Search Results: "reg"

2 October 2016

Gregor Herrmann: RC bugs 2016/38-39

the last two weeks have seen the migration of perl 5.24 into testing, most of the bugs I worked on were related to it. additionally a few more build dependencies on tzdata werde needed. here's the list:

Russell Coker: Hostile Web Sites

I was asked whether it would be safe to open a link in a spam message with wget. So here are some thoughts about wget security and web browser security in general. Wget Overview Some spam messages are designed to attack the recipient s computer. They can exploit bugs in the MUA, applications that may be launched to process attachments (EG MS Office), or a web browser. Wget is a very simple command-line program to download web pages, it doesn t attempt to interpret or display them. As with any network facing software there is a possibility of exploitable bugs in wget. It is theoretically possible for an attacker to have a web server that detects the client and has attacks for multiple HTTP clients including wget. In practice wget is a very simple program and simplicity makes security easier. A large portion of security flaws in web browsers are related to plugins such as flash, rendering the page for display on a GUI system, and javascript features that wget lacks. The Profit Motive An attacker that aims to compromise online banking accounts probably isn t going to bother developing or buying an exploit against wget. The number of potential victims is extremely low and the potential revenue benefit from improving attacks against other web browsers is going to be a lot larger than developing an attack on the small number of people who use wget. In fact the potential revenue increase of targeting the most common Linux web browsers (Iceweasel and Chromium) might still be lower than that of targeting Mac users. However if the attacker doesn t have a profit motive then this may not apply. There are people and organisations who have deliberately attacked sysadmins to gain access to servers (here is an article by Bruce Schneier about the attack on Hacking Team [1]). It is plausible that someone who is targeting a sysadmin could discover that they use wget and then launch a targeted attack against them. But such an attack won t look like regular spam. For more information about targeted attacks Brian Krebs article about CEO scams is worth reading [2]. Privilege Separation If you run wget in a regular Xterm in the same session you use for reading email etc then if there is an exploitable bug in wget then it can be used to access all of your secret data. But it is very easy to run wget from another account. You can run ssh otheraccount@localhost and then run the wget command so that it can t attack you. Don t run su otheraccount as it is possible for a compromised program to escape from that. I think that most Linux distributions have supported a switch user functionality in the X login system for a number of years. So you should be able to lock your session and then change to a session for another user to run potentially dangerous programs. It is also possible to use a separate PC for online banking and other high value operations. A 10yo PC is more than adequate for such tasks so you could just use an old PC that has been replaced for regular use for online banking etc. You could boot it from a CD or DVD if you are particularly paranoid about attack. Browser Features Google Chrome has a feature to not run plugins unless specifically permitted. This requires a couple of extra mouse actions when watching a TV program on the Internet but prevents random web sites from using Flash and Java which are two of the most common vectors of attack. Chrome also has a feature to check a web site against a Google black list before connecting. When I was running a medium size mail server I often had to determine whether URLs being sent out by customers were legitimate or spam, if a user sent out a URL that s on Google s blacklist I would lock their account without doing any further checks. Conclusion I think that even among Linux users (who tend to be more careful about security than users of other OSs) using a separate PC and booting from a CD/DVD will generally be regarded as too much effort. Running a full featured web browser like Google Chrome and updating it whenever a new version is released will avoid most problems. Using wget when you have to reason to be concerned is a possibility, but not only is it slightly inconvenient but it also often won t download the content that you want (EG in the case of HTML frames).

1 October 2016

Dirk Eddelbuettel: RcppAnnoy 0.0.8

An new version 0.0.8 of RcppAnnoy, our Rcpp-based R integration of the nifty Annoy library by Erik, is now on CRAN. Annoy is a small, fast, and lightweight C++ template header library for approximate nearest neighbours. This release pulls in a few suggested changes which had piled up since the last release. Changes in this version are summarized here:

Changes in version 0.0.8 (2016-10-01)
  • New functions getNNsByItemList and getNNsByVectorList, by Michael Phan-Ba in #12
  • Added destructor (PR #14 by Michael Phan-Ba)
  • Extended templatization (PR #11 by Dan Dillon)
  • Switched to run.sh for Travis (PR #17)
  • Added test for admissible value to addItem (PR #18 closing issue #13)

Courtesy of CRANberries, there is also a diffstat report for this release.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.

David Moreno: Thanks Debian

I sent this email to debian-private a few days ago, on the 10th anniversary of my Debian account creation:
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 19:37:20 +0200
From: David Moreno 
To: debian-private@lists.debian.org
Subject: Retiring from Debian
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12)
[-- PGP output follows (current time: Sun 23 Aug 2015 06:18:36 PM CEST) --]
gpg: Signature made Fri 14 Aug 2015 07:37:20 PM CEST using RSA key ID 4DADEC2F
gpg: Good signature from "David Moreno "
gpg:                 aka "David Moreno "
gpg:                 aka "David Moreno (1984-08-08) "
[-- End of PGP output --]
[-- The following data is signed --]
Hi,
Ten years ago today (2005-08-14) my account was created:
https://nm.debian.org/public/person/damog
Today, I don't feel like Debian represents me and neither do I represent the
project anymore.
I had tried over the last couple of years to retake my involvement but lack of
motivation and time always got on the way, so the right thing to do for me is
to officially retire and gtfo.
I certainly learned a bunch from dozens of Debian people over these many years,
and I'm nothing but grateful with all of them; I will for sure carry the project
close to my heart   as I carry it with the Debian swirl I still have tattooed
on my back ;)
http://damog.net/blog/2005/06/29/debian-tattoo/
I have three packages left that have not been updated in forever and you can
consider orphaned now: gcolor2, libperl6-say-perl and libxml-treepp-perl.
With all best wishes,
David Moreno.
http://damog.net/
[-- End of signed data --]
I received a couple of questions about my decision here. I basically don t feel like Debian represents my interests and neither do I represent the project this doesn t mean I don t believe in free software, to the contrary. I think some of the best software advancements we ve made as society are thanks to it. I don t necessarily believe on how the project has evolved itself, whether that has been the right way, to regain relevancy and dominance, and if it s remained primarily a way to feed dogmatism versus pragmatism. This is the perfect example of a tragic consequence. I was very happy to learn that the current Debian Conference being held in Germany got the highest attendance ever, hopefully that can be utilized in a significant and useful way. Regardless, my contributions to Debian were never noteworthy so it s also not that big of a deal. I just need to close cycles myself and move forward, and the ten year anniversary looked like a significant mark for that. Poke me in case you wanna discuss some more. I ll always be happy to. Specially over beer :) Peace.

