struct foo  
    unsigned long flags;
    u32 length;
    u32 data[1];
 ;
void foo_init(int count)
 
    struct foo *instance;
    size_t bytes = sizeof(*instance) + sizeof(u32) * (count - 1);
    ...
    instance = kmalloc(bytes, GFP_KERNEL);
    ...
 ;

-    u32 data[1];
+    u32 data[];

$ KBF="KBUILD_BUILD_TIMESTAMP=1970-01-01 KBUILD_BUILD_USER=user KBUILD_BUILD_HOST=host KBUILD_BUILD_VERSION=1"
$ OUT=gcc
$ make $KBF O=$OUT allmodconfig
$ ./scripts/config --file $OUT/.config \
        -d GCOV_KERNEL -d KCOV -d GCC_PLUGINS -d IKHEADERS -d KASAN -d UBSAN \
        -d DEBUG_INFO_NONE -e DEBUG_INFO_DWARF_TOOLCHAIN_DEFAULT
$ make $KBF O=$OUT olddefconfig

$ make -jN $KBF O=$OUT drivers/scsi/megaraid/
$ mkdir -p $OUT/before
$ cp $OUT/drivers/scsi/megaraid/*.o $OUT/before/

$ vi the/source/code.c
$ make -jN $KBF O=$OUT drivers/scsi/megaraid/
$ mkdir -p $OUT/after
$ cp $OUT/drivers/scsi/megaraid/*.o $OUT/after/

$ diffoscope $OUT/before/ $OUT/after/

$ ARGS="--disassemble --demangle --reloc --no-show-raw-insn --section=.text"
$ for i in $(cd $OUT/before && echo *.o); do
        echo $i
        diff -u <(objdump $ARGS $OUT/before/$i   sed "0,/^Disassembly/d") \
                <(objdump $ARGS $OUT/after/$i    sed "0,/^Disassembly/d")
done

-    c120:      movq   $0x0,0x800(%rbx)
+    c120:      movq   $0x0,0x7f8(%rbx)

$ vi <(objdump --line-numbers $ARGS $OUT/after/megaraid_sas_fp.o)

$ vi drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fp.c +329

-    size_t bytes = sizeof(*instance) + sizeof(u32) * (count - 1);
+    size_t bytes = sizeof(*instance) + sizeof(u32) * count;

-    size_t bytes = sizeof(*instance) + sizeof(u32) * (count - 1);
+    size_t bytes = struct_size(instance, data, count);

2022, Kees Cook. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 License.

• Abhijith PA did 14.0h (out of 14h assigned).
• Andreas R nnquist did 14.5h (out of 25.0h assigned), thus carrying over 10.5h to June.
• Anton Gladky did 19h (out of 19h assigned).
• Ben Hutchings did 8h (out of 11h assigned and 13h from April), thus carrying over 16h to June.
• Chris Lamb did 18h (out of 18h assigned).
• Dominik George did 2h (out of 20.0h assigned), thus carrying over 18h to June.
• Enrico Zini did 9.5h (out of 16.0h assigned), thus carrying over 6.5h to June.
• Emilio Pozuelo Monfort did 28h (out of 13.75h assigned and 35.25h from April), thus carrying over 21h to June.
• Markus Koschany did 40h (out of 40h assigned).
• Roberto C. S nchez did 13.5h (out of 32h assigned), thus carrying over 18.5h to June.
• Sylvain Beucler did 23.5h (out of 20h assigned and 20h from April), thus carrying over 16.5h to June.
• Stefano Rivera did 5h in April and 14h in May (out of 17.5h assigned), thus anticipating 1.5h for June.
• Thorsten Alteholz did 40h (out of 40h assigned).
• Utkarsh Gupta did 35h (out of 19h assigned and 30h from April), thus carrying over 14h to June.

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  • sipgate GmbH (for 16 months)
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• Bronze sponsors:
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wrap-and-sort --experimental-rts-parser -tabk

I believe, if I understand the bug correctly, it only triggers if you F_SETPIPE_SZ when the writer has put nonzero but not a full unit s worth in yet, which is why the world isn t on fire screaming about this you need to either have a very slow but nonzero or otherwise very strange write pattern to hit it, which is why it doesn t come up in, say, the CI or most of my testbeds, but my poor little SPARC (440 MHz, 1c1t) and Raspberry Pis were not so fortunate.

• am ultra-surprised that my foot is not in pieces (yet?)
• am still pretty tired (form: -48), but I did manage to run again after a day of pause from running (and my foot is still OK-ish).
• am confused as to what are really my problems
• am convinced that I have some way of running a bit, if I take it careful (which is hard!)
• am really, really hungry; well, not anymore, I ate like a pig for the last two days.
• beat my all-time Garmin record for weekly intensity minutes (1174, damn, 1 more minute and would have been rounder number)

gpg -q -d   zstdcat -T0   zfs receive -u -o readonly=on "$STORE/$DEST"

bash -c 'gpg -q -d 2>/dev/null   zstdcat -T0'   zfs receive -u -o readonly=on "$STORE/$DEST"

1. The fspl process has a File handle, which after forking but before invoking bash, it dup2 s to stdin.
2. The connection between bash and zfs receive is a standard Unix pipe.

• bash is blocking in wait4(), which is expected.
• gpg is blocking in write().
• If I attach to zstdcat with strace -p, then all of a sudden the deadlock is cleared and everything resumes and completes normally.
• Attaching to zfs receive with strace -p causes no output at all from strace for a few seconds, then zfs just writes cannot receive incremental stream: incomplete stream and exits with error code 1.

                int err = zfs_file_read(fp, (char *)buf + done,
                    len - done, &resid);
                if (resid == len - done)  
                        /*
                         * Note: ECKSUM or ZFS_ERR_STREAM_TRUNCATED indicates
                         * that the receive was interrupted and can
                         * potentially be resumed.
                         */
                        err = SET_ERROR(ZFS_ERR_STREAM_TRUNCATED);
                 

Introduction to Matrix Matrix is an "open standard for interoperable, decentralised, real-time communication over IP. It can be used to power Instant Messaging, VoIP/WebRTC signalling, Internet of Things communication - or anywhere you need a standard HTTP API for publishing and subscribing to data whilst tracking the conversation history". It's also (when compared with XMPP) "an eventually consistent global JSON database with an HTTP API and pubsub semantics - whilst XMPP can be thought of as a message passing protocol." According to their FAQ, the project started in 2014, has about 20,000 servers, and millions of users. Matrix works over HTTPS but over a special port: 8448.

Security and privacy I have some concerns about the security promises of Matrix. It's advertised as a "secure" with "E2E [end-to-end] encryption", but how does it actually work?

Data retention defaults One of my main concerns with Matrix is data retention, which is a key part of security in a threat model where (for example) an hostile state actor wants to surveil your communications and can seize your devices. On IRC, servers don't actually keep messages all that long: they pass them along to other servers and clients as fast as they can, only keep them in memory, and move on to the next message. There are no concerns about data retention on messages (and their metadata) other than the network layer. (I'm ignoring the issues with user registration, which is a separate, if valid, concern.) Obviously, an hostile server could log everything passing through it, but IRC federations are normally tightly controlled. So, if you trust your IRC operators, you should be fairly safe. Obviously, clients can (and often do, even if OTR is configured!) log all messages, but this is generally not the default. Irssi, for example, does not log by default. IRC bouncers are more likely to log to disk, of course, to be able to do what they do. Compare this to Matrix: when you send a message to a Matrix homeserver, that server first stores it in its internal SQL database. Then it will transmit that message to all clients connected to that server and room, and to all other servers that have clients connected to that room. Those remote servers, in turn, will keep a copy of that message and all its metadata in their own database, by default forever. On encrypted rooms those messages are encrypted, but not their metadata. There is a mechanism to expire entries in Synapse, but it is not enabled by default. So one should generally assume that a message sent on Matrix is never expired.

