Search Results: "ema"

21 December 2013

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: Kevin M. Igoe should step down from CFRG Co-chair

I've said recently that pervasive surveillance is wrong. I don't think anyone from the NSA should have a leadership position in the development or deployment of Internet communications, because their interests are at odds with the interest of the rest of the Internet. But someone at the NSA is in exactly such a position. They ought to step down. Here's the background: The Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) is a body tasked with research into underlying concepts, themes, and technologies related to the Internet as a whole. They act as a research organization that cooperates and complements the engineering and standards-setting activities of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The IRTF is divided into issue-specific research groups, each of which has a Chair or Co-Chairs who have "wide discretion in the conduct of Research Group business", and are tasked with organizing the research and discussion, ensuring that the group makes progress on the relevant issues, and communicating the general sense of the results back to the rest of the IRTF and the IETF. One of the IRTF's research groups specializes in cryptography: the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). There are two current chairs of the CFRG: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> and Kevin M. Igoe <kmigoe@nsa.gov>. As you can see from his e-mail address, Kevin M. Igoe is affiliated with the National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA itself actively tries to weaken cryptography on the Internet so that they can improve their surveillance, and one of the ways they try to do so is to "influence policies, standards, and specifications". On the CFRG list yesterday, Trevor Perrin requested the removal of Kevin M. Igoe from his position as Co-chair of the CFRG. Trevor's specific arguments rest heavily on the technical merits of a proposed cryptographic mechanism called Dragonfly key exchange, but I think the focus on Dragonfly itself is the least of the concerns for the IRTF. I've seconded Trevor's proposal, and asked Kevin directly to step down and to provide us with information about any attempts by the NSA to interfere with or subvert recommendations coming from these standards bodies. Below is my letter in full:
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
To: cfrg@ietf.org, Kevin M. Igoe <kmigoe@nsa.gov>
Date: Sat, 21 Dec 2013 16:29:13 -0500
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Requesting removal of CFRG co-chair
On 12/20/2013 11:01 AM, Trevor Perrin wrote:
> I'd like to request the removal of Kevin Igoe from CFRG co-chair.
Regardless of the conclusions that anyone comes to about Dragonfly
itself, I agree with Trevor that Kevin M. Igoe, as an employee of the
NSA, should not remain in the role of CFRG co-chair.
While the NSA clearly has a wealth of cryptographic knowledge and
experience that would be useful for the CFRG, the NSA is apparently
engaged in a series of attempts to weaken cryptographic standards and
tools in ways that would facilitate pervasive surveillance of
communication on the Internet.
The IETF's public position in favor of privacy and security rightly
identifies pervasive surveillance on the Internet as a serious problem:
https://www.ietf.org/media/2013-11-07-internet-privacy-and-security.html
The documents Trevor points to (and others from similar stories)
indicate that the NSA is an organization at odds with the goals of the IETF.
While I want the IETF to continue welcoming technical insight and
discussion from everyone, I do not think it is appropriate for anyone
from the NSA to be in a position of coordination or leadership.
----
Kevin, the responsible action for anyone in your position is to
acknowledge the conflict of interest, and step down promptly from the
position of Co-Chair of the CFRG.
If you happen to also subscribe to the broad consensus described in the
IETF's recent announcement -- that is, if you care about privacy and
security on the Internet -- then you should also reveal any NSA activity
you know about that attempts to subvert or weaken the cryptographic
underpinnings of IETF protocols.
Regards,
	--dkg
I'm aware that an abdication by Kevin (or his removal by the IETF chair) would probably not end the NSA's attempts to subvert standards bodies or weaken encryption. They could continue to do so by subterfuge, for example, or by private influence on other public members. We may not be able to stop them from doing this in secret, and the knowledge that they may do so seems likely to cast a pall of suspicion over any IETF and IRTF proceedings in the future. This social damage is serious and troubling, and it marks yet another cost to the NSA's reckless institutional disregard for civil liberties and free communication. But even if we cannot rule out private NSA influence over standards bodies and discussion, we can certainly explicitly reject any public influence over these critical communications standards by members of an institution so at odds with the core principles of a free society. Kevin M. Igoe, please step down from the CFRG Co-chair position. And to anyone (including Kevin) who knows about specific attempts by the NSA to undermine the communications standards we all rely on: please blow the whistle on this kind of activity. Alert a friend, a colleague, or a journalist. Pervasive surveillance is an attack on all of us, and those who resist it are heroes.

20 December 2013

Riku Voipio: Replicant on Galaxy S3

I recently got my self and Galaxy S3 for testing out Replicant, an android image made out of only open source components. Why Galaxy S3? It is well supported in Replicant, almost every driver is already open source. The hardware specs are acceptable, 1.4Ghz quad core, 1GB ram, microsd, and all the peripheral chips one expects for a phone. Galaxy S3 has sold insanely (50 million units supposedly), meaning I won't run out of accessories and aftermarket spare parts any time soon. The massive installed base also means a huge potential user community. S3 is still available as new, with two years of warranty. Why notWhile the S3 is still available new, it is safe to assume production is ending already - 1.5 year old product is ancient history in mobile world! It remains to be seen how much the massive user base will defend against the obsolescence. Upstream kernel support for "old" cpu is open question, replicant is still basing kernel on vendor kernel. Bootloader is unlocked, but it can't be changed due to trusted^Wtreacherous computing, preventing things like boot from sd card. Finally, not everything is open source, the GPU (mali) driver while being reverse engineered, is taking it's time - and the GPS hasn't been reversed yet. Installing replicant Before install, from the original installation, you might want to take a copy of firmware files (since replicant won't provide them). enable developer mode on the S3 and:
sudo apt-get install android-tools
mkdir firmware
adb pull /system/vendor/firmware/
adb pull /system/etc/wifi
After then, just follow official replicant install guide for S3. If you don't mind closed source firmwares, post-install you need to push the firmware files back:

adb shell
mount -o remount,rw /system
adb push . /system/vendor/firmware
Here was my first catch, the wifi firmwares from jelly bean based image were not compatible with older ICS based replicant. Using replicant
Booting to replicant is fast, few seconds to the pin screen. You are treated with the standard android lockscreen, usual slide/pin/pattern options are available. Basic functions like phone, sms and web browsing have icons from the homescreen and work without a hitch. Likewise camera seems to work, really the only smartphone feature missing is GPS. Sidenote - this image looks a LOT better on the S3 than on my thinkpad. No wonder people are flocking to phones and tablets when laptop makers use such crappy components.
The grid menu has the standard android AOSP opensource applications in the ICS style menu with the extra of f-droid icon - which is the installer for open source applications. F-droid is it's own project that complements replicant project by maintaining a catalog of Free Software.
F-droid brings hundreds of open source applications not only for replicant, but for any other android users, including platforms with android compatibility, such as Jolla's Sailfish OS. Of course f-droid client is open source, like the f-droid server (in Debian too). F-droid server is not just repository management, it can take care of building and deploying android apps.
The WebKit based android browser renders web sites without issues, and if you are not happy with, you can download Firefox from f-droid. Many websites will notice you are mobile, and provide mobile web sites, which is sometimes good and sometimes annoying. Worse, some pages detect you are android and only offer you to load their closed android app for viewing the page. OTOH I am already viewing their closed source website, so using closed source app to view it isn't much worse. This keyboard is again the android standard one, but for most unixy people the hacker's keyboard with arrow buttons and ctrl/alt will probably be the one you want. Closing thoughts While using replicant has been very smooth, the lack of GPS is becoming a deal-breaker. I could just copy the gpsd from cyanogen, like some have done, but it kind of beats the purpose of having replicant on the phone. So it might be that I move back to cyanogen, unless I find time to help reverse engineering the BCM4751 GPS.

Christoph Egger

Greetings from the FAU Security Team (FAUST), the Uni Erlangen CTF group. We were participating in the RuCTFe competition and made it to 4th place. Following is my write-up on the nsaless service, the main crypto challenge in the competition. nsaless is a nodejs webservice providing a short message service. People can post messages and their followers receive the message encrypted to their individual RSA key.

About the gameserver protocol
The gameserver created groups of 8 users on the service 7 were just following the first user (and authorized by the first user to do so) while the first user sent a tweet containing the flag. The service used 512bit RSA with 7 as public exponent. While RSA512 is certainly weak, it's strong enough to make it unfeasible to break directly.

Attacking RSA
There are some known attacks against RSA with small exponents if no proper padding is done. The most straightforward version just takes the e-th root of the cipher-text and, if the clear message was small enough, outputs that root as plain-text. As the flag was long enough to make this attack impossible, we need a somewhat improved Attack.

H stad's Broadcast Attack
Reminder:
  • In RSA, given a plain-text A, the sender computes A mod N to build the cipher-text B.
  • Given simultaneous congruences we can efficiently compute a x such that x satisfies all congruences using the Chinese remainder theorem.
For NSAless we actually get several such B for different N (each belonging to different users receiving the tweet because they follow the poster). This effectively means we get A in mod N for different N. Using the Chinese remainder theorem we can now compute a x A mod N . If we use at least e different B for this we are guaranteed that x actually equals A (in ): A needs to be smaller than N for all N used (otherwise we lose information during encryption), therefore A needs to be smaller than N . Computing now the e-th root of x we get the plain-text A the flag.

Fix
Fixing your service is easy enough, just increase e to an suitable number > 8. At the end of the contest 5 Teams had fixed this vulnerability by either using 17 or 65537.

