Search Results: "js"

30 July 2025

Utkarsh Gupta: FOSS Activites in July 2025

Here s my 70th monthly but brief update about the activities I ve done in the F/L/OSS world.

Debian
This was my 79th month of actively contributing to Debian. I became a DM in late March 2019 and a DD on Christmas 19! \o/ Debian was in freeze throughout so whilst I didn t do many uploads, there s a bunch of other things I did:
  • Attended DebConf25 in Brest, France.
    • Lead the bursary BOF and discussions.
    • Participated in other sessions, especially around the FTP masters.
    • I ve started to look at things with my trainee hat on.
    • Participated in the Debian Security Tracker sprints during DebCamp. More on that below.
  • Mentoring for newcomers.
  • Moderation of -project mailing list.

Ubuntu
This was my 54th month of actively contributing to Ubuntu. I joined Canonical to work on Ubuntu full-time back in February 2021. Whilst I can t give a full, detailed list of things I did (there s so much and some of it might not be public yet!), here s a quick TL;DR of what I did:
  • Released Questing snapshot 3! \o/
  • EOL d Oracular. o/
  • Participated in the mid-cycle sprints.
  • Got a recognition award for leading 24.04.2 LTS release and leading the Release Management team.
  • Preparing for the 24.04.3 LTS release early next month.

Debian (E)LTS
Debian Long Term Support (LTS) is a project to extend the lifetime of all Debian stable releases to (at least) 5 years. Debian LTS is not handled by the Debian security team, but by a separate group of volunteers and companies interested in making it a success. And Debian Extended LTS (ELTS) is its sister project, extending support to the stretch and jessie release (+2 years after LTS support). This was my 70th month as a Debian LTS and 57th month as a Debian ELTS paid contributor.
I only worked for 15.00 hours for LTS and 5.00 hours for ELTS and did the following things:
  • [LTS] Released DLA 4263-1 for ruby-graphql.
    • Coordinated with upstream due to lack of clarity on 1.11.4 being affected & not having a clear reproducer.
    • As 1.11.4 was still partially vulnerable and the backport was non-trivial, it was probably conveinent to bump the upstream version to 1.11.12 instead, fixing:
    • CVE-2025-27407): a remote code execution.
    • Salsa repository: https://salsa.debian.org/lts-team/packages/ruby-graphql.
    • Coordinated with the Security team for a p-u fix or a DSA.
  • [E/LTS] Frontdesk duty from 28th July to 04th August.
  • [LTS] Attended the monthly LTS meeting on IRC. Summary here.

Debian Security Tracker sprint 2025 Thanks to the LTS team for also organizing a security tracker sprint during DebCamp25. I attended the sprint and spent 10 hours working on the following tasks: That s all. A quicky shoutout to Roberto for organizing the sprints remotely and being awake at odd hours. <3
Until next time.
:wq for today.

28 July 2025

Dimitri John Ledkov: Achieving actually full disk encryption of UEFI ESP at rest with TCG OPAL, FIPS, LUKS

Achieving full disk encryption using FIPS, TCG OPAL and LUKS to encrypt UEFI ESP on bare-metal and in VMs
Many security standards such as CIS and STIG require to protect information at rest. For example, NIST SP 800-53r5 SC-28 advocate to use cryptographic protection, offline storage and TPMs to enhance protection of information confidentiality and/or integrity.Traditionally to satisfy such controls on portable devices such as laptops one would utilize software based Full Disk Encryption - Mac OS X FileVault, Windows Bitlocker, Linux cryptsetup LUKS2. In cases when FIPS cryptography is required, additional burden would be placed onto these systems to operate their kernels in FIPS mode.Trusted Computing Group works on establishing many industry standards and specifications, which are widely adopted to improve safety and security of computing whilst keeping it easy to use. One of their most famous specifications them is TCG TPM 2.0 (Trusted Platform Module). TPMs are now widely available on most devices and help to protect secret keys and attest systems. For example, most software full disk encryption solutions can utilise TCG TPM to store full disk encryption keys providing passwordless, biometric or pin-base ways to unlock the drives as well as attesting that system have not been modified or compromised whilst offline.TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification is a set of specifications for features of data storage devices. The authors and contributors to OPAL are leading and well trusted storage manufacturers such as Samsung, Western Digital, Seagate Technologies, Dell, Google, Lenovo, IBM, Kioxia, among others. One of the features that Opal Specification enables is self-encrypting drives which becomes very powerful when combined with pre-boot authentication. Out of the box, such drives always and transparently encrypt all disk data using hardware acceleration. To protect data one can enter UEFI firmware setup (BIOS) to set NVMe single user password (or user + administrator/recovery passwords) to encrypt the disk encryption key. If one's firmware didn't come with such features, one can also use SEDutil to inspect and configure all of this. Latest release of major Linux distributions have SEDutil already packaged.Once password is set, on startup, pre-boot authentication will request one to enter password - prior to booting any operating systems. It means that full disk is actually encrypted, including the UEFI ESP and all operating systems that are installed in case of dual or multi-boot installations. This also prevents tampering with ESP, UEFI bootloaders and kernels which with traditional software-based encryption often remain unencrypted and accessible. It also means one doesn't have to do special OS level repartitioning, or installation steps to ensure all data is encrypted at rest.What about FIPS compliance? Well, the good news is that majority of the OPAL compliant hard drives and/or security sub-chips do have FIPS 140-3 certification. Meaning they have been tested by independent laboratories to ensure they do in-fact encrypt data. On the CMVP website one can search for module name terms "OPAL" or "NVMe" or name of hardware vendor to locate FIPS certificates.Are such drives widely available? Yes. For example, a common Thinkpad X1 gen 11 has OPAL NVMe drives as standard, and they have FIPS certification too. Thus, it is likely in your hardware fleet these are already widely available. Use sedutil to check if MediaEncrypt and LockingSupported features are available.Well, this is great for laptops and physical servers, but you may ask - what about public or private cloud? Actually, more or less the same is already in-place in both. On CVMP website all major clouds have their disk encryption hardware certified, and all of them always encrypt all Virtual Machines with FIPS certified cryptography without an ability to opt-out. One is however in full control of how the encryption keys are managed: cloud-provider or self-managed (either with a cloud HSM or KMS or bring your own / external). See these relevant encryption options and key management docs for GCP, Azure, AWS. But the key takeaway without doing anything, at rest, VMs in public cloud are always encrypted and satisfy NIST SP 800-53 controls.What about private cloud? Most Linux based private clouds ultimately use qemu typically with qcow2 virtual disk images. Qemu supports user-space encryption of qcow2 disk, see this manpage. Such encryption encrypts the full virtual machine disk, including the bootloader and ESP. And it is handled entirely outside of the VM on the host - meaning the VM never has access to the disk encryption keys. Qemu implements this encryption entirely in userspace using gnutls, nettle, libgcrypt depending on how it was compiled. This also means one can satisfy FIPS requirements entirely in userspace without a Linux kernel in FIPS mode. Higher level APIs built on top of qemu also support qcow2 disk encryption, as in projects such as libvirt and OpenStack Cinder.If you carefully read the docs, you may notice that agent support is explicitly sometimes called out as not supported or not mentioned. Quite often agents running inside the OS may not have enough observability to them to assess if there is external encryption. It does mean that monitoring above encryption options require different approaches - for example monitor your cloud configuration using tools such as Wiz and Orca, rather than using agents inside individual VMs. For laptop / endpoint security agents, I do wish they would start gaining capability to report OPAL SED availability and status if it is active or not.What about using software encryption none-the-less on top of the above solutions? It is commonly referred to double or multiple encryption. There will be an additional performance impact, but it can be worthwhile. It really depends on what you define as data at rest for yourself and which controls you need. If one has a dual-boot laptop, and wants to keep one OS encrypted whilst booted into the other, it can perfectly reasonable to encrypted the two using separate software encryption keys. In addition to the OPAL encryption of the ESP. For more targeted per-file / per-folder encryption, one can look into using gocryptfs which is the best successor to the once popular, but now deprecated eCryptfs (amazing tool, but has fallen behind in development and can lead to data loss).All of the above mostly talks about cryptographic encryption, which only provides confidentially but not data integrity. To protect integrity, one needs to choose how to maintain that. dm-verity is a good choice for read-only and rigid installations. For read-write workloads, it may be easier to deploy ZFS or Btrfs instead. If one is using filesystems without a built-in integrity support such as XFS or Ext4, one can retrofit integrity layer to them by using dm-integrity (either standalone, or via dm-luks/cryptsetup --integrity option).

If one has a lot of estate and a lot of encryption keys to keep track off a key management solution is likely needed. The most popular solution is likely the one from Thales Group marketed under ChiperTrust Data Security Platform (previously Vormetric), but there are many others including OEM / Vendor / Hardware / Cloud specific or agnostic solutions.

I hope this crash course guide piques your interest to learn and discover modern confidentially and integrity solutions, and to re-affirm or change your existing controls w.r.t. to data protection at rest.

Full disk encryption, including UEFI ESP /boot/efi is now widely achievable by default on both baremetal machines and in VMs including with FIPS certification. To discuss more let's connect on Linkedin.

26 July 2025

Matthew Palmer: Object deserialization attacks using Ruby's Oj JSON parser

tl;dr: there is an attack in the wild which is triggering dangerous-but-seemingly-intended behaviour in the Oj JSON parser when used in the default and recommended manner, which can lead to everyone s favourite kind of security problem: object deserialization bugs! If you have the oj gem anywhere in your Gemfile.lock, the quickest mitigation is to make sure you have Oj.default_options = mode: :strict somewhere, and that no library is overwriting that setting to something else.

Prologue As a sensible sysadmin, all the sites I run send me a notification if any unhandled exception gets raised. Mostly, what I get sent is error-handling corner cases I missed, but now and then things get more interesting. In this case, it was a PG::UndefinedColumn exception, which looked something like this:
PG::UndefinedColumn: ERROR:  column "xyzzydeadbeef" does not exist
This is weird on two fronts: firstly, this application has been running for a while, and if there was a schema problem, I d expect it to have made itself apparent long before now. And secondly, while I don t profess to perfection in my programming, I m usually better at naming my database columns than that. Something is definitely hinky here, so let s jump into the mystery mobile!

The column name is coming from outside the building! The exception notifications I get sent include a whole lot of information about the request that caused the exception, including the request body. In this case, the request body was JSON, and looked like this:
 "name":":xyzzydeadbeef", ... 
The leading colon looks an awful lot like the syntax for a Ruby symbol, but it s in a JSON string. Surely there s no way a JSON parser would be turning that into a symbol, right? Right?!? Immediately, I thought that that possibly was what was happening, because I use Sequel for my SQL database access needs, and Sequel treats symbols as database column names. It seemed like too much of a coincidence that a vaguely symbol-shaped string was being sent in, and the exact same name was showing up as a column name. But how the flying fudgepickles was a JSON string being turned into a Ruby symbol, anyway? Enter Oj.

Oj? I barely know aj A long, long time ago, the standard Ruby JSON library had a reputation for being slow. Thus did many competitors flourish, claiming more features and better performance. Strong amongst the contenders was oj (for Optimized JSON ), touted as The fastest JSON parser and object serializer . Given the history, it s not surprising that people who wanted the best possible performance turned to Oj, leading to it being found in a great many projects, often as a sub-dependency of a dependency of a dependency (which is how it ended up in my project). You might have noticed in Oj s description that, in addition to claiming fastest , it also describes itself as an object serializer . Anyone who has kept an eye on the security bug landscape will recall that object deserialization is a rich vein of vulnerabilities to mine. Libraries that do object deserialization, especially ones with a history that goes back to before the vulnerability class was well-understood, are likely to be trouble magnets. And thus, it turns out to be with Oj. By default, Oj will happily turn any string that starts with a colon into a symbol:

>> require "oj"
>> Oj.load(' "name":":xyzzydeadbeef","username":"bob","answer":42 ')
=>  "name"=>:xyzzydeadbeef, "username"=>"bob", "answer"=>42 

How that gets exploited is only limited by the creativity of an attacker. Which I ll talk about more shortly but first, a word from my rant cortex.

Insecure By Default is a Cancer While the object of my ire today is Oj and its fast-and-loose approach to deserialization, it is just one example of a pervasive problem in software: insecurity by default. Whether it s a database listening on 0.0.0.0 with no password as soon as its installed, or a library whose default behaviour is to permit arbitrary code execution, it all contributes to a software ecosystem that is an appalling security nightmare. When a user (in this case, a developer who wants to parse JSON) comes across a new piece of software, they have by definition no idea what they re doing with that software. They re going to use the defaults, and follow the most easily-available documentation, to achieve their goal. It is unrealistic to assume that a new user of a piece of software is going to do things the right way , unless that right way is the only way, or at least the by-far-the-easiest way. Conversely, the developer(s) of the software is/are the domain experts. They have knowledge of the problem domain, through their exploration while building the software, and unrivalled expertise in the codebase. Given this disparity in knowledge, it is tantamount to malpractice for the experts the developer(s) to off-load the responsibility for the safe and secure use of the software to the party that has the least knowledge of how to do that (the new user). To apply this general principle to the specific case, take the Using section of the Oj README. The example code there calls Oj.load, with no indication that this code will, in fact, parse specially-crafted JSON documents into Ruby objects. The brand-user user of the library, no doubt being under pressure to Get Things Done, is almost certainly going to look at this Using example, get the apparent result they were after (a parsed JSON document), and call it a day. It is unlikely that a brand-new user will, for instance, scroll down to the Further Reading section, find the second last (of ten) listed documents, Security.md , and carefully peruse it. If they do, they ll find an oblique suggestion that parsing untrusted input is never a good idea . While that s true, it s also rather unhelpful, because I d wager that by far the majority of JSON parsed in the world is untrusted , in one way or another, given the predominance of JSON as a format for serializing data passing over the Internet. This guidance is roughly akin to putting a label on a car s airbags that driving at speed can be hazardous to your health : true, but unhelpful under the circumstances. The solution is for default behaviours to be secure, and any deviation from that default that has the potential to degrade security must, at the very least, be clearly labelled as such. For example, the Oj.load function should be named Oj.unsafe_load, and the Oj.load function should behave as the Oj.safe_load function does presently. By naming the unsafe function as explicitly unsafe, developers (and reviewers) have at least a fighting chance of recognising they re doing something risky. We put warning labels on just about everything in the real world; the same should be true of dangerous function calls. OK, rant over. Back to the story.

But how is this exploitable? So far, I ve hopefully made it clear that Oj does some Weird Stuff with parsing certain JSON strings. It caused an unhandled exception in a web application I run, which isn t cool, but apart from bombing me with exception notifications, what s the harm? For starters, let s look at our original example: when presented with a symbol, Sequel will interpret that as a column name, rather than a string value. Thus, if our save an update to the user code looked like this:

# request_body has the JSON representation of the form being submitted
body = Oj.load(request_body)
DB[:users].where(id: user_id).update(name: body["name"])

In normal operation, this will issue an SQL query along the lines of UPDATE users SET name='Jaime' WHERE id=42. If the name given is Jaime O Dowd , all is still good, because Sequel quotes string values, etc etc. All s well so far. But, imagine there is a column in the users table that normally users cannot read, perhaps admin_notes. Or perhaps an attacker has gotten temporary access to an account, and wants to dump the user s password hash for offline cracking. So, they send an update claiming that their name is :admin_notes (or :password_hash). In JSON, that ll look like "name":":admin_notes" , and Oj.load will happily turn that into a Ruby object of "name"=>:admin_notes . When run through the above update the user code fragment, it ll produce the SQL UPDATE users SET name=admin_notes WHERE id=42. In other words, it ll copy the contents of the admin_notes column into the name column which the attacker can then read out just by refreshing their profile page.

But Wait, There s More! That an attacker can read other fields in the same table isn t great, but that s barely scratching the surface. Remember before I said that Oj does object serialization ? That means that, in general, you can create arbitrary Ruby objects from JSON. Since objects contain code, it s entirely possible to trigger arbitrary code execution by instantiating an appropriate Ruby object. I m not going to go into details about how to do this, because it s not really my area of expertise, and many others have covered it in detail. But rest assured, if an attacker can feed input of their choosing into a default call to Oj.load, they ve been handed remote code execution on a platter.

Mitigations As Oj s object deserialization is intended and documented behaviour, don t expect a future release to make any of this any safer. Instead, we need to mitigate the risks. Here are my recommended steps:
  1. Look in your Gemfile.lock (or SBOM, if that s your thing) to see if the oj gem is anywhere in your codebase. Remember that even if you don t use it directly, it s popular enough that it is used in a lot of places. If you find it in your transitive dependency tree anywhere, there s a chance you re vulnerable, limited only by the ingenuity of attackers to feed crafted JSON into a deeply-hidden Oj.load call.
  2. If you depend on oj directly and use it in your project, consider not doing that. The json gem is acceptably fast, and JSON.parse won t create arbitrary Ruby objects.
  3. If you really, really need to squeeze the last erg of performance out of your JSON parsing, and decide to use oj to do so, find all calls to Oj.load in your code and switch them to call Oj.safe_load.
  4. It is a really, really bad idea to ever use Oj to deserialize JSON into objects, as it lacks the safety features needed to mitigate the worst of the risks of doing so (for example, restricting which classes can be instantiated, as is provided by the permitted_classes argument to Psych.load). I d make it a priority to move away from using Oj for that, and switch to something somewhat safer (such as the aforementioned Psych). At the very least, audit and comment heavily to minimise the risk of user-provided input sneaking into those calls somehow, and pass mode: :object as the second argument to Oj.load, to make it explicit that you are opting-in to this far more dangerous behaviour only when it s absolutely necessary.
  5. To secure any unsafe uses of Oj.load in your dependencies, consider setting the default Oj parsing mode to :strict, by putting Oj.default_options = mode: :strict somewhere in your initialization code (and make sure no dependencies are setting it to something else later!). There is a small chance that this change of default might break something, if a dependency is using Oj to deliberately create Ruby objects from JSON, but the overwhelming likelihood is that Oj s just being used to parse ordinary JSON, and these calls are just RCE vulnerabilities waiting to give you a bad time.

Is Your Bacon Saved? If I ve helped you identify and fix potential RCE vulnerabilities in your software, or even just opened your eyes to the risks of object deserialization, please help me out by buying me a refreshing beverage. I would really appreciate any support you can give. Alternately, if you d like my help in fixing these (and many other) sorts of problems, I m looking for work, so email me.