Kees Cook: security things in Linux v4.6

Previously: v4.5. The v4.6 Linux kernel release included a bunch of stuff, with much more of it under the KSPP umbrella. seccomp support for parisc Helge Deller added seccomp support for parisc, which including plumbing support for PTRACE_GETREGSET to get the self-tests working. x86 32-bit mmap ASLR vs unlimited stack fixed Hector Marco-Gisbert removed a long-standing limitation to mmap ASLR on 32-bit x86, where setting an unlimited stack (e.g. ulimit -s unlimited ) would turn off mmap ASLR (which provided a way to bypass ASLR when executing setuid processes). Given that ASLR entropy can now be controlled directly (see the v4.5 post), and that the cases where this created an actual problem are very rare, means that if a system sees collisions between unlimited stack and mmap ASLR, they can just adjust the 32-bit ASLR entropy instead. x86 execute-only memory Dave Hansen added Protection Key support for future x86 CPUs and, as part of this, implemented support for execute only memory in user-space. On pkeys-supporting CPUs, using mmap(..., PROT_EXEC) (i.e. without PROT_READ) will mean that the memory can be executed but cannot be read (or written). This provides some mitigation against automated ROP gadget finding where an executable is read out of memory to find places that can be used to build a malicious execution path. Using this will require changing some linker behavior (to avoid putting data in executable areas), but seems to otherwise Just Work. I m looking forward to either emulated QEmu support or access to one of these fancy CPUs. CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA enabled by default on arm and arm64, and mandatory on x86 Ard Biesheuvel (arm64) and I (arm) made the poorly-named CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA enabled by default. This feature controls whether the kernel enforces proper memory protections on its own memory regions (code memory is executable and read-only, read-only data is actually read-only and non-executable, and writable data is non-executable). This protection is a fundamental security primitive for kernel self-protection, so making it on-by-default is required to start any kind of attack surface reduction within the kernel. On x86 CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA was already enabled by default, but, at Ingo Molnar s suggestion, I made it mandatory: CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA cannot be turned off on x86. I expect we ll get there with arm and arm64 too, but the protection is still somewhat new on these architectures, so it s reasonable to continue to leave an out for developers that find themselves tripping over it. arm64 KASLR text base offset Ard Biesheuvel reworked a ton of arm64 infrastructure to support kernel relocation and, building on that, Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization of the kernel text base offset (and module base offset). As with x86 text base KASLR, this is a probabilistic defense that raises the bar for kernel attacks where finding the KASLR offset must be added to the chain of exploits used for a successful attack. One big difference from x86 is that the entropy for the KASLR must come either from Device Tree (in the /chosen/kaslr-seed property) or from UEFI (via EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL), so if you re building arm64 devices, make sure you have a strong source of early-boot entropy that you can expose through your boot-firmware or boot-loader. zero-poison after free Laura Abbott reworked a bunch of the kernel memory management debugging code to add zeroing of freed memory, similar to PaX/Grsecurity s PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE feature. This feature means that memory is cleared at free, wiping any sensitive data so it doesn t have an opportunity to leak in various ways (e.g. accidentally uninitialized structures or padding), and that certain types of use-after-free flaws cannot be exploited since the memory has been wiped. To take things even a step further, the poisoning can be verified at allocation time to make sure that nothing wrote to it between free and allocation (called sanity checking ), which can catch another small subset of flaws. To understand the pieces of this, it s worth describing that the kernel s higher level allocator, the page allocator (e.g. __get_free_pages()) is used by the finer-grained slab allocator (e.g. kmem_cache_alloc(), kmalloc()). Poisoning is handled separately in both allocators. The zero-poisoning happens at the page allocator level. Since the slab allocators tend to do their own allocation/freeing, their poisoning happens separately (since on slab free nothing has been freed up to the page allocator). Only limited performance tuning has been done, so the penalty is rather high at the moment, at about 9% when doing a kernel build workload. Future work will include some exclusion of frequently-freed caches (similar to PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE), and making the options entirely CONFIG controlled (right now both CONFIGs are needed to build in the code, and a kernel command line is needed to activate it). Performing the sanity checking (mentioned above) adds another roughly 3% penalty. In the general case (and once the performance of the poisoning is improved), the security value of the sanity checking isn t worth the performance trade-off. Tests for the features can be found in lkdtm as READ_AFTER_FREE and READ_BUDDY_AFTER_FREE. If you re feeling especially paranoid and have enabled sanity-checking, WRITE_AFTER_FREE and WRITE_BUDDY_AFTER_FREE can test these as well. To perform zero-poisoning of page allocations and (currently non-zero) poisoning of slab allocations, build with:
CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY=y
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO=y
CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y
and enable the page allocator poisoning and slab allocator poisoning at boot with this on the kernel command line:
page_poison=on slub_debug=P
To add sanity-checking, change PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY=n, and add F to slub_debug as slub_debug=PF . read-only after init I added the infrastructure to support making certain kernel memory read-only after kernel initialization (inspired by a small part of PaX/Grsecurity s KERNEXEC functionality). The goal is to continue to reduce the attack surface within the kernel by making even more of the memory, especially function pointer tables, read-only (which depends on CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA above). Function pointer tables (and similar structures) are frequently targeted by attackers when redirecting execution. While many are already declared const in the kernel source code, making them read-only (and therefore unavailable to attackers) for their entire lifetime, there is a class of variables that get initialized during kernel (and module) start-up (i.e. written to during functions that are marked __init ) and then never (intentionally) written to again. Some examples are things like the VDSO, vector tables, arch-specific callbacks, etc. As it turns out, most architectures with kernel memory protection already delay making their data read-only until after __init (see mark_rodata_ro()), so it s trivial to declare a new data section ( .data..ro_after_init ) and add it to the existing read-only data section ( .rodata ). Kernel structures can be annotated with the new section (via the __ro_after_init macro), and they ll become read-only once boot has finished. The next step for attack surface reduction infrastructure will be to create a kernel memory region that is passively read-only, but can be made temporarily writable (by a single un-preemptable CPU), for storing sensitive structures that are written to only very rarely. Once this is done, much more of the kernel s attack surface can be made read-only for the majority of its lifetime. As people identify places where __ro_after_init can be used, we can grow the protection. A good place to start is to look through the PaX/Grsecurity patch to find uses of __read_only on variables that are only written to during __init functions. The rest are places that will need the temporarily-writable infrastructure (PaX/Grsecurity uses pax_open_kernel()/pax_close_kernel() for these). That s it for v4.6, next up will be v4.7!