EXPLOIT
The basic exploit is shown below. Unfortunately it needs to retrieve all tweets for all users the compute the flags which just takes too long to be feasible (at least at the end of the competition where tons of users already existed) so you would need some caching to make it actually work. Would have been a great idea to have users expire after an hour or two in the service!
#!/usr/bin/python
import httplib
import urllib
import re
import json
import pprint
import gmpy
import sys
userparse_re = re.compile('<a [^>]*>([^<]*)</a></div>\s*<div>([^<]*)</div>')
tweetparse_re = re.compile("<div id='last_tweet'>([0-9]+)</div>")
followingparse_re = re.compile('<div><a href="/[0-9]+">([0-9]+)</a></div>')
def my_parse_number(number):
    string = "%x" % number
    if len(string) != 64:
        return ""
    erg = []
    while string != '':
        erg = erg + [chr(int(string[:2], 16))]
        string = string[2:]
    return ''.join(erg)
def extended_gcd(a, b):
    x,y = 0, 1
    lastx, lasty = 1, 0
    while b:
        a, (q, b) = b, divmod(a,b)
        x, lastx = lastx-q*x, x
        y, lasty = lasty-q*y, y
    return (lastx, lasty, a)
def chinese_remainder_theorem(items):
  N = 1
  for a, n in items:
    N *= n
  result = 0
  for a, n in items:
    m = N/n
    r, s, d = extended_gcd(n, m)
    if d != 1:
      raise "Input not pairwise co-prime"
    result += a*s*m
  return result % N, N
def get_tweet(uid):
    try:
        conn = httplib.HTTPConnection("%s:48879" % sys.argv[1], timeout=60)
        conn.request("GET", "/%s" % uid)
        r1 = conn.getresponse()
        data = r1.read()
        tweet = re.findall(tweetparse_re, data)
        if len(tweet) != 1:
            return None
        followers = re.findall(followingparse_re, data)
        return tweet[0], followers
    except:
        return None
def get_users():
    conn = httplib.HTTPConnection("%s:48879" % sys.argv[1], timeout=60)
    conn.request("GET", "/users")
    r1 = conn.getresponse()
    data1 = r1.read(1024 * 1024)
    data = dict()
    for i in re.findall(userparse_re, data1)[:100]:
        userinfo = get_tweet(i[0])
        if userinfo != None:
            data[i[0]] = (json.loads(i[1].replace('&quot;', '"'))['n'], userinfo)
    return data
users = get_users()
allusers = users.keys()
masters = [ user for user in allusers if len(users[user][1][1]) > 0 ]
for test in masters:
    try:
        followers = users[test][1][1]
        data = []
        for fol in followers:
            n = int(users[fol][0])
            tweet = int(users[fol][1][0])
            data = data + [(tweet, n)]
        x, n = chinese_remainder_theorem(data)
        realnum = gmpy.mpz(x).root(7)[0].digits()
        print my_parse_number(int(realnum))
    except:
        pass

Dirk Eddelbuettel: New RcppEigen release 0.3.2.0.1 -- and a new maintainer

In a recent email to the Rcpp and lme4 mailing lists, Doug Bates announced that was turning away from R, Rcpp, lme4 and hence also RcppEigen for which he had been both the primary author and maintainer. This is huge loss for the R community. I have known Doug since the 1990s. He has been a fairly central figure around R during all those years in which I got more and more involved with R. I have learned a lot from him, and enjoyed the work together---initially on the Debian R package (which I took over from him), and all the way to joint work on Rcpp and RcppEigen, including our JSS paper. I am certain to miss him around R. Now, in order to keep RcppEigen viable within CRAN and the R ecosystem, I have offered to maintain it. A first new upload is now on CRAN (and I also uploaded it to Debian where I started to maintain it too as a depedency for lme4). I have also started to make a few minor changes such as tightening Suggests: a little, and editing a few descriptive files. Details are in the Github repo. Questions, comments etc about RcppEigen should go to the rcpp-devel mailing list off the R-Forge page.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.

18 December 2013

Daniel Pocock: Embedding Python in multi-threaded C++ applications

Embedding Python into other applications to provide a scripting mechanism is a popular practice. Ganglia can run user-supplied Python scripts for metric collection and the Blender project does it too, allowing users to develop custom tools and use script code to direct their animations. There are various reasons people choose Python:
  • Modern, object orientated style of programming
  • Interpreted language (no need to compile things, just edit and run the code)
  • Python has a vast array of modules providing many features such as database and network access, data processing, etc
The bottom line is that the application developer who chooses to embed Python in their existing application can benefit from the product of all this existing code multiplied by the imagination of their users. Enter repro repro is the SIP proxy of the reSIProcate project. reSIProcate is an advanced SIP implementation developed in C++. repro is a multi-threaded process. repro's most serious competitor is the Kamailio SIP proxy. Kamailio has its own bespoke scripting language that it has inherited from the SIP Express Router (SER) family of projects. repro has always been far more rigid in its capabilities than Kamailio. On the other hand, while Kamailio has given users great flexibility, it has also come at a cost: users can easily build configurations that are not valid or may not do what they really intend if they don't understand the intricacies of the SIP protocol. Here is an example of the Kamailio configuration script (from Daniel's excellent blog about building a Skype-like service in less than an hour) Kamailio also has a wide array of plugins for things like database and LDAP access. repro only had embedded bdb and MySQL support. Embedding Python into repro appears to be a quick way to fill many of these gaps and allow users to combine the power of the reSIProcate stack with their own custom routing logic. On the other hand, it is not simply copying the Kamailio scripting solution: rather, it provides a distinctive alternative. Starting the integration Embedding Python is such a popular practice that there is even dedicated documentation on the subject. As well as looking there, I also looked over the example provided by the embedded Python module for Ganglia. Looking over the Ganglia mod_python code I noticed a lot of boilerplate code for reference counting and other tedious activities. Given that reSIProcate is C++ code, I thought I would look for a C++ solution to this and I came across PyCXX. PyCXX is licensed under BSD-like terms similar to reSIProcate itself so it is a good fit. There is also the alternative Boost.Python API, however, reSIProcate has been built without Boost dependencies so I decided to stick with PyCXX. I looked over the PyCXX examples and the documentation and was able to complete a first cut of the embedded Python scripting feature very quickly. Using PyCXX One unusual thing I noticed about PyCXX is that the Debian package, python-cxx-dev does not provide any shared library. Instead, some uncompiled source files are provided and each project using PyCXX must compile them and link them statically itself. Here is how I do that in the Makefile.am for pyroute in repro:
AM_CXXFLAGS = -I $(top_srcdir)
reproplugin_LTLIBRARIES = libpyroute.la
libpyroute_la_SOURCES = PyRoutePlugin.cxx
libpyroute_la_SOURCES += PyRouteWorker.cxx
libpyroute_la_SOURCES += $(PYCXX_SRCDIR)/cxxextensions.c
libpyroute_la_SOURCES += $(PYCXX_SRCDIR)/cxx_extensions.cxx
libpyroute_la_SOURCES += $(PYCXX_SRCDIR)/cxxsupport.cxx
libpyroute_la_SOURCES += $(PYCXX_SRCDIR)/../IndirectPythonInterface.cxx
libpyroute_la_CPPFLAGS = $(DEPS_PYTHON_CFLAGS)
libpyroute_la_LDFLAGS = -module -avoid-version
libpyroute_la_LDFLAGS += $(DEPS_PYTHON_LIBS)
EXTRA_DIST = example.py
noinst_HEADERS = PyRouteWorker.hxx
noinst_HEADERS += PyThreadSupport.hxx
The value PYCXX_SRCDIR must be provided on the configure command line. On Debian, it is /usr/share/python2.7/CXX/Python2 Going multi-threaded My initial implementation simply invoked the Python method from the main routing thread of the repro SIP proxy. This meant that it would only be suitable for executing functions that complete quickly, ruling out the use of any Python scripts that talk to network servers or other slow activities. When the proxy becomes heavily loaded, it is important that it can complete many tasks asynchronously, such as forwarding chat messages between users in real-time. Therefore, it was essential to extend the solution to run the Python scripts in a pool of worker threads. At this point, I had an initial feeling that there may be danger in just calling the Python methods from some other random threads started by my own code. I went to see the manual and I came across this specific documentation about the subject. It looks quite easy, just wrap the call to the user-supplied Python code in something like this:
PyGILState_STATE gstate;
gstate = PyGILState_Ensure();
/* Perform Python actions here. */
result = CallSomeFunction();
/* evaluate result or handle exception */
/* Release the thread. No Python API allowed beyond this point. */
PyGILState_Release(gstate);
Unfortunately, I found that this would not work and that one of two problems occur when using this code:
  • The thread blocks on the call to PyGILState_Ensure()
  • The program crashes with a segmentation fault when the call to a Python method was invoked
Exactly which of these outcomes I experienced seemed to depend on whether I tried to explicitly call PyEval_ReleaseThread() from the main thread after doing the Py_Initialize() and other setup tasks. I tried various permutations of using PyGILState_Ensure()PyGILState_Release() and/or PyEval_SaveThread()/PyEval_ReleaseThread() but I always had one of the same problems. The next thing that occurred to me is that maybe PyCXX provides some framework for thread integration: I had a look through the code and couldn't find any reference to the threading functionality from the C API. I went looking for more articles and mailing list discussions and found implementation notes such as this one in Linux Journal and this wiki from the Blender developers. Most of them just appeared to be repeating what was in the manual, with a few subtle differences, but none of this provided an immediate solution. Eventually, I discovered this other blog about concurrency with embedded Python and it suggests something not highlighted in any of the other resources: calling PyThreadState_New(m_interpreterState) in each thread after it starts and before it does anything else. Combining this with the use of PyEval_SaveThread()/PyEval_ReleaseThread() fixed the problem: the use of PyThreadState_New() was not otherwise mentioned in the relevant section of the Python guide. I decided to take this solution a step further and create a convenient C++ class to encapsulate the logic, you can see this in PyThreadSupport.hxx:
class PyExternalUser
 
   public:
      PyExternalUser(PyInterpreterState* interpreterState)
       : mInterpreterState(interpreterState),
         mThreadState(PyThreadState_New(mInterpreterState))  ;
   class Use
    
      public:
         Use(PyExternalUser& user)
          : mUser(user)
           PyEval_RestoreThread(mUser.getThreadState());  ;
         ~Use()   mUser.setThreadState(PyEval_SaveThread());  ;
      private:
         PyExternalUser& mUser;
    ;
   friend class Use;
   protected:
      PyThreadState* getThreadState()   return mThreadState;  ;
      void setThreadState(PyThreadState* threadState)   mThreadState = threadState;  ;
   private:
      PyInterpreterState* mInterpreterState;
      PyThreadState* mThreadState;
 ;
and the way to use it is demonstrated in the PyRouteWorker class. Observe how PyExternalUser::Use is instantiated in the PyRouteWorker::process() method: when it goes out of scope (either due to a normal return, an error or an exception) the necessary call to PyEval_SaveThread() is made in the PyExternalUser::Use::~Use() destructor. Using other Python modules and DSO problems All of the above worked for basic Python such as this trivial example script:
def on_load():
    '''Do initialisation when module loads'''
    print 'example: on_load invoked'
def provide_route(method, request_uri, headers):
    '''Process a request URI and return the target URI(s)'''
    print 'example: method = ' + method
    print 'example: request_uri = ' + request_uri
    print 'example: From = ' + headers["From"]
    print 'example: To = ' + headers["To"]
    routes = list()
    routes.append('sip:bob@example.org')
    routes.append('sip:alice@example.org')
    return routes
However, it needs a more credible and useful test: using the python-ldap module to try and query an LDAP server appears like a good choice. Upon trying to use import ldap in the Python script, repro would refuse to load the Python script, choking on an error like this:
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/ldap/__init__.py", line 22, in 
    import _ldap
ImportError: /usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/_ldap.so: undefined symbol: PyExc_SystemError
I looked at the file _ldap.so and discovered that it is linked with the LDAP libraries but not explicitly linked to any version of the Python runtime libraries. It expects the application hosting it to provide the Python symbols globally. In my own implementation, my embedded Python encapsulation code is provide as a DSO plugin, similar to the way plugins are loaded in Ganglia or Apache. The DSO links to Python: the DSO is loaded by a dlopen() call from the main process. The main repro binary has no direct link to Python libraries. Adding RTLD_GLOBAL to the top-level dlopen() call for loading the plugin is one way to ensure the Python symbols are made available to the Python modules loaded indirectly by the Python interpreter. This solution may be suitable for applications that don't mix and match many different components. Doing something useful with it Now it was all working nicely, I took a boilerplate LDAP Python example and used it for making a trivial script that converts sip:user@example.org to something like sip:9001@pbx.example.org, assuming that 9001 is the telephoneNumber associated with the user@ email address in LDAP. It is surprisingly simple and easily adaptable to local requirements depending upon the local LDAP structures:
import ldap
from urlparse import urlparse
def on_load():
    '''Do initialisation when module loads'''
    #print 'ldap router: on_load invoked'
def provide_route(method, request_uri, headers):
    '''Process a request URI and return the target URI(s)'''
    #print 'ldap router: request_uri = ' + request_uri
    _request_uri = urlparse(request_uri)
    routes = list()
    