22 July 2025

Iustin Pop: Watching website scanning bots

Ever since I put up http://demo.corydalis.io, and setup logcheck, I m inadvertently keeping up with recent exploits in common CMS frameworks, or maybe even normal web frameworks issues, by seeing what 404s I get from the logs. Now, I didn t indent to do this per se, I just wanted to make sure I don t have any 500s, and at one point, I did actually catch a bug by seeing seemingly valid URLs, with referrer my own pages, leading to 404s. But besides that, it s mainly a couple times per week, a bot finds the site, and then it tries in fast succession something like this (real log entries, with the source IP address removed):
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:09 +0200] "GET /pms?module=logging&file_name=../../../../../../~/.aws/credentials&number_of_lines=10000 HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:11 +0200] "GET /admin/config?cmd=cat+/root/.aws/credentials HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:11 +0200] "GET /.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:13 +0200] "GET /.env.local HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:13 +0200] "GET /.env.production HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:16 +0200] "GET /.env.dev HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:17 +0200] "GET /.env.development HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:19 +0200] "GET /.env.prod HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:19 +0200] "GET /.env.stage HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:22 +0200] "GET /.env.test HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:23 +0200] "GET /.env.example HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:25 +0200] "GET /.env.bak HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:26 +0200] "GET /.env.old HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:28 +0200] "GET /.envs/.production/.django HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:28 +0200] "GET /blog.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:31 +0200] "GET /wp-content/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:32 +0200] "GET /application/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:34 +0200] "GET /app/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:35 +0200] "GET /apps/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:37 +0200] "GET /config/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:38 +0200] "GET /config/config.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:40 +0200] "GET /config/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:41 +0200] "GET /api/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:43 +0200] "GET /vendor/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:44 +0200] "GET /backend/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:46 +0200] "GET /server/.env HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:46 +0200] "GET /home/user/.aws/credentials HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:49 +0200] "GET /aws/credentials HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:50 +0200] "GET /.aws/credentials HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:52 +0200] "GET /.aws/config HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:52 +0200] "GET /config/aws.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:55 +0200] "GET /config/aws.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:55 +0200] "GET /.env.production HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:58 +0200] "GET /config.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:27:59 +0200] "GET /config/config.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:01 +0200] "GET /config/settings.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:02 +0200] "GET /config/secrets.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:04 +0200] "GET /config.yaml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:04 +0200] "GET /config.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:07 +0200] "GET /config.py HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:08 +0200] "GET /secrets.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:10 +0200] "GET /secrets.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:11 +0200] "GET /credentials.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:13 +0200] "GET /.git-credentials HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:14 +0200] "GET /.git/config HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:16 +0200] "GET /.gitignore HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:18 +0200] "GET /.gitlab-ci.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:19 +0200] "GET /.github/workflows HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:22 +0200] "GET /.idea/workspace.xml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:22 +0200] "GET /.vscode/settings.json HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:25 +0200] "GET /docker-compose.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:25 +0200] "GET /docker-compose.override.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:28 +0200] "GET /docker-compose.prod.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:28 +0200] "GET /docker-compose.dev.yml HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:32 +0200] "GET /phpinfo HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:32 +0200] "GET /_profiler/phpinfo HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:34 +0200] "GET /phpinfo.php HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:34 +0200] "GET /info.php HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:37 +0200] "GET /storage/logs/laravel.log HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:37 +0200] "GET /storage/logs/error.log HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:40 +0200] "GET /logs/debug.log HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:40 +0200] "GET /logs/app.log HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:49 +0200] "GET /debug.log HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:51 +0200] "GET /error.log HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:53 +0200] "GET /.DS_Store HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:55 +0200] "GET /backup.zip HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:28:58 +0200] "GET /.backup HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:29:00 +0200] "GET /db.sql HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:29:03 +0200] "GET /dump.sql HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:29:06 +0200] "GET /database.sql HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
[21/Jul/2025:09:29:09 +0200] "GET /backup.tar.gz HTTP/1.1" 404 - "" "Mozilla/5.0"
Now, this example is actually trying to catch a bit more things, but many times it s focused on some specific thing, or two things. Here we have docker, MacOS .DS_Store (I m not sure how that s useful - to find more filenames?), VSCode settings, various secrets, GitHub workflows, log output, database dumps, AWS credentials, and still I guess from the wp filename WordPress settings. The first few years were full of WordPress scanners, now it seems it has quieted down, I haven t seen a bot scanning 200 WP potential filenames in ages. And this bot even bothers to put in Mozilla/5.0 as browser identification . Side-note: I don t think the filename path in the first log entry, i.e. ../../../../../../~/, ever properly resolves to the home directory of any user. So I m not that particular scanner ever works, but who knows? Maybe some framework does bad tilde expansion, but at least bash will not expand ~ inside a path, it seems that path is passed as-is to an invoked command (strace confirms it). What s surprising here is that these are usually plain dumb scanners, from the same IP address, no concern on throttling, no attempt to hide, just 2 minutes of brute-forcing a random list of known treasures , then moving on. For this to be worth, it means there are still victims found using this method, sadly. Well, sometimes I get a single, one-off "GET /wp-login.php HTTP/1.1, which is strange enough it might not be a bot even, who knows. But in general, periods of activity of this type are coming and going, probably aligned with new CVEs. And another surprising thing is that for this type of scanning to work (and I ve seen many over the years), the website framework/configuration must allow random file download. Corydalis itself is written in Haskell, using Yesod, and it has a hardcoded (built at compile time) list of static resources it will serve. I haven t made the switch to fully embedding in the binary, but at that point, it won t need to read from the filesystem at all. Right now it will serve a few CSS and JS files, plus fonts, but that s it, no arbitrary filesystem traversal. Strange that some frameworks allow it. This is not productively spent time, but it is fun, especially seeing how this changes over time. And probably the most use anyone gets out of http://demo.corydalis.io .

20 July 2025

Michael Prokop: What to expect from Debian/trixie #newintrixie

Trixie Banner, Copyright 2024 Elise Couper Update on 2025-07-28: added note about Debian 13/trixie support for OpenVox (thanks, Ben Ford!) Debian v13 with codename trixie is scheduled to be published as new stable release on 9th of August 2025. I was the driving force at several of my customers to be well prepared for the upcoming stable release (my efforts for trixie started in August 2024). On the one hand, to make sure packages we care about are available and actually make it into the release. On the other hand, to ensure there are no severe issues that make it into the release and to get proper and working upgrades. So far everything is looking pretty well and working fine, the efforts seemed to have payed off. :) As usual with major upgrades, there are some things to be aware of, and hereby I m starting my public notes on trixie that might be worth for other folks. My focus is primarily on server systems and looking at things from a sysadmin perspective. Further readings As usual start at the official Debian release notes, make sure to especially go through What s new in Debian 13 + issues to be aware of for trixie (strongly recommended read!). Package versions As a starting point, let s look at some selected packages and their versions in bookworm vs. trixie as of 2025-07-20 (mainly having amd64 in mind):
Package bookworm/v12 trixie/v13
ansible 2.14.3 2.19.0
apache 2.4.62 2.4.64
apt 2.6.1 3.0.3
bash 5.2.15 5.2.37
ceph 16.2.11 18.2.7
docker 20.10.24 26.1.5
dovecot 2.3.19 2.4.1
dpkg 1.21.22 1.22.21
emacs 28.2 30.1
gcc 12.2.0 14.2.0
git 2.39.5 2.47.2
golang 1.19 1.24
libc 2.36 2.41
linux kernel 6.1 6.12
llvm 14.0 19.0
lxc 5.0.2 6.0.4
mariadb 10.11 11.8
nginx 1.22.1 1.26.3
nodejs 18.13 20.19
openjdk 17.0 21.0
openssh 9.2p1 10.0p1
openssl 3.0 3.5
perl 5.36.0 5.40.1
php 8.2+93 8.4+96
podman 4.3.1 5.4.2
postfix 3.7.11 3.10.3
postgres 15 17
puppet 7.23.0 8.10.0
python3 3.11.2 3.13.5
qemu/kvm 7.2 10.0
rsync 3.2.7 3.4.1
ruby 3.1 3.3
rust 1.63.0 1.85.0
samba 4.17.12 4.22.3
systemd 252.36 257.7-1
unattended-upgrades 2.9.1 2.12
util-linux 2.38.1 2.41
vagrant 2.3.4 2.3.7
vim 9.0.1378 9.1.1230
zsh 5.9 5.9
Misc unsorted apt The new apt version 3.0 brings several new features, including: systemd systemd got upgraded from v252.36-1~deb12u1 to 257.7-1 and there are lots of changes. Be aware that systemd v257 has a new net.naming_scheme, v257 being PCI slot number is now read from firmware_node/sun sysfs file. The naming scheme based on devicetree aliases was extended to support aliases for individual interfaces of controllers with multiple ports. This might affect you, see e.g. #1092176 and #1107187, the Debian Wiki provides further useful information. There are new systemd tools available: The tools provided by systemd gained several new options: Debian s systemd ships new binary packages: Linux Kernel The trixie release ships a Linux kernel based on latest longterm version 6.12. As usual there are lots of changes in the kernel area, including better hardware support, and this might warrant a separate blog entry. To highlight some changes with Debian trixie: See Kernelnewbies.org for further changes between kernel versions. Configuration management For puppet users, Debian provides the puppet-agent (v8.10.0), puppetserver (v8.7.0) and puppetdb (v8.4.1) packages. Puppet s upstream does not provide packages for trixie, yet. Given how long it took them for Debian bookworm, and with their recent Plans for Open Source Puppet in 2025, it s unclear when (and whether at all) we might get something. As a result of upstream behavior, also the OpenVox project evolved, and they already provide Debian 13/trixie support (https://apt.voxpupuli.org/openvox8-release-debian13.deb). FYI: the AIO puppet-agent package for bookworm (v7.34.0-1bookworm) so far works fine for me on Debian/trixie. Be aware that due to the apt-key removal you need a recent version of the puppetlabs-apt for usage with trixie. The puppetlabs-ntp module isn t yet ready for trixie (regarding ntp/ntpsec), if you should depend on that. ansible is available and made it with version 2.19 into trixie. Prometheus stack Prometheus server was updated from v2.42.0 to v2.53, and all the exporters that got shipped with bookworm are still around (in more recent versions of course). Trixie gained some new exporters: Virtualization docker (v26.1.5), ganeti (v3.1.0), libvirt (v11.3.0, be aware of significant changes to libvirt packaging), lxc (v6.0.4), podman (v5.4.2), openstack (see openstack-team on Salsa), qemu/kvm (v10.0.2), xen (v4.20.0) are all still around. Proxmox already announced their PVE 9.0 BETA, being based on trixie and providing 6.14.8-1 kernel, QEMU 10.0.2, LXC 6.0.4, OpenZFS 2.3.3. Vagrant is available in version 2.3.7, but Vagrant upstream does not provide packages for trixie yet. Given that HashiCorp adopted the BSL, the future of vagrant in Debian is unclear. If you re relying on VirtualBox, be aware that upstream doesn t provide packages for trixie, yet. VirtualBox is available from Debian/unstable (version 7.1.12-dfsg-1 as of 2025-07-20), but not shipped with stable release since quite some time (due to lack of cooperation from upstream on security support for older releases, see #794466). Be aware that starting with Linux kernel 6.12, KVM initializes virtualization on module loading by default. This prevents VirtualBox VMs from starting. In order to avoid this, either add kvm.enable_virt_at_load=0 parameter into kernel command line or unload the corresponding kvm_intel / kvm_amd module. If you want to use Vagrant with VirtualBox on trixie, be aware that Debian s vagrant package as present in trixie doesn t support the VirtualBox package version 7.1 as present in Debian/unstable (manually patching vagrant s meta.rb and rebuilding the package without Breaks: virtualbox (>= 7.1) is known to be working). util-linux The are plenty of new options available in the tools provided by util-linux: Now no longer present in util-linux as of trixie: The following binaries got moved from util-linux to the util-linux-extra package: And the util-linux-extra package also provides new tools: OpenSSH OpenSSH was updated from v9.2p1 to 10.0p1-5, so if you re interested in all the changes, check out the release notes between those versions (9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9 + 10.0). Let s highlight some notable behavior changes in Debian: There are some notable new features: Thanks to everyone involved in the release, looking forward to trixie + and happy upgrading!
Let s continue with working towards Debian/forky. :)

12 July 2025

Freexian Collaborators: Monthly report about Debian Long Term Support, June 2025 (by Roberto C. S nchez)

Like each month, have a look at the work funded by Freexian s Debian LTS offering.

Debian LTS contributors In June, 20 contributors have been paid to work on Debian LTS, their reports are available:
  • Abhijith PA did 14.0h (out of 14.0h assigned).
  • Adrian Bunk did 23.5h (out of 23.5h assigned).
  • Andreas Henriksson did 3.0h (out of 3.0h assigned and 17.0h from previous period), thus carrying over 17.0h to the next month.
  • Andrej Shadura did 2.0h (out of 3.0h assigned and 7.0h from previous period), thus carrying over 8.0h to the next month.
  • Bastien Roucari s did 20.0h (out of 20.0h assigned).
  • Ben Hutchings did 8.0h (out of 7.5h assigned and 16.0h from previous period), thus carrying over 15.5h to the next month.
  • Carlos Henrique Lima Melara did 12.0h (out of 12.0h assigned).
  • Chris Lamb did 18.0h (out of 18.0h assigned).
  • Daniel Leidert did 22.0h (out of 22.5h assigned and 1.0h from previous period), thus carrying over 1.5h to the next month.
  • Emilio Pozuelo Monfort did 23.5h (out of 16.75h assigned and 6.75h from previous period).
  • Guilhem Moulin did 14.0h (out of 11.5h assigned and 3.5h from previous period), thus carrying over 1.0h to the next month.
  • Jochen Sprickerhof did 21.0h (out of 0.5h assigned and 22.75h from previous period), thus carrying over 2.25h to the next month.
  • Lucas Kanashiro did 20.0h (out of 20.0h assigned).
  • Markus Koschany did 23.25h (out of 17.0h assigned and 6.25h from previous period).
  • Roberto C. S nchez did 21.25h (out of 20.75h assigned and 3.25h from previous period), thus carrying over 2.75h to the next month.
  • Santiago Ruano Rinc n did 12.75h (out of 15.0h assigned), thus carrying over 2.25h to the next month.
  • Sean Whitton did 1.0h (out of 4.25h assigned and 1.75h from previous period), thus carrying over 5.0h to the next month.
  • Sylvain Beucler did 23.5h (out of 23.5h assigned).
  • Thorsten Alteholz did 15.0h (out of 15.0h assigned).
  • Tobias Frost did 2.5h (out of 12.0h assigned), thus carrying over 9.5h to the next month.

Evolution of the situation In June, we released 35 DLAs.
  • Notable security updates:
    • mariadb-10.5, prepared by Otto Kek l inen, fixes vulnerabilities which could result in denial of service, information disclosure, or unauthorized data modification
    • python-django, prepared by Chris Lamb, fixes vulnerabilities which would result in log injection or denial of service
    • webkit2gtk, prepared by Emilio Pozuelo Monfort, fixes many vulnerabilities which could results in a wide range of issues
    • xorg-server, prepared by Emilio Pozuelo Monfort, fixes multiple vulnerabilities which may result in privilege escalation
    • sudo, prepared by Thorsten Alteholz, fixes a vulnerability which could result in privilege escalation
  • Notable non-security updates:
    • debian-security-support, prepared by Santiago Ruano Rinc n, updates status of packages which receive limited security support or which have reached the end of security support
    • dns-root-data, prepared by Sylvain Beucler, updates the DNSSEC trust anchors
This month s contributions from outside the regular team include the mariadb-10.5 update mentioned above, prepared by Otto Kek l inen (the package maintainer); an update to libfile-find-rule-perl, prepared by Salvatore Bonaccorso (a member of the Debian Security Team); an update to activemq, prepared by Emmanuel Arias (a maintainer of the package). Additionally, LTS Team members contributed stable updates of the following packages:
  • curl, prepared by Carlos Henrique Lima Melara
  • python-tornado, prepared by Daniel Leidert
  • python-flask-cors, prepared by Daniel Leidert
  • common-vfs, prepared by Daniel Leidert
  • cjson, prepared by Adrian Bunk
  • icu, prepared by Adrian Bunk
  • node-tar-fs, prepared by Adrian Bunk
  • rar, prepared by Adrian Bunk
Something of particular noteworthiness is that LTS contributor Carlos Henrique Lima Melara discovered a regression in the upstream fix for CVE-2023-2753 in curl. The corrective action which he took included providing a patch to upstream, uploading a stable update of curl, and further updating the version of curl in LTS. DebConf, the annual Debian Conference, is coming up in July and, as is customary each year, the week preceding the conference will feature an event called DebCamp. The DebCamp week provides an opportunity for teams and other interested groups/individuals to meet together in person in the same venue as the conference itself, with the purpose of doing focused work, often called sprints . LTS coordinator Roberto C. S nchez has announced that the LTS Team is planning to hold a sprint primarily focused on the Debian security tracker and the associated tooling used by the LTS Team and the Debian Security Team.

