Search Results: "ag"

14 May 2008

Christian Perrier: [life] Why I love CGT

If you're a French person and were guessing what I have to do with the most famous French union, you've just been tricked. CGT stands for California Guitar Trio, a band of three virtuose guitar players. We attended their French gig yesterday night at 'Le New Morning', a famous jazz club in Paris. They came and played with Tony Levin who is, for the skilled music amateurs, one of the top world's bass player (*the* top for me). That was an amazing concert and great experience. Just try to imagine Pink Floyd's 'Echoes' played by 3 (electrified) acoustic guitar players, just after a 'Prelude and Fugue' by J.S. Bach, played cyclically (one note per player in round-robin order....a playing method invented by Robert Fripp and the League of Crafty Guitarists). That plus Bohemian Rhapsody, several pieces of their own and a stunning composition by Tony Levin where he proved that he *is* really a virtuose bass player..:-) I was just stunned, indeed....and, of course, also enjoyed a lot the presence in a very small club of Uncle Tony who I saw many times until now, but only in big arenas in all Peter Gabriel concerts I've attended since about 1980. CGT will play tonight (15th) on Milan, tomorrow in Roma, on 27th in Toronto, 31th in Rouyn-Noranda (Quebec) and a few times with friends during the Quebec Summer Festival. Then, they'll play in many places in California and all over USA. If you love eclectic music, just go listening to them. So, yes, CGT rocks!

Joey Hess: charter

So, Charter will be spying on every web page their customers view, and collating and using this information in a Big Brotherly fashion. But it's for advertising, so it's a good thing, right? Yeah, right. I signed up for fiber to the home from my local ISP today. $charter_customers--. Oddly, besides not being a privacy nightmare, my local ISP is cheaper too. Who'd have thought. Anyone using http://kitenet.net/wifi wireless or on the network here: You should assume Charter is spying on you for now. (BTES will install their connection on Monday.)

Wouter Verhelst: Long live the NMBS

When an emergency occurs in a critical piece of your infrastructure, problems are to be expected. I don't think anyone can argue with that. If you do have a piece of infrastructure so critical that the use of your services all over the country will be affected by it not being there anymore, you'll want to have emergency procedures in place; one of these procedures could be having a backup copy of your infrastructure standing by, allowing it to take over should the primary break down. If you have multiple instances of almost-but-not-quite the same thing, allowing another instance of said thing to take over your functioning should you break down might be a good idea, too. If the emergency that sparks the problem in the first place turns out to be "fire", it might be a good idea to investigate your infrastructure for fire safety; you wouldn't want the same thing to happen all over again in te near future on a different site. And if things go really bad, you will want to inform your users as much as humanly possible: in today's day and age, that would include posting something on your website, even if that's only reference to a phone number which people can call for more information. Welcome to the real world. Long live the NMBS... Not. Last year or so, some critical piece of infrastructure in the Brussels South trainstation burned down. As a result, trains were delayed and often cancelled for months afterwards. This clearly shows they did not have any emergency procedures in place; if they did, train services would have returned to normal after, at most, a few days. Granted, the piece of infrastructure that burned down last year was a power transfer station, which might be hard to replace, but still. Today, another fire burned down another piece of infrastructure; this time, it was the signalling station in Brussels North. The fire itself occurred around 16:30, and from 17:30 onwards, not a single train could enter or leave Brussels anymore. Right now, more than 7 hours later, it is still impossible to get from or to Brussels. Even here, in Mechelen, it seems impossible to get to Antwerp—the opposite site, but because almost all trains to Antwerp come from Brussels, well... And of course, the NMBS website mentions none of this. The only thing it mentions is the fact that there are "extra trains to the coast", because of the hot weather. As if anyone would be interested in taking the train right now... Huge companies. A PITA, that's what they are.