    # Basic LDAP server parameters:
    server_uri = 'ldaps://ldap.example.org'
    base_dn = "dc=example,dc=org"
    # this domain will be appended to the phone numbers when creating
    # the target URI:
    phone_domain = 'pbx.example.org'
    # urlparse is not great for "sip:" URIs,
    # the user@host portion is in the 'path' element:
    filter = "(&(objectClass=inetOrgPerson)(mail=%s))" % _request_uri.path
    #print "Using filter: %s" % filter
    try:
        con = ldap.initialize(server_uri)
        scope = ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE
        retrieve_attributes = None
        result_id = con.search(base_dn, scope, filter, retrieve_attributes)
        result_set = []
        while 1:
            timeout = 1
            result_type, result_data = con.result(result_id, 0, None)
            if (result_data == []):
                break
            else:
                if result_type == ldap.RES_SEARCH_ENTRY:
                    result_set.append(result_data)
        if len(result_set) == 0:
            #print "No Results."
            return routes
        for i in range(len(result_set)):
            for entry in result_set[i]:
                if entry[1].has_key('telephoneNumber'):
                    phone = entry[1]['telephoneNumber'][0]
                    routes.append('sip:' + phone + '@' + phone_domain)
    except ldap.LDAPError, error_message:
        print "Couldn't Connect. %s " % error_message
    return routes
Embedded Python opens up a world of possibilities After Ganglia 3.1.0 introduced an embedded Python scripting facility, dozens of new modules started appearing in github. Python scripting lowers the barrier for new contributors to a project and makes it much easier to fine tune free software projects to meet local requirements: hopefully we will see similar trends with the repro SIP proxy and other projects that choose Python. The code is committed here in the reSIProcate repository. These features will appear in the next beta release of reSIProcate and Debian packages will be available in unstable in a few days.

16 December 2013

Craig Small: Debian s procps 3.3.9

While the upstream procps which was released last week has a new pidof, the Debian package will continue to not have that binary and the Debian sysvint-utils package will continue to have that file. That stops any messy procps splits and putting one part into Essential etc. This may mean that one distributions pidof doesn t quite work like anothers, but that has been like that already; which is why when I discussed the change as upstream I wondered where they found some of those flags I don t have.

Craig Small: Debian s procps 3.3.9

While the upstream procps which was released last week has a new pidof, the Debian package will continue to not have that binary and the Debian sysvint-utils package will continue to have that file. That stops any messy procps splits and putting one part into Essential etc. This may mean that one distributions pidof doesn t quite work like anothers, but that has been like that already; which is why when I discussed the change as upstream I wondered where they found some of those flags I don t have.

Craig Sanders: shopping online whinge of the day

There are numerous benefits to shopping online you can order stuff and pay for it from the comfort of your own home and it ll arrive on your doorstep in just a few days. wonderful, and so many words have been written about the benefits over the years that there s no need to belabour the point, But there are some things about it that really suck and make me NOT want to order stuff online most of the time my distaste for the privacy and delivery problems is enough to dissauade me from buying anything, helped by the fact that I live a fairly non-consumerist lifestyle (and for a geek, I have an almost non-existent gadget-fetish) but occasionally I want or need something that isn t available locally or which my ill-health makes impractical to buy in person (i ve been effectively housebound or in hospital for most of the year) so here are the things that piss me off most about shopping online.
  1. Loss of anonymity and privacy. You can walk into any shop and pay cash for whatever you want, they don t need to know who you are or where you live, and they don t get to accidentally add you to a mailing list against your express wishes oh, we didn t realise that when you said DO NOT SPAM ME, you actually meant DO NOT SPAM ME we ll just keep spamming you for another six months until we get around to processing your removal request . partial solution: use a different email address with each online shop. boycott the shop and destroy the address if they spam. what sucks is that this is actually necessary. it doesn t matter how loudly I say DO NOT SPAM ME. DO NOT ADD ME TO ANY MAILING LISTS. DO NOT ASK ME TO COMPLETE A SURVEY. DO NOT CONTACT ME FOR ANY REASON NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO DELIVERING MY ORDER. MY PERSONAL INFORMATION IS PROVIDED SOLELY SO THAT YOU CAN SHIP MY ORDER TO ME AND MAY NOT BE USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE. FAILURE TO RESPECT MY PRIVACY WILL RESULT IN IMMEDIATE AND PERMANENT BOYCOTT (yes, that IS the text I use in the comments/instructions field of every order I place), marketing vermin will decide that I really want their spam after all because their spam is super interesting and important and isn t really spam at all.
  2. nosy demands for unneccessary information. OK, they need your addresss to ship your parcel but they don t need your phone number, and they don t need to tie your order to your facebook or other bullshit social-spam account. most online order forms have phone number as a required field. Fortunately, they usually accept 0000000 or some other bogus non-phone number as a valid number .if not, i give them their own phone number.
  3. the thing that really shits me the most about online shopping is that both couriers and australia post suck. the lazy fuckers usually don t even bother attempting to deliver to residential addressess. at best, they just stick a non-delivery card in your letterbox without even attempting to knock on the door ..and sometimes they don t even bother doing that. the delivery driver just files a bogus failed to deliver or recipient refused delivery with their office.
i ve made four online purchases in the last month and a half. only one of them was delivered correctly to my door, even though I was sitting at my desk in the front room of the house, a few feet from my front door, and regularly monitoring the parcel s tracking web page so I knew it was arriving. parcel 1 (Nov 16): DHL from NZ to AU. delivered perfectly. delivered in about two days for $17. order value: around $35. parcel 2 (Nov 20): Aust Post from WA to Vic, Express Post (costs a few bucks more than standard post). order value: around $80. lazy driver didn t bother to attempt delivery. left card in letter box. i had to pick it up 2 days later from a post office the next suburb over (it wasn t there yet on the first attempt to pick up, the next day). Aust Post offered to maybe put me in touch with their re-delivery people who might possibly be able to re-deliver the parcel next week sometime maybe, if they felt like it. knowing that I had another hospital appt the next week, I declined (if i hadn t, it would have been an absolute certainty that they would try to deliver it while i was out). parcel 3 (nov 29): DHL from NZ to AU. order value: around $85. lazy courier didn t even bother to leave a card, just logged it as Recipient refused delivery . This refused delivery lie infuriated me when i saw it on the tracking page so i phoned and yelled at them a lot. DHL delivered it later the same day. if they hadn t I would have had to get myself over to the other side of town during business hours and pick it up from their South Melbourne depot. parcel 4 (today, Dec 16): Aust Post from NSW to Vic, Express Post . order value: around $160. lazy driver didn t even bother to leave a card, just logged it as Attempted delivery being carded to Australia Post outlet . Complete bullshit. There was no delivery attempt, not even a card in the letterbox, let alone a knock on the door with my parcel. Rang Aust Post on 8847 9045 (a phone number curiously absent from their tracking page, but which I had written down after their failure to deliver on Nov 20) and complained. they claim that they will try to deliver it today. i ll believe it when I see it. UPDATE @4.30pm: no, it s not going to be delivered today. they say they might choose to deliver it tomorrow or sometime in the future, if the delivery center manager feels like it. i told them that this is not an option my parcel WILL be delivered, it is what they were paid to do so it is what they ARE going to do. btw, the tracking page says that they attempted delivery at 12.15 today (they didn t not even a card in the letterbox), but the tracking page wasn t updated with that until about 2.30pm. by a complete non-coincidence their delivery center allegedly closes at 2pm, so it s impossible to complain about non-delivery in time for the complaint to do any good. Score so far: DHL 50% delivery rate. Aust Post: 100% failure rate. Annoyance Rate: extremely high. Desire to repeat the experience: non-existent. The Australia Post delivery problems are particularly annoying. I ve always thought of the network of local post offices to be a huge advantage for parcel delivery if i m not home, my parcel will go to a local post office and I can pick it up from there. And this is a great advantage. I used to take advantage of it when I was well enough to work. In fact, I d insist on delivery by Aust. Post rather than by a courier for exactly this reason, a local post office is far more convenient than some courier s depot on the other side of town or out in some far outer-suburban hellhole. But when it s used as an excuse to not even bother attempting delivery, it sucks. I m not well, and I should have been lying in bed reading or sleeping today, not wasting what little energy I have waiting for a parcel that never arrived and I certainly shouldn t have to phone Aust Post or DHL to yell at them for failing to do the job that they have been paid to do. shopping online whinge of the day is a post from: Errata

