine you were explaining the last line to someone orally. How would you speak it? One common way to do so is to not read the parentheses out aloud, but rather speak parenthesised expression more quickly and add pauses otherwise. We can do the same in syntax!
(++) :: [a] -> [a] -> [a]
[]   ++ ys = ys
x:xs ++ ys = x : xs++ys
The rule is simple: A sequence of tokens without any space is implicitly parenthesised. The reaction I got in Oxford was horror and disgust. And that is understandable we are very used to ignore spacing when parsing expressions (unless it is indentation, of course. Then we are no longer horrified, as our non-Haskell colleagues are when they see our code). But I am convinced that once you let the rule sink in, you will have no problem parsing such code with ease, and soon even with greater ease than the parenthesised version. It is a very natural thing to look at the general structure, identify compact chunks of characters , mentally group them, and then go and separately parse the internals of the chunks and how the chunks relate to each other. More natural than first scanning everything for ( and ), matching them up, building a mental tree, and then digging deeper. Incidentally, there was a non-programmer present during my presentation, and while she did not openly contradict the dismissive groan of the audience, I later learned that she found this variant quite obvious to understand and more easily to read than the parenthesised code. Some FAQs about this:
  • What about an operator with space on one side but not on the other? I d simply forbid that, and hence enforce readable code.
  • Do operator sections still require parenthesis? Yes, I d say so.
  • Does this overrule operator precedence? Yes! a * b+c == a * (b+c).
  • What is a token? Good question, and I am not not decided. In particular: Is a parenthesised expression a single token? If so, then (Succ a)+b * c parses as ((Succ a)+b) * c, otherwise it should probably simply be illegal.
  • Can we extend this so that one space binds tighter than two spaces, and so on? Yes we can, but really, we should not.
  • This is incompatible with Agda s syntax! Indeed it is, and I really like Agda s mixfix syntax. Can t have everything.
  • Has this been done before? I have not seen it in any language, but Lewis Wall has blogged this idea before.
Well, let me know what you think!

Lior Kaplan: PHP 7.2 is coming mcrypt extension isn t

Early September, it s about 3 months before PHP 7.2 is expected to be release (schedule here). One of the changes is the removal of the mcrypt extension after it was deprecated in PHP 7.1. The main problem with mcrypt extension is that it is based on libmcrypt that was abandoned by it s upstream since 2007. That s 10 years of keeping a library alive, moving the burden to distribution s security teams. But this isn t new, Remi already wrote about this two years ago: About libmcrypt and php-mcrypt . But with removal of the extension from the PHP code base (about F**King time), it would force the recommendation was done nicely till now. And forcing people means some noise, although an alternative is PHP s owns openssl extension. But as many migrations that require code change it s going slow. The goal of this post is to reach to the PHP eco system and map the components (mostly frameworks and applications) to still require/recommend mcyrpt and to pressure them to fix it before PHP 72 is released. I ll appreciate the readers help with this mapping in the comments. For example, Laravel s release notes for 5.1:
In previous versions of Laravel, encryption was handled by the mcrypt PHP extension. However, beginning in Laravel 5.1, encryption is handled by the openssl extension, which is more actively maintained.
Or, on the other hand Joomla 3 requirements still mentions mcrypt. mcrypt safe: mcrypt dependant: For those who really need mcrypt, it is part of PECL, PHP s extensions repository. You re welcome to compile it on your own risk.
Filed under: Debian GNU/Linux, PHP