Erich Schubert: Consequences of the SSH/SSL weakness

Let me just point out, that the consequences affect all users of SSH. Therefore IMHO all other Linux and BSD distributions need to release a security update to OpenSSH as well, to prevent the use of insecure (too common) keys, because it threatens the security of their systems as well!Apparently, there are only about 2^15 different keys generated by the SSH versions shipped with Debian for 2 years. It's really surprising that noone noticed this earler. This is just about 32767 different keys. (For each type, size and endianess, but that still makes this number much much much too low) The weakness is caused by a bad random number generator in the Debian package.Hackers have already generated all these 32767 different keys, for two key lengths and types. In a few hours, they'll also have generated all the 4096 bit keys that could have been generated. Other key lengths are uncommon and sometimes might even be unsupported. Most people use keys with length 1024 or 2048.So we now have about 32767 keys which are used by lots of Debian and Ubuntu users. That's not very much. Now you have to realize how the keys are used:The key is used to log into a system without a password. Sometimes a key is protected with a passphrase (you really should do that), but this doesn't help here, because an unencrypted clone of the key was already generated.Sometimes (or let me even claim 'often') one such key is also used to login as root into a server. This is equivalent to just 32767 different passwords being used as root passwords. So with about this number of tries, an attacker might be able to log into your server as 'root'!Now the weakness is 'distributed' by the users, it's not just a server-side vulnerability. If your server is running e.g. RedHat, it doesn't mean it is secure!.In fact, if your server is running Debian and you installed the Debian security update for openssh, it will be much more secure than the RedHat server. Because the Debian server has a blacklist of keys that are too common. The other-Linux server who doesn't have this blacklist doesn't know that a certain 'weak' key is not trustworthy.Fixing the bad key-generation is just half of the deal. "Recalling" all the keys in use out there is the big challenge, that affects all systems using SSH (and to a different extend, SSL). The most reliable way is if all other distributions would release a security update as well, which refuses to accept the keys that were generated by vulnerable Debian systems.Let me just repeat it in other words: Any Linux/Unix/*BSD system is vulnerable that grants access to a key that was generated on an affected Debian or Ubuntu system. (Until the system has a reliable detection method of such weak keys.) Keys are usually generated on the users workstation, so if any of your users is or was potentially running Debian or Ubuntu ... you get the idea.Note that if you are not careful, you might lock yourself out from your server. If you don't have or remember the password, installing the security update might disable your login key. So if your key is bad, make sure to generate a new, secure key and distribute it ASAP. Also remove any vulnerable key ASAP; remember that hackers now have a list of all possible keys and could use that to brute-force login.P.S. Since some people still don't seem to get the consequences in full: The bigger problem is to remove are the weak keys, not to fix the broken library. The weak keys (especially in the form of public keys!) can live on tons of other systems, not just on Debian and Ubuntu. This is why TOR also released a security update and e.g. CACert urges non-Debian distributors to also ship and use the blacklists of known weak keys. Also note that not all keys that can be considered compromised can be detected this easily. If you've been using a DSA key on an affected system - even when it was created on a different system - it is to be considered compromised.

Michal Čihař: Everything bad is good for something

After recent not so funny thing with OpenSSL in Debian, I realized that I will have to regenerate most of keys and certificates, because last big changes I did in networking/vpn/ssh setup which involved generating keys are not older than broken OpenSSL appeared in archives. First obvious thing was SSH keys and cleanup of ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all hosts. While doing that, I realized that I still have there several keys, which are more or less gone (not that I'd lost them, but I simply stopped to use them). So it was good opportunity to do cleanup here. While I was at these changes, cleaning up ~/.ssh/known_hosts was also good idea, because I still had there lot of hosts I collected during some of my previous jobs and I definitely won't (and can not) access these machines anymore. So good, big cleanup in SSH configuration was forced :-). Next and harder step was to found out where else I use certificates generated by vulnerable OpenSSL. Server certificates for sure were also generated by OpenSSL, so let's regenerate web and email certificates and hope I did not miss anything. All this happened yesterday, but today I realized that I missed other even more important thing - OpenVPN certificates. While regenerating certificates, I also found some machine keys which are not really used anymore, so I again could drop some of them. So that was task for this evening and now I'm hopefully really done with this issue and I really hope that this won't happen again in near future, I don't need to cleanup that often ;-).