13 December 2013

Keith Packard: xserver-warnings

Cleaning up X server warnings So I was sitting in the Narita airport with a couple of other free software developers merging X server patches. One of the developers was looking over my shoulder while the X server was building and casually commented on the number of warnings generated by the compiler. I felt like I had invited someone into my house without cleaning for months embarrassed and ashamed that we d let the code devolve into this state. Of course, we ve got excuses the X server code base is one of the oldest pieces of regularly used free software in existence. It was started before ANSI-C was codified. No function prototypes, no const , no void * , no enums or stdint.h. There may be a few developers out there who remember those days (fondly, of course), but I think most of us are glad that our favorite systems language has gained a lot of compile-time checking in the last 25 years. We ve spent time in the past adding function prototypes and cleaning up other warnings, but there was never a point at which the X server compiled without any warnings. More recently, we ve added a pile of new warning flags when compiling the X server which only served to increase the number of warnings dramatically. The current situation With the master branch of the X server and released versions of the dependencies, we generate 1047 warnings in the default build. -Wcast-qual considered chatty The GCC flag, -Wcast-qual, complains when you cast a pointer and change the const qualifier status. A very common thing for the X server to do is declare pointers as const to mark them as immutable once assigned. Often, the relevant data is actually constructed once at startup in allocated memory and stored to the data structure. During server reset, that needs to be freed, but free doesn t take a const pointer, so we cast to (void *), which -Wcast-qual then complains about. Loudly. Of the 1047 warnings, 380 of them are generated by this one warning flag. I ve gone ahead and just disabled it in util/macros for now. String constants are a pain The X server uses string constants to initialize defaults for font paths, configuration options, font names along with a host of other things. These end up getting stored in variables that can also take allocated storage. I ve gone ahead and declared the relevant objects as const and then fixed the code to suit. I don t have a count of the number of warnings these changes fixed; they were scattered across dozens of X server directories, and I was fixing one directory at a time, but probably more than half of the remaining warnings were of this form. And a host of other warnings Fixing the rest of the warnings was mostly a matter of stepping through them one at a time and actually adjusting the code. Shadowed declarations, unused values, redundant declarations and missing printf attributes were probably the bulk of them though. Changes to external modules Instead of just hacking the X server code, I ve created patches for other modules where necessary to fix the problems in the right place. Getting the bits In case it wasn t clear, the X server build now generates zero warnings on my machine. I m hoping that this will also be true for other people. Patches are available at:
xserver - git://people.freedesktop.org/~keithp/xserver warning-fixes
fontsproto - git://people.freedesktop.org/~keithp/fontsproto fontsproto-next
mesa/drm - git://people.freedesktop.org/~keithp/drm warning-fixes
util/macros - already upstream on master
Keeping our house clean Of course, these patches are all waiting until 1.15 ships so that we don t accidentally break something important. However, once they re merged, I ll be bouncing any patches which generate warnings on my system, and if other people find warnings when they build, I ll expect them to send patches as well. Now to go collect the tea cups in my office and get them washed along with the breakfast dishes so I won t be embarrassed if some free software developers show up for lunch today.

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: OpenPGP Key IDs are not useful

Fingerprints and Key IDsOpenPGPv4 fingerprints are made from an SHA-1 digest over the key's public key material, creation date, and some boilerplate. SHA-1 digests are 160 bits in length. The "long key ID" of a key is the last 64 bits of the key's fingerprint. The "short key ID" of a key is the last 32 bits of the key's fingerprint. You can see both of the key IDs as a hash in and of themselves, as "32-bit truncated SHA-1" is a sort of hash (albeit not a cryptographically secure one). I'm arguing here that short Key IDs and long Key IDs are actually useless, and we should stop using them entirely where we can do so. We certainly should not be exposing normal human users to them. (Note that I am not arguing that OpenPGP v4 fingerprints themselves are cryptographically insecure. I do not believe that there are any serious cryptographic risks currently associated with OpenPGP v4 fingerprints. This post is about Key IDs specifically, not fingerprints.)Key IDs have serious problemsAsheesh pointed out two years ago that OpenPGP short key IDs are bad because they are trivial to replicate. This is called a preimage attack against the short key ID (which is just a truncated fingerprint). Today, David Leon Gil demonstrated that a collision attack against the long key ID is also trivial. A collision attack differs from a preimage attack in that the attacker gets to generate two different things that both have the same digest. Collision attacks are easier than preimage attacks because of the birthday paradox. dlg's colliding keys are not a surprise, but hopefully the explicit demonstration can serve as a wakeup call to help us improve our infrastructure. So this is not a way to spoof a specific target's long key ID on its own. But it indicates that it's more of a worry than most people tend to think about or plan for. And remember that for a search space as small as 64-bits (the long key ID), if you want to find a pre-image against any one of 2k keys, your search is actually only in a (64-k)-bit space to find a single pre-image. The particularly bad news: gpg doesn't cope well with the two keys that have the same long key ID:
0 dkg@alice:~$ gpg --import x
gpg: key B8EBE1AF: public key "9E669861368BCA0BE42DAF7DDDA252EBB8EBE1AF" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg:               imported: 1  (RSA: 1)
0 dkg@alice:~$ gpg --import y
gpg: key B8EBE1AF: doesn't match our copy
gpg: Total number processed: 1
2 dkg@alice:~$ 
This probably also means that caff (from the signing-party package) will also choke when trying to deal with these two keys. I'm sure there are other OpenPGP-related tools that will fail in the face of two keys with matching 64-bit key IDs. We should not use Key IDs I am more convinced than ever that key IDs (both short and long) are actively problematic to real-world use of OpenPGP. We want two things from a key management framework: unforgability, and human-intelligible handles. Key IDs fail at both. So reasonable tools should not expose either short or long key IDs to users, or use them internally if they can avoid them. They do not have any properties we want, and in the worst case, they actively mislead people or lead them into harm. What reasonable tool should do that? How to replace Key IDs If we're not going to use Key IDs, what should we do instead? For anything human-facing, we should be using human-intelligible things like user IDs and creation dates. These are trivial to forge, but people can relate to them. This is better than offering the user something that is also trivial to forge, but that people cannot relate to. The job of any key management UI should be to interpret the cryptographic assurances provided by the certifications and present that to the user in a comprehensible way. For anything not human-facing (e.g. key management data storage, etc), we should be using the full key itself. We'll also want to store the full fingerprint as an index, since that is used for communication and key exchange (e.g. on calling cards). There remain parts of the spec (e.g. PK-ESK, Issuer subpackets) that make some use of the long key ID in ways that provide some measure of convenience but no real cryptographic security. We should fix the spec to stop using those, and either remove them entirely, or replace them with the full fingerprints. These fixes are not as urgent as the user-facing changes or the critical internal indexing fixes, though. Key IDs are not useful. We should stop using them.Tags: collision, crypto, gpg, openpgp, pgp, security

11 December 2013

Daniel Pocock: Get WebRTC going faster

On Saturday, Lumicall began offering free calls from browser to mobile using the free and open WebRTC technology. It should be no surprise that the service has been popular. Is it really free and open? The only way to prove this technology is free is to help people implement this for themself. On Monday, I uploaded reSIProcate v1.9.0 beta7 packages to Debian. The reSIProcate SIP proxy, repro, is one of the core components of the solution behind the free Lumicall service. Simply install the repro and resiprocate-turn-server packages using apt-get and make the following changes to the configuration (use your own IP addresses of course). I've taken this diff from my own runtime environment, only hiding my passwords, so that you can see exactly how I got it working:
--- repro.config.orig	2013-12-11 17:36:27.179228324 +0100
+++ repro-ws.sip5060.net.config	2013-12-11 17:48:24.159938649 +0100
@@ -143,6 +143,41 @@
 # Transport6TlsClientVerification = None
 # Transport6RecordRouteUri = sip:h1.sipdomain.com;transport=WS
 
+Transport1Interface = 195.8.117.57:80
+Transport1Type = WS
+Transport1RecordRouteUri = auto
+
+Transport2Interface = 2001:67c:1388:1000::57:80
+Transport2Type = WS
+Transport2RecordRouteUri = auto
+
+Transport3Interface = 195.8.117.57:5060
+Transport3Type = TCP
+Transport3RecordRouteUri = auto
+
+Transport4Interface = 2001:67c:1388:1000::57:5060
+Transport4Type = TCP
+Transport4RecordRouteUri = auto
+
+Transport5Interface = 195.8.117.57:443
+Transport5Type = WSS
+#Transport5RecordRouteUri = auto
+Transport5TlsDomain = ws.sip5060.net
+Transport5TlsClientVerification = None
+Transport5RecordRouteUri = sip:ws.sip5060.net;transport=WSS
+Transport5TlsCertificate = /etc/ssl/ssl.crt/ws.sip5060.net-bundle.crt
+Transport5TlsPrivateKey = /etc/ssl/private/ws.sip5060.net-key.pem
+
+Transport6Interface = 2001:67c:1388:1000::57:443
+Transport6Type = WSS
+#Transport6RecordRouteUri = auto
+Transport6TlsDomain = ws.sip5060.net
+Transport6TlsClientVerification = None
+Transport6RecordRouteUri = sip:ws.sip5060.net;transport=WSS
+Transport6TlsCertificate = /etc/ssl/ssl.crt/ws.sip5060.net-bundle.crt
+Transport6TlsPrivateKey = /etc/ssl/private/ws.sip5060.net-key.pem
+
+
 # Comma separated list of DNS servers, overrides default OS detected list (leave blank 
 # for default)
 DNSServers =
@@ -455,7 +490,7 @@
 ForceRecordRouting = false
 
 # Assume path option
-AssumePath = false
+AssumePath = true
 
 # Disable registrar
 DisableRegistrar = false
@@ -481,7 +516,7 @@
 # WARNING: Before enabling this, ensure you have a RecordRouteUri setup, or are using
 # the alternate transport specification mechanism and defining a RecordRouteUri per
 # transport: TransportXRecordRouteUri
-DisableOutbound = true
+DisableOutbound = false
 
 # Set the draft version of outbound to support (default: RFC5626)
 # Other accepted values are the versions of the IETF drafts, before RFC5626 was issued
@@ -505,7 +540,7 @@
 # WARNING: Before enabling this, ensure you have a RecordRouteUri setup, or are using
 # the alternate transport specification mechanism and defining a RecordRouteUri per
 # transport: TransportXRecordRouteUri
-EnableFlowTokens = false
+EnableFlowTokens = true
 
 # Enable use of flow-tokens in non-outbound cases for clients detected to be behind a NAT.  
 # This a more selective flow token hack mode for clients not supporting RFC5626.  The 

This is a diff against the /etc/repro/repro.config file distributed in the Debian package version 1.9.0~beta7-1. In the example above, I've included WSS transport defintions for WebSockets over TLS. Use the standard procedure for creating webserver SSL certificates to create certificates for repro and make sure you insert the correct filenames in the TLS parameters above. I've also duplicated every transport for IPv6. If you don't want TLS/WSS or IPv6, just comment those entries out (and renumber the remaining transports). Web-based SIP proxy setup Once you have repro running, go to the web admin interface (port 5080, username: admin, password: admin) and finish the setup using the web UI. The following steps are essential:
  • Add your domain (and restart the repro daemon after adding your domain)
  • Add some users
  • Add any routes to external services (optional - in my next blog I'll demonstrate how to route WebRTC calls to Asterisk using the Debian packages and less than 20 lines of configuration)
Set up reTurn, the TURN server Just put your IP addresses in /etc/reTurnServer.config and add the following line to /etc/reTurnServer-users.txt:
test:notasecret:reTurn:authorized
IMPORTANT: the realm in the users file (reTurn in the example and default config) must be identical to the AuthenticationRealm in the /etc/reTurnServer.config file. On your own web site Simply install your own apache server and clone the webrtc.lumicall.org demo site. Modify the file js/custom.js and include the settings for your own server.
# cd /var/www
# mkdir webcall
# cd webcall
# wget -r -nH http://webrtc.lumicall.org
# vi js/custom.js
In the custom.js, make sure you use a ws:// URL if you didn't set up SSL certificates and use a wss:// URL if you did. The IP or domain of your repro server must be in the ws:// or wss:// URL. Now navigate to the URL ending with /webcall on your server. For RHEL, Fedora and other RPM users Can somebody please assist with the review of the cajun-jsonapi dependency package so I can upload this new version of reSIProcate to Fedora? I'm also planning to make v1.9.0 available in EPEL6 when it is released in January. Questions? Please come and ask questions or discuss your experiences on the Free RTC mailing list sponsored by FSF Europe.