9 September 2017

Russell Coker: Observing Reliability

Last year I wrote about how great my latest Thinkpad is [1] in response to a discussion about whether a Thinkpad is still the Rolls Royce of laptops. It was a few months after writing that post that I realised that I omitted an important point. After I had that laptop for about a year the DVD drive broke and made annoying clicking sounds all the time in addition to not working. I removed the DVD drive and the result was that the laptop was lighter and used less power without missing any feature that I desired. As I had installed Debian on that laptop by copying the hard drive from my previous laptop I had never used the DVD drive for any purpose. After a while I got used to my laptop being like that and the gaping hole in the side of the laptop where the DVD drive used to be didn t even register to me. I would prefer it if Lenovo sold Thinkpads in the T series without DVD drives, but it seems that only the laptops with tiny screens are designed to lack DVD drives. For my use of laptops this doesn t change the conclusion of my previous post. Now the T420 has been in service for almost 4 years which makes the cost of ownership about $75 per year. $1.50 per week as a tax deductible business expense is very cheap for such a nice laptop. About a year ago I installed a SSD in that laptop, it cost me about $250 from memory and made it significantly faster while also reducing heat problems. The depreciation on the SSD about doubles the cost of ownership of the laptop, but it s still cheaper than a mobile phone and thus not in the category of things that are expected to last for a long time while also giving longer service than phones usually do. One thing that s interesting to consider is the fact that I forgot about the broken DVD drive when writing about this. I guess every review has an unspoken caveat of this works well for me but might suck badly for your use case . But I wonder how many other things that are noteworthy I m forgetting to put in reviews because they just don t impact my use. I don t think that I am unusual in this regard, so reading multiple reviews is the sensible thing to do.

8 September 2017

Vincent Fourmond: Extract many attachement from many mails in one go using ripmime

I was recently looking for a way to extract many attachments from a series of emails. I first had a look at the AttachmentExtractor thunderbird plugin, but it seems very old and not maintained anymore. So I've come up with another very simple solution that also works with any other mail client.Just copy all the mails you want to extract attachments from to a single (temporary) mail folder, find out which file holds the mail folder and use ripmime on that file (ripmime is packaged for Debian). For my case, it looked like:
~ ripmime -i .icedove/XXXXXXX.default/Mail/pop.xxxx/tmp -d target-directory
Simple solution, but it saved me quite some time. Hope it helps !

Sven Hoexter: munin with TLS

Primarily a note for my future self so I don't have to find out what I did in the past once more. If you're running some smaller systems scattered around the internet, without connecting them with a VPN, you might want your munin master and nodes to communicate with TLS and validate certificates. If you remember what to do it's a rather simple and straight forward process. To manage the PKI I'll utilize the well known easyrsa script collection. For this special purpose CA I'll go with a flat layout. So it's one root certificate issuing all server and client certificates directly. Some very basic docs can be also found in the munin wiki. master setup For your '/etc/munin/munin.conf':
tls paranoid
tls_verify_certificate yes
tls_private_key /etc/munin/master.key
tls_certificate /etc/munin/master.crt
tls_ca_certificate /etc/munin/ca.crt
tls_verify_depth 1
A node entry with TLS will look like this:
[node1.stormbind.net]
    address [2001:db8::]
    use_node_name yes
Important points here: For easy-rsa the following command invocations are relevant:
./easyrsa init-pki
./easyrsa build-ca
./easrsa gen-req master
./easyrsa sign-req client master
./easyrsa set-rsa-pass master nopass
node setup For your '/etc/munin/munin-node.conf':
tls paranoid
tls_verify_certificate yes
tls_private_key /etc/munin/node1.key
tls_certificate /etc/munin/node1.crt
tls_ca_certificate /etc/munin/ca.crt
tls_verify_depth 1
For easy-rsa the following command invocations are relevant:
./easyrsa gen-req node1
./easyrsa sign-req server node1
./easyrsa set-rsa-pass node1 nopass
Important points here:

7 September 2017

Gunnar Wolf: It was thirty years ago today... (and a bit more): My first ever public speech!

I came across a folder with the most unexpected treasure trove: The text for my first ever public speech! (and some related materials)
In 1985, being nine years old, I went to the IDESE school, to learn Logo. I found my diploma over ten years ago and blogged about it in this same space. Of course, I don't expect any of you to remember what I wrote twelve years ago about a (then) twenty years old piece of paper! I add to this very old stuff about Gunnar the four pages describing my game, Evitamono ("Avoid the monkey", approximately). I still remember the game quite vividly, including traumatic issues which were quite common back then; I wrote that the sprites were accidentally deleted twice and the game once . I remember several of my peers telling about such experiences. Well, that is good if you account for the second system syndrome! I also found the amazing course material for how to program sound and graphics in the C64 BASIC. That was a course taken by ten year old kids. Kids that understood that you had to write [255,129,165,244,219,165,0,102] (see pages 3-5) into a memory location starting at 53248 to redefine a character so it looked as the graphic element you wanted. Of course, it was done with a set of POKEs, as everything in C64. Or that you could program sound by setting the seven SID registers for each of the three voices containing low frequency, high frequency, low pulse, high pulse, wave control, wave length, wave amplitude in memory locations 54272 through 54292... And so on and on and on... And as a proof that I did take the course: ...I don't think I could make most of my current BSc students make sense out of what is in the manual. But, being a kid in the 1980s, that was the only way to get a computer to do what you wanted. Yay for primitivity! :-D
AttachmentSize
Speech for "Evitamono"1.29 MB
Coursee material for sound and graphics programming in C64 BASIC15.82 MB
Proof that I was there!4.86 MB