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10 July 2025

Tianon Gravi: Yubi Whati? (YubiKeys, ECDSA, and X.509)

Off-and-on over the last several weeks, I've been spending time trying to learn/understand YubiKeys better, especially from the perspective of ECDSA and signing. I had a good mental model for how "slots" work (canonically referenced by their hexadecimal names such as 9C), but found that it had a gap related to "objects"; while closing that, I was annoyed that the main reference table for this gap lives primarily in either a PDF or inside several implementations, so I figured I should create the reference I want to see in the world, but that it would also be useful to write down some of my understanding for my own (and maybe others') future reference. So, to that end, I'm going to start with a bit ( ) of background information, with the heavy caveat that this only applies to "PIV" ("FIPS 201") usage of YubiKeys, and that I only actually care about ECDSA, although I've been reassured that it's the same for at least RSA (anything outside this is firmly Here Be Not Tianon; "gl hf dd"). (Incidentally, learning all this helped me actually appreciate the simplicity of cloud-based KMS solutions, which was an unexpected side effect. ) At a really high level, ECDSA is like many other (asymmetric) cryptographic solutions you've got a public key and a private key, the private key can be used to "sign" data (tiny amounts of data, in fact, like P-256 can only reasonably sign 256 bits of data, which is where cryptographic hashes like SHA256 come in as secure analogues for larger data in small bit sizes), and the public key can then be used to verify that the data was indeed signed by the private key, and only someone with the private key could've done so. There's some complex math and RNGs involved, but none of that's actually relevant to this post, so find that information elsewhere. Unfortunately, this is where things go off the rails: PIV is X.509 ("x509") heavy, and there's no X.509 in the na ve view of my use case. In a YubiKey (or any other PIV-signing-supporting smart card? do they actually have competitors in this specific niche? ), a given "slot" can hold one single private key. There are ~24 slots which can hold a private key and be used for signing, although "Slot 9c" is officially designated as the "Digital Signature" slot and is encouraged for signing purposes. One of the biggest gotchas is that with pure-PIV (and older YubiKey firmware ) the public key for a given slot is only available at the time the key is generated, and the whole point of the device in the first place is that the private key is never, ever available from it (all cryptographic operations happen inside the device), so if you don't save that public key when you first ask the device to generate a private key in a particular slot, the public key is lost forever (asterisk).
$ # generate a new ECDSA P-256 key in "slot 9c" ("Digital Signature")
$ # WARNING: THIS WILL GLEEFULLY WIPE SLOT 9C WITHOUT PROMPTING
$ yubico-piv-tool --slot 9c --algorithm ECCP256 --action generate
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEtGoWRGyjjUlJFXpu8BL6Rnx8jjKR
5+Mzl2Vepgor+k7N9q7ppOtSMWefjFVR0SEPmXqXINNsCi6LpLtNEigIRg==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Successfully generated a new private key.
$ # this is the only time/place we (officially) get this public key
With that background, now let's get to the second aspect of "slots" and how X.509 fits. For every aforementioned slot, there is a corresponding "object" (read: place to store arbitrary data) which is corresponding only by convention. For all these "key" slots the (again, by convention) corresponding "object" is explicitly supposed to be an X.509 certificate (see also the PDF reference linked above). It turns out this is a useful and topical place to store that public key we need to keep handy! It's also an interesting place to shove additional details about what the key in a given slot is being used for, if that's your thing. Converting the raw public key into a (likely self-signed) X.509 certificate is an exercise for the reader, but if you want to follow the conventions, you need some way to convert a given "slot" to the corresponding "object", and that is the lookup table I wish existed in more forms. So, without further ado, here is the anti-climax:
Slot Object Description
0x9A 0x5FC105 X.509 Certificate for PIV Authentication
0x9E 0x5FC101 X.509 Certificate for Card Authentication
0x9C 0x5FC10A X.509 Certificate for Digital Signature
0x9D 0x5FC10B X.509 Certificate for Key Management
0x82 0x5FC10D Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 1
0x83 0x5FC10E Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 2
0x84 0x5FC10F Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 3
0x85 0x5FC110 Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 4
0x86 0x5FC111 Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 5
0x87 0x5FC112 Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 6
0x88 0x5FC113 Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 7
0x89 0x5FC114 Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 8
0x8A 0x5FC115 Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 9
0x8B 0x5FC116 Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 10
0x8C 0x5FC117 Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 11
0x8D 0x5FC118 Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 12
0x8E 0x5FC119 Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 13
0x8F 0x5FC11A Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 14
0x90 0x5FC11B Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 15
0x91 0x5FC11C Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 16
0x92 0x5FC11D Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 17
0x93 0x5FC11E Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 18
0x94 0x5FC11F Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 19
0x95 0x5FC120 Retired X.509 Certificate for Key Management 20
See also "piv-objects.json" for a machine-readable copy of this data. (Major thanks to paultag and jon gzip johnson for helping me learn and generally putting up with me, but especially dealing with my live-stream-of-thoughts while I stumble through the dark. )

4 July 2025

Sahil Dhiman: Secondary Authoritative Name Server Options for Self-Hosted Domains

In the past few months, I have moved authoritative name servers (NS) of two of my domains (sahilister.net and sahil.rocks) in house using PowerDNS. Subdomains of sahilister.net see roughly 320,000 hits/day across my IN and DE mirror nodes, so adding secondary name servers with good availability (in addition to my own) servers was one of my first priorities. I explored the following options for my secondary NS, which also didn t cost me anything:

1984 Hosting

Hurriance Electric

Afraid.org

Puck

NS-Global

Asking friends Two of my friends and fellow mirror hosts have their own authoritative name server setup, Shrirang (ie albony) and Luke. Shirang gave me another POP in IN and through Luke (who does have an insane amount of in-house NS, see dig ns jing.rocks +short), I added a JP POP. If we know each other, I would be glad to host a secondary NS for you in (IN and/or DE locations).

Some notes
  • Adding a third-party secondary is putting trust that the third party would serve your zone right.
  • Hurricane Electric and 1984 hosting provide multiple NS. One can use some or all of them. Ideally, you can get away with just using your own with full set from any of these two. Play around with adding and removing secondaries, which gives you the best results. . Using everyone is anyhow overkill, unless you have specific reasons for it.
  • Moving NS in-house isn t that hard. Though, be prepared to get it wrong a few times (and some more). I have already faced partial outages because:
    • Recursive resolvers (RR) in the wild behave in a weird way and cache the wrong NS response for longer time than in TTL.
    • NS expiry took more than time. 2 out of 3 of my Netim s NS (my domain registrar) had stopped serving my domain, while RRs in the wild hadn t picked up my new in-house NS. I couldn t really do anything about it, though.
    • Dot is pretty important at the end.
    • With HE.net, I forgot to delegate my domain on their panel and just added in my NS set, thinking I ve already done so (which I did but for another domain), leading to a lame server situation.
  • In terms of serving traffic, there s no distinction between primary and secondary NS. RR don t really care who they re asking the query to. So one can have hidden primary too.
  • I initially thought of adding periodic RIPE Atlas measurements from the global set but thought against it as I already host a termux mirror, which brings in thousands of queries from around the world leading to a diverse set of RRs querying my domain already.
  • In most cases, query resolution time would increase with out of zone NS servers (which most likely would be in external secondary). 1 query vs. 2 queries. Pay close attention to ADDITIONAL SECTION Shrirang s case followed by mine:
$ dig ns albony.in
; <<>> DiG 9.18.36 <<>> ns albony.in
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 60525
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 4, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 9
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 65494
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;albony.in.			IN	NS
;; ANSWER SECTION:
albony.in.		1049	IN	NS	ns3.albony.in.
albony.in.		1049	IN	NS	ns4.albony.in.
albony.in.		1049	IN	NS	ns2.albony.in.
albony.in.		1049	IN	NS	ns1.albony.in.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns3.albony.in.		1049	IN	AAAA	2a14:3f87:f002:7::a
ns1.albony.in.		1049	IN	A	82.180.145.196
ns2.albony.in.		1049	IN	AAAA	2403:44c0:1:4::2
ns4.albony.in.		1049	IN	A	45.64.190.62
ns2.albony.in.		1049	IN	A	103.77.111.150
ns1.albony.in.		1049	IN	AAAA	2400:d321:2191:8363::1
ns3.albony.in.		1049	IN	A	45.90.187.14
ns4.albony.in.		1049	IN	AAAA	2402:c4c0:1:10::2
;; Query time: 29 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.53#53(127.0.0.53) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Fri Jul 04 07:57:01 IST 2025
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 286
vs mine
$ dig ns sahil.rocks
; <<>> DiG 9.18.36 <<>> ns sahil.rocks
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 64497
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 11, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 65494
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;sahil.rocks.			IN	NS
;; ANSWER SECTION:
sahil.rocks.		6385	IN	NS	ns5.he.net.
sahil.rocks.		6385	IN	NS	puck.nether.net.
sahil.rocks.		6385	IN	NS	colin.sahilister.net.
sahil.rocks.		6385	IN	NS	marvin.sahilister.net.
sahil.rocks.		6385	IN	NS	ns2.afraid.org.
sahil.rocks.		6385	IN	NS	ns4.he.net.
sahil.rocks.		6385	IN	NS	ns2.albony.in.
sahil.rocks.		6385	IN	NS	ns3.jing.rocks.
sahil.rocks.		6385	IN	NS	ns0.1984.is.
sahil.rocks.		6385	IN	NS	ns1.1984.is.
sahil.rocks.		6385	IN	NS	ns-global.kjsl.com.
;; Query time: 24 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.53#53(127.0.0.53) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Fri Jul 04 07:57:20 IST 2025
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 313
  • Theoretically speaking, a small increase/decrease in resolution would occur based on the chosen TLD and the popularity of the TLD in query originators area (already cached vs. fresh recursion).
  • One can get away with having only 3 NS (or be like Google and have 4 anycast NS or like Amazon and have 8 or like Verisign and make it 13 :P).
  • Nowhere it s written, your NS needs not to be called dns* or ns1, ns2 etc. Get creative with naming NS; be deceptive with the naming :D.
  • A good understanding of RR behavior can help engineer a good authoritative NS system.

Further reading

2 July 2025

Dirk Eddelbuettel: Rcpp 1.1.0 on CRAN: C++11 now Minimum, Regular Semi-Annual Update

rcpp logo With a friendly Canadian hand wave from vacation in Beautiful British Columbia, and speaking on behalf of the Rcpp Core Team, I am excited to shared that the (regularly scheduled bi-annual) update to Rcpp just brought version 1.1.0 to CRAN. Debian builds haven been prepared and uploaded, Windows and macOS builds should appear at CRAN in the next few days, as will builds in different Linux distribution and of course r2u should catch up tomorrow as well. The key highlight of this release is the switch to C++11 as minimum standard. R itself did so in release 4.0.0 more than half a decade ago; if someone is really tied to an older version of R and an equally old compiler then using an older Rcpp with it has to be acceptable. Our own tests (using continuous integration at GitHub) still go back all the way to R 3.5.* and work fine (with a new-enough compiler). In the previous release post, we commented that we had only reverse dependency (falsely) come up in the tests by CRAN, this time there was none among the well over 3000 packages using Rcpp at CRAN. Which really is quite amazing, and possibly also a testament to our rigorous continued testing of our development and snapshot releases on the key branch. This release continues with the six-months January-July cycle started with release 1.0.5 in July 2020. As just mentioned, we do of course make interim snapshot dev or rc releases available. While we not longer regularly update the Rcpp drat repo, the r-universe page and repo now really fill this role admirably (and with many more builds besides just source). We continue to strongly encourage their use and testing I run my systems with these versions which tend to work just as well, and are of course also fully tested against all reverse-dependencies. Rcpp has long established itself as the most popular way of enhancing R with C or C++ code. Right now, 3038 packages on CRAN depend on Rcpp for making analytical code go faster and further. On CRAN, 13.6% of all packages depend (directly) on Rcpp, and 61.3% of all compiled packages do. From the cloud mirror of CRAN (which is but a subset of all CRAN downloads), Rcpp has been downloaded 100.8 million times. The two published papers (also included in the package as preprint vignettes) have, respectively, 2023 (JSS, 2011) and 380 (TAS, 2018) citations, while the the book (Springer useR!, 2013) has another 695. As mentioned, this release switches to C++11 as the minimum standard. The diffstat display in the CRANberries comparison to the previous release shows how several (generated) sources files with C++98 boilerplate have now been removed; we also flattened a number of if/else sections we no longer need to cater to older compilers (see below for details). We also managed more accommodation for the demands of tighter use of the C API of R by removing DATAPTR and CLOENV use. A number of other changes are detailed below. The full list below details all changes, their respective PRs and, if applicable, issue tickets. Big thanks from all of us to all contributors!

Changes in Rcpp release version 1.1.0 (2025-07-01)
  • Changes in Rcpp API:
    • C++11 is now the required minimal C++ standard
    • The std::string_view type is now covered by wrap() (Lev Kandel in #1356 as discussed in #1357)
    • A last remaining DATAPTR use has been converted to DATAPTR_RO (Dirk in #1359)
    • Under R 4.5.0 or later, R_ClosureEnv is used instead of CLOENV (Dirk in #1361 fixing #1360)
    • Use of lsInternal switched to lsInternal3 (Dirk in #1362)
    • Removed compiler detection macro in a header cleanup setting C++11 as the minunum (Dirk in #1364 closing #1363)
    • Variadic templates are now used onconditionally given C++11 (Dirk in #1367 closing #1366)
    • Remove RCPP_USING_CXX11 as a #define as C++11 is now a given (Dirk in #1369)
    • Additional cleanup for __cplusplus checks (I aki in #1371 fixing #1370)
    • Unordered set construction no longer needs a macro for the pre-C++11 case (I aki in #1372)
    • Lambdas are supported in a Rcpp Sugar functions (I aki in #1373)
    • The Date(time)Vector classes now have default ctor (Dirk in #1385 closing #1384)
    • Fixed an issue where Rcpp::Language would duplicate its arguments (Kevin in #1388, fixing #1386)
  • Changes in Rcpp Attributes:
    • The C++26 standard now has plugin support (Dirk in #1381 closing #1380)
  • Changes in Rcpp Documentation:
    • Several typos were correct in the NEWS file (Ben Bolker in #1354)
    • The Rcpp Libraries vignette mentions PACKAGE_types.h to declare types used in RcppExports.cpp (Dirk in #1355)
    • The vignettes bibliography file was updated to current package versions, and now uses doi references (Dirk in #1389)
  • Changes in Rcpp Deployment:
    • Rcpp.package.skeleton() creates URL and BugReports if given a GitHub username (Dirk in #1358)
    • R 4.4.* has been added to the CI matrix (Dirk in #1376)
    • Tests involving NA propagation are skipped under linux-arm64 as they are under macos-arm (Dirk in #1379 closing #1378)

Thanks to my CRANberries, you can also look at a diff to the previous release Questions, comments etc should go to the rcpp-devel mailing list off the R-Forge page. Bugs reports are welcome at the GitHub issue tracker as well (where one can also search among open or closed issues).

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can sponsor me at GitHub.

24 June 2025

Matthew Garrett: Why is there no consistent single signon API flow?

Single signon is a pretty vital part of modern enterprise security. You have users who need access to a bewildering array of services, and you want to be able to avoid the fallout of one of those services being compromised and your users having to change their passwords everywhere (because they're clearly going to be using the same password everywhere), or you want to be able to enforce some reasonable MFA policy without needing to configure it in 300 different places, or you want to be able to disable all user access in one place when someone leaves the company, or, well, all of the above. There's any number of providers for this, ranging from it being integrated with a more general app service platform (eg, Microsoft or Google) or a third party vendor (Okta, Ping, any number of bizarre companies). And, in general, they'll offer a straightforward mechanism to either issue OIDC tokens or manage SAML login flows, requiring users present whatever set of authentication mechanisms you've configured.

This is largely optimised for web authentication, which doesn't seem like a huge deal - if I'm logging into Workday then being bounced to another site for auth seems entirely reasonable. The problem is when you're trying to gate access to a non-web app, at which point consistency in login flow is usually achieved by spawning a browser and somehow managing submitting the result back to the remote server. And this makes some degree of sense - browsers are where webauthn token support tends to live, and it also ensures the user always has the same experience.

But it works poorly for CLI-based setups. There's basically two options - you can use the device code authorisation flow, where you perform authentication on what is nominally a separate machine to the one requesting it (but in this case is actually the same) and as a result end up with a straightforward mechanism to have your users socially engineered into giving Johnny Badman a valid auth token despite webauthn nominally being unphisable (as described years ago), or you reduce that risk somewhat by spawning a local server and POSTing the token back to it - which works locally but doesn't work well if you're dealing with trying to auth on a remote device. The user experience for both scenarios sucks, and it reduces a bunch of the worthwhile security properties that modern MFA supposedly gives us.

There's a third approach, which is in some ways the obviously good approach and in other ways is obviously a screaming nightmare. All the browser is doing is sending a bunch of requests to a remote service and handling the response locally. Why don't we just do the same? Okta, for instance, has an API for auth. We just need to submit the username and password to that and see what answer comes back. This is great until you enable any kind of MFA, at which point the additional authz step is something that's only supported via the browser. And basically everyone else is the same.

Of course, when we say "That's only supported via the browser", the browser is still just running some code of some form and we can figure out what it's doing and do the same. Which is how you end up scraping constants out of Javascript embedded in the API response in order to submit that data back in the appropriate way. This is all possible but it's incredibly annoying and fragile - the contract with the identity provider is that a browser is pointed at a URL, not that any of the internal implementation remains consistent.

I've done this. I've implemented code to scrape an identity provider's auth responses to extract the webauthn challenges and feed those to a local security token without using a browser. I've also written support for forwarding those challenges over the SSH agent protocol to make this work with remote systems that aren't running a GUI. This week I'm working on doing the same again, because every identity provider does all of this differently.

There's no fundamental reason all of this needs to be custom. It could be a straightforward "POST username and password, receive list of UUIDs describing MFA mechanisms, define how those MFA mechanisms work". That even gives space for custom auth factors (I'm looking at you, Okta Fastpass). But instead I'm left scraping JSON blobs out of Javascript and hoping nobody renames a field, even though I only care about extremely standard MFA mechanisms that shouldn't differ across different identity providers.

Someone, please, write a spec for this. Please don't make it be me.

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22 June 2025

Iustin Pop: Coding, as we knew it, has forever changed

Back when I was terribly na ve When I was younger, and definitely na ve, I was so looking forward to AI, which will help us write lots of good, reliable code faster. Well, principally me, not thinking what impact it will have industry-wide. Other more general concerns, like societal issues, role of humans in the future and so on were totally not on my radar. At the same time, I didn t expect this will actually happen. Even years later, things didn t change dramatically. Even the first release of ChatGPT a few years back didn t click for me, as the limitations were still significant.

Hints of serious change The first hint of the change, for me, was when a few months ago (yes, behind the curve), I asked ChatGPT to re-explain a concept to me, and it just wrote a lot of words, but without a clear explanation. On a whim, I asked Grok then recently launched, I think to do the same. And for the first time, the explanation clicked and I felt I could have a conversation with it. Of course, now I forgot again that theoretical CS concept, but the first step was done: I can ask an LLM to explain something, and it will, and I can have a back and forth logical discussion, even if on some theoretical concept. Additionally, I learned that not all LLMs are the same, and that means there s real competition and that leap frogging is possible. Another topic on which I tried to adopt early and failed to get mileage out of it, was GitHub Copilot (in VSC). I tried, it helped, but didn t feel any speed-up at all. Then more recently, in May, I asked Grok what s the state of the art in AI-assisted coding. It said either Claude in a browser tab, or in VSC via continue.dev extension. The continue.dev extension/tooling is a bit of a strange/interesting thing. It seems to want to be a middle-man between the user and actual LLM services, i.e. you pay a subscription to continue.dev, not to Anthropic itself, and they manage the keys/APIs, for whatever backend LLMs you want to use. The integration with Visual Studio Code is very nice, but I don t know if long-term their business model will make sense. Well, not my problem.