10 December 2013

Kees Cook: live patching the kernel

A nice set of recent posts have done a great job detailing the remaining ways that a root user can get at kernel memory. Part of this is driven by the ideas behind UEFI Secure Boot, but they come from the same goal: making sure that the root user cannot directly subvert the running kernel. My perspective on this is toward making sure that an attacker who has gained access and then gained root privileges can t continue to elevate their access and install invisible kernel rootkits. An outline for possible attack vectors is spelled out by Matthew Gerrett s continuing useful kernel lockdown patch series. The set of attacks was examined by Tyler Borland in Bypassing modules_disabled security . His post describes each vector in detail, and he ultimately chooses MSR writing as the way to write kernel memory (and shows an example of how to re-enable module loading). One thing not mentioned is that many distros have MSR access as a module, and it s rarely loaded. If modules_disabled is already set, an attacker won t be able to load the MSR module to begin with. However, the other general-purpose vector, kexec, is still available. To prove out this method, Matthew wrote a proof-of-concept for changing kernel memory via kexec. Chrome OS is several steps ahead here, since it has hibernation disabled, MSR writing disabled, kexec disabled, modules verified, root filesystem read-only and verified, kernel verified, and firmware verified. But since not all my machines are Chrome OS, I wanted to look at some additional protections against kexec on general-purpose distro kernels that have CONFIG_KEXEC enabled, especially those without UEFI Secure Boot and Matthew s lockdown patch series. My goal was to disable kexec without needing to rebuild my entire kernel. For future kernels, I have proposed adding /proc/sys/kernel/kexec_disabled, a partner to the existing modules_disabled, that will one-way toggle kexec off. For existing kernels, things got more ugly. What options do I have for patching a running kernel? First I looked back at what I d done in the past with fixing vulnerabilities with systemtap. This ends up being a rather heavy-duty way to go about things, since you need all the distro kernel debug symbols, etc. It does work, but has a significant problem: since it uses kprobes, a root user can just turn off the probes, reverting the changes. So that s not going to work. Next I looked at ksplice. The original upstream has gone away, but there is still some work being done by Jiri Slaby. However, even with his updates which fixed various build problems, there were still more, even when building a 3.2 kernel (Ubuntu 12.04 LTS). So that s out too, which is too bad, since ksplice does exactly what I want: modifies the running kernel s functions via a module. So, finally, I decided to just do it by hand, and wrote a friendly kernel rootkit. Instead of dealing with flipping page table permissions on the normally-unwritable kernel code memory, I borrowed from PaX s KERNEXEC feature, and just turn off write protect checking on the CPU briefly to make the changes. The return values for functions on x86_64 are stored in RAX, so I just need to stuff the kexec_load syscall with mov -1, %rax; ret (-1 is EPERM):
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
static unsigned long long_target;
static char *target;
module_param_named(syscall, long_target, ulong, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(syscall, "Address of syscall");
/* mov $-1, %rax; ret */
unsigned const char bytes[] =   0x48, 0xc7, 0xc0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
                                0xc3  ;
unsigned char *orig;
/* Borrowed from PaX KERNEXEC */
static inline void disable_wp(void)
 
        unsigned long cr0;
        preempt_disable();
        barrier();
        cr0 = read_cr0();
        cr0 &= ~X86_CR0_WP;
        write_cr0(cr0);
 
static inline void enable_wp(void)
 
        unsigned long cr0;
        cr0 = read_cr0();
        cr0  = X86_CR0_WP;
        write_cr0(cr0);
        barrier();
        preempt_enable_no_resched();
 
static int __init syscall_eperm_init(void)
 
        int i;
        target = (char *)long_target;
        if (target == NULL)
                return -EINVAL;
        /* save original */
        orig = kmalloc(sizeof(bytes), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!orig)
                return -ENOMEM;
        for (i = 0; i < sizeof(bytes); i++)  
                orig[i] = target[i];
         
        pr_info("writing %lu bytes at %p\n", sizeof(bytes), target);
        disable_wp();
        for (i = 0; i < sizeof(bytes); i++)  
                target[i] = bytes[i];
         
        enable_wp();
        return 0;
 
module_init(syscall_eperm_init);
static void __exit syscall_eperm_exit(void)
 
        int i;
        pr_info("restoring %lu bytes at %p\n", sizeof(bytes), target);
        disable_wp();
        for (i = 0; i < sizeof(bytes); i++)  
                target[i] = orig[i];
         
        enable_wp();
        kfree(orig);
 
module_exit(syscall_eperm_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("makes target syscall always return EPERM");
If I didn t want to leave an obvious indication that the kernel had been manipulated, the module could be changed to: And with this in place, it s just a matter of loading it with the address of sys_kexec_load (found via /proc/kallsyms) before I disable module loading via modprobe. Here s my upstart script:
# modules-disable - disable modules after rc scripts are done
#
description "disable loading modules"
start on stopped module-init-tools and stopped rc
task
script
        cd /root/modules/syscall_eperm
        make clean
        make
        insmod ./syscall_eperm.ko \
                syscall=0x$(egrep ' T sys_kexec_load$' /proc/kallsyms   cut -d" " -f1)
        modprobe disable
end script
And now I m safe from kexec before I have a kernel that contains /proc/sys/kernel/kexec_disabled.

2013, Kees Cook. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License.
Creative Commons License

8 December 2013

Russell Coker: A Basic Income for Australia

There has been a lot of discussion recently about the concept of a Basic Income (Wikipedia), largely due to the efforts to change the Swiss constitution to provide a Basic Income [1]. The concept of a Basic Income is that residents get a fixed payment without having to be sick, disabled, looking for work, or eligible for other forms of social security. A Basic Income wouldn t replace all other forms of social security, one of the most obvious examples is that sick people will often need money for medical care in additional to living expenses. Also I believe that it shouldn t be means tested in any way. I think that one of the problems with current payment schemes is that there are complex eligibility criteria which require effort for the applicant and for government agencies to prevent accidental or fraudulent over-payment. The tax rates could be raised slightly to make it revenue neutral. Newstart In Australia the main form of social security for unemployed people at the moment is called Newstart [2]. Currently Newstart payments range from a maximum of $501 per fortnight for a single person ($13,026 per annum), to a maximum of $699.90 per fortnight for someone who is a carer. The Newstart payments start to decrease if the recipient earns more than $62 per fortnight. The minimum wage in Australia is $16.37 per hour for permanent work or $20.30 for casual work [3]. So if someone works for more than 3 hours at a casual rate (and I can t imagine 4 hours a fortnight being anything other than casual) then their Newstart payments will decrease. The payment decreases are fairly significant, for every dollar that is earned about 50 cents will be deducted from the payments. That s a great incentive to either avoid opportunities to do part-time work or to do cash-only work that s outside the tax system. The most obvious way of implementing a Basic Income would be to replace Newstart. Then anyone who is in that situation would be free to just not get a job which would be OK IMHO as people who don t want to work probably wouldn t do a good job if the government forced them to get a job. People who are unemployed who want to work could work as much as they want and scale up according to what their employer asks and how much money they need. Currently the full-time minimum wage is $622.20 per week (I m not sure exactly how they get that from $16.37). That s almost 2.5* the Newstart allowance for a single person (but less than twice the Newstart allowance for a carer). While Newstart (and the other forms of social security) don t provide a great income, it seems that the difference between Newstart and the minimum wage isn t that great particularly when you consider that working involves some expenses for travel etc. There doesn t seem to be a great financial incentive for someone to leave Newstart and get a minimum wage job. People Who Want Social Security Some people think it s great to get government payments while others find it embarrassing to need such payments and won t necessarily apply if they are eligible. I think that the current system of forcing people to apply for social security is a way of discouraging people who find themselves unexpectedly in a difficult situation but doesn t discourage people who are happy not to work. This seems to effectively reduce the incidence of payments to the people who most tax-payers would regard as the most worthy recipients. Economics Charles Stross wrote about some ideas related to this [4]. He suggests that as the workforce participation has been steadily reducing due to technology we should move to a social model that isn t based around working to live but working to buy luxuries that aren t covered by the Basic Income. One of the many economic changes related to a Basic Income is that the minimum wage could be smaller than it might otherwise be. For example if the minimum wage was decreased by the same amount that the Basic Income provided then the minimum income would remain the same while employers would pay less, this would affect the viability of certain types of contract work web sites if they were subject to minimum wage laws (currently they just ignore the minimum wage laws by paying based on job completion instead of hours worked). I don t think that the minimum wage should decrease that much though, currently employers are able to run viable businesses with the minimum wage laws and I don t think that a Basic Income should be used as a way of helping corporations avoid paying their employees. If we had a Basic Income then there s many ways that it could be used to stabilise the economy. If people could pay their rent even if they lost their job then a down-turn in one area of the economy wouldn t immediately affect other areas. Also if rent payments were deducted automatically from an account used to receive the Basic Income then landlords would be more likely to rent to poor people as they could be guaranteed to receive rent payments (it would be easy to have a contractual agreement for rent to take priority and have bank computers enforce that). The Implementation Problem I don t think that my idea would have any significant negative effects. It wouldn t decrease government revenues if tax was adjusted accordingly. It wouldn t make people stop working as people who don t want to work already avoid it. It would help people who are out of work to get work by reducing the barriers to entry in terms of paperwork and of unreasonable cuts to Newstart making it bad value to take part time work. I think that the big problem with implementing it is people who want to prevent poor people from having opportunities. They want to reduce social security and minimum wages even though such changes will in the long run only give less tax revenue and greater expense in law enforcement. It seems rather ironic that such hostility often comes from people at the low end of the middle class whos jobs are most likely to be at risk from new technology. As on-going technological development reduces the number of workers that are required to keep things running we need to have some form of payment to the people who aren t doing enough work to survive. A decent Basic Income is a much better option than giving Newstart payments and forcing a significant portion of the population into a degrading search for jobs that don t exist. As that s the inevitable future I think we should make political changes to deal with it sooner rather than later. However a Basic Income might be implemented now it s surely going to be a lot better than what might happen if we wait until the majority of the population are unemployed before doing something about it.