MJ Ray: Strategy on Strategies

[SNR Event Welcome Slide]
Anyone seen this before? Today, I went to an event about the Sub-National Review Consultation (as a substitute for someone else AIUI). I'd not heard about this before, but if you're in England and you've any interest in our regional planning system (which I think you should, if you have your main home here or run a business here), you have six weeks left to comment on the UK Government's suggested changes. As I understand it, it will move the second-highest tier of planning control from democratically-accountable regional bodies to the business-led Regional Development Agencies, with some oversight by MPs and the very- indirectly-accountable council leaders. I've posted more detail on Co-opNet. When I asked about local involvement and cooperatives, I was directed towards Local Strategic Partnerships, but I'm pessimistic about how easy it will be to influence regional planning through those: a few weeks ago, I was at the launch of the North Somerset Partnership Sustainable Community Strategy for 2008-2026. It's a 72-page A4 glossy book which I've still not found time to read properly. I think the size says something about its sustainability. I've posted a little more detail on WsMForum. I'll try to answer questions about either of them on this blog or those forums...

Mike Hommey: Irony

How do you see this message in python2.5 changelog:
* Add README.db4 describing the db4.6 -> db4.5 change (Steve Greenland). Closes: #469770.
when apt-listchanges has been broken by the db4.6 -> db4.5 change ?

Wouter Verhelst: Referer logs

I did this three years ago, too. I guess now's the time to go again: I just went through my referer logs—specifically, keywords people entered in search engines right before they ended up on my site—, and will try to answer those questions people seem to have when they end up on my site. Here goes: Moving further down, it's fascinating to see what people were looking for when they ended up on my site. Some of the below, I have absolutely no clue what happened...: I guess blogging about technical things for several years has made me "interesting" enough for some people. Grin.

Nico Golde: nitrogen uploaded to Debian

nitrogen
I usually don't blog about uploads to the Debian archive but since I don't know any similar software in Debian I do in this case.
nitrogen is a wallpaper selection and setting tool with both a graphical (with image preview) and text based frontend to set wallpapers and restore them later.
That's nothing special, there are some tools doing that.
But nitrogen also provides great multihead and xinerama support and is the only tool in the archive I know that is able to set different wallpapers to different monitors!

From the description:
nitrogen is a graphical wallpaper utility that can be used in two
modes, browser and recall.
Some of the things to look for in nitrogen are:
.
- Multihead and Xinerama support (setting different wallpapers for each monitor)
- Recall mode to restore wallpapers via startup script
- Uses freedesktop.org standard for thumbnails
- Can set GNOME background
- Command line set modes for script usage
- Inotify monitoring of browsed directories
Check it out

Julien Blache: Of course it s far worse. Did I tell otherwise?

Dear Daniel, It looks like you are referring to my post, though you got my name wrong so that wasn’t immediately obvious. Of course this is far worse than the 2003 compromise in terms of the direct, known and quantifiable impact it has on our users. I don’t think I stated otherwise, so I hardly see why your post starts with “I disagree”.