Claude: reverse engineering my old code and teaching new concepts So I installed the latter and subscribed, thinking 20 CHF for a month is good for testing. I skipped the tutorial model/assistant, created a new one from scratch, just enabled Claude 3.7 Sonnet, and started using it. And then, my mind was blown-not just by the LLM, but by the ecosystem. As said, I ve used GitHub copilot before, but it didn t seem effective. I don t know if a threshold has been reached, or Claude (3.7 at that time) is just better than ChatGPT. I didn t use the AI to write (non-trivial) code for me, at most boilerplate snippets. But I used it both as partner for discussion - I want to do x, what do you think, A or B? , and as a teacher, especially for fronted topics, which I m not familiar with. Since May, in mostly fragmented sessions, I ve achieved more than in the last two years. Migration from old school JS to ECMA modules, a webpacker (reducing bundle size by 50%), replacing an old Javascript library with hand written code using modern APIs, implementing the zoom feature together with all of keyboard, mouse, touchpad and touchscreen support, simplifying layout from manually computed to automatic layout, and finding a bug in webkit for which it also wrote a cool minimal test (cool, as in, way better than I d have ever, ever written, because for me it didn t matter that much). And more. Could I have done all this? Yes, definitely, nothing was especially tricky here. But hours and hours of reading MDN, scouring Stack Overflow and Reddit, and lots of trial and error. So doable, but much more toily. This, to me, feels like cheating. 20 CHF per month to make me 3x more productive is free money well, except that I don t make money on my code which is written basically for myself. However, I don t get stuck anymore searching hours in the web for guidance, I ask my question, and I get at least direction if not answer, and I m finished way earlier. I can now actually juggle more hobbies, in the same amount of time, if my personal code takes less time or differently said, if I m more efficient at it. Not all is roses, of course. Once, it did write code with such an endearing error that it made me laugh. It was so blatantly obvious that you shouldn t keep other state in the array that holds pointer status because that confuses the calculation of how many pointers are down , probably to itself too if I d have asked. But I didn t, since it felt a bit embarassing to point out such a dumb mistake. Yes, I m anthropomorphising again, because this is the easiest way to deal with things. In general, it does an OK-to-good-to-sometimes-awesome job, and the best thing is that it summarises documentation and all of Reddit and Stack Overflow. And gives links to those. Now, I have no idea yet what this means for the job of a software engineer. If on open source code, my own code, it makes me 3x faster reverse engineering my code from 10 years ago is no small feat for working on large codebases, it should do at least the same, if not more. As an example of how open-ended the assistance can be, at one point, I started implementing a new feature threading a new attribute to a large number of call points. This is not complex at all, just add a new field to a Haskell record, and modifying everything to take it into account, populate it, merge it when merging the data structures, etc. The code is not complex, tending toward boilerplate a bit, and I was wondering on a few possible choices for implementation, so, with just a few lines of code written that were not even compiling, I asked I want to add a new feature, should I do A or B if I want it to behave like this , and the answer was something along the lines of I see you want to add the specific feature I was working on, but the implementation is incomplete, you still need to to X, Y and Z . My mind was blown at this point, as I thought, if the code doesn t compile, surely the computer won t be able to parse it, but this is not a program, this is an LLM, so of course it could read it kind of as a human would. Again, the code complexity is not great, but the fact that it was able to read a half-written patch, understand what I was working towards, and reason about, was mind-blowing, and scary. Like always.

Non-code writing Now, after all this, while writing a recent blog post, I thought this is going to be public anyway, so let me ask Claude what it thinks about it. And I was very surprised, again: gone was all the pain of rereading three times my post to catch typos (easy) or phrasing structure issues. It gave me very clearly points, and helped me cut 30-40% of the total time. So not only coding, but word smithing too is changed. If I were an author, I d be delighted (and scared). Here is the overall reply it gave me:
  • Spelling and grammar fixes, all of them on point except one mistake (I claimed I didn t capitalize one word, but I did). To the level of a good grammar checker.
  • Flow Suggestions, which was way beyond normal spelling and grammar. It felt like a teacher telling me to do better in my writing, i.e. nitpicking on things that actually were true even if they d still work. I.e. lousy phrase structure, still understandable, but lousy nevertheless.
  • Other notes: an overall summary. This was mostly just praising my post . I wish LLMs were not so focused on praise the user .
So yeah, this speeds me up to about 2x on writing blog posts, too. It definitely feels not fair.

Wither the future? After all this, I m a bit flabbergasted. Gone are the 2000 s with code without unittests, gone are the 2010 s without CI/CD, and now, mid-2020 s, gone is the lone programmer that scours the internet to learn new things, alone? What this all means for our skills in software development, I have no idea, except I know things have irreversibly changed (a butlerian jihad aside). Do I learn better with a dedicated tutor even if I don t fight with the problem for so long? Or is struggling in finding good docs the main method of learning? I don t know yet. I feel like I understand the topics I m discussing with the AI, but who knows in reality what it will mean long term in terms of stickiness of learning. For the better, or for worse, things have changed. After all the advances over the last five centuries in mechanical sciences, it has now come to some aspects of the intellectual work. Maybe this is the answer to the ever-growing complexity of tech stacks? I.e. a return of the lone programmer that builds things end-to-end, but with AI taming the complexity added in the last 25 years? I can dream, of course, but this also means that the industry overall will increase in complexity even more, because large companies tend to do that, so maybe a net effect of not much One thing I did learn so far is that my expectation that AI (at this level) will only help junior/beginner people, i.e. it would flatten the skills band, is not true. I think AI can speed up at least the middle band, likely the middle top band, I don t know about the 10x programmers (I m not one of them). So, my question about AI now is how to best use it, not to lament how all my learning (90% self learning, to be clear) is obsolete. No, it isn t. AI helps me start and finish one migration (that I delayed for ages), then start the second, in the same day. At the end of this a bit rambling reflection on the past month and a half, I still have many questions about AI and humanity. But one has been answered: yes, AI , quotes or no quotes, already has changed this field (producing software), and we ve not seen the end of it, for sure.

17 June 2025

Evgeni Golov: Arguing with an AI or how Evgeni tried to use CodeRabbit

Everybody is trying out AI assistants these days, so I figured I'd jump on that train and see how fast it derails. I went with CodeRabbit because I've seen it on YouTube ads work, I guess. I am trying to answer the following questions: To reduce the amount of output and not to confuse contributors, CodeRabbit was configured to only do reviews on demand. What follows is a rather unscientific evaluation of CodeRabbit based on PRs in two Foreman-related repositories, looking at the summaries CodeRabbit posted as well as the comments/suggestions it had about the code. Ansible 2.19 support PR: theforeman/foreman-ansible-modules#1848 summary posted The summary CodeRabbit posted is technically correct.
This update introduces several changes across CI configuration, Ansible roles, plugins, and test playbooks. It expands CI test coverage to a new Ansible version, adjusts YAML key types in test variables, refines conditional logic in Ansible tasks, adds new default variables, and improves clarity and consistency in playbook task definitions and debug output.
Yeah, it does all of that, all right. But it kinda misses the point that the addition here is "Ansible 2.19 support", which starts with adding it to the CI matrix and then adjusting the code to actually work with that version. Also, the changes are not for "clarity" or "consistency", they are fixing bugs in the code that the older Ansible versions accepted, but the new one is more strict about. Then it adds a table with the changed files and what changed in there. To me, as the author, it felt redundant, and IMHO doesn't add any clarity to understand the changes. (And yes, same "clarity" vs bugfix mistake here, but that makes sense as it apparently miss-identified the change reason) And then the sequence diagrams They probably help if you have a dedicated change to a library or a library consumer, but for this PR it's just noise, especially as it only covers two of the changes (addition of 2.19 to the test matrix and a change to the inventory plugin), completely ignoring other important parts. Overall verdict: noise, don't need this. comments posted CodeRabbit also posted 4 comments/suggestions to the changes. Guard against undefined result.task IMHO a valid suggestion, even if on the picky side as I am not sure how to make it undefined here. I ended up implementing it, even if with slightly different (and IMHO better readable) syntax. Inconsistent pipeline in when for composite CV versions That one was funny! The original complaint was that the when condition used slightly different data manipulation than the data that was passed when the condition was true. The code was supposed to do "clean up the data, but only if there are any items left after removing the first 5, as we always want to keep 5 items". And I do agree with the analysis that it's badly maintainable code. But the suggested fix was to re-use the data in the variable we later use for performing the cleanup. While this is (to my surprise!) valid Ansible syntax, it didn't make the code much more readable as you need to go and look at the variable definition. The better suggestion then came from Ewoud: to compare the length of the data with the number we want to keep. Humans, so smart! But Ansible is not Ewoud's native turf, so he asked whether there is a more elegant way to count how much data we have than to use list count in Jinja (the data comes from a Python generator, so needs to be converted to a list first). And the AI helpfully suggested to use count instead! However, count is just an alias for length in Jinja, so it behaves identically and needs a list. Luckily the AI quickly apologized for being wrong after being pointed at the Jinja source and didn't try to waste my time any further. Wouldn't I have known about the count alias, we'd have committed that suggestion and let CI fail before reverting again. Apply the same fix for non-composite CV versions The very same complaint was posted a few lines later, as the logic there is very similar just slightly different data to be filtered and cleaned up. Interestingly, here the suggestion also was to use the variable. But there is no variable with the data! The text actually says one need to "define" it, yet the "committable suggestion" doesn't contain that part. Interestingly, when asked where it sees the "inconsistency" in that hunk, it said the inconsistency is with the composite case above. That however is nonsense, as while we want to keep the same number of composite and non-composite CV versions, the data used in the task is different it even gets consumed by a totally different playbook so there can't be any real consistency between the branches. I ended up applying the same logic as suggested by Ewoud above. As that refactoring was possible in a consistent way. Ensure consistent naming for Oracle Linux subscription defaults One of the changes in Ansible 2.19 is that Ansible fails when there are undefined variables, even if they are only undefined for cases where they are unused. CodeRabbit complains that the names of the defaults I added are inconsistent. And that is technically correct. But those names are already used in other places in the code, so I'd have to refactor more to make it work properly. Once being pointed at the fact that the variables already exist, the AI is as usual quick to apologize, yay. add new parameters to the repository module PR: theforeman/foreman-ansible-modules#1860 summary posted Again, the summary is technically correct
The repository module was updated to support additional parameters for repository synchronization and authentication. New options were added for ansible collections, ostree, Python packages, and yum repositories, including authentication tokens, filtering controls, and version retention settings. All changes were limited to module documentation and argument specification.
But it doesn't add anything you'd not get from looking at the diff, especially as it contains a large documentation chunk explaining those parameters. No sequence diagram this time. That's a good thing! Overall verdict: noise (even if the amount is small), don't need this. comments posted CodeRabbit generated two comments for this PR. Interestingly, none of them overlapped with the issues ansible-lint and friends found. get rid of the FIXMEs Yepp, that's fair add validation for the new parameters Yepp, I forgot these (not intentionally!). The diff it suggests is nonsense, as it doesn't take into account the existing Ansible and Yum validations, but it clearly has read them as the style etc of the new ones matches. It also managed to group the parameters correctly by repository type, so it's something.
 if module.foreman_params['content_type'] != 'ansible_collection':
     invalid_list = [key for key in ['ansible_collection_requirements'] if key in module.foreman_params]
     if invalid_list:
         module.fail_json(msg="( 0 ) can only be used with content_type 'ansible_collection'".format(",".join(invalid_list)))
+
+# Validate ansible_collection specific parameters
+if module.foreman_params['content_type'] != 'ansible_collection':
+    invalid_list = [key for key in ['ansible_collection_auth_token', 'ansible_collection_auth_url'] if key in module.foreman_params]
+    if invalid_list:
+        module.fail_json(msg="( 0 ) can only be used with content_type 'ansible_collection'".format(",".join(invalid_list)))
+
+# Validate ostree specific parameters
+if module.foreman_params['content_type'] != 'ostree':
+    invalid_list = [key for key in ['depth', 'exclude_refs', 'include_refs'] if key in module.foreman_params]
+    if invalid_list:
+        module.fail_json(msg="( 0 ) can only be used with content_type 'ostree'".format(",".join(invalid_list)))
+
+# Validate python package specific parameters
+if module.foreman_params['content_type'] != 'python':
+    invalid_list = [key for key in ['excludes', 'includes', 'package_types', 'keep_latest_packages'] if key in module.foreman_params]
+    if invalid_list:
+        module.fail_json(msg="( 0 ) can only be used with content_type 'python'".format(",".join(invalid_list)))
+
+# Validate yum specific parameter
+if module.foreman_params['content_type'] != 'yum' and 'upstream_authentication_token' in module.foreman_params:
+    module.fail_json(msg="upstream_authentication_token can only be used with content_type 'yum'")
Interestingly, it also said "Note: If 'python' is not a valid content_type, please adjust the validation accordingly." which is quite a hint at a bug in itself. The module currently does not even allow to create content_type=python repositories. That should have been more prominent, as it's a BUG! parameter persistence in obsah PR: theforeman/obsah#72 summary posted Mostly correct. It did miss-interpret the change to a test playbook as an actual "behavior" change: "Introduced new playbook variables for database configuration" there is no database configuration in this repository, just the test playbook using the same metadata as a consumer of the library. Later on it does say "Playbook metadata and test fixtures", so unclear whether this is a miss-interpretation or just badly summarized. As long as you also look at the diff, it won't confuse you, but if you're using the summary as the sole source of information (bad!) it would. This time the sequence diagram is actually useful, yay. Again, not 100% accurate: it's missing the fact that saving the parameters is hidden behind an "if enabled" flag something it did represent correctly for loading them. Overall verdict: not really useful, don't need this. comments posted Here I was a bit surprised, especially as the nitpicks were useful! Persist-path should respect per-user state locations (nitpick) My original code used os.environ.get('OBSAH_PERSIST_PATH', '/var/lib/obsah/parameters.yaml') for the location of the persistence file. CodeRabbit correctly pointed out that this won't work for non-root users and one should respect XDG_STATE_HOME. Ewoud did point that out in his own review, so I am not sure whether CodeRabbit came up with this on its own, or also took the human comments into account. The suggested code seems fine too just doesn't use /var/lib/obsah at all anymore. This might be a good idea for the generic library we're working on here, and then be overridden to a static /var/lib path in a consumer (which always runs as root). In the end I did not implement it, but mostly because I was lazy and was sure we'd override it anyway. Positional parameters are silently excluded from persistence (nitpick) The library allows you to generate both positional (foo without --) and non-positional (--foo) parameters, but the code I wrote would only ever persist non-positional parameters. This was intentional, but there is no documentation of the intent in a comment which the rabbit thought would be worth pointing out. It's a fair nitpick and I ended up adding a comment. Enforce FQDN validation for database_host The library has a way to perform type checking on passed parameters, and one of the supported types is "FQDN" so a fully qualified domain name, with dots and stuff. The test playbook I added has a database_host variable, but I didn't bother adding a type to it, as I don't really need any type checking here. While using "FQDN" might be a bit too strict here technically a working database connection can also use a non-qualified name or an IP address, I was positively surprised by this suggestion. It shows that the rest of the repository was taken into context when preparing the suggestion. reset_args() can raise AttributeError when a key is absent This is a correct finding, the code is not written in a way that would survive if it tries to reset things that are not set. However, that's only true for the case where users pass in --reset-<parameter> without ever having set parameter before. The complaint about the part where the parameter is part of the persisted set but not in the parsed args is wrong as parsed args inherit from the persisted set. The suggested code is not well readable, so I ended up fixing it slightly differently. Persisted values bypass argparse type validation When persisting, I just yaml.safe_dump the parsed parameters, which means the YAML will contain native types like integers. The argparse documentation warns that the type checking argparse does only applies to strings and is skipped if you pass anything else (via default values). While correct, it doesn't really hurt here as the persisting only happens after the values were type-checked. So there is not really a reason to type-check them again. Well, unless the type changes, anyway. Not sure what I'll do with this comment. consider using contextlib.suppress This was added when I asked CodeRabbit for a re-review after pushing some changes. Interestingly, the PR already contained try: except: pass code before, and it did not flag that. Also, the code suggestion contained import contextlib in the middle of the code, instead in the head of the file. Who would do that?! But the comment as such was valid, so I fixed it in all places it is applicable, not only the one the rabbit found. workaround to ensure LCE and CV are always sent together PR: theforeman/foreman-ansible-modules#1867 summary posted
A workaround was added to the _update_entity method in the ForemanAnsibleModule class to ensure that when updating a host, both content_view_id and lifecycle_environment_id are always included together in the update payload. This prevents partial updates that could cause inconsistencies.
Partial updates are not a thing. The workaround is purely for the fact that Katello expects both parameters to be sent, even if only one of them needs an actual update. No diagram, good. Overall verdict: misleading summaries are bad! comments posted Given a small patch, there was only one comment. Implementation looks correct, but consider adding error handling for robustness. This reads correct on the first glance. More error handling is always better, right? But if you dig into the argumentation, you see it's wrong. Either: The AI accepted defeat once I asked it to analyze things in more detail, but why did I have to ask in the first place?! Summary Well, idk, really. Did the AI find things that humans did not find (or didn't bother to mention)? Yes. It's debatable whether these were useful (see e.g. the database_host example), but I tend to be in the "better to nitpick/suggest more and dismiss than oversee" team, so IMHO a positive win. Did the AI output help the humans with the review (useful summary etc)? In my opinion it did not. The summaries were either "lots of words, no real value" or plain wrong. The sequence diagrams were not useful either. Luckily all of that can be turned off in the settings, which is what I'd do if I'd continue using it. Did the AI output help the humans with the code (useful suggestions etc)? While the actual patches it posted were "meh" at best, there were useful findings that resulted in improvements to the code. Was the AI output misleading? Absolutely! The whole Jinja discussion would have been easier without the AI "help". Same applies for the "error handling" in the workaround PR. Was the AI output distracting? The output is certainly a lot, so yes I think it can be distracting. As mentioned, I think dropping the summaries can make the experience less distracting. What does all that mean? I will disable the summaries for the repositories, but will leave the @coderabbitai review trigger active if someone wants an AI-assisted review. This won't be something that I'll force on our contributors and maintainers, but they surely can use it if they want. But I don't think I'll be using this myself on a regular basis. Yes, it can be made "usable". But so can be vim ;-) Also, I'd prefer to have a junior human asking all the questions and making bad suggestions, so they can learn from it, and not some planet burning machine.

8 June 2025

Colin Watson: Free software activity in May 2025

My Debian contributions this month were all sponsored by Freexian. Things were a bit quieter than usual, as for the most part I was sticking to things that seemed urgent for the upcoming trixie release. You can also support my work directly via Liberapay or GitHub Sponsors. OpenSSH After my appeal for help last month to debug intermittent sshd crashes, Michel Casabona helped me put together an environment where I could reproduce it, which allowed me to track it down to a root cause and fix it. (I also found a misuse of strlcpy affecting at least glibc-based systems in passing, though I think that was unrelated.) I worked with Daniel Kahn Gillmor to fix a regression in ssh-agent socket handling. I fixed a reproducibility bug depending on whether passwd is installed on the build system, which would have affected security updates during the lifetime of trixie. I backported openssh 1:10.0p1-5 to bookworm-backports. I issued bookworm and bullseye updates for CVE-2025-32728. groff I backported a fix for incorrect output when formatting multiple documents as PDF/PostScript at once. debmirror I added a simple autopkgtest. Python team I upgraded these packages to new upstream versions: In bookworm-backports, I updated these packages: I fixed problems building these packages reproducibly: I backported fixes for some security vulnerabilities to unstable (since we re in freeze now so it s not always appropriate to upgrade to new upstream versions): I fixed various other build/test failures: I added non-superficial autopkgtests to these packages: I packaged python-django-hashids and python-django-pgbulk, needed for new upstream versions of python-django-pgtrigger. I ported storm to Python 3.14. Science team I fixed a build failure in apertium-oci-fra.