GDPR in the federation But even if that setting was enabled by default, how do you control it? This is a fundamental problem of the federation: if any user is allowed to join a room (which is the default), those user's servers will log all content and metadata from that room. That includes private, one-on-one conversations, since those are essentially rooms as well. In the context of the GDPR, this is really tricky: who is the responsible party (known as the "data controller") here? It's basically any yahoo who fires up a home server and joins a room. In a federated network, one has to wonder whether GDPR enforcement is even possible at all. But in Matrix in particular, if you want to enforce your right to be forgotten in a given room, you would have to:

1. enumerate all the users that ever joined the room while you were there
2. discover all their home servers
3. start a GDPR procedure against all those servers

I recognize this is a hard problem to solve while still keeping an open ecosystem. But I believe that Matrix should have much stricter defaults towards data retention than right now. Message expiry should be enforced by default, for example. (Note that there are also redaction policies that could be used to implement part of the GDPR automatically, see the privacy policy discussion below on that.) Also keep in mind that, in the brave new peer-to-peer world that Matrix is heading towards, the boundary between server and client is likely to be fuzzier, which would make applying the GDPR even more difficult. Update: this comment links to this post (in german) which apparently studied the question and concluded that Matrix is not GDPR-compliant. In fact, maybe Synapse should be designed so that there's no configurable flag to turn off data retention. A bit like how most system loggers in UNIX (e.g. syslog) come with a log retention system that typically rotate logs after a few weeks or month. Historically, this was designed to keep hard drives from filling up, but it also has the added benefit of limiting the amount of personal information kept on disk in this modern day. (Arguably, syslog doesn't rotate logs on its own, but, say, Debian GNU/Linux, as an installed system, does have log retention policies well defined for installed packages, and those can be discussed. And "no expiry" is definitely a bug.

Matrix.org privacy policy When I first looked at Matrix, five years ago, Element.io was called Riot.im and had a rather dubious privacy policy:

We currently use cookies to support our use of Google Analytics on the Website and Service. Google Analytics collects information about how you use the Website and Service. [...] This helps us to provide you with a good experience when you browse our Website and use our Service and also allows us to improve our Website and our Service.

When I asked Matrix people about why they were using Google Analytics, they explained this was for development purposes and they were aiming for velocity at the time, not privacy (paraphrasing here). They also included a "free to snitch" clause:

If we are or believe that we are under a duty to disclose or share your personal data, we will do so in order to comply with any legal obligation, the instructions or requests of a governmental authority or regulator, including those outside of the UK.

Those are really broad terms, above and beyond what is typically expected legally. Like the current retention policies, such user tracking and ... "liberal" collaboration practices with the state set a bad precedent for other home servers. Thankfully, since the above policy was published (2017), the GDPR was "implemented" (2018) and it seems like both the Element.io privacy policy and the Matrix.org privacy policy have been somewhat improved since. Notable points of the new privacy policies:

• 2.3.1.1: the "federation" section actually outlines that "Federated homeservers and Matrix clients which respect the Matrix protocol are expected to honour these controls and redaction/erasure requests, but other federated homeservers are outside of the span of control of Element, and we cannot guarantee how this data will be processed"
• 2.6: users under the age of 16 should not use the matrix.org service
• 2.10: Upcloud, Mythic Beast, Amazon, and CloudFlare possibly have access to your data (it's nice to at least mention this in the privacy policy: many providers don't even bother admitting to this kind of delegation)
• Element 2.2.1: mentions many more third parties (Twilio, Stripe, Quaderno, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, Outplay, PipeDrive, HubSpot, Posthog, Sentry, and Matomo (phew!) used when you are paying Matrix.org for hosting

I'm not super happy with all the trackers they have on the Element platform, but then again you don't have to use that service. Your favorite homeserver (assuming you are not on Matrix.org) probably has their own Element deployment, hopefully without all that garbage. Overall, this is all a huge improvement over the previous privacy policy, so hats off to the Matrix people for figuring out a reasonable policy in such a tricky context. I particularly like this bit:

We will forget your copy of your data upon your request. We will also forward your request to be forgotten onto federated homeservers. However - these homeservers are outside our span of control, so we cannot guarantee they will forget your data.

It's great they implemented those mechanisms and, after all, if there's an hostile party in there, nothing can prevent them from using screenshots to just exfiltrate your data away from the client side anyways, even with services typically seen as more secure, like Signal. As an aside, I also appreciate that Matrix.org has a fairly decent code of conduct, based on the TODO CoC which checks all the boxes in the geekfeminism wiki.

Metadata handling Overall, privacy protections in Matrix mostly concern message contents, not metadata. In other words, who's talking with who, when and from where is not well protected. Compared to a tool like Signal, which goes through great lengths to anonymize that data with features like private contact discovery, disappearing messages, sealed senders, and private groups, Matrix is definitely behind. (Note: there is an issue open about message lifetimes in Element since 2020, but it's not at even at the MSC stage yet.) This is a known issue (opened in 2019) in Synapse, but this is not just an implementation issue, it's a flaw in the protocol itself. Home servers keep join/leave of all rooms, which gives clear text information about who is talking to. Synapse logs may also contain privately identifiable information that home server admins might not be aware of in the first place. Those log rotation policies are separate from the server-level retention policy, which may be confusing for a novice sysadmin. Combine this with the federation: even if you trust your home server to do the right thing, the second you join a public room with third-party home servers, those ideas kind of get thrown out because those servers can do whatever they want with that information. Again, a problem that is hard to solve in any federation. To be fair, IRC doesn't have a great story here either: any client knows not only who's talking to who in a room, but also typically their client IP address. Servers can (and often do) obfuscate this, but often that obfuscation is trivial to reverse. Some servers do provide "cloaks" (sometimes automatically), but that's kind of a "slap-on" solution that actually moves the problem elsewhere: now the server knows a little more about the user. Overall, I would worry much more about a Matrix home server seizure than a IRC or Signal server seizure. Signal does get subpoenas, and they can only give out a tiny bit of information about their users: their phone number, and their registration, and last connection date. Matrix carries a lot more information in its database.

Amplification attacks on URL previews I (still!) run an Icecast server and sometimes share links to it on IRC which, obviously, also ends up on (more than one!) Matrix home servers because some people connect to IRC using Matrix. This, in turn, means that Matrix will connect to that URL to generate a link preview. I feel this outlines a security issue, especially because those sockets would be kept open seemingly forever. I tried to warn the Matrix security team but somehow, I don't think this issue was taken very seriously. Here's the disclosure timeline:

• January 18: contacted Matrix security
• January 19: response: already reported as a bug
• January 20: response: can't reproduce
• January 31: timeout added, considered solved
• January 31: I respond that I believe the security issue is underestimated, ask for clearance to disclose
• February 1: response: asking for two weeks delay after the next release (1.53.0) including another patch, presumably in two weeks' time
• February 22: Matrix 1.53.0 released
• April 14: I notice the release, ask for clearance again
• April 14: response: referred to the public disclosure

There are a couple of problems here:

1. the bug was publicly disclosed in September 2020, and not considered a security issue until I notified them, and even then, I had to insist
2. no clear disclosure policy timeline was proposed or seems established in the project (there is a security disclosure policy but it doesn't include any predefined timeline)
3. I wasn't informed of the disclosure
4. the actual solution is a size limit (10MB, already implemented), a time limit (30 seconds, implemented in PR 11784), and a content type allow list (HTML, "media" or JSON, implemented in PR 11936), and I'm not sure it's adequate
5. (pure vanity:) I did not make it to their Hall of fame

I'm not sure those solutions are adequate because they all seem to assume a single home server will pull that one URL for a little while then stop. But in a federated network, many (possibly thousands) home servers may be connected in a single room at once. If an attacker drops a link into such a room, all those servers would connect to that link all at once. This is an amplification attack: a small amount of traffic will generate a lot more traffic to a single target. It doesn't matter there are size or time limits: the amplification is what matters here. It should also be noted that clients that generate link previews have more amplification because they are more numerous than servers. And of course, the default Matrix client (Element) does generate link previews as well. That said, this is possibly not a problem specific to Matrix: any federated service that generates link previews may suffer from this. I'm honestly not sure what the solution is here. Maybe moderation? Maybe link previews are just evil? All I know is there was this weird bug in my Icecast server and I tried to ring the bell about it, and it feels it was swept under the rug. Somehow I feel this is bound to blow up again in the future, even with the current mitigation.

