Search Results: "will"

6 April 2016

Holger Levsen: 20160406-irc-proxy

selectivly caching IRC proxy wanted I use IRC a lot. For many things, which are often unrelated. As IRC proxy I currently use bip so I can run a local IRC client. To get less distracted by "random stuff" popping up when I want to focus on something, I would like to use an IRC proxy, which I can configure - for example - to do this: "immediatly relay everything from all debian channels and cache everything said on all other channels". Direct messages should always be relayed immediatly. And of course more fine grained control should be possible too: "all debian channels except reproducible related", "everything reproducible builds related", "debconf channels", "everything else", and so on. Does an IRC proxy with such a feature exist? Any suggestions on which proxys come close? Feedback much appreciated, if I manage to find something, I will post an update on this blog.

Michal Čihař: API for Weblate

The long requested feature for Weblate is here - it now has API which you can use to control it. It's scope is currently limited, but it will expand in future releases. The API is currently available in Git, deployed on both Demo server and Hosted Weblate, our hosted solution. It will be also part of 2.6 release, which should be released by end of April. Anyway the API now provides basic operations up to translation level - you can not edit individual translations, handle suggestions or other advanced features. However what you can do includes: As you can see this really covers the basic operations which were most frequently requested, more will come in future. You can see more detailed the Weblate API documentation.

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5 April 2016

Ian Wienand: Image building in OpenStack CI

Also titled minimal images - maximal effort! The OpenStack Infrastructure Team manages a large continuous-integration system that provides the broad range of testing the OpenStack project requires. Tests are run thousands of times a day across every project, on multiple platforms and on multiple cloud-providers. There are essentially no manual steps in any part of the process, with every component being automated via scripting, a few home-grown tools and liberal doses of Puppet and Ansible. More importantly, every component resides in the public git trees right alongside every other OpenStack project, with contributions actively encouraged. As with any large system, technical debt can build up and start to affect stability and long-term maintainability. OpenStack Infrastructure can see some of this debt accumulating as more testing environments across more cloud-providers are being added to support ever-growing testing demands. Thus a strong focus of recent work has been consolidating testing platforms to be smaller, better defined and more maintainable. This post illustrates some of the background to the issues and describes how these new platforms are more reliable and maintainable.
OpenStack CI Overview Before getting into details, it's a good idea to get a basic big-picture conceptual model of how OpenStack CI testing works. If you look at the following diagram and follow the numbers with the explanation below, hopefully you'll have all the context you need. Overview of OpenStack CI
  1. The developer uploads their code to gerrit via the git-review tool. There is no further action required on their behalf and the developer simply waits for results.

  2. Gerrit provides a JSON-encoded "firehose" output of everything happening to it. New reviews, votes, updates and more all get sent out over this pipe. Zuul is the overall scheduler that subscribes itself to this information and is responsible for managing the CI jobs appropriate for each change.

  3. Zuul has a configuration that tells it what jobs to run for what projects. Zuul can do lots of interesting things, but for the purposes of this discussion we just consider that it puts the jobs it wants run into gearman for a Jenkins master to consume. gearman is a job-server; as they explain it "[gearman] provides a generic application framework to farm out work to other machines or processes that are better suited to do the work". Zuul puts into gearman basically a tuple (job-name, node-type) for each job it wants run, specifying the unique job name to run and what type of node it should be run on.

  4. A group of Jenkins masters are subscribed to gearman as workers. It is these Jenkins masters that will consume the job requests from the queue and actually get the tests running. However, Jenkins needs two things to be able to run a job a job definition (what to actually do) and a slave node (somewhere to do it). The first part what to do is provided by job-definitions stored in external YAML files and processed by Jenkins Job Builder (jjb) in to job configurations for Jenkins. Each Jenkins master gets these definitions pushed to it constantly by Puppet, thus each Jenkins master instance knows about all the jobs it can run automatically. Zuul also knows about these job definitions; this is the job-name part of the tuple we said it put into gearman. The second part somewhere to run the test takes some more explaining. To the next point...

  5. Several cloud companies donate capacity in their clouds for OpenStack to run CI tests. Overall, this capacity is managed by a customised orchestration tool called nodepool. Nodepool watches the gearman queue and sees what requests are coming out of Zuul. It looks at node-type of jobs in the queue and decides what types of nodes need to start and which cloud providers have capacity to satisfy demand. Nodepool will monitor the start-up of the virtual-machines and register the new nodes to the Jenkins master instances.

  6. At this point, the Jenkins master has what it needs to actually get jobs started. When nodepool registers a host to a Jenkins master as a slave, the Jenkins master can now advertise its ability to consume jobs. For example, if a ubuntu-trusty node is provided to the Jenkins master instance by nodepool, Jenkins can now consume from gearman any job it knows about that is intended to run on an ubuntu-trusty slave. Jekins will run the job as defined in the job-definition on that host ssh-ing in, running scripts, copying the logs and waiting for the result. (It is a gross oversimplification, but for the purposes of OpenStack CI, Jenkins is pretty much used as a glorified ssh/scp wrapper. Zuul Version 3, under development, is working to remove the need for Jenkins to be involved at all).

  7. Eventually, the test will finish. The Jenkins master will put the result back into gearman, which Zuul will consume. The slave will be released back to nodepool, which destroys it and starts all over again (slaves are not reused and also have no sensitive details on them, as they are essentially publicly accessible). Zuul will wait for the results of all jobs for the change and post the result back to Gerrit; it either gives a positive vote or the dreaded negative vote if required jobs failed (it also handles merges to git, but we'll ignore that bit for now).

In a nutshell, that is the CI work-flow that happens thousands-upon-thousands of times a day keeping OpenStack humming along.
Image builds So far we have glossed over how nodepool actually creates the images that it hands out for testing. Image creation, illustrated in step 8 above, contains a lot of important details. Firstly, what are these images and why build them at all? These images are where the "rubber hits the road" they are instantiated into the virtual-machines that will run DevStack, unit-testing or whatever else someone might want to test. The main goal is to provide a stable and consistent environment in which to run a wide-range of tests. A full OpenStack deployment results in hundreds of libraries and millions of lines of code all being exercised at once. The testing-images are right at the bottom of all this, so any instability or inconsistency affects everyone; leading to constant fire-firefighting and major inconvenience as all forward-progress stops when CI fails. We want to support a wide number of platforms interesting to developers such as Ubuntu, Debian, CentOS and Fedora, and we also want to and make it easy to handle new releases and add other platforms. We want to ensure this can be maintained without too much day-to-day hands-on. Caching is a big part of the role of these images. With thousands of jobs going on every day, an occasional network blip is not a minor annoyance, but creates constant and difficult to debug failures. We want jobs to rely on as few external resources as possible so tests are consistent and stable. This means caching things like the git trees tests might use (OpenStack just broke the 1000 repository mark), VM images, packages and other common bits and pieces. Obviously a cache is only as useful as the data in it, so we build these images up every day to keep them fresh.
Snapshot images If you log into almost any cloud-provider's interface, they almost certainly have a range of pre-canned images of common distributions for you to use. At first, the base images for OpenStack CI testing came from what the cloud-providers had as their public image types. However, over time, there are a number of issues that emerge:
  1. No two images, even for the same distribution or platform, are the same. Every provider seems to do something "helpful" to the images which requires some sort of workaround.
  2. Providers rarely leave these images alone. One day you would boot the image to find a bunch of Python libraries pip-installed, or a mount-point moved, or base packages removed (all happened).
  3. Even if the changes are helpful, it does not make for consistent and reproducible testing if every time you run, you're on a slightly different base system.
  4. Providers don't have some images you want (like a latest Fedora), or have different versions, or different point releases. All update asynchronously whenever they get around to it.
So the original incarnations of OpenStack CI images were based on these public images. Nodepool would start one of these provider images and then run a series of scripts on it these scripts would firstly try to work-around any quirks to make the images look as similar as possible across providers, and then do the caching, setup things like authorized keys and finish other configuration tasks. Nodepool would then snapshot this prepared image and start instantiating VM's from these snapshots into the pool for testing. If you hear someone talking about a "snapshot image" in OpenStack CI context, that's likely what they are referring to. Apart from the stability of the underlying images, the other issue you hit with this approach is that the number of images being built starts to explode when you take into account multiple providers and multiple regions. Even with just Rackspace and the (now defunct) HP Cloud we would end up creating snapshot images for 4 or 5 platforms across a total of about 8 regions meaning anywhere up to 40 separate image builds happening daily (you can see how ridiculous it was getting in the logging configuration used at the time). It was almost a fait accompli that some of these would fail every day nodepool can deal with this by reusing old snapshots but this leads to a inconsistent and heterogeneous testing environment. Naturally there was a desire for something more consistent a single image that could run across multiple providers in a much more tightly controlled manner.
Upstream-based builds Upstream distributions do provide "cloud-images", which are usually pre-canned .qcow2 format files suitable for uploading to your average cloud. So the diskimage-builder tool was put into use creating images for nodepool, based on these upstream-provided images. In essence, diskimage-builder uses a series of elements (each, as the name suggests, designed to do one thing) that allow you to build a completely customised image. It handles all the messy bits of laying out the image file, tries to be smart about caching large downloads and final things like conversion to qcow2 or vhd. nodepool has used diskimage-builder to create customised images based upon the upstream releases for some time. These are better, but still have some issues for the CI environment:
  1. You still really have no control over what does or does not go into the upstream base images. You don't notice a change until you deploy a new image based on an updated version and things break.
  2. The images still start with a fair amount of "stuff" on them. For example cloud-init is a rather large Python program and has a fair few dependencies. These dependencies can both conflict with parts of OpenStack or end up tacitly hiding real test requirements (the test doesn't specify it, but the package is there as part of another base dependency. Things then break when the base dependencies change). The whole idea of the CI is that (as much as possible) you're not making any assumptions about what is required to run your tests you want everything explicitly included.
  3. An image that "works everywhere" across multiple cloud-providers is quite a chore. cloud-init hasn't always had support for config-drive and Rackspace's DHCP-less environment, for example. Providers all have their various different networking schemes or configuration methods which needs to be handled consistently.
If you were starting this whole thing again, things like LXC/Docker to keep "systems within systems" might come into play and help alleviate some of the packaging conflicts. Indeed they may play a role in the future. But don't forget that DevStack, the major CI deployment mechanism, was started before Docker existed. And there's tricky stuff with networking and Neutron going on. And things like iSCSI kernel drivers that containers don't support well. And you need to support Ubuntu, Debian, CentOS and Fedora. And you have hundreds of developers already relying on what's there. So change happens incrementally, and in the mean time, there is a clear need for a stable, consistent environment.
Minimal builds To this end, diskimage-builder now has a serial of "minimal" builds that are really that systems with essentially nothing on them. For Debian and Ubuntu this is achieved via debootstrap, for Fedora and CentOS we replicate this with manual installs of base packages into a clean chroot environment. We add on a range of important elements that make the image useful; for example, for networking, we have simple-init which brings up the network consistently across all our providers but has no dependencies to mess with the base system. If you check the elements provided by project-config you can see a range of specific elements that OpenStack Infra runs at each image build (these are actually specified by in arguments to nodepool, see the config file, particularly diskimages section). These custom elements do things like caching, using puppet to install the right authorized_keys files and setup a few needed things to connect to the host. In general, you can see the logs of an image build provided by nodepool for each daily build. So now, each day at 14:14 UTC nodepool builds the daily images that will be used for CI testing. We have one image of each type that (theoretically) works across all our providers. After it finishes building, nodepool uploads the image to all providers (p.s. the process of doing this is so insanely terrible it spawned shade; this deserves many posts of its own) at which point it will start being used for CI jobs. If you wish to replicate this entire process, the build-image.sh script, run on an Ubuntu Trusty host in a virtualenv with diskimage-builder will get you pretty close (let us know of any issues!).
DevStack and bare nodes There are two major ways OpenStack projects test their changes:
  1. Running with DevStack, which brings up a small, but fully-functional, OpenStack cloud with the change-under-test applied. Generally tempest is then used to ensure the big-picture things like creating VM's, networks and storage are all working.
  2. Unit-testing within the project; i.e. what you do when you type tox -e py27 in basically any OpenStack project.
To support this testing, OpenStack CI ended up with the concept of bare nodes and devstack nodes.
  • A bare node was made for unit-testing. While tox has plenty of information about installing required Python packages into the virtualenv for testing, it doesn't know anything about the system packages required to build those Python packages. This means things like gcc and library -devel packages which many Python packages use to build bindings. Thus the bare nodes had an ever-growing and not well-defined list of packages that were pre-installed during the image-build to support unit-testing. Worse still, projects didn't really know their dependencies but just relied on their testing working with this global list that was pre-installed on the image.
  • In contrast to this, DevStack has always been able to bootstrap itself from a blank system to a working OpenStack deployment by ensuring it has the right dependencies installed. We don't want any packages pre-installed here because it hides actual dependencies that we want explicitly defined within DevStack otherwise, when a user goes to deploy DevStack for their development work, things break because their environment differs slightly to the CI one. If you look at all the job definitions in OpenStack, by convention any job running DevStack has a dsvm in the job name this referred to running on a "DevStack Virtual Machine" or a devstack node. As the CI environment has grown, we have more and more testing that isn't DevStack based (puppet apply tests, for example) that rather confusingly want to run on a devstack node because they do not want dependencies installed. While it's just a name, it can be difficult to explain!
Thus we ended up maintaining two node-types, where the difference between them is what was pre-installed on the host and yes, the bare node had more installed than a devstack node, so it wasn't that bare at all!
Specifying Dependencies Clearly it is useful to unify these node types, but we still need to provide a way for the unit-test environments to have their dependencies installed. This is where a tool called bindep comes in. This tool gives project authors a way to specify their system requirements in a similar manner to the way their Python requirements are kept. For example, OpenStack has the concept of global requirements those Python dependencies that are common across all projects so version skew becomes somewhat manageable. This project now has some extra information in the other-requirements.txt file, which lists the system packages required to build the Python packages in the global-requirements list. bindep knows how to look at these lists provided by projects and get the right packages for the platform it is running on. As part of the image-build, we have a cache-bindep element that can go through every project and build a list of the packages it requires. We can thus pre-cache all of these packages onto the images, knowing that they are required by jobs. This both reduces the dependency on external mirrors and improves job performance (as the packages are locally cached) but doesn't pollute the system by having everything pre-installed. Package installation can now happen via the way we really should be doing it as part of the CI job. There is a job-macro called install-distro-packages which a test can use to call bindep to install the packages specified by the project before the run. You might notice the script has a "fallback" list of packages if the project does not specify it's own dependencies this essentially replicates the environment of a bare node as we transition to projects more strictly specifying their system requirements. We can now start with a blank image and all the dependencies to run the job can be expressed by and within the project leading to a consistent and reproducible environment without any hidden dependencies. Several things have broken as part of removing bare nodes this is actually a good thing because it means we have revealed areas where we were making assumptions in jobs about what the underlying platform provides. There's a few other job-macros that can do things like provide MySQL/Postgres instances for testing or setup other common job requirements. By splitting these types of things out from base-images we also improve the performance of jobs who don't waste time doing things like setting up databases for jobs that don't need it. As of this writing, the bindep work is new and still a work-in-progress. But the end result is that we have no more need for a separate bare node type to run unit-tests. This essentially halves the number of image-builds required and brings us to the goal of a single image for each platform running all CI.
Conclusion While dealing with multiple providers, image-types and dependency chains has been a great effort for the infra team, to everyone's credit I don't think the project has really noticed much going on underneath. OpenStack CI has transitioned to a situation where there is a single image type for each platform we test that deploys unmodified across all our providers and runs all testing environments equally. We have better insight into our dependencies and better tools to manage them. This leads to greatly decreased maintenance burden, better consistency and better performance; all great things to bring to OpenStack CI!