2016, Kees Cook. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License.
Creative Commons License

30 September 2016

Chris Lamb: Free software activities in September 2016

Here is my monthly update covering what I have been doing in the free software world (previous month):
Reproducible builds

Whilst anyone can inspect the source code of free software for malicious flaws, most Linux distributions provide binary (or "compiled") packages to end users. The motivation behind the Reproducible Builds effort is to allow verification that no flaws have been introduced either maliciously and accidentally during this compilation process by promising identical binary packages are always generated from a given source. My work in the Reproducible Builds project was also covered in our weekly reports #71, #72, #71 & #74. I made the following improvements to our tools:

diffoscope

diffoscope is our "diff on steroids" that will not only recursively unpack archives but will transform binary formats into human-readable forms in order to compare them.

  • Added a global Progress object to track the status of the comparison process allowing for graphical and machine-readable status indicators. I also blogged about this feature in more detail.
  • Moved the global Config object to a more Pythonic "singleton" pattern and ensured that constraints are checked on every change.

disorderfs

disorderfs is our FUSE filesystem that deliberately introduces nondeterminism into the results of system calls such as readdir(3).

  • Display the "disordered" behaviour we intend to show on startup. (#837689)
  • Support relative paths in command-line parameters (previously only absolute paths were permitted).

strip-nondeterminism

strip-nondeterminism is our tool to remove specific information from a completed build.

  • Fix an issue where temporary files were being left on the filesystem and add a test to avoid similar issues in future. (#836670)
  • Print an error if the file to normalise does not exist. (#800159)
  • Testsuite improvements:
    • Set the timezone in tests to avoid a FTBFS and add a File::StripNondeterminism::init method to the API to to set tzset everywhere. (#837382)
    • "Smoke test" the strip-nondeterminism(1) and dh_strip_nondeterminism(1) scripts to prevent syntax regressions.
    • Add a testcase for .jar file ordering and normalisation.
    • Check the stripping process before comparing file attributes to make it less confusing on failure.
    • Move to a lookup table for descriptions of stat(1) indices and use that for nicer failure messages.
    • Don't uselessly test whether the inode number has changed.
  • Run perlcritic across the codebase and adopt some of its prescriptions including explicitly using oct(..) for integers with leading zeroes, avoiding mixing high and low-precedence booleans, ensuring subroutines end with a return statement, etc.

I also submitted 4 patches to fix specific reproducibility issues in golang-google-grpc, nostalgy, python-xlib & torque.


Debian https://lamby-www.s3.amazonaws.com/yadt/blog.Image/image/original/28.jpeg

Patches contributed

Debian LTS

This month I have been paid to work 12.75 hours on Debian Long Term Support (LTS). In that time I did the following:
  • "Frontdesk" duties, triaging CVEs, etc.
  • Issued DLA 608-1 for mailman fixing a CSRF vulnerability.
  • Issued DLA 611-1 for jsch correcting a path traversal vulnerability.
  • Issued DLA 620-1 for libphp-adodb patching a SQL injection vulnerability.
  • Issued DLA 631-1 for unadf correcting a buffer underflow issue.
  • Issued DLA 634-1 for dropbear fixing a buffer overflow when parsing ASN.1 keys.
  • Issued DLA 635-1 for dwarfutils working around an out-of-bounds read issue.
  • Issued DLA 638-1 for the SELinux policycoreutils, patching a sandbox escape issue.
  • Enhanced Brian May's find-work --unassigned switch to take an optional "except this user" argument.
  • Marked matrixssl and inspircd as being unsupported in the current LTS version.

Uploads
  • python-django 1:1.10.1-1 New upstream release and ensure that django-admin startproject foo creates files with the correct shebang under Python 3.
  • gunicorn:
    • 19.6.0-5 Don't call chown(2) if it would be a no-op to avoid failure under snap.
    • 19.6.0-6 Remove now-obsolete conffiles and logrotate scripts; they should have been removed in 19.6.0-3.
  • redis:
    • 3.2.3-2 Call ulimit -n 65536 by default from SysVinit scripts to normalise the behaviour with systemd. I also bumped the Debian package epoch as the "2:" prefix made it look like we are shipping version 2.x. I additionaly backported this upload to Debian Jessie.
    • 3.2.4-1 New upstream release, add missing -ldl for dladdr(3) & add missing dependency on lsb-base.
  • python-redis (2.10.5-2) Bump python-hiredis to Suggests to sync with Ubuntu and move to a machine-readable debian/copyright. I also backported this upload to Debian Jessie.
  • adminer (4.2.5-3) Move mysql-server dependencies to default-mysql-server. I also backported this upload to Debian Jessie.
  • gpsmanshp (1.2.3-5) on behalf of the QA team:
    • Move to "minimal" debhelper style, making the build reproducible. (#777446 & #792991)
    • Reorder linker command options to build with --as-needed (#729726) and add hardening flags.
    • Move to machine-readable copyright file, add missing #DEBHELPER# tokens to postinst and prerm scripts, tidy descriptions & other debian/control fields and other smaller changes.