Moderation In Matrix like elsewhere, Moderation is a hard problem. There is a detailed moderation guide and much of this problem space is actively worked on in Matrix right now. A fundamental problem with moderating a federated space is that a user banned from a room can rejoin the room from another server. This is why spam is such a problem in Email, and why IRC networks have stopped federating ages ago (see the IRC history for that fascinating story).

The mjolnir bot The mjolnir moderation bot is designed to help with some of those things. It can kick and ban users, redact all of a user's message (as opposed to one by one), all of this across multiple rooms. It can also subscribe to a federated block list published by matrix.org to block known abusers (users or servers). Bans are pretty flexible and can operate at the user, room, or server level. Matrix people suggest making the bot admin of your channels, because you can't take back admin from a user once given.

The command-line tool There's also a new command line tool designed to do things like:

• System notify users (all users/users from a list, specific user)
• delete sessions/devices not seen for X days
• purge the remote media cache
• select rooms with various criteria (external/local/empty/created by/encrypted/cleartext)
• purge history of theses rooms
• shutdown rooms

This tool and Mjolnir are based on the admin API built into Synapse.

Rate limiting Synapse has pretty good built-in rate-limiting which blocks repeated login, registration, joining, or messaging attempts. It may also end up throttling servers on the federation based on those settings.

Fundamental federation problems Because users joining a room may come from another server, room moderators are at the mercy of the registration and moderation policies of those servers. Matrix is like IRC's +R mode ("only registered users can join") by default, except that anyone can register their own homeserver, which makes this limited. Server admins can block IP addresses and home servers, but those tools are not easily available to room admins. There is an API (m.room.server_acl in /devtools) but it is not reliable (thanks Austin Huang for the clarification). Matrix has the concept of guest accounts, but it is not used very much, and virtually no client or homeserver supports it. This contrasts with the way IRC works: by default, anyone can join an IRC network even without authentication. Some channels require registration, but in general you are free to join and look around (until you get blocked, of course). I have seen anecdotal evidence (CW: Twitter, nitter link) that "moderating bridges is hell", and I can imagine why. Moderation is already hard enough on one federation, when you bridge a room with another network, you inherit all the problems from that network but without the entire abuse control tools from the original network's API...

Room admins Matrix, in particular, has the problem that room administrators (which have the power to redact messages, ban users, and promote other users) are bound to their Matrix ID which is, in turn, bound to their home servers. This implies that a home server administrators could (1) impersonate a given user and (2) use that to hijack the room. So in practice, the home server is the trust anchor for rooms, not the user themselves. That said, if server B administrator hijack user joe on server B, they will hijack that room on that specific server. This will not (necessarily) affect users on the other servers, as servers could refuse parts of the updates or ban the compromised account (or server). It does seem like a major flaw that room credentials are bound to Matrix identifiers, as opposed to the E2E encryption credentials. In an encrypted room even with fully verified members, a compromised or hostile home server can still take over the room by impersonating an admin. That admin (or even a newly minted user) can then send events or listen on the conversations. This is even more frustrating when you consider that Matrix events are actually signed and therefore have some authentication attached to them, acting like some sort of Merkle tree (as it contains a link to previous events). That signature, however, is made from the homeserver PKI keys, not the client's E2E keys, which makes E2E feel like it has been "bolted on" later.

Availability While Matrix has a strong advantage over Signal in that it's decentralized (so anyone can run their own homeserver,), I couldn't find an easy way to run a "multi-primary" setup, or even a "redundant" setup (even if with a single primary backend), short of going full-on "replicate PostgreSQL and Redis data", which is not typically for the faint of heart.

How this works in IRC On IRC, it's quite easy to setup redundant nodes. All you need is:

1. a new machine (with it's own public address with an open port)
2. a shared secret (or certificate) between that machine and an existing one on the network
3. a connect block on both servers

That's it: the node will join the network and people can connect to it as usual and share the same user/namespace as the rest of the network. The servers take care of synchronizing state: you do not need to worry about replicating a database server. (Now, experienced IRC people will know there's a catch here: IRC doesn't have authentication built in, and relies on "services" which are basically bots that authenticate users (I'm simplifying, don't nitpick). If that service goes down, the network still works, but then people can't authenticate, and they can start doing nasty things like steal people's identity if they get knocked offline. But still: basic functionality still works: you can talk in rooms and with users that are on the reachable network.)

User identities Matrix is more complicated. Each "home server" has its own identity namespace: a specific user (say @anarcat:matrix.org) is bound to that specific home server. If that server goes down, that user is completely disconnected. They could register a new account elsewhere and reconnect, but then they basically lose all their configuration: contacts, joined channels are all lost. (Also notice how the Matrix IDs don't look like a typical user address like an email in XMPP. They at least did their homework and got the allocation for the scheme.)

Rooms Users talk to each other in "rooms", even in one-to-one communications. (Rooms are also used for other things like "spaces", they're basically used for everything, think "everything is a file" kind of tool.) For rooms, home servers act more like IRC nodes in that they keep a local state of the chat room and synchronize it with other servers. Users can keep talking inside a room if the server that originally hosts the room goes down. Rooms can have a local, server-specific "alias" so that, say, #room:matrix.org is also visible as #room:example.com on the example.com home server. Both addresses refer to the same room underlying room. (Finding this in the Element settings is not obvious though, because that "alias" are actually called a "local address" there. So to create such an alias (in Element), you need to go in the room settings' "General" section, "Show more" in "Local address", then add the alias name (e.g. foo), and then that room will be available on your example.com homeserver as #foo:example.com.) So a room doesn't belong to a server, it belongs to the federation, and anyone can join the room from any serer (if the room is public, or if invited otherwise). You can create a room on server A and when a user from server B joins, the room will be replicated on server B as well. If server A fails, server B will keep relaying traffic to connected users and servers. A room is therefore not fundamentally addressed with the above alias, instead ,it has a internal Matrix ID, which basically a random string. It has a server name attached to it, but that was made just to avoid collisions. That can get a little confusing. For example, the #fractal:gnome.org room is an alias on the gnome.org server, but the room ID is !hwiGbsdSTZIwSRfybq:matrix.org. That's because the room was created on matrix.org, but the preferred branding is gnome.org now. As an aside, rooms, by default, live forever, even after the last user quits. There's an admin API to delete rooms and a tombstone event to redirect to another one, but neither have a GUI yet. The latter is part of MSC1501 ("Room version upgrades") which allows a room admin to close a room, with a message and a pointer to another room.

Spaces Discovering rooms can be tricky: there is a per-server room directory, but Matrix.org people are trying to deprecate it in favor of "Spaces". Room directories were ripe for abuse: anyone can create a room, so anyone can show up in there. It's possible to restrict who can add aliases, but anyways directories were seen as too limited. In contrast, a "Space" is basically a room that's an index of other rooms (including other spaces), so existing moderation and administration mechanism that work in rooms can (somewhat) work in spaces as well. This enables a room directory that works across federation, regardless on which server they were originally created. New users can be added to a space or room automatically in Synapse. (Existing users can be told about the space with a server notice.) This gives admins a way to pre-populate a list of rooms on a server, which is useful to build clusters of related home servers, providing some sort of redundancy, at the room -- not user -- level.