Lior Kaplan: FOSScamp Syros 2017 day 3

The 3rd day should have started with a Debian sprint and then a LibreOffice one, taking advantage I m still attending, as that s my last day. But plans don t always work out and we started 2 hours later. When everybody arrive we got everyone together for a short daily meeting (scrum style). The people were divided to 3 teams for translating: Debian Installer, LibreOffice and Gnome. For each team we did a short list of what left and with what to start. And in the end how does what so there will be no toe stepping. I was really proud with this and felt it was time well spent. The current translation percentage for Albanian in LibreOffice is 60%. So my recommendation to the team is translate master only and do not touch the help translation. My plans ahead would be to improve the translation as much as possible for LibreOffice 6.0 and near the branching point (Set to November 20th by the release schedule) decide if it s doable for the 6.0 life time or to set the goal at 6.1. In the 2nd case, we might try to backport translation back to 6.0. For the translation itself, I ve mentioned to the team about KeyID language pack and referred them to the nightly builds. These tools should help with keeping the translation quality high. For the Debian team, after deciding who works on what, I ve asked Silva to do review for the others, as doing it myself started to take more and more of my time. It s also good that the reviewer know the target language and not like me, can catch more the syntax only mistakes. Another point, as she s available more easily to the team while I m leaving soon, so I hope this role of reviewer will stay as part of the team. With the time left I mostly worked on my own tasks, which were packaging the Albanian dictionary, resulting in https://packages.debian.org/sid/myspell-sq and making sure the dictionary is also part of LibreOffice resulting in https://gerrit.libreoffice.org/#/c/41906/ . When it is accepted, I want to upload it to the LibreOffice repository so all users can download and use the dictionary. During the voyage home (ferry, bus, plain and train), I mailed Sergio Durigan Junior, my NM applicant, with a set of questions. My first action as an AM (: Overall FOSScamp results for Albanian translation were very close to the goal I set (100%): That s the result of work by Silva Arapi, Eva Vranici, Redon Skikuli, Anisa Kuci and Nafie Shehu.
Filed under: Debian GNU/Linux, i18n & l10n, LibreOffice

Thomas Lange: My recent FAI activities

During DebConf 17 in Montr al I had a FAI demo session (video), where I showed how to create a customized installation CD and how to create a diskimage using the same configuration. This diskimage is ready for use with a VM software or can be booted inside a cloud environment. During the last weeks I was working on FAI 5.4 which will be released in a few weeks. I you want to test it use
deb https://fai-project.org/download beta-testing koeln
in your sources.list file. The most important new feature will be the cross architecture support. I managed to create an ARM64 diskimage on a x86 host and boot this inside Qemu. Currently I learn how to flash images onto my new Hikey960 board for booting my own Debian images on real hardware. The embedded world is still new for me and very different in respect to the boot process. At DebConf, I also worked on debootstrap. I produced a set of patches which can speedup debootstrap by a factor of 2. See #871835 for details. FAI debootstrap ARM