I sponsored the upload of 5 packages from other developers:

I also NMU'd:



FTP Team

As a Debian FTP assistant I ACCEPTed 147 packages: alljoyn-services-1604, android-platform-external-doclava, android-platform-system-tools-aidl, aufs, bcolz, binwalk, bmusb, bruteforce-salted-openssl, cappuccino, captagent, chrome-gnome-shell, ciphersaber, cmark, colorfultabs, cppformat, dnsrecon, dogtag-pki, dxtool, e2guardian, flask-compress, fonts-mononoki, fwknop-gui, gajim-httpupload, glbinding, glewmx, gnome-2048, golang-github-googleapis-proto-client-go, google-android-installers, gsl, haskell-hmatrix-gsl, haskell-relational-query, haskell-relational-schemas, haskell-secret-sharing, hindsight, i8c, ip4r, java-string-similarity, khal, khronos-opencl-headers, liblivemedia, libshell-config-generate-perl, libshell-guess-perl, libstaroffice, libxml2, libzonemaster-perl, linux, linux-grsec-base, linux-signed, lua-sandbox, lua-torch-trepl, mbrola-br2, mbrola-br4, mbrola-de1, mbrola-de2, mbrola-de3, mbrola-ir1, mbrola-lt1, mbrola-lt2, mbrola-mx1, mimeo, mimerender, mongo-tools, mozilla-gnome-keyring, munin, node-grunt-cli, node-js-yaml, nova, open-build-service, openzwave, orafce, osmalchemy, pgespresso, pgextwlist, pgfincore, pgmemcache, pgpool2, pgsql-asn1oid, postbooks-schema, postgis, postgresql-debversion, postgresql-multicorn, postgresql-mysql-fdw, postgresql-unit, powerline-taskwarrior, prefix, pycares, pydl, pynliner, pytango, pytest-cookies, python-adal, python-applicationinsights, python-async-timeout, python-azure, python-azure-storage, python-blosc, python-can, python-canmatrix, python-chartkick, python-confluent-kafka, python-jellyfish, python-k8sclient, python-msrestazure, python-nss, python-pytest-benchmark, python-tenacity, python-tmdbsimple, python-typing, python-unidiff, python-xstatic-angular-schema-form, python-xstatic-tv4, quilt, r-bioc-phyloseq, r-cran-filehash, r-cran-png, r-cran-testit, r-cran-tikzdevice, rainbow-mode, repmgr, restart-emacs, restbed, ruby-azure-sdk, ruby-babel-source, ruby-babel-transpiler, ruby-diaspora-prosody-config, ruby-haikunator, ruby-license-finder, ruby-ms-rest, ruby-ms-rest-azure, ruby-rails-assets-autosize, ruby-rails-assets-blueimp-gallery, ruby-rails-assets-bootstrap, ruby-rails-assets-bootstrap-markdown, ruby-rails-assets-emojione, ruby-sprockets-es6, ruby-timeliness, rustc, skytools3, slony1-2, snmp-mibs-downloader, syslog-ng, test-kitchen, uctodata, usbguard, vagrant-azure, vagrant-mutate & vim.

29 September 2016

Dirk Eddelbuettel: gcbd 0.2.6

A pure maintenance release 0.2.6 of the gcbd package is now on CRAN. The gcbd proposes a benchmarking framework for LAPACK and BLAS operations (as the library can exchanged in a plug-and-play sense on suitable OSs) and records result in local database. Recent / upcoming changes to DBMI and RSQLite let me to update the package; there are no actual functionality changes in this release. CRANberries also provides a diffstat report for the latest release.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.

Dirk Eddelbuettel: RcppCNPy 0.2.6

A new version of the RcppCNPy package arrived on CRAN a few days ago. RcppCNPy provides R with read and write access to NumPy files thanks to the cnpy library by Carl Rogers. This new release reflects all the suggestions and comments I received during the review process for the Journal of Open Source Software submission. I am happy to say that about twenty-nine days after I submitted, the paper was accepted and is now published.
Changes in version 0.2.6 (2016-09-25)
  • Expanded documentation in README.md
  • Added examples to help page
  • Added CITATION file for JOSS paper
CRANberries also provides a diffstat report for the latest release. As always, feedback is welcome and the best place to start a discussion may be the GitHub issue tickets page.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.

28 September 2016

Kees Cook: security things in Linux v4.5

Previously: v4.4. Some things I found interesting in the Linux kernel v4.5: CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM The CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM setting that has existed for a long time already protects system RAM from being accessible through the /dev/mem device node to root in user-space. Dan Williams added CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM to extend this so that if a kernel driver has reserved a device memory region for use, it will become unavailable to /dev/mem also. The reservation in the kernel was to keep other kernel things from using the memory, so this is just common sense to make sure user-space can t stomp on it either. Everyone should have this enabled. (And if you have a system where you discover you need IO memory access from userspace, you can boot with iomem=relaxed to disable this at runtime.) If you re looking to create a very bright line between user-space having access to device memory, it s worth noting that if a device driver is a module, a malicious root user can just unload the module (freeing the kernel memory reservation), fiddle with the device memory, and then reload the driver module. So either just leave out /dev/mem entirely (not currently possible with upstream), build a monolithic kernel (no modules), or otherwise block (un)loading of modules (/proc/sys/kernel/modules_disabled). ptrace fsuid checking Jann Horn fixed some corner-cases in how ptrace access checks were handled on special files in /proc. For example, prior to this fix, if a setuid process temporarily dropped privileges to perform actions as a regular user, the ptrace checks would not notice the reduced privilege, possibly allowing a regular user to trick a privileged process into disclosing things out of /proc (ASLR offsets, restricted directories, etc) that they normally would be restricted from seeing. ASLR entropy sysctl Daniel Cashman standardized the way architectures declare their maximum user-space ASLR entropy (CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX) and then created a sysctl (/proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits) so that system owners could crank up entropy. For example, the default entropy on 32-bit ARM was 8 bits, but the maximum could be as much as 16. If your 64-bit kernel is built with CONFIG_COMPAT, there s a compat version of the sysctl as well, for controlling the ASLR entropy of 32-bit processes: /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits. Here s how to crank your entropy to the max, without regard to what architecture you re on:
for i in "" "compat_"; do f=/proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_$ i bits; n=$(cat $f); while echo $n > $f ; do n=$(( n + 1 )); done; done
strict sysctl writes Two years ago I added a sysctl for treating sysctl writes more like regular files (i.e. what s written first is what appears at the start), rather than like a ring-buffer (what s written last is what appears first). At the time it wasn t clear what might break if this was enabled, so a WARN was added to the kernel. Since only one such string showed up in searches over the last two years, the strict writing mode was made the default. The setting remains available as /proc/sys/kernel/sysctl_writes_strict. seccomp UM support Micka l Sala n added seccomp support (and selftests) for user-mode Linux. Moar architectures! seccomp NNP vs TSYNC fix Jann Horn noticed and fixed a problem where if a seccomp filter was already in place on a process (after being installed by a privileged process like systemd, a container launcher, etc) then the setting of the no new privs flag could be bypassed when adding filters with the SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC flag set. Bypassing NNP meant it might be possible to trick a buggy setuid program into doing things as root after a seccomp filter forced a privilege drop to fail (generally referred to as the sendmail setuid flaw ). With NNP set, a setuid program can t be run in the first place. That s it! Next I ll cover v4.6 Edit: Added notes about iomem=

2016, Kees Cook. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License.
Creative Commons License

Alessio Treglia: Emptiness and Form

Being_ParmenidesIn the perennial search of the meaning of life and the fundamental laws that govern nature, man was always faced for millennia with the mysterious concept of emptiness. What is emptiness? Does it really exist in nature? Is emptiness the non-being, as theorized by Parmenides?

