Search Results: "Daniel Kahn Gillmor"

23 January 2009

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: target disk mode (sbp-2 mass storage host mode?)

One very convenient feature of Apple's hardware is the ability for their workstations to enter target disk mode. This effectively transforms the machine into a glorified ieee1394 (firewire) block device, which can then be manipulated from outside the machine using the standard SBP-2 protocol. Is there a way to provide this same functionality from a running GNU/Linux machine? For example, i have a GNU/Linux system with a block device attached to it. I would prefer if the block device was available to a neighboring machine, but (for whatever reason) i'm unable to physically move it. However, i'm able to link the two machines via a simple ieee1394 connection. A "virtual target disk mode" server (or would it be better to say "an SBP-2 mass storage target service over an ieee1394 link"?) would be really useful. One thing that occurs to me is that i could do some sort of networking abstraction over the link (using eth1394?), and then use something like vblade (an ATA-over-Ethernet target service) to provide a virtual block device to the remote host. However, this requires the remote host to run an operating system capable of dealing with these (more obscure) protocols, and i'd like this to work for any remote machine that knows how to deal with generic SBP-2 ieee1394 mass storage. I know that in general GNU/Linux is at least as powerful and capable as the firmware that Apple ships ;) But it's possible that our community just hasn't gotten around to implementing something like this. Is this the case? My attempts to search for it haven't turned up anything, but it's entirely possible that i'm reading the wrong docs (or reading the docs wrong). Any pointers?Tags: firewire, ieee1394, sbp2, vblade

22 January 2009

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: Trancendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach

Poking around the web site for Law in Contemporary Society, a class taught this semester by Eben Moglen, (who is counsel for the Free Software Foundation and founder of the Software Freedom Law Center), i found Felix Cohen's Trancendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, which (according to wikipedia) is one of "the most-cited law review articles ever written". I haven't read the whole thing yet (and i'm neither a lawyer nor a philosopher) but it's fascinating reading. And from what i've read so far, it's a strong push toward directly addressing the values that lie hidden beneath our technical or mechanical decisions, and to avoid mistaking technical success or skill with a worthwhile outcome and clear goals at a societal level. This is something we software developers and system administrators struggle with as well (or at least i think we should). It's neat to get my head around these concepts from a different intellectual sphere, and a different era (74 years ago!) when the technical and mechanical tools i work with didn't exist in anything like their present form. This kind of reading makes me wonder what works from Computer Science or Systems Engineering or Information Technology will have this kind of exhortative power and social relevance so far into the future. Do you have a favorite (or abhorred?) text from your field that offers the kind of moral and technical challenges that Cohen's work does?Tags: law, moglen, philosophy

31 December 2008

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: sysadvent -- 25 days of systems administration

I just ran across Jordan Sissel's sysadvent project, where he posted one article about systems administration each day from the 1st of December to the 25th. Jordan has been a great communicator when we've exchanged mail (he's the author of xdotool, which i maintain for debian). Unsurprisingly, his posts in sysadvent are also excellent. He has a broad knowledge of what tools are available, clever insights in how to connect them together, an engaging and clear writing style, and sharp sense of what really should matter to a systems administrator. Definitely worth reading!

16 October 2008

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: wireless hardware switches (pciehp is your friend)

I've been playing around with an eeePC 900, which is very well-supported by debian. Kudos to the eeepc team! I had one problem with it, after upgrading eeepc-acpi-scripts from version 1.0.4 to 1.0.9: with 1.0.4, i was able to use an ACPI hotkey to disable and re-enable the wireless. With 1.0.9, the device did not come back up for me after a toggle. The problem was resolved for me with:
echo pciehp >> /etc/modules
which i figured out from reading a brief post on the very-informative debian-eeepc-devel mailing list. The rest of this post explores why that was the answer for me. This entry has been truncated read the full entry.Tags: eeepc, wlan

4 September 2008

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: Monkeysphere: an OpenPGP-based PKI for SSH