Home servers So while you can workaround a home server going down at the room level, there's no such thing at the home server level, for user identities. So if you want those identities to be stable in the long term, you need to think about high availability. One limitation is that the domain name (e.g. matrix.example.com) must never change in the future, as renaming home servers is not supported. The documentation used to say you could "run a hot spare" but that has been removed. Last I heard, it was not possible to run a high-availability setup where multiple, separate locations could replace each other automatically. You can have high performance setups where the load gets distributed among workers, but those are based on a shared database (Redis and PostgreSQL) backend. So my guess is it would be possible to create a "warm" spare server of a matrix home server with regular PostgreSQL replication, but that is not documented in the Synapse manual. This sort of setup would also not be useful to deal with networking issues or denial of service attacks, as you will not be able to spread the load over multiple network locations easily. Redis and PostgreSQL heroes are welcome to provide their multi-primary solution in the comments. In the meantime, I'll just point out this is a solution that's handled somewhat more gracefully in IRC, by having the possibility of delegating the authentication layer.

Delegations If you do not want to run a Matrix server yourself, it's possible to delegate the entire thing to another server. There's a server discovery API which uses the .well-known pattern (or SRV records, but that's "not recommended" and a bit confusing) to delegate that service to another server. Be warned that the server still needs to be explicitly configured for your domain. You can't just put:

  "m.server": "matrix.org:443"  

... on https://example.com/.well-known/matrix/server and start using @you:example.com as a Matrix ID. That's because Matrix doesn't support "virtual hosting" and you'd still be connecting to rooms and people with your matrix.org identity, not example.com as you would normally expect. This is also why you cannot rename your home server. The server discovery API is what allows servers to find each other. Clients, on the other hand, use the client-server discovery API: this is what allows a given client to find your home server when you type your Matrix ID on login.

Performance The high availability discussion brushed over the performance of Matrix itself, but let's now dig into that.

Horizontal scalability There were serious scalability issues of the main Matrix server, Synapse, in the past. So the Matrix team has been working hard to improve its design. Since Synapse 1.22 the home server can horizontally scale to multiple workers (see this blog post for details) which can make it easier to scale large servers.

Other implementations There are other promising home servers implementations from a performance standpoint (dendrite, Golang, entered beta in late 2020; conduit, Rust, beta; others), but none of those are feature-complete so there's a trade-off to be made there. Synapse is also adding a lot of feature fast, so it's an open question whether the others will ever catch up. (I have heard that Dendrite might actually surpass Synapse in features within a few years, which would put Synapse in a more "LTS" situation.)

Latency Matrix can feel slow sometimes. For example, joining the "Matrix HQ" room in Element (from matrix.debian.social) takes a few minutes and then fails. That is because the home server has to sync the entire room state when you join the room. There was promising work on this announced in the lengthy 2021 retrospective, and some of that work landed (partial sync) in the 1.53 release already. Other improvements coming include sliding sync, lazy loading over federation, and fast room joins. So that's actually something that could be fixed in the fairly short term. But in general, communication in Matrix doesn't feel as "snappy" as on IRC or even Signal. It's hard to quantify this without instrumenting a full latency test bed (for example the tools I used in the terminal emulators latency tests), but even just typing in a web browser feels slower than typing in a xterm or Emacs for me. Even in conversations, I "feel" people don't immediately respond as fast. In fact, this could be an interesting double-blind experiment to make: have people guess whether they are talking to a person on Matrix, XMPP, or IRC, for example. My theory would be that people could notice that Matrix users are slower, if only because of the TCP round-trip time each message has to take.

Transport Some courageous person actually made some tests of various messaging platforms on a congested network. His evaluation was basically:

• Briar: uses Tor, so unusable except locally
• Matrix: "struggled to send and receive messages", joining a room takes forever as it has to sync all history, "took 20-30 seconds for my messages to be sent and another 20 seconds for further responses"
• XMPP: "worked in real-time, full encryption, with nearly zero lag"

So that was interesting. I suspect IRC would have also fared better, but that's just a feeling. Other improvements to the transport layer include support for websocket and the CoAP proxy work from 2019 (targeting 100bps links), but both seem stalled at the time of writing. The Matrix people have also announced the pinecone p2p overlay network which aims at solving large, internet-scale routing problems. See also this talk at FOSDEM 2022.

Usability

Onboarding and workflow The workflow for joining a room, when you use Element web, is not great:

1. click on a link in a web browser
2. land on (say) https://matrix.to/#/#matrix-dev:matrix.org
3. offers "Element", yeah that's sounds great, let's click "Continue"
4. land on https://app.element.io/#/room%2F%23matrix-dev%3Amatrix.org and then you need to register, aaargh

As you might have guessed by now, there is a specification to solve this, but web browsers need to adopt it as well, so that's far from actually being solved. At least browsers generally know about the matrix: scheme, it's just not exactly clear what they should do with it, especially when the handler is just another web page (e.g. Element web). In general, when compared with tools like Signal or WhatsApp, Matrix doesn't fare so well in terms of user discovery. I probably have some of my normal contacts that have a Matrix account as well, but there's really no way to know. It's kind of creepy when Signal tells you "this person is on Signal!" but it's also pretty cool that it works, and they actually implemented it pretty well. Registration is also less obvious: in Signal, the app confirms your phone number automatically. It's friction-less and quick. In Matrix, you need to learn about home servers, pick one, register (with a password! aargh!), and then setup encryption keys (not default), etc. It's a lot more friction. And look, I understand: giving away your phone number is a huge trade-off. I don't like it either. But it solves a real problem and makes encryption accessible to a ton more people. Matrix does have "identity servers" that can serve that purpose, but I don't feel confident sharing my phone number there. It doesn't help that the identity servers don't have private contact discovery: giving them your phone number is a more serious security compromise than with Signal. There's a catch-22 here too: because no one feels like giving away their phone numbers, no one does, and everyone assumes that stuff doesn't work anyways. Like it or not, Signal forcing people to divulge their phone number actually gives them critical mass that means actually a lot of my relatives are on Signal and I don't have to install crap like WhatsApp to talk with them.

5 minute clients evaluation Throughout all my tests I evaluated a handful of Matrix clients, mostly from Flathub because almost none of them are packaged in Debian. Right now I'm using Element, the flagship client from Matrix.org, in a web browser window, with the PopUp Window extension. This makes it look almost like a native app, and opens links in my main browser window (instead of a new tab in that separate window), which is nice. But I'm tired of buying memory to feed my web browser, so this indirection has to stop. Furthermore, I'm often getting completely logged off from Element, which means re-logging in, recovering my security keys, and reconfiguring my settings. That is extremely annoying. Coming from Irssi, Element is really "GUI-y" (pronounced "gooey"). Lots of clickety happening. To mark conversations as read, in particular, I need to click-click-click on all the tabs that have some activity. There's no "jump to latest message" or "mark all as read" functionality as far as I could tell. In Irssi the former is built-in (alt-a) and I made a custom /READ command for the latter:

/ALIAS READ script exec \$_->activity(0) for Irssi::windows

And yes, that's a Perl script in my IRC client. I am not aware of any Matrix client that does stuff like that, except maybe Weechat, if we can call it a Matrix client, or Irssi itself, now that it has a Matrix plugin (!). As for other clients, I have looked through the Matrix Client Matrix (confusing right?) to try to figure out which one to try, and, even after selecting Linux as a filter, the chart is just too wide to figure out anything. So I tried those, kind of randomly:

• Fractal
• Mirage
• Nheko
• Quaternion

Unfortunately, I lost my notes on those, I don't actually remember which one did what. I still have a session open with Mirage, so I guess that means it's the one I preferred, but I remember they were also all very GUI-y. Maybe I need to look at weechat-matrix or gomuks. At least Weechat is scriptable so I could continue playing the power-user. Right now my strategy with messaging (and that includes microblogging like Twitter or Mastodon) is that everything goes through my IRC client, so Weechat could actually fit well in there. Going with gomuks, on the other hand, would mean running it in parallel with Irssi or ... ditching IRC, which is a leap I'm not quite ready to take just yet. Oh, and basically none of those clients (except Nheko and Element) support VoIP, which is still kind of a second-class citizen in Matrix. It does not support large multimedia rooms, for example: Jitsi was used for FOSDEM instead of the native videoconferencing system.