Until the early years of the last century, technology had not yet been able to equip scientists with the necessary tools to investigate the innermost structure of matter, so the concept of emptiness was always faced with insights and metaphors that led, over the centuries, to a broad philosophical debate.

For the ancient atomist Greek philosophers, the existence of emptiness was not only possible but had become a necessity, becoming the ontological principle for the existence of being: for them, actually, the emptiness that permeates the atoms is what allows movement.

<Read More [by Fabio Marzocca]>

27 September 2016

Kees Cook: security things in Linux v4.4

Previously: v4.3. Continuing with interesting security things in the Linux kernel, here s v4.4. As before, if you think there s stuff I missed that should get some attention, please let me know. seccomp Checkpoint/Restore-In-Userspace Tycho Andersen added a way to extract and restore seccomp filters from running processes via PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER under CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. This is a continuation of his work (that I failed to mention in my prior post) from v4.3, which introduced a way to suspend and resume seccomp filters. As I mentioned at the time (and for which he continues to quote me) this feature gives me the creeps. :) x86 W^X detection Stephen Smalley noticed that there was still a range of kernel memory (just past the end of the kernel code itself) that was incorrectly marked writable and executable, defeating the point of CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA which seeks to eliminate these kinds of memory ranges. He corrected this in v4.3 and added CONFIG_DEBUG_WX in v4.4 which performs a scan of memory at boot time and yells loudly if unexpected memory protection are found. To nobody s delight, it was shortly discovered the UEFI leaves chunks of memory in this state too, which posed an ugly-to-solve problem (which Matt Fleming addressed in v4.6). x86_64 vsyscall CONFIG I introduced a way to control the mode of the x86_64 vsyscall with a build-time CONFIG selection, though the choice I really care about is CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE, to force the vsyscall memory region off by default. The vsyscall memory region was always mapped into process memory at a fixed location, and it originally posed a security risk as a ROP gadget execution target. The vsyscall emulation mode was added to mitigate the problem, but it still left fixed-position static memory content in all processes, which could still pose a security risk. The good news is that glibc since version 2.15 doesn t need vsyscall at all, so it can just be removed entirely. Any kernel built this way that discovered they needed to support a pre-2.15 glibc could still re-enable it at the kernel command line with vsyscall=emulate . That s it for v4.4. Tune in tomorrow for v4.5!

2016, Kees Cook. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License.
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26 September 2016

Kees Cook: security things in Linux v4.3

When I gave my State of the Kernel Self-Protection Project presentation at the 2016 Linux Security Summit, I included some slides covering some quick bullet points on things I found of interest in recent Linux kernel releases. Since there wasn t a lot of time to talk about them all, I figured I d make some short blog posts here about the stuff I was paying attention to, along with links to more information. This certainly isn t everything security-related or generally of interest, but they re the things I thought needed to be pointed out. If there s something security-related you think I should cover from v4.3, please mention it in the comments. I m sure I haven t caught everything. :) A note on timing and context: the momentum for starting the Kernel Self Protection Project got rolling well before it was officially announced on November 5th last year. To that end, I included stuff from v4.3 (which was developed in the months leading up to November) under the umbrella of the project, since the goals of KSPP aren t unique to the project nor must the goals be met by people that are explicitly participating in it. Additionally, not everything I think worth mentioning here technically falls under the kernel self-protection ideal anyway some things are just really interesting userspace-facing features. So, to that end, here are things I found interesting in v4.3: CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN Russell King implemented this feature for ARM which provides emulated segregation of user-space memory when running in kernel mode, by using the ARM Domain access control feature. This is similar to a combination of Privileged eXecute Never (PXN, in later ARMv7 CPUs) and Privileged Access Never (PAN, coming in future ARMv8.1 CPUs): the kernel cannot execute user-space memory, and cannot read/write user-space memory unless it was explicitly prepared to do so. This stops a huge set of common kernel exploitation methods, where either a malicious executable payload has been built in user-space memory and the kernel was redirected to run it, or where malicious data structures have been built in user-space memory and the kernel was tricked into dereferencing the memory, ultimately leading to a redirection of execution flow. This raises the bar for attackers since they can no longer trivially build code or structures in user-space where they control the memory layout, locations, etc. Instead, an attacker must find areas in kernel memory that are writable (and in the case of code, executable), where they can discover the location as well. For an attacker, there are vastly fewer places where this is possible in kernel memory as opposed to user-space memory. And as we continue to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, these opportunities will continue to shrink. While hardware support for this kind of segregation exists in s390 (natively separate memory spaces), ARM (PXN and PAN as mentioned above), and very recent x86 (SMEP since Ivy-Bridge, SMAP since Skylake), ARM is the first upstream architecture to provide this emulation for existing hardware. Everyone running ARMv7 CPUs with this kernel feature enabled suddenly gains the protection. Similar emulation protections (PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF) have been available in PaX/Grsecurity for a while, and I m delighted to see a form of this land in upstream finally. To test this kernel protection, the ACCESS_USERSPACE and EXEC_USERSPACE triggers for lkdtm have existed since Linux v3.13, when they were introduced in anticipation of the x86 SMEP and SMAP features. Ambient Capabilities Andy Lutomirski (with Christoph Lameter and Serge Hallyn) implemented a way for processes to pass capabilities across exec() in a sensible manner. Until Ambient Capabilities, any capabilities available to a process would only be passed to a child process if the new executable was correctly marked with filesystem capability bits. This turns out to be a real headache for anyone trying to build an even marginally complex least privilege execution environment. The case that Chrome OS ran into was having a network service daemon responsible for calling out to helper tools that would perform various networking operations. Keeping the daemon not running as root and retaining the needed capabilities in children required conflicting or crazy filesystem capabilities organized across all the binaries in the expected tree of privileged processes. (For example you may need to set filesystem capabilities on bash!) By being able to explicitly pass capabilities at runtime (instead of based on filesystem markings), this becomes much easier. For more details, the commit message is well-written, almost twice as long as than the code changes, and contains a test case. If that isn t enough, there is a self-test available in tools/testing/selftests/capabilities/ too. PowerPC and Tile support for seccomp filter Michael Ellerman added support for seccomp to PowerPC, and Chris Metcalf added support to Tile. As the seccomp maintainer, I get excited when an architecture adds support, so here we are with two. Also included were updates to the seccomp self-tests (in tools/testing/selftests/seccomp), to help make sure everything continues working correctly. That s it for v4.3. If I missed stuff you found interesting, please let me know! I m going to try to get more per-version posts out in time to catch up to v4.8, which appears to be tentatively scheduled for release this coming weekend.