Ever thought that there should be an automated way to handle ssh keys? Do you know the administrators of your servers, and wish that SSH could verify new host keys from them automatically, based on your personal connections to the web-of-trust? Do you wish you could revoke and/or rotate your old SSH authentication keys without having to log into every single machine you have an account on?Do you administer servers, and wish you could re-key them without sowing massive confusion among your users (or worse, encouraging bad security habits among them)? Do you wish you could grant access to your users by name, instead of by opaque string? Do you wish you could rapidly revoke access to a user (or compromised key) across a group of machines by disabling authentication for that user?A group of us have been working on a public key infrastructure for SSH. Monkeysphere makes use of the existing OpenPGP web-of-trust to fetch and cryptographically validate (and revoke!) keys. This works in both direction: authorized_keys and known_hosts are handled. Monkeysphere gives users and admins tools to deal with SSH keys by thinking about the people and machines to whom the keys belong, instead of requiring humans to do tedious (and error-prone) manual key verification.We have debian packages available which should install against lenny (for i386, amd64, powerpc, and arm architectures at the moment), a mailing list, and open ears for good questions, suggestions and criticism.If you have a chance to give it a try (as a user or as an admin), it would be great to get feedback.

18 June 2008

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: transient "obsolete packages" with apt

On the testing and unstable systems that i run, i occasionally get a disturbing "there are N newly obsolete packages" message. For example
[0 root@squeak ~]# aptitude update
Hit http://cmrg.fifthhorseman.net unstable Release.gpg
 [...]
Get:42 http://ftp.us.debian.org unstable/main [2077kB]                          
Fetched 15.2MB in 57s (262kB/s)                                                 
Reading package lists... Done
Updating debtags database...... Done
Current status: 3 updates [+3], 1136 new [-21212].
There are 1804 newly obsolete packages.
[255 root@squeak ~]# 
Usually, i can fix this with another aptitude update. Does this mean i've hit a mirror at an inopportune time? Or do i have apt mis-configured somehow? Other people have documented this before, and casual conversation with friends lets me know it's not just me. If this is due to some inconsistency at the mirrors (particularly for suites with rolling updates?), is there some way to engineer the mirror transfers so that this doesn't happen? For example (i have no idea how this stuff is done, so i'm just making this up):
  1. rsync the pool/ without --delete to all mirrors,
  2. rsync the Packages and Release, and DiffIndex files to all mirrors,
  3. rsync the pool/ with --delete
Or should apt itself deal with these circumstances differently? It seems like signed apt ought to be able to detect when something like this is amiss. I'm reluctant to consider the situation acceptable, because i'd like to be able to trust apt in general. In particular, i can imagine apt eventually becoming more assertive about suggesting removal of newly obsolete and unsupported packages. If it is wrong about what's obsolete and unsupported, this could be dangerous.

3 June 2008

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: Can you mirror-read?

A high school student i work with is trying to gather data on the prevalence of mirror-reading (the ability to easily read text that is reversed left-to-right). He's posted a simple webapp to gather data points for his experiment. It should take only a couple of minutes to try it out and give him some data. If he gets enough data to write something up, i'll try to encourage him to publish his results as well.

22 May 2008

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: New York State Electronic Records Report