Bots This falls a little aside the "usability" section, but I didn't know where to put this... There's a few Matrix bots out there, and you are likely going to be able to replace your existing bots with Matrix bots. It's true that IRC has a long and impressive history with lots of various bots doing various things, but given how young Matrix is, there's still a good variety:

• maubot: generic bot with tons of usual plugins like sed, dice, karma, xkcd, echo, rss, reminder, translate, react, exec, gitlab/github webhook receivers, weather, etc
• opsdroid: framework to implement "chat ops" in Matrix, connects with Matrix, GitHub, GitLab, Shell commands, Slack, etc
• matrix-nio: another framework, used to build lots more bots like:
  • hemppa: generic bot with various functionality like weather, RSS feeds, calendars, cron jobs, OpenStreetmaps lookups, URL title snarfing, wolfram alpha, astronomy pic of the day, Mastodon bridge, room bridging, oh dear
  • devops: ping, curl, etc
  • podbot: play podcast episodes from AntennaPod
  • cody: Python, Ruby, Javascript REPL
  • eno: generic bot, "personal assistant"
• mjolnir: moderation bot
• hookshot: bridge with GitLab/GitHub
• matrix-monitor-bot: latency monitor

One thing I haven't found an equivalent for is Debian's MeetBot. There's an archive bot but it doesn't have topics or a meeting chair, or HTML logs.

Working on Matrix As a developer, I find Matrix kind of intimidating. The specification is huge. The official specification itself looks somewhat digestable: it's only 6 APIs so that looks, at first, kind of reasonable. But whenever you start asking complicated questions about Matrix, you quickly fall into the Matrix Spec Change specification (which, yes, is a separate specification). And there are literally hundreds of MSCs flying around. It's hard to tell what's been adopted and what hasn't, and even harder to figure out if your specific client has implemented it. (One trendy answer to this problem is to "rewrite it in rust": Matrix are working on implementing a lot of those specifications in a matrix-rust-sdk that's designed to take the implementation details away from users.) Just taking the latest weekly Matrix report, you find that three new MSCs proposed, just last week! There's even a graph that shows the number of MSCs is progressing steadily, at 600+ proposals total, with the majority (300+) "new". I would guess the "merged" ones are at about 150. That's a lot of text which includes stuff like 3D worlds which, frankly, I don't think you should be working on when you have such important security and usability problems. (The internet as a whole, arguably, doesn't fare much better. RFC600 is a really obscure discussion about "INTERFACING AN ILLINOIS PLASMA TERMINAL TO THE ARPANET". Maybe that's how many MSCs will end up as well, left forgotten in the pits of history.) And that's the thing: maybe the Matrix people have a different objective than I have. They want to connect everything to everything, and make Matrix a generic transport for all sorts of applications, including virtual reality, collaborative editors, and so on. I just want secure, simple messaging. Possibly with good file transfers, and video calls. That it works with existing stuff is good, and it should be federated to remove the "Signal point of failure". So I'm a bit worried with the direction all those MSCs are taking, especially when you consider that clients other than Element are still struggling to keep up with basic features like end-to-end encryption or room discovery, never mind voice or spaces...

Conclusion Overall, Matrix is somehow in the space XMPP was a few years ago. It has a ton of features, pretty good clients, and a large community. It seems to have gained some of the momentum that XMPP has lost. It may have the most potential to replace Signal if something bad would happen to it (like, I don't know, getting banned or going nuts with cryptocurrency)... But it's really not there yet, and I don't see Matrix trying to get there either, which is a bit worrisome.

Looking back at history I'm also worried that we are repeating the errors of the past. The history of federated services is really fascinating:. IRC, FTP, HTTP, and SMTP were all created in the early days of the internet, and are all still around (except, arguably, FTP, which was removed from major browsers recently). All of them had to face serious challenges in growing their federation. IRC had numerous conflicts and forks, both at the technical level but also at the political level. The history of IRC is really something that anyone working on a federated system should study in detail, because they are bound to make the same mistakes if they are not familiar with it. The "short" version is:

• 1988: Finnish researcher publishes first IRC source code
• 1989: 40 servers worldwide, mostly universities
• 1990: EFnet ("eris-free network") fork which blocks the "open relay", named Eris - followers of Eris form the A-net, which promptly dissolves itself, with only EFnet remaining
• 1992: Undernet fork, which offered authentication ("services"), routing improvements and timestamp-based channel synchronisation
• 1994: DALnet fork, from Undernet, again on a technical disagreement
• 1995: Freenode founded
• 1996: IRCnet forks from EFnet, following a flame war of historical proportion, splitting the network between Europe and the Americas
• 1997: Quakenet founded
• 1999: (XMPP founded)
• 2001: 6 million users, OFTC founded
• 2002: DALnet peaks at 136,000 users
• 2003: IRC as a whole peaks at 10 million users, EFnet peaks at 141,000 users
• 2004: (Facebook founded), Undernet peaks at 159,000 users
• 2005: Quakenet peaks at 242,000 users, IRCnet peaks at 136,000 (Youtube founded)
• 2006: (Twitter founded)
• 2009: (WhatsApp, Pinterest founded)
• 2010: (TextSecure AKA Signal, Instagram founded)
• 2011: (Snapchat founded)
• ~2013: Freenode peaks at ~100,000 users
• 2016: IRCv3 standardisation effort started (TikTok founded)
• 2021: Freenode self-destructs, Libera chat founded
• 2022: Libera peaks at 50,000 users, OFTC peaks at 30,000 users

(The numbers were taken from the Wikipedia page and Netsplit.de. Note that I also include other networks launch in parenthesis for context.) Pretty dramatic, don't you think? Eventually, somehow, IRC became irrelevant for most people: few people are even aware of it now. With less than a million users active, it's smaller than Mastodon, XMPP, or Matrix at this point.¹ If I were to venture a guess, I'd say that infighting, lack of a standardization body, and a somewhat annoying protocol meant the network could not grow. It's also possible that the decentralised yet centralised structure of IRC networks limited their reliability and growth. But large social media companies have also taken over the space: observe how IRC numbers peak around the time the wave of large social media companies emerge, especially Facebook (2.9B users!!) and Twitter (400M users).