2016, Kees Cook. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License.
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25 September 2016

Russ Allbery: podlators 4.08

A new release of the distribution that provides Pod::Man and Pod::Text for Perl documentation formatting. The impetus for this release is fixing a rendering bug in Pod::Man that spewed stray bits of half-escaped *roff into the man page for the text "TRUE (1)". This turned out to be due to two interlocking bugs in the dark magic regexes that try to fix up formatting to make man pages look a bit better: incorrect double-markup in both small caps and as a man page reference, and incorrect interpretation of the string "\s0(1)". Both are fixed in this release. podlators 4.00 changed Pod::Man to make piping POD through pod2man on standard input without providing the --name option an error, since there was no good choice for the man page title. This turned out to be too disruptive: the old behavior of tolerating this had been around for too long, and I got several bug reports. Since I think backward compatibility is extremely important for these tools, I've backed down from this change, and now Pod::Man and pod2man just silently use the man page name "STDIN" (which still fixes the original problem of being reproducible). It is, of course, still a good idea to provide the name option when dealing with standard input, since "STDIN" isn't a very good man page title. This release also adds new --lquote and --rquote options to pod2man to set the quote marks independently, and removes a test that relied on a POD construct that is going to become an error in Pod::Simple. You can get the latest release from the podlators distribution page.

24 September 2016

Dirk Eddelbuettel: tint 0.0.1: Tint Is Not Tufte

A new experimental package is now on the ghrr drat. It is named tint which stands for Tint Is Not Tufte. It provides an alternative for Tufte-style html presentation. I wrote a bit more on the package page and the README in the repo -- so go read this. Here is just a little teaser of what it looks like:
and the full underlying document is available too. For questions or comments use the issue tracker off the GitHub repo. The package may be short-lived as its functionality may end up inside the tufte package.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.

21 September 2016

Matthew Garrett: Microsoft aren't forcing Lenovo to block free operating systems

There's a story going round that Lenovo have signed an agreement with Microsoft that prevents installing free operating systems. This is sensationalist, untrue and distracts from a genuine problem.

The background is straightforward. Intel platforms allow the storage to be configured in two different ways - "standard" (normal AHCI on SATA systems, normal NVMe on NVMe systems) or "RAID". "RAID" mode is typically just changing the PCI IDs so that the normal drivers won't bind, ensuring that drivers that support the software RAID mode are used. Intel have not submitted any patches to Linux to support the "RAID" mode.

In this specific case, Lenovo's firmware defaults to "RAID" mode and doesn't allow you to change that. Since Linux has no support for the hardware when configured this way, you can't install Linux (distribution installers will boot, but won't find any storage device to install the OS to).

Why would Lenovo do this? I don't know for sure, but it's potentially related to something I've written about before - recent Intel hardware needs special setup for good power management. The storage driver that Microsoft ship doesn't do that setup. The Intel-provided driver does. "RAID" mode prevents the Microsoft driver from binding and forces the user to use the Intel driver, which means they get the correct power management configuration, battery life is better and the machine doesn't melt.

(Why not offer the option to disable it? A user who does would end up with a machine that doesn't boot, and if they managed to figure that out they'd have worse power management. That increases support costs. For a consumer device, why would you want to? The number of people buying these laptops to run anything other than Windows is miniscule)

Things are somewhat obfuscated due to a statement from a Lenovo rep:This system has a Signature Edition of Windows 10 Home installed. It is locked per our agreement with Microsoft. It's unclear what this is meant to mean. Microsoft could be insisting that Signature Edition systems ship in "RAID" mode in order to ensure that users get a good power management experience. Or it could be a misunderstanding regarding UEFI Secure Boot - Microsoft do require that Secure Boot be enabled on all Windows 10 systems, but (a) the user must be able to manage the key database and (b) there are several free operating systems that support UEFI Secure Boot and have appropriate signatures. Neither interpretation indicates that there's a deliberate attempt to prevent users from installing their choice of operating system.

The real problem here is that Intel do very little to ensure that free operating systems work well on their consumer hardware - we still have no information from Intel on how to configure systems to ensure good power management, we have no support for storage devices in "RAID" mode and we have no indication that this is going to get better in future. If Intel had provided that support, this issue would never have occurred. Rather than be angry at Lenovo, let's put pressure on Intel to provide support for their hardware.

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20 September 2016

Vincent Sanders: If I see an ending, I can work backward.

Now while I am sure Arthur Miller was referring to writing a play when he said those words they have an oddly appropriate resonance for my topic.

In the early nineties Lou Montulli applied the idea of magic cookies to HTTP to make the web stateful, I imagine he had no idea of the issues he was going to introduce for the future. Like most of the web technology it was a solution to an immediate problem which it has never been possible to subsequently improve.

Chocolate chip cookie are much tastier than HTTP cookiesThe HTTP cookie is simply a way for a website to identify a connecting browser session so that state can be kept between retrieving pages. Due to shortcomings in the design of cookies and implementation details in browsers this has lead to a selection of unwanted side effects. The specific issue that I am talking about here is the supercookie where the super prefix in this context has similar connotations as to when applied to the word villain.