Reproducible builds folks: Reproducible Builds: Weekly report #123

Here's what happened in the Reproducible Builds effort between Sunday August 27 and Saturday September 2 2017: Talks and presentations Holger Levsen talked about our progress and our still-far goals at BornHack 2017 (Video). Toolchain development and fixes The Debian FTP archive will now reject changelogs where different entries have the same timestamps. UDD now uses reproducible-tracker.json (~25MB) which ignores our tests for Debian unstable, instead of our full set of results in reproducible.json. Our tests for Debian unstable uses a stricter definition of "reproducible" than what was recently added to Debian policy, and these stricter tests are currently more unreliable. Packages reviewed and fixed, and bugs filed Patches sent upstream: Debian bugs filed: Debian packages NMU-uploaded: Reviews of unreproducible packages 25 package reviews have been added, 50 have been updated and 86 have been removed in this week, adding to our knowledge about identified issues. Weekly QA work During our reproducibility testing, FTBFS bugs have been detected and reported by: diffoscope development Version 86 was uploaded to unstable by Mattia Rizzolo. It included previous weeks' contributions from: reprotest development Development continued in git with contributions from: Misc. This week's edition was written by Ximin Luo, Chris Lamb, Bernhard M. Wiedemann and Holger Levsen & reviewed by a bunch of Reproducible Builds folks on IRC & the mailing lists.

John Goerzen: Switching to xmonad + Gnome and ditching a Mac

I have been using XFCE with xmonad for years now. I m not sure exactly how many, but at least 6 years, if not closer to 10. Today I threw in the towel and switched to Gnome. More recently, at a new job, I was given a Macbook Pro. I wasn t entirely sure what to think of this, but I thought I d give it a try. I found MacOS to be extremely frustrating and confining. It had no real support for a tiling window manager, and although projects like amethyst tried to approximate what xmonad can do on Linux, they were just too limited by the platform and were clunky. Moreover, the entire UI was surprisingly sluggish; maybe that was an induced effect from animations, but I don t think that explains it. A Debisn stretch install, even on inferior hardware, was snappy in a way that MacOS never was. So I have requested to swap for a laptop that will run Debian. The strange use of Command instead of Control for things, combined with the overall lack of configurability of keybindings, meant that I was going to always be fighting muscle memory moving from one platform to another. Not only that, but being back in the world of a Free Software OS means a lot. Now then, back to xmonad and XFCE situation. XFCE once worked very well with xmonad. Over the years, this got more challenging. Around the jessie (XFCE 4.10) time, I had to be very careful about when I would let it save my session, because it would easily break. With stretch, I had to write custom scripts because the panel wouldn t show up properly, and even some application icons would be invisible, if things were started in a certain order. This took much trial and error and was still cumbersome. Gnome 3, with its tightly-coupled Gnome Shell, has never been compatible with other window managers at least not directly. A person could have always used MATE with xmonad but a lot of people that run XFCE tend to have some Gnome 3 apps (for instance, evince) anyhow. Cinnamon also wouldn t work with xmonad, because it is simply another tightly-coupled shell instead of Gnome Shell. And then today I discovered gnome-flashback. gnome-flashback is a Gnome 3 environment that uses the traditional X approach with a separate window manager (metacity of yore by default). Sweet. It turns out that Debian s xmonad has built-in support for it. If you know the secret: apt-get install gnome-session-flashback (OK, it s not so secret; it s even in xmonad s README.Debian these days) Install that, plus gnome and gdm3 and things are nice. Configure xmonad with GNOME support and poof goodness right out of the box, selectable from the gdm sessions list. I still have some gripes about Gnome s configurability (or lack thereof). But I ve got to say: This environment is the first one I ve ever used that got external display switching very nearly right without any configuration, and I include MacOS in that. Plug in an external display, and poof it s configured and set up. You can hit a toggle key (Windows+P by default) to change the configurations, or use the Display section in gnome-control-center. Unplug it, and it instantly reconfigures itself to put everything back on the laptop screen. Yessss! I used to have scripts to do this in the wheezy/jessie days. XFCE in stretch had numerous annoying failures in this area which rendered the internal display completely dark until the next reboot very frustrating. With Gnome, it just works. And, even if you have suspend on lid closed turned on, if the system is powered up and hooked up to an external display, it will keep running even if the lid is closed, figuring you must be using it on the external screen. Another thing the Mac wouldn t do well. All in all, some pretty good stuff here. I continue to be impressed by stretch. It is darn impressive to put this OS on generic hardware and have it outshine the closed-ecosystem Mac!

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