Where the federated services are in history Right now, Matrix, and Mastodon (and email!) are at the "pre-EFnet" stage: anyone can join the federation. Mastodon has started working on a global block list of fascist servers which is interesting, but it's still an open federation. Right now, Matrix is totally open, but matrix.org publishes a (federated) block list of hostile servers (#matrix-org-coc-bl:matrix.org, yes, of course it's a room). Interestingly, Email is also in that stage, where there are block lists of spammers, and it's a race between those blockers and spammers. Large email providers, obviously, are getting closer to the EFnet stage: you could consider they only accept email from themselves or between themselves. It's getting increasingly hard to deliver mail to Outlook and Gmail for example, partly because of bias against small providers, but also because they are including more and more machine-learning tools to sort through email and those systems are, fundamentally, unknowable. It's not quite the same as splitting the federation the way EFnet did, but the effect is similar. HTTP has somehow managed to live in a parallel universe, as it's technically still completely federated: anyone can start a web server if they have a public IP address and anyone can connect to it. The catch, of course, is how you find the darn thing. Which is how Google became one of the most powerful corporations on earth, and how they became the gatekeepers of human knowledge online. I have only briefly mentioned XMPP here, and my XMPP fans will undoubtedly comment on that, but I think it's somewhere in the middle of all of this. It was co-opted by Facebook and Google, and both corporations have abandoned it to its fate. I remember fondly the days where I could do instant messaging with my contacts who had a Gmail account. Those days are gone, and I don't talk to anyone over Jabber anymore, unfortunately. And this is a threat that Matrix still has to face. It's also the threat Email is currently facing. On the one hand corporations like Facebook want to completely destroy it and have mostly succeeded: many people just have an email account to register on things and talk to their friends over Instagram or (lately) TikTok (which, I know, is not Facebook, but they started that fire). On the other hand, you have corporations like Microsoft and Google who are still using and providing email services because, frankly, you still do need email for stuff, just like fax is still around but they are more and more isolated in their own silo. At this point, it's only a matter of time they reach critical mass and just decide that the risk of allowing external mail coming in is not worth the cost. They'll simply flip the switch and work on an allow-list principle. Then we'll have closed the loop and email will be dead, just like IRC is "dead" now. I wonder which path Matrix will take. Could it liberate us from these vicious cycles? Update: this generated some discussions on lobste.rs.

---

1. According to Wikipedia, there are currently about 500 distinct IRC networks operating, on about 1,000 servers, serving over 250,000 users. In contrast, Mastodon seems to be around 5 million users, Matrix.org claimed at FOSDEM 2021 to have about 28 million globally visible accounts, and Signal lays claim to over 40 million souls. XMPP claims to have "millions" of users on the xmpp.org homepage but the FAQ says they don't actually know. On the proprietary silo side of the fence, this page says
   • Facebook: 2.9 billion users
   • WhatsApp: 2B
   • Instagram: 1.4B
   • TikTok: 1B
   • Snapchat: 500M
   • Pinterest: 480M
   • Twitter: 397M
   Notable omission from that list: Youtube, with its mind-boggling 2.6 billion users... Those are not the kind of numbers you just "need to convince a brother or sister" to grow the network...

1. Download the latest LineageOS image for your phone.
2. unzip the image to get the payload.bin file inside it.
3. Clone the LineageOS scripts git repository: $ git clone https://github.com/LineageOS/scripts
4. extract the boot image (requires python3-protobuf): $ mkdir extracted-payload $ python3 scripts/update-payload-extractor/extract.py payload.bin --output_dir extracted-payload

1. Upload the boot.img file you previously extracted to your device.
2. Open Magisk and patch the boot.img file.
3. Download the patched file back on your computer.

1. Enable ADB debug mode on your phone.
2. Reboot into fastboot mode. $ adb reboot fastboot
3. Flash the patched boot image file: $ fastboot flash boot magisk_patched-foo.img
4. Disable ADB debug mode on your phone.

1. Download the latest LineageOS version for your phone.
2. Reboot into recovery (Power + Volume Down).
3. Click on "Apply Updates"
4. Sideload the ROM: $ adb sideload lineageos-foo.zip

• ~/.config/QtProject
• ~/.cache/QtProject/
• /usr/share/qtcreator/QtProject which is where configuration is stored if you used sdktool to programmatically configure Qt Creator (see for example this post and see Debian bug #1012561.

-DIST_CODENAME = "stretch"
+DIST_CODENAME = "bullseye"

Test$ qmake-armhf -makefile
Info: creating stash file  /Test/.qmake.stash
Test$ make
[...]
/usr/bin/arm-linux-gnueabihf-g++ -Wl,-O1 -Wl,-rpath-link, /armhf/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf -Wl,-rpath-link, /armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf -Wl,-rpath-link, /armhf/usr/lib/ -o Test main.o mainwindow.o moc_mainwindow.o    /armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf/libQt5Widgets.so  /armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf/libQt5Gui.so  /armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf/libQt5Core.so -lGLESv2 -lpthread
/usr/lib/gcc-cross/arm-linux-gnueabihf/10/../../../../arm-linux-gnueabihf/bin/ld: cannot find -lGLESv2
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
make: *** [Makefile:146: Test] Error 1

--- a/cbqt
+++ b/cbqt
@@ -241,18 +241,21 @@ include(../common/linux.conf)
 include(../common/gcc-base-unix.conf)
 include(../common/g++-unix.conf)
+QMAKE_LIBDIR +=  chroot.abspath /lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf
+QMAKE_LIBDIR +=  chroot.abspath /usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf
+QMAKE_LIBDIR +=  chroot.abspath /usr/lib/
 QMAKE_RPATHLINKDIR +=  chroot.abspath /lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf
 QMAKE_RPATHLINKDIR +=  chroot.abspath /usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf
 QMAKE_RPATHLINKDIR +=  chroot.abspath /usr/lib/

Test$ qmake-armhf -makefile
Test$ make
/usr/bin/arm-linux-gnueabihf-g++ -Wl,-O1 -Wl,-rpath-link, /armhf/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf -Wl,-rpath-link, /armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf -Wl,-rpath-link, /armhf/usr/lib/ -o Test main.o mainwindow.o moc_mainwindow.o   -L /armhf/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf -L /armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf -L /armhf/usr/lib/  /armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf/libQt5Widgets.so  /armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf/libQt5Gui.so  /armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf/libQt5Core.so -lGLESv2 -lpthread

 /armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf/qt5/mkspecs/features/toolchain.prf:76: Variable QMAKE_CXX.COMPILER_MACROS is not defined.

isEmpty($$ target_prefix .COMPILER_MACROS)  
    msvc  
        #  
      else: gcc ghs  
        vars = $$qtVariablesFromGCC($$QMAKE_CXX)
     
    for (v, vars)  
        #  
        $$ target_prefix .COMPILER_MACROS += $$v
     
    cache($$ target_prefix .COMPILER_MACROS, set stash)
  else  
    #  
 

strace -e trace=execve --string-limit=123456 -o qtcreator.trace -f qtcreator

$ grep qmake- qtcreator.trace
1015841 execve("/usr/local/bin/qmake-armhf", ["/usr/local/bin/qmake-armhf", "-query"], 0x56096e923040 /* 54 vars */) = 0
1015865 execve("/usr/local/bin/qmake-armhf", ["/usr/local/bin/qmake-armhf", " /Test/Test.pro", "-spec", "arm-linux-gnueabihf", "CONFIG+=debug", "CONFIG+=qml_debug"], 0x7f5cb4023e20 /* 55 vars */) = 0

$ /usr/local/bin/qmake-armhf Test.pro -spec arm-linux-gnueabihf CONFIG+=debug CONFIG+=qml_debug
 /armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf/qt5/mkspecs/features/toolchain.prf:76: Variable QMAKE_CXX.COMPILER_MACROS is not defined.

$ rm .qmake.stash
$ qmake-armhf -makefile
 /armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf/qt5/mkspecs/features/toolchain.prf:76: Variable QMAKE_CXX.COMPILER_MACROS is not defined.

• The else: gcc ghs test is matching the value(s) of QMAKE_COMPILER
• QMAKE_COMPILER can have multiple values, separated by space
• If in armhf/usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf/qt5/mkspecs/arm-linux-gnueabihf/qmake.conf I set QMAKE_COMPILER = gcc arm-linux-gnueabihf-gcc, then things work again.