Whenever the browser requests a resource (web page, image, etc.) the server may return a cookie along with the resource that your browser remembers. The cookie has a domain name associated with it and when your browser requests additional resources if the cookie domain matches the requested resources domain name the cookie is sent along with the request.

As an example the first time you visit a page on www.example.foo.invalid you might receive a cookie with the domain example.foo.invalid so next time you visit a page on www.example.foo.invalid your browser will send the cookie along. Indeed it will also send it along for any page on another.example.foo.invalid

A supercookies is simply one where instead of being limited to one sub-domain (example.foo.invalid) the cookie is set for a top level domain (foo.invalid) so visiting any such domain (I used the invalid name in my examples but one could substitute com or co.uk) your web browser gives out the cookie. Hackers would love to be able to set up such cookies and potentially control and hijack many sites at a time.

This problem was noted early on and browsers were not allowed to set cookie domains with fewer than two parts so example.invalid or example.com were allowed but invalid or com on their own were not. This works fine for top level domains like .com, .org and .mil but not for countries where the domain registrar had rules about second levels like the uk domain (uk domains must have a second level like .co.uk).

 NetSurf cookie manager showing a supercookieThere is no way to generate the correct set of top level domains with an algorithm so a database is required and is called the Public Suffix List (PSL). This database is a simple text formatted list with wildcard and inversion syntax and is at time of writing around 180Kb of text including comments which compresses down to 60Kb or so with deflate.

A few years ago with ICANN allowing the great expansion of top level domains the existing NetSurf supercookie handling was found to be wanting and I decided to implement a solution using the PSL. At this point in time the database was only 100Kb source or 40Kb compressed.

I started by looking at limited existing libraries. In fact only the regdom library was adequate but used 150Kb of heap to load the pre-processed list. This would have had the drawback of increasing NetSurf heap usage significantly (we still have users on 8Mb systems). Because of this and the need to run PHP script to generate the pre-processed input it was decided the library was not suitable.

Lacking other choices I came up with my own implementation which used a perl script to construct a tree of domains from the PSL in a static array with the label strings in a separate table. At the time my implementation added 70Kb of read only data which I thought reasonable and allowed for direct lookup of answers from the database.

This solution still required a pre-processing step to generate the C source code but perl is much more readily available, is a language already used by our tooling and we could always simply ship the generated file. As long as the generated file was updated at release time as we already do for our fallback SSL certificate root set this would be acceptable.

wireshark session shown NetSurf sending a co.uk supercookie to bbc.co.uk
I put the solution into NetSurf, was pleased no-one seemed to notice and moved on to other issues. Recently while fixing a completely unrelated issue in the display of session cookies in the management interface and I realised I had some test supercookies present in the display. After the initial "thats odd" I realised with horror there might be a deeper issue.

It quickly became evident the PSL generation was broken and had been for a long time, even worse somewhere along the line the "redundant" empty generated source file had been removed and the ancient fallback code path was all that had been used.

This issue had escalated somewhat from a trivial display problem. I took a moment to asses the situation a bit more broadly and came to the conclusion there were a number of interconnected causes, centered around the lack of automated testing, which could be solved by extracting the PSL handling into a "support" library.

NetSurf has several of these support libraries which could be used separately to the main browser project but are principally oriented towards it. These libraries are shipped and built in releases alongside the main browser codebase and mainly serve to make API more obvious and modular. In this case my main aim was to have the functionality segregated into a separate module which could be tested, updated and monitored directly by our CI system meaning the embarrassing failure I had found can never occur again.

Before creating my own library I did consider a library called libpsl had been created since I wrote my original implementation. Initially I was very interested in using this library given it managed a data representation within a mere 32Kb.

Unfortunately the library integrates a great deal of IDN and punycode handling which was not required in this use case. NetSurf already has to handle IDN and punycode translations and uses punycode encoded domain names internally only translating to unicode representations for display so duplicating this functionality using other libraries requires a great deal of resource above the raw data representation.

I put the library together based on the existing code generator Perl program and integrated the test set that comes along with the PSL. I was a little alarmed to discover that the PSL had almost doubled in size since the implementation was originally written and now the trivial test program of the library was weighing in at a hefty 120Kb.

This stemmed from two main causes:
  1. there were now many more domain label strings to be stored
  2. there now being many, many more nodes in the tree.
To address the first cause the length of the domain label strings was moved into the unused padding space within each tree node removing a byte from each domain label saving 6Kb. Next it occurred to me that while building the domain label string table that if the label to be added already existed as a substring within the table it could be elided.

The domain labels were sorted from longest to shortest and added in order searching for substring matches as the table was built this saved another 6Kb. I am sure there are ways to reduce this further I have missed (if you see them let me know!) but a 25% saving (47Kb to 35Kb) was a good start.

The second cause was a little harder to address. The structure representing nodes in the tree I started with was at first look reasonable.

struct pnode  
uint16_t label_index; /* index into string table of label */
uint16_t label_length; /* length of label */
uint16_t child_node_index; /* index of first child node */
uint16_t child_node_count; /* number of child nodes */
;

I examined the generated table and observed that the majority of nodes were leaf nodes (had no children) which makes sense given the type of data being represented. By allowing two types of node one for labels and a second for the child node information this would halve the node size in most cases and requiring only a modest change to the tree traversal code.

The only issue with this would be that a way to indicate a node has child information. It was realised that the domain labels can have a maximum length of 63 characters meaning their length can be represented in six bits so a uint16_t was excessive. The space was split into two uint8_t parts one for the length and one for a flag to indicate child data node followed.

union pnode  
struct
uint16_t index; /* index into string table of label */
uint8_t length; /* length of label */
uint8_t has_children; /* the next table entry is a child node */
label;
struct
uint16_t node_index; /* index of first child node */
uint16_t node_count; /* number of child nodes */
child;
;

static const union pnode pnodes[8580] =
/* root entry */
.label = 0, 0, 1 , .child = 2, 1553 ,
/* entries 2 to 1794 */
.label = 37, 2, 1 , .child = 1795, 6 ,

...

/* entries 8577 to 8578 */
.label = 31820, 6, 1 , .child = 8579, 1 ,
/* entry 8579 */
.label = 0, 1, 0 ,

;

This change reduced the node array size from 63Kb to 33Kb almost a 50% saving. I considered using bitfields to try and reduce the label length and has_children flag into a single byte but such packing will not reduce the length of a node below 32bits because it is unioned with the child structure.