6 June 2025

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in May 2025

Welcome to our 5th report from the Reproducible Builds project in 2025! Our monthly reports outline what we ve been up to over the past month, and highlight items of news from elsewhere in the increasingly-important area of software supply-chain security. If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please do visit the Contribute page on our website. In this report:
  1. Security audit of Reproducible Builds tools published
  2. When good pseudorandom numbers go bad
  3. Academic articles
  4. Distribution work
  5. diffoscope and disorderfs
  6. Website updates
  7. Reproducibility testing framework
  8. Upstream patches

Security audit of Reproducible Builds tools published The Open Technology Fund s (OTF) security partner Security Research Labs recently an conducted audit of some specific parts of tools developed by Reproducible Builds. This form of security audit, sometimes called a whitebox audit, is a form testing in which auditors have complete knowledge of the item being tested. They auditors assessed the various codebases for resilience against hacking, with key areas including differential report formats in diffoscope, common client web attacks, command injection, privilege management, hidden modifications in the build process and attack vectors that might enable denials of service. The audit focused on three core Reproducible Builds tools: diffoscope, a Python application that unpacks archives of files and directories and transforms their binary formats into human-readable form in order to compare them; strip-nondeterminism, a Perl program that improves reproducibility by stripping out non-deterministic information such as timestamps or other elements introduced during packaging; and reprotest, a Python application that builds source code multiple times in various environments in order to to test reproducibility. OTF s announcement contains more of an overview of the audit, and the full 24-page report is available in PDF form as well.

When good pseudorandom numbers go bad Danielle Navarro published an interesting and amusing article on their blog on When good pseudorandom numbers go bad. Danielle sets the stage as follows:
[Colleagues] approached me to talk about a reproducibility issue they d been having with some R code. They d been running simulations that rely on generating samples from a multivariate normal distribution, and despite doing the prudent thing and using set.seed() to control the state of the random number generator (RNG), the results were not computationally reproducible. The same code, executed on different machines, would produce different random numbers. The numbers weren t just a little bit different in the way that we ve all wearily learned to expect when you try to force computers to do mathematics. They were painfully, brutally, catastrophically, irreproducible different. Somewhere, somehow, something broke.
Thanks to David Wheeler for posting about this article on our mailing list

Academic articles There were two scholarly articles published this month that related to reproducibility: Daniel Hugenroth and Alastair R. Beresford of the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom and Mario Lins and Ren Mayrhofer of Johannes Kepler University in Linz, Austria published an article titled Attestable builds: compiling verifiable binaries on untrusted systems using trusted execution environments. In their paper, they:
present attestable builds, a new paradigm to provide strong source-to-binary correspondence in software artifacts. We tackle the challenge of opaque build pipelines that disconnect the trust between source code, which can be understood and audited, and the final binary artifact, which is difficult to inspect. Our system uses modern trusted execution environments (TEEs) and sandboxed build containers to provide strong guarantees that a given artifact was correctly built from a specific source code snapshot. As such it complements existing approaches like reproducible builds which typically require time-intensive modifications to existing build configurations and dependencies, and require independent parties to continuously build and verify artifacts.
The authors compare attestable builds with reproducible builds by noting an attestable build requires only minimal changes to an existing project, and offers nearly instantaneous verification of the correspondence between a given binary and the source code and build pipeline used to construct it , and proceed by determining that t he overhead (42 seconds start-up latency and 14% increase in build duration) is small in comparison to the overall build time.
Timo Pohl, Pavel Nov k, Marc Ohm and Michael Meier have published a paper called Towards Reproducibility for Software Packages in Scripting Language Ecosystems. The authors note that past research into Reproducible Builds has focused primarily on compiled languages and their ecosystems, with a further emphasis on Linux distribution packages:
However, the popular scripting language ecosystems potentially face unique issues given the systematic difference in distributed artifacts. This Systemization of Knowledge (SoK) [paper] provides an overview of existing research, aiming to highlight future directions, as well as chances to transfer existing knowledge from compiled language ecosystems. To that end, we work out key aspects in current research, systematize identified challenges for software reproducibility, and map them between the ecosystems.
Ultimately, the three authors find that the literature is sparse , focusing on few individual problems and ecosystems, and therefore identify space for more critical research.

Distribution work In Debian this month:
Hans-Christoph Steiner of the F-Droid catalogue of open source applications for the Android platform published a blog post on Making reproducible builds visible. Noting that Reproducible builds are essential in order to have trustworthy software , Hans also mentions that F-Droid has been delivering reproducible builds since 2015 . However:
There is now a Reproducibility Status link for each app on f-droid.org, listed on every app s page. Our verification server shows or based on its build results, where means our rebuilder reproduced the same APK file and means it did not. The IzzyOnDroid repository has developed a more elaborate system of badges which displays a for each rebuilder. Additionally, there is a sketch of a five-level graph to represent some aspects about which processes were run.
Hans compares the approach with projects such as Arch Linux and Debian that provide developer-facing tools to give feedback about reproducible builds, but do not display information about reproducible builds in the user-facing interfaces like the package management GUIs.
Arnout Engelen of the NixOS project has been working on reproducing the minimal installation ISO image. This month, Arnout has successfully reproduced the build of the minimal image for the 25.05 release without relying on the binary cache. Work on also reproducing the graphical installer image is ongoing.
In openSUSE news, Bernhard M. Wiedemann posted another monthly update for their work there.
Lastly in Fedora news, Jelle van der Waa opened issues tracking reproducible issues in Haskell documentation, Qt6 recording the host kernel and R packages recording the current date. The R packages can be made reproducible with packaging changes in Fedora.

diffoscope & disorderfs diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility that can locate and diagnose reproducibility issues. This month, Chris Lamb made the following changes, including preparing and uploading versions 295, 296 and 297 to Debian:
  • Don t rely on zipdetails --walk argument being available, and only add that argument on newer versions after we test for that. [ ]
  • Review and merge support for NuGet packages from Omair Majid. [ ]
  • Update copyright years. [ ]
  • Merge support for an lzma comparator from Will Hollywood. [ ][ ]
Chris also merged an impressive changeset from Siva Mahadevan to make disorderfs more portable, especially on FreeBSD. disorderfs is our FUSE-based filesystem that deliberately introduces non-determinism into directory system calls in order to flush out reproducibility issues [ ]. This was then uploaded to Debian as version 0.6.0-1. Lastly, Vagrant Cascadian updated diffoscope in GNU Guix to version 296 [ ][ ] and 297 [ ][ ], and disorderfs to version 0.6.0 [ ][ ].

Website updates Once again, there were a number of improvements made to our website this month including:

Reproducibility testing framework The Reproducible Builds project operates a comprehensive testing framework running primarily at tests.reproducible-builds.org in order to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. However, Holger Levsen posted to our mailing list this month in order to bring a wider awareness to funding issues faced by the Oregon State University (OSU) Open Source Lab (OSL). As mentioned on OSL s public post, recent changes in university funding makes our current funding model no longer sustainable [and that] unless we secure $250,000 in committed funds, the OSL will shut down later this year . As Holger notes in his post to our mailing list, the Reproducible Builds project relies on hardware nodes hosted there. Nevertheless, Lance Albertson of OSL posted an update to the funding situation later in the month with broadly positive news.
Separate to this, there were various changes to the Jenkins setup this month, which is used as the backend driver of for both tests.reproducible-builds.org and reproduce.debian.net, including:
  • Migrating the central jenkins.debian.net server AMD Opteron to Intel Haswell CPUs. Thanks to IONOS for hosting this server since 2012.
  • After testing it for almost ten years, the i386 architecture has been dropped from tests.reproducible-builds.org. This is because that, with the upcoming release of Debian trixie, i386 is no longer supported as a regular architecture there will be no official kernel and no Debian installer for i386 systems. As a result, a large number of nodes hosted by Infomaniak have been retooled from i386 to amd64.
  • Another node, ionos17-amd64.debian.net, which is used for verifying packages for all.reproduce.debian.net (hosted by IONOS) has had its memory increased from 40 to 64GB, and the number of cores doubled to 32 as well. In addition, two nodes generously hosted by OSUOSL have had their memory doubled to 16GB.
  • Lastly, we have been granted access to more riscv64 architecture boards, so now we have seven such nodes, all with 16GB memory and 4 cores that are verifying packages for riscv64.reproduce.debian.net. Many thanks to PLCT Lab, ISCAS for providing those.

Outside of this, a number of smaller changes were also made by Holger Levsen:
  • reproduce.debian.net-related:
    • Only use two workers for the ppc64el architecture due to RAM size. [ ]
    • Monitor nginx_request and nginx_status with the Munin monitoring system. [ ][ ]
    • Detect various variants of network and memory errors. [ ][ ][ ][ ]
    • Add a prominent link to reproducible-builds.org. [ ]
    • Add a rebuilderd-cache-cleanup.service and run it daily via timer. [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ]
    • Be more verbose what sources are being downloaded. [ ]
    • Correctly deal with packages with an epoch in their version [ ] and deal with binNMUs versions with an epoch as well [ ][ ].
    • Document how to reschedule all other errors on all archs. [ ]
    • Misc documentation improvements. [ ][ ][ ][ ]
    • Include the $HOSTNAME variable in the rebuilderd logfiles. [ ]
    • Install the equivs package on all worker nodes. [ ][ ]
  • Jenkins nodes:
    • Permit the sudo tool to fix up permission issues. [ ][ ]
    • Document how to manage diskspace with OpenStack. [ ]
    • Ignore a number of spurious monitoring errors on riscv64, FreeBSD, etc.. [ ][ ][ ][ ]
    • Install ntpsec-ntpdate (instead of ntpdate) as the former is available on Debian trixie and bookworm. [ ][ ]
    • Use the same SSH ControlPath for all nodes. [ ]
    • Make sure the munin user uses the same SSH config as the jenkins user. [ ]
  • tests.reproducible-builds.org-related:
    • Disable testing of the i386 architecture. [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ]
    • Document the current disk usage. [ ][ ]
    • Address some image placement now that we only test three architectures. [ ]
    • Keep track of build performance. [ ]
  • Misc:
    • Fix a (harmless) typo in the multiarch_versionskew script. [ ]
In addition, Jochen Sprickerhof made a series of changes related to reproduce.debian.net:
  • Add out of memory detection to the statistics page. [ ]
  • Reverse the sorting order on the statistics page. [ ][ ][ ][ ]
  • Improve the spacing between statistics groups. [ ]
  • Update a (hard-coded) line number in error message detection pertaining to a debrebuild line number. [ ]
  • Support Debian unstable in the rebuilder-debian.sh script. [ ] ]
  • Rely on rebuildctl to sync only arch-specific packages. [ ][ ]

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

Finally, if you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

31 May 2025

Antoine Beaupr : Traffic meter per ASN without logs

Have you ever found yourself in the situation where you had no or anonymized logs and still wanted to figure out where your traffic was coming from? Or you have multiple upstreams and are looking to see if you can save fees by getting into peering agreements with some other party? Or your site is getting heavy load but you can't pinpoint it on a single IP and you suspect some amoral corporation is training their degenerate AI on your content with a bot army? (You might be getting onto something there.) If that rings a bell, read on.

TL;DR: ... or just skip the cruft and install asncounter:
pip install asncounter
Also available in Debian 14 or later, or possibly in Debian 13 backports (soon to be released) if people are interested:
apt install asncounter
Then count whoever is hitting your network with:
awk ' print $2 ' /var/log/apache2/*access*.log   asncounter
or:
tail -F /var/log/apache2/*access*.log   awk ' print $2 '   asncounter
or:
tcpdump -q -n   asncounter --input-format=tcpdump --repl
or:
tcpdump -q -i eth0 -n -Q in "tcp and tcp[tcpflags] & tcp-syn != 0 and (port 80 or port 443)"   asncounter --input-format=tcpdump --repl
Read on for why this matters, and why I wrote yet another weird tool (almost) from scratch.

Background and manual work This is a tool I've been dreaming of for a long, long time. Back in 2006, at Koumbit a colleague had setup TAS ("Traffic Accounting System", " " in Russian, apparently), a collection of Perl script that would do per-IP accounting. It was pretty cool: it would count bytes per IP addresses and, from that, you could do analysis. But the project died, and it was kind of bespoke. Fast forward twenty years, and I find myself fighting off bots at the Tor Project (the irony...), with our GitLab suffering pretty bad slowdowns (see issue tpo/tpa/team#41677 for the latest public issue, the juicier one is confidential, unfortunately). (We did have some issues caused by overloads in CI, as we host, after all, a fork of Firefox, which is a massive repository, but the applications team did sustained, awesome work to fix issues on that side, again and again (see tpo/applications/tor-browser#43121 for the latest, and tpo/applications/tor-browser#43121 for some pretty impressive correlation work, I work with really skilled people). But those issues, I believe were fixed.) So I had the feeling it was our turn to get hammered by the AI bots. But how do we tell? I could tell something was hammering at the costly /commit/ and (especially costly) /blame/ endpoint. So at first, I pulled out the trusted awk, sort uniq -c sort -n tail pipeline I am sure others have worked out before:
awk ' print $1 ' /var/log/nginx/*.log   sort   uniq -c   sort -n   tail -10
For people new to this, that pulls the first field out of web server log files, sort the list, counts the number of unique entries, and sorts that so that the most common entries (or IPs) show up first, then show the top 10. That, other words, answers the question of "which IP address visits this web server the most?" Based on this, I found a couple of IP addresses that looked like Alibaba. I had already addressed an abuse complaint to them (tpo/tpa/team#42152) but never got a response, so I just blocked their entire network blocks, rather violently:
for cidr in 47.240.0.0/14 47.246.0.0/16 47.244.0.0/15 47.235.0.0/16 47.236.0.0/14; do 
  iptables-legacy -I INPUT -s $cidr -j REJECT
done
That made Ali Baba and his forty thieves (specifically their AL-3 network go away, but our load was still high, and I was still seeing various IPs crawling the costly endpoints. And this time, it was hard to tell who they were: you'll notice all the Alibaba IPs are inside the same 47.0.0.0/8 prefix. Although it's not a /8 itself, it's all inside the same prefix, so it's visually easy to pick it apart, especially for a brain like mine who's stared too long at logs flowing by too fast for their own mental health. What I had then was different, and I was tired of doing the stupid thing I had been doing for decades at this point. I had recently stumbled upon pyasn recently (in January, according to my notes) and somehow found it again, and thought "I bet I could write a quick script that loops over IPs and counts IPs per ASN". (Obviously, there are lots of other tools out there for that kind of monitoring. Argos, for example, presumably does this, but it's a kind of a huge stack. You can also get into netflows, but there's serious privacy implications with those. There are also lots of per-IP counters like promacct, but that doesn't scale. Or maybe someone already had solved this problem and I just wasted a week of my life, who knows. Someone will let me know, I hope, either way.)

ASNs and networks A quick aside, for people not familiar with how the internet works. People that know about ASNs, BGP announcements and so on can skip. The internet is the network of networks. It's made of multiple networks that talk to each other. The way this works is there is a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), a relatively simple TCP-based protocol, that the edge routers of those networks used to announce each other what network they manage. Each of those network is called an Autonomous System (AS) and has an AS number (ASN) to uniquely identify it. Just like IP addresses, ASNs are allocated by IANA and local registries, they're pretty cheap and useful if you like running your own routers, get one. When you have an ASN, you'll use it to, say, announce to your BGP neighbors "I have 198.51.100.0/24" over here and the others might say "okay, and I have 216.90.108.31/19 over here, and I know of this other ASN over there that has 192.0.2.1/24 too! And gradually, those announcements flood the entire network, and you end up with each BGP having a routing table of the global internet, with a map of which network block, or "prefix" is announced by which ASN. It's how the internet works, and it's a useful thing to know, because it's what, ultimately, makes an organisation responsible for an IP address. There are "looking glass" tools like the one provided by routeviews.org which allow you to effectively run "trace routes" (but not the same as traceroute, which actively sends probes from your location), type an IP address in that form to fiddle with it. You will end up with an "AS path", the way to get from the looking glass to the announced network. But I digress, and that's kind of out of scope. Point is, internet is made of networks, networks are autonomous systems (AS) and they have numbers (ASNs), and they announced IP prefixes (or "network blocks") that ultimately tells you who is responsible for traffic on the internet.

Introducing asncounter So my goal was to get from "lots of IP addresses" to "list of ASNs", possibly also the list of prefixes (because why not). Turns out pyasn makes that really easy. I managed to build a prototype in probably less than an hour, just look at the first version, it's 44 lines (sloccount) of Python, and it works, provided you have already downloaded the required datafiles from routeviews.org. (Obviously, the latest version is longer at close to 1000 lines, but it downloads the data files automatically, and has many more features). The way the first prototype (and later versions too, mostly) worked is that you feed it a list of IP addresses on standard input, it looks up the ASN and prefix associated with the IP, and increments a counter for those, then print the result. That showed me something like this:
root@gitlab-02:~/anarcat-scripts# tcpdump -q -i eth0 -n -Q in "(udp or tcp)"   ./asncounter.py --tcpdump                                                                                                                                                                          
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v[v]... for full protocol decode                                                                
listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 262144 bytes                                                             
INFO: collecting IPs from stdin, using datfile ipasn_20250523.1600.dat.gz                                                                
INFO: loading datfile /root/.cache/pyasn/ipasn_20250523.1600.dat.gz...                                                                   
INFO: loading /root/.cache/pyasn/asnames.json                       
ASN     count   AS               
136907  7811    HWCLOUDS-AS-AP HUAWEI CLOUDS, HK                                                                                         
[----]  359     [REDACTED]
[----]  313     [REDACTED]
8075    254     MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK, US
[---]   164     [REDACTED]
[----]  136     [REDACTED]
24940   114     HETZNER-AS, DE  
[----]  98      [REDACTED]
14618   82      AMAZON-AES, US                                                                                                           
[----]  79      [REDACTED]
prefix  count                                         
166.108.192.0/20        1294                                                                                                             
188.239.32.0/20 1056                                          
166.108.224.0/20        970                    
111.119.192.0/20        951              
124.243.128.0/18        667                                         
94.74.80.0/20   651                                                 
111.119.224.0/20        622                                         
111.119.240.0/20        566           
111.119.208.0/20        538                                         
[REDACTED]  313           
Even without ratios and a total count (which will come later), it was quite clear that Huawei was doing something big on the server. At that point, it was responsible for a quarter to half of the traffic on our GitLab server or about 5-10 queries per second. But just looking at the logs, or per IP hit counts, it was really hard to tell. That traffic is really well distributed. If you look more closely at the output above, you'll notice I redacted a couple of entries except major providers, for privacy reasons. But you'll also notice almost nothing is redacted in the prefix list, why? Because all of those networks are Huawei! Their announcements are kind of bonkers: they have hundreds of such prefixes. Now, clever people in the know will say "of course they do, it's an hyperscaler; just ASN14618 (AMAZON-AES) there is way more announcements, they have 1416 prefixes!" Yes, of course, but they are not generating half of my traffic (at least, not yet). But even then: this also applies to Amazon! This way of counting traffic is way more useful for large scale operations like this, because you group by organisation instead of by server or individual endpoint. And, ultimately, this is why asncounter matters: it allows you to group your traffic by organisation, the place you can actually negotiate with. Now, of course, that assumes those are entities you can talk with. I have written to both Alibaba and Huawei, and have yet to receive a response. I assume I never will. In their defence, I wrote in English, perhaps I should have made the effort of translating my message in Chinese, but then again English is the Lingua Franca of the Internet, and I doubt that's actually the issue.