Matthew Garrett: There's more than one way to exploit the commons

There's a piece of software called XScreenSaver. It attempts to fill two somewhat disparate roles: XScreenSaver does an excellent job of the second of these[2] and is pretty good at the first, which is to say that it only suffers from a disastrous security flaw once very few years and as such is certainly not appreciably worse than any other piece of software.

Debian ships an operating system that prides itself on stability. The Debian definition of stability is a very specific one - rather than referring to how often the software crashes or misbehaves, it refers to how often the software changes behaviour. Debian is very reluctant to upgrade software that is part of a stable release, to the extent that developers will attempt to backport individual security fixes to the version they shipped rather than upgrading to a release that contains all those security fixes but also adds a new feature. The argument here is that the new release may also introduce new bugs, and Debian's users desire stability (in the "things don't change" sense) more than new features. Backporting security fixes keeps them safe without compromising the reason they're running Debian in the first place.

This all makes plenty of sense at a theoretical level, but reality is sometimes less convenient. The first problem is that security bugs are typically also, well, bugs. They may make your software crash or misbehave in annoying but apparently harmless ways. And when you fix that bug you've also fixed a security bug, but the ability to determine whether a bug is a security bug or not is one that involves deep magic and a fanatical devotion to the cause so given the choice between maybe asking for a CVE and dealing with embargoes and all that crap when perhaps you've actually only fixed a bug that makes the letter "E" appear in places it shouldn't and not one that allows the complete destruction of your intergalactic invasion fleet means people will tend to err on the side of "Eh fuckit" and go drinking instead. So new versions of software will often fix security vulnerabilities without there being any indication that they do so[3], and running old versions probably means you have a bunch of security issues that nobody will ever do anything about.

But that's broadly a technical problem and one we can apply various metrics to, and if somebody wanted to spend enough time performing careful analysis of software we could have actual numbers to figure out whether the better security approach is to upgrade or to backport fixes. Conversations become boring once we introduce too many numbers, so let's ignore that problem and go onto the second, which is far more handwavy and social and so significantly more interesting.

The second problem is that upstream developers remain associated with the software shipped by Debian. Even though Debian includes a tool for reporting bugs against packages included in Debian, some users will ignore that and go straight to the upstream developers. Those upstream developers then have to spend at least 15 or so seconds telling the user that the bug they're seeing has been fixed for some time, and then figure out how to explain that no sorry they can't make Debian include a fixed version because that's not how things work. Worst case, the stable release of Debian ends up including a bug that makes software just basically not work at all and everybody who uses it assumes that the upstream author is brutally incompetent, and they end up quitting the software industry and I don't know running a nightclub or something.

From the Debian side of things, the straightforward solution is to make it more obvious that users should file bugs with Debian and not bother the upstream authors. This doesn't solve the problem of damaged reputation, and nor does it entirely solve the problem of users contacting upstream developers. If a bug is filed with Debian and doesn't get fixed in a timely manner, it's hardly surprising that users will end up going upstream. The Debian bugs list for XScreenSaver does not make terribly attractive reading.

So, coming back to the title for this entry. The most obvious failure of the commons is where a basically malicious actor consumes while giving nothing back, but if an actor with good intentions ends up consuming more than they contribute that may still be a problem. An upstream author releases a piece of software under a free license. Debian distributes this to users. Debian's policies result in the upstream author having to do more work. What does the upstream author get out of this exchange? In an ideal world, plenty. The author's software is made available to more people. A larger set of developers is willing to work on making improvements to the software. In a less ideal world, rather less. The author has to deal with bug mail about already fixed bugs. The author's reputation may be harmed by user exposure to said fixed bugs. The author may get less in the way of useful bug fixes or features because people are running old versions rather than fixing new ones. If the balance tips towards the latter, the author's decision to release their software under a free license has made their life more difficult.

Most discussions about Debian's policies entirely ignore the latter scenario, focusing more on the fact that the author chose to release their software under a free license to begin with. If the author is unwilling to handle the consequences of that, goes the argument, why did they do it in the first place? The unfortunate logical conclusion to that argument is that the author realises that they made a huge mistake and never does so again, and woo uh oops.

The irony here is that one of Debian's foundational documents, the Debian Free Software Guidelines, makes allowances for this. Section 4 allows for distribution of software in Debian even if the author insists that modified versions[4] are renamed. This allows for an author to make a choice - allow themselves to be associated with the Debian version of their work and increase (a) their userbase and (b) their support load, or try to distinguish what Debian ship from their identity. But that document was ratified in 1997 and people haven't really spent much time since then thinking about why it says what it does, and so this tradeoff is rarely considered.

Free software doesn't benefit from distributions antagonising their upstreams, even if said upstream is a cranky nightclub owner. Debian's users are Debian's highest priority, but those users are going to suffer if developers decide that not using free licenses improves their quality of life. Kneejerk reactions around specific instances aren't helpful, but now is probably a good time to start thinking about what value Debian bring to its upstream authors and how that can be increased. Failing to do so doesn't serve users, Debian itself or the free software community as a whole.

[1] The X server has no fundamental concept of a screen lock. This is implemented by an application asking that the X server send all keyboard and mouse input to it rather than to any other application, and then that application creating a window that fills the screen. Due to some hilarious design decisions, opening a pop-up menu in an application prevents any other application from being able to grab input and so it is impossible for the screensaver to activate if you open a menu and then walk away from your computer. This is merely the most obvious problem - there are others that are more subtle and more infuriating. The only fix in this case is to nuke the site from orbit.

[2] There's screenshots here. My favourites are the one that emulate the electrical characteristics of an old CRT in order to present a more realistic depiction of the output of an Apple 2 and the one that includes a complete 6502 emulator.