The CIO and the Office For Technology of New York State (USA) just released a new report on electronic records strategy, titled A Strategy for Openness: Enhancing E-Records Access in New York State. I submitted my own comments during the call for public comments earlier this year -- apparently there were only 114 comments submitted by the public (you can see the call for comments and an overview/analysis of the responses). I wish there'd been more, since it looks like the 59 individual commenters were overwhelmingly supportive of a requirement for the Gov't to use ODF. The rest of the comments were from governments, NGOs, and businesses, and they don't seem as unanimous as the individual commenters. Looking at the metadata for the executive summary shows just how far we have to go:
[0 dkg@squeak doc]$ pdfinfo PartIerecordsStudy.pdf    egrep '^Title Producer Creator'
Title:          Microsoft Word - PartIerecordsStudy.doc
Creator:        PScript5.dll Version 5.2.2
Producer:       Acrobat Distiller 8.1.0 (Windows)
[0 dkg@squeak doc]$ 
And in a message sent to commenters announcing the report, they seem to be aware that they're not quite doing their best at interoperability:
(Please note this is the first time any of NYS government's agencies has ever published a document in ODF format. We ran into problems this morning not caused by the format, but rather with some controls on our systems which were not prepared to encounter such documents. So the website links to ODF versions are not working at the moment, but will be repaired soon).
What web server are they running that is having trouble "encountering" ODF? No surprise:
[0 dkg@squeak doc]$ wget -S -O/dev/null 'http://www.oft.state.ny.us/policy/esra/erecords-study.htm' 2>&1   grep Server
  Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
[0 dkg@squeak doc]$ 
Sigh. My initial reaction to the report (i've only read the executive summary, not the supporting documentation) is disappointment. While they claim that "openness" is an important feature, they fall far short of taking a strong stand for free and open formats. The main thrust of the executive summary seems to be (paraphrasing here, i welcome corrections): While these are unsurprising conclusions, they don't take the strong stand i'd like them to take. They seem aware of the "chicken and egg" problem of wide adoption and vendor support, and aware of the anti-democratic effects of proprietary formats. But they don't seem to be willing to act as a catalyst to push free formats explicitly. If they did, they could break the chicken/egg vendor lock-in cycle and facilitate better open government practices while simultaneously encouraging a healthy information ecosystem. At this point, i suppose my biggest hope from the process is that the proposed ERC forms pilot groups with long-term goals modeled after Munich, but i'm not holding my breath. If there are any advocates or participants in the Munich process who want to share what's been working for you (and what hasn't), i'd be interested in hearing about it.Tags: government, odf, policy

21 May 2008

Steve Kemp: You get the dwarf. I get the girl.

Recently I have mostly been "behind". I've caught up a little on what I wanted to do though over the past couple of days, so I won't feel too bad. I've:
made a new release of the chronicle blog compiler, after recieving more great feedback from MJ Ray. un-stalled the Planet Debian. updated the weblogs hosted by Debian Administration, after help and suggestions from Daniel Kahn Gillmor. stripped, cleaned, and tested a new steam engine. Nearly dying in the process. discovered a beautiful XSS attack against a popular social networking site, then exploited that en masse to collect hundreds of username/password pairs - all because the site admins said "Prove it" when I reported the hole. Decisions decisions .. what to do with the list... released a couple of woefully late DSAs. started learning British Sign Language.
Anyway I've been bad and not writing much recently on the Debian Administration site, partly because I'm just sick of the trolling comments that have been building up, and partly due to general lack of time. I know I should ignore them, and I guess by mentioning them here I've kinda already lost, but I find it hard to care when random folk are being snipy. Still I've remembed that some people are just great to hear from. I know if I see mail from XX they will offer an incisive, valid, criticism or a fully tested and working patch. Sometimes both at the same time. In conclusion I need my pending holiday in the worst way; and I must find time to write another letter... ObQuote: Dungeons & Dragons

20 May 2008

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: on limiting damage from a compromised ssh host

An interesting thread on openssh-unix-dev points out a way that a compromised remote ssh account or host could potentially trick users into divulging the passphrase for their local secret key. Given that we're all dealing with the potential for compromised ssh hosts lately, i think this is an important consideration. (this has apparently been raised on openssh-unix-dev as far back as 8 years ago). Unfortunately, a couple messages with mangled headers seem to have broken the thread into two chunks in the archive, severing the start of the thread from the part where it starts getting really good: In particular, Damien Miller's suggestion is to forbid in-terminal key-based authentication entirely, and rely instead on ssh-agent. My impression of this strategy is that it's analogous to forcing an out-of-band verification process -- since the in-channel communication is happening in the tty, and the remote host will have some level of control over the tty once authentication succeeds, it's important that any locally-divulged secrets (e.g. the passphrase for the local secret key) are not transmitted over the tty in question. Of course, disabling in-terminal key-based authentication creates something of a usability problem for users who aren't using X11 (and who don't have some other method for an out-of-band ssh-askpass). And it also points out the additional problems with X11 forwarding (e.g. a compromised host allowed to forward X connections could trigger a mimicry of a standard ssh-askpass password prompt). This is something that debian might want to consider, as we've diverged from upstream on the default settings for ForwardX11Trusted. I'm uncomfortable with how Damien's suggestion raises the bar to key-based authentication in general, since users will now have to understand both keys and agents in order to effectively authenticate this way. But maybe that's what's needed, since we desperately need to phase out password-based authentication (and all the security pitfalls associated with it) in this brave new networked world. At any rate, i've adopted the suggestion for now:
[0 dkg@squeak ~]$ tail -n1 .ssh/config
IdentityFile none
[0 dkg@squeak ~]$ 
I'm curious to know if other people have adopted this strategy, or have other mitigating techniques.Tags: security, ssh