The Huawei and Facebook blocks Another aside, because this is my blog and I am not looking for a Pullitzer here. So I blocked Huawei from our GitLab server (and before you tear your shirt open: only our GitLab server, everything else is still accessible to them, including our email server to respond to my complaint). I did so 24h after emailing them, and after examining their user agent (UA) headers. Boy that was fun. In a sample of 268 requests I analyzed, they churned out 246 different UAs. At first glance, they looked legit, like:
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Safari on a Mac, so far so good. But when you start digging, you notice some strange things, like here's Safari running on Linux:
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.3 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/6.0.457.0 Safari/534.3
Was Safari ported to Linux? I guess that's.. possible? But here is Safari running on a 15 year old Ubuntu release (10.10):
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686) AppleWebKit/534.24 (KHTML, like Gecko) Ubuntu/10.10 Chromium/12.0.702.0 Chrome/12.0.702.0 Safari/534.24
Speaking of old, here's Safari again, but this time running on Windows NT 5.1, AKA Windows XP, released 2001, EOL since 2019:
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-CA) AppleWebKit/534.13 (KHTML like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.98 Safari/534.13
Really? Here's Firefox 3.6, released 14 years ago, there were quite a lot of those:
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; lt; rv:1.9.2) Gecko/20100115 Firefox/3.6
I remember running those old Firefox releases, those were the days. But to me, those look like entirely fake UAs, deliberately rotated to make it look like legitimate traffic. In comparison, Facebook seemed a bit more legit, in the sense that they don't fake it. most hits are from:
meta-externalagent/1.1 (+https://developers.facebook.com/docs/sharing/webmasters/crawler)
which, according their documentation:
crawls the web for use cases such as training AI models or improving products by indexing content directly
From what I could tell, it was even respecting our rather liberal robots.txt rules, in that it wasn't crawling the sprawling /blame/ or /commit/ endpoints, explicitly forbidden by robots.txt. So I've blocked the Facebook bot in robots.txt and, amazingly, it just went away. Good job Facebook, as much as I think you've given the empire to neo-nazis, cause depression and genocide, you know how to run a crawler, thanks. Huawei was blocked at the web server level, with a friendly 429 status code telling people to contact us (over email) if they need help. And they don't care: they're still hammering the server, from what I can tell, but then again, I didn't block the entire ASN just yet, just the blocks I found crawling the server over a couple hours.

A full asncounter run So what does a day in asncounter look like? Well, you start with a problem, say you're getting too much traffic and want to see where it's from. First you need to sample it. Typically, you'd do that with tcpdump or tailing a log file:
tail -F /var/log/apache2/*access*.log   awk ' print $2 '   asncounter
If you have lots of traffic or care about your users' privacy, you're not going to log IP addresses, so tcpdump is likely a good option instead:
tcpdump -q -n   asncounter --input-format=tcpdump --repl
If you really get a lot of traffic, you might want to get a subset of that to avoid overwhelming asncounter, it's not fast enough to do multiple gigabit/second, I bet, so here's only incoming SYN IPv4 packets:
tcpdump -q -n -Q in "tcp and tcp[tcpflags] & tcp-syn != 0 and (port 80 or port 443)"   asncounter --input-format=tcpdump --repl
In any case, at this point you're staring at a process, just sitting there. If you passed the --repl or --manhole arguments, you're lucky: you have a Python shell inside the program. Otherwise, send SIGHUP to the thing to have it dump the nice tables out:
pkill -HUP asncounter
Here's an example run:
> awk ' print $2 ' /var/log/apache2/*access*.log   asncounter
INFO: using datfile ipasn_20250527.1600.dat.gz
INFO: collecting addresses from <stdin>
INFO: loading datfile /home/anarcat/.cache/pyasn/ipasn_20250527.1600.dat.gz...
INFO: finished reading data
INFO: loading /home/anarcat/.cache/pyasn/asnames.json
count   percent ASN AS
12779   69.33   66496   SAMPLE, CA
3361    18.23   None    None
366 1.99    66497   EXAMPLE, FR
337 1.83    16276   OVH, FR
321 1.74    8075    MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK, US
309 1.68    14061   DIGITALOCEAN-ASN, US
128 0.69    16509   AMAZON-02, US
77  0.42    48090   DMZHOST, GB
56  0.3 136907  HWCLOUDS-AS-AP HUAWEI CLOUDS, HK
53  0.29    17621   CNCGROUP-SH China Unicom Shanghai network, CN
total: 18433
count   percent prefix  ASN AS
12779   69.33   192.0.2.0/24    66496   SAMPLE, CA
3361    18.23   None        
298 1.62    178.128.208.0/20    14061   DIGITALOCEAN-ASN, US
289 1.57    51.222.0.0/16   16276   OVH, FR
272 1.48    2001:DB8::/48   66497   EXAMPLE, FR
235 1.27    172.160.0.0/11  8075    MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK, US
94  0.51    2001:DB8:1::/48 66497   EXAMPLE, FR
72  0.39    47.128.0.0/14   16509   AMAZON-02, US
69  0.37    93.123.109.0/24 48090   DMZHOST, GB
53  0.29    27.115.124.0/24 17621   CNCGROUP-SH China Unicom Shanghai network, CN
Those numbers are actually from my home network, not GitLab. Over there, the battle still rages on, but at least the vampire bots are banging their heads against the solid Nginx wall instead of eating the fragile heart of GitLab. We had a significant improvement in latency thanks to the Facebook and Huawei blocks... Here are the "workhorse request duration stats" for various time ranges, 20h after the block:
range mean max stdev
20h 449ms 958ms 39ms
7d 1.78s 5m 14.9s
30d 2.08s 3.86m 8.86s
6m 901ms 27.3s 2.43s
We went from two seconds mean to 500ms! And look at that standard deviation! 39ms! It was ten seconds before! I doubt we'll keep it that way very long but for now, it feels like I won a battle, and I didn't even have to setup anubis or go-away, although I suspect that will unfortunately come. Note that asncounter also supports exporting Prometheus metrics, but you should be careful with this, as it can lead to cardinal explosion, especially if you track by prefix (which can be disabled with --no-prefixes . Folks interested in more details should read the fine manual for more examples, usage, and discussion. It shows, among other things, how to effectively block lots of networks from Nginx, aggregate multiple prefixes, block entire ASNs, and more! So there you have it: I now have the tool I wish I had 20 years ago. Hopefully it will stay useful for another 20 years, although I'm not sure we'll have still have internet in 20 years. I welcome constructive feedback, "oh no you rewrote X", Grafana dashboards, bug reports, pull requests, and "hell yeah" comments. Hacker News, let it rip, I know you can give me another juicy quote for my blog. This work was done as part of my paid work for the Tor Project, currently in a fundraising drive, give us money if you like what you read.

29 May 2025

Debian XMPP Team: XMPP/Jabber Debian 13 Trixie News

Debian 13 "Trixie" full freeze has started 2025-05-17, so this is a good time to take a look at some of the features, that this release will bring. Here we will focus on packages related to XMPP, a.k.a. Jabber. XMPP is a universal communication protocol for instant messaging, push notifications, IoT, WebRTC, and social applications. It has existed since 1999, originally called "Jabber", it has a diverse and active developers community. Clients Servers Libraries Gateways/Transports Not in Trixie

26 May 2025

Otto Kek l inen: Creating Debian packages from upstream Git

Featured image of post Creating Debian packages from upstream GitIn this post, I demonstrate the optimal workflow for creating new Debian packages in 2025, preserving the upstream git history. The motivation for this is to lower the barrier for sharing improvements to and from upstream, and to improve software provenance and supply-chain security by making it easy to inspect every change at any level using standard git tooling. Key elements of this workflow include: To make the instructions so concrete that anyone can repeat all the steps themselves on a real package, I demonstrate the steps by packaging the command-line tool Entr. It is written in C, has very few dependencies, and its final Debian source package structure is simple, yet exemplifies all the important parts that go into a complete Debian package:
  1. Creating a new packaging repository and publishing it under your personal namespace on salsa.debian.org.
  2. Using dh_make to create the initial Debian packaging.
  3. Posting the first draft of the Debian packaging as a Merge Request (MR) and using Salsa CI to verify Debian packaging quality.
  4. Running local builds efficiently and iterating on the packaging process.

Create new Debian packaging repository from the existing upstream project git repository First, create a new empty directory, then clone the upstream Git repository inside it:
shell
mkdir debian-entr
cd debian-entr
git clone --origin upstreamvcs --branch master \
 --single-branch https://github.com/eradman/entr.git
Using a clean directory makes it easier to inspect the build artifacts of a Debian package, which will be output in the parent directory of the Debian source directory. The extra parameters given to git clone lay the foundation for the Debian packaging git repository structure where the upstream git remote name is upstreamvcs. Only the upstream main branch is tracked to avoid cluttering git history with upstream development branches that are irrelevant for packaging in Debian. Next, enter the git repository directory and list the git tags. Pick the latest upstream release tag as the commit to start the branch upstream/latest. This latest refers to the upstream release, not the upstream development branch. Immediately after, branch off the debian/latest branch, which will have the actual Debian packaging files in the debian/ subdirectory.
shell
cd entr
git tag # shows the latest upstream release tag was '5.6'
git checkout -b upstream/latest 5.6
git checkout -b debian/latest
%% init:   'gitGraph':   'mainBranchName': 'master'      %%
gitGraph:
checkout master
commit id: "Upstream 5.6 release" tag: "5.6"
branch upstream/latest
checkout upstream/latest
commit id: "New upstream version 5.6" tag: "upstream/5.6"
branch debian/latest
checkout debian/latest
commit id: "Initial Debian packaging"
commit id: "Additional change 1"
commit id: "Additional change 2"
commit id: "Additional change 3"
At this point, the repository is structured according to DEP-14 conventions, ensuring a clear separation between upstream and Debian packaging changes, but there are no Debian changes yet. Next, add the Salsa repository as a new remote which called origin, the same as the default remote name in git.
shell
git remote add origin git@salsa.debian.org:otto/entr-demo.git
git push --set-upstream origin debian/latest
This is an important preparation step to later be able to create a Merge Request on Salsa that targets the debian/latest branch, which does not yet have any debian/ directory.

Launch a Debian Sid (unstable) container to run builds in To ensure that all packaging tools are of the latest versions, run everything inside a fresh Sid container. This has two benefits: you are guaranteed to have the most up-to-date toolchain, and your host system stays clean without getting polluted by various extra packages. Additionally, this approach works even if your host system is not Debian/Ubuntu.
shell
cd ..
podman run --interactive --tty --rm --shm-size=1G --cap-add SYS_PTRACE \
 --env='DEB*' --volume=$PWD:/tmp/test --workdir=/tmp/test debian:sid bash
Note that the container should be started from the parent directory of the git repository, not inside it. The --volume parameter will loop-mount the current directory inside the container. Thus all files created and modified are on the host system, and will persist after the container shuts down. Once inside the container, install the basic dependencies:
shell
apt update -q && apt install -q --yes git-buildpackage dpkg-dev dh-make

Automate creating the debian/ files with dh-make To create the files needed for the actual Debian packaging, use dh_make:
shell
# dh_make --packagename entr_5.6 --single --createorig
Maintainer Name : Otto Kek l inen
Email-Address : otto@debian.org
Date : Sat, 15 Feb 2025 01:17:51 +0000
Package Name : entr
Version : 5.6
License : blank
Package Type : single
Are the details correct? [Y/n/q]

Done. Please edit the files in the debian/ subdirectory now.
Due to how dh_make works, the package name and version need to be written as a single underscore separated string. In this case, you should choose --single to specify that the package type is a single binary package. Other options would be --library for library packages (see libgda5 sources as an example) or --indep (see dns-root-data sources as an example). The --createorig will create a mock upstream release tarball (entr_5.6.orig.tar.xz) from the current release directory, which is necessary due to historical reasons and how dh_make worked before git repositories became common and Debian source packages were based off upstream release tarballs (e.g. *.tar.gz). At this stage, a debian/ directory has been created with template files, and you can start modifying the files and iterating towards actual working packaging.
shell
git add debian/
git commit -a -m "Initial Debian packaging"

Review the files The full list of files after the above steps with dh_make would be:
 -- entr
   -- LICENSE
   -- Makefile.bsd
   -- Makefile.linux
   -- Makefile.linux-compat
   -- Makefile.macos
   -- NEWS
   -- README.md
   -- configure
   -- data.h
   -- debian
     -- README.Debian
     -- README.source
     -- changelog
     -- control
     -- copyright
     -- gbp.conf
     -- entr-docs.docs
     -- entr.cron.d.ex
     -- entr.doc-base.ex
     -- manpage.1.ex
     -- manpage.md.ex
     -- manpage.sgml.ex
     -- manpage.xml.ex
     -- postinst.ex
     -- postrm.ex
     -- preinst.ex
     -- prerm.ex
     -- rules
     -- salsa-ci.yml.ex
     -- source
       -- format
     -- upstream
       -- metadata.ex
     -- watch.ex
   -- entr.1
   -- entr.c
   -- missing
     -- compat.h
     -- kqueue_inotify.c
     -- strlcpy.c
     -- sys
     -- event.h
   -- status.c
   -- status.h
   -- system_test.sh
 -- entr_5.6.orig.tar.xz
You can browse these files in the demo repository. The mandatory files in the debian/ directory are:
  • changelog,
  • control,
  • copyright,
  • and rules.
All the other files have been created for convenience so the packager has template files to work from. The files with the suffix .ex are example files that won t have any effect until their content is adjusted and the suffix removed. For detailed explanations of the purpose of each file in the debian/ subdirectory, see the following resources:
  • The Debian Policy Manual: Describes the structure of the operating system, the package archive and requirements for packages to be included in the Debian archive.
  • The Developer s Reference: A collection of best practices and process descriptions Debian packagers are expected to follow while interacting with one another.
  • Debhelper man pages: Detailed information of how the Debian package build system works, and how the contents of the various files in debian/ affect the end result.
As Entr, the package used in this example, is a real package that already exists in the Debian archive, you may want to browse the actual Debian packaging source at https://salsa.debian.org/debian/entr/-/tree/debian/latest/debian for reference. Most of these files have standardized formatting conventions to make collaboration easier. To automatically format the files following the most popular conventions, simply run wrap-and-sort -vast or debputy reformat --style=black.

Identify build dependencies The most common reason for builds to fail is missing dependencies. The easiest way to identify which Debian package ships the required dependency is using apt-file. If, for example, a build fails complaining that pcre2posix.h cannot be found or that libcre2-posix.so is missing, you can use these commands:
shell
$ apt install -q --yes apt-file && apt-file update
$ apt-file search pcre2posix.h
libpcre2-dev: /usr/include/pcre2posix.h
$ apt-file search libpcre2-posix.so
libpcre2-dev: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpcre2-posix.so
libpcre2-posix3: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpcre2-posix.so.3
libpcre2-posix3: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpcre2-posix.so.3.0.6
The output above implies that the debian/control should be extended to define a Build-Depends: libpcre2-dev relationship. There is also dpkg-depcheck that uses strace to trace the files the build process tries to access, and lists what Debian packages those files belong to. Example usage:
shell
dpkg-depcheck -b debian/rules build

Build the Debian sources to generate the .deb package After the first pass of refining the contents of the files in debian/, test the build by running dpkg-buildpackage inside the container:
shell
dpkg-buildpackage -uc -us -b
The options -uc -us will skip signing the resulting Debian source package and other build artifacts. The -b option will skip creating a source package and only build the (binary) *.deb packages. The output is very verbose and gives a large amount of context about what is happening during the build to make debugging build failures easier. In the build log of entr you will see for example the line dh binary --buildsystem=makefile. This and other dh commands can also be run manually if there is a need to quickly repeat only a part of the build while debugging build failures. To see what files were generated or modified by the build simply run git status --ignored:
shell
$ git status --ignored
On branch debian/latest

Untracked files:
 (use "git add <file>..." to include in what will be committed)
 debian/debhelper-build-stamp
 debian/entr.debhelper.log
 debian/entr.substvars
 debian/files

Ignored files:
 (use "git add -f <file>..." to include in what will be committed)
 Makefile
 compat.c
 compat.o
 debian/.debhelper/
 debian/entr/
 entr
 entr.o
 status.o
Re-running dpkg-buildpackage will include running the command dh clean, which assuming it is configured correctly in the debian/rules file will reset the source directory to the original pristine state. The same can of course also be done with regular git commands git reset --hard; git clean -fdx. To avoid accidentally committing unnecessary build artifacts in git, a debian/.gitignore can be useful and it would typically include all four files listed as untracked above. After a successful build you would have the following files:
shell
 -- entr
   -- LICENSE
   -- Makefile -> Makefile.linux
   -- Makefile.bsd
   -- Makefile.linux
   -- Makefile.linux-compat
   -- Makefile.macos
   -- NEWS
   -- README.md
   -- compat.c
   -- compat.o
   -- configure
   -- data.h
   -- debian
     -- README.source.md
     -- changelog
     -- control
     -- copyright
     -- debhelper-build-stamp
     -- docs
     -- entr
       -- DEBIAN
         -- control
         -- md5sums
       -- usr
       -- bin
         -- entr
       -- share
       -- doc
         -- entr
         -- NEWS.gz
         -- README.md
         -- changelog.Debian.gz
         -- copyright
       -- man
       -- man1
       -- entr.1.gz
     -- entr.debhelper.log
     -- entr.substvars
     -- files
     -- gbp.conf
     -- patches
       -- PR149-expand-aliases-in-system-test-script.patch
       -- series
       -- system-test-skip-no-tty.patch
       -- system-test-with-system-binary.patch
     -- rules
     -- salsa-ci.yml
     -- source
       -- format
     -- tests
       -- control
     -- upstream
       -- metadata
       -- signing-key.asc
     -- watch
   -- entr
   -- entr.1
   -- entr.c
   -- entr.o
   -- missing
     -- compat.h
     -- kqueue_inotify.c
     -- strlcpy.c
     -- sys
     -- event.h
   -- status.c
   -- status.h
   -- status.o
   -- system_test.sh
 -- entr-dbgsym_5.6-1_amd64.deb
 -- entr_5.6-1.debian.tar.xz
 -- entr_5.6-1.dsc
 -- entr_5.6-1_amd64.buildinfo
 -- entr_5.6-1_amd64.changes
 -- entr_5.6-1_amd64.deb
 -- entr_5.6.orig.tar.xz
The contents of debian/entr are essentially what goes into the resulting entr_5.6-1_amd64.deb package. Familiarizing yourself with the majority of the files in the original upstream source as well as all the resulting build artifacts is time consuming, but it is a necessary investment to get high-quality Debian packages. There are also tools such as Debcraft that automate generating the build artifacts in separate output directories for each build, thus making it easy to compare the changes to correlate what change in the Debian packaging led to what change in the resulting build artifacts.