Steve Kemp: I still don't know why I'm here

I wasn't going to comment on the recent openssl security update, because too many people have already done so. Personally I thought that Aigars Mahinovs made the best writeup I've seen so far. However I would like to say that having 20+ people all mailing security[at]debian.org to say the webpage we referenced in the security advisory is currently blank is not useful, or ask for details already released in the advisory they replied to, or ask for even more details is not so much fun. Having people immediately start mailing questions like "Huh? What can I do" is only natural, but you can't expect a response when things are as hectic as they have been recently. Ideally people would sit on their hands and bite their tongues. Realistically that isn't going to happen, and realistically this post will make no difference either... Had the issue not leaked to unstable so quickly (and inappropriately IMHO) then we'd have had a little more time. But once an issue is reported you need to coordinate with other distributions, and etc. Handling something as severe as this is not fun, and random mails from users are a distraction, and a resource-hog. I should say I was not in any way involved in the discovery, the reporting, the preparation of the fix(es), or the releasing of the update. I knew it was coming, but everybody else seemed to have it well in hand. When there are mails going back and forth for 5+ days with ever-growing Cc: lists, and mailing lists being involved I figure one more cook wouldn't be useful. So in conclusion:
a. Bad hole. b. Fixing this will take years, probably. c. 50+ mails to the security team within an hour of the advisory going public complaining of missing information is not helpful, not useful, and quite irritating. (Albeit understandable). d. People who don't know the details of an attack, or issue, shouldn't speculate and start panic, fear, and confusion. Esp. when details are a little vague. e. I still like pies.
Once again thanks to everybody who was involved and put in an insane amount of work. Yes this is only the start - our users have to suffer the pain of regenerating everything - but we did good. Really. Debian did good. It might not look like it right now, but it could have been so much worse, and Debian did do good. ObQuote: X-Men: The Last Stand

Zak B. Elep: Where's the Open?

Ok, so it seems that the whirlwind on OpenSSL has settled down a bit. Posts about it are coming from everywhere, ranging from rants on package maintenance to blame-pointing on both upstream and packager sides. And, of course, Slashdot. Where does all this leave the end user with? Well, probably not much except to regenerate weak SSH keys with the new openssh-server (now enhanced with openssh-blacklist, see the new advisory) and hope to $DEITY all gets well soon. And maybe, just maybe, a minor suspicion that other Debian-packaged software may be "tainted" with a similar blemish (that being having patches that are supposed to fix something, applied with upstream's blessing, and yet not really audited enough to ensure functionality AND security of the system is maintained.) Obviously, there's going to be some adjustments to be made on the Debian side. But I do hope to $DEITY that major revamps ought to happen on the OpenSSL side as well, in particular on clarifying their public channels to reaching upstream developers (read: publish openssl-team@openssl.org in a legitimate way, being the legitimate upstream contact endpoint it is,) and keeping a closer eye on the vendors who package their software (yeah, it may not be an obligation at all for OpenSSL, but heck, their vendors are users, too!) Upstream may be free not to partake on a social contract like Debian's, but it shouldn't escape from them the fact that vendors nevertheless aggregate continuing and potential users (aside from being users themselves) for their benefit. More importantly though, is that delivering FOSS is a community effort. Sure, its easy to put blame now, but in the end, the blame isn't as important as the real cause and effects of the problem/bug/issue are. Better to move on and work together towards a real fix, rather than the bickering that currently passes as FOSS entertainment.

John Goerzen: Thoughtfulness on the OpenSSL bug

By now, I'm sure you all have read about the OpenSSL bug discovered in Debian.

There's a lot being written about it. There's a lot of misinformation floating about, too. First thing to do is read this post, which should clear up some of that.

Now then, I'd like to think a little about a few things people have been saying.

People shouldn't try to fix bugs they don't understand.

At first, that sounds like a fine guideline. But when I thought about it a bit, I think it's actually more along the lines of useless.

First of all, there is this problem: how do you know whether or not you understand it? Obviously, sometimes you know you don't understand code well. But there are times when you think you do, but don't. Especially when we're talking about C and its associated manual memory management and manual error handling. I'd say that, for a C program of any given size, very few people really understand it. Especially since you may be dealing with functions that call other functions 5 deep, and one of those functions modifies what you thought was an input-only parameter in certain rare cases. Maybe it's documented to do that, maybe not, but of course documentation cannot always be trusted either.

I'd say it's more useful to say that people should get peer review of code whenever possible. Which, by the way, did occur here.

The Debian maintainer of this package is an idiot, should be fired, should be banned

I happen to know that the Debian programmer that made this patch is a very sharp individual. I have worked with him on several occasions and I would say that kicking him out of maintaining OpenSSL would be a quite stupid thing to do.