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: debhelper 7 and lintian disagree

I'm excited by version 7 of debhelper, in particular the opportunity for debian/rules minimization. I suspect this will lower the barrier for rapid, reasonable packaging of simple software tools in a way that should be easy to audit and maintain. The most-minimized debian/rules possible with it is just (from dh(1)):
#!/usr/bin/make -f
%:
	dh $@
And all of the project-specific interesting bits go into nice, clean, well-named files under debian/. However, lintian (at least as of 1.23.48) complains loudly about the minimized debian/rules:
E: xdotool source: debian-rules-missing-required-target binary
E: xdotool source: debian-rules-missing-required-target binary-arch
E: xdotool source: debian-rules-missing-required-target binary-indep
E: xdotool source: debian-rules-missing-required-target build
E: xdotool source: debian-rules-missing-required-target clean
I'm not sure the right way to proceed: should i try to manually add overrides for each package that uses a minimized debian/rules? Should lintian recognize debhelper-specific minimized rules files and accept them? Should debhelper assuage lintian somehow? Or is this rules file minimization actually not as good an idea as I think it is? I notice that mr, which is Joey Hess's first example package using the minimized rules also reports the same errors.Tags: debhelper, lintian, packaging

9 May 2008

Daniel Kahn Gillmor: GNOME and libpam-mount

So i've been struggling with an Ubuntu 8.04 networked workstation. It uses libpam-mount to mount the user's homedir (actually, the mountpoint is one level up from the homedir) automatically at login over CIFS. One of the problems i ran into with this arrangement happened because i was following the pam_mount configuration instructions too literally. In particular, README.Debian.gz says:
For every application used for logging in, there is a file of the form /etc/pam.d/xyz, add the following line at the end of the file:
@include common-pammount
In particular, ubuntu's /etc/pam.d/gdm defaults to:
#%PAM-1.0                                                                                                                                                               
auth    requisite       pam_nologin.so
auth    required        pam_env.so readenv=1
auth    required        pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
@include common-auth
auth    optional        pam_gnome_keyring.so
@include common-account
session required        pam_limits.so
@include common-session
session optional        pam_gnome_keyring.so auto_start
@include common-password
When i added the @include common-pammount directive to the bottom of this file when using pam_mount, new GNOME sessions failed badly: the gnome-panel didn't appear (which means that the user couldn't log out conveniently), and two error messages popped up at each login with nasty details like:
No database available to save your configuration: Unable to store a value at [...], as the configuration server has no writable databases.
The problem seems to be that libpam-gnome-keyring actually kicks off gconfd-2 during its PAM session invocation. If that comes before libpam-mount's PAM session invocation, then the home directory isn't mounted for the keyring, and gconfd-2 decides that it is unable to save any settings. Since gconfd then persists for the rest of the session, further GNOME session components try to talk to it and it refuses, even though the gconf db is now available (via the mounted homedir). Since the order of the lines in a /etc/pam.d/* are semantically relevant, i'm usually very reluctant to tamper with the defaults. However, i think the correct /etc/pam.d/gdm for this scenario (or any pam-mount scenario using GNOME where the homedir might not be present at all before the session) is actually:
#%PAM-1.0                                                                                                                                                               
auth    requisite       pam_nologin.so
auth    required        pam_env.so readenv=1
auth    required        pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
@include common-auth
@include common-account
session required        pam_limits.so
@include common-session
@include common-password
@include common-pammount
auth    optional        pam_gnome_keyring.so
session optional        pam_gnome_keyring.so auto_start
With this configuration in place, i can successfully log in with a test user, anyway (and move on to the next problem, which appears to be SQLite over CIFS, ugh). These sorts of problems are tough to nail down: Or maybe it's just a configuration detail that i should have known about and expected to deal with in the first place. Ah, well.

Next.

Previous.