Re-run the initial import with git-buildpackage When upstreams publish releases as tarballs, they should also be imported for optimal software supply-chain security, in particular if upstream also publishes cryptographic signatures that can be used to verify the authenticity of the tarballs. To achieve this, the files debian/watch, debian/upstream/signing-key.asc, and debian/gbp.conf need to be present with the correct options. In the gbp.conf file, ensure you have the correct options based on:
  1. Does upstream release tarballs? If so, enforce pristine-tar = True.
  2. Does upstream sign the tarballs? If so, configure explicit signature checking with upstream-signatures = on.
  3. Does upstream have a git repository, and does it have release git tags? If so, configure the release git tag format, e.g. upstream-vcs-tag = %(version%~%.)s.
To validate that the above files are working correctly, run gbp import-orig with the current version explicitly defined:
shell
$ gbp import-orig --uscan --upstream-version 5.6
gbp:info: Launching uscan...
gpgv: Signature made 7. Aug 2024 07.43.27 PDT
gpgv: using RSA key 519151D83E83D40A232B4D615C418B8631BC7C26
gpgv: Good signature from "Eric Radman <ericshane@eradman.com>"
gbp:info: Using uscan downloaded tarball ../entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz
gbp:info: Importing '../entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz' to branch 'upstream/latest'...
gbp:info: Source package is entr
gbp:info: Upstream version is 5.6
gbp:info: Replacing upstream source on 'debian/latest'
gbp:info: Running Postimport hook
gbp:info: Successfully imported version 5.6 of ../entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz
As the original packaging was done based on the upstream release git tag, the above command will fetch the tarball release, create the pristine-tar branch, and store the tarball delta on it. This command will also attempt to create the tag upstream/5.6 on the upstream/latest branch.

Import new upstream versions in the future Forking the upstream git repository, creating the initial packaging, and creating the DEP-14 branch structure are all one-off work needed only when creating the initial packaging. Going forward, to import new upstream releases, one would simply run git fetch upstreamvcs; gbp import-orig --uscan, which fetches the upstream git tags, checks for new upstream tarballs, and automatically downloads, verifies, and imports the new version. See the galera-4-demo example in the Debian source packages in git explained post as a demo you can try running yourself and examine in detail. You can also try running gbp import-orig --uscan without specifying a version. It would fetch it, as it will notice there is now Entr version 5.7 available, and import it.

Build using git-buildpackage From this stage onwards you should build the package using gbp buildpackage, which will do a more comprehensive build.
shell
gbp buildpackage -uc -us
The git-buildpackage build also includes running Lintian to find potential Debian policy violations in the sources or in the resulting .deb binary packages. Many Debian Developers run lintian -EviIL +pedantic after every build to check that there are no new nags, and to validate that changes intended to previous Lintian nags were correct.

Open a Merge Request on Salsa for Debian packaging review Getting everything perfectly right takes a lot of effort, and may require reaching out to an experienced Debian Developers for review and guidance. Thus, you should aim to publish your initial packaging work on Salsa, Debian s GitLab instance, for review and feedback as early as possible. For somebody to be able to easily see what you have done, you should rename your debian/latest branch to another name, for example next/debian/latest, and open a Merge Request that targets the debian/latest branch on your Salsa fork, which still has only the unmodified upstream files. If you have followed the workflow in this post so far, you can simply run:
  1. git checkout -b next/debian/latest
  2. git push --set-upstream origin next/debian/latest
  3. Open in a browser the URL visible in the git remote response
  4. Write the Merge Request description in case the default text from your commit is not enough
  5. Mark the MR as Draft using the checkbox
  6. Publish the MR and request feedback
Once a Merge Request exists, discussion regarding what additional changes are needed can be conducted as MR comments. With an MR, you can easily iterate on the contents of next/debian/latest, rebase, force push, and request re-review as many times as you want. While at it, make sure the Settings > CI/CD page has under CI/CD configuration file the value debian/salsa-ci.yml so that the CI can run and give you immediate automated feedback. For an example of an initial packaging Merge Request, see https://salsa.debian.org/otto/entr-demo/-/merge_requests/1.

Open a Merge Request / Pull Request to fix upstream code Due to the high quality requirements in Debian, it is fairly common that while doing the initial Debian packaging of an open source project, issues are found that stem from the upstream source code. While it is possible to carry extra patches in Debian, it is not good practice to deviate too much from upstream code with custom Debian patches. Instead, the Debian packager should try to get the fixes applied directly upstream. Using git-buildpackage patch queues is the most convenient way to make modifications to the upstream source code so that they automatically convert into Debian patches (stored at debian/patches), and can also easily be submitted upstream as any regular git commit (and rebased and resubmitted many times over). First, decide if you want to work out of the upstream development branch and later cherry-pick to the Debian packaging branch, or work out of the Debian packaging branch and cherry-pick to an upstream branch. The example below starts from the upstream development branch and then cherry-picks the commit into the git-buildpackage patch queue:
shell
git checkout -b bugfix-branch master
nano entr.c
make
./entr # verify change works as expected
git commit -a -m "Commit title" -m "Commit body"
git push # submit upstream
gbp pq import --force --time-machine=10
git cherry-pick <commit id>
git commit --amend # extend commit message with DEP-3 metadata
gbp buildpackage -uc -us -b
./entr # verify change works as expected
gbp pq export --drop --commit
git commit --amend # Write commit message along lines "Add patch to .."
The example below starts by making the fix on a git-buildpackage patch queue branch, and then cherry-picking it onto the upstream development branch:
shell
gbp pq import --force --time-machine=10
nano entr.c
git commit -a -m "Commit title" -m "Commit body"
gbp buildpackage -uc -us -b
./entr # verify change works as expected
gbp pq export --drop --commit
git commit --amend # Write commit message along lines "Add patch to .."
git checkout -b bugfix-branch master
git cherry-pick <commit id>
git commit --amend # prepare commit message for upstream submission
git push # submit upstream
The key git-buildpackage commands to enter and exit the patch-queue mode are:
shell
gbp pq import --force --time-machine=10
gbp pq export --drop --commit
%% init:   'gitGraph':   'mainBranchName': 'debian/latest'      %%
gitGraph
checkout debian/latest
commit id: "Initial packaging"
branch patch-queue/debian/latest
checkout patch-queue/debian/latest
commit id: "Delete debian/patches/..."
commit id: "Patch 1 title"
commit id: "Patch 2 title"
commit id: "Patch 3 title"
These can be run at any time, regardless if any debian/patches existed prior, or if existing patches applied cleanly or not, or if there were old patch queue branches around. Note that the extra -b in gbp buildpackage -uc -us -b instructs to build only binary packages, avoiding any nags from dpkg-source that there are modifications in the upstream sources while building in the patches-applied mode.

Programming-language specific dh-make alternatives As each programming language has its specific way of building the source code, and many other conventions regarding the file layout and more, Debian has multiple custom tools to create new Debian source packages for specific programming languages. Notably, Python does not have its own tool, but there is an dh_make --python option for Python support directly in dh_make itself. The list is not complete and many more tools exist. For some languages, there are even competing options, such as for Go there is in addition to dh-make-golang also Gophian. When learning Debian packaging, there is no need to learn these tools upfront. Being aware that they exist is enough, and one can learn them only if and when one starts to package a project in a new programming language.

The difference between source git repository vs source packages vs binary packages As seen in earlier example, running gbp buildpackage on the Entr packaging repository above will result in several files:
entr_5.6-1_amd64.changes
entr_5.6-1_amd64.deb
entr_5.6-1.debian.tar.xz
entr_5.6-1.dsc
entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz
entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz.asc
The entr_5.6-1_amd64.deb is the binary package, which can be installed on a Debian/Ubuntu system. The rest of the files constitute the source package. To do a source-only build, run gbp buildpackage -S and note the files produced:
entr_5.6-1_source.changes
entr_5.6-1.debian.tar.xz
entr_5.6-1.dsc
entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz
entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz.asc
The source package files can be used to build the binary .deb for amd64, or any architecture that the package supports. It is important to grasp that the Debian source package is the preferred form to be able to build the binary packages on various Debian build systems, and the Debian source package is not the same thing as the Debian packaging git repository contents.
flowchart LR
git[Git repository<br>branch debian/latest] --> gbp buildpackage -S  src[Source Package<br>.dsc + .tar.xz]
src --> dpkg-buildpackage  bin[Binary Packages<br>.deb]
If the package is large and complex, the build could result in multiple binary packages. One set of package definition files in debian/ will however only ever result in a single source package.

Option to repackage source packages with Files-Excluded lists in the debian/copyright file Some upstream projects may include binary files in their release, or other undesirable content that needs to be omitted from the source package in Debian. The easiest way to filter them out is by adding to the debian/copyright file a Files-Excluded field listing the undesired files. The debian/copyright file is read by uscan, which will repackage the upstream sources on-the-fly when importing new upstream releases. For a real-life example, see the debian/copyright files in the Godot package that lists:
debian
Files-Excluded: platform/android/java/gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar
The resulting repackaged upstream source tarball, as well as the upstream version component, will have an extra +ds to signify that it is not the true original upstream source but has been modified by Debian:
godot_4.3+ds.orig.tar.xz
godot_4.3+ds-1_amd64.deb

Creating one Debian source package from multiple upstream source packages also possible In some rare cases the upstream project may be split across multiple git repositories or the upstream release may consist of multiple components each in their own separate tarball. Usually these are very large projects that get some benefits from releasing components separately. If in Debian these are deemed to go into a single source package, it is technically possible using the component system in git-buildpackage and uscan. For an example see the gbp.conf and watch files in the node-cacache package. Using this type of structure should be a last resort, as it creates complexity and inter-dependencies that are bound to cause issues later on. It is usually better to work with upstream and champion universal best practices with clear releases and version schemes.

When not to start the Debian packaging repository as a fork of the upstream one Not all upstreams use Git for version control. It is by far the most popular, but there are still some that use e.g. Subversion or Mercurial. Who knows maybe in the future some new version control systems will start to compete with Git. There are also projects that use Git in massive monorepos and with complex submodule setups that invalidate the basic assumptions required to map an upstream Git repository into a Debian packaging repository. In those cases one can t use a debian/latest branch on a clone of the upstream git repository as the starting point for the Debian packaging, but one must revert the traditional way of starting from an upstream release tarball with gbp import-orig package-1.0.tar.gz.

Conclusion Created in August 1993, Debian is one of the oldest Linux distributions. In the 32 years since inception, the .deb packaging format and the tooling to work with it have evolved several generations. In the past 10 years, more and more Debian Developers have converged on certain core practices evidenced by https://trends.debian.net/, but there is still a lot of variance in workflows even for identical tasks. Hopefully, you find this post useful in giving practical guidance on how exactly to do the most common things when packaging software for Debian. Happy packaging!

25 May 2025

Iustin Pop: Corydalis v2025.21.0 - new features!

I just released yesterday a new version of Corydalis (https://demo.corydalis.io, https://github.com/iustin/corydalis). To me personally, it s a major improvement, since the native (my own) image viewer finally gets zooming, panning, gesture handling, etc. This is table-stakes for an image viewer, but oh well, it took me a long time to implement it, because of multiple things: lack of time, the JS library I was using for gestures was pretty old and unmaintained and it caused more trouble than was helping, etc. The feature is not perfect, and on the demo site there s already a bug since all images are smaller than the screen, and this I didn t test , so double-click to zoom doesn t work: says Already at minimum zoom , but zooming otherwise (+/- on the keyboard, mouse wheel, gesture) works. End-to-end, the major development for this release was done over around two weeks, which is pretty short: I extensively used Claude Sonnet and Grok to unblock myself. Not to write code per se - although there is code written 1:1 by LLMs, but most of the code is weirdly wrong, and I have to either correct it or just use it as a starter and rewrite most of it. But to discuss and unblock, and learn about new things, the current LLMs are very good at. And yet, sometimes even what they re good at, fails hard. I asked for ideas to simplify a piece of code, and it went nowhere, even if there were significant rewrite possibilities. I spent the brain cycles on it, reverse engineered my own code, then simplified. I ll have to write a separate blog post on this In any case, this (zooming) was the last major feature I was missing. There are image viewer libraries, but most of them slow, compared to the bare-bones (well, now not so much anymore) viewer that I use as main viewer. From now on, it will me minor incremental features, mostly around Exif management/handling, etc. Or, well, internal cleanups: extend test coverage, remove use of JQuery in the frontend, etc., there are tons of things to do. Fun fact: I managed to discover a Safari iOS bug. Or at least I think it s a bug, so reported it and curious what ll come out of it. Finally, I still couldn t fix the GitHub actions bug where the git describe doesn t see the just pushed tag, sigh, so the demo site still lists Corydalis v2024.12.0-133-g00edf63 as the version .

Otto Kek l inen: New Debian package creation from upstream git repository

Featured image of post New Debian package creation from upstream git repositoryIn this post, I demonstrate the optimal workflow for creating new Debian packages in 2025, preserving the upstream git history. The motivation for this is to lower the barrier for sharing improvements to and from upstream, and to improve software provenance and supply-chain security by making it easy to inspect every change at any level using standard git tooling. Key elements of this workflow include: To make the instructions so concrete that anyone can repeat all the steps themselves on a real package, I demonstrate the steps by packaging the command-line tool Entr. It is written in C, has very few dependencies, and its final Debian source package structure is simple, yet exemplifies all the important parts that go into a complete Debian package:
  1. Creating a new packaging repository and publishing it under your personal namespace on salsa.debian.org.
  2. Using dh_make to create the initial Debian packaging.
  3. Posting the first draft of the Debian packaging as a Merge Request (MR) and using Salsa CI to verify Debian packaging quality.
  4. Running local builds efficiently and iterating on the packaging process.

Create new Debian packaging repository from the existing upstream project git repository First, create a new empty directory, then clone the upstream Git repository inside it:
shell
mkdir debian-entr
cd debian-entr
git clone --origin upstreamvcs --branch master \
 --single-branch https://github.com/eradman/entr.git
Using a clean directory makes it easier to inspect the build artifacts of a Debian package, which will be output in the parent directory of the Debian source directory. The extra parameters given to git clone lay the foundation for the Debian packaging git repository structure where the upstream git remote name is upstreamvcs. Only the upstream main branch is tracked to avoid cluttering git history with upstream development branches that are irrelevant for packaging in Debian. Next, enter the git repository directory and list the git tags. Pick the latest upstream release tag as the commit to start the branch upstream/latest. This latest refers to the upstream release, not the upstream development branch. Immediately after, branch off the debian/latest branch, which will have the actual Debian packaging files in the debian/ subdirectory.
shell
cd entr
git tag # shows the latest upstream release tag was '5.6'
git checkout -b upstream/latest 5.6
git checkout -b debian/latest
%% init:   'gitGraph':   'mainBranchName': 'master'      %%
gitGraph:
checkout master
commit id: "Upstream 5.6 release" tag: "5.6"
branch upstream/latest
checkout upstream/latest
commit id: "New upstream version 5.6" tag: "upstream/5.6"
branch debian/latest
checkout debian/latest
commit id: "Initial Debian packaging"
commit id: "Additional change 1"
commit id: "Additional change 2"
commit id: "Additional change 3"
At this point, the repository is structured according to DEP-14 conventions, ensuring a clear separation between upstream and Debian packaging changes, but there are no Debian changes yet. Next, add the Salsa repository as a new remote which called origin, the same as the default remote name in git.
shell
git remote add origin git@salsa.debian.org:otto/entr-demo.git
git push --set-upstream origin debian/latest
This is an important preparation step to later be able to create a Merge Request on Salsa that targets the debian/latest branch, which does not yet have any debian/ directory.

Launch a Debian Sid (unstable) container to run builds in To ensure that all packaging tools are of the latest versions, run everything inside a fresh Sid container. This has two benefits: you are guaranteed to have the most up-to-date toolchain, and your host system stays clean without getting polluted by various extra packages. Additionally, this approach works even if your host system is not Debian/Ubuntu.
shell
cd ..
podman run --interactive --tty --rm --shm-size=1G --cap-add SYS_PTRACE \
 --env='DEB*' --volume=$PWD:/tmp/test --workdir=/tmp/test debian:sid bash
Note that the container should be started from the parent directory of the git repository, not inside it. The --volume parameter will loop-mount the current directory inside the container. Thus all files created and modified are on the host system, and will persist after the container shuts down. Once inside the container, install the basic dependencies:
shell
apt update -q && apt install -q --yes git-buildpackage dpkg-dev dh-make

Automate creating the debian/ files with dh-make To create the files needed for the actual Debian packaging, use dh_make:
shell
# dh_make --packagename entr_5.6 --single --createorig
Maintainer Name : Otto Kek l inen
Email-Address : otto@debian.org
Date : Sat, 15 Feb 2025 01:17:51 +0000
Package Name : entr
Version : 5.6
License : blank
Package Type : single
Are the details correct? [Y/n/q]

Done. Please edit the files in the debian/ subdirectory now.
Due to how dh_make works, the package name and version need to be written as a single underscore separated string. In this case, you should choose --single to specify that the package type is a single binary package. Other options would be --library for library packages (see libgda5 sources as an example) or --indep (see dns-root-data sources as an example). The --createorig will create a mock upstream release tarball (entr_5.6.orig.tar.xz) from the current release directory, which is necessary due to historical reasons and how dh_make worked before git repositories became common and Debian source packages were based off upstream release tarballs (e.g. *.tar.gz). At this stage, a debian/ directory has been created with template files, and you can start modifying the files and iterating towards actual working packaging.
shell
git add debian/
git commit -a -m "Initial Debian packaging"

Review the files The full list of files after the above steps with dh_make would be:
 -- entr
   -- LICENSE
   -- Makefile.bsd
   -- Makefile.linux
   -- Makefile.linux-compat
   -- Makefile.macos
   -- NEWS
   -- README.md
   -- configure
   -- data.h
   -- debian
     -- README.Debian
     -- README.source
     -- changelog
     -- control
     -- copyright
     -- gbp.conf
     -- entr-docs.docs
     -- entr.cron.d.ex
     -- entr.doc-base.ex
     -- manpage.1.ex
     -- manpage.md.ex
     -- manpage.sgml.ex
     -- manpage.xml.ex
     -- postinst.ex
     -- postrm.ex
     -- preinst.ex
     -- prerm.ex
     -- rules
     -- salsa-ci.yml.ex
     -- source
       -- format
     -- upstream
       -- metadata.ex
     -- watch.ex
   -- entr.1
   -- entr.c
   -- missing
     -- compat.h
     -- kqueue_inotify.c
     -- strlcpy.c
     -- sys
     -- event.h
   -- status.c
   -- status.h
   -- system_test.sh
 -- entr_5.6.orig.tar.xz
You can browse these files in the demo repository. The mandatory files in the debian/ directory are:
  • changelog,
  • control,
  • copyright,
  • and rules.
All the other files have been created for convenience so the packager has template files to work from. The files with the suffix .ex are example files that won t have any effect until their content is adjusted and the suffix removed. For detailed explanations of the purpose of each file in the debian/ subdirectory, see the following resources:
  • The Debian Policy Manual: Describes the structure of the operating system, the package archive and requirements for packages to be included in the Debian archive.
  • The Developer s Reference: A collection of best practices and process descriptions Debian packagers are expected to follow while interacting with one another.
  • Debhelper man pages: Detailed information of how the Debian package build system works, and how the contents of the various files in debian/ affect the end result.
As Entr, the package used in this example, is a real package that already exists in the Debian archive, you may want to browse the actual Debian packaging source at https://salsa.debian.org/debian/entr/-/tree/debian/latest/debian for reference. Most of these files have standardized formatting conventions to make collaboration easier. To automatically format the files following the most popular conventions, simply run wrap-and-sort -vast or debputy reformat --style=black.