6 December 2013

Gunnar Wolf: For people in Mexico: Workshop next Wednesday! Video editing from the command line (by Chema Serralde, @joseserralde)

(Yes, yes... Maybe I should post in Spanish.. But hey, gotta keep consistecy in my blog!) General, public, open invitation Are you in Mexico City, or do you plan to be next Wednesday (December 11)? Are you interested in video edition? In Free Software? I will have the pleasure to host at home the great Chema Serralde, a good friend, and a multifacetic guru both in the technical and musical areas. He will present a workshop: Video editing from the command line. I asked Chema for an outline of his talk, but given he is a busy guy, I will basically translate the introduction he prepared for this same material in FSL Vallarta, held two weeks ago.
With the help of the commandline, you can become a multimedia guru. We will edit a video using just a terminal. This skill will surprise your friends and your couple. But the most important is that this knowledge is just an excuse to understand step by step what does a video CODEC mean, what is a FORMAT, and how video and audio editors work; by using this knowledge, you will be able to set the basis for multimedia editing, without the promises and secrets of propietary editors. How much does my file weigh and why? How to improve a video file's quality? Why cannot I read my camera's information from GNU/Linux? By the end of this workshop, we well see how some libraries help you develop your first audio and video application, what are their main APIs and uses.
Logistics Everybody is welcome to come for free, no questions asked, no fees collected. I can offer coffee for all, but if you want anything else to eat/drink, you are welcome to bring it. We do require you to reserve and confirm your place (mail me to my usual mail address). We have limited space, and I must set an absolute quota of 10 participants. Some people hide their address... Mine is quite publicly known: Av. Copilco 233, just by Parque Hugo Margain, on the Northern edge of UNAM (Metro Copilco). The course starts at 16:00, and lasts... As long as we make it last ;-) So, that said... See you there! :-D [update]: Chema sent me the list of topics he plans to cover. Copy/pasting from his mail, in Spanish:
TALLER REL MPAGO DE EDICI N AUDIOVISUAL EN L NEA DE COMANDO
Jos Mar a Serralde Ruiz, facilitador
  1. Editando como cavern cola.
    1. Manipulaci n b sica de archivos multimedia en entornos POSIX.
    2. S un Bash VJ (videojockey)
    3. Vaciando y entubando
  2. Editando como cient fico.
    1. Encabezados y fourcc
    2. 3 familias de CODECS de v deo y sus patentes
    3. 3 famlias de CODECS de audio y sus patentes
    4. Muxers, demuxers y muxes.
  3. Editando como artista.
    1. Cajas de herramientas en software libre para procesamiento de v deo.
    2. Procesamiento en tiempo real de v deo (el que se crea artista pierde)
    3. Derritiendo v deo, audio con calcetines MELT + SOX
Software necesario (sistemas operativos POSIX, windouseros acercarse con el af n de repensar sus vidas): mplayer, avconv/ffmpeg (libavcodec), melt, sox, imagemagick

5 December 2013

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: The legal utility of deniability in secure chat

This Monday, I attended a workshop on Multi-party Off the Record Messaging and Deniability hosted by the Calyx Institute. The discussion was a combination of legal and technical people, looking at how the characteristics of this particular technology affect (or do not affect) the law. This is a report-back, since I know other people wanted to attend. I'm not a lawyer, but I develop software to improve communications security, I care about these questions, and I want other people to be aware of the discussion. I hope I did not misrepresent anything below. I'd be happy if anyone wants to offer corrections. BackgroundOff the Record Messaging (OTR) is a way to secure instant messaging (e.g. jabber/XMPP, gChat, AIM). The two most common characteristics people want from a secure instant messaging program are:
Authentication
Each participant should be able to know specifically who the other parties are on the chat.
Confidentiality
The content of the messages should only be intelligible to the parties involved with the chat; it should appear opaque or encrypted to anyone else listening in. Note that confidentiality effectively depends on authentication -- if you don't know who you're talking to, you can't make sensible assertions about confidentiality.
As with many other modern networked encryption schemes, OTR relies on each user maintaining a long-lived "secret key", and publishing a corresponding "public key" for their peers to examine. These keys are critical for providing authentication (and by extension, for confidentiality). But OTR offers several interesting characteristics beyond the common two. Its most commonly cited characteristics are "forward secrecy" and "deniability".
Forward secrecy
Assuming the parties communicating are operating in good faith, forward secrecy offers protection against a special kind of adversary: one who logs the encrypted chat, and subsequently steals either party's long-term secret key. Without forward secrecy, such an adversary would be able to discover the content of the messages, violating the confidentiality characteristic. With forward secrecy, this adversary is be stymied and the messages remain confidential.
Deniability
Deniability only comes into play when one of the parties is no longer operating in good faith (e.g. their computer is compromised, or they are collaborating with an adversary). In this context, if Alice is chatting with Bob, she does not want Bob to be able to cryptographically prove to anyone else that she made any of the specific statements in the conversation. This is the focus of Monday's discussion. To be clear, this kind of deniability means Alice can correctly say "you have no cryptographic proof I said X", but it does not let her assert "here is cryptographic proof that I did not say X" (I can't think of any protocol that offers the latter assertion). The opposite of deniability is a cryptographic proof of origin, which usually runs something like "only someone with access to Alice's secret key could have said X."
The traditional two-party OTR protocol has offered both forward secrecy and deniability for years. But deniability in particular is a challenging characteristic to provide for group chat which is the domain of Multi-Party OTR (mpOTR). You can read some past discussion about the challenges of deniability in mpOTR (and why it's harder when there are more than two people chatting) from the otr-users mailing list. If you're not doing anything wrong... The discussion was well-anchored by a comment from another participant who cheekily asked "If you're not doing anything wrong, why do you need to hide your chat at all, let alone be able to deny it?" The general sense of the room was that we'd all heard this question many times, from many people. There are lots of problems with the ideas behind the question from many perspectives. But just from a legal perspective, there are at least two problems with the way this question is posed: In these situations, people confront real risk from the law. If we care about these people, we need to figure out if we can build systems to help them reduce that legal risk (of course we also need to fix broken laws, and the legal environment in general, but those approaches were out of scope for this discussion). The Legal Utility of Deniability Monday's meeting was called specifically because it wasn't clear how much real-world usefulness there is in the "deniability" characteristic, and whether this feature is worth the development effort and implementation tradeoffs required. In particular, the group was interested in deniability's utility in legal contexts; many (most?) people in the room were lawyers, and it's also not clear that deniability has much utility outside of a formal legal setting. If your adversary isn't constrained by some rule of law, they probably won't care at all whether there is a cryptographic proof or not that you wrote a particular message (In retrospect, one possible exception is exposure in the media, but we did not discuss that scenario). Places of possible usefulness So where might deniability come in handy during civil litigation or a criminal trial? Presumably the circumstance is that a piece of a chat log is offered as incriminating evidence, and the defendant is trying to deny something that they appear to have said in the log. This denial could take place in two rather different contexts: during rules over admissibility of evidence, or (once admitted) in front of a jury. In legal wrangling over admissibility, apparently a lot of horse-trading can go on -- each side concedes some things in exchange for the other side conceding other things. It appears that cryptographic proof of origin (that is, a lack of deniability) on the chat logs themselves might reduce the amount of leverage a defense lawyer can get from conceding or arguing strongly over that piece of evidence. For example, if the chain of custody of a chat transcript is fuzzy (i.e. the transcript could have been mishandled or modified somehow before reaching trial), then a cryptographic proof of origin would make it much harder for the defense to contest the chat transcript on the grounds of tampering. Deniability would give the defense more bargaining power. In arguing about already-admitted evidence before a jury, deniability in this sense seems like a job for expert witnesses, who would need to convince the jury of their interpretation of the data. There was a lot of skepticism in the room over this, both around the possibility of most jurors really understanding what OTR's claim of deniability actually means, and on jurors' ability to distinguish this argument from a bogus argument presented by an opposing expert witness who is willing to lie about the nature of the protocol (or who misunderstands it and passes on their misunderstanding to the jury). The complexity of the tech systems involved in a data-heavy prosecution or civil litigation are themselves opportunities for lawyers to argue (and experts to weigh in) on the general reliability of these systems. Sifting through the quantities of data available and ensuring that the appropriate evidence is actually findable, relevant, and suitably preserved for the jury's inspection is a hard and complicated job, with room for error. OTR's deniability might be one more element in a multi-pronged attack on these data systems. These are the most compelling arguments for the legal utility of deniability that I took away from the discussion. I confess that they don't seem particularly strong to me, though some level of "avoiding a weaker position when horse-trading" resonates with me. What about the arguments against its utility? Limitations The most basic argument against OTR's deniability is that courts don't care about cryptographic proof for digital evidence. People are convicted or lose civil cases based on unsigned electronic communications (e.g. normal e-mail, plain chat logs) all the time. OTR's deniability doesn't provide any legal cover stronger than trying to claim you didn't write a given e-mail that appears to have originated from your account. As someone who understands the forgeability of e-mail, i find this overall situation troubling, but it seems to be where we are. Worse, OTR's deniability doesn't cover whether you had a conversation, just what you said in that conversation. That is, Bob can still cryptographically prove to an adversary (or before a judge or jury) that he had a communication with someone controlling Alice's secret key (which is probably Alice); he just can't prove that Alice herself said any particular part of the conversation he produces. Additionally, there are runtime tradeoffs depending on how the protocol manages to achieve these features. For example, forward secrecy itself requires an additional round trip or two when compared to authenticated, encrypted communications without forward secrecy (a "round trip" is a message from Alice to Bob followed by a message back from Bob to Alice). Getting proper deniability into the mpOTR spec might incur extra latency (imagine having to wait 60 seconds after everyone joins before starting a group chat, or a pause in the chat of 15 seconds when a new member joins) or extra computational power (meaning that they might not work well on slower/older devices) or an order of magnitude more bandwidth (meaning that chat might not work at all on a weak connection). There could also simply be complexity that makes it harder to correctly implement a protocol with deniability than an alternate protocol without deniability. Incorrectly-implemented software can put its users at risk. I don't know enough about the current state of mpOTR to know what the specific tradeoffs are for the deniability feature, but it's clear there will be some. Who decides whether the tradeoffs are worth the feature? Other kinds of deniability Further weakening the case for the legal utility of OTR's deniability, there seem to be other ways to get deniability in a legal context over a chat transcript. There are deniability arguments that can be made from outside the protocol. For example, you can always claim someone else took control of your computer while you were asleep or using the bathroom or eating dinner, or you can claim that your computer had a virus that exported your secret key and it must have been used by someone else. If you're desperate enough to sacrifice your digital identity, you could arrange to have your secret key published, at which point anyone can make signed statements with it. Having forward secrecy makes it possible to expose your secret key without exposing the content of your past communications to any listener who happened to log them. Conclusion My takeaway from the discussion is that the legal utility of OTR's deniability is non-zero, but quite low; and that development energy focused on deniability is probably only justified if there are very few costs associated with it. Several folks pointed out that most communications-security tools are too complicated or inconvenient to use for normal people. If we have limited development energy to spend on securing instant messaging, usability and ubiquity would be a better focus than this form of deniability. Secure chat systems that take too long to make, that are too complex, or that are too cumbersome are not going to be adopted. But this doesn't mean people won't chat at all -- they'll just use cleartext chat, or maybe they'll use supposedly "secure" protocols with even worse properties: for example, without proper end-to-end authentication (permitting spoofing or impersonation by the server operator or potentially by anyone else); with encryption that is reversible by the chatroom operator or flawed enough to be reversed by any listener with a powerful computer; without forward secrecy; or so on. As a demonstration of this, we heard some lawyers in the room admit to using Skype to talk with their clients even though they know it's not a safe communications channel because their clients' adversaries might have access to the skype messaging system itself. My conclusion from the meeting is that there are a few particular situations where deniability could be useful legally, but that overall, it is not where we as a community should be spending our development energy. Perhaps in some future world where all communications are already authenticated, encrypted, and forward-secret by default, we can look into improving our protocols to provide this characteristic, but for now, we really need to work on usability, popularization, and wide deployment. Thanks Many thanks to Nick Merrill for organizing the discussion, to Shayana Kadidal and Stanley Cohen for providing a wealth of legal insight and legal experience, to Tom Ritter for an excellent presentation of the technical details, and to everyone in the group who participated in the interesting and lively discussion. Tags: chat, deniability, otr, security