[3] And obviously new versions of software will often also introduce new security vulnerabilities without there being any indication that they do so, because who would ever put that in their changelog. But the less ethically challenged members of the security community are more likely to be looking at new versions of software than ones released three years ago, so you're probably still tending towards winning overall

[4] There's a perfectly reasonable argument that all packages distributed by Debian are modified in some way

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4 April 2016

Matthew Garrett: TPMs, event logs, fine-grained measurements and avoiding fragility in remote-attestation

Trusted Platform Modules are fairly unintelligent devices. They can do some crypto, but they don't have any ability to directly monitor the state of the system they're attached to. This is worked around by having each stage of the boot process "measure" state into registers (Platform Configuration Registers, or PCRs) in the TPM by taking the SHA1 of the next boot component and performing an extend operation. Extend works like this:

New PCR value = SHA1(current value new hash)

ie, the TPM takes the current contents of the PCR (a 20-byte register), concatenates the new SHA1 to the end of that in order to obtain a 40-byte value, takes the SHA1 of this 40-byte value to obtain a 20-byte hash and sets the PCR value to this. This has a couple of interesting properties:But how do we know what those operations were? We control the bootloader and the kernel and we know what extend operations they performed, so that much is easy. But the firmware itself will have performed some number of operations (the firmware itself is measured, as is the firmware configuration, and certain aspects of the boot process that aren't in our control may also be measured) and we may not be able to reconstruct those from scratch.

Thankfully we have more than just the final PCR data. The firmware provides an interface to log each extend operation, and you can read the event log in /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements. You can pull information out of that log and use it to reconstruct the writes the firmware made. Merge those with the writes you performed and you should be able to reconstruct the final TPM state. Hurrah!

The problem is that a lot of what you want to measure into the TPM may vary between machines or change in response to configuration changes or system updates. If you measure every module that grub loads, and if grub changes the order that it loads modules in, you also need to update your calculations of the end result. Thankfully there's a way around this - rather than making policy decisions based on the final TPM value, just use the final TPM value to ensure that the log is valid. If you extract each hash value from the log and simulate an extend operation, you should end up with the same value as is present in the TPM. If so, you know that the log is valid. At that point you can examine individual log entries without having to care about the order that they occurred in, which makes writing your policy significantly easier.

But there's another source of fragility. Imagine that you're measuring every command executed by grub (as is the case in the CoreOS grub). You want to ensure that no inappropriate commands have been run (such as ones that would allow you to modify the loaded kernel after it's been measured), but you also want to permit certain variations - for instance, you might have a primary root filesystem and a fallback root filesystem, and you're ok with either being passed as a kernel argument. One approach would be to write two lines of policy, but there's an even more flexible approach. If the bootloader logs the entire command into the event log, when replaying the log we can verify that the event description hashes to the value that was passed to the TPM. If it does, rather than testing against an explicit hash value, we can examine the string itself. If the event description matches a regular expression provided by the policy then we're good.

This approach makes it possible to write TPM policies that are resistant to changes in ordering and permit fine-grained definition of acceptable values, and which can cleanly separate out local policy, generated policy values and values that are provided by the firmware. The split between machine-specific policy and OS policy allows for the static machine-specific policy to be merged with OS-provided policy, making remote attestation viable even over automated system upgrades.

We've integrated an implementation of this kind of policy into the TPM support code we'd like to integrate into Kubernetes, and CoreOS will soon be generating known-good hashes at image build time. The combination of these means that people using Distributed Trusted Computing under Tectonic will be able to validate the state of their systems with nothing more than a minimal machine-specific policy description.

The support code for all of this should also start making it into other distributions in the near future (the grub code is already in Fedora 24), so with luck we can define a cross-distribution policy format and make it straightforward to handle this in a consistent way even in hetrogenous operating system environments. Remote attestation is a powerful tool for ensuring that your systems are in a valid state, but the difficulty of policy management has been a significant factor in making it difficult for people to deploy in their data centres. Making it easier for people to shield themselves against low-level boot attacks is a big step forward in improving the security of distributed workloads and makes bare-metal hosting a much more viable proposition.

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Raphaël Hertzog: My Free Software Activities in February and March 2016

My monthly report covers a large part of what I have been doing in the free software world. I write it for my donators (thanks to them!) but also for the wider Debian community because it can give ideas to newcomers and it s one of the best ways to find volunteers to work with me on projects that matter to me. I skipped my monthly report last time so this one will cover two months. I will try to list only the most important things to not make it too long.  The Debian Handbook I worked with Ryuunosuke Ayanokouzi to prepare a paperback version of the Japanese translation of my book. Thanks to the efforts of everybody, it s now available. Unfortunately, Lulu declined to take it in distribution program so it won t be available on traditional bookstores (like Amazon, etc.). The reason is that they do not support non-latin character sets in the meta-data. I tried to cheat a little bit by inputting the description in English (still explaining that the book was in Japanese) but they rejected it nevertheless because the English title could mislead people. So the paperback is only available on lulu.com. Fortunately, the shipping costs are reasonable if you pick the most economic offer. Following this I invited the Italian, Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese translators to complete the work (they were close will all the strings already translated, mainly missing translated screenshots and some backcover content) so that we can also release paperback versions in those languages. It s getting close to completion for them. Hopefully we will have those available until next month. Distro Tracker In early February, I tweaked the configuration to send (by email) exceptions generated by incoming mails and by routine task. Before this they were logged but I did not take the time to look into them. This quickly brought a few issues into light and I fixed them as they appeared: for instance the bounce handling code was getting confused when the character case was not respected, and it appears that some emails come back to us after having been lowercased. Also the code was broken when the References field used more than one line on incoming control emails. This brought into light a whole class of problems with the database storing twice the same email with only differing case. So I did further work to merge all those duplicate entries behind a single email entry. Later, the experimental Sources files changed and I had to tweak the code to work with the removal of the Files field (relying instead on Checksums-* to find out the various files part of the entry). At some point, I also fixed the login form to not generate an exception when the user submits an empty form. I also decided that I no longer wanted to support Django 1.7 in distro tracker as Django 1.8 is the current LTS version. I asked the Debian system administrators to update the package on tracker.debian.org with the version in jessie-backports. This allowed me to fix a few deprecation warnings that I kept triggering because I wanted the code to work with Django 1.7. One of those warnings was generated by django-jsonfield though and I could not fix it immediately. Instead I prepared a pull request that I submitted to the upstream author. Oh, and a last thing, I tweaked the CSS to densify the layout on the package page. This was one of the most requested changes from the people who were still preferring packages.qa.debian.org over tracker.debian.org. Kali and new pkg-security team As part of my Kali work, I have been fixing RC bugs in Debian packages that we use in Kali. But in many cases, I stumbled upon packages whose maintainers were really missing in action (MIA). Up to now, we were only doing non-maintainers upload (NMU) but I want to be able to maintain those packages more effectively so we created a new pkg-security team (we re only two right now and we have no documentation yet, but if you want to join, you re welcome, in particular if you maintain a package which is useful in the security field). arm64 work. The first 3 packages that we took over (ssldump, sucrack, xprobe) are actually packages that were missing arm64 builds. We just started our arm64 port on Kali and we fixed them for that architecture. Since they were no longer properly maintained, in most cases it was just a matter of using dh_autoreconf to get up-to-date config. sub,guess files. We still miss a few packages on arm64: vboot-utils (that we will likely take over soon since it s offered for adoption), ruby-libv8 and ruby-therubyracer, ntopng (we have to wait a new luajit which is only in experimental right now). We also noticed that dh-make-golang was not available on arm64, after some discussion on #debian-buildd, I filed two bugs for this: #819472 on dh-make-golang and #819473 on dh-golang. RC bug fixing. hdparm was affected by multiple RC bugs and the release managers were trying to get rid of it from testing. This removed multiple packages that were used by Kali and its users. So I investigated the situation of that package, convinced the current maintainers to orphan it, asked for new maintainers on debian-devel, reviewed multiple updates prepared by the new volunteers and sponsored their work. Now hdparm is again RC-bug free and has the latest upstream version. We also updated jsonpickle to 0.9.3-1 to fix RC bug #812114 (that I forwarded upstream first). Systemd presets support in init-system-helpers. I tried to find someone (to hire) to implement the system preset feature I requested in #772555 but I failed. Still Andreas Henriksson was kind enough to give it a try and sent a first patch. I tried it and found some issues so I continued to improve it and simplify it I submitted an updated patch and pinged Martin Pitt. He pointed me to the DEP-8 test failures that my patch was creating. I quickly fixed those afterwards. This patch is in use in Kali and lets us disable network services by default. I would like to see it merged in Debian so that everybody can setup systemd preset file and have their desire respected at installation time. Misc bug reports. I filed #813801 to request a new upstream release of kismet. Same for masscan in #816644 and for wkhtmltopdf in #816714. We packaged (before Debian) a new upstream release of ruby-msgpack and found out that it was not building on armel/armhf so we filed two upstream tickets (with a suggested fix). In #814805, we asked the pyscard maintainer to reinstate python-pyscard that was dropped (keeping only the Python3 version) as we use the Python 2 version in Kali. And there s more: I filed #816553 (segfault) and #816554 against cdebootstrap. I asked for dh-python to have a better behaviour after having being bitten by the fact that dh with python3 was not doing what I expected it to do (see #818175). And I reported #818907 against live-build since it is failing to handle a package whose name contains an upper case character (it s not policy compliant but dpkg supports them). Misc packaging I uploaded Django 1.9.2 to unstable and 1.8.9 to jessie-backports. I provided the supplementary information that Julien Cristau asked me in #807654 but despite this, this jessie update has been ignored for the second point release in a row. It is now outdated until I update it to include the security fixes that have been released in the mean time but I m not yet sure that I will do it the lack of cooperation of the release team for that kind of request is discouraging. I sponsored multiple uploads of dolibarr (on security update notably) and tcpdf (to fix one RC bug). Thanks See you next month for a new summary of my activities.

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Ian Wienand: Image building for OpenStack CI -- Minimal images, big effort

A large part of OpenStack Infrastructure teams recent efforts has been focused on moving towards more stable and maintainable CI environments for testing.
OpenStack CI Overview Before getting into details, it's a good idea to get a basic big-picture conceptual model of how OpenStack CI testing works. If you look at the following diagram and follow the numbers with the explanation below, hopefully you'll have all the context you need. Overview of OpenStack CI
  1. The developer uploads their code to gerrit via the git-review tool. They wait.

  2. Gerrit provides a JSON-encoded "firehose" output of everything happening to it. New reviews, votes, updates and more all get sent out over this pipe. Zuul is the overall scheduler that subscribes itself to this information and is responsible for managing the CI jobs appropriate for each change.

  3. Zuul has a configuration that tells it what jobs to run for what projects. Zuul can do lots of interesting things, but for the purposes of this discussion we just consider that it puts the jobs it wants run into gearman for a Jenkins host to consume. gearman is a job-server; as they explain it "[gearman] provides a generic application framework to farm out work to other machines or processes that are better suited to do the work".