Identify build dependencies The most common reason for builds to fail is missing dependencies. The easiest way to identify which Debian package ships the required dependency is using apt-file. If, for example, a build fails complaining that pcre2posix.h cannot be found or that libcre2-posix.so is missing, you can use these commands:
shell
$ apt install -q --yes apt-file && apt-file update
$ apt-file search pcre2posix.h
libpcre2-dev: /usr/include/pcre2posix.h
$ apt-file search libpcre2-posix.so
libpcre2-dev: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpcre2-posix.so
libpcre2-posix3: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpcre2-posix.so.3
libpcre2-posix3: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpcre2-posix.so.3.0.6
The output above implies that the debian/control should be extended to define a Build-Depends: libpcre2-dev relationship. There is also dpkg-depcheck that uses strace to trace the files the build process tries to access, and lists what Debian packages those files belong to. Example usage:
shell
dpkg-depcheck -b debian/rules build

Build the Debian sources to generate the .deb package After the first pass of refining the contents of the files in debian/, test the build by running dpkg-buildpackage inside the container:
shell
dpkg-buildpackage -uc -us -b
The options -uc -us will skip signing the resulting Debian source package and other build artifacts. The -b option will skip creating a source package and only build the (binary) *.deb packages. The output is very verbose and gives a large amount of context about what is happening during the build to make debugging build failures easier. In the build log of entr you will see for example the line dh binary --buildsystem=makefile. This and other dh commands can also be run manually if there is a need to quickly repeat only a part of the build while debugging build failures. To see what files were generated or modified by the build simply run git status --ignored:
shell
$ git status --ignored
On branch debian/latest

Untracked files:
 (use "git add <file>..." to include in what will be committed)
 debian/debhelper-build-stamp
 debian/entr.debhelper.log
 debian/entr.substvars
 debian/files

Ignored files:
 (use "git add -f <file>..." to include in what will be committed)
 Makefile
 compat.c
 compat.o
 debian/.debhelper/
 debian/entr/
 entr
 entr.o
 status.o
Re-running dpkg-buildpackage will include running the command dh clean, which assuming it is configured correctly in the debian/rules file will reset the source directory to the original pristine state. The same can of course also be done with regular git commands git reset --hard; git clean -fdx. To avoid accidentally committing unnecessary build artifacts in git, a debian/.gitignore can be useful and it would typically include all four files listed as untracked above. After a successful build you would have the following files:
shell
 -- entr
   -- LICENSE
   -- Makefile -> Makefile.linux
   -- Makefile.bsd
   -- Makefile.linux
   -- Makefile.linux-compat
   -- Makefile.macos
   -- NEWS
   -- README.md
   -- compat.c
   -- compat.o
   -- configure
   -- data.h
   -- debian
     -- README.source.md
     -- changelog
     -- control
     -- copyright
     -- debhelper-build-stamp
     -- docs
     -- entr
       -- DEBIAN
         -- control
         -- md5sums
       -- usr
       -- bin
         -- entr
       -- share
       -- doc
         -- entr
         -- NEWS.gz
         -- README.md
         -- changelog.Debian.gz
         -- copyright
       -- man
       -- man1
       -- entr.1.gz
     -- entr.debhelper.log
     -- entr.substvars
     -- files
     -- gbp.conf
     -- patches
       -- PR149-expand-aliases-in-system-test-script.patch
       -- series
       -- system-test-skip-no-tty.patch
       -- system-test-with-system-binary.patch
     -- rules
     -- salsa-ci.yml
     -- source
       -- format
     -- tests
       -- control
     -- upstream
       -- metadata
       -- signing-key.asc
     -- watch
   -- entr
   -- entr.1
   -- entr.c
   -- entr.o
   -- missing
     -- compat.h
     -- kqueue_inotify.c
     -- strlcpy.c
     -- sys
     -- event.h
   -- status.c
   -- status.h
   -- status.o
   -- system_test.sh
 -- entr-dbgsym_5.6-1_amd64.deb
 -- entr_5.6-1.debian.tar.xz
 -- entr_5.6-1.dsc
 -- entr_5.6-1_amd64.buildinfo
 -- entr_5.6-1_amd64.changes
 -- entr_5.6-1_amd64.deb
 -- entr_5.6.orig.tar.xz
The contents of debian/entr are essentially what goes into the resulting entr_5.6-1_amd64.deb package. Familiarizing yourself with the majority of the files in the original upstream source as well as all the resulting build artifacts is time consuming, but it is a necessary investment to get high-quality Debian packages. There are also tools such as Debcraft that automate generating the build artifacts in separate output directories for each build, thus making it easy to compare the changes to correlate what change in the Debian packaging led to what change in the resulting build artifacts.

Re-run the initial import with git-buildpackage When upstreams publish releases as tarballs, they should also be imported for optimal software supply-chain security, in particular if upstream also publishes cryptographic signatures that can be used to verify the authenticity of the tarballs. To achieve this, the files debian/watch, debian/upstream/signing-key.asc, and debian/gbp.conf need to be present with the correct options. In the gbp.conf file, ensure you have the correct options based on:
  1. Does upstream release tarballs? If so, enforce pristine-tar = True.
  2. Does upstream sign the tarballs? If so, configure explicit signature checking with upstream-signatures = on.
  3. Does upstream have a git repository, and does it have release git tags? If so, configure the release git tag format, e.g. upstream-vcs-tag = %(version%~%.)s.
To validate that the above files are working correctly, run gbp import-orig with the current version explicitly defined:
shell
$ gbp import-orig --uscan --upstream-version 5.6
gbp:info: Launching uscan...
gpgv: Signature made 7. Aug 2024 07.43.27 PDT
gpgv: using RSA key 519151D83E83D40A232B4D615C418B8631BC7C26
gpgv: Good signature from "Eric Radman <ericshane@eradman.com>"
gbp:info: Using uscan downloaded tarball ../entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz
gbp:info: Importing '../entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz' to branch 'upstream/latest'...
gbp:info: Source package is entr
gbp:info: Upstream version is 5.6
gbp:info: Replacing upstream source on 'debian/latest'
gbp:info: Running Postimport hook
gbp:info: Successfully imported version 5.6 of ../entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz
As the original packaging was done based on the upstream release git tag, the above command will fetch the tarball release, create the pristine-tar branch, and store the tarball delta on it. This command will also attempt to create the tag upstream/5.6 on the upstream/latest branch.

Import new upstream versions in the future Forking the upstream git repository, creating the initial packaging, and creating the DEP-14 branch structure are all one-off work needed only when creating the initial packaging. Going forward, to import new upstream releases, one would simply run git fetch upstreamvcs; gbp import-orig --uscan, which fetches the upstream git tags, checks for new upstream tarballs, and automatically downloads, verifies, and imports the new version. See the galera-4-demo example in the Debian source packages in git explained post as a demo you can try running yourself and examine in detail. You can also try running gbp import-orig --uscan without specifying a version. It would fetch it, as it will notice there is now Entr version 5.7 available, and import it.

Build using git-buildpackage From this stage onwards you should build the package using gbp buildpackage, which will do a more comprehensive build.
shell
gbp buildpackage -uc -us
The git-buildpackage build also includes running Lintian to find potential Debian policy violations in the sources or in the resulting .deb binary packages. Many Debian Developers run lintian -EviIL +pedantic after every build to check that there are no new nags, and to validate that changes intended to previous Lintian nags were correct.

Open a Merge Request on Salsa for Debian packaging review Getting everything perfectly right takes a lot of effort, and may require reaching out to an experienced Debian Developers for review and guidance. Thus, you should aim to publish your initial packaging work on Salsa, Debian s GitLab instance, for review and feedback as early as possible. For somebody to be able to easily see what you have done, you should rename your debian/latest branch to another name, for example next/debian/latest, and open a Merge Request that targets the debian/latest branch on your Salsa fork, which still has only the unmodified upstream files. If you have followed the workflow in this post so far, you can simply run:
  1. git checkout -b next/debian/latest
  2. git push --set-upstream origin next/debian/latest
  3. Open in a browser the URL visible in the git remote response
  4. Write the Merge Request description in case the default text from your commit is not enough
  5. Mark the MR as Draft using the checkbox
  6. Publish the MR and request feedback
Once a Merge Request exists, discussion regarding what additional changes are needed can be conducted as MR comments. With an MR, you can easily iterate on the contents of next/debian/latest, rebase, force push, and request re-review as many times as you want. While at it, make sure the Settings > CI/CD page has under CI/CD configuration file the value debian/salsa-ci.yml so that the CI can run and give you immediate automated feedback. For an example of an initial packaging Merge Request, see https://salsa.debian.org/otto/entr-demo/-/merge_requests/1.

Open a Merge Request / Pull Request to fix upstream code Due to the high quality requirements in Debian, it is fairly common that while doing the initial Debian packaging of an open source project, issues are found that stem from the upstream source code. While it is possible to carry extra patches in Debian, it is not good practice to deviate too much from upstream code with custom Debian patches. Instead, the Debian packager should try to get the fixes applied directly upstream. Using git-buildpackage patch queues is the most convenient way to make modifications to the upstream source code so that they automatically convert into Debian patches (stored at debian/patches), and can also easily be submitted upstream as any regular git commit (and rebased and resubmitted many times over). First, decide if you want to work out of the upstream development branch and later cherry-pick to the Debian packaging branch, or work out of the Debian packaging branch and cherry-pick to an upstream branch. The example below starts from the upstream development branch and then cherry-picks the commit into the git-buildpackage patch queue:
shell
git checkout -b bugfix-branch master
nano entr.c
make
./entr # verify change works as expected
git commit -a -m "Commit title" -m "Commit body"
git push # submit upstream
gbp pq import --force --time-machine=10
git cherry-pick <commit id>
git commit --amend # extend commit message with DEP-3 metadata
gbp buildpackage -uc -us -b
./entr # verify change works as expected
gbp pq export --drop --commit
git commit --amend # Write commit message along lines "Add patch to .."
The example below starts by making the fix on a git-buildpackage patch queue branch, and then cherry-picking it onto the upstream development branch:
shell
gbp pq import --force --time-machine=10
nano entr.c
git commit -a -m "Commit title" -m "Commit body"
gbp buildpackage -uc -us -b
./entr # verify change works as expected
gbp pq export --drop --commit
git commit --amend # Write commit message along lines "Add patch to .."
git checkout -b bugfix-branch master
git cherry-pick <commit id>
git commit --amend # prepare commit message for upstream submission
git push # submit upstream
The key git-buildpackage commands to enter and exit the patch-queue mode are:
shell
gbp pq import --force --time-machine=10
gbp pq export --drop --commit
%% init:   'gitGraph':   'mainBranchName': 'debian/latest'      %%
gitGraph
checkout debian/latest
commit id: "Initial packaging"
branch patch-queue/debian/latest
checkout patch-queue/debian/latest
commit id: "Delete debian/patches/..."
commit id: "Patch 1 title"
commit id: "Patch 2 title"
commit id: "Patch 3 title"
These can be run at any time, regardless if any debian/patches existed prior, or if existing patches applied cleanly or not, or if there were old patch queue branches around. Note that the extra -b in gbp buildpackage -uc -us -b instructs to build only binary packages, avoiding any nags from dpkg-source that there are modifications in the upstream sources while building in the patches-applied mode.

Programming-language specific dh-make alternatives As each programming language has its specific way of building the source code, and many other conventions regarding the file layout and more, Debian has multiple custom tools to create new Debian source packages for specific programming languages. Notably, Python does not have its own tool, but there is an dh_make --python option for Python support directly in dh_make itself. The list is not complete and many more tools exist. For some languages, there are even competing options, such as for Go there is in addition to dh-make-golang also Gophian. When learning Debian packaging, there is no need to learn these tools upfront. Being aware that they exist is enough, and one can learn them only if and when one starts to package a project in a new programming language.

The difference between source git repository vs source packages vs binary packages As seen in earlier example, running gbp buildpackage on the Entr packaging repository above will result in several files:
entr_5.6-1_amd64.changes
entr_5.6-1_amd64.deb
entr_5.6-1.debian.tar.xz
entr_5.6-1.dsc
entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz
entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz.asc
The entr_5.6-1_amd64.deb is the binary package, which can be installed on a Debian/Ubuntu system. The rest of the files constitute the source package. To do a source-only build, run gbp buildpackage -S and note the files produced:
entr_5.6-1_source.changes
entr_5.6-1.debian.tar.xz
entr_5.6-1.dsc
entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz
entr_5.6.orig.tar.gz.asc
The source package files can be used to build the binary .deb for amd64, or any architecture that the package supports. It is important to grasp that the Debian source package is the preferred form to be able to build the binary packages on various Debian build systems, and the Debian source package is not the same thing as the Debian packaging git repository contents.
flowchart LR
git[Git repository<br>branch debian/latest] --> gbp buildpackage -S  src[Source Package<br>.dsc + .tar.xz]
src --> dpkg-buildpackage  bin[Binary Packages<br>.deb]
If the package is large and complex, the build could result in multiple binary packages. One set of package definition files in debian/ will however only ever result in a single source package.

Option to repackage source packages with Files-Excluded lists in the debian/copyright file Some upstream projects may include binary files in their release, or other undesirable content that needs to be omitted from the source package in Debian. The easiest way to filter them out is by adding to the debian/copyright file a Files-Excluded field listing the undesired files. The debian/copyright file is read by uscan, which will repackage the upstream sources on-the-fly when importing new upstream releases. For a real-life example, see the debian/copyright files in the Godot package that lists:
debian
Files-Excluded: platform/android/java/gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar
The resulting repackaged upstream source tarball, as well as the upstream version component, will have an extra +ds to signify that it is not the true original upstream source but has been modified by Debian:
godot_4.3+ds.orig.tar.xz
godot_4.3+ds-1_amd64.deb

Creating one Debian source package from multiple upstream source packages also possible In some rare cases the upstream project may be split across multiple git repositories or the upstream release may consist of multiple components each in their own separate tarball. Usually these are very large projects that get some benefits from releasing components separately. If in Debian these are deemed to go into a single source package, it is technically possible using the component system in git-buildpackage and uscan. For an example see the gbp.conf and watch files in the node-cacache package. Using this type of structure should be a last resort, as it creates complexity and inter-dependencies that are bound to cause issues later on. It is usually better to work with upstream and champion universal best practices with clear releases and version schemes.

When not to start the Debian packaging repository as a fork of the upstream one Not all upstreams use Git for version control. It is by far the most popular, but there are still some that use e.g. Subversion or Mercurial. Who knows maybe in the future some new version control systems will start to compete with Git. There are also projects that use Git in massive monorepos and with complex submodule setups that invalidate the basic assumptions required to map an upstream Git repository into a Debian packaging repository. In those cases one can t use a debian/latest branch on a clone of the upstream git repository as the starting point for the Debian packaging, but one must revert the traditional way of starting from an upstream release tarball with gbp import-orig package-1.0.tar.gz.

Conclusion Created in August 1993, Debian is one of the oldest Linux distributions. In the 32 years since inception, the .deb packaging format and the tooling to work with it have evolved several generations. In the past 10 years, more and more Debian Developers have converged on certain core practices evidenced by https://trends.debian.net/, but there is still a lot of variance in workflows even for identical tasks. Hopefully, you find this post useful in giving practical guidance on how exactly to do the most common things when packaging software for Debian. Happy packaging!

17 May 2025

Daniel Lange: Polkitd (Policy Kit Daemon) in Trixie ... getting rid of "Authentication is required to create a color profile"

On the way to Trixie, polkitd (Policy Kit Daemon) has lost the functionality to evaluate its .pkla (Polkit Local Authority) files.
$ zcat /usr/share/doc/polkitd/NEWS.Debian.gz 
policykit-1 (121+compat0.1-2) experimental; urgency=medium
  This version of polkit changes the syntax used for local policy rules:
  it is now the same JavaScript-based format used by the upstream polkit
  project and by other Linux distributions.
  System administrators can override the default security policy by
  installing local policy overrides into /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/*.rules,
  which can either make the policy more restrictive or more
  permissive. Some sample policy rules can be found in the
  /usr/share/doc/polkitd/examples directory. Please see polkit(8) for
  more details.
  Some Debian packages include security policy overrides, typically to
  allow members of the sudo group to carry out limited administrative
  actions without re-authenticating. These packages should install their
  rules as /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d/*.rules. Typical examples can be
  found in packages like flatpak, network-manager and systemd.
  Older Debian releases used the "local authority" rules format from
  upstream version 0.105 (.pkla files with an .desktop-like syntax,
  installed into subdirectories of /etc/polkit-1/localauthority
  or /var/lib/polkit-1/localauthority). The polkitd-pkla package
  provides compatibility with these files: if it is installed, they
  will be processed at a higher priority than most .rules files. If the
  polkitd-pkla package is removed, .pkla files will no longer be used.
 -- Simon McVittie   Wed, 14 Sep 2022 21:33:22 +0100
This applies now to the polkitd version 126-2 destined for Trixie. The most prominent issue is that you will get an error message: "Authentication is required to create a color profile" asking for the root(!) password every time you remotely log into a Debian Trixie system via RDP, x2go or the like. This used to be mendable with a .pkla file dropped into /etc/polkit-1/localauthority/50-local.d/ ... but these .pkla files are void now and need to be replace with a Javascript "rules" file. The background to his is quite a fascinating read ... 13 years later:
https://davidz25.blogspot.com/2012/06/authorization-rules-in-polkit.html The solution has been listed in DevAnswers as other distros (Fedora, ArchLinux, OpenSuse) have been faster to depreciate the .pkla files and require .rules files. I amended the solution given there with checking for root to be automatically authenticated, too. So, create a 50-color-manager.rules file in /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/:
polkit.addRule(function(action, subject)
if (action.id.startsWith("org.freedesktop.color-manager.") && (subject.isInGroup("users") (subject.user == "root")))
return polkit.Result.YES;

);
and run systemctl restart polkit. You should be good until polkit is rewritten in Rust.

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