Steve Kemp: Belated updates

Today I should have been heading down to York, to attend the Bytemark Christmas party. Instead I'm here in Edinburgh, because wind/storms basically shutdown the rail network in Scotland for the morning. Technically I could have probably made it, but only belatedly and only at a huge cost to my sanity. The train-station was insane with stranded people, and there seemed no guarantee the recently-revived service would continue. So instead I'm sulking at home. I had a lot of other things scheduled to do in York/London today/tomorrow, for reasons that will become apparent next week, so to say I'm annoyed is an understatement. In happier news I'm not dead.
Walking to work this morning was horrific, there was so much wind 70-100mph, that I counldn't actually cross a bridge, on Ocean Drive, because I just kept getting blown into the road. (Yeah, that's a road that is very close to the coast. Driving wind. Horrible rain. Storming sea. Fun.)
I ended up retracing my steps, and taking a detour. (PS. My boots leaked.) Not a good day. Enjoy some software instead - a trivial HTTP / XMPP bridge.

3 December 2013

Iustin Pop: A not so dark sky

I'm aware of how not-dark our modern city night sky is, but sometimes it still heavily surprises me how full of light it actually is. Yesterday I went about five kilometres out of Z rich; I thought at that distance, on a reasonably dark hill, it would be good enough for some night-sky shots. So I setup my tripod, only to realise I can't expose over 30 seconds because (at low ISO and fast aperture, shooting not straight up), everything is bleached out: I couldn't believe my eyes. Yes, I heard that one needs to go 100Km out of big cities, but but So I went and found that since about 2004, all of Switzerland is light polluted - even going on top of Jungfrau, for example, wouldn't completely eliminate it. I also learned about Merle Walker's equation - yeah, 200Km or more away from light sources would be good. Not here, in this quite small, quite populated country in the middle of Europe :/ I realised that as soon as my eyes got acclimated to the location I was at, I could easily see everything around me, due to the light pollution. I miss a really dark sky - I remember a couple of years back, in a different country, stopping at night on the side of the road, and being shocked at how the sky was filled with starts. I didn't have any camera with me at that time Heck, I remember seeing the Milky Way way back as a child, but nowadays when I get out of work, I can barely see 4-5 points of light in the sky. Anyway, enough with ranting Thanks to modern technology, one can recover lots of detail, even in a washed out picture. So in the end, shooting straight up, I could get some resemblance of structure (and this was only at 28mm, which is not that wide): Or alternatively, one can use the glowing light for a bit of play/contrast: I also played with stacking images via Deep Sky Stacker, but stacking - I learned to my surprise - only works to reduce noise in the final image, and not to make it "brighter" or more detailed. Live and learn The result was a bit better than not stacked, but not by much: This was a 25 5s, ISO 800, f/4, same 28mm lens. What I found surprising is the "non-star object" (to call it so) near the centre of the image - I have no idea what it is, it definitely doesn't look like a star, it could be an elliptical galaxy or so. I tried navigating back in time via Stellarium, but I don't remember the orientation of the lens, so it will remain a mystery to me. Anyway, two more pictures and higher resolutions on a Smugmug album. Feel free to leave a comment or drop me an email if you have suggestions where to take nice night sky photos in Switzerland

Russell Coker: Preferring Not To

I ve just read Bartleby the Scrivener which is a short story about a scrivener who refused to work saying I d prefer not to . It reminded me of some situations in the computer industry. I ve never seen a single case where someone preferred not to work when everyone around them (colleagues and management) wanted them to work. But then the incidence of having an entire team and management wanting to work efficiently isn t nearly as common as one might imagine. In some cases it s desired that someone not work, such as a former colleague who was hired as a sysadmin but did nothing but change backup tapes (a few hours work per week). Not having him login as root improved the general reliability of the servers but it was fortunate that we never needed to restore from backups One time I had a colleague who preferred to spend most of his time in the office searching the Internet for videos of street fights. I have often told colleagues that I would prefer them to work, but in the case of a guy who s only hobby is street-fighting I decided to let it go. Managing people can be difficult, particularly for someone who doesn t like disagreements. Some managers that I ve reported to seemed to prefer not to manage in an apparent attempt to avoid disputes. One time when I complained about a colleague not even having a suitable computer to permit doing any work a manager responded with the rhetorical question what do you expect me to do? . That manager didn t do any annual reviews of staff for over a year, he only eventually did some reviews because he was told that his scheduled promotion was on hold until he got them done. I got the impression that at least two levels of management preferred not to work at that company. Sometimes it just gets weird though, such as the occasion when I was the only member of a team and the manager who was supposedly managing no-one but me never seemed to have time to have a meeting with me. But he didn t want me to bypass him and talk directly to other people in the company, so he preferred not to work and not to have anyone else do his job. Most of the companies that I ve worked for in a full-time capacity didn t seem to have any effective technical interviews (note that I ve mostly worked for financial companies and ISPs not free software companies). So it seems that anyone with minimal computer skills who wants a well paying job could just send out a CV to a bunch of recruiting agencies, get interviewed by enough companies to eventually hit one without a technical interview process and then find a job that doesn t require work. Depression The Wikipedia page about Bartleby the Scrivener [2] suggests that Bartleby was depressed. I wonder how much of the lack of performance I ve witnessed has been due to depression. There appears to be a strong correlation between work environments that cause depression and people preferring not to work. Maybe managers should be considering how to make work less depressing to try and get more effective employees (in terms of quality and quantity of work). One example of this is the sysadmin team death spiral I ve witnessed where no-one can automate solving problems (EG by cron jobs to manage resource usage and analysis tools to find minor problems before they become major problems) because everyone is dedicated to fixing things that break needlessly (EG systems crashing due to lack of disk space). When people start getting control over recurring problems and automating things then the work becomes increasingly about solving problems and less about implementing the same manual processes every day/week and it s more fun and effective for everyone. At the BoF on depression at LCA 2013 one delegate stated that many companies have people in HR who can arrange support for depressed employees. Apparently if you are depressed and you work for a company that s large enough to have a HR department then it can be beneficial to talk to HR about it. That probably works well in the case where an employee is depressed but the company is working well. But in the case where the company isn t working well it seems unlikely to help. David Graeber wrote an interesting article about Bullshit Jobs [3]. He goes a bit far, I don t think that late night pizza delivery is a bullshit job and actuaries are useful to society. But his points about the existence of useless jobs are reasonable. Management Levels I sometimes wonder whether there is some benefit in establishing social norms about working and then having management take little interest in how it happens. If a team works well together then management could just set deadlines (which would be negotiated with employees who know what s possible) and let the team work out how to do it. Then instead of having one manager for each team of ~10 people who theoretically tracks what everyone is doing you could have one manager for a dozen teams who just tracks overall team performance essentially remove a layer of management. Valve is famous for having no formal management structure and for getting things done, unfortunately that apparently allows school-style cliques to block actions [4]. But I think that the Valve experiment is useful and provides some ideas that can be used by other companies. Maybe if instead of requiring consensus of the entire company for hiring decisions they only required consensus of the team things would have worked better. Of course another down-side to such things is that hierarchical management can be good for avoiding discrimination and bullying. The article I cited about Valve compares it to high-school. It could be that Valve employees were all nice people who only hired other nice people. But if similar systems were implemented in many companies then some would surely end up being like a typical high school with all the bullying and mistreatment of minority groups that entails. Michael O. Church wrote an interesting article in which he divides employees into four categories, loser , clueless , psychopaths , and technocrats (note that he didn t invent the first three names) [5]. In his model the clueless category includes most middle-management. I think that there are some problems with Michael s model and I m not arguing for a technocracy (which is how this post might be interpreted in terms of his ideas). But I think he demonstrates some of the real problems in the way companies are managed and in his model the losers prefer not to work as long as they can get paid. Conclusion I don t have any good solutions to these problems to offer. It seems that the best we can hope for is incremental change to make work less depressing, to have the minimal amount of management, and to avoid bullshit jobs .