  4. A group of Jenkins hosts are subscribed to gearman as workers. It is these Jenkins hosts that will consume the job requests from the queue and actually get the tests running. Jenkins needs two things to be able to run a job -- a job definition (what to actually do) and a slave node (somewhere to do it). The first part -- what to do -- is provided by job-definitions stored in external YAML files and processed by Jenkins Job Builder (jjb) in to job configurations for Jenkins. Thus each Jenkins instance knows about all the jobs it might need to run. Zuul also knows about these job definitions, so you can see how we now have a mapping where Zuul can put a job into gearman saying "run test foo-bar-baz" and a Jenkins host can consume that request and know what to do. The second part -- somewhere to run the test -- takes some more explaining. To the next point...

  5. Several cloud companies donate capacity in their clouds for OpenStack to run CI tests. Overall, this capacity is managed by nodepool -- a customised orchestration tool. Nodepool watches the gearman queue and sees what requests are coming out of Zuul, and decides what type of capacity to provide and in what clouds to satisfy the outstanding job queue. Nodepool will start-up virtual-machines as required, and register those nodes to the Jenkins instances.

  6. At this point, Jenkins has what it needs to actually get jobs started. When nodepool registers a host to Jenkins as a slave, the Jenkins host can now advertise its ability to consume jobs. For example, if a ubuntu-trusty node is provided to the Jenkins instance by nodepool, Jenkins can now consume a job from the queue intended to run on an ubuntu-trusty host. It will run the job as defined in the job-definition -- ssh-ing into the host, running scripts, copying the logs and waiting for the result. (It is a gross oversimplification, but but Jenkins is pretty much a glorified ssh/scp wrapper to OpenStack CI. Zuul Version 3, under development, is working to remove the need for Jenkins to be involved at all).

  7. Eventually, the test will finish. Jenkins will put the result back into gearman, which Zuul will consume. The slave will be released back to nodepool, which destroys it and starts all over again (slaves are not reused and also have no sensitive details on them, as they are essentially publicly accessible). Zuul will wait for the results of all jobs and post the result back to Gerrit and give either a positive vote or the dreaded negative vote if required jobs failed (it also handles merges to git, but we'll ignore that bit for now).

In a nutshell, that is the CI work-flow that happens thousands-upon-thousands of times a day keeping OpenStack humming along.
Image builds There is, however, another more asynchronous part of the process that hides a lot of details the rest of the system relies on. Illustrated in step 8 above, this is the management of the images that tests are being run upon. Above we we said that a test runs on a ubuntu-trusty, centos, fedora or some other type of node, but glossed over where these images come from. Firstly, what are these images, and why build them at all? These images are where the "rubber hits the road" -- where DevStack, functional testing or whatever else someone might want to test is actually run for real. Caching is a big part of the role of these images. With thousands of jobs going on every day, an occasional network blip is not a minor annoyance, but creates constant and difficult to debug CI failures. We want the images that CI runs on to rely on as few external resources as possible so test runs are as stable as possible. This means caching all the git trees tests might use, VM images consumed by various tests and other common bits and pieces. Obviously a cache is only as useful as the data in it, so we build these images up every day to keep them fresh.
Provider images If you log into almost any cloud-provider's interface, they almost certainly have a range of pre-canned images of common distributions for you to use. At first, the base images for OpenStack CI testing came from what the cloud-providers had as their public image types. However, over time, there are a number of issues that emerge:
  1. No two images, even for the same distribution or platform, are the same. Every provider seems to do something "helpful" to the images which requires some sort of workaround.
  2. Providers rarely leave these images alone. One day you would boot the image to find a bunch of Python libraries pip-installed, or a mount-point moved, or base packages removed (all happened).
  3. Even if the changes are helpful, it does not make for consistent and reproducible testing if every time you run, you're on a slightly different base system.
  4. Providers don't have some images you want (like a latest Fedora), or have different versions, or different point releases. All update asynchronously whenever they get around to it.
So the original incarnations of building images was that nodepool would start one of these provider images, run a bunch of scripts on it to make a base-image (do the caching, setup keys, etc), snapshot it and then start putting VM's based on these images into the pool for testing (if you hear someone talking about a "snapshot image" in OpenStack CI context, that's what it means). The first problem you hit here is that the number of images being built starts to explode when you take into account multiple providers and multiple regions. Even with just Rackspace and the (now defunct) HP Cloud we would end up snapshot images for 4 or 5 platforms across a total of about 8 regions -- meaning anywhere up to 40 separate image builds happening. It was almost a fait accompli that some images would fail every day -- nodepool can deal with this by reusing old snapshots; but this leads to a inconsistent and heterogeneous testing environment. OpenStack is like a gigantic Jenga tower, with a full DevStack deployment resulting in hundreds of libraries and millions of lines of code all being exercised at once. The testing images are right at the bottom of all this, and it doesn't take much to make the whole thing fall over (see points about providers not leaving images alone). This leads to constant fire-firefighting and everyone annoyed as all CI stops. Naturally there was a desire for something much more consistent -- a single image that could run across multiple providers in a much more tightly controlled manner.
Upstream-based builds Upstream distributions do provide their "cloud-images", which are usually pre-canned .qcow2 format files suitable for uploading to your average cloud. So the diskimage-builder tool was put into use creating images for nodepool, based on these upstream-provided images. In essence, diskimage-builder uses a series of elements (each, as the name suggests, designed to do one thing) that allow you to build a completely customised image. It handles all the messy bits of laying out the image file, tries to be smart about caching large downloads and final things like conversion to qcow2 or vhd or whatever your cloud requires. nodepool has used diskimage-builder to create customised images based upon the upstream releases for some time. These are better, but still have some issues for the CI environment:
  1. You still really have no control over what does or does not go into the upstream base images. You don't notice a change until you deploy a new image based on an updated version and things break.
  2. The images still have a fair amount of "stuff" on them. For example cloud-init is a rather large Python program and has a fair few dependencies. These dependencies can both conflict with parts of OpenStack or end up tacitly hiding real test requirements (the test doesn't specify it, but the package is there as part of another base dependency -- things break when the base dependencies change). The whole idea of the CI is that (as much as possible) you're not making any assumptions about what is required to run your tests -- you want everything explicitly included. (If you were starting this whole thing again, things like Docker to keep "systems within systems" might come into play. Indeed they may be in the future. But don't forget that DevStack, the major CI deployment mechanism, was started before Docker existed. And there's tricky stuff with networking and Neutron etc going on).
  3. An image that "works everywhere" across multiple cloud-providers is quite a chore. cloud-init hasn't always had support for config-drive and Rackspace's DHCP-less environment, for example. Providers all have their various different networking schemes or configuration methods which needs to be handled consistently.
Minimal builds To this end, diskimage-builder now has a serial of "minimal" builds that are really that -- systems with essentially nothing on them. For Debian and Ubuntu, this is achieved via debootstrap, for Fedora and CentOS we replicate this with manual installs of base packages into a clean chroot environment. We add-on a range of important elements that make the image useful; for example, for networking, we have simple-init which brings up the network consistently across all our providers but has no dependencies to mess with the base system. If you check the elements provided by project-config you can see a range of specific elements that OpenStack Infra runs at each image build (these are actually specified by in arguments to nodepool, see the config file, particularly diskimages section). These custom elements do things like caching, using puppet to install the right authorized_keys files and setup a few needed things to connect to the host. In general, you can see the logs of an image build provided by nodepool for each daily build. So now, each day at 14:00 UTC nodepool builds the daily images that will be used for CI testing. We have one image of each type that (theoretically) works across all our providers. After it finishes building, nodepool uploads the image to all providers (p.s. the process of doing this is so insanely terrible it spawned shade; this deserves many posts of its own) at which point it will start being used for CI jobs. If you wish to replicate this entire process, the build-image.sh script, run on an Ubuntu Trusty host in a virtualenv with diskimage-builder will get you pretty close (let us know of any issues!).
Dependencies But guess what, there's more! Along the way, OpenStack CI ended up with the concept of bare nodes and devstack nodes. A bare node was one that was used for functional testing; i.e. what you do when you type tox -e py27 in basically any OpenStack project. The problem here is that tox has plenty of information about installing required Python packages into the virtualenv for testing; but it doesn't know anything about the system packages required to build the Python libraries. This means things like gcc and -devel packages which many Python libraries use to build library bindings. In contrast to this, DevStack has always been able to bootstrap itself from a blank system to a working OpenStack deployment, ensuring it has the right libraries, etc, installed to get everything working. If you look at all the job definitions, anything running DevStack has a dsvm in the job name; which referred to to "DevStack Virtual Machine"; or basically specifying what was installed on the host (and yes, the bare node had more installed, so it wasn't that bare at all!). Thus we don't want packages pre-installed for DevStack, because it hides actual devstack dependencies that we want explicitly defined. But the bare nodes, used for functional testing, were different -- there was an every-growing and not well-defined list of packages that were pre-installed on those nodes to make sure functional testing worked. In general, you don't want jobs relying on something like this; we want to be sure if jobs have a dependency, they require it explicitly. This is where a tool called bindep comes in. OpenStack has the concept of global requirements -- those Python dependencies that are common across all projects so version skew becomes somewhat manageable. This now has some extra information in the other-requirements.txt file, which lists the system-packages required to build the Python-packages in the requirements list. bindep knows how to look at this and get the right packages for the platform it is running on. Indeed -- remember how it was previously mentioned we want to minimise dependencies on external resources at runtime? Well we can pre-cache all of these packages onto the images, knowing that they are likely to be required by packages. How do we get the packages installed? The way we really should be doing it -- as part of the CI job. There is a macro called install-distro-packages which uses bindep to install those packages as required by the global-requirements list. The result -- no more need for the bare node type to run functional tests! In all cases we can start with essentially a blank image and all the dependencies to run the job are expressed by and within the job -- leading to a consistent and reproducible environment. Several things have broken as part of removing bare nodes -- this is actually a good thing because it means we have revealed areas where we were making assumptions in jobs about what the underlying platform provides; issues that get fixed by thinking about and ensuring we have correct dependencies bringing up jobs. There's a few other macros there that do things like provide MySQL/Postgres instances or setup other common job requirements. By splitting these out we also improve the performance of jobs who now only bring in the dependencies they need -- we don't waste time doing things like setting up databases for jobs that don't need it.
Conclusion While dealing with multiple providers, image-types and dependency chains has been a great effort for the infra team, to everyone's credit I don't think the project has really noticed much going on underneath. OpenStack CI has transitioned to a situation where there is a single image type for each platform we test that deploys unmodified across all our providers. We have better insight into our dependencies and better tools to manage them. This leads to greatly decreased maintenance burden, better consistency and better performance; all great things to bring to OpenStack CI!