He is, like the rest of us, human. We might find that other people are considerably less perfect than he.

Nobody that isn't running Debian or Ubuntu has any need to worry. This is all Debian's fault.

I guess you missed the part of the advisory that mentioned that it also fixed an OpenSSL upstream bug (that *everyone* is vulnerable to) that permitted arbitrary code execution in a certain little-used protocol? OpenSSL has a history of security bugs over the years.

Of course, the big keygen bug is a Debian-specific thing.

Debian should send patches upstream

This is general practice in Debian. It happens so often, in fact, that the Debian bug-tracking system has had -- for probably more than a decade -- a feature that lets a Debian developer record that a bug reported to Debian has been forwarded to an upstream developer or bug-tracking system.

It is routine to send both bug reports and patches upstream. Some Debian developers are more closely aligned with upstream than others. In some cases, Debian developers are part of the upstream team. In others, upstream may be friendly and responsive enough that Debian developers run any potential patches to upstream code by them before committing them to Debian. (I tend to do this for Bacula). In some cases, upstream is busy and doesn't respond fast or reliably or helpfully enough to permit Debian to make security updates or other important fixes in a timely manner. And sometimes, upstream is plain AWOL.

Of course, it benefits Debian developers to send patches upstream, because then they have a smaller diff to maintain when each new version comes out.

In this particular case, communication with upstream happened, but the end result just fell through the cracks.

Debian shouldn't patch security-related stuff itself, ever

Well, that's not a very realistic viewpoint. Every Linux distribution does this, for several reasons. First, a given stable release of a distribution may be older than the current state of the art upstream software, and some upstreams are not interested in patching old versions, while the new upstream versions introduce changes too significant to go into a security update. Secondly, some upstreams do not respond in a timely manner, and Debian wants to protect its users ASAP. Finally, some upstreams are simply bad at security, and having smart folks from Debian -- and other distributions -- write security patches is a benefit to the community.

13 May 2008

Aigars Mahinovs: Too similar to be different

Eric, I cann’t claim to 100% understand the situation but after glancing trough the logs of the discussions and of the patches the conclusion I came to was this - OpenSSL used supposed randomness of the uninitialized memory as an added source of entropy (interesting hack, but not an example of good coding as such). Valgring caught that problem and the Debian maintainer during a cleanup fixed it. Making such a fix can be considered a preventive step against possible attack vectors by poisoning the uninitialized memory. He took it up to upstream, they did not raise red flags, but did not quite merge the ‘clean up’ patch either. It fell through the cracks. The problem is that in the same file, in another function all other sources of entropy were being merged into the pool of randomness using exactly the same code line as the one code line flagged by Valgrind. The maintainer assumed that the second code line has a similar function to the first and commented that one as well. AFAIK that also did not show up in the emails to the upstream list. So we have: I am impressed by the swift action of the people involved in fixing this. And while I think everyone can find some lesson be learned here, I think this is another good example of free software in action. And I hope that in the aftermath of this we will find ways to prevent this from happening in the future without stifling our progress.

Kapil Paranjape: Adding comments to the blog

The configuration of this blog has been explained earlier. There was one thing still missing from this blog --- comments.The comments plugin that comes in the contrib tarball from the pyblosxom web site is well-documented and easy enough to install. One modification I made is to remove all the javascript stuff since I don't understand the latter.After all this one still needs some sort of authentication to prevent complete rubbish from cluttering the comments section. The natural candidate was openid which is supported by a plugin from snarfed.org.This seemed easy enough to configure except that there is no version of these libraries in Debian "etch" (which is what people.imsc.res.in runs). So I downloaded the latest 2.x.x version of these libraries. Since I rarely install my own python libraries, it took me a while to figure out that I need to run
python setup.py install --home $HOME
in order to install it in my home directory. This also needed the codebase variable to be set in config.py.Unfortunately, this still did not work. The plugin comments_openid.py actually uses the API from the older 2.0.x version of the python-openid libraries.Some error messages from our web server led me onto a completely different track and I thought that the rewrite rules from the .htaccess file were in error. This was a McGuffin and I had to revert to the comment-free version in order to clean-up the mess. Thank goodness for git!The plugin currently works with the 2.0.x version of the libraries which may be mildly worse than the 2.1.x version.Some other things which are not working are e-mail/rdf notification of comments. I don't know if I will bother to fix that.

Russell Coker: Smoke from the PSU

Yesterday I received two new machines from DOLA on-line auctions [1]. I decided to use the first to replace the hardware for my SE Linux Play Machine [2]. The previous machine I had used for that purpose was a white-box 1.1GHz Celeron and I replaced it with an 800MHz Pentium3 system (which uses only 35W when slightly active and only 28W when the hard disk spins down [3]). The next step was to get the machine in question ready for it’s next purpose, I was planning to give it to a friend of a friend. A machine of those specs which was made by Compaq would be very useful to me, but when it’s a white-box I’ll just give it away. So I installed new RAM and a new hard drive in it (both of which had been used in another machine a few hours earlier and seemed to be OK) and turned it on. Nothing happened, I was just checking that it was plugged in correctly when I noticed smoke coming from the PSU… It seems strange that the machine in question had run 24*7 for about 6 months and then suddenly started smoking after being moved to a different room and being turned off overnight. It is possible that the hard drive was broken and shorted out the PSU (the power cables going to the hard drive are thick enough that it could damage the PSU if it had a short-circuit). What I might do in the future is keep an old and otherwise useless machine on hand for testing hard drives so that if something like that happens then it won’t destroy a machine that is useful. Another possibility is that the dust in the PSU contained some metal fragments and that moving the machine to another room caused them to short something out, but there’s not much I can do with that when I get old machines. I might put an air filter in each room that I use for running computers 24*7 to stop such problems getting worse in future though. I recently watched the TED lecture “5 dangerous things you should let your kids do” [4], so I’m going to offer the broken machine to some of my neighbors if they want to let their children take it apart.

Erich Schubert: The Debian OpenSSL disaster

I've read some more about this and especially had a look at some of the source code, so I've completely revised this blog post.There is no doubt that the Debian Maintainer who added this patch screwed up, seriously. But he's not the only one to blame: I'm really sick of hearing comments like "Still, whoever took out the entire initialization should not be trusted with security intensive code." (guest comment on LWN). Yes, he screwed up there. But you bet he's going to be a lot more careful with any change in the future: he has learned his lesson. Better than having someone else screw up in a similar way again. And actually he didn't do this change half as easy-hearted as many people suggest, if you look at the discussions on the bug report and mailing lists. He was trying to fix the valgrind bug, and he talked to several people on how to do it properly.The best way the bug could have been avoided was if the OpenSSL upstream developers had cared more about the valgrind issue themselves. (E.g. by teaching valgrind to ignore the issue, documenting in the source code why this is intentional and not an issue, ...)P.S. in the previous version of this blog post I had asked why OpenSSL apparently relies on uninitialized data for security. It doesn't; the same lines exist in two places, and it's the other change that caused the problems. One place will 'usually' generate the warning, and it's not important (that's the place where you could just remove the line). The other place will generate the same warning when someone passes uninitialized data into the RNG. As long as the RNG is sufficiently seeded with other random data that isn't much of a problem. So if you take a buffer of 1024 bytes and fill it with 1000 bytes of good random data (e.g. from a hardware randomness source) and feed the whole buffer to the RNG, it will be seeded quite well, but the warning will be generated. The 24 uninitizialized bytes won't take the entropy away.(This blog does intentionally not have a comment function. Sorry.)

Matthew Garrett

As noted in the comments here, one reason to forcibly slow down the CPU on a system (and waste power in the long run) is to deal with cases where failing to do so can result in the machine overheating. Part of the problem is that Linux still tends to be less power efficient than Windows, and so various components will be generating more heat than when the machine was tested. The ACPI spec includes support for passive cooling of processors, which allows the system to reduce heat generation by slowing the CPU down. The problem is that not all vendors include a passive trip point in their firmware, and in the absence of one Linux will happily let the temperature rise until it hits a critical level and the machine shuts down.

I've written a patch that generates a passive cooling trip point if your firmware doesn't provide one. Since there won't be a firmware event when the temperature crosses the trip point, it also forcibly enables polling (the spec actually requires this, so I've no idea why Linux doesn't do it anyway). The default polling interval is quite long - you can adjust it in /proc/acpi/thermal_zone/*/polling by just echoing in a value in seconds. I've gone for a long delay in order to reduce any possible power consumption issues caused by this, but in the long run I'd like it to reduce the polling interval if the temperature trend is upwards and increase it again if the trend is downwards.

The patch makes the assumption that you're never going to get within 5 degrees of the critical temperature in normal use, which I think is pretty reasonable. The probability that the machine will reach equilibrium at that point is fairly small, so if you get that close you'll almost certainly end up with a powered down machine unless we do something about it (like forcibly downclocking your CPU). I don't have any affected machines, so I've only been able to test it by artificially lowering the trip point - if people find that it still lets the processor get over temperature without attempting to slow it down first, then I'll probably need to implement the more advanced polling policy.

In any case, I'm interested in feedback.

Daniel Leidert: [DSA 1571-1] New openssl packages fix predictable random number generator

Ok, shit sometimes also happens to Debian users. Now I read a lot of FUD, flames, arrogant claims and much more bad things, including blaming of downstream in general. Well, Debian maintainers are NOT upstream authors. Maintainers often care about a lot more than just 1 package. Now I wonder if one can really expect, that maintainers know the source code of their packages as good as upstream authors do? Is this, what the user or the Debian project expects from a package maintainer? I agree, that this would be the ideal situation. But how realistic is it, if one maintains 10, 20 or more packages? Normally users report us issues. We take a look at the source, try to catch the issue, track it down and fix it. And IMHO in almost all cases this is enough and it lets us handle several packages. And maybe this is also, what happened here. The maintainer got a report, tracked it down and tried to fix it. It seems, he posted it to the openssl-dev list, which is to my reading considered for such questions, and got a positive response. And with fixing it, he made a horrible mistake. But apparently it also seems, that the question had been discussed earlier more than just once (I wish, the OpenSSL guys would have created the FAQ entry earlier). I don’t want to blame the maintainer for doing this mistake. We are humans. But do we need another instance, that (periodically) checks (probably only Debian-specific) patches/changes to security relevent software or do we need different requirements for maintainers of such software [1] or should we simply archive this under “Shit sometimes happens … even to Debian users”? [1] Consider gnupg which is currently almost unmaintained. It also has Debian specific patches applied and I wonder, which skills the new maintainer should or must(?) have (IIRC this question was raised in the linked threads too)?

Craig Sanders: Howard s Child Protection Babies

See this article, Baby boom link to rise in child-welfare cases at The Age web site. What a great legacy for John Howard - his “baby bonus”, a grubby and cynical vote-buying exercise for the 2004 Federal Election has resulted in a mini- baby-boom. It has also resulted in a more than 66% increase in interventions by the Child Protection Agency (from 600 in 2000-2001 to over 1000 last financial year). And that’s just from the first few batches of baby-bonus babies. Perhaps the people who think a $3000 “bonus” (as introduced in 2004, now increased to $5000) is a good reason to have a baby are precisely the kind of people who shouldn’t be having babies. “Cool, $5000 if i have a baby”. or worse, “Cool, $5000 if i make my girlfriend have a baby”. Great reasons to have a baby. Thank you, Mr Howard. At least we now all know the answer to the question “How many abused and neglected babies is a vote worth”? Syndicated from Craig Sanders' Errata: Tech Notes and Miscellaneous Thoughts Howard’s Child Protection Babies

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