A possibility of using the spare uint8_t derived by bitfield packing to store an additional label node in three other nodes was considered but added a great deal of complexity to node lookup and table construction for saving around 4Kb so was not incorporated.

With the changes incorporated the test program was a much more acceptable 75Kb reasonably close to the size of the compressed source but with the benefits of direct lookup. Integrating the libraries single API call into NetSurf was straightforward and resulted in correct operation when tested.

This episode just reminded me of the dangers of code that can fail silently. It exposed our users to a security problem that we thought had been addressed almost six years ago and squandered the limited resources of the project. Hopefully a lesson we will not have to learn again any time soon. If there is a positive to take away it is that the new implementation is more space efficient, automatically built and importantly tested

Gunnar Wolf: Proposing a GR to repeal the 2005 vote for declassification of the debian-private mailing list

For the non-Debian people among my readers: The following post presents bits of the decision-taking process in the Debian project. You might find it interesting, or terribly dull and boring :-) Proceed at your own risk. My reason for posting this entry is to get more people to read the accompanying options for my proposed General Resolution (GR), and have as full a ballot as possible. Almost three weeks ago, I sent a mail to the debian-vote mailing list. I'm quoting it here in full:
Some weeks ago, Nicolas Dandrimont proposed a GR for declassifying
debian-private[1]. In the course of the following discussion, he
accepted[2] Don Armstrong's amendment[3], which intended to clarify the
meaning and implementation regarding the work of our delegates and the
powers of the DPL, and recognizing the historical value that could lie
within said list.
[1] https://www.debian.org/vote/2016/vote_002
[2] https://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2016/07/msg00108.html
[3] https://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2016/07/msg00078.html
In the process of the discussion, several people objected to the
amended wording, particularly to the fact that "sufficient time and
opportunity" might not be sufficiently bound and defined.
I am, as some of its initial seconders, a strong believer in Nicolas'
original proposal; repealing a GR that was never implemented in the
slightest way basically means the Debian project should stop lying,
both to itself and to the whole free software community within which
it exists, about something that would be nice but is effectively not
implementable.
While Don's proposal is a good contribution, given that in the
aforementioned GR "Further Discussion" won 134 votes against 118, I
hereby propose the following General Resolution:
=== BEGIN GR TEXT ===
Title: Acknowledge that the debian-private list will remain private.
1. The 2005 General Resolution titled "Declassification of debian-private
   list archives" is repealed.
2. In keeping with paragraph 3 of the Debian Social Contract, Debian
   Developers are strongly encouraged to use the debian-private mailing
   list only for discussions that should not be disclosed.
=== END GR TEXT ===
Thanks for your consideration,
--
Gunnar Wolf
(with thanks to Nicolas for writing the entirety of the GR text ;-) )
Yesterday, I spoke with the Debian project secretary, who confirmed my proposal has reached enough Seconds (that is, we have reached five people wanting the vote to happen), so I could now formally do a call for votes. Thing is, there are two other proposals I feel are interesting, and should be part of the same ballot, and both address part of the reasons why the GR initially proposed by Nicolas didn't succeed: So, once more (and finally!), why am I posting this? I plan to do the formal call for votes by Friday 23.
[update] Kurt informed me that the discussion period started yesterday, when I received the 5th second. The minimum discussion period is two weeks, so I will be doing a call for votes at or after 2016-10-03.

18 September 2016

Gregor Herrmann: RC bugs 2016/37

we're not running out of (perl-related) RC bugs. here's my list for this week:

Norbert Preining: Fixing packages for broken Gtk3

As mentioned on sunweaver s blog Debian s GTK-3+ v3.21 breaks Debian MATE 1.14, Gtk3 is breaking apps all around. But not only Mate, probably many other apps are broken, too, in particular Nemo (the file manager of Cinnamon desktop) has redraw issues (bug 836908), and regular crashes (bug 835043). gtk-breakage I have prepared packages for mate-terminal and nemo built from the most recent git sources. The new mate-terminal now does not crash anymore on profile changes (bug 835188), and the nemo redraw issues are gone. Unfortunately, the other crashes of nemo are still there. The apt-gettable repository with sources and amd64 binaries are here:
deb http://www.preining.info/debian/ gtk3fixes main
deb-src http://www.preining.info/debian/ gtk3fixes main
and are signed with my usual GPG key. Last but not least, I quote from sunweaver s blog: Questions
  1. Isn t GTK-3+ a shared library? This one was rhetorical Yes, it is.
  2. One that breaks other application with every point release? Well, unfortunately, as experience over the past years has shown: Yes, this has happened several times, so far and it happened again.
  3. Why is it that GTK-3+ uploads appear in Debian without going through a proper transition? This question is not rhetorical. If someone has an answer, please enlighten me.
(end of quote) <rant>
My personal answer to this is: Gtk is strongly related to Gnome, Gnome is strongly related to SystemD, all this is pushed onto Debian users in the usual way of we don t care for breaking non-XXX apps (for XXX in Gnome, SystemD). It is very sad to see this recklessness taking more and more space all over Debian.
</rant> I finish with another quote from sunweaver s blog:
already scared of the 3.22 GTK+ release, luckily the last development release of the GTK+ 3-series

16 September 2016

Dirk Eddelbuettel: anytime 0.0.2: Added functionality

anytime arrived on CRAN via release 0.0.1 a good two days ago. anytime aims to convert anything in integer, numeric, character, factor, ordered, ... format to POSIXct (or Date) objects. This new release 0.0.2 adds two new functions to gather conversion formats -- and set new ones. It also fixed a minor build bug, and robustifies a conversion which was seen to be not quite right under some time zones. The NEWS file summarises the release:
Changes in Rcpp version 0.0.2 (2016-09-15)
  • Refactored to use a simple class wrapped around two vector with (string) formats and locales; this allow for adding formats; also adds accessor for formats (#4, closes #1 and #3).
  • New function addFormats() and getFormats().
  • Relaxed one tests which showed problems on some platforms.
  • Added as.POSIXlt() step to anydate() ensuring all POSIXlt components are set (#6 fixing #5).
Courtesy of CRANberries, there is a comparison to the previous release. More information is on the anytime page. For questions or comments use the issue tracker off the GitHub repo.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.

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