2 December 2013

Ben Hutchings: Upgrading from Android 2.3 'Gingerbread' to 4.3 'Jelly Bean'

Replacing my phone My first Android phone was a ZTE Blade (sold as Orange San Francisco here in the UK). It originally shipped with Android 2.1 but was upgradable to 2.3 thanks to CyanogenMod (or other unofficial mods). However there's little sign of an upgrade to 4.x; the apps I want to use are pushing the limits of its CPU, RAM and internal storage; and I've never got very good at typing on a soft keyboard. So it seemed like time to get a newer phone with a hard keyboard (and still with a SD slot). After a little research with the CyanogenMod compatibility list and some time looking at reviews, I settled on the Samsung Galaxy S Relay 4G, which was exclusive to T-Mobile USA but is being resold through eBay. It shipped with Android 4.0 but I immediately installed CyanogenMod 10.2 (Android 4.3). This was a bit of an adventure as I bought the Blade with CM already installed and wasn't familiar with the multiple steps that were necessary. Copying my data The last step, and the real subject of this entry, was to move my data across. Much of this was on a SD card which I could simply plug into the Relay. The internal files had to be backed up onto this card and then restored, using the recovery environment (ClockworkMod) on each phone. After rebooting the Relay into the full Android system, my apps and settings were mostly present but I was immediately confronted with a series of error dialogs reporting that 'Unfortunately, Dialler has stopped' - and the same for 'Clock' and 'the process android.process.acore' (whatever that is). What went wrong There are thankfully more detailed error logs in the filesystem, under /data/system/dropbox (this is for logging at the Java level; if a process is terminated by a fatal signal it's logged to /data/tombstones). There are several ways to get at them, but I used recovery mode and adb to get a root shell where I could easily read and write files as necessary. The Contacts (aka People) database upgrade fails with an SQLiteException, apparently because it doesn't account for upgrading from the schema used in 2.3:
Process: android.process.acore
Flags: 0x883e45
Package: com.android.providers.applications v18 (4.3.1-f963020e38)
Package: com.android.providers.contacts v18 (4.3.1-f963020e38)
Package: com.android.providers.userdictionary v18 (4.3.1-f963020e38)
Build: samsung/apexqtmo/apexqtmo:4.1.2/JZO54K/T699UVBMC5:user/release-keys
android.database.sqlite.SQLiteException: no such column: phonebook_label (code 1): , while compiling: UPDATE raw_contacts SET display_name_source=?,display_name=?,display_name_alt=?,phonetic_name=?,phonetic_name_style=?,sort_key=?,phonebook_label=?,phonebook_bucket=?,sort_key_alt=?,phonebook_label_alt=?,phonebook_bucket_alt=? WHERE _id=?
...
        at com.android.providers.contacts.ContactsDatabaseHelper.updateRawContactDisplayName(ContactsDatabaseHelper.java:5344)
        at com.android.providers.contacts.ContactsDatabaseHelper.upgradeToVersion504(ContactsDatabaseHelper.java:3580)
        at com.android.providers.contacts.ContactsDatabaseHelper.onUpgrade(ContactsDatabaseHelper.java:2261)
...
Clock fails somewhat similarly though it apparently didn't try to upgrade:
Process: com.android.deskclock
Flags: 0xc8be45
Package: com.android.deskclock v203 (2.0.3)
Build: samsung/apexqtmo/apexqtmo:4.1.2/JZO54K/T699UVBMC5:user/release-keys
android.database.sqlite.SQLiteException: no such column: incvol (code 1): , while compiling: SELECT _id, hour, minutes, daysofweek, alarmtime, enabled, vibrate, message, alert, incvol, profile FROM alarms WHERE (enabled=1)
...
        at com.android.deskclock.AlarmProvider.query(AlarmProvider.java:73)
        at android.content.ContentProvider.query(ContentProvider.java:744)
        at android.content.ContentProvider$Transport.query(ContentProvider.java:199)
        at android.content.ContentResolver.query(ContentResolver.java:414)
        at android.content.ContentResolver.query(ContentResolver.java:357)
        at com.android.deskclock.Alarms.getFilteredAlarmsCursor(Alarms.java:165)
        at com.android.deskclock.Alarms.calculateNextAlert(Alarms.java:344)
        at com.android.deskclock.Alarms.setNextAlert(Alarms.java:417)
        at com.android.deskclock.Alarms.saveSnoozeAlert(Alarms.java:510)
        at com.android.deskclock.AlarmInitReceiver$1.run(AlarmInitReceiver.java:49)
...
The media player fails with a NullPointerException:
Process: com.andrew.apollo:main
Flags: 0x98be65
Package: com.andrew.apollo v2 (1.1)
Build: samsung/apexqtmo/apexqtmo:4.1.2/JZO54K/T699UVBMC5:user/release-keys
java.lang.NullPointerException
        at com.andrew.apollo.MusicPlaybackService.stop(MusicPlaybackService.java:878)
        at com.andrew.apollo.MusicPlaybackService.openCurrentAndMaybeNext(MusicPlaybackService.java:1048)
        at com.andrew.apollo.MusicPlaybackService.openCurrentAndNext(MusicPlaybackService.java:1031)
        at com.andrew.apollo.MusicPlaybackService.access$1500(MusicPlaybackService.java:74)
        at com.andrew.apollo.MusicPlaybackService$MusicPlayerHandler.handleMessage(MusicPlaybackService.java:2337)
        at android.os.Handler.dispatchMessage(Handler.java:99)
        at android.os.Looper.loop(Looper.java:137)
        at android.os.HandlerThread.run(HandlerThread.java:61)
Fixing the problem Maybe I could have worked out how to upgrade the relevant databases myself, but I went for simpler solutions. The clock settings are easy to re-enter and most of the media player state is regenerated by scanning files on the SD card. So I just deleted those on the Relay:
  rm -rf /data/data/com.android.deskclock
  rm -rf /data/data/com.android.providers.media
The contacts were what I really cared about, and there are actually specific menu items in Contacts to export and import those (using VCF format), side-stepping the database upgrade. So I did:
  1. Insert SD card in Blade
  2. Open Contacts and export to VCF (I forget where this is in the menus but it was easy to find)
  3. Remove broken Contacts database on Relay:
    rm -rf /data/data/com.android.providers.contacts
  4. Insert SD card in Relay
  5. Move exported contacts to internal storage:
    mv /storage/sdcard1/*.vcf /storage/emulated/legacy
  6. Open People and tap the menu key, 'Import/export', 'Import from storage', then the filename
This may not include all data, and in particular it doesn't seem to include attached photos. But that was good enough for me.

1 December 2013

Marco d'Itri: Easily installing Debian on a Cubieboard

I recently bought a Cubieboard to replace my old Sheevaplug which has finally blown a power supply capacitor (this appears to be a common defect of Sheevaplugs), so I am publishing these instructions which show how to install Debian on sunxi systems (i.e. based on the Allwinner A10 SoC or one of its newer versions) with no need for cross compilers, emulators or ugly FAT partitions. This should work on any sunxi system as long as U-Boot is at least version 2012.10. The first step is to erase the beginning of SD card to remove anything in the unpartitioned space which may confuse U-Boot, partition and format it as desired. The first partition must begin at 1MB (1024*1024/512=2048 sectors) because the leading unpartitioned space is used by the boot loaders.
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mmcblk0 bs=1M count=1
parted /dev/mmcblk0
  mklabel msdos
  mkpart primary ext4 2048s 15G
  unit s
  print
  mkpart primary linux-swap ... -1
mkfs.ext4 -L root /dev/mmcblk0p1
mkswap --label swap /dev/mmcblk0p2
Download the boot loaders and an initial kernel and install them:
tar xf cubieboard_hwpack.tar.xz
dd if=bootloader/sunxi-spl.bin of=/dev/mmcblk0 bs=1024 seek=8
dd if=bootloader/u-boot.bin of=/dev/mmcblk0 bs=1024 seek=32
mount /dev/mmcblk0p1 /mnt
mkdir /mnt/boot/
cp kernel/script.bin kernel/uImage /mnt/boot/
script.bin is Allwinner's proprietary equivalent of the device tree: it will be needed until sunxi support will be fully merged in mainline kernels. U-Boot needs to be configured to load the kernel from the ext4 file system (join the lines at \\, this is not a supported syntax!):
cat << END > /mnt/boot/uEnv.txt
# kernel=uImage
root=/dev/mmcblk0p1 rootwait
boot_mmc=ext4load mmc 0:1 0x43000000 boot/script.bin && ext4load mmc 0:1 0x48000000 boot/$ kernel  \\
  && watchdog 0 && bootm 0x48000000
END
Now the system is bootable: add your own root file system or build one with debootstrap. My old Sheevaplug tutorial shows how to do this without a working ARM system or emulator (beware: the other parts are quite obsolete and should not be trusted blindly). If you have an old armel install around it will work as well, and you can easily cross-grade it to armhf as long as it is up to date to at least wheezy (the newer, the better). You can also just use busybox for a quick test:
mkdir /mnt/bin/
dpkg-deb -x .../busybox-static_1.21.0-1_armhf.deb .
cp bin/busybox /mnt/bin/
ln -s busybox /mnt/bin/sh
After booting the busybox root file system you can run busybox --install /bin/ to install links for all the supported commands. Until Debian kernels will support sunxi (do not hold your breath: there are still many parts which are not yet in mainline) I recommend to install one of Roman's kernels:
dpkg -i linux-image-3.4.67-r0-s-rm2+_3.4.67-r0-s-rm2+-10.00.Custom_armhf.deb
mkimage -A arm -O linux -T kernel -C none -a 40008000 -e 40008000 \
  -n uImage -d /boot/vmlinuz-3.4.67-r0-s-rm2+ /boot/uImage-3.4.67-r0-s-rm2+
It is not needed with these kernels for most setups, but an initramfs can be created with:
update-initramfs -c -k 3.4.67-r0-s-rm2+
mkimage -A arm -T ramdisk -C none -n uInitrd \
  -d /boot/initrd.img-3.4.67-r0-s-rm2+ /boot/uInitrd-3.4.67-r0-s-rm2+
/boot/uEnv.txt will have to be updated to load the initramfs. Since the Cubieboard lacks a factory-burned MAC address you should either configure one in script.bin or (much easier) add it to /etc/network/interfaces:
iface eth0 inet dhcp
        hwaddress ether xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx
To learn more about the Allwinner SoCs boot process you can consult 1 and 2.

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