--- a/cbqt
+++ b/cbqt
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ QMAKE_RPATHLINKDIR +=  chroot.abspath /lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf
 QMAKE_RPATHLINKDIR +=  chroot.abspath /usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf
 QMAKE_RPATHLINKDIR +=  chroot.abspath /usr/lib/
-QMAKE_COMPILER          =  chroot.arch_triplet -gcc
+QMAKE_COMPILER          = gcc  chroot.arch_triplet -gcc
 QMAKE_CC                = /usr/bin/ chroot.arch_triplet -gcc

 QMAKE_COMPILER          =  chroot.arch_triplet -gcc
-QMAKE_CC                =  chroot.arch_triplet -gcc
+QMAKE_CC                = /usr/bin/ chroot.arch_triplet -gcc
 QMAKE_LINK_C            = $$QMAKE_CC
 QMAKE_LINK_C_SHLIB      = $$QMAKE_CC
-QMAKE_CXX               =  chroot.arch_triplet -g++
+QMAKE_CXX               = /usr/bin/ chroot.arch_triplet -g++
 QMAKE_LINK              = $$QMAKE_CXX
 QMAKE_LINK_SHLIB        = $$QMAKE_CXX

sudo cbqt ./armhf --create --verbose

sudo ./cbqt ./armhf --qmake -o /usr/local/bin/qmake-armhf

# Note: :arch is added automatically to package names if no arch is explicitly specified
sudo ./cbqt ./armhf --install libqt5svg5-dev libmosquittopp-dev qtwebengine5-dev

qmake-armhf -makefile
make

1. Tools/Options, then Kits, then Add
2. Name: armhf (or anything you like)
3. In the Qt Versions tab, click Add then set the path of the new Qt to /usr/local/bin/qmake-armhf. Click Apply.
4. Back in the Kits, select the Qt version you just created in the Qt version field
5. In Compilers, select the ARM versions of GCC. If they do not appear, install crossbuild-essential-armhf, then in the Compilers tab click Re-detect and then Apply to make them available for selection
6. Dismiss the dialog with "OK": the new kit is ready

Repfix paper Zhilei Ren, Shiwei Sun, Jifeng Xuan, Xiaochen Li, Zhide Zhou and He Jiang have published an academic paper titled Automated Patching for Unreproducible Builds:

[..] fixing unreproducible build issues poses a set of challenges [..], among which we consider the localization granularity and the historical knowledge utilization as the most significant ones. To tackle these challenges, we propose a novel approach [called] RepFix that combines tracing-based fine-grained localization with history-based patch generation mechanisms.

The paper (PDF, 3.5MB) uses the Debian mylvmbackup package as an example to show how RepFix can automatically generate patches to make software build reproducibly. As it happens, Reiner Herrmann submitted a patch for the mylvmbackup package which has remained unapplied by the Debian package maintainer for over seven years, thus this paper inadvertently underscores that achieving reproducible builds will require both technical and social solutions.

Python variables Johannes Schauer discovered a fascinating bug where simply naming your Python variable _m led to unreproducible .pyc files. In particular, the types module in Python 3.10 requires the following patch to make it reproducible:

--- a/Lib/types.py
+++ b/Lib/types.py
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ _ag = _ag()
 AsyncGeneratorType = type(_ag)
 
 class _C:
-    def _m(self): pass
-MethodType = type(_C()._m)
+    def _b(self): pass
+MethodType = type(_C()._b)

Simply renaming the dummy method from _m to _b was enough to workaround the problem. Johannes bug report first led to a number of improvements in diffoscope to aid in dissecting .pyc files, but upstream identified this as caused by an issue surrounding interned strings and is being tracked in CPython bug #78274.

New SPDX team to incorporate build metadata in Software Bill of Materials SPDX, the open standard for Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), is continuously developed by a number of teams and committees. However, SPDX has welcomed a new addition; a team dedicated to enhancing metadata about software builds, complementing reproducible builds in creating a more secure software supply chain. The SPDX Builds Team has been working throughout May to define the universal primitives shared by all build systems, including the who, what, where and how of builds:

• Who: the identity of the person or organisation that controls the build infrastructure.
• What: the inputs and outputs of a given build, combining metadata about the build s configuration with an SBOM describing source code and dependencies.
• Where: the software packages making up the build system, from build orchestration tools such as Woodpecker CI and Tekton to language-specific tools.
• How: the invocation of a build, linking metadata of a build to the identity of the person or automation tool that initiated it.

The SPDX Builds Team expects to have a usable data model by September, ready for inclusion in the SPDX 3.0 standard. The team welcomes new contributors, inviting those interested in joining to introduce themselves on the SPDX-Tech mailing list.

Talks at Debian Reunion Hamburg Some of the Reproducible Builds team (Holger Levsen, Mattia Rizzolo, Roland Clobus, Philip Rinn, etc.) met in real life at the Debian Reunion Hamburg (official homepage). There were several informal discussions amongst them, as well as two talks related to reproducible builds. First, Holger Levsen gave a talk on the status of Reproducible Builds for bullseye and bookworm and beyond (WebM, 210MB): Secondly, Roland Clobus gave a talk called Reproducible builds as applied to non-compiler output (WebM, 115MB):

Supply-chain security attacks This was another bumper month for supply-chain attacks in package repositories. Early in the month, Lance R. Vick noticed that the maintainer of the NPM foreach package let their personal email domain expire, so they bought it and now controls foreach on NPM and the 36,826 projects that depend on it . Shortly afterwards, Drew DeVault published a related blog post titled When will we learn? that offers a brief timeline of major incidents in this area and, not uncontroversially, suggests that the correct way to ship packages is with your distribution s package manager .

Bootstrapping Bootstrapping is a process for building software tools progressively from a primitive compiler tool and source language up to a full Linux development environment with GCC, etc. This is important given the amount of trust we put in existing compiler binaries. This month, a bootstrappable mini-kernel was announced. Called boot2now, it comprises a series of compilers in the form of bootable machine images.

Google s new Assured Open Source Software service Google Cloud (the division responsible for the Google Compute Engine) announced a new Assured Open Source Software service. Noting the considerable 650% year-over-year increase in cyberattacks aimed at open source suppliers, the new service claims to enable enterprise and public sector users of open source software to easily incorporate the same OSS packages that Google uses into their own developer workflows . The announcement goes on to enumerate that packages curated by the new service would be:

• Regularly scanned, analyzed, and fuzz-tested for vulnerabilities.
• Have corresponding enriched metadata incorporating Container/Artifact Analysis data.
• Are built with Cloud Build including evidence of verifiable SLSA-compliance
• Are verifiably signed by Google.
• Are distributed from an Artifact Registry secured and protected by Google.

(Full announcement)

A retrospective on the Rust programming language Andrew bunnie Huang published a long blog post this month promising a critical retrospective on the Rust programming language. Amongst many acute observations about the evolution of the language s syntax (etc.), the post beings to critique the languages approach to supply chain security ( Rust Has A Limited View of Supply Chain Security ) and reproducibility ( You Can t Reproduce Someone Else s Rust Build ):

There s some bugs open with the Rust maintainers to address reproducible builds, but with the number of issues they have to deal with in the language, I am not optimistic that this problem will be resolved anytime soon. Assuming the only driver of the unreproducibility is the inclusion of OS paths in the binary, one fix to this would be to re-configure our build system to run in some sort of a chroot environment or a virtual machine that fixes the paths in a way that almost anyone else could reproduce. I say almost anyone else because this fix would be OS-dependent, so we d be able to get reproducible builds under, for example, Linux, but it would not help Windows users where chroot environments are not a thing.

(Full post)

Reproducible Builds IRC meeting The minutes and logs from our May 2022 IRC meeting have been published. In case you missed this one, our next IRC meeting will take place on Tuesday 28th June at 15:00 UTC on #reproducible-builds on the OFTC network.