2 April 2016

Thorsten Alteholz: My Debian Activities in March 2016

FTP assistant This month I marked 226 packages for accept and rejected 22. I also sent 5 emails to maintainers asking questions. It seems to be that a rather quiet month is behind us. As I have seen some packages with strange debian/copyright in binNEW, I wonder whether also the archive should be checked regularly. Maybe it is time to file some bugs Debian LTS This was my twenty-first month that I did some work for the Debian LTS initiative, started by Raphael Hertzog at Freexian. Due to outstanding hours that were redistributed, my all in all workload had been 14.25h. As Wheezy LTS didn t start yet and I am not able to do normal security uploads, I sent debdiffs to the security team. Btw. this can be done by everybody and the way to go is described in chapter 5.8.5 of the Debian Developer s Reference. Altogether I sent the following debdiffs for As the security team wants to update Wheezy and Jessie with only one DSA, whenever applicable I created debdiffs for both releases. Up to now the results can be seen in DSA 3526-1, DSA 3527-1 and DSA 3536-1. As tlslite has been removed from Wheezy during today s point release, I am afraid that was a wasted effort. Other stuff My node activities this month involved uploads of: node-component-consoler, node-generator-supported, node-xmlhttprequest-ssl, node-co, node-uid-umber, node-url-join, node-uri-path, node-read-file, node-nth-check, node-base62, node-require-dir, node-for-in, node-obj-util, node-normalize-it-url, node-delve, node-function-bind, node-seq, node-json-localizer, node-through, node-addressparser, node-ansi-regex, node-crypto-cacerts, node-decamelize, node-array-find-index, node-require-main-filename, node-invert-kv, node-starttls. To fix one or the other bug I also uploaded: node-connect, node-mysql. I also forwarded bug #809252, which is tagged as security relevant in the BTS, to the Node Security Project. I even got one answer stating that the report arrived. We will see what happens next. At least after 45 days another email might arrive

Alessio Treglia: Fuzzy: a many-valued logic

The paths of life to guide us towards the knowledge are many and a straight; well-defined line does not always represent them. Among these, the theory of Fuzzy Logic can help us to better understand some of the methods that maybe for too long we have lost the habit to use, if not even forgotten, because of the residuals of the positivist scientism.

Brief mathematical introduction

blur2All the elements making up the majority of the categories of everyday life (feelings, emotions, opinions, values, quality, etc.) cannot be defined in a unique or exact way. Let s try to define an event that causes severe pain: a hammer blow on the finger? The loss of a loved one? Tooth extraction? It is evident that the answer can vary in a very consistent way, based on the subjectivity of the individual, the environment, boundary conditions and the general context. This is because the Strong Pain is a fuzzy set (which we will call SP), characterized by a function of degree of membership which maps the elements of a universe in a real continuous interval between 0 and 1. In practical terms

<Read More [by Fabio Marzocca]>

Petter Reinholdtsen: syslog-trusted-timestamp - chain of trusted timestamps for your syslog

Two years ago, I had a look at trusted timestamping options available, and among other things noted a still open bug in the tsget script included in openssl that made it harder than necessary to use openssl as a trusted timestamping client. A few days ago I was told the Norwegian government office DIFI is close to releasing their own trusted timestamp service, and in the process I was happy to learn about a replacement for the tsget script using only curl:
openssl ts -query -data "/etc/shells" -cert -sha256 -no_nonce \
    curl -s -H "Content-Type: application/timestamp-query" \
         --data-binary "@-" http://zeitstempel.dfn.de > etc-shells.tsr
openssl ts -reply -text -in etc-shells.tsr
This produces a binary timestamp file (etc-shells.tsr) which can be used to verify that the content of the file /etc/shell with the calculated sha256 hash existed at the point in time when the request was made. The last command extract the content of the etc-shells.tsr in human readable form. The idea behind such timestamp is to be able to prove using cryptography that the content of a file have not changed since the file was stamped. To verify that the file on disk match the public key signature in the timestamp file, run the following commands. It make sure you have the required certificate for the trusted timestamp service available and use it to compare the file content with the timestamp. In production, one should of course use a better method to verify the service certificate.
wget -O ca-cert.txt https://pki.pca.dfn.de/global-services-ca/pub/cacert/chain.txt
openssl ts -verify -data /etc/shells -in etc-shells.tsr -CAfile ca-cert.txt -text
Wikipedia have a lot more information about trusted Timestamping and linked timestamping, and there are several trusted timestamping services around, both as commercial services and as free and public services. Among the latter is the zeitstempel.dfn.de service mentioned above and freetsa.org service linked to from the wikipedia web site. I believe the DIFI service should show up on https://tsa.difi.no, but it is not available to the public at the moment. I hope this will change when it is into production. The RFC 3161 trusted timestamping protocol standard is even implemented in LibreOffice, Microsoft Office and Adobe Acrobat, making it possible to verify when a document was created. I would find it useful to be able to use such trusted timestamp service to make it possible to verify that my stored syslog files have not been tampered with. This is not a new idea. I found one example implemented on the Endian network appliances where the configuration of such feature was described in 2012. But I could not find any free implementation of such feature when I searched, so I decided to try to build a prototype named syslog-trusted-timestamp. My idea is to generate a timestamp of the old log files after they are rotated, and store the timestamp in the new log file just after rotation. This will form a chain that would make it possible to see if any old log files are tampered with. But syslog is bad at handling kilobytes of binary data, so I decided to base64 encode the timestamp and add an ID and line sequence numbers to the base64 data to make it possible to reassemble the timestamp file again. To use it, simply run it like this:
syslog-trusted-timestamp /path/to/list-of-log-files
This will send a timestamp from one or more timestamp services (not yet decided nor implemented) for each listed file to the syslog using logger(1). To verify the timestamp, the same program is used with the --verify option:
syslog-trusted-timestamp --verify /path/to/log-file /path/to/log-with-timestamp
The verification step is not yet well designed. The current implementation depend on the file path being unique and unchanging, and this is not a solid assumption. It also uses process number as timestamp ID, and this is bound to create ID collisions. I hope to have time to come up with a better way to handle timestamp IDs and verification later. Please check out the prototype for syslog-trusted-timestamp on github and send suggestions and improvement, or let me know if there already exist a similar system for timestamping logs already to allow me to join forces with others with the same interest. As usual, if you use Bitcoin and want to show your support of my activities, please send Bitcoin donations to my address 15oWEoG9dUPovwmUL9KWAnYRtNJEkP1u1b.

1 April 2016

Ben Hutchings: Debian LTS work, March 2016

Last month was relatively quiet for me in terms of uploads, as the "squeeze" LTS period was over and "wheezy" is still in the hands of the regular Debian security team. I carried over 7.25 hours from Feburary and was assigned another 11 hours of work by Freexian's Debian LTS initiative, and worked a total of 12.75 hours. As Debian 7 "wheezy" uses Linux 3.2.y, I took on maintenance of that stable branch at kernel.org from May 2012 until wheezy's EOL. (This currently makes it both the oldest of the kernel.org supported releases and the one with the latest projected EOL!) I will now be maintaining it as part of my Debian LTS work, and then taking on Linux 3.16.y in my own time starting next month. Each update takes me around 10 hours to prepare, so Linux 3.2.79 accounted for most of my work this month. Aside from that, I backported an additional security fix for the kernel (that was not yet suitable for a kernel.org update) to the wheezy-security branch, rebased the wheezy branch on 3.2.79, and pulled upstream updates to the PREEMPT_RT patchset.

Francois Marier: How Safe Browsing works in Firefox

Firefox has had support for Google's Safe Browsing since 2005 when it started as a stand-alone Firefox extension. At first it was only available in the USA, but it was opened up to the rest of the world in 2006 and moved to the Google Toolbar. It then got integrated directly into Firefox 2.0 before the public launch of the service in 2007. Many people seem confused by this phishing and malware protection system and while there is a pretty good explanation of how it works on our support site, it doesn't go into technical details. This will hopefully be of interest to those who have more questions about it.

Browsing Protection The main part of the Safe Browsing system is the one that watches for bad URLs as you're browsing. Browsing protection currently protects users from: If a Firefox user attempts to visit one of these sites, a warning page will show up instead, which you can see for yourself here: The first two warnings can be toggled using the browser.safebrowsing.malware.enabled preference (in about:config) whereas the last one is controlled by browser.safebrowsing.enabled.

List updates It would be too slow (and privacy-invasive) to contact a trusted server every time the browser wants to establish a connection with a web server. Instead, Firefox downloads a list of bad URLs every 30 minutes from the server (browser.safebrowsing.provider.google.updateURL) and does a lookup against its local database before displaying a page to the user. Downloading the entire list of sites flagged by Safe Browsing would be impractical due to its size so the following transformations are applied:
  1. each URL on the list is canonicalized,
  2. then hashed,
  3. of which only the first 32 bits of the hash are kept.
The lists that are requested from the Safe Browsing server and used to flag pages as malware/unwanted or phishing can be found in urlclassifier.malwareTable and urlclassifier.phishTable respectively. If you want to see some debugging information in your terminal while Firefox is downloading updated lists, turn on browser.safebrowsing.debug. Once downloaded, the lists can be found in the cache directory:
  • ~/.cache/mozilla/firefox/XXXX/safebrowsing/ on Linux
  • ~/Library/Caches/Firefox/Profiles/XXXX/safebrowsing/ on Mac
  • C:\Users\XXXX\AppData\Local\mozilla\firefox\profiles\XXXX\safebrowsing\ on Windows

Resolving partial hash conflicts Because the Safe Browsing database only contains partial hashes, it is possible for a safe page to share the same 32-bit hash prefix as a bad page. Therefore when a URL matches the local list, the browser needs to know whether or not the rest of the hash matches the entry on the Safe Browsing list. In order resolve such conflicts, Firefox requests from the Safe Browsing server (browser.safebrowsing.provider.mozilla.gethashURL) all of the hashes that start with the affected 32-bit prefix and adds these full-length hashes to its local database. Turn on browser.safebrowsing.debug to see some debugging information on the terminal while these "completion" requests are made. If the current URL doesn't match any of these full hashes, the load proceeds as normal. If it does match one of them, a warning interstitial page is shown and the load is canceled.

Download Protection The second part of the Safe Browsing system protects users against malicious downloads. It was launched in 2011, implemented in Firefox 31 on Windows and enabled in Firefox 39 on Mac and Linux. It roughly works like this:
  1. Download the file.
  2. Check the main URL, referrer and redirect chain against a local blocklist (urlclassifier.downloadBlockTable) and block the download in case of a match.
  3. On Windows, if the binary is signed, check the signature against a local whitelist (urlclassifier.downloadAllowTable) of known good publishers and release the download if a match is found.
  4. If the file is not a binary file then release the download.
  5. Otherwise, send the binary file's metadata to the remote application reputation server (browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.url) and block the download if the server indicates that the file isn't safe.
Blocked downloads can be unblocked by right-clicking on them in the download manager and selecting "Unblock". While the download protection feature is automatically disabled when malware protection (browser.safebrowsing.malware.enabled) is turned off, it can also be disabled independently via the browser.safebrowsing.downloads.enabled preference. Note that Step 5 is the only point at which any information about the download is shared with Google. That remote lookup can be suppressed via the browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.enabled preference for those users concerned about sending that metadata to a third party.

Types of malware The original application reputation service would protect users against "dangerous" downloads, but it has recently been expanded to also warn users about unwanted software as well as software that's not commonly downloaded. These various warnings can be turned on and off in Firefox through the following preferences:
  • browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.block_dangerous
  • browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.block_dangerous_host
  • browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.block_potentially_unwanted
  • browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.block_uncommon
and tested using Google's test page. If you want to see how often each "verdict" is returned by the server, you can have a look at the telemetry results for Firefox Beta.

Privacy One of the most persistent misunderstandings about Safe Browsing is the idea that the browser needs to send all visited URLs to Google in order to verify whether or not they are safe. While this was an option in version 1 of the Safe Browsing protocol (as disclosed in their privacy policy at the time), support for this "enhanced mode" was removed in Firefox 3 and the version 1 server was decommissioned in late 2011 in favor of version 2 of the Safe Browsing API which doesn't offer this type of real-time lookup. Google explicitly states that the information collected as part of operating the Safe Browsing service "is only used to flag malicious activity and is never used anywhere else at Google" and that "Safe Browsing requests won't be associated with your Google Account". In addition, Firefox adds a few privacy protections:
  • Query string parameters are stripped from URLs we check as part of the download protection feature.
  • Cookies set by the Safe Browsing servers to protect the service from abuse are stored in a separate cookie jar so that they are not mixed with regular browsing/session cookies.
  • When requesting complete hashes for a 32-bit prefix, Firefox throws in a number of extra "noise" entries to obfuscate the original URL further.
On balance, we believe that most users will want to keep Safe Browsing enabled, but we also make it easy for users with particular needs to turn it off.

Learn More If you want to learn more about how Safe Browsing works in Firefox, you can find all of the technical details on the Safe Browsing and Application Reputation pages of the Mozilla wiki or you can ask questions on our mailing list. Google provides some interesting statistics about what their systems detect in their transparency report and offers a tool to find out why a particular page has been blocked. Some information on how phishing sites are detected is also available on the Google Security blog, but for more detailed information about all parts of the Safe Browsing system, see the following papers:

Bits from Debian: Debian announces partnership to sub-contract publicity and press to an outside marketing agency

Last year we started to push more of Debian news and information away the single news source of the DPN into other media services. Debian has been more active than ever on our many IRC channels, free software based social networks, and unofficial Twitter and Facebook feeds. Today we have decided to announce the next stage in keeping Debian at the forefront of media by sub-contracting publicity and press to an outside marketing agency. The marketing agency (name will be disclosed soon) has provided an AI system (running entirely with free software) which will be fed with all the content of Debian mailing lists and sources.debian.net to understand the character of the Debian community and then better customize future articles, interviews, and event news. However, some bits of personal information are also needed. Please install the "publicity" package and you'll be presented a form to fill in your data: name, surname, phone, snail mail address, place of birth, names of family members, employers or employees. Each person providing their data to the agency will receive coupon for a 20% discount in the download (purchase) of next Debian release (valid only for downloads from the official site www.debian.org). We kindly ask every Debian community member to sign up in, at least, one of theses services: Twitter, Whatsapp, Slack or Facebook (IRC, mailing lists, and free software based RTC are allegedly not so 'cool'). Users need not be concerned with losing the features that the IRC bots provide (so long KGB!) as they will be replaced by Tay-like AI systems. The most visible change will be that MeetBot will no longer log the meetings anymore, but we have bribed an NSA employee so they pass the relevant messages to us. "If this 'centralization, outsourcing and pay-and-forget' approach goes well with publicity, I'm considering running for DPL in 2017 to extend this model to other areas of Debian" said Laura Arjona Reina, (now) former publicity delegate. A new logo and mascot has been designed too, as a symbol of this new era embracing the standards of branding and corporate messaging. Please consider voting in favor of it, in the General Resolution that will be proposed soon: Mascot and Logo

31 March 2016

Antoine Beaupr : My free software activities, march 2016

Debian Long Term Support (LTS) This is my 4th month working on Debian LTS, started by Raphael Hertzog at Freexian. I spent half of the month away on a vacation so little work was done, especially since I tried to tackle rather large uploads like NSS and Xen. I also worked on the frontdesk shift last week.

Frontdesk That work mainly consisted of figuring out how to best help the security team with the last uploads to the Wheezy release. For those who don't know, Debian 7 Wheezy, or "oldstable", is going to be unsupported by the security team starting end of april, and the Debian 6 Squeeze (the previous LTS) is now unsupported. The PGP signatures on the archived release have started yielding expiration errors which can be ignored but that are really a strong reminder that it is really time to upgrade. So the LTS team is now working towards backporting a few security issues from squeeze to wheezy, and this is what I focused on during triage work. I have identified the following high priority packages I will work on after I complete my work on the Xen and NSS packages (detailed below):
  • libidn
  • icu
  • phpmyadmin
  • tomcat6
  • optipng
  • srtp
  • dhcpcd
  • python-tornado

Updates to NSS and Xen I have spent a lot of time testing and building packages for NSS and Xen. To be fair, Brian May did most of the work on the Xen packages, and I merely did some work to test the packages on Koumbit's infrastructure, something which I will continue doing in the next month. For NSS, wheezy and jessie are in this weird state where patches were provided to the security team all the way back in November yet were never tested. Since then, yet more issues came up and I worked hard to review and port patches for those new security issues to wheezy. I'll followup on both packages in the following month.

Other free software work

Android TL;DR: there's an even longer version of this with the step-by-step procedures and that I will update as time goes on in my wiki. I somehow inherited an Android phone recently, on a loan from a friend because the phone broke one too many times and she got a new one from her provider. This phone is a HTC One S "Ville", which is fairly old, but good enough to play with and give me a mobile computing platform to listen to podcasts, play music, access maps and create GPS traces. I was previously doing this with my N900, but that device is really showing its age: very little development is happening on it, the SDK is closed source and the device itself is fairly big, compared to the "Ville". Plus, the SIM card actually works on the Ville so, even though I do not have an actual contract with a cell phone provider (too expensive, too invasive on my privacy), I can still make emergency phone calls (911)! Plus, since there is good wifi on the machine, I can use it to connect to the phone system with the built-in SIP client, send text messages through SMS (thanks to VoIP.ms SMS support) or Jabber. I have also played around with LibreSignal, the free software replacement for Signal, which uses proprietary google services. Yes, the VoIP.ms SMS app also uses GCM, but hopefully that can be fixed. (While I was writing this, another Debian Developer wrote a good review of Signal so I am happy to skip that step. Go read that.)
See also my apps list for a more complete list of the apps I have installed on the phone. I welcome recommendations on cool free software apps I should use!
I have replaced the stock firmware on the phone with Cyanogenmod 12.1, which was a fairly painful experience, partly because of the difficult ambiance on the #cyanogenmod channel on Freenode, where I had extreme experiences: a brave soul helped me through the first flashing process for around 2 hours, nicely holding my hand at every step. Other times, I have seen flames and obtuse comments from people being vulgar, brutal, obnoxious, if not sometimes downright homophobic and sexist from other users. It is clearly a community that needs to fix their attitude. I have documented everything I could in details in this wiki page, in case others want to resuscitate their old phones, but also because I ended up reinstalling the freaking phone about 4 times, and was getting tired of forgetting how to do it every time. I am somewhat fascinated by Android: here is the Linux-based device that should save us all from the proprietary Apple nightmares of fenced in gardens and censorship. Yet, public Android downloads are hidden behind license agreements, even though the code itself is free, which has led fellow Debian developers to work on making libre rebuilds of Androids to workaround this insanity. But worse: all phones are basically proprietary devices down to the core. You need custom firmware to be loaded on the machine for it to boot at all, from the bootloader all the way down to the GSM baseband and Wifi drivers. It is a minefield of closed source software, and trying to run free software on there is a bit of a delusion, especially since the baseband has so much power over the phone. Still, I think it is really interesting to run free software on those machines, and help people that are stuck with cell phones get familiar with software freedom. It seems especially important to me to make Android developers aware of software freedom considering how many apps are available for free yet on which it is not possible to contribute significantly because the source code is not published at all, or published only on the Google Store, instead of the more open and public F-Droid repository which publishes only free software. So I did contribute. This month, I am happy to announce that I contributed to the following free software projects on Android: I have also reviewed the literature surrounding Telegram, a popular messaging app rival to Signal and Whatsapp. Oddly enough, my contributions to Wikipedia on that subject were promptly reverted which made me bring up the subject on the page's Talk page. This lead to an interesting response from the article's main editors which at least added that the "its security features have been contested by security researchers and cryptography experts". Considering the history of Telegram, I would keep people away from it and direct people to use Signal instead, even though Signal has similar metadata issues, mostly because Telegram's lack of response to the security issues that were outlined by fellow security researchers. Both systems suffer from a lack of federation as well, which is a shame in this era of increasing centralization. I am not sure I will put much more work in developing for Android for now. It seems like a fairly hostile platform to work on, and unless I have specific pain points I want to fix, it feels so much better to work on my own stuff in Debian. Which brings me to my usual plethora of free software projects I got stuck in this month.

IRC projects irssi-plugin-otr had a bunch of idiotic bugs lying around, and I had a patch that I hadn't submitted upstream from the Debian package, which needed a rebuild because the irssi version changed, which is a major annoyance. The version in sid is now a snapshot because upstream needs to make a new release but at least it should fix things for my friends running unstable and testing. Hopefully those silly uploads won't be necessary in the future. That's for the client side. On the server side, I have worked on updating the Atheme-services package to the latest version, which actually failed because the upstream libmowgli is missing release tags, which means the Debian package for it is not up-to-date either. Still, it is nice to have a somewhat newer version, even though it is not the latest and some bugs were fixed. I have also looked at making atheme reproducible but was surprised at the hostility of the upstream. In the end, it looks like they are still interested in patches, but they will be a little harder to deploy than for Charybdis, so this could take some time. Hopefully I will find time in the coming weeks to test the new atheme services daemon on the IRC network I operate.

Syncthing I have also re-discovered Syncthing, a file synchronization software. Amazingly, I was having trouble transferring a single file between two phones. I couldn't use Bluetooth (not sure why), the "Wifi sharing" app was available only on one phone (and is proprietary, and has a limit of 4MB files), and everything else requires an account, the cloud, or cabling. So. Just heading to f-droid, install syncthing, flash a few qr-codes around and voil : files are copied over! Pretty amazing: the files were actually copied over the local network, using IPv6 link-local addresses, encryption and the DHT. Which is a real geeky way of saying it's completely fast, secure and fast. Now, I found a few usability issues, so much that I wrote a whole usability story for the developers, which were really appreciative of my review. Some of the issues were already fixed, others were pretty minor. Syncthing has a great community, and it seems like a great project I encourage everyone to get familiar with.

Battery stats The battery-status project I mentionned previously has been merged with the battery-stats project (yes, the names are almost the same, which is confusing) and so I had to do some work to fix my Python graph script, which was accepted upstream and will be part of Debian officially from now on, which is cool. The previous package was unofficial. I have also noticed that my battery has a significantly than when I wrote the script. Whereas it was basically full back then, it seems now it has lost almost 15% of its capacity in about 6 months. According to the calculations of the script:
this battery will reach end of life (5%) in 935 days, 19:07:58.336480, on 2018-10-23 12:06:07.270290
Which is, to be fair, a good life: it will somewhat work for about three more years.

Playlist, git-annex and MPD in Python On top of my previously mentioned photos-import script, I have worked on two more small programs. One is called get-playlist and is an extension to git-annex to easily copy to the local git-annex repository all files present in a given M3U playlist. This is useful for me because my phone cannot possibly fit my whole MP3 collection, and I use playlists in GMPC to tag certain files, particularly the Favorites list which is populated by the "star" button in the UI. I had a lot of fun writing this script. I started using elpy as an IDE in Emacs. (Notice how Emacs got a new webpage, which is a huge improvement was had been basically unchanged since the original version, now almost 20 years old, and probably written by RMS himself.) I wonder how I managed to stay away from Elpy for so long, as it glues together key components of Emacs in an elegant and functional bundle:
  • Company: the "vim-like" completion mode i had been waiting for forever
  • Jedi: context-sensitive autocompletion for Python
  • Flymake: to outline style and syntax errors (unfortunately not the more modern Flycheck)
  • inline documentation...
In short, it's amazing and makes everything so much easier to work with that I wrote another script. The first program wouldn't work very well because some songs in the playlists had been moved, so I made another program, this time to repair playlists which refer to missing files. The script is simply called fix-playlists, and can operate transparently on multiple playlists. It has a bunch of heuristics to find files and uses a MPD server as a directory to search into. It can edit files in place or just act as a filter.

Useful snippets Writing so many scripts, so often, I figured I needed to stop wasting time always writing the same boilerplate stuff on top of every file, so I started publishing Yasnippet-compatible file snippets, in my snippets repository. For example, this report is based on the humble lts snippet. I also have a base license snippet which slaps the AGPLv3 license on top of a Python file. But the most interesting snippet, for me, is this simple script snippet which is a basic scaffolding for a commandline script that includes argument processing, logging and filtering of files, something which I was always copy-pasting around.

Other projects And finally, a list of interesting issues en vrac:
  • there's a new Bootstrap 4 theme for Ikiwiki. It was delivering content over CDNs, which is bad for privacy issues, so I filed an issue which was almost immediately fixed by the author!
  • I found out about BitHub, a tool to make payments with Bitcoins for patches submitted on OWS projects. It wasn't clear to me where to find the demo, but when I did, I quickly filed a PR to fix the documentation. Given the number of open PRs there and the lack of activity, I wonder if the model is working at all...
  • a fellow Debian Developer shared his photos workflow, which was interesting to me because I have my own peculiar script, which I never mentionned here, but which I ended up sharing with the author

Chris Lamb: Free software activities in March 2016

Here is my monthly update covering a large part of what I have been doing in the free software world (previously):
Debian
  • Presented Reproducible Builds - fulfilling the original promise of free software at FOSSASIA '16.
  • Uploaded libfiu (0.94-4), adding a patch from Logan Rose to fix a FTBFS with ld --as-needed.
My work in the Reproducible Builds project was also covered in more depth in Lunar's weekly reports (#44, #45, #46, #47).
LTS

This month I have been paid to work 7 hours on Debian Long Term Support (LTS). Whilst the LTS team will take over support from the Security Team on April 26, 2016, in the meantime I did the following:
  • Archived the squeeze distribution (via the FTPteam).
  • Assisted in preparing updates for python-django.
  • Helping end-users migrate to wheezy now that squeeze LTS has reached end-of-life.


FTP Team

As a Debian FTP assistant I ACCEPTed 143 packages: acme-tiny, berkshelf-api, circlator, cloud-utils, corsix-th, cronic, diaspora-installer, dub, dumb-init, firehol, firetools, flask-bcrypt, flask-oldsessions, flycheck, ganeti, geany-plugins, git-build-recipe, git-phab, gnome-shell-extension-caffeine, gnome-shell-extension-mediaplayer, golang-github-cheggaaa-pb, golang-github-coreos-ioprogress, golang-github-cyberdelia-go-metrics-graphite, golang-github-cznic-ql, golang-github-elazarl-goproxy, golang-github-hashicorp-hil, golang-github-mitchellh-go-wordwrap, golang-github-mvdan-xurls, golang-github-paulrosania-go-charset, golang-github-xeipuuv-gojsonreference, golang-github-xeipuuv-gojsonschema, grilo-plugins, gtk3-nocsd, herisvm, identity4c, lemonldap-ng, libisal, libmath-gsl-perl, libmemcached-libmemcached-perl, libplack-middleware-logany-perl, libplack-middleware-logwarn-perl, libpng1.6, libqmi, librdf-generator-http-perl, libtime-moment-perl, libvirt-php, libxml-compile-soap-perl, libxml-compile-wsdl11-perl, linux, linux-tools, mdk-doc, mesa, mpdecimal, msi-keyboard, nauty, node-addressparser, node-ansi-regex, node-argparse, node-array-find-index, node-base62, node-co, node-component-consoler, node-crypto-cacerts, node-decamelize, node-delve, node-for-in, node-function-bind, node-generator-supported, node-invert-kv, node-json-localizer, node-normalize-git-url, node-nth-check, node-obj-util, node-read-file, node-require-dir, node-require-main-filename, node-seq, node-starttls, node-through, node-uid-number, node-uri-path, node-url-join, node-xmlhttprequest-ssl, ocrmypdf, octave-netcdf, open-infrastructure-container-tools, osmose-emulator, pdal, pep8, pg-backup-ctl, php-guzzle, printrun, pydocstyle, pysynphot, python-antlr3, python-biom-format, python-brainstorm, python-django-adminsortable, python-feather-format, python-gevent, python-lxc, python-mongoengine, python-nameparser, python-pdal, python-pefile, python-phabricator, python-pika-pool, python-pynlpl, python-qtawesome, python-requests-unixsocket, python-saharaclient, python-stringtemplate3, r-cran-adegraphics, r-cran-assertthat, r-cran-bold, r-cran-curl, r-cran-data.table, r-cran-htmltools, r-cran-httr, r-cran-lazyeval, r-cran-mcmc, r-cran-openssl, r-cran-pbdzmq, r-cran-rncl, r-cran-uuid, rawtran, reel, ruby-certificate-authority, ruby-rspec-pending-for, ruby-ruby-engine, ruby-ruby-version, scribus-ng, specutils, symfony, tandem-mass, tdb, thrift, udfclient, vala, why3, wmaker, xdg-app & xiccd.

Michael Prokop: Event: OSDC 2016

* Open Source Data Center Conference (OSDC) is a conference on open source software in data centers and huge IT environments and will take place in Berlin/Germany in April 2016. I will give a talk titled Continuous Integration in Data Centers Further 3 Years Later there. I gave a talk titled Continuous Integration in data centers at OSDC in 2013, presenting ways how to realize continuous integration/delivery with Jenkins and related tools. Three years later we gained new tools in our continuous delivery pipeline, including Docker, Gerrit and Goss. Over the years we also had to deal with different problems caused by faster release cycles, a growing team and gaining new projects. We therefore established code review in our pipeline, improved our test infrastructure and invested in our infrastructure automation. In this talk I will discuss the lessons we learned over the last years, demonstrate how a proper continuous delivery pipeline can improve your life and how open source tools like Jenkins, Docker and Gerrit can be leveraged for setting up such an environment. Hope to see you there!

30 March 2016

Ian Wienand: Durable photo workflow

Ever since my kids were born I have accumulated thousands of digital happy-snaps and I have finally gotten to a point where I'm quite happy with my work-flow. I have always been extremely dubious of using any sort of external all-in-one solution to managing my photos; so many things seem to shut-down, cease development or disappear, all leaving you to have to figure out how to migrate to the next latest thing (e.g. Picasa shutting down). So while there is nothing complicated or even generic about them, there are a few things in my photo-scripts repo that might help others who like to keep a self-contained archive. Firstly I have a simple script to copy the latest photos from the SD card (i.e. those new since the last copy -- this is obviously very camera specific). I then split by date so I have a simple flat directory layout with each week's photos in it. With the price of SD cards and my rate of filling them up, I don't even bother wiping them at this point, but just keep them in the safe as a backup. For some reason I have a bit of a thing about geotagging all the photos so I know where I took them. Certainly some cameras do this today, but mine does not. I have a two-progned approach; I have a geotag script and then a small website easygeotag.info which quickly lets met translate a point on Google maps to exiv2 command-line syntax. Since I take a lot of photos in the same place, the script can store points by name in a small file sourced by the script. Adding comments to the photos is done with perhaps the lesser-known cousin of EXIF -- IPTC. Some time ago I wrote python bindings for libiptcdata and it has been working just fine ever since. Debian's python-iptcdata comes with a inbuilt script to set title and caption, which is easily wrapped. What I like about this is that my photos are in a simple directory layout, with all metadata embedded within the actual image files in very standarised formats that should be readable by anywhere I choose to host them. For sharing, I then upload to Flickr. I used to have a command-line script for this, but have found the web uploader works even better these days. It reads the IPTC data for titles and comments, and gets the geotag info for nice map displays. I manually coralle them into albums, and the Flickr "guest pass" is perfect for then sharing albums to friends and family without making them jump through hoops to register on a site to get access to the photos, or worse, host them myself. I consider Flickr a cache, because (even though I pay) I expect it to shut-down or turn evil at any time. Interestingly, their AI tagging is often quite accurate, and I imagine will only get better. This is nice extra metadata that you don't have to spend time on yourself. The last piece has always been the "hit by a bus" component of all this. Can anyone figure out access to all these photos if I suddenly disappear? I've tried many things here -- at one point I was using rdiff-backup to sync encrypted bundles up to AWS for example; but I very clearly found the problem in that when I forgot the keep the key safe and couldn't unencrypt any of my backups (let alone anyone else figuring all this out). Finally Google Nearline seems to be just what I want. It's off-site, redundant and the price is right; but more importantly I can very easily give access to the backup bucket to anyone with a Google address, who can then just hit a website to download the originals from the bucket (I left the link with my other "hit by a bus" bits and pieces). Of course what they then do with this data is their problem, but at least I feel like they have a chance. This even has an rsync like interface in the client, so I can quickly upload the new stuff from my home NAS (where I keep the photos in a RAID0). I've been doing this now for 350 weeks and have worked through some 25,000 photos. I used to get an album up every week, but as the kids get older and we're closer to family I now do it in batches about once a month. I do wonder if my kids will ever be interested in tagged and commented photos with pretty much their exact location from their childhood ... I doubt it, but it's nice to feel like I have a good chance of still having them if they do.

Niels Thykier: Easter patching of Britney

I decided to take a couple of days of vacation next to Easter and obviously ended up with tons of time. I ended up channelling most of the (productive) time into improving Britney. In raw results: The most exciting items in the patch series are probably: Once reviewed, these will be merged into master and we will have versioned provides support (in Britney).:)
Filed under: Debian, Release-Team

Mike Gabriel: Pushing X.org Git repos to Github et al.

TL;DR; If you want to know why cloning several of the X.org repositories to Github or GitLab instances fails and how this can be worked around, you may want to continue reading. Why we stumbled over this issue... As a joint effort of the Arctica Project, TheQVD and X2Go, Ulrich Sibiller and I are currently preparing a build workflow for the nxagent X-server (version 3) [1] that allows building nxagent against the modular X.org 7.0 (using autoconf and automake) rather than the monolithic build workflow of X.org 6.9 (using ancient imake). Our goal is to rewind all X.org components required for building nxagent back to a state where nxagent successfully builds and runs. Then we will go through various, (probably) monthly cycles of Our first hurdle... After Ulrich now has a functioning nxagent-against-X.org-7.0-workflow locally, we want to get everything into the Arctica Project's Github namespace. Which fails...
[mike@minobo xorg.upstream]$ git clone https://anongit.freedesktop.org/git/xorg/lib/libX11.git
Cloning into 'libX11'...
remote: Counting objects: 18520, done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (3441/3441), done.
remote: Total 18520 (delta 15094), reused 18325 (delta 14954)
Receiving objects: 100% (18520/18520), 5.98 MiB   549.00 KiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (15094/15094), done.
Checking connectivity... done.
[mike@minobo xorg.upstream]$ cd libX11/
[mike@minobo libX11 (master)]$ git remote rename origin upstream 
[mike@minobo libX11 (master)]$ git remote add origin git@github.com:ArcticaProject/libX11.git
[mike@minobo libX11 (master)]$ git push --mirror origin 
Counting objects: 18520, done.
Delta compression using up to 4 threads.
Compressing objects: 100% (3301/3301), done.
remote: error: object 70d5e4d45dd7bf1e05b099cb5a4dd529344084f0: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
remote: fatal: Error in object
error: pack-objects died of signal 13
error: failed to push some refs to 'git@github.com:ArcticaProject/libX11.git'
This issue should be a known issue at X.org / Mesa upstream [2]. The underlying problem occurs with Git 2.5 and above... If you run git-fsck from Git (>= 2.5) against several of the X.org Git repositories, you will stumble over the above issue. For libX11.git, we see these errors reported when running git-fsck from current Debian unstable:
mike@sid:~/xorg/libX11.git$ git fsck 
Checking object directories: 100% (256/256), done.
error in tag 70d5e4d45dd7bf1e05b099cb5a4dd529344084f0: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag a3bfe698090a5d41f1e9acb1b57a049085d6b04e: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag c1fc8c9aec1bc92d03d08d5e986dd40b194a7a3e: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag d4c27f7e7d8e2ea32418f341ad85c33f3b76862d: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 79780379aee21bf4d4bcb046a3b54774893ea6b1: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag a638de80ec20dc1de625cd323ed19a6646fecf2e: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag f6a6414e4e52a971a35fd118c350567e2383d034: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag b5c6810e21be2e7ccfac8f0539d46bf75dbe50a0: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 86cec9d20428cc190ec7278a0abe481b180288ac: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag ac912988091574790c7cffbbc2c60b8c59f8fcef: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 2d01674092951cd3284b3b099978b2436ea468ad: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 922d0534154668918eaa09a36cc5cd53fc6b71b7: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 8ef91b9cc0a4a7b0361f6b40b3f735221c8272cb: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 1516173727005a87aa501e1ad708d72e6ae6e753: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 77c9e63a3abff1593ccbed249b2c3ae7f68e1833: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 58044c7087137ce2b521297dbb31934ccaedc94e: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 2e0d061c6830891dcc856a04aac900e5bb6d0779: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 2f58c7cc4cbf3d30927f6301039b6bf018ed38fd: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 77fc2e1e26019c3ba92275d249fe1979570255d2: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 9b2e06fa262f23dbcbbccd42be6477e08a452268: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 7f99410bb9cc9f7cbbc2d43d8ad044771a6eec0a: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 99b59b83f126b4abb9da89f577a5b8147d543c25: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 97170c33f99761acd932f968e21d6d7664e7ba80: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag b39966d452127c992987d082f69321f950ae4c39: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 05e20c3bd8ac6b7e873607db73894486a4ac0519: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag f478497b5a3e9d6b92237e0f408c9f0f18108f52: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag c5ed936f28ce70c8932e33d67a6e06d140e35ba8: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 2b6beba295a6ff997dfe15a732c95ae6577fa735: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 32edbb1e9c5b7d1c6f8639dab85e5368d303df7f: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 490fbe2afb9ffc7057c0eb150f7cdd4d4fa8686c: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag fc605ac48bd7d675d6d04162a0f3bfebe27f2037: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 6289ecc26d1d505f395c59da744a9354d7aad2a2: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 8c9c30dac72aebd1a2c31a55a47c0ac11bc328db: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 3b7aa57994924be0dad693e837559d9ee900299c: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag b02ad9a8ec96e3c1027ca71289aeef5b8748e17e: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 4402ab1a86226a9cd0ce84fb8147b1c4958c684d: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag bb02b4fbde316644c771d28d5edeeb9b213a6d6a: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 95b6462c70213b562c9d2b8726eda706edc9c456: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag a99fea43ad53907623f269942c55237c238645e0: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 0c417ce98a6cf927ce7a1359b198b2bb746c707e: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag ce3ff6b102f360fc9dcd3a85361f44da054de0b1: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 2fb7b16b38a365c5009bd170d4463634c1f3de26: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 95570f484bfde5fc2ed8548cb17b87d8114a2866: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag d6e5895c104cfe0d135494a605013dd2910a93a1: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 49be7144523c4a56afcb389a9aa021d167710d2c: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 020353d1b982ac938d229039ca13bfea5793fcd9: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 991792d4f8477ab65ad4d8a0245c9a3bbb1f0294: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag e8037555efe299a7143370b485f754f6b08ffac7: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 4fdc8e36a5022f3e32d5567305d8e9cde4011f1a: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 9c93a19a76163328e30a7306bb0babe3175fb9a2: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 9f90bf4424250f80340b3e2803d343c74d2adb0b: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 2e7a8c7974777e3e869de9013025dc3f61633e1e: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 59b7c06da2a64d72668394e9239e3dfe8a5cff59: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 0263c4f684faa9a5126a0db524d5d35be7277e52: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 1514e654c1a9b346cbfca5a81f6d331f106242aa: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
error in tag 6aa83ec3d1d82ee332cedcf4e99d3cbd56e73edd: missingSpaceBeforeDate: invalid author/committer line - missing space before date
Checking objects: 100% (18523/18523), done.
What actually is going wrong here... When looking at one of those tags (luckily, only tags are affected), we see that something's not ok with the date string of the tag (I am not a Git plumber, so sorry for being superficial here):
mike@sid:~/xorg/libX11.git$ git show 2fb7b16b38a365c5009bd170d4463634c1f3de26
tag XORG-RELEASE-1-TM-MERGE
Tagger: Alan Coopersmith 
Date:   Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 +0000
        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
commit 84adc60cae8e944777563501dd633622a28bdb3b
Author: Alan Coopersmith 
Date:   Sat Mar 27 07:08:16 2004 +0000
    Fix typo (IsModiferKey should be IsModifierKey)
[... not quoting the diff for the above commit ...]
How to work around that issue... We then got the idea that we could redo those tags with the date string derived from the commit that this tag points at. This can be scripted (credits go to an unnamed person in Ulrich's surrounding!!!):
mike@sid:~/xorg/libX11$ cat repair.sh
#!/bin/bash
set -x
git fsck 2>&1   tee git-fsck.log   grep "error in tag"   sed -r -e 's/error in tag ([0-9a-f]+):.*/\1/p'   while read broken; do
         echo $broken
         commit=$(git rev-parse $ broken ^ commit )
         tag=$(git cat-file tag $broken   sed -n 's/^tag //p')
         tag_msg=$(git cat-file tag $broken   sed -n '/^$/,$p'   tail -n +2)
         export GIT_COMMITTER_NAME="$(git log -1 --format='%cn' $commit)"
         export GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL="$(git log -1 --format='%ce' $commit)"
         export GIT_COMMITTER_DATE="$(git log -1 --format='%cD' $commit)"
         git tag -a -f -m "$tag_msg" $tag $commit
done
# drop all old content...
git reflog expire --expire=all --all
git gc --prune=all
# no more errors should be reported...
git fsck
Copy this repair.sh into the Git repo itself and let the script walk over your tags. After this script has been applied you can push the X.org Git repo with broken tags redone to Git hosters like Github or GitLab. light+love,
Mike [1] https://github.com/ArcticaProject/nx-libs
[2] https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/mesa-dev/2016-February/106268.html

Bits from Debian: DebConf16 welcomes its first nine sponsors!

DebConf16 logo DebConf16 will take place in Cape Town, South Africa in July 2016. We strive to provide an intense working environment and enable good progress for Debian and for Free Software in general. We extend an invitation to everyone to join us and to support this event. As a volunteer-run non-profit conference, we depend on our sponsors. Nine companies have already committed to sponsor DebConf16! Let's introduce them: Our first Platinum sponsor is Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE). HPE is one of the largest computer companies in the world, providing a wide range of products and services, such as servers, storage, networking, consulting and support, software, and financial services. HPE is also a development partner of Debian, and provides hardware for port development, Debian mirrors, and other Debian services (hardware donations are listed in the Debian machines page). Our first Gold sponsor is Valve, a company developing games, social entertainment platform, and game engine technologies. Our second Gold sponsor is Google, the technology company specialized in Internet-related services as online advertising and search engine. Rusbitech (developers of the Astra Linux Debian derivative), credativ (a service-oriented company focusing on open-source software and also a Debian development partner), Catalyst (a company offering IT solutions using open source software), the Bern University of Applied Sciences (with over 7,000 students enrolled, located in the Swiss capital), and Texas Instruments (the global semiconductor company) are our four Silver sponsors. And last but not least, the open source company Univention has agreed to support us as Bronze-level. Become a sponsor too! Would you like to become a sponsor? Do you know of or work in a company or organization that may consider sponsorship? Please have a look at our sponsorship brochure (or a summarized flyer), in which we outline all the details and describe the sponsor benefits. For further details, feel free to contact us through sponsors@debconf.org, and visit the DebConf16 website at https://debconf16.debconf.org.

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