A new tool to improve supply-chain security in Arch Linux kpcyrd published yet another interesting tool related to reproducibility. Writing about the tool in a recent blog post, kpcyrd mentions that although many PKGBUILDs provide authentication in the context of signed Git tags (i.e. the ability to verify the Git tag was signed by one of the two trusted keys ), they do not support pinning, ie. that upstream could create a new signed Git tag with an identical name, and arbitrarily change the source code without the [maintainer] noticing . Conversely, other PKGBUILDs support pinning but not authentication. The new tool, auth-tarball-from-git, fixes both problems, as nearly outlined in kpcyrd s original blog post.

diffoscope diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility. Not only can it locate and diagnose reproducibility issues, it can provide human-readable diffs from many kinds of binary formats. This month, Chris Lamb prepared and uploaded versions 212, 213 and 214 to Debian unstable. Chris also made the following changes:

• New features:
  • Add support for extracting vmlinuz Linux kernel images. [ ]
  • Support both python-argcomplete 1.x and 2.x. [ ]
  • Strip sticky etc. from x.deb: sticky Debian binary package [ ]. [ ]
  • Integrate test coverage with GitLab s concept of artifacts. [ ][ ][ ]
• Bug fixes:
  • Don t mask differences in .zip or .jar central directory extra fields. [ ]
  • Don t show a binary comparison of .zip or .jar files if we have observed at least one nested difference. [ ]
• Codebase improvements:
  • Substantially update comment for our calls to zipinfo and zipinfo -v. [ ]
  • Use assert_diff in test_zip over calling get_data with a separate assert. [ ]
  • Don t call re.compile and then call .sub on the result; just call re.sub directly. [ ]
  • Clarify the comment around the difference between --usage and --help. [ ]
• Testsuite improvements:
  • Test --help and --usage. [ ]
  • Test that --help includes the file formats. [ ]

Vagrant Cascadian added an external tool reference xb-tool for GNU Guix [ ] as well as updated the diffoscope package in GNU Guix itself [ ][ ][ ].

Distribution work In Debian, 41 reviews of Debian packages were added, 85 were updated and 13 were removed this month adding to our knowledge about identified issues. A number of issue types have been updated, including adding a new nondeterministic_ordering_in_deprecated_items_collected_by_doxygen toolchain issue [ ] as well as ones for mono_mastersummary_xml_files_inherit_filesystem_ordering [ ], extended_attributes_in_jar_file_created_without_manifest [ ] and apxs_captures_build_path [ ]. Vagrant Cascadian performed a rough check of the reproducibility of core package sets in GNU Guix, and in openSUSE, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted his usual monthly reproducible builds status report.

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

• Bernhard M. Wiedemann:
  • gtkmm-documentation (merged; sorting issue)
  • librespot (merged; random BuildID issue)
  • lirc (merged)
  • lsof (uname/hostname problem)
  • solanum (merged, possibly a race condition)
• Chris Lamb:
  • #1010845 filed against logapp.
  • #1010854 filed against mono.
  • #1010855 filed against longrun.
  • #1011452 filed against rust-simplelog.
  • #1011752 filed against freesas.
  • PeachPy (merged, sort entries)
• Johannes Schauer Marin Rodrigues:
  • #1010957 filed against man-db.
• Vagrant Cascadian:
  • #1010462 filed against mtink.
  • #1010463 filed against fceux.
  • #1010466 filed against glob2.
  • #1010483 filed against coinor-cgl.
  • #1010486 filed against metapixel.
  • #1010781 filed against ragel.
  • #1010785 filed against gdome2.
  • #1010787 filed against sgml-base-doc.
  • #1010789 filed against xarclock.
  • #1010790 filed against xgammon.
  • #1010825 filed against lwatch.
  • #1010828 filed against bbrun.
  • #1010830 filed against gscanbus.
  • #1010859 filed against libnss-gw-name.
  • #1010870 filed against pidgin-blinklight.
  • #1010871 filed against dvbtune.
  • #1010872 filed against efax.
  • #1010944 filed against quelcom.
  • #1010948 filed against xine-lib-1.2.
  • #1011034 filed against fusesmb.
  • #1011036 filed against mailfront.
  • #1011104 filed against convlit.
  • #1011109 filed against bitstormlite.
  • #1011257 filed against coinor-osi.
  • #1011402 filed against razor.
  • #1011405 filed against autoclass.
  • #1011428 filed against cdbackup.
  • #1011429 filed against dds2tar.
  • #1011469 filed against transcalc.
  • #1011470 filed against libapache2-mod-authz-unixgroup.
  • #1011471 filed against mgdiff.
  • #1011478 filed against scsitools.
  • #1011479 filed against fstrcmp.
  • #1011480 filed against libxsettings-client.
  • #1011481 filed against tamil-gtk2im.
  • #1011486 filed against tdfsb.
  • #1011488 filed against stymulator.
  • #1011489 filed against wiipdf.
  • #1011490 filed against gdigi.
  • #1011491 filed against getstream.
  • #1011493 filed against freecdb.
  • #1011495 filed against modglue.
  • #1011496 filed against nwall.
  • #1011498 filed against parprouted.
  • #1011499 filed against imagination.
  • #1011500 filed against tuxcmd-modules.
  • #1011501 filed against libapache2-mod-authn-yubikey.
  • #1011503 filed against libapache2-mod-auth-plain.
  • lcsync (remove build paths)

Reproducible builds website Chris Lamb updated the main Reproducible Builds website and documentation in a number of small ways, but also prepared and published an interview with Jan Nieuwenhuizen about Bootstrappable Builds, GNU Mes and GNU Guix. [ ][ ][ ][ ] In addition, Tim Jones added a link to the Talos Linux project [ ] and billchenchina fixed a dead link [ ].

Testing framework The Reproducible Builds project runs a significant testing framework at tests.reproducible-builds.org, to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. This month, the following changes were made:

• Holger Levsen:
  • Add support for detecting running kernels that require attention. [ ]
  • Temporarily configure a host to support performing Debian builds for packages that lack .buildinfo files. [ ]
  • Update generated webpages to clarify wishes for feedback. [ ]
  • Update copyright years on various scripts. [ ]
• Mattia Rizzolo:
  • Provide a facility so that Debian Live image generation can copy a file remotely. [ ][ ][ ][ ]
• Roland Clobus:
  • Add initial support for testing generated images with OpenQA. [ ]

And finally, as usual, node maintenance was also performed by Holger Levsen [ ][ ].

Misc news On our mailing list this month:

• John Neffenger posted that the early-access release of OpenJDK version 19 build 21 is reproducible.
• Mattia Rizzolo added a request around tentatively planning a Reproducible Builds summit in 2022.
• Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted about a Reproducible Builds meetup at the openSUSE conference in Nuremberg.
• Luca Boccassi asked for help getting arm64 binaries to build reproducibly for the Debian systemd package.
• Yaobin Wen asked a number of questions in an attempt to discover the best practices for manage Debian .dsc files using reprepro.

Contact If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

• IRC: #reproducible-builds on irc.oftc.net.
• Twitter: @ReproBuilds
• Mailing list: rb-general@lists.reproducible-builds.org

• Abhijith PA did 14h out of 14h assigned
• Anton Gladky did 20h out of 20h assigned
• Ben Hutchings did 11h out of 16h assigned and 8h from March, thus carrying over 13h to May
• Chris Lamb did 18h out of 18h assigned
• Emilio Pozuelo Monfort did 18h (out of 53.25h assigned), thus carrying over 35.25h to May
• Jeremiah Foster did 9.5h out of 13.5h assigned, thus carrying over 4h to May
• Markus Koschany did 40 out of 40h assigned
• Roberto C. S nchez did 18h carried out from March
• Sylvain Beucler did 20h out of 14.5h assigned and 25.5h from March, thus carrying over 20h to May
• Thorsten Alteholz did 40h out of 40h assigned
• Utkarsh Gupta did 23.25h out of 51.5h assigned and 1.75h from March, thus carrying over